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FROM THE PAST TO THE FUTURE

**(The social order of new Russia in the context
of national historic experience)**

The almost twenty years of new Russia's history demonstrate the indifferent attitude of the citizens' majority to the values of freedom, democracy, private property, market and liberalism as components of the ideological foundation of the existing Constitution of the Russian Federation. Evidently, on the eve of the 1990s, having abandoned the Marxist-Leninist perceptions on development of society and state, the national political elite was unable to propose to society an adequate conception of social-political development. As a result, for the whole period of its formation new Russia has been in the state of a profound world look crisis, which prevented formation of the long-term political course of the country.

The results of sociological research prove the above said. The question concerning the perception on direction of the country's movement and on the national aims set by the present leadership in 2005 was responded in the following way: rather clear perception – 14% of the answers, rather vague perception – 41%, no perception – 22%, has been let taken its course – 18%. In the end of 2009, the results

showed greater despondency – 86% of respondents had no vision of the Russia's direction of movement.

It is not accidental that the images of the past dominate in consciousness of Russians. According to sociologists, Russians prefer state planning and distribution (from 36% to 58% of responses in various years) and the Soviet political system (from 24% to 48%); the social system based on private property and market relations causes less enthusiasm (from 28% to 40%) of respondents, while from 15% to 23% of respondents are attracted by western democracy. The political and economic system of contemporary Russia is considered as the best system as follows: from 13% to 36% of respondents. It is evident that the search is needed for new and untraditional approaches to elaboration of the conception of social order of the country.

The study of national historic process within the context of history of the world civilizations is in great need in the process of this work. As a founding principle there should be stressed the idea of V.O. Klyuchevsky that the crux of world history consists in the counter struggle between idealism and realism in all spheres of society's life, primarily in the sphere of "human spirit". As the scientist noted, the idealists are convinced that the destiny of the peoples is fixed by a certain reasonable basis and is determined by an ideal scheme of world structure. On the contrary, the realists do not recognize the existence of the supreme basis in history. Life of people, to their mind, should be saturated with practicality, wisdom, politicians' ability to see and to express the needs and interests inherent to different strata of the population, which should be taken into account in the course of the choice on the way of further society's development. Of great interest are also deliberations of great historian on the method of realistic study of society's life, which should foresee perception of the

origin, the course and conditions of forms and the nature of human common life.

One of the most significant features of research activities of philosophers of the past, which has a permanent theoretical-methodological meaning, is the intention to separate the scientific and the philosophic approaches in the course of study of society life. According to them, the subject of science is the reality, the facts, the environment; the subject of philosophy is the thinking, which is not limited either by time, or space, or natural and social environment. Just therefore the scientific method supposes an all-round comprehension of society's lie on the basis of veracious knowledge and not on speculative construction of this life according to ideal perception on it. Neither human activity, nor the process of its research can be surrendered to the despotism of the idea, as was stressed particularly by S.L. Frank. The consignation to oblivion of this truth always results in reproduction of the revolutionary-heroic principle, which is fatal for the mankind. Just due to this circumstance any adequate public force assuming the courage to influence the historic course of events should constantly remember that the state's good includes each just public interest of every citizen and every class, considered I.A. Ilyin.

Appraising via the prism of these ideas the contemporary situation of the national public thinking, the author regards that many approaches for study the problems of the public development in Russia are marked to a larger extent by philosophical and speculative and to a lesser extent by the scientific and concrete characteristic. And the significant fact is ignored that all mega-theories used more often as a methodological basis of contemporary studies of social systems of Russia appeared as a result of generalization of realities of quite another social environment, which was radically different from the Russian social environment; these theories are as follows: the formation theory

attributed to K. Marx and F. Engels, the civilization-confessional conceptions of M. Weber and S. Huntington, the civilization-national theories of A. Toinbi and F. Fukuyama, the theory of the post-industrial society of D. Bell and O. Toffler, the theory of forms of exchange of K. Polani and D. Dalton, the theories of the world-systemic analysis of F. Brodel and I. Wallerstine. O. Klyuchevsky with sagacity wrote: “We asked the West-European wisdom to come and to teach us to learn sense but we tried to replace it by our sense”.

The analysis of contemporary knowledge of society in the context of realism and idealism leads to another conclusion – the methodological exhaust and lack of perspective of the alternatives “capitalism – socialism”, “democracy – totalitarianism”, “liberalism – authoritarianism”, which are actively used by national researchers for the last decades in the course of comprehension of the sense of public systems’ problems. Keeping as a research device these alternatives being ideological rudiments of continuing ‘cold war’ the researchers condemn themselves to existence in captivity of mythic perceptions of history, theory, policy and practice of national social reforms. By conservation of the shaped study tradition the researchers will be never able to escape dogmatism and to start study of the social system of the Russian federation on the principally new theoretical-methodological orbit – the multiform and genuine scientific movement of research thinking.

The world history’s experience convincingly proved that the civilizations possessing a chance to use extensively the values and institutions of freedom, democracy, liberalism, private property and market finally have more advantageous conditions for the accelerated social progress, satisfaction of needs and interests of people. However, this experience demonstrates as well the following: all mentioned values and institutions are nothing else than the external

display of inner foundations of functioning of the corresponding social structures. In sum, the taking root in the social system of primary democratic or primary administrative methods, of liberal or authoritarian, of market or distribution principles is the result of not so much the subjective activities of participants of historic process as the consequence of the impact of the whole complex of objective circumstances inherent to each country (or a group of countries). Exactly these circumstances have a decisive influence on shaping of a certain social genotype.

