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RUSSIA IN THE CHANGING WORLD

(ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL PROCESSES)

The correlation between the trends to disintegration and integration of various state entities is one of the key problems of the contemporary historic process. The significant historic action unfolds before our eyes on the territory of the Eurasian continent: the instant, judging by the historic period of time, destruction of multinational states and emergence on their debris of the transnational statehood of new type – the European Community.

The disintegration of the USSR remained a single phenomenon not for a long time. Yugoslavia went to pieces accompanied by bloody events; later Czechia and Slovakia went apart with dignity of a married couple of intellectuals. Very soon we shall see on the political map of Balkans lonely Serbia left by Montenegro and the Republic of Kosovo. But has the disintegration potential been reduced to nothing?

Many experts in our country and abroad think that the necrosis of the political structure of the Russian Federation continues after disintegration of the Soviet Empire. The North Caucasus is kept only under partial control by the Center; Muslim Tatarstan acquires greater economic and political self-dependence; the Far Eastern region is oriented more to Japan and China than to Moscow; the Kaliningrad region is being rapidly integrated in the West-European space. Georgia is in the process of losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Against a background of disintegration of state entities, one can see the totally opposing trend – the rapid process of development of the European Union and of NATO. The primitive Union of Coal and Steel, created after the war, gradually transformed itself into the European Union, a transnational organization with all attributes of statehood: the constitution (Lisbon treaty), the presidency (the Chairman of the European Union), the government (the European Commission), the single currency (euro), and in the nearest future – the armed forces. This process not only intensifies but also extends. Z. Brzezinski remarks that only for the post-Soviet period this process enters its third stage. The first, Warsaw stage was connected with direct geo-strategic consequences of cold war and envisaged rapid entry in NATO of Poland, Czechia and Hungary; the second, Vilnius stage was connected with almost simultaneous and geographically coincided decision on extension of NATO and European Union at the expense of, consequently, seven and ten new states; the further (Kiev?) round may be directed to the East, to Ukraine and, probably, to the Caucasus and, finally, to Russia to be accepted by NATO.

In which way is it possible to explain this simultaneous development of seemingly mutually exclusive trends to disintegration and integration?

It is necessary to recall theory of civilizations to respond to this question. One should remember the names of scientists, who developed this theory: Max Weber, F. Braudel, O. Schpengler, A. Toynbee and S. Huntington as the author of the work “Clashes of Civilizations”. According to these views, the historic process is perceived as the chain consisting of the links, local entities – civilizations, united by common cultural kernel. The civilizations represent cultural entities, based on values, norms, mentality, religion, world outlook. They may consist of one or several state or political entities. They may possess the common

territory or may be located simultaneously in several continents. For the period of their existence, they may migrate jointly with the bearers of their common culture, like in North and South America. Civilization communities are the systems, which remain intact for a long time and are more sustainable than any other social-political entities, for instance, national states and particularly empires, especially if the latter include ethnic elements of different civilizations. S. Huntington enumerates seven civilizations: Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American, Islamic, Western and Orthodox. Many modern geopolitical processes become evident within the framework of such approach.

From the point of view of the civilization theory, any empire, consisting of elements of different civilizations, will collapse sooner or later. The break of imperial links should occur on the lines of civilization borders. Just this process characterized the collapse of the Roman Empire in the ancient world, of the Ottoman Empire and the Austria-Hungarian Empire in modern time and, finally the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia at the present time.

The disintegration of the USSR as a historic descendent of the Russian Empire may be regarded in this context as a typical example. The Baltic peoples as the bearers of Western civilization left the USSR at the initial stage, they were followed by the peoples, who belong to Islamic civilization (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan). The situation was more complicated in case of Ukraine and Belarus. After separation they remained satellites of the mother country for a long time. But the western dominant overcomes in Ukraine, and the painful self-identification of the country goes on as a part of Western civilization. And political re-orientation follows it. Belarus demonstrates an example of Orthodox mentality and, probably, is doomed to remain within the zone of Russian attraction for a long time. The painful disintegration of Yugoslavia demonstrates the same

trends. Imperial Orthodox Serbia was separated from Catholic Croatia and Slavonia, later from Islamic Bosnia and Kosovo. Montenegro, like Belarus, maintains special relations with the former mother country.

The actually simultaneous collapse of multinational states in the end of the XX century has its specific social-historic reasons. The Russian Empire was formed in the XV–XVI centuries, when Moscow centralized state directed its expansion to the east, acquired Kazan and Astrakhan khanates and started colonization of Siberia. Later, for the XVIII century, in times of Peter and Catherine, the territories in the north-west near the Baltic Sea and in the south-west along the coast of the Black Sea were included in the Empire, and in the XIX century the North Caucasus was conquered. The Empire included the territories of western and Islamic civilizations. The main force of this expansion was the rapidly growing population. In terms of rates of population growth, Russia surpassed any West European country; for two centuries (1750–1950) the population increased 9.7 times within the borders of the RF, while in Great Britain – 7 times, Germany – 5 times, France – 3 times. This circumstance pre-determined for centuries the chance for permanent migration flow from the European part of the country to the east and to the south. The constant expansion as a means of throwing out the growing internal energy was the way of existence of any empire, including the Russian Empire.

The situation started to change in the beginning of the 1970s, when the quality break took place in the direction of inter-republican migration flows: Russia became the republic accepting population. The main outflow of Russians took place in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics. Observers of this return flow of Russians might interpret it as the beginning of the end of the Russian Empire.

The two reasons of the migration flows' change may be cited. One reason is connected with internal changes in the center of the empire, while the other – with the changes in the colonial distant regions. As a result of industrialization for the 1930s–1950s and the related urbanization, the greater part of the Russian Federation's population was concentrated in the cities (in 1993 the share of the urban population made 73%). This process covered mainly the economically most developed regions, where the main part of the population, belonged to the orthodox culture, was concentrated. The demographic reproduction of the urban population differs from the demographic reproduction of the rural population. The birth rate of the urban population rapidly decreases, and the problem of simple reproduction is put on the agenda. The demographic problems aggravated in time of the systemic crisis and degradation of social and economic institutions of the state for the 1980s in the USSR. The death rate was raised, while the average longevity started to reduce. For the first time, the negative tempos of the population increase was fixed in the Russian Federation in 1992 and continued to rise rapidly. The reduction of the population in the mother land makes impossible not only maintenance of its inflow to colonies but also execution of efficient military control over them, since the fall of birth rate results inevitably in reduction of the size of the army, in degradation of its quality composition.

The other reason of return migration is connected with development of colonial distant regions. The growth of economy and rise of education lead to formation of national elites comprehending their civilization identity. The process was started to push out “new comers from the mother country” from the key posts in governance, education and economy. The myth of formation of a new social community, called “Soviet people”, disappeared. The disintegration of the empire became inevitable. The destruction of the Soviet Union took

place along the lines of administrative inter-republican borders. Is it possible to consider this process to be finished? The answer to this question may be rather negative than positive, taking into account the above logic. It refers at least to the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

On 1 January 2010, the population of the Russian Federation accounted for 142.2 millions. In 2007 an astonishing report was made public: the population of Russia reduces annually by 1.0-0.7 million people and in 50 years may be reduced twice. At the same time, the reduction of the population goes on mainly at the expense of the Russian ethnos, while the Muslim population grows in mainly rural regions. The birth rate in the Central economic region makes 1.5 children for one woman, while in Dagestan – 2.9 children for one woman; the simple reproduction demands not less than 2.3 children for one woman. Can this fact avoid negative impact on keeping integrity of the state?

Aspiring for ideological substantiation of national unity, the authorities make an attempt to incorporate notion “Russian nation” in the political lexicon. But may there exist such nation in principle or is it the same myth like “Soviet people”? Let us answer this question, leaving aside the present political conjuncture, basing on contemporary ethnology (cultural and social anthropology). In this respect, it is necessary to study the connection between notions of ethnos and nation. It is evident that we live in the poly-ethnic country. But can the united nation be formed on the basis on many ethnos and on this basis create the sustainable national state? In principle, yes, and there were such historic examples. France and certainly Switzerland are such states in Europe.

The French nation at the stage of its formation included Italian speaking Corsicans, German speaking people in Alsace-Lorraine, Bretons, Basks. But Switzerland is the most evident example of the

poly-ethnic nation – Swiss nation. It consists of at least four ethnoses: German-Swiss, French-Swiss, Italian-Swiss and Reto-Roman. For the process of the long-term development these ethnoses integrated in the so-called socio-nation, based not on affiliation with the united ethnos, like in Germany, but on perception by the population of common social-economic aims and moral-ethnic values.

However, the European and the North-American experience give us other examples, when seemingly poly-ethnic nations suddenly start to disintegrate. The most urgent example is Belgium. Formerly only one nation existed in the country - the Belgian nation. The Wallons and the Flemish were only ethnoses. At present they have become ethno-nations. The process goes on, called by professor Y. Semenov as a nation making ethnoses, which finally may result in national “divorce” and separation of the poly-ethnic country. In any case, for the last two decades Belgium goes on through an acute national-political crisis. The same problems confront: Great Britain in relations with the Scottish separatism, Spain for the long-term war against Basks, Canada having almost lost at the referendum on separation the province of Quebec. This list may be enlarged by including the closest example, connected with separation from Georgia of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Probably, a new historic process has started: the acceleration of nation making out of ethnoses and emergence on this basis of new national states. The fundamental reason of this process, in the author’s view, is globalization, which allows separate ethnic groups, striving for national self-dependence, to base themselves on the economic, information and political infrastructure of the contemporary world. It should be noted that all cited examples concern nation making by ethnoses belonging to the western civilization. What may be said about sustainability of poly-ethnic states, uniting ethnoses of “conflicting” civilizations?

What are the perspectives of creation of “the Russian nation”? The most spectacular sign of the level of integration of ethnos in the united nation is recognition of the state language, Russian, in this case, to be a native language. According to the census of the population in 1989, out of 534 thousand Jews 90.5% of respondents consider Russian as their native language, out of 5.5 million Tatars – only 14.2%, out of 1.4 million Bashkirs – 22.3%, out of 1 million Chechens – 1.1%, out of 600 thousand Avars – 1.6%. One may easily predict the place of “construction” of the new Russian nation. The Chechen war shows weakness of the new myth. Evidently, for the mid-term period, Russia in all probability will lose the North Caucasus, like it has lost actually Chechnya, left by the Russian population, while the control over internal social-economic processes is given to one of the local clans. Less probable is the perspective of exit out the Russian Federation of Tatarstan, with due account of its geographic location and the level of integration of its population. It is sufficient to say that 68% of Tatars live outside their own republic. In this case, the matter will be limited to further extension of its autonomous rights.

It is worth making remarks about European integration. The present unification of European countries makes a great impression thanks to its newness particularly against a background of the collapse of the Soviet Empire. This process is the passage from the industrial union of several states to the real proto-state structure, which actually takes a form of European confederation, consisting of twenty seven states. This is the result of economic globalization, which demands extension of markets and their coordinated regulation. It does not contradict the civilization approach to the analysis of geopolitical processes.

First, most Europeans are convinced that the construction of the Union should be based on the common Christian heritage. Therefore

the date of fixed obligation to let Muslim Turkey enter the European Union has been delayed for a long time.

Second, the creation of the UE does not liquidate national peculiarities and contradictions among its member-states, while due to these circumstances the UE may become a not adequately integrated or in general a short-lived entity.

The same demographic reasons determine the specific trends of the growing crisis within the framework of the European Union, although they might seem to be paradoxical. Urbanization resulted in absolute reduction of the number of title nations in most European countries. In its turn, this fact resulted in shortage of labor force for stable and developing economy. The Old Europe may compensate the deficit of labor force at the expense of two sources – the Afro-Asian environment and new “volunteers” coming to the European Union from the Eastern Europe. The expansion of the European Union to the east to a large extent is determined by the interest to the labor force of the post-Soviet countries. However, this is a short-lived source. For the next decade, the capacity of migration flows from the east to the west will expire, since demography of the Eastern Europe is characterized by the same trends, which exist in the Western Europe, while the difference in level of living is being leveled.

The situation in the North Africa and Turkey is marked by the sustainable original flows: from Maghreb countries – to France and Italy, from Turkey – to Balkans, Germany and Netherlands. The question is that the migrants from these countries are the bearers of the other civilization culture. For the last years, the events in France connected with acute conflicts between a small part of the Arabic immigrants and the indigenous population clearly showed that further augmentation of the Muslim component may not only result in aggravation of inter-civilization conflicts but also creates the threat to

preservation of national identity of this country. The similar problems emerge also in other countries of the Western Europe, for instance, in Germany with its great Turkish Diaspora. More often the frequent voices are heard in Old Europe, pronounced by those, who put this issue to the foreground. The most spectacular manifestation of supporters of national identity became the book “Fury and Pride”, written by Italian journalist O. Fallachi. Bringing to a head the problem of clash between Islamic and Christian cultural values, Fallachi writes: “The problem will hold true, even if Usama bin Laden dies or becomes a Catholic. I will repeat again that Usama bin Laden and his adepts represent only a modern expression of the trend, which is ignored by the West, having done a stupid thing or cynically shutting its eyes. Settle into shape! In 1982, I saw them demolishing Catholic churches, setting crucifixes to fire, dirtying icons, urinating on altars, transforming chapels into lavatories. I saw them in Beirut. Beirut before their coming there was so happy, so rich, so refined. Today Beirut is a poor copy of Damask or Islamabad”. The above mentioned trends will inevitably lead to aggravation of disputes among countries of the European Union on the issues of migration policy and will result in undermining of a key foundation of the EU – the common labor market, as many experts think. The failure to adopt the Constitution of the European Union and the substitution of it by the Lisbon treaty represents an evident example of objective limitations of integration processes in Europe. When the Muslim community becomes a voting majority in France, this country will leave the European Union by 2020, while Great Britain and Germany will follow it, concludes Russian political scientist S. Pereslegin, being an exponent of extreme European skepticism.