The sense of each concrete genotype in some cases creates a rather comfortable environment but in other cases engenders a mighty mechanism, which hinders realization of the scenario chosen by the political elite. Just therefore the process of elaboration of reforming contemporary society should be started from the search for a certain genetic code, a paradigm of social development, which not only in the past but also at present determines the characteristic of reciprocal action, its aims and methods, determines the destiny of a number of attempts to change the historic course of development.

What is the national social genotype? In other words, what should be referred to the specifics of origin, formation and evolution of Russian civilization, to the nature of its difference from the West-European model of social order? According to P.N. Milyukov, in Eastern Europe the state organization was shaped earlier than the process of internal economic development could create it, while in West Europe the state order was the result of the internal process.

The European society and state were constructed organically upwards: the centralized power became the political superstructure above the previously shaped middle strata of landowners, which, in its turn, naturally grew out of the formed lowest strata of settled peasants. In Russia the system of social relations was constructed on the basis of

diametrically opposite principle – from top to bottom. In this case, the central political power by methods of compulsion fixed for itself the military-service class, which in its turn over-rode the peasants. This process was quite objective, since political superstructure in Rus – Russia became the result of the underdevelopment of lowest (economic, social and spiritual) strata of social life.

The emergence of this political state superstructure – the military-national state, inexplicable by the internal development process, was the explained result of external reasons, marked P.N. Milyukov. All essential features of Russian social history are explained by this preponderance of the external over the internal growth. But what are the external factors?

First, for the period since the VIII–IX centuries, the West Europe was not subjugated to external invasions, and this circumstance created very advantageous conditions for development of natural process of maturing the social relations' system. In a rather calm situation in numerous European states-principalities there was going on the process of social-economic, cultural and religious interests, which further started to dictate the necessity of creation of adequate forms of political relations of statehood. In a quite different way there were consolidated the social relations in Russia, where their origin was going on in the vast space characterized by the lack of exit to the sea and by nearness of steppe. The last factor had a great impact on the peculiarities of Russian history, since, as correctly mentioned S.M. Solovyov, the Russian state was primarily condemned for a constant hard work and permanent exhausting struggle against nomads in the steppes. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky, for 234 years (from 1228 to 1462), Rus endured about 160 external wars. The needed struggle for survival against the nomads of the steppe, against other enemies, which lasted to the end of the XVIII century, obliged Russia to use actually all existing

resources to keep the army in the struggle for preservation of independence. As a result, the task to ensure defense and security for many centuries subjugated to itself all other spheres of social life. The biggest part of the state expenses was used in order to form and keep military forces, and only about 30% or 10% of the state budget were devoted to its other items.

Second, the permanent state of war for many centuries was aggravated by a very disadvantageous demographic situation. Even for the XVIII–XIX centuries, when the tempos of population growth rapidly rose, this problem remained very complicated. For two centuries after governance of Peter I the population of Russia increased by 10 times (from 13 to 130 million people) making one third of the population of Europe. However, the indexes of population density were desperate: for the beginning of the XVIII century, only 3.7 persons accounted for one square km, while in the beginning of the XX century – 17 persons (for comparing: already in the XIV century the population density in France was 40 persons per square km, and in England in the XI century it made 21 person). It was extremely difficult to solve many problems with very limited human resources.

Third, the underdevelopment of economic relations had a great influence on the feature of social development. For a long period of time, when the process of formation of commodity-money relations and entrepreneurship was going on rapidly in Western Europe, Russia remained a mainly agrarian country with unfavorable natural-climatic conditions. The last circumstance determined a rather low level of agricultural production up to the middle of the XIX century. The situation was greatly aggravated by the extraordinary cycle of agricultural works for 125–130 days per year (from mid-April to mid-September). In the countries of West Europe this season was much

longer (and in some countries the interval between agricultural works lasted only from December to January).

For many centuries the Russian peasants cultivated non-fertile soil demanding hard work and lacked time for it. They also had not enough time for accumulation of fodder stocks, which caused permanent deficit of organic manure. The extremely low level of crop yield, the poor basis of cattle-breeding resulted in a relatively low amount of the aggregate surplus product inherent to Russian society. This circumstance to a large extent hindered the process of economic and, finally, of the general social development.

The mentioned and the other features had a great impact on the social-economic and political system of Russia. The mechanism of this impact was described very well by S.M. Solovyov in his time. The poor state lacks money due to poor industrial and trade development but has to keep a large army; therefore the state distributes lands to servicemen. The servicemen compete for the workforce to cultivate their lands. Since the state needs the army ready to start military actions, it takes the decision to fix the peasants to landowners, who should always have people to cultivate the lands, while they will be ready to serve in the army.

For a long time, the foreigners and Russians as well were amazed at this phenomenon: why the serfdom disappeared in West Europe but in Russia it was installed at the same time? At present, the science clearly shows the reason of this historic phenomenon. In West Europe thanks to its advantageous position the industrial and trade activities were consolidating, while private property for land was replaced by the other form of property in terms of money, and the rise of population and enrichment of the city liberated the village. And in the East the state appeared under the most disadvantageous conditions, with vast space and small population; the state was in need of big army to protect

its independence; the poor agricultural state was characterized by the known phenomenon in such case: the armed part of the population is supported directly by its non-armed part, the armed part of the population possesses the land, which is cultivated by the unarmed serf.