All the above mentioned contradictions create objective limitations in the sphere of European integration. These limitations are

determined by the needs to keep national identities. What conclusions may be made?

For the last decades, the acceleration of nation making out of ethnoes continues and the corresponding instability of poly-ethnic states grows.

The state structures including big ethnoes, belonging to different civilizations, lack vital capacity within the great historic periods and collapse inevitably.

The disintegration of the USSR was caused by the specific reasons, such as depopulation of the indigenous population of the mother country and the urge of the population of union republics towards civilization and national self-identification against a background of collapse of the Soviet social-economic model.

Globalization of contemporary economy creates conditions and needs in development of transnational coordinating organizations up to providing them with some part of the rights of their member-states.

The transnational integration attains the highest level within the framework of individual civilizations. The integration processes within the framework of western civilization resulted in formation of a rather sustainable transnational entity of the confederation type – the European Union; however, the attempted inclusion in the EU of Turkey, which belongs to the Islamic civilization, may greatly aggravate its internal contradictions.

The transnational integration even within the framework of common civilization has rigid limitations, created by the demands of preservation of national identity as one of the key social values of the contemporary world. These limitations lead to the growth of internal conflicts in the process of European integration and due to rising European skepticism.

*“Politika i bizness v menyayushchemsya mire”,
Obninsk, 2010, p. 6-14.*

Eldar Kasayev,

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POLITICIZATION OF ISLAM IN RUSSIA

For the last time, the clergy of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and a number of other Islamic states greatly intensified their missionary activities on the territory of Russia. The general consolidation of Islamic fundamentalism in the compact settlements of Muslims in the North Caucasus, in the Volga Basin and in Ural is one of the consequences of these activities.

First of all, the religious renaissance resulted in a big growth of the infrastructure. For the last years, only in Tatarstan over a thousand mosques were built, in Dagestan – over two thousand (according to unofficial data – up to five thousand) mosques, in Bashkortostan – about six hundred mosques.

The national system of religious Islamic education is unable to train rapidly qualified cadres, but the holy places can not be left unoccupied, and they have to be imported. These “unlicensed foreign deliveries” mainly from the Near and the Middle East cause concern not only of the authorities but also of Muslims themselves. Why?

It seems that the foreign assistance in building mosques, publishing religious literature, training clergy cadres, creating education institutions had given essential support to Russian Muslims to master spiritual-moral values and theological foundations of Islam.

However, some international Islamic organizations, rendering assistance to Muslims in Russia, due to their rather great politicization carried out propaganda not only of Islamic values but also of the idea that, performing their religious duty they should struggle for independence and, consequently, for creation of a sovereign Islamic state within Russia.

With due account of prognoses that by the year of 2030 the number of Muslims in Russia may account for 30 million people and that the rapidly developing Arabic countries would create a mighty stronghold for rendering further greater assistance to Muslims in Russia, it is worth taking into account the probable type of modernization.

Some prominent representatives of the public circles see that the skew between the growth of Muslim population in Russia and, on the contrary, the depopulation of its other part creates a threat of geopolitical catastrophe, when the Islamic region Idel-Ural (the Volga Basin) will split Russia and divide it in half. To prevent such occurrence, political scientist S. Gradirovsky is engaged in elaboration of project “Russian Islam”, proceeding from the prerequisite of the growing role of Islam in Russia and also of the need to get on with the representatives of this confession for consolidation of the state integrity. It is sufficient to recall that for the period of 1992–1994 on the territory of Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan and Bashkortostan, the Islamic organizations of Saudi Arabia created for the youth the camps to propagate fundamentalist trends of Islam.

In particular, the idea of creation of the Islamic state, based on shariat, provides for the needed exit of Muslim regions from the Russian Federation and for establishment by them of the confederation or the federation with orientation to Islamic countries. The Pan-Turkic idea to re-create “the state of Great Turan”, including the territory of contemporary Islamic states of Asia, Middle and Near East, divide some organizations and nationalist movements in the republics of the North Caucasus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Dissemination of this ideology may promote creation of antagonism in relations among different groups of population and confessions of Russian society.

The politicization of Islam, alien to traditional Islam in Russia, not only engenders a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation but also nourishes Islamic radicalism and extremism, as well as negates the secular character of the state.

It is worth mentioning in this respect that the Russian legislation contains the provisions, which do not provide for participation of religious organizations in elections relating to the state organs and organs of local self-government, as well as for taking part in activities of political parties and political movements, for rendering them material and other assistance. The measures aimed at consolidation of the state control over observance of this legislative norm by all religious organizations, including Muslim organizations, might contribute to restrain politicization of Islam in Russia.

Will the legislation be able to stop the Islamic ideology and its adepts? What will be the future of Muslim regions in Russia? How powerful is “Islamic threat” for the Russian state?

One may put many questions, but one thing is clear for sure. There are two possible options of modernization via Islamic fundamentalism: to become a target for radical Muslims of the whole world or to transform into a friendly country ready for dialogue of cultures. Islam as one of the world religions propagates also in Russia humanism, humility, considers general human values as the most important qualities, calls up for piety and righteous way of life, observance of ethic and moral imperatives. President D. Medvedev, congratulating all Muslims of Russia with festivity Uraza-bairam, truly noted some unshakable values of Islam: charity, aspiration for creation, care for relatives. The head of the state also expressed the hope that Muslims will further thoroughly preserve traditions of faith, promote development of fruitful inter-confessional dialogue. D. Medvedev at the higher level came forward for tolerant and confidential relations of

Muslims with representatives of other religions. On 12 November 2009, presenting his traditional address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the president stressed that the people of different nationalities and confessions, living in Russia, should have a chance for the valuable joint relations. The head of the state made the following remark concerning the region of the North Caucasus: “The Russian authorities will do all possible to make happy life for people in the North Caucasus. As far as those, who will hinder us, is concerned, we will look into it.”

It is a great comfort that in the XXI century the spiritual life of millions of adepts of traditional Islam in many regions becomes more rich and diverse, while their input in strengthening of public consent and mutual understanding among peoples of the united Motherland becomes more significant. However, ideology of Islamism often is constructed on the pseudo-Islamic religious values. First, growing contemporary Russian Islamism is inherent in most shortcomings. In particular, it concerns contradictions in ideology and heterogeneity of convictions, which result in imperfection and illogicality of its certain norms. Second, this circumstance makes it possible to conclude that the political leaders may apply only those aspects of shariat, which are advantageous for one or other situations. In this case Islamic fundamentalism presents itself not as a religious but as a political movement, which urges towards coming to power by any means, including the forceful overthrow of the legitimate Russian power.

The Muslim umma in Russia is split: the Volga Basin, the Ural, the republics of the North Caucasus, characterized by antagonist feelings. These regions have suffered from numerous internal contradictions and conflicts, related to the Islamic factor. The authorities lack the united approach to this circumstance. Some officials consider that the split is an advantage, since it makes possible act

according to the well-known principle “divide and rule”. The other officials are convinced that it would be better to follow the example of Catherine II, who after some mutinies of Muslims united them and established in Orenburg the Muslim Department and in this way put the Muslim confession under state control and stopped dissemination of Islamism.

What position will prevail today? In the author’s opinion, the key for overcoming the recurrences of Islamic fundamentalism, aggravated against a background of demographic augmentation of the number of Muslims and connected with the world financial crisis and social-economic problems, should be looked for not in the direct struggle against it as a certain materialized evil, but in the development of Russian economy and in amelioration of the level of living of the citizens. Only these actions, taken by the federal and the regional power, are able first “to preserve” and further, probably, to level completely the negative displays of Islamism on the territory of Muslims regions in Russia.

“Vestnik analitiki”, M., 2010, N 3, p. 41–58.

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TRENDS OF ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS

DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES OF RUSSIA

The post-Soviet period was marked by the stage of ethnic feelings’ growth of peoples in Russia and of their ethnic consciousness’ development. The direction of these processes was shown by such evident indicator (to a large extent characteristic for other ethnic groups) as the change in mass consciousness of Turkic peoples, living

in Russia. The reconstruction itself was accepted by many representatives of Turkic ethnic groups as “national liberation”, a chance to obtain state sovereignty. Under this slogan the national elites unleashed mass movement for raising the status of their national republics and entities, for solving problems with obligatory account of “national question”.

The representatives of Turkic peoples, living in Russia, note that worried trends grow within their ethnic groups:

- the reduction of the share of the people, who consider the language of their nation as their native language, great reduction of the sphere of the native language’s use;

- the poor chance for getting high special and higher education in the native language, great reduction of chances for national education in the native language;

- the great reduction of the number of people, who acquire the values of national culture;

- the reduction of the level of development of national cultures and the number of national fiction books;

- the essential diminishing of the share of people, who know and observe national rites, habits and traditions;

- the appearance within ethnoses of considerable number of people with national nihilistic consciousness and others.

Comparing these conclusions of ideologists of Turkic national elites with the processes going on in contemporary ethnic consciousness of Russians, it is possible to see that both Turkic and Slavonic peoples are involved in the process of ethnic disintegration. At the same time, the main reason of self-disintegration of nations is proclaimed to be not an internal but the external factor – “alien” nations are to blame: for Russians – “from the south” (“Caucasians”, “Turks” and others) and “from the west” (Americans, Jews and others) ethnic

groups; for Turkic peoples (particularly for ethnic elites) – often Russian themselves. It is characteristic that most non-Russian peoples do not possess the complex of “defeat delivered by the West” and do not regard “the West” as an enemy. They consider destruction of the Soviet Union as a defeat of Russia and Russians (being “over them”) and as a chance to create a new life of their nation. If something fails in the construction of national state, the stereotype of mass consciousness works – “Russians are to blame”.

Unlike Russians, many “small peoples” were keen on ethnic history, got interested in their cultural-historic heritage. There were created might ideological trends, called in the works of some western researchers as “mirasism” (“miras” – heritage). The new, “genuine” history of their own peoples often is presented as “the centuries of struggle for freedom” against the Russian state (by official ideologists) or against “the Russians as a whole” (by nationalists). Rafael Khakim, a contemporary Tatarian philosopher described it in the following characteristic way: “For more than four centuries of oppression, directed not simply to exploitation of the nation, but also to its assimilation and even physical annihilation, the Tatars stood up, survived and in full forces are ready to become an integral part of the world civilization”. He puts the question: “What the Tatars wait to get from Russia, from Russia, which kept them in fear, was the source of humiliation and oppression of the nation? The Tatars do not need privileges. Freedom and equality of rights – that will do...” Do Russians understand such statement of a question? It is not likely. Many Russians are convinced that the Russian people “have led” from “the pre-historic abyss” many peoples, living in Russia, to “the civilized world”, “gave” them their technical achievements, the well-being, language, culture and a lot of other things. The attempts “to review the history of peoples of Russia”, to make “multinational” – the

education system, culture, mass media, the whole state apparatus, to change the status of the Russian language a the sole state language and to change many other things (initiated repeatedly, for instance, by Tatarian public organizations), which give rise to sustainable feelings of dislike and enmity of the Russians. For the post-Soviet time, the ethnic consolidation of Turkic (on the one side) and Slavonic peoples (on the other side) goes on according to these signs.

Most representatives of non-Russian peoples in Russia feel their ethnic consolidation to a much greater extent than the Russians themselves. The sociological surveys testify to it. The respondents-representatives of the title ethnic groups in the list of “factors of confidence” gave the answer - “the support of the family, relatives, friends” to the question: “What gives you the sense of confidence in the future?” The first place in the responses, given by Russians to the same question, was the answer – “the ability to earn” (Tatarstan) and “gives nothing” (Yakutia, Tuva), which shows their pessimism.

D. Gorovits, a known conflictologist, having studied in the beginning of the 1990s the Russian realities and basing on the international experience, made the prognosis on development of inter-groups conflicts in the republics, opposing the federal center, particularly, in Tatarstan for the period of 1993–1994. Actually, in the end of the 1980s – the beginning of the 1990s, the elite of Tatarstan in the sphere of ideology and politics was waging the struggle for a new status of the republic: initially, for the status of the union republic and further for a status, which resembles the status of Puerto-Rico, maintaining associated relations with the USA. The elite of Yakutia, having established its national organizations, arranged the ethnic mobilization in support of the idea of the right for a special access to the resources, for the priority in the cultural-information space. Tuva lacked this level of ideological pressing, like in the first two republics,

but its ideologists questioned legitimacy of entry of the republic in the USSR and the Russian Federation. In Bashkortostan the ideological mobilization was going on for the right of the status of the union republic and further – the republic with special rights.

The most numerous meetings (from 5 to 50 thousand participants) took place in Tatarstan, where extreme nationalists raised not only slogans against Russia but also against Russian people. Although the authorities reduced the extremists' activities and took into account the small number of them (not more than 2–3%), nevertheless 35% of Russians and 25% of Tatars in 1991 considered the relations as “very tense”, while over half the of both groups “felt the tension”. In 1994, the tension decreased and was felt by 8% of Tatars and 15% of Russians. However, Russians felt tense situation more often 1.5–2 times in Tatarstan, 2.5-3.5 times more often in Sakha (Yakutia) and Tuva than the indigenous peoples.

About 40% of Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan (in 1997) encountered negative examples in the inter-national relations. The share of Russians in this group of people exceeded 60%, and they saw negative examples in “designations for higher posts for the national reason”; 35% of Russians encountered contradictions “in daily life, trade, services”; 20% of Russians sensed “the absence or insufficient participation of Russians in official activities”. The Tatars were mostly dissatisfied with “negative attitude to Tatars” and “oral enmity, expressed to them” (about 35%); and 30% of Tatars were dissatisfied with “disregard to habits, traditions and refusal to learn the language of Tatars; and 20% of Tatars were dissatisfied with nomination to official posts for national reason and with contradictions in daily life, in the sphere of trade and services.

The perceptions on significance of preservation and rebirth of culture greatly divide the ethnic communities. The renaissance and

development of culture in the opinion of Tatars acquires the ethnic and political importance relating to restoration of dignity and equality. This value, occupying the third place, is followed by “consolidation of the republican self-dependence”, which acquires political value. For Russians this political value is “representation of their interests” in the organ of power.

The openness in friendly and family relations for Tatars and Russians in Tatarstan is not less and even a bit more important than between Russians and Ossetians in the North Ossetia-Alania and is much more important than in Tuva between indigenous residents of Tuva and Russians. (Readiness for friendship expressed about 60% of Tatars and over 70% of Russians, and correspondingly they (60%) are ready to be neighbors. Thus, in Tatarstan as a leader of Turkic peoples, as a republic with greater rights, according to the treaty with the Center, given evident ethnic-political conflict with the Center, the psychological distance between the title nationality and the Russians was less than in other republics. Correspondingly, since the middle of the 1990s the inter-national relations were appraised as more favorable in Tatarstan.

The situation in poly-ethnic republics, given rising contradictions with the center, two opposite trends started to display: on the one side, the public dissatisfaction with the Center is being transferred to the local Russian population; on the other side, the official power of the republic and the elite, close to the official circles, aspire for uniting related ethnic communities to oppose the Center. The emerging republican authoritarian political regimes have great chances for development of ethnic-national relations in one or other direction. The viable (“treacherous” and “corrupted”, according to the meaning of many Russians) position, marked by concessions, made by the federal government to the national elites for the 1990s (particularly in the

beginning – “take as much sovereignty, as you can!”), gave the chance to stop development of inter-ethnic conflicts according to the Karabakh or the Yugoslavian variant (except Chechnya, which became an example of probable destiny of our state in case of incorrect appraisal of ethnic factors) and to stabilize the relations among the peoples belonging to the Russian Federation. However, for how long the peoples and the national elites are ready to maintain the existing system of relations?

Certain significant attempts to change the balance were taken. In the end of the 1990s, the leaders of Tatarstan declared that the heed, taken by them, to introduce the Latin alphabet did exist and that they were ready to do it, clearly letting Moscow and the people in the republic understand what is the new target of Turkic peoples in Russia – it was Turkey and related with it entry in their “own” Islamic world. The Russians perceived this movement as a beginning of “the departure of the Tatars “from under” Moscow and out of Russia”. It is significant that ideologists of the passage to the Latin alphabet ignore evident arguments about “the inevitable language split between Tatars of the other regions and Tatars of Tatarstan”, about “the Tatarian literature of the XX century, based on the Cyrillic alphabet, falling into oblivion” etc. Their determination is based on certitude in the need of a new ethnicity of the Tatars in the XXI century – creation of the Pan-Turkic super-ethnos. As a result of the intended change in the contemporary consciousness of some part of Tatars for the period of reforms in the post-Soviet space, they started to consider themselves as a “northern outpost” of the Muslim world and Turkic civilization. The extreme ideologists of the national movement proclaim the need “no only to transform Tatarstan into a state, serving the interests of the whole Tatarian people, but also to create in Eurasia an ex-territorial national governance of the Tatarian nation in the name of the National

Assembly (Milli Majilis)". Some ideologists and organizations ("Tugan tel", "Azatlyk" and others) regard the restoration of the union of the Tatars and Bashkirs as a pivot of the supposed process of Turkic unification in the post-Russian space.

For the period of the 2000s, the Kremlin started to carry out a more rigid policy in relation to regions and in response to "the Tatarian maneuver" proclaimed "consolidation of power vertical" and further "obligation to use the Cyrillic alphabet in all regions". Time will show, in which way is it possible to consolidate "vertical" in a sovereign national republic and what will be the attitude to it on the part of the authorities and the population of this republic. Probably, the Kremlin will have again to recede and for a change of compromise to keep stability, being afraid of division of Russia in two by "Islamic arch" Turkey-Tatarstan. The decisive meaning, turning the scale, may be pronounced by the Russian people, who made a big concession in the end of the XX century. Will they make new concessions further (including the role of the state creating nation), will they agree to the role of "new poor people" in their own country or will the Russians formulate their new demands?

"The Eurasian Tatars" in order to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts propose to establish the Volga Basin Republic – Idel-Ural, where, like in Switzerland, the state creating nations will have completely the same rights. The processes, going on among the Tatars, from the point of view of western ethnology and political science, were studied by French political scientist Jean Rober Ravio, who formulated the main problem in the form of two questions: 1) do we see in Tatarstan "the nation, urged towards becoming a state", or "the state intended to be a nation"? 2) is it possible that Tatarstan will transform into a state without preliminary formation of a "nation" republic?

According to the meaning of the French political scientist, the ruling elite of Tatarstan has chosen the way of constructing “nation”, based on the common character of economic and social interests. In response to this meaning, D.Iskhakov, a researcher of the Institute of History of Tatarstan advanced the thesis on existence in Tatarstan of two national communities – “Tatarian” (“ethnic” as the ethnic-cultural unity) and “Tatarstanian” (“political” as a territorial economic-social community), as well as concerning the further development of Tatarstan – the thesis on the need of “genuine” renaissance and development of ethnic culture, since ethnic Tatarian culture can not revive within “the narrow framework of Russian Orthodox Eurasia”.

Just intensified propagation of ethnicity by representatives of some peoples in Russia, particularly of the Tatars and the Bashkirs, contributed to the known protests against the lack of item “nationality” (the notorious “fifth point”) in new Russian passports. The value of ethnic origin in the consciousness of a number of peoples of Russia greatly surpasses the significance of civil identity.

At the same time, the processes of new ethnoses’ emergence intensified within developing nationalities. For example, among Tatars there were marked the so-called “Bulgarists”, including many enthusiasts, who got after judicial proceedings new passports with mentioned nationality – Bulgar. In Siberia there are people, who formed a movement, aspiring for proclaiming Tatars of Siberia as a self-dependent people and for creating their own republic. In Kazan the baptized Tatars declared their wish to be an independent people – Kryashens. Some Tatars in Astrakhan signed themselves to be Nogai. The representatives of the elite in Tatarstan consider these processes as “artificial”, provoked by “certain forces” in Russia itself (implied “great power state”).

The national movement in Chuvashia emerged in the beginning of the 1990s. Many activists-intellectuals, sharing nationalist feelings, concentrated their activities and substantiation of their political views and positions on the pivotal search of national idea as an ideological doctrine of the movement, regarding religion as an outcome of this search. Great discord became evident in the course of discussions on the role of people's faith for the period before Christian religion as a factor of ethnic consolidation and a basis of the rise of national self-consciousness. At the initial stage of ideological searches and specific actions of intellectuals, the sameness of popular religiousness before Christianity and of the perspectives of nation's development, construction of a sovereign state and its ideology was not questioned. The confessional and ethnic aspects of self-consciousness of the Chuvahis were interpreted as identical notions by analogy and simultaneously were opposed to similar and integral notions "Russian"- "Orthodox" in the national Russian patriotic doctrines. Christianity was associated with Russian, "colonial" religion; the danger of the complete assimilation by Tatars was seen in Islam. The only way out for the ethnic-national consolidation of Chuvashis became conversion to their traditional faith. As the main organizers proposed, Kiremet symbolically and actually should become the temple of the Chuvashi religion and the center of the spiritual development of the nation.

In search of the sense and substance of Chuvashi spirituality, of its present realities the Chuvashi scientists, publicists and students of local lore examined again their historic heritage, religion and myths, making them subject to thorough thinking in contrast to the old conceptions. The national old gods and heroes, former public outstanding figures, devoted not only to the people but also to the genuine Chuvashi faith, were restored in memory of the people.

Seeing in Chuvashis' religiousness to ethnic and moral principles of life, to the basis, forming the national character, psychology and stereotypes of thinking, the researchers once more turned to Kiremet, which in contemporary consciousness became the symbol of recalcitrance, love of freedom, rebelliousness and independence. For instance, quite characteristic in this respect is the review, written by Yu. Yakovlev, on activities of I.N. Yurkin, a known writer, ethnographer and activist of original Chuvashi nationalism, who publicly proclaimed the idea of creating the sovereign state, "magic and cult of Kiremet" is compared with "freedom-loving spirit of Chuvashi faith", "perception of life as an effort of will, close to thinking of Nietzsche", and is connected with formation of national character, "contrary to modesty and sense of proportion". As a symbol of Chuvashi world outlook Kiremet is identified to national philosophy – "Chuvashi idea" and principles of the people's life subjected to destruction for a long time and interpreted as a "death of God" in Chuvashi culture.

The expression – Chuvashi culture is often perceived as liberation of "living spirit of the nation" from artificial hindrances and its development in the forms of Chuvashi ancient religion and myths corresponding to the contemporary context. One more example of such approach is represented by deliberations of I. Dmitriyev, a modern theater critic and producer. For the period from 1992 to 1995, being the peak of activities of the Chuvashi National Congress (CNC), he was in the epicenter of discussions on the problems of restoration of people's religion, in the course of public polemics with the Orthodox Church. He insisted on the need to create the canons of religion on the basis of detailed study of popular rites. He determined the national religion and spirit as "Chuvashi work", which opposes "state work". "Preservation of nation" consists in spiritual development and extension of spiritual

impact on all spheres of life. His pessimistic prognosis for the future of the Chuvashi nation during recession in national movement in 1999 he connected with the people's lack of mastering the value of their religion, with the loss of spiritual unity – “loss of spirit for the Christian and Soviet period”, with “faithlessness” to Chuvashi God Tore and with sinful life of the nation as the deserved punishment. I. Dmitriyev regards as incongruous the arrangement of reconstructed rites, introducing disharmony in people's life, and sees the chance to comprehend the sense of not dissipated spirituality in its correlation with contemporary realities.

Given aspiration of the Chuvashi thinking for substantiation of its unique and original feature due to its historic factors, this thinking, nevertheless, is being shaped on the analogy of Slavonic search for the nation's spirituality in Orthodox religion. The explanation may be found, particularly, in the fact that the first generation of the Chuvashi intellectuals was educated in the traditions of Christian enlightenment. Kiremet will hardly become the temple of Chuvashi national religion under conditions, when the Orthodox Church gains in strength and influence. At the same time, Kiremet rests as a significant symbol of national self-consciousness in contemporary people's world outlook in Chuvashia. Analogous to transfer of people's mentality in the new and widely dispersed Chuvashi word “chavashlakh” (“belonged to Chuvash”), the word “kiremet” concentrates and expresses the people's spirit in national literature and arts, raises interest to ancient times by the youth inclined to myths, promotes dissemination of information on religion and myths through the system of education and mass media. The symbol of the sacred wood has passed from pages of scientific and popular books to contemporary consciousness and from popular creative works – to the symbols of national Flag and State Emblem.

At present, the sacral space of symbols' action is much stronger than their physical meaning. In the perception of national ideologists the constancy of symbols consists in their contradiction: on the one side, as the signs, personifying tradition, permanency, the past and the unchained entities; on the other side, as the negation of the past – regime, social order and establishment of a new order, norms, ideology and national doctrine. The viability of symbols, adjustability and adaptability of different religious and ideological directions, such as Islam, Orthodoxy, atheism and new religious trends, prove not only universality but also ability react to the going on processes and changes of the social sphere – reciprocal action with other cultures and ethnic neighbors, crisis periods in life of the people.

It is necessary to mention that the peoples gradually lose ethnic identity, the chance within the framework of their ethnos adequately to feel and to understand the challenges of the present time. It refers first of all to the small peoples of the North. For the XX century, the ethnic consciousness of Tungus, Yakut, Evenk, Dolgan, Nenets and Nganasan was losing its integrity. Traditions and ethnic culture were disappearing. The loss of identity by peoples of the North was one of the main reasons of hard drinking diffusion. The average life-time of the peoples of the North was reduced to 34 years.

The representatives of Mordovian people speak about the loss of ethnic identity, about a chance in the near future of “dissolution” of Mordva among other peoples. The situation is significant: out of all peoples in the Volga Basin only Mordva is subjected to such intensive assimilation processes. The Mordovian people are scattered in 45 regions of Russia from the Kaliningrad region to the Sakhalin Island, and this factor greatly weakens the consolidation processes and intensifies destructive feelings concerning ethnic perspectives. It is more evident in feelings of Mordovian people, living outside Mordovia.