The measure taken to fix the peasants to the land was an action of state, which was in a desperate political and economic situation. The state did not limit itself with serfdom in relation to peasants, and due to the constant need in money the state demanded great payments from the people living in cities, from industrialists and merchants. This was only one distinction of the Russian city from the city of West Europe.

In West Europe emergence and development of the city was the result of internal economic needs. The city came forward out of the environment of Middle Ages in time, when the trade-industrial stratum gained in strength to protect its interests in its struggle against landowners. The city population was rapidly consolidated by including in its society the lower strata. The city union installed within the milieu of relations among its members the origins of freedom based on hundreds of city charters. For the XI–XII centuries, the city population jointly with middle-aged nobility participated in fixing the foundations of West-European statehood. Further the practice of city social life, based on the principle of self-organization, became the proto-type of West-European democracy.

The history of Russian cities and the city stratum differed a lot from the European example. The Russian city was not a natural product of internal national economic development, mentioned P.N. Milyukov. As a rule, the Russian cities were not the trade-economic but the administrative and defensive centers. This specific function was explained by the notion “gorod” – the guarded and protected place, a point of protection against the enemy.

The specific feature of Russian cities consisted in their close with agricultural production, the small number of the population and the financial-economic underdevelopment. Even in the middle of the XIX century out of 1000 cities in Russia 878 cities numbered less than 10 thousand residents and only 32 – over 20 thousands. In 1844, except St. Petersburg, Odessa and Nizhni Novgorod, not a single regional city had city budget over 40 thousand rubles, while in the half of the Russian cities this number even did not reach 20 thousand rubles.

Thus, the reality consisted of the whole roster of objective circumstances (the unfavorable geographic, natural-climatic, demographic conditions; the constant external aggressions; the need to use a great size of material and financial means for keeping the army etc.), which for many centuries reproduced in Russia a particular, using modern terminology, mobilizing type of social system. This type, according to O.V. Gaman-Golutvin, emerges as a means of organizing life of society under conditions of deficit of resources needed for development (financial, intellectual, foreign policy and other resources) and/or in case of overtaking the tasks of maturity's level of internal factors or development subjects confronting society.

Exactly this centuries-long contradiction between the permanently complicating tasks of historic reality and the existing amount of national resources reproduced the Russian special social genotype, which engendered both the all-mighty state basis and disposition to collective form of property and labor organization, to dominance of the state form of property, non-development of market economy and the power's dictate of lawlessness, the main principle of obligation, which left, in words of Klyuchevsky, an extremely small place for private, personal or estates' interests and sacrificed them to the demands of the state.

The mobilizing type of social order of Russia represented by itself a specific system of organization of economic life – “distributive economy”, which was thoroughly studied in the works of O.E. Bessonova, who as an author of the terminology stressed the following features of this economy.

The social-service characteristic of the property is displayed as follows: its parts are given to economic subjects according to the terms of its use; nobody possesses this property, since its parts are distributed among all participants of economic activities, who receive the access to the property in the form of service.

The service work is the participation in working process in the objects of social-service property for the sake of realization of certain functions in the interests of the whole society; it is the obligation determined by the conditions being external to each subject of economic management and connected with implementation of certain functions and obligations in the interests of the whole society.

The institution of distribution is a form of ensuring material conditions for fulfilling service obligations relating not only to distribution of objects of social-service property but also the scope of rights to determine the rights of possession and use of these objects, while they may be represented by all types of material and non-material assets: land, labor force, money, housing, services and food-stuffs.

The institution of deliveries in a form of achievement of industrial tasks and of formation of public wealth by means of reverse handing-over to society of the created and existing material wealth, services and resources from all subjects of economic management and private persons possessing parts of social-service property as a result of distribution.

The institution of administrative claims consists of systematic signals of reverse communication reflecting reaction of all participants of economic management to the emerging problems.

The coordination of the delivery-distribution flows comprises a moving mechanism of distributive economy, including a system of management and financial institutions servicing the delivery-distribution processes.

A number of contemporary scientists (A.A. Galkin, A.G. Fonotov, O.V. Gaman-Golutvin) correctly think that the mobilizing type of social order dominated for the main periods of Russia's existence – in time of Kiev Rus and in period of appanage principalities, in Moscow tsarist state, in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the analysis of facts of the contemporary Russian reality makes it possible to make the conclusion that the changes for the end of the XX century with outward resemblance with revolutions resulted in installation in Russian society of many external attributes of western civilization but actually did not radically changed the fundamental bases of the social system of new Russia.

The deep gap between the social-economic and cultural needs of the majority of the population and the existing size of resources for their satisfaction is quite evident; the situation is as follows: many features of distributing economy still exist, and the political and economic competition are actually absent in the country; the permanent forced participation of the state leadership in solving numerous problems far from being all-national ones – all this makes it possible to conclude that at present the mobilizing model usually dominates in social life of the Russian Federation. The whole epoch of origin, formation and development of national civilization, irrespective of different characteristics at its ideological stages (Moscow – Third

Rome, United and Undivided, Soviet Socialist, Liberal-Democratic) comes forward as a qualitatively homogeneous historic line characterized by dominance of mobilizing forms and methods of organizing all main spheres of life in society directed to self-preservation and survival of the nation.

It should be an axiom for every reasonable person that the mobilization type of social system is historically restricted and unfounded for the future of contemporary Russia. It is evident that life in Russia needs in principle a new quality, which will let move from the state of being satisfied with elementary needs of society to the state of social development. The historic experience in Russia logically leads to the conclusion the main strategic aim of reforms in Russia should consist in transformation of the mobilization type into the organic and self-developing type of social system with the features described below:

Orientation of social development process to the national aims, means and potentialities;

Domination in social life of human interests and not of state's interests;

Correlation between constantly growing needs of society and existing resources for meeting the requirements by existing resources;

Prevalence of human interests and needs but not administrative and all the more forceful methods in the system of stimuli of society's development;

Clear display of the principle of social self-organization and state de-regulation;

Transformation of balance of interests into the principal factor of dynamic, sustainable and self-dependent social development;

Omnipotence of law but not of political feasibility dictated by state officials;

Omnipotence of realism and the scientific basis constitute the founding principle of social life.

The last element has a special significance for transformation of mobilizing society into the organic entity, since realism should come forward not only as a final aim but also as a means of organizing daily work for reformation of the whole system of social relations. Realism is summoned to promote consolidation of completely new social-political activities in contemporary Russia based on the extensive use of scientific method of creation. This method is marked by a multidimensional feature, by a possibility to ensure the organic unity and dialectic correlation:

The needed correlation determined by requirements of Russia in the course of overcoming its present state to master all progressive achievements of highly developed countries;

The aspiring correlation dictated by the interests and feelings of the main strata of the population;

The probable correlation formed by the existing resources, dominating culture, consciousness, psychology and traditions of the people.

Naturally, application of this method will make the transfer from the mobilizing to the organic type of social order very complicated and intrinsically contradictory. As a matter of fact, the sense of the realistic method supposes that the principal (at the initial stage, in the essence of the matter, the sole) criterion of selection of forms and methods of creative social-political activities becomes not an abstract perception of advantage of democracy, freedom, private property, market and liberalism over their value and institutional antipodes, but is the capability in a short time with maximum efficiency to solve the urgent problems confronting the contemporary Russian society. The question

is the achievement of the primary all-known tasks in terms of their capacity, which is the must to count on a new quality of life.

First, there exists the need in a big rise of the Russian economy's efficiency and in the achievement on this basis of stably high tempos of the general national product (GNP). At present, Russia occupies 12th place in the list of the countries of the most developed economy. However, the actual amount of national production as a result of trade-industrial activities in 2006 (\$ 987 – in Russia, comparing with \$ 13164 – in the USA, \$ 4368 – in Japan, \$ 2897 – in Germany, \$ 2377 – in Great Britain, \$ 2248 – in France, \$ 1851 – in Italy) does not let ensure an adequately high level of living of the population: Russia is not a member of the group of 70 countries with the highest GNP per one person. The world history experience demonstrates that the society is capable to develop dynamically and to solve successfully the whole complex of confronting problems, if the annual tempos of growth of national wealth are stable and high, being not less than 5%. Following the essential reduction of this index for the 1990s, for the 2000s this index increased and made annually in average 7% from 1999 to 2008. However, the system of factors of this growth was far from being perfect: for the first five years the share of the structural component including fundamental bases of development was rather high, but for the following years the situation changed radically – the input of structural factors reduced, while 70%–80% of the GNP growth was attained due to conjuncture's factors, primarily, the high prices for energy bearers. Naturally, the fall of prices, side by side with reduction of the size of the exported from Russia energy bearers, under conditions of the world economic and financial crisis resulted in decrease of tempos of the national income's rise. For the sake of creation of conditions for sustainable development of Russian economy it is necessary to raise essentially the efficiency of production and

productivity of labor (at present making only 20%–30% of the indexes of the leading countries of the world) by means of radical changes in the business-processes, the outdated powers and production methods, in the structure of national economic complex.

Second, the demographic situation is the urgent problem to be solved immediately. As is known, the deficit of population is the centuries-long feature of Russia. However, for 500 years (from 1490 to 1990) the population was growing constantly, but for the first 15 years of formation of new Russia it actually stopped. For the last years, the demographic situation started to improve, but at present Russia occupies usually a stable place in the list of countries with a low population density – 8.3 persons for 1 square km (for comparison: in the USA – 30 people, in France – 110 people, in Italy – 192 people, in Germany – 230 people, in Great Britain – 246 people, in Japan – 337 people, in South Korea – 491 person, in China – 636 people for 1 square km). In case of conservation of the shaped trend, which makes the demographic situation in Russia a crisis in the best case and a catastrophe in the worst case, the population in the Russian Federation may decrease by 2050 to 120 million people (comparing with 142 million people in 2009). At the same time, if in 2005 the share of able-bodied people in the Russian population made up 63.1%, by the middle of the XXI century its share may be reduced to 49.1%. Being a realist, one should recognize that the problem of deficit of labor-bodied part of the population on the vast territory of Russia in the visible future should be solved not only by means of neutralization of the factors, which keep back the increase in the population in Russia, but also by a thoughtful and efficient policy in the field of migration.

Third, the problem of creating conditions for human capital development should be solved by means of intensive production factor of development of economy, society and family, including educated

part of human resources, knowledge, instruments of intellectual and governance work, the environment and labor activities. For the sake of efficient functioning of human capital in Russia it is necessary to create the competitive quality of life, including security, ecology, health care, education, housing conditions comparable with the level in the developed countries of the world. At the same time, it should be taken into account the following significant principal aspect: the stress made on the quality of life is determined both by objective need of overcoming backwardness of Russia in this sphere not only from highly developed but also from the countries of middle development, it is determined as well by the sustainable wish of the main part of the population to solve the problems of daily life of people. The latter is connected primarily with great changes in psychology and consciousness of the people in Russia.