In many regions of the Volga Basin the Mordovian people, being the indigenous population in this region, make rather small ethnic groups: in Ulyanov region – 61.1 thousand people, in Nizhni Novgorod region – 36.7 thousand people, in Bashkortostan – 31.9 thousand people, in Tatarstan – 28.9 thousand people, in Saratov region – 23.4 thousand people, in Chuvashia – 18.7 thousand people. The representatives of social-cultural organizations note that the Mordovian language is on the stage of disappearance. The number of people speaking the Mordovian language reduces annually. According to the population census of 1989, 30% of the Mordovian people considered Russian as their native language. A rather great part of the Mordovian people think that by means of Erzya and Mokshan languages it is impossible to reap the fruits of the world civilization and that sooner or later these languages will disappear.

The similar processes go on among Ukrainians, living in Russia, Byelorussians, Germans and Jews. They strive for integrating within the nation, which, in their opinions, is mightier and is able efficiently to react to the changes of life and to ethnic challenges; therefore the representatives of these peoples either leave for the historic motherland or are assimilated with Russians.

The ethnic diversity on the territory of the North Caucasus is a long-standing feature of this region, and over hundred indigenous peoples, speaking 90 languages, live here and maintain reciprocal relations. The main groups are as follows: the Dagestani group (Avars, Aguls, Dargins, Laks, Lezgins, Rutuls, Tabasarans, Tskhurs – totally 30 ethnic groups), the Vainakh group (Chechens and Ingushis), the Turkic group (Azerbaijanis, Balkars, Karachais, Nogais, Tatars, Turks and Turkmen), the Abkhaz-Adygeya group (Abazins, Adygs, Kabardins, Cherkess), the Iranian group (Ossetians, Tats, mountainous Jews, Greeks, Koreans and Gipsy). For the post-Soviet time, the new

intentions of ethnic consciousness were displayed here most evidently, resulting in rapid intensification of inter-ethnic contradictions and direct conflicts. For a number of objective and subjective reasons, Chechnya remained and rests the territory of the greatest tension.

At present, the Chechens are at the stage of their historic development, characterized by a high vital energy leading to ethnic expansion. Quite often, in the course of confrontation with traditional values of other ethnic groups just Chechens initiate changes in the shaped ethnic structures and the means of mutual action. The dominant feature of a part of Chechens is the raised level of conflicting behavior and aggressive attitude to the external environment. Under these conditions, the inclination to conflicts, the forceful overcoming of hindrances in solving daily problems of ethnic self-assertion become insurmountable. Thus, Chechnya has become the focus of all anti-Russian feelings and movements in the North Caucasus, the peculiar center of ideological, organizational and economic support of separatist attempts, political aspirations for replacing the economic burden of the crisis on the Central leadership, on Russia and the Russian people as a whole.

At the present time, only Cossacks responded to “the challenge of the Caucasus” by active actions to raise their readiness for mobilization. Cossacks represent actually the sole movement based on the national reason in the Russian speaking subjects of the North Caucasus (Krasnodar krai, Stavropol krai and Rostov region), which aims at achievement of political targets. The idea of “renaissance of the Cossacks community” ceased to be an abstract of mass consciousness and transformed in a significant attempt to start the activities for a change of the ethnic-political situation in the North Caucasus and in Russia as a whole. Ideology of Cossacks community, combining ideas of national patriotism, Slavonic renaissance, community self-

governance, peculiar ethnic center feelings of Cossacks, is able to consolidate the Cossacks community, which proclaimed itself as a self-dependent ethnos (which differs from Russian ethnos). At the same time, the processes of internal division appeared among Cossacks: the division between “the Whites” and “the Reds”, among the local and regional leaders of Cossacks, between Moscow and local leaders of Cossacks.

One should mention the reciprocal enmity among Cossacks and national movements in the North Caucasus. The Cossacks community shares negative attitude actually to all official political leaders and leaders of national movements, to the political aspirations of non-Russian peoples. The heterogeneity of political intentions of the Cossacks community may be explained by syncretism of their ethnic self-identification: on the one side, the Cossacks identify themselves with the Russian speaking population, and, on the other side, they are firmly convinced in their own ethnic specificity. However, in present circumstances, given ethnic passivity of the main part of the Russian population, the Cossacks community becomes more and more the All-Russian and All-Slavonic ethnic, cultural and political phenomenon.

The other direction of appearing dividing marks in mass consciousness of the peoples in the North Caucasus is connected with existence in the republics of bipolar ethnic structure. In the community with sustainable numerous ethnic interests, the rise of polarization of ethnic feelings and consciousness confronts hindrances, and it is difficult to reduce numerous interests to two opposing positions. The existence in the republic of two title nations creates chances for development of ethnic opposition, which resulted in military clashes in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. In Kabardino-Balkaria, where 49 nationalities live, the main problems, threatening unity of the republic, appear between Kabardins and Balkars. The conflicting tension is

determined by the struggle of the main ethnoses for political leadership. In the main, the analogous situation exists in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, although the opposition along the line Karachai-Cherkess is supplemented by intensified activities of Abazins and Cossacks. As a whole, the claims for formation of five separate states were made in the republic. The idea of “national sovereignty” became the central idea, reigned over the minds of the non-Russian peoples of the Caucasus (like among Turkic peoples in the Central Russia). The Chechen, Avars, Ingushis, Dargins, Kabardins and Karachai exert the greatest efforts to realize their ethnos as a “sovereign nation”.

The steady acquisition the status of basic value by ethnicity results in urgent ethnic inequality for many peoples in Russia (gradually including Russians). As mentioned R. Dahrendorf, the ethnic inequality exists in any ethnic space, since the ethnic groups, exactly like all other social groups, form a particular hierarchy. The potential conflict is based in this circumstance.

The direction of a search for the limits of peoples' ethnic area is being consolidated in their mass consciousness. Thus, Russians remark that the ethnic space of Russians surpasses the borders of the political space of Russia, including the northern-eastern part of Estonia, the greater part of the Donetsk region of Ukraine, the northern territories of Kazakhstan and some districts of compact settlement of Russian people. For example, the ethnic space of Lezgins is divided in two between political spaces of the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijani Republic; the ethnic space of Ossetians is divided between territorial limits of Russia and Georgia. Exactly due to this fact it is impossible to make an assertion about absolute “superposition” of the political space on the ethnic space, which, in its turn, leads to the sense and the perception of the emerging situation as a challenge to the ethnos, to appearance of conflicts in the beginning at the level of ethnic

consciousness and further to their transfer to the sphere of ethnic-political relations.

The ethnic-central orientation results in appearance and incorporation into consciousness of some people (at the stage of emergence and development of the nation) of the idea proclaiming exclusiveness and the choice of the people. As a result, the following hierarchy of stereotypes is being constructed: the dominant dichotomy of mass consciousness of non-Russian peoples – “we – the people” differ from “them – Russians” – suddenly is supplemented by the feeling – “we – the peculiar people” differ from “them – ordinary peoples”. The further taken actions to consolidate its exclusive sovereign status among other peoples lead to creation of the ethnic-political hierarchy.

In the post-Soviet space the similar direction of ethnic-political development leads to the rise of the status of the title nation's representative in the national-territorial entities against a background of diminishing of the status of the Russian people (and other peoples). Quite often, this outcome does not depend either on the number correlation between the title people and the Russian population in one or other subject of the Russian Federation, or even on the fact that Russians represent the title people of the state as a whole. Thus, the new ethnic stratification is being constructed, perceived particularly painful in the cases, when the greater in number “national majority” turns out to be at the lower steps of hierarchy for ethnic reason.

The peculiar feature of the beginning of the new millennium was the fact that the challenge addressed to Russians by Chechnya and Tatarstan was felt by representatives of dozens of peoples, preserving themselves as ethnoses. Many ethnic groups, unable to be ready to formulate their national ideas, numerous ethnic groups turned out to accept a challenge: “Whom to support in the raised national

opposition?” Up till present, this issue is more often settled in favor of Russians: neither Chechnya, nor Tatarstan have become the consolidating pivot for emergence of the united Caucasian or Turkic super-ethnos. Given even the lack of a definite urge and actual actions towards preservation of All-Russian consolidation, the Russians probably due to traditions and the past inherent in ethnos continue to keep in the poly-ethnic consciousness the status of the state creating nation and to a large extent to accumulate the rising ethnicity of other groups around themselves.

The confessional distinction of the population is another indication of aggravation of ethnic differences. Republics with traditional Islam are located in the compact way in the North Caucasus. The big Muslim Diaspora and the geographical nearness of Islamic states promote intensification of the political activities carried out by Turkey, Iran and Arabic countries. This factor leads to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the growth of feelings and ideas on the need of creating a united Islamic corridor. The growing influence of Islamic trends became the main threat to stability not only in Russia but also in the whole world. In contemporary society all fundamentalist and radical trends of the Sunni dogmas are called “wahhabism”. However, the Caucasian adepts of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab express protests against this term relating to them. They prefer to name themselves “community of Muslims” (jama’at al-Muslimin), “Salafits” (salafuin) or “brothers” (it is the widely used form of communication in wahhaby communities in the Caucasus). At the same time, the Karachai name them “karasakal” (“black-bearded”) because they do not shave the beards.

“Purification of local Islam” is the first step in consolidation of influence of the so-called “wahhabism” not only in the Caucasus but also in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Mordovia and other

regions. In the opinion of wahhabies, “traditional Russian Islam” is far from being real Islam. The adepts of “pure Islam” regard “traditional Muslims” nearly pagans. And what is more, in the contemporary wahhaby literature there is a special term, which means “new ignorance” (on the analogy of “old ignorance”, which existed before coming of Prophet). As applied to Tatarian Muslims, “new ignorance” is considered as follows: the formerly existed for 1114 years complex of ritual daily public worship; funeral ceremony; rites, connected with funeral pray (reading Koran, devoted to the deceased, arrangement of the ritual redemption of the deceased’s sins – “deur”, giving alms in the cemetery); celebration of Mavlid (birth day of Prophet Muhammad); sanctifying historic-religious memorials, graves of saints and sacred springs; all traditional prays. Wahhabies assert that all these rites were unknown in times of the Prophet and therefore are innovations, which are groundless and unacceptable for Muslims.

However, wahhabies express the greatest irreconcilability to local Sufism and related cult of saints. Wahhabies consider as an indication of the deepest and conceived delusion, polytheism (“shirk”) and disbelief (“kufr”) as follows: worship of sheikhs, zikra, visiting the graves of saint sheikhs (“ziarat”) and many other aspects of the practice, adopted by local tarikats. Wahhabies proclaim as unfaithful all Muslims who do not share their point of view. Wahhabies achieved rather great successes not only in the Caucasus but also in Tatarstan and other regions exactly in the struggle against traditional rites and pushing them out of daily life of the population. At the same time, one should mention the fact that exactly ethnicity actively opposes dissemination of wahhabism in the Caucasus and in other regions of Russia. It is possible to consider it as a definite display and justification and of the theoretical conclusion, made by the author, on diversity of

ethnic and religious processes in mass consciousness, on the opposition between ethnicity and religion.

The military operation in Chechnya, presented by ideologists of separatism as a war of “Christian-Judaic Russia” against Muslims of the Caucasus, contributed to successful penetration of extremist elements into radical fundamentalist ideas. It should be said that the impact of wahhabism on the Caucasus is often overestimated: as wahhabies were regarded those, who actually were not adepts of wahhabism but only used in their aims the extremist interpretation of the wahhaby teaching.

The most dangerous aspect of wahhabism is its postulate on the armed struggle. According to wahhabies, jihad consists in the struggle against internal enemies, i.e. the co-religionists using Islam not “in a wahhaby way”, and against the adherents of another faith – primarily against Christians and Israelites, as well as against the unfaithful and pagans not only in Russia but also in the whole world.

The contemporary wahhabies in the Russian Federation do not represent a certain uniform movement. At present, two main trends have shaped – radical and moderate. The radicals demand the immediate installment of Islamic rule in the North Caucasus and introduction of shariat norms in all Muslim districts. The moderate wing correctly points out that the people are not ready to adopt shariat norms, since most people, considering themselves as Muslims, are not aware of the foundations of their own denomination. They think that first it is necessary to enlighten a generation of Muslims, sincerely striving for living according to shariat norms, while the problem of establishment of Islamic governance should be solved in the future, since the attempts to introduce shariat lack any real basis.

Thus, two main intentions, leading to different directions, were installed in consciousness of Islamic population: ethnic – in the form of

“traditional Islam” and religious – in the form of “pure Islam”. The diversity of these intentions’ development results first in different self-identification and emergence of a conflict in consciousness of Muslims and further in tension caused by clashes of opposite actions, taken by dominant Islamic groups. The stress made on ethnicity leads to further stratification of Turkic and Caucasian peoples, to their aspiration for installment of numerous inter-ethnic borders, to attempted separation of one from the other. The growth of religious influence promotes overcoming the inter-ethnic borders, uniting Turkic-Caucasian ethnic groups in a national-state super-ethnos. The way of “pure Islamic religiousness”, liquidating inter-ethnic contradictions and urging towards maximum elimination of external borders, actually became the start of an offensive against territorial and historic positions of Slavonic-Orthodox and Western-Christian worlds, which raises a conflict at the global scale.