For the end of the 1980s- the beginning of the 1990s, as is well known, the feelings of the people under the influence of the uncompromised struggle between “democrats” and “Communists” were marked by emotions and myths. However, further an essential rationalization of public opinion took place: by the end of the 1990s, the consciousness of the absolute majority of the citizens of Russia was not limited to “socialist” and “liberal-democratic” ideals – over 70% of the population in Russia regarded as their main priority in development of the country “arrangement of normal dignified life”. In the course of sociological reviews, responding to the question on the needed conditions of such life, citizens of Russia mentioned first good health (85%), material well-being (77%), stable family based on the separate housing (75%), good education (57%). This system of values dominated in the consciousness of Russians for the last decade.

The above described information shows that under contemporary conditions the people need not so much a great as more precisely a

normal Russia able to ensure an adequate quality of life comparable with the advanced countries of the world. The concentration of main forces and possibilities of society to create conditions for achievement of a high level of living for the people is the urgent task acquiring decision on the part of the national elite in the observed future. For the period of its achievement, one should comprehend (and should not make any tragedy out of this!) clearly that the applied forms and methods of work to attain a high level of living may be taken from both the liberal-democratic and the traditional national administrative-directive arsenal, within the framework of compliance with legislation, the main human rights and freedoms, and there may be acceptable any means ensuring the final result.

They are acceptable because without the radical change of quality of the people's life on the basis of rapid growth of the size of national wealth by modernization of all spheres of life of Russian society it is impossible to expect to achieve the strategic aim of constructing new Russia – the transfer from the mobilizing to the organic self-developing type of social system, which is the sole society able to create a favorable basis for the stable taking root of freedom, democracy and liberalism in Russia.

“*Svobodnaya mysl'*”, M., 2011, N 2, p. 71–86.

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**THE ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
AND STATE UNIVERSITIES OF RUSSIA**

The renaissance of Islamic education in Russia after the long interruption started in the middle of the 1980s and was going on in two directions: first, – the education was executed via summer schools at

the mosques, where the basics of Islam were taught to the population (adults and children); second, – through the system of religious education (Islamic medreces, colleges and institutions, universities, where the cadres of Muslim clergy were trained).

The religious education institutions appeared chaotically and independently from each other. They started the education process without unified curricular and training plans. Despite the fact that these education institutions were commissioned on the initiative of the Spiritual Departments of Muslims, their activities were deprived of any support on the part of any scientific-methodical or coordinating center. Each education institution was carrying out its activities self-dependently and actually solved its problems independently. They also confronted the problem of organizing vocational orientation. The contemporary professional education institutions, which were opened after a long intermission could not admit for education the graduates of maktab, since they also were in the process of creation. The religious education institutions admitted Muslims on the basis of the school programs.

For the 1990s, young Muslims of Russia could get Islamic education only abroad. For that period several thousands of young Muslims of Russia received the chance to leave for Islamic states for studies. Nevertheless, the process of the unprecedented mass exit of young Muslims to Islamic states for studies did not produce an adequate result for development of umma.

The main features having impact on the inefficient outcome of their studies was as follows: 1) the inadequate control over this process on the part of Muslim structures; 2) the full diversity in criteria of the students sent abroad. The entrance examination for Russians in Islamic higher education institutions were either pure formality or did not exist at all.

Thus, the foreign Islamic higher education turned out to be deprived of any value by such approach, when only some students were able to graduate from these education institutions. Of not lesser significance was the circumstance that Russia did not sign with any Muslim state an agreement of mutual recognition of their diplomas. This fact promoted creation of Muslim higher education institutions in Russia. However, the organizers of the education process lacked methodology and methods of teaching, and they did not have a chance to raise their education level. Some of them started to study history and traditions of Islamic education in Russia, which existed before the 1930s, but were unaware of the standards of contemporary professional education; or, on the contrary, the Spiritual Departments recruited for organization of the education process the people, who lacked the knowledge of the religious education's sense.

The restoration of professional Islamic education in Russia actually from zero had, except difficulties, some advantages: it was possible to organize the contemporary religious education at once without rebuilding old forms, which often is not easy to do. A chance existed to create in Russia at once a contemporary and optimal Muslim education system.

All Russian professional education institutions – both medreces and universities – were concerned about dissemination of general religious knowledge on Islam as a whole. But these perceptions have not been constructed into a system. Given the lack of Islamic theologians, the theoretical bases of education institutions' activities have not been elaborated. The curriculum able to comprehend religious problems has not been planned either. The inter-disciplines transfers are not maintained. The circular disciplines in the curricular have been selected by random. Although the directors of religious education institutions hold the view of the close inter-connection and mutual

supplementation of all disciplines, actually the integration of secular and religious disciplines takes place without due account of connections between them. This is the result of the lack of the united standard for religious education institutions, of centers for the methodic consultation, of the courses for improvement of trainers' skill.

The state accreditation supposes the control of the state education institutions, however, it should not be considered as a negative phenomenon: on the contrary, this kind of control will promote a more efficient work of Islamic education institutions. One should take into account that this control shall be executed not by ordinary officials but by professionals, by professors of secular state higher education institutions.

At present, two higher education institutions – Moscow Islamic University and Russian Islamic University (Kazan) – arrange the education process according to the state standards of “Theology”. The integration of circular and religious disciplines in these two higher education institutions is effected differently, and each higher education institution has selected its own way of development. In MIU the adoption of the state education standard was the result of decision to solve the problems emerging in the process of education. The experience shows that the integration of secular and religious disciplines goes on successfully.