*“Aktualnye voprosy politicheskoi nauki”,
Saratov, 2010, p. 66–82.*

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IMMIGRATION TO MOSCOW: NEW REALITY

For the 1990s, after disintegration of the Soviet Union, the process of mass resettlement of people started from some regions to other regions with more favorable living conditions. Having comprehended the scale of social changes in Russia, inherent in its contemporary economic growth, a great number of people from former Soviet republics with lower level of living decided to change the place of residence. The flow of immigration to Russia attained its maximum

in 1994. According to Russian officials, today from 1.5 to 15 million people as labor migrants stay in Russia. The size of unofficial immigrants makes 4–4.2 million people. These numbers are most correct, to the experts' views.

As practice shows, the migrants occupy the jobs, which are not much in demand by Russian citizens due to low payment and hard working conditions. Even those of them, who get unemployment benefits, refuse to perform a not prestigious work. However, economy needs the people, who are ready to clean streets, to build roads, to wash wards in hospitals. It should be noted that even under conditions of high level of unemployment in the countries-leaders of contemporary economic growth the high deficit of work force remains in light industry, in metallurgy, health care, transport, in restaurant business. At the same time, since the year of 2000 up to present, the countries, like Germany, Japan, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Greece experience reduction of the number of the working people. There are many working places in Russia, where it is difficult and sometimes impossible to hire Russian citizens. The situation in the Moscow labor market, particularly in the construction complex and in public transport, proves it quite clearly.

In contemporary Russia, the attraction of the non-qualified foreign labor force is an old and painful problem, used by non-conscientious politicians to provoke xenophobia of the population and to put the blame on aliens for the difficulties and problems of the country.

The notion “migrant worker”, used in international legal documents, lacks in the Russian legislation. Even the notion, such as “labor migration”, is not determined in the legislation of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, if it is possible to reduce the traditional time lag of Russia from big European countries (approximately for two generations), the number of jobs will inevitably rise. It means that the

import of foreign labor force will become more significant for national economic development.

Moscow and the Moscow region stand out in terms of the large scale of attracted foreign labor force against a background of subjects of the Russian Federation. In 2006, the number of migrant workers in Moscow accounted for 35% of the quantity of migrant workers. It is connected with development of the biggest investment in economy of the region. It is supposed that up to 90% of economic migrants in Moscow work illegally. The question is that they confront big complications in their aspirations for getting permit to get job and find housing, which force them to be in the shadow sector, depriving the state of tax payments. The corrupted officials extort money from them.

In 2007, the share of the eight states (out of 27 states), whose citizens enter the Russian labor market, accounted for 80% of migrants. They are as follows: China – 15.5%, Ukraine – 12%, Uzbekistan – 17%, Turkey – 9%, Tajikistan – 13%, Kirghizstan – 5%, Moldova – 5%, Vietnam – 5%. Naturally, a great part of immigrants settle in Moscow. It should be added that the amount of remittances, sent home, is estimated in 5-7 % of the GNP of Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan, over 20% of the GNP of Moldova. The money transfers are comparable with the annual budgets of these countries, while in some cases – Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – they surpass them.

The growing demand for the unqualified labor force in Russia, on the one side, and the mass readiness of poor countries to satisfy this demand, on the other side, result in rise of the number of immigrants in the composition of the population in Russia. It is impossible to stop this process, while the administrative barriers in the way of migration processes are ineffective. The mutual support within ethnic communities and a chance to enter the country as a tourist allow a person to overcome any barriers. At the same time, migrants are ready

to endure hardships and humiliations in order to earn money. The migrants' flow is polarized into two distant strata: "the owners" and "the proletarians". The numerous facts give evidence of existence of discrimination and exploitation within and among groups.

Most immigrants come for a certain time to earn money. Those, who wish to settle in Moscow, make the final decision 5–7 years later. This fact is characteristic for migration processes in all host communities of the West. It should be mentioned that the migrants, coming to the capital with intention to settle there and to bring their families, possess a much higher integration potential than their compatriots, for whom Moscow is the place for getting money. The first ones will eagerly regard themselves as Muscovites. For example, the Azerbaijanis, settled in the Russian capital, react painfully, if they are identified with "persons of the Caucasian nationality".

The notion "Muscovite" latently is connected with the notion "Russian, i.e. in Moscow, like in Russia as a whole, the ethnic and not the civil identity prevails. Thus, the newly proposed term – "person of the Caucasian nationality" appeared. The image of migrant workers, coming for a short time, i.e. the less integrated segment of another ethnicity, gives an opportunity for the ingrained stereotype of "a person of Caucasian (Asian) nationality", actually the image of an aggressive alien. It is not surprising that this stereotype is transferred to all groups, which differ from the main mass of the urban population in terms of anthropology and culture, including indigenous Russians and representatives of ethnic Diaspora, living in Moscow for many centuries.

Thus, the Azerbaijanis – migrants of the last post-Soviet wave, if they wish to settle in Moscow, should comprehend that they are primarily Caucasians. This is for them the sole niche in the urban social environment. It seems that this reality hinders integration of migrants in

the big city, besides, just those, who want to become “indigenous residents”. The temporary migrant workers do not always reckon with “the Russian foundation” of Moscow and with the need “to live like all”.

Russia is marked by low population density, and the long-term trends to reduction of labor force and to the population’s aging are evident in the country. The share of Russia in the population of the world will be rather greatly reduced by 2050, the experts made prognoses. In this respect, the situation in Russia will not differ from the situation in most countries of the Western Europe, where the number of the population will decrease for the present century. When the age structure of the population in Russia will change due to the rapid rise of the share of senior age groups, society will confront the need to restructure the pension system. The sustainability of this system will depend on the number of immigrants, whom it would be possible to include in the labor force and to achieve their social adaptation. A great inflow of legal immigrants will make it possible to accelerate the economic growth of Russia. At the same time, comparing with other countries, which carry out an efficient immigration policy, Russia has a significant advantage: it is encircled by the countries with a much lower level of living than in Russia, by the countries, where there live millions of ethnic Russians and dozens of millions Russian speaking people, integrated in Russian culture.

The unique present migration in Russia is characterized not only by its scale but also by the fact that 7% of able to work people consists of illegal migrant workers. This quantity is comparable with the share of legal migrant workers in Sweden (4.6%) and France (6.2%). The unique feature of this situation is as follows: the migrants not only provide Russia to a certain degree as a whole and Moscow, in particular, with labor force, they introduced their own world into the

Russian environment: the other culture, language, way of life, manners of behavior, other perceptions on the must and the admissible. Most Muscovites experience the sense of alert and fear; the migration situation represents for them “invasion” and “expansion” of aliens. Therefore Ukrainian “Gastarbaiters”, who have the same anthropology, live in all suburbs of Moscow. Byelorussians are let to live in the districts with good reputation.

Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians live in compact settlements in distant suburbs, for evident reasons. As a whole, the contrast settlement is characteristic for migrants from the Caucasus. The greater part of Armenians is settled in the center, particularly in the districts with a higher share of the Moscow Armenian Diaspora. The less well-to-do citizens of Armenia rent housing in Chertanovo, Tekstilshchiki, Kuzminki, Lyublino, Tsaritsino. Migrants from the Central Asia live mainly in the southern and in the northern suburbs of Moscow. The relatively cheap compartments and level of living in the districts near the ring road are approximately equal irrespective of the geographic situation.

Many myths have been created relating to immigration. One of them is as follows: immigration is a contemporary measure. The immigrants treated it in this way, according to some researches. They left for Russia to save money and to come back. But the facts show that it is an illusion. Usually the family comes and joins the breadwinner to stay in a new place. The other illusion is – the masculine part of the population is the source of immigrants. This problem needs additional study. Migration from Tajikistan is characterized by a small share of women (15%). It should be said that labor migration from the Central Asia has not been yet studied, particularly in terms of its gender structure.

The traditional system of distribution of the gender roles among family members in the CA countries determines the role of the breadwinner for the man. Women perform the reproductive function and are in charge of housekeeping. This distribution of roles was rigidly fixed for many centuries by norms of Islam, inter alia. The post-Soviet stage of regional development engendered two opposite processes. The consolidation of traditionalism in the rural districts coincided with the large scaled social and economic processes in the region as a whole, and the mass outflow abroad of able-bodied males started with the aim of earning money in foreign countries. Tajik women joined the emigration flow. Evidently, this phenomenon was strange for the Central Asia, but it was logical for the development of migration processes on the eve of the XXI century: since the 1990s, feminization of migrant flows became a characteristic feature of the contemporary stage of labor migration.

What are the Tajik women, who have to earn for life in Moscow? As a rule they are married women at the age over 40 years, whose families, including husbands, stay at home in the motherland. There are among them widows or women with sick husbands or husbands earning not more than 1000 rubles per month. They have high school education or rarely high school special education. Sometimes they are teachers of secondary school or nurses. They speak poor Russian, since even in Soviet times most Tajik women did not leave their villages (kishlaks). Since labor emigration from Tajikistan is a rather known process, women go to the places, where work their compatriots, i.e. do as people do in the whole world – apply not to the Diaspora in order to get job but use informal immigration networks.

They borrow money for the journey. Having arrived to Moscow, they work at the market every day without free days and get \$100 per month. Tajik or Uzbek women do not make “carrier” in Moscow, since

their field of activities is very restricted. Their compatriots-migrants work as laborers and loaders in the markets, construction workers with hard work and as street cleaners. They become servants in fast food restaurants and sellers of dry fruits. Some of them find jobs in business and in criminal structures (in the system of narcotics trade).

With good reason one may say that the female immigration from the Central Asia will acquire a more extensive scale. The complicated economic situation in the CA countries, the rise of unemployment and destitution of the population makes their citizens ignore the traditional factors. As a result, the money earned by migrant workers gradually changes the image of Tajik rural scenery. White cars may be seen on the rough road. The people started to improve their housing conditions and to repair with common money the disintegrating infrastructure.

The immigration capacity to Russia from the CIS countries is estimated to be 7–8 million people for formation of the migration policy. For the next decade it will be enough, but in the future, according to experts, it would be necessary to elaborate the policy aimed at attraction of migrant workers from the countries outside the CIS.

The opened channels for legal labor migration, ensuring the right of newcomers to live legally and to work in Russia, to have access to social benefits and after a certain period of time to get Russian citizenship – all this, as was said, is significant for the perspectives of development of Russia. As far as the state ideology is concerned, it should be said that openness of Russian society, its ability to integrate non-Russian elements for many centuries were the specific features of Russian traditions, allowing to include non-Slavonic peoples in the structure of this society. Just this community, where immigrants will be integrated in its structure by Russian language and Russian culture, will

provide Russia of the new century with additional chances, which Russia will use with success.

“Vostok: vyzovy XXI veka”, M., 2010, p. 247–251.

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**THE TERRORIST UNDERGROUND
IN INGUSHETIA**

The terrorist underground finally was formed in Ingushetia for the beginning of the XXI century. Although Ingushetia was subject to significant ordeal for the 1990s, terrorism in the forms characteristic for the contemporary North Caucasus actually was absent within the limits of the republic itself. At the same time, the destabilizing impact of the adjacent separatist Chechnya as a mighty hotbed of tension should have been felt in all main spheres of social life in Ingushetia. For the beginning of the 1990s, there occurred the peak of the Ossetian-Ingushi opposition – the central conflict, which to a large extent determined the social-political life of the Ingushi Republic and the main zones of conflicting capacity.

Thus, the first post-Soviet decade may be relatively defined as a “pro-native” period in development of the republican underground, like the underground in Dagestan. However, the rigid territorial conflict with North Ossetia-Alania pre-determined the essential specificity of the Ingushi variant of formation of the terrorist complex. The situation in the social-economic spheres of both republics differs greatly.

The economic potential of Ingushetia originally was rather insignificant. Within the Soviet Checheno-Ingushetia (not at all the advanced regions of the national economy) the “Ingushi” districts

represented the agrarian periphery. At the same time, the economic crisis of the 1990s in the newly established republic was greatly aggravated by the fact that the industrial structures, located in the Ingushi districts of Checheno-Ingushetia, after its division and rapid separation of Chechnya turned out to be fragments of the demolished republican industrial complex. As a result, the fall of industrial production in the republic grew to catastrophic scales: for the period of 1980 it made the size of 14% of the level of 1990 (the maximum indicator for the regions of the RF, except Chechnya).

But the economic “specificity” of Ingushetia consisted even not in this fact (the reduction of production in other republics of the macro-region was also impressive). The significant circumstance was as follows: in the beginning of the XXI century after “pacification” of Ichkeria, against a general background in the RF and the North Caucasus of political and social-economic stabilization, the sustainable rise of economy (including the industrial sector) did not started in Ingushetia. In 2009, the amount of industrial production made 48% of the level, existed in 2000 (in 2008 it accounted for 84%). The situation in the republican agriculture, which lacks big market production, was not better. The detailed study of economic problems is not within the framework of the present study. But it is important to find out the stage of chronic stagnation of local economy, which is able to transform into terrorist activities.

The high unemployment and decrease of level of living of the population were two phenomena accompanying the social-economic crisis. The level of unemployment in Ingushetia, equally with Chechnya, was the highest in the RF (for the last decade, it made in Ingushetia 45-65%). This unprecedented indication would have testified to a catastrophic situation, incompatible with preservation of the main social institutions in society with contemporary productive

economy, since it would have been connected with the deep mass impoverishment of the population. The preservation of this level of unemployment for many years shows that local society has adapted to its extreme surplus of the labor force.

The system of diverse social financing for the benefit of the population in the republic (pensions, various subsidies, grants) is one of the reasons of such situation. And the other reason of this situation is the high level of subsidies, received by the republic, since 95% of its budget is formed at the expense of the financial means, transferred by the federal center. The republic actually depends on the Russian budget. At the same time, if in relation to adjacent Chechnya there exist at least two objective reasons (two devastating military campaigns) for a great support given to the social-economic sphere of the republic by the federal center, in case of Ingushetia there are no reasons for such support.

The stable federal financing is the main reason of the situation, when the long-term economic stagnation and the highest level of unemployment are not accompanied by the rapid fall of the level of living and impoverishment of the population in the republic. The incomes of the latter actually are lower than the average per capita incomes of the population in other republics in the North Caucasus. However, they do not fall and do not rest at the former level as it could have been without the stable “external” financial support. The dynamics of incomes of the population in the republic demonstrate a sustainable rise. For the period from 2005 to 2009, they raised by 2.3 times (like in other republics of the North Caucasus, except Dagestan, where the incomes of the population grew by 2.8 times). For the period from 2000 to 2009, the average per capita income rose ten times (from 0.6 to 5.8 thousand rubles). Thus, demonstrating minimal successes in the economic sphere, comparing with other republics, Ingushetia is not

behind them in terms of growth of the material level of living. There is no reason to speak about “impoverishment” of the population.

In other words, there are no significant reasons for the rise of “social-economic” protest movement in Ingushetia. There is no link between economic dynamics and rise of incomes of the population in the republic. For many decades, it is possible in a stable way to raise the level of material conditions of living against a background of economic stagnation. It is quite possible that the protests on the part of population would rather be provoked by the need to get rid of the shaped way of existence.

Thus, the republican underground only to a lesser extent is supported by the economic conditions of life in the republic.

One of the main reasons of the rise of the protest potential in the republic is the low qualitative level of local authorities, characterized by the typical list of “vices”, particularly high level of corruption, clanship, lack of professionalism. The comparative analysis of “moral-professional” qualities of the local bureaucracy with the officialdom in other republics is a complicated study. It is not excluded that the Ingushi administrative apparatus in terms of these indications occupies a separate place in the North Caucasus. However, all failures inherent in the Ingushi officialdom were shaped since the beginning of the post-Soviet period.

It is possible to put a question: has the efficiency of the republican bureaucracy taken a turn for the worse for the last years? The negative answer should be rather given to it. The failures of the local authorities do not show a definite negative dynamics, able to provoke a rise of social protests in the republican society. Certainly, like in Dagestan, one should take into account the factor of public “patience”: even the level of a long-term sustainable “vice” is being perceived by society with growing irritation. Nevertheless, it is evident

that the protest potential, accumulated along this channel, maybe a significant but not the sole factor of the terrorist activities.

The confessional factor. The dissemination of Islam was terminated in Ingushetia only by the middle of the XIX century. The post-Soviet period in the republic (like in the North Caucasus as a whole) was connected with “renaissance” of Islam”: the rapid rise of the number of active believers, the multiple rise of mosques and house for praying, establishment of religious educational institutions (including institutions, financed by foreign Islamic sponsors); appearance of religious radicalism. However, despite existence of adjacent Ichkeria as a main stronghold of wahhabism in the North Caucasus, for the 1990s pure Islam did not attain definite success of its development within the limits of Ingushetia (at the same time, already for the period of the first Chechen campaign there were registered the attempts of wahhabies to recruit young people).

The ideological “enlightenment” of the Ingushi national society was repeated from the territory of Chechnya for the second half of the 1990s. The first measures against dissemination of wahhabism were taken not by the federal center but by the republican authorities and the local traditional clergy, worried by this situation. For summer of 1998, by their joint decision, the functioning of wahhaby organizations was forbidden on the territory of the republic. However, such measure was not always successful and able to stop dissemination of pure Islam. But in Ingushetia this decision actually succeeded and demonstrated primarily the sustainable orientation of local population to traditional Islam and Sufi values and practice, severely criticized by wahhabies. The constant outflow of local religious radicals to Chechnya also played its role in this respect.

In the beginning of the XXI century the situation started to change. Islamic radicalism becomes in the republic the ideological

cover for different protest movements, based on various ancient social forms of life. From the definite time, the situation in Ingushetia was characterized by the return inflow of Ingushi and Chechen people to the country.

However, already in 2005, estimating the number of wahhaby communities in some republics of the North Caucasus, K.M. Khanbabayev, a known expert in religion, omitted in his review Ingushetia and Adygeya, and only stated that adepts of pure Islam in these republics were rather active. One may suppose that the question is that Ingushi wahhaby community is rather closely connected with the Chechen wahhaby community and that it was difficult to analyze its own quantitative characteristics.

The sphere of inter-national relations and the Ossetian-Ingushi conflict. Since the beginning of the post-Soviet period, within the limits of the republic, the reasons for inter-national conflicts were minimal: according to the census of 1989, in the Ingushi districts of Checheno-Ingushetia the dominance of Ingushis was evident (76.6%), making 86% of the population, including Chechens, on these territories. Thus, the greatest part of the Russian speaking population of Checheno-Ingushetia lived in its Chechen part, mainly in Grozny. In the non-Ingushi part “non-Vainakh” made only 14% (including 1.8% of “non-Russian non-Vainakh”), while in the Chechen part these groups accounted correspondingly for 32.2% and 7%.

The social processes of the beginning of the 1990s promoted creation of mono-ethnic districts in Ingushetia. The Russian population left the republic actually without demonstrated protests, which might have become the conflicting pivot between Russians and the title population. By the middle of the 1990s, Ingushetia lost the main mass of its Russians and Russian-speaking residents. Should the mass inflow of Chechen refugees in time of military campaigns did not enter the

republic, it could have become the most homogeneous ethnic region in the RF. According to the census of 2002, Ingushis made 77.3% of the population in the republic (97.7% with Chechens).

Following the gradual return to Chechnya of the main part of refugees (2002–2007), the share of the title population of Ingushetia had essentially increased. However, the percentage of the “non-Vainah” population in the republic in any case was minimal and without federal servicemen may account at present 1.5–2%. It is evident that the mono-ethnicity of the republic will be kept for a long-term perspective. It is actually impossible to imagine a scenario of development, when Ingushetia becomes a territory of migration inflow of the non-title (non-Vainah) population. In other words, the program adopted in 2005 and intended to realize the program of return to the republic of Russians represents a pure bureaucratic utopia even in its reduced variant (the return of one thousand people for 2005–2010, while for the 1900s 17 thousand Russians left the republic).

Nevertheless, the sphere of inter-national relations became almost the main source of concentration of the conflict capacity, which played a significant role in formation of the situation in the republic. The central (Ossetian-Ingushi) conflict in the post-Soviet Ingushetia was and is not only the conflict between two republics but also between two nationalities.

The events, connected with deportation in 1994 of Ingushis from the territory of the Prigorodny district and its inclusion in North Ossetia, usually are considered as the beginning of the conflict. As a “compensation” for this loss, three districts of Stavropol krai in 1957 were transferred to Checheno-Ingushetia, where they were included, however, in the system of ethnic settlement of Chechens and not Ingushis. Thus, the roots of the inter-ethnic tension between Ossetians and Ingushis should be found in the second half of the 1950s (the return

of Ingushis from deportation to the North Caucasus). This latent conflict repeatedly emerged in public life even during the stable 1960s-1970s. For this period of time, this conflict was suppressed by the Soviet authorities, which perceived all displays of inter-national animosity as survivals of “pre-socialist” past. The situation was changed for the second part of the 1980s. The struggle for “return” of the Prigorodny district became for Ingushis the ethnic-consolidating (partially also a “state forming”) idea on the eve of the 1990s.

Thus, the formation of Ingushi statehood from the beginning turned out to be connected with the territorial issue and in existing circumstances objectively and inevitably led to escalation of inter-national tension between two peoples. The inter-republican conflict with North Ossetia, as a matter of fact, turns out to be the conflict between two national communities. The Ingushis in their consciousness regarded as their “offenders” to some extent the federal center too, since the federal center, to the mind of Ingushis, in this conflict supported Ossetians (via the federal center this offense was projected to Russia as a whole). However, this offense was in deep contradiction with “pro-Russian” position of Ingushi society. In this case, the pro-Russian position means the interest of national community in its Russian status, the conceived by this community dependence of its functioning on the complex (financial, material-technical, organizational etc.) support by the federal center. Thus, the question is a kind of public “reckon”, which often turns out to be a more powerful neutralizer of internal ethnic radicalism and separatism than the ethnic-cultural closeness or even psychological computability of peoples. The Ingushi society did not want to go the way of separatist Chechnya.

The accumulated conflict energy of the national community, being unable to realize itself in the main direction (against North Ossetia and to some extent also against the federal center), was looking

for itself more accessible objects of forceful action. They were found in the republic itself. One of them (probably, the main one) was its own republican power – the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus, the law enforcement bodies and the groups of the population, connected with them.

The republican power might be regarded as a projection of the federal center – its protégé (particularly after M. Zayzikov occupied the presidential post). The strokes, delivered against it, allowed partially splashing out the anti-Russian, anti-feudal “energy”. But it was possible to incriminate to the republican authorities also many other things: for instance, the unpardonable compromise, the lack of will in defending national interests during negotiations with the Ossetian party.

There existed also quite objective already mentioned claims: corruption, clanship and lack of professionalism; pursuit of vested interests accompanied by the low level of efficiency in administrative sphere. From the beginning of the 1990s, the functioning of the republican authorities was characterized by such failures. But just comprehension in the beginning of the XXI century by the radical wing of Ingushi community of impracticability of the strategic task of its national “project” made the official power intolerable for this part of Ingushi society.

Since the middle of the 2010s, the extreme radicals’ energy gradually changed the main direction of its realization from the Ossetian (local clashes on the inter-republican border territory) direction to the internal republican direction against the administrative apparatus and its “guards” – the law enforcement bodies. The responsive repression arranged by the authorities led only to the conflict’s growth. Thus, in parallel grew the potential of the terrorist underground, which extended its demographic basis in the republic and escalated the spiral of reciprocal forceful actions. Since that time, the

terrorist actions were intensified due to intensification of activities carried out by radical elements of Ingushi national community, who more often did not leave for Chechnya and had to concentrate in Ingushetia, greatly raising the cadre capacity and general conflicting potential of local extremism.

The republican terrorist complex, which was formed in the republic, was characterized as follows: existence of the social system, where the main structural element was a group of people, concentrated in terrorist activities, able in a sustained way to compensate the cadre losses and to function chiefly at the expense of their own (internal-republican) organizational means, infrastructure and, probably, financial resources. The external assistance gradually moved to the background. At present, the republican underground, having been isolated from external “injections”, is able, however, to compensate its losses, in spite of rigid pressure of the law enforcement bodies.

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Thus, the terrorist activities in the republic is the consequence (and simultaneously) of the civil opposition – the rigid counter-struggle between the republican power and the radical part of Ingushi national society. But the central axis of civil conflict is often supplemented by many other axes essentially complicating the scene of civil antagonism and to some extent transforming it. Ingushetia is not the exclusion. Taking into account additional conflict axes, the situation is similar to the situation in Dagestan (inter-clanish wars, criminal conflicts, emergence of a common field of activities and probable reciprocal actions of separate power groups, the criminality and the underground).

However, it seems that this complex of reciprocal actions in Ingushetia did not result in emergence of a criminal-corrupted-extremist complex, analogous to the situation in Dagestan. The power clans in Ingushetia are rather numerous. This fact promotes rivalry

among them. However, unlike, for example, the situation in Dagestan, they represent the sole national community. The common space in Ingushetia is much less for economic mutual activities of power clans, the criminal and the underground. The dynamic and the large-scaled (in terms of republics in the North Caucasus) economy of Dagestan represents much greater chances for joint activities (rivalry/cooperation) than economy of Ingushetia. Thus, given the evident systemic resemblance of situations in Dagestan and Ingushetia, the Ingushi terrorist underground (TU) did not become (at least for the present time) an element of the united complex, combining power, criminality and underground.

Unlike the terrorist underground in Dagestan, TU in Ingushetia is much more mono-ethnic. On the other side, comparing with Chechnya it is more compact thanks to the small territory of the republic itself. These two factors contribute to centralization of TU in Ingushetia. They at least facilitate coordination of activities of various groups of fighters from one central point, despite its primarily communication and not centralizing role. The other aspect of the problem is essential. The map of TU activities in the North Caucasus for 2007-2009 fixes the common and not split area from Nazran to Vedeno – the wide belt, cutting in two Ingushetia and Chechnya. This common space, ethnic-cultural and social-psychological closeness of two peoples pre-supposes a rather extensive cooperation of terrorist groups of both republics, which may be reflected in their organization.

On the other side, the operation advantages of terrorist activities, carried out in the autonomous and semi-autonomous regime (network organization) should be a natural limitation of any form of rigid centralization and definite hierarchic structure of TU. Besides, TU of Ingushetia, like TU of Dagestan, lacks “famous” leaders, capable by

their authority to unite at least a considerable part of local terrorist community.

The number of fighters in Ingushetia rarely becomes subject to comments on the part of politicians or officials. One may mention the remark, made by A. Edelev (January 2009) on 120 fighters in Ingushetia. In February 2010 Yu.B.Evkurov at the press-conference, held in Magas, said, that “according to current information, three groups from three to five people each arrange shooting, but in some case criminal elements commit their acts under the cover of TU”. So, the president of the republic spoke about 10-15 republican fighters.