The other professional Islamic religious education institution – Kh. Faizkhanov Nizhni Novgorod Islamic Institute carries out the work in the field of preparing a material-technical and education-methodical basis. At present, the directorate and the trainers pay a great attention to writing and publishing of text books. It is necessary to mention a series of books on the main legal norms of the Khanafit school education.

At present, the professional training of specialists in the sphere of “Islamic theology” is practiced mainly in the religious education

institutions. Since 2008, the education program “Theology” jointly with the Islamic block of disciplines is realized in GOU VPO “Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University”. The active work of the State for Islamic Education and of the Spiritual Departments is needed in this direction. The state should give financial support also to the religious education institutions to maintain a high quality of education. Its quality should be improved by means of methodical assistance and by increase of the teachers’ salaries. The teachers of the religious education institutions do not enjoy social protection and do not have any benefits and guaranties, and the system of their qualification improvement has not been organized. One of the main objectives in the field of religious education should be the rise of social status and professionalism of educators and the support given to them by the state and the public circles. The graduates from religious education institutions turn out to be in the complicated position.

For the 2000s, the authorities paid attention to problems of Islamic education. They implemented a number of projects aimed at unification of education programs and elimination of radical ideologies in education programs. In 2002, the president of the Russian Federation charged the Ministry of Education and Science of the RF in a short time to elaborate a complex of measures for organizational, material and methodical assistance aimed at development of religious and primarily Muslim education. For the sake of implementation of this assignment as well as for achievement of great tasks for support of traditions and culture of the peoples of Russia traditionally professing Islam, for the sake of education in the sense of inter-national and inter-confessional tolerance and for preventive measures relating to extremism the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia in cooperation with higher education institutions within its competence and jointly with spiritual (Islamic) education institutions has elaborated and implements for some

years (since 2005) a complex of measures aimed at attaining the set tasks by means of creating a system of training specialists in history and culture of Islam. Due to various objective and subjective reasons these activities were carried out quite recently, and therefore this process has just been started. Nevertheless, recently a rather great amount of work was carried out; and the organs of the executive power (Administration of the President of the RF, the Ministry of Education and Science etc.) as well as Muslim public and religious figures participated in this complex work, which is directed to several spheres.

The Foundation for Support of Islamic Culture, Science and Education should be mentioned among other means. The Trusteeship Council of the Foundation accumulates and distributes among Muslims in Russia the moneys received from Islamic states via OIC and other organizations.

At the federal level, the thorough work is carried out to train cadres for the Spiritual Departments of Muslims in Russia. As an example, the Ministry of Education and Science of the RF regularly convenes conferences devoted to development of Muslim education in Russia. The State Duma of the Russian Federation discussed the issues of preventing by legislation the attempts to radicalize Russian umma, particularly in the milieu of the youth. The purposeful presidential program of training in circular higher education institutions of cadres for the Spiritual Departments of Muslims is successfully implemented in Russia.

Thus, the complex activities aimed at restoration and development of national system at the Muslim spiritual and education institutions have been started. Given the systemic approach to this work, for several years it will be possible to arrange training of loyal Muslim clergy's cadres able to participate in the constructive dialogue.

In its turn, it will contribute to prevention of dissemination of radical and extremist ideas in Muslim environment of Russia.

A significant step in development of Islamic education both in Moscow and in Russia as a whole became establishment in 2005 of the Council for Islamic Education at the Council of Muftis of Russia. The Council for Islamic Education adopted the corresponding standard for each stage in order to construct the integrated system of education in relation to basics of Islam and of training specialists in the middle and the highest religious levels of the personnel. All education institutions will work according to the united standard. The education institutions may apply the proposed programs and curricular, prepared by the Council for Islamic Education, or may elaborate their own programs according to the standards.

The scheme of constructing the system of contemporary Islamic education in Russia was adopted; it includes the primary religious education, the general high religious education, the stage of high professional education and three directions of higher education: Koran sciences, shariat sciences and Islamic theology. The close connection is being arranged among these stages. Some other problem is being gradually solved in this way: ensuring continuity of various levels of Islamic education and succession of education and enlightenment processes, which makes it possible to maintain activities of different parts of the system and to arrange vocational training.

What direction should be fixed for integration of higher Islamic educations in Russia? At present, the standard of education direction “Theology” has been worked and adopted with qualification of the bachelor received by the first holders of this diploma. But there is no need to adopt the united religious standard, and therefore there are no and there will be no standard state diplomas (since this sphere is out of competence of the state), and in each higher education institution the

religious education directions and professions differ a lot like their education programs. Thus, there are no united criteria of evaluation of the higher education institutions' activities in terms of their quality. The Olympic competitions in Arabic and Islamic sciences among representatives of various Islamic higher education institutions may present only indirect information on the quality of the graduates' training.