However, Ingushetia for the last years (2008-the beginning of 2010) in a sustained way occupies the first place in the North Caucasus in terms of terrorist acts and, according to I.V. Pashchenko, is comparable with Chechnya and Dagestan, taken together. The materials of the international report on the forceful actions in the North Caucasus published in 2009, present a different comparison among these three republics. But the first place of Ingushetia in terms of terrorist intensity for 2008–2009 is unquestioned. If the group of 10-15 fighters were responsible for it, one should admit their “productivity” to be phenomenal (succeeding the “average” indexes for TU in Chechnya and Dagestan many times). It is much more probable that this level of activities is ensured by the number of fighters comparable with other “eastern” republics of the North Caucasus (it should be hundreds of fighters). Since TU in Ingushetia rather easily compensates its losses, it means that the number of fighters is rather great.

At the same time, the limited demographic capacity of the republic should be taken into account. The national community of Ingushetia accounts for 300–320 thousand people. Occupying the first place in terms of number of terrorist acts, the republic is behind Chechnya in terms of their intensity. The Ingushi fighters, probably due

to their smaller capacity, prefer shooting and attacks and avoid direct contacts. It may be said that the fighting component of Ingushi TU is smaller than that of TU in Dagestan and Chechnya. It should be recalled that the format of the fighting nucleus – the number of armed fighters could be changed several times per year.

Like the number of fighters in TU itself, the number of its supporters in Ingushetia may be inferior in Ingushetia than in Dagestan and Chechnya. It might be caused by the smaller number of Ingushi national community. In the contrary case, one should suppose that 1-2% of the population participate in TU (many times more than in Chechnya and Dagestan). Given the compact republican settlement of the population, the correlation between composition of settlement and intensity of terrorist actions evidently exists. Nazran and the Nazran and the Sungen districts may be called the epicenters of TU activities (the great part of the population is concentrated there).

The stratum of sympathizers to some or other extent may include all protest groups of national community. Taking into account a rather great percent of the people dissatisfied with various aspects of life in the republic, it is possible to appraise it minimum in several percent of the republican population (15–20 thousand people), representing all districts of the republic and social groups of all ages (including several thousand young people at 18–25 years of age).

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The rapid rise of terrorist activities in Ingushetia for the last years to some extent was unexpected for the expertise. The internal tension/conflict in the beginning of the XXI century at least did not diminish. But the direction of the main conflict changed: it moved from “external” (inter-national and inter-republican) social space to the republic itself and within national community. This process resembled the events in Chechnya but was determined by the other complex of

factors and was going on under other political and social conditions. Like in Dagestan, the central axis of Ingushi opposition in the republic was complicated by many other conflicts, composing the republican “Gordian knot”. One of the factors, which neutralize support, given to TU, is (except forceful “measures”) solving of “territorial” problems, as well as social-cultural and social-economic modernization of Ingushi community and the rise of quality of the republican power. The real decision of the territorial question supposes for Ingushi national community the change of the administrative status of the Prigorodny district or the comparative territorial compensations. However, the probable “transfer” of the Prigorodny district to Ingushetia is actually impossible. The republic is unable to get any territorial-administrative compensation from the federal center. In the existing situation in the North Caucasus, as the events confirm, the center will not make administrative “presents” to regional republics in any circumstances. The program of social-economic development of Ingushetia, which costs billions of rubles, actually is a kind of “compensation”, although a single politician did not make (and could not make) it public.

The question is whether the national community, including its radical elements, responsible for terrorist actions, is ready for such “barter”. And especially in the situation as this reciprocal exchange is not formulated as such. The great part of Ingushi society perceives the social subsidies to the republic as a due, as a “liability” of the federal center, which does not suppose any obligations in response.

The social-economic and social-cultural modernization supposes the inflow to the republic of additional financial means, which should come to it and which will come. If the financial means are used for the fixed purposes, if even not at once, for the middle-term perspective, some modernization steps forward in the republican community will be

achieved, in parallel with certain transformation of the ways of “external” realization of its conflict potential.

If one proceeds from the existing (and rather extensive) post-Soviet experience, the most probable variant is realization of the conservative-pessimistic development of the republic. Money will come, but not in full amount of them, prescribed in the corresponding program documents. The republic will get undoubtedly considerable sums of money. The social-economic output will be much less than it was expected. The reasons of this are numerous and well known (corruption at all levels – from the federal to the municipal – of distribution, low level of qualification of executive officials etc.). Nevertheless, some results in the sphere of social-economic and social-cultural modernization of republican society will be achieved. The level of living will rise, and there is a chance for certain improvement of local authorities’ functioning. But will these steps forward be sufficient to put social protests into “civilized” channel and will it be possible to reduce the inflow of new cadres in the underground, minimizing its activities?

For the nearest decade, it is almost impossible. There is only a small probability for this in the perspective of 10-20 years. By 2030, though, Ingushi national society will be rather more educated and urbanized (the stratum of “indigenous” city residents may definitely rise); their families will have 2–3 children. However, the modernization will be still far away from its termination.

Up till present, there is no perspective of solving the youth problem – “getting professions” and work by a great part of young Ingushis, having only high education (including ten years). In 2008, only 52% of Ingushis, graduated from high school, entered the specialized education institutions. This group of young people is subject to easier dissemination of radical ideas and extremist practice

(i.e. the source of cadres for TU), and it is the fore-ground for the social-cultural traditionalism and religious fanatic ideas for many decades in the future. The large-scale inflow of young people into the group of youth subjected to religious fanatic ideas prolongs the period of social-cultural and social-professional modernization of the national community; young Ingushis without professional education will constitute a considerable part of the able-bodied republican population till the middle of the XXI century.

At present, a great part of the population in the republic, evidently, lacks the need in qualitative education (consequently in further professional carrier) of the young generation. The lack of the aspiration means the lack of the corresponding social need. The mentioned reasons are as follows: “archaic” characteristic of the republican economy and the developed system of “subsidized” financing, decreasing the value of professional qualification (the comparable sum of money may be earned not by work but via numerous channels of the state social financing or by work in household). At present, this problem has not been solved in the republic. And even efficient ways of its solving have not been “touched”.

Thus, the main factors of protests (conflicts) of the national community and “nourishment” of the republican underground in all likelihood will remain also 10–20 years later. However, taking into account the whole complex of dynamic trends in economy and social-cultural sphere, it is possible with good reason to make the prognosis about certain reduction of the protests’ “energy” scale. It means that by the period of 2025–2030 a significant rise of terrorist activities seems to be hardly probable comparing with the last two-three years. There are some rather significant circumstances, which prevent a great spread of TU in the republic. One of them is the reduced demographic capacity of

the national community, which is several times less than the number of the Chechen people and of the three main peoples taken together in Dagestan, which participate actively in extremist activities. A certain role is played by the birth rate, which was characterized by sustained reduction in Ingushetia from 1995 to 2005 (if for the first part of the 1990s it made 2.4–2.5% per year, in the second part of the 1990s it diminished to 2.1% and accounted for 1.4% by 2001). Taking into account that the main backbone of bandits' groups is formed by young people at the age of 18–25 years, the demographic resource group will start to reduce essentially already since 2012–2013. The early generation, attaining its majority in 2020, will be inferior by 1.5 time to the present level. The birth rate reduction will continue further in the republic. By 2030, its level will be almost the same like the average Russian index in case of actually any scenario of demographic dynamics in Ingushetia.

The birth rate reduction is only an external display of rather deep and various modernizing progresses, changes in psychological stereotypes and social practices of society. As the number of children in families reduces, the forms of socialization of the new generation change themselves. They attain greater personal feature, orient more to the good education and professional carrier. With due account of significant problem in Ingushi society, it is almost no doubts that the Ingushi youth, attaining its majority in 2020 or in 2030, will be not only much less numerous but also more modernized in terms of its world outlook and life aspirations, than the youth of today.

This educated and less numerous new generations of young people will reduce essentially the chance of the underground to replenish its losses after military actions. Therefore the more probable scenario of republican TU for the next decades will be gradual diminishing of its format and general activities. The variant of total

liquidation of TU for the perspective of 10–20 years is perceived to be unlikely due to preservation for this period of the main factors of conflicts/protests of the national community.

Finally, it should be repeated, as it was said about TU in Chechnya and Dagestan, that even a significant reduction of potential of Ingushi terrorist complex will hardly make it unable to commit terrorist acts in the republic and outside its borders. The people “full of hatred” will appear and be at the disposal of TU for many decades. And the problem of republican terrorism will be present to some extent at this time.

And the last remark should be made. The probable correlation of enumerated dynamic scenarios of TU proceeds from a rather sustainable political and social-economic development of the RF. A significant destabilization of Russia is able to raise “vital” resources of the underground in the republic, will provide it with additional historic chances.

*Sergey Slutsky. "Terroristskoje podpolje na vostoje
Severnogo Kavkaza", R-na-D, 2010, p. 161–186.*

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THE WOMEN IN THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL POWER AND MANAGEMENT IN TAJIKISTAN

The new concept on integrated approach was approved at the forth World Conference of UNO on the women problems and approved in Action program being adopted upon completion of the Conference work. The Peking framework for action (1995) gave a definition of a gender problem, i.e. this is equality of men and women in all the

spheres of life and activity. Its main regulations: 1. Equality of rights. 2. Equality of responsibility. 3. Equality of possibilities. 4. Equal business relations of men and women. Gender policy was being developed and administered in the CIS countries after the Peking conference.

In Tajikistan a civil confrontation took place parallel to attaining independence in contrast to the other CIS countries having worsened, first of all, women status, i.e. those possibilities acquired in the field of women rights as early as during the soviet period lessened gradually. According to General census of population in 1989 25,8% of the leading positions were hold by women in Tajikistan. During the soviet period women traditionally work as the ministers of social security and health public at the high level in the republic, supervised ideology in the party structures up to superior body. In 1989 women amounted to 70,7% among the leaders of the offices and personal departments, nursery schools and children's homes – 94,5%, managers of libraries - 62,3% but only 17,1% among the heads of enterprises and organizations of basic industries. But women status in the society was reduced during the period of “glasnost” having brought to quota elimination. The first rather free elections in Tajikistan in 1989-90-s were ample evidence of it. Only 9 women or only 3,9% were among 230 deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the republic.

At the beginning of 90-s the civil war began in the country parallel to attaining independence and the problems being typical for all the wars independent of geography were placed on the agenda. And therefore, it was nothing to do with women and actually with their status, their role in the political processes and system of administration though the women took part in the meetings preceding a political confrontation. And the representatives of the softer sex were among the debased and the killed. Of course, this situation could not but influence on their participation in a decision adoption at all the levels. At the

elections in 1995 women share in bodies of power amounted to 2,8% in the parliament and 8,7% – in local representative bodies of power.

One can also observe evident discrimination in bodies of executive power. In the same year only 3,3% of women were among the first parties and their deputies among women amounted to 5% and 19,4% among the leaders of structural units. The women were chairmen only in two towns out of 68. The men got even those positions held traditionally by women like deputy-chairman of executive committees on socio-cultural problems.

In 1999 the Republic Tajikistan ratified Convention on “Political rights of women”, the International pact on civil and political rights. For the first time the term “gender” was used in governmental acts in September 1998 when approving the National plan of actions of the Republic Tajikistan to enhance a role and a status of women for 1998-2005-ss. This document stipulated “particularly to form personnel reserve in order to nominate in the management structures on a gender basis.

A quota for the women for a post of deputy administrators of public organs, organizations, institutions, enterprises and territories was stipulated by a decree of the President on “Role enhancing in the society” dated 3 December 1999. This decree gave a stimulus to increase a number of women in the system of administration. Women were the chairmen in two khukumats (administrations) before this decree and now their number was increased up to 8. By 2005 15,5% of women were in the management team of organs of government, 7,3% – in the ministers and state committees, 12,3% – in the management team of the President administration and 10,6% – in the organs under the president and government. Women representation was considerably increased in the membership of territorial executive bodies and local bodies of self-government in the townships and villages. Women were chairmen in four towns and districts and in 26,9% of the villages. One

can observe positive growth trends of women among deputy chairmen of the towns and districts – 27,4%.

However, as our analysis shows that mainly lower and middle management were strengthened by women. 20% are the heads of department and administrations in the ministers and agencies and 40% – in some state organs. One woman was deputy chairman of Majilisi namoyandagon (the lower chamber) in the parliament and two women headed the committees; one woman was among the government; three women were among the first leaders of central agencies of administration; four women were the chairmen of the towns and the districts and five women were the presidents of the court. One can observe such pyramid at the local level though the women number was more: 49,% – among deputy chairmen of jamoatov, 35,7% – among deputy administrators of the machinery units of the town and the district and 35,2% – among deputy chairmen of the towns and the districts. The posts of school directors and head doctors were hold by women before changing over a market economy but now there are few of them among these traditional nomenclatures. According to data 2005 the women were only 15,6% and 26,3%, correspondingly. 3,4% of women were among directors of the industries, 4,4% – among administration chairmen and 4,6% – among enterprise administration when women share amounted 30–70%.