The lack of integration is the result not only of the administrative division of Muslim umma by its centers (TsDUM, CMP, KTsMCK) but also the absence of a united comprehension of the aims and tasks of activities of Islamic higher education institutions. For instance, in the middle of the 1990s, the following point of view was widely spread: the Islamic higher education institutions represent by themselves the center of training of highly educated imams – the religious activists. This view on the conception of the higher Islamic religious education is shared by the functionaries of the Spiritual Departments of Muslims and by muftis and was shaped by the middle of the 1990s, when rapid construction of new mosques in big cities was accompanied by a great lack of cadres. This position was considered as an adequate point of view by the leaders of biggest Islamic foundations and Maecenas of flourishing states of the Persian Gulf and ensured the inflow of the sponsors' money for accommodation of these universities. The representatives of the intellectual circles postulate the quite different approach. They think that the contemporary Islamic higher education institution should form primarily Muslim intellectuals, who are equally educated in the sphere of the so called religious and in the secular sciences, who organically correlate in themselves both identities (general-civic and Muslim) and are ready to work both in Muslim and in circular institutions – in the sphere of education, in state offices, in

mass media etc. Up to the present time there is no final response to the answer – what is the way further ahead.

“Mir cherez yazyki, obrazovanie, kulturu: Rossiya-Kavkaz-Mirovoe soobschestvo”, Pyatigorsk, 2010, p. 184–190.

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THE CONFLICTING PROCESSES IN KARACHAYEVO-CHEKESSIA (2008–2010)

The conflict generative situation in the North-Caucasian region is determined by a complex of problems with historic roots and by the new problems emerging in various spheres of life of the regional society. Given the internal dispersion of the North Caucasus, the conflict generative situation in the region and its determining characteristics, these phenomena are different on its territories. Since 2008 and particularly since the end of 2009, the escalation of inter-ethnic tension was growing in Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Political scientists and journalists more often compare the present situation with the situation shaped in the republic for the period of presidential elections in 1999. Nevertheless, in terms of its substance it differs greatly from the situation ten years ago.

After the period of a relative stabilization of ethnic-political processes in Karachayevo-Cherkessia the new escalation of tension for the period of 2008–2010 was the result of the non-constructive reciprocal action of the state authorities and of a number of public organizations with each other and with the republican power. And one of them, namely the most active – “Adyge Khase” of Karachayevo-Cherkessia constantly and directly makes its requirements to the regional and even the federal power. The most acute contradictions are

as follows: a) the demand to recognize “the genocide of Cherkessians” in the course of the Caucasian war; b) the demand of creation of the Cherkessian Autonomous Republic; c) the demands relating to the representation of Cherkessians in the organs of the republican power.

The public organizations apply manipulation of history as a main means for justification of their demands. All interested subjects use it according to their possibilities. Apart from the traditional claims related to the Caucasian war and deportation in the period of the Great Patriotic war they more often return to the Great Patriotic War itself in the unusual context. For instance, the mutual reproaches of Cherkessians and Karachais connected with the heroic emotions of the ethnic reality of the period of the Great Patriotic War were reflected in articles published in “Vestnik Kavkaza” and “Express Pochta”. Such publications will hardly promote arranging harmonic relations between ethnic communities in Karachayev-Cherkessia. The republican office of the republican attorney conducted verification of the published facts, which caused indignation of representatives of public-political publications.

Nevertheless, the procurator’s supervision includes only the legal aspect of the issue, and therefore there exists a real opportunity to introduce into mass consciousness the ideological schemes, which divide the regional society by means of formulas without signs of breach of law.

Since the beginning of the last decade the historic factor ceased to play the leading role in the regional conflicting process in the South of Russia. But having gone to the periphery it is actualized depending on its aims set by different ethnic entrepreneurs. It is impossible to stop the process of formation of identities, and therefore the principal task shall be directing this process to the constructive channel. In this connection, one should speak not only about the need of refutation of a

destructive information (mass media is the resource of it) but also about re-animation of the positive historic memory, which is common for all objects of the state national policy of the Russian Federation. It seems that by means of the education system it will be possible to defend the paradigm traditional for Russian political reality and to oppose the trend of manipulation by military history.

At present, mass media more often informs about the rise of ethnic-political tension and development of destructive conflicts. For instance, on 18 February 2010, a mass scuffle of the youth took place in the center of Cherkessk, and it was repeated on 19 February near the building of the state technological academy. The number of their participants made from 300 to 500 people, armed with improvised means (the Cherkessians and Abazins, on the one part, and the Karachais, on the other part, participated in the disturbances). This information was proved by “Regnum”, which used information submitted by S. Skripka, the minister of internal affairs for Karachayev-Cherkessia.

According to “Kavkazski uzel”, such events take place rather often. At the same time, the needed measures for searching the instigators of mass disturbances and instituting proceedings against them were not taken. Meanwhile, P. Khasanov, the deputy chairman of the organization of the Karachai people “Tere” asserted that there was no opposition between the Cherkessian and the Karachai youth in the region.

Nevertheless, on 1 March 2010, the working meeting of the collegian of the Public Council at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic was held with the aim of attracting the attention of public circles to the repeated cases of inter-national clashes of groups of the youth in the republic. According to S. Skripka, the similar events were taken place in Cherkessk since October 2009 and that it was necessary

to take rigid measures to prevent a further development of such events with clear nationalist feelings and to prevent its transformation into a mass counteraction. Since the end of 2009, the militia officials prevented four probable gatherings of the youth in Cherkessk and in aul Psyzh, where the situation aggravated since the middle of January 2010. The situation, according to S. Skripka, might imitate the similar scenarios of conflicts in Yandyk, Salsk, Kondopoga, Volsk and Stavropol. As he stressed, it was necessary to stop keep silent about such events and to inform residents of the republic about the significance of the situation and about the threat of the repeated events of 1999.