A contrastive data analysis of the given elections in the country parliament 1995 and 2000 showed that the situation with respect to women was changed. In 2000 women participated in the elections in three times more in comparison with the previous ones though a number of women-candidates were in ten times less in comparison with the men-candidates. 29 women were among 287 candidates having nominated their candidates for elections for single-seat electoral districts. It's a little bit more 10% of all the self-candidates for

promotion. Only 22 women received a candidate mandate out of 214 candidates; it amounts to 10% of the total number of the candidates. The women were elected into deputies in 4 out of 41 single-seat electoral districts; it also amounts to 10%. The elections in 2000 were also notable for women success achievement being nominated by the political parties. One should note that both in 70-s and in 90-s the women representation in the parliaments based on the elective system according to the party (proportional representation) was more everywhere in the major and middle countries of long-standing democracy in comparison with the countries where single-seat electoral (majoritarian) form or type of the elective system was prevailing. 7 independent candidates were supported by no party out of 6 at the elections in 2000. But the experts don't consider it as discrimination according to sex. The men have the analogical index.

These examples are associated with that the situation was stabilized in the country and women participated actively in the elections in 2000 after having signed the peaceful agreement. One should mention the following interesting data: in 1988 there was a record number of women-parliamentarians in the world countries – they amounted to 14,8%. However, the last parliamentary election but one and the new election in 2005 in Tajikistan showed that the parties don't give equal chances for men and women; there aren't many women in the leading party bodies and there are no special programs to promote women into power-holding structures. There is also discrimination approach to assign seat order in the party lists – women don't rank first – doesn't give an opportunity for women to be equal with men.

Women status will be improved and increased in the society in whole if the woman comes into power. Stereotypes with respect to the politicians from their among bothered to realize and understand by women, i.e. it was impossible to persuade women electorate that there

came the other times and now women coming into power can solve their problems proper. And women-deputes having come through a thorny path into the parliament are convinced of it. So, one of deputies-women of Majilisi oli considers that a number of women-parliamentarians will be 15 persons in the next elections (now there are 11 women in the lower parliament). But to her mind women are to be united, support and understand each other under any circumstances. During a period of transition a work of public non-governmental organizations (NGO) became active where mainly women work. The work in these organizations in the country differed from their activity in the other states of Central Asia during the first years of independence. They pursued the operative object during the first period of their work: dilapidated building restoration, refugee help and support for children-orphanages having lost breadwinners during the armed conflict. There were only 3 similar organizations in Tajikistan in 1995, in 1998 – 54, in 2000 – 73 and in 2005 – 152. These data speak about proliferation of these organizations but then non-governmental women organization activity was being changed qualitatively. The cooperation was developed according to a vertical principle during the first years: donor-NGO-task group. With the lapse of time a horizontal principle became priority: round-table conferences, conferences, seminars and corporate projects. At the present NGO number is 15213.

From the beginning of 2000 non-governmental organizations began to be united into coalitions for their interest lobbying, in particular, to increase women representation in bodies of power both appointed and elected though NGOs don't politick. Achieving their long-term goal – protection of civil and political rights, civil and legal education, women-leader training and their socialization – they afford a possibility to fulfill oneself for women, i.e. promote their involvement in policy. Meanwhile the cooperation of power and a civil society in the

person of women and international organizations brought to positive trends. So, at the elections in Madjlisi Namoyandagon (the lower chamber of the parliament) 11 women were elected in February 2005 (out of 63 deutes) having amounted to 17,5% of the total number. According to UNO data the laws are elaborated for the benefit the children, i.e. future of the country nation, only when the women amount is no less than 20% among the deutees.

The women representation in the other structures corresponds to approximately the average world indexes: in 2006 more than 15% – on public positions of trust and 24% – among the public officers. The women as the leaders are concentrated in the lower echelon and middle management. In average 20% of women are occupied as heads of department and service chiefs in the ministers and agencies. In high echelons in the parliament – one woman is the deputy chairman of Madjilisa Namoyandagon and two women are at the head of committees. One woman is the vice-premier in the government of the country. Most of all the women participate in decision-making at the local level and in the local administrations. Here the women representation is more than in the bodies of state power. So, 43% – among jamoatov deutes, 34% – deutes of chairmen of the towns and districts and only 9% – the heads of the towns and districts.

Quite naturally that many things depend on the women themselves, their personal participation in their positioning as from NGO, the women organizations –their contribution in improving their image in order to improve status. By the way, the information about the women NGO or the international organizations solving problems of women is seldom published in mass media of the country. The telling illustration of this thesis is the article “Gender. Patriarchate... and irresponsibility”. 6–7 persons talk about gender problems in Tajikistan at the instance of the newspaper “Millat” (“Nation”) correspondent.

According to the authors the experts solving women problems in the different NGO refused from the participation in discussion. One can summarize their statements-fears by the following way: the society must be patriarchal as it is the basis of our culture; all NGO open feminism questions more in comparison with gender ones; NGO act only because of grants. Though the men agree with that today the woman is a breadwinner but they consider it as a forced temporary factor.

In short, one considers that NGO, mass media and other structures addressing the concerns of gender problems stew in their own juice. It's possible that the international organizations don't prepare the journalists up to the mark writing on the subject of gender themes or how one can explain that a journalist ask a deputy such a question: Why do women become deputies not by means of one-single seat okrugs, i.e. independently but by means of the party lists? But global experience demonstrates factors promoting women representation increasing within higher levels of legislative branch in the countries of "steady" democracy: conscious political will expressed in that the one advances the object to increase women-candidates in the parliaments as a priority of the party policy being elected according to proportional election system (political party quota); the laws demanding that sex ratio in the lists of candidates from the parties would correspond to sex ratio in the country, electoral system change from one-single seat (mazhoritarnogo) for proportional representation. Women movement, politicians and journalists addressing the concerns about a gender aspect should reflect upon these problems. But for the present 612 women hold the leading post in the bodies of state power of the different levels according to a statement of Chairman of committee for women and the family under the government of Republic Tajikistan. Very many women are the leaders of the different offices, head doctors of hospitals, directors of schools and the leaders of the public

organizations. Beginning from 2008 State program “Training, selection and displacement of the leading cadres from the clever women and girls for 2007–2016” is realized. The women amount to 49,8% of the country population.

*“Lomonosovskie chteniya: vostokovedenie”,
M., 2010, April, p. 199–2006.*

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**HYDROTECHNICAL “ATTACK” OF CHINA
IN CENTRAL ASIA: CONSEQUENCES FOR
KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA**

China belongs among the states of the eastern Asia being capable of having effect on and already having the marked influence on neighboring countries. Water supply of some territories of Russia and Kazakhstan depend on China to a considerable degree.

There exists contradictive enough water situation in China. On one hand, China takes 5-6 place in volume of renewable water resources in the world (mainly owing to that many littoral territories of the country are characterized with monsoon supply of the rivers when the summer monsoon brings much water and is accompanied with high water and floods). On the face of it there can't be water shortage in China. However, during the period of the winter monsoon there comes a dry season causing a sharp decreasing of the river flowing. So, one can observe water shortage during the dry season even having a rather large quantity of average annual water resources. Besides, water shortage in China like in the most countries of Central Asia is mainly

caused by its unpractical use. So, water resources are spent in China per unit of production in 10-20 times more in comparison with Europe and USA.

There are external circumstances in spite of water shortage in China itself being capable of China's changing into active guide of water policy in the region as China is water donor of Central Asian region and the large part of the South and the South-East Asia. Many rivers head in the mountain regions of China including Brakmaputra (Matsang-Tsangpo in Tibet), Ind, Mekong (Dzachu-Lan'tsantsyan in China) and Khongkha (the Red river) - (Lishekhe-Yuan'tszyan at the territory of China).

The large part of the Central Asia's territory, at least 50% is supplied with water resources from abroad. So, about one-third of water resources of Kazakhstan are from transboundary rivers heading in China. With its will China can make a control over transboundary river flowing as an effective lever of policy with respect to countries located downstream.

Only for the account of the transboundary rivers Sin'tszyan-Uigurskogo autonomous district and Kazakhstan one can solve water supply problem in the western areas of China facing to a problem on developing of hydropower engineering, oil and the other branches of industry, irrigated agriculture, animal breeding for increasing and moving population there.

Peking is inclined to use water resources of more than 30 rivers running from China in Kazakhstan whereas Kazakhstan gets the overwhelming part of its waters from abroad – from China (Irtysh) or from Kyrgyzstan (the Syr Darya).

The main object of the joint management is the river the Black Irtysh. The length of the Black Irtysh in China up to the border with Kazakhstan is 672 km; it falls into the lake Zaisan having the area of

1800 square kilometers at the territory of Kazakhstan. Irtysh proper flows out the lake Zaisan where the inflows Ishim and Tobol flow into. The economic and domestic needs of the area exceed the existing water resources by 21% by now; besides the water of Irtysh is very dirty. In Kazakhstan Bukhtarminskaya, Ust'-Kamenogorskaya and Shul'binskaya hydropower plants are constructed and operate in the river Irtysh. Reservoir storage of Bukhtarminskoi hydropower plant having a volume of 490 cubic meters makes the long-term control of the river flowing but the reservoir of Shul'binskaya hydropower plant – the seasonal one. Annually Peking increases the sown area under cotton and the crops in Sin'tszyan-Uigurskom autonomous area for the account of water intake from the Black Irtysh; it will be increased up to 5 cubic meters in a year after 2010.

The Chinese hydrotechnical “attack” in Central Asia took place as early as in 1970 when more than one third of waters of the transboundary river Ili (third largest river in Kazakhstan) were taken for irrigation especially just at the Chinese territory resulting in shoaling of the Lake Balkhash.

To our mind the regime intensification by China to use the transboundary rivers can bring to the following negative consequences for Kazakhstan: natural water, climatic and common natural disbalance in the area of the Lakes Balkhash and Zaisan; to the detriment of the fishery, decreasing the level of crop yield and pasture degradation; a huge fall of biological water value right up to its unfitness for domestic use owing to hazardous substances concentration increasing there.

China doesn't join to two basic international treaties for the present – Convention on the right of unnavigable types to use the international watercourses (1997) and Convention on protection and the transboundary watercourse and the international lake using (1992).

However, it insists on the transboundary watercourse regulation by conducting bilateral negotiations (China- Kazakhstan with Russia).

The legal basis of the Chinese-Kazakhstan negotiations is narrow enough. The additional legal complexity for Kazakhstan (also for Russia) is that the river heads of Irtysh are in SUAA. It follows from the international-legal documents that the owner of the river runoff formed at the territory of the concrete state is just that state. Therefore, it is authorized to dispose of these waters and as it means must do it rationally, i.e. without prejudice for ecology and economic activity over water areas and territories located downstream. However, nobody specially mentions (and per se, this problem isn't taken into account) is this state to be responsible for observing at least minimal sanitary codes and the corresponding expenses on water purification that state has to bears where polluted waters flow.

The Chinese party tries to soft-pedal the acutest problem associated with water intake level increasing from the rivers Irtysh and Ili. In all probability this tactics entails the intention to play along and finalize its projects in SUAA according to scheduled terms thereby confronting the neighbors with a fait accompli.

China changes gradually hydro-economic regime of Irtysh's part to its own advantage (it's about 70% of stream canal) thereby partly destabilizing water supply of the south of the West Siberia. Russia doesn't get for the present more than 2 cubic km of water in the year because of the Black Irtysh canal's change; Omskaya, Kurganskaya and Tyumenskaya oblasts can face with acute water shortages. Water intake from Irtysh brought to the water supply problems in the Northern Caucasus (for example, 300-kilometer-long channel Irtysh - Karaganda became substantially shallow). The corresponding member of the National academy of sciences of Kazakhstan, I. Seversky, supposes that because of China's interference into Irtysh's current its flow deficit will

be increased so that sanitary minimum water support will cause the great difficulties, one will have to refuse from navigation, fishery and the necessary lands flood. Cascade powers of the Irtysh hydropower plants are decreasing already at the territory of the republic.

According to project coordinators on water resources of the National ecologic center of Kazakhstan, K. Duskaev, the Irtysh water intake increasing can bring to ecologic catastrophe in the near Irtysh region literally in several years: “Water flowing into Irtysh and therefore into Ob from China is now polluted with heavy metals, oil products and nitrates”. “The Irtysh problem” is very urgent for Russia because Irtysh ranks N6 in the country on volumes of dumping of polluted sewage. There is a threat for a dangerous pollution of the river Tobol with many other confluent of Ob flowing into Russia from China. Chemical pollution of water is often of irreversible character. So, water resources recovery of Ob is under great doubt now.

The plans adopted by Peking without agreement with Russia on water use of the rivers and its confluent heading in China are fraught with the new economic and ecological risks for Russia and also for Kazakhstan. In spite of the fact that Irtysh is the transboundary river for Russia and China Peking appealing to the individual approach in every concrete case insists on the negotiations continuing concerning the Irtysh resources future only in bilateral format with Kazakhstan without Russia’s participation. In all probability the Chinese party doesn’t hurry to limit its economy to use water resources and all the more to accept a compromise with the partners to solve this problem supposing that a rapid continuous development of China’s economy supporting the needs of the large population of the country is impossible without adequate water supply.

The main economic priority of the Russian “water strategy” over the triangle area “Russia-Kazakhstan-China” is high technology

development on effective water use and water saving and all the more that our country has undoubted competitive advantages in this respect: Russia has its own rich experience to control water resources and also extensive knowledge on water specificity not only of Kazakhstan but of the whole Central Asia and also its hydrotechnical infrastructure stored during the decades. Russia could be successful in giving technical assistance in depreciated irrigation system reconstruction built during the soviet period; in assisting geological investigations on groundwater resource evaluation and also in space monitoring of water resource state.

“Aziya I Afrika segodnya”, M., 2010, N9, p. 34–38.

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