At present, the discussion on reciprocal action of the authorities and institutions of civil society is going on taking measures to prevent conflicts: a) the information coming in good time from the law enforcement bodies, compliance with the right of journalists to get information; b) discussion of the problem in education institutions, at meetings of residents at the place of living; c) confirmation of the ethic legal subject; d) liquidation of gaps in education of the youth; e) social-economic development of the region.

However, in spite of existing chances for optimization of the present situation, the conflicting process develops rather in accordance to the negative scenario. On 14 March, A. Zhukov, one of the leaders of the Cherkessian youth movement was assassinated, and on 15 March his burial took place. On the same day, his relatives, having returned from the cemetery, initiated an action of protest, which involved about hundred people. The protestors demanded to punish the killers of A. Zhukov. The indignation of the protestors was caused by the official version of the assassination, which differed from the meaning of the protestors, namely – it was a political criminal act.

The attendants of the meeting formulated the demand: the restoration of the autonomous status of the republic and nomination of a person of Russian nationality to the post of its president, as well as compliance with the rotation of cadres. M. Cherkesov, the chairman of the public organization of Cherkessians “Adyge Khase” declared: “We have no other way out of it”. This point of view is being disseminated within the Cherkessian community.

T. Zhuzhayev, the chairman of the youth organization “Adyge Khase” said in his interview to “Nezavisimaya gazeta” that he jointly with A. Zhulov not once had to stop mass disturbances with strikes of the Karachai and Cherkessian youth, which often were started as an everyday occurrence and usually acquired a national feature. Before the assassination of A. Zhukov the activists of “Adyge Khase”, including T. Zhuzhayev, were repeatedly threatened. Thus, in this way the information context is being formed, which proves existence in the republic of significant inter-ethnic problems primarily in the environment of the youth (the people, who urge towards reduction of the level of conflicts, confront the other people, who get benefits from this conflict).

The Coordinating Council of the leaders of national public organizations was established due to aggravation of inter-ethnic relations. The position of the representatives of the Karachai public organizations remains unclear: all leaders, except the Karachai leaders, of the public organizations joined the Coordinating Council. The leader of public movement “Jamaat” Khachirov was nominated as its representative in the Coordinating Council, but on the following day his candidature was repudiated. Nevertheless, the chairman of the public movement “Rus” of Karachaev-Cherkessia N. Khokhlachev expressed his intention to come to an agreement with “Jamaat” and to arrange cooperation with this movement. The position of the Karachai public

organizations may be interpreted as an opposition to the general course to harmonization of inter-ethnic relations in the republic, which has a high conflicting potential. The representatives of the Cherkessian public organizations more often see “the restoration of autonomy” as the only way out of this situation.

On 28 April 2010, B. Ebzeyev, the president of Karachayevo-Cherkessia dismissed the government and nominated M. Kemov as the acting chairman of the government. B. Ebzeyev proposed to the parliament of the republic a candidature of the new head of the government before the May festivities. According to unofficial information it was F. Shebzukhov, an advisor to the president (the Cherkessians were interested in this candidature). On 12 May, he was assassinated in Cherkessk. This crime caused a great public resonance in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and in the adjacent regions. B. Ebzeyev called this killing as a political crime. This meaning did not contradict the opinion expressed by mass media and was shared by public opinion.

On 14 May 2010, the public movement “Adyge Khase”, including its youth organization, jointly with residents of the republic, held an extraordinary meeting for discussion of the known assassinations, the crimes committed in the republic. The situation was very tense. The idea of “restoration of autonomy” in public consciousness of the Cherkessian people in this context may acquire a special urgent feature, supplemented by the theme of “genocide” of the Cherkessian people. On 21 March 2010, the conference, held in Tbilisi and titled “Hided Nations, Continued Crimes: the Cherkessians and the peoples of the North Caucasus between the past and the present time”, adopted the resolution “On Recognition of Genocide of the Cherkessian People in the Russian Empire for the XIX century”. The corresponding request was sent to the parliament of Georgia. The international scientific conference was organized by American “Jamestown

Foundation” and the International School of Study of the Caucasus at the Tbilisi State University. N. Tsiklauri, the head of the Georgian parliamentary group of friendship with the peoples of the Caucasus, declared that the parliament of Georgia was ready to start the work relating to recognition of “genocide” against the Cherkessian people. “The group of friendship with the peoples of the Caucasus is ready to promote discussions. With this view, the parliament will arrange meetings with public representatives and representatives of non-governmental organizations”, said he.

At present, “promotion of discussion” is the most efficient means of aggravating the situation, since the initiative of public organizations is rather powerful but is not reflected in the needed realization – the authorities in Russia rarely pay attention to this theme. Thus, the Georgian party, which before August 2008 claimed for the status of “locomotive” for development of inter-national relations in the Caucasus, tries to put this situation under its control and to direct its development to the needed channel.

The Russian authorities prefer to keep silent about this problem. Although from the legal point of view “genocide of the Cherkessians” (Adygs) is not a historic fact, from the political point of view for a long time it is the fact of social-political life of the contemporary society. The discourse practice about recognition of “genocide” makes it possible to develop the paradigm’s conflict using the dissatisfaction of the population as a mobilizing factor especially, as at present only one line is being developed. Thus, a further destabilization of the republic in the ethnic-political sphere becomes quite probable. It is necessary to admit existence of the problem and to substantiate impossibility of recognizing “genocide” from the legal point of view and to see the probable damage of such recognition, from the political point of view.

Nevertheless, at present the Cherkessian organizations of Russia do not have a united meaning concerning recognition of “genocide” at the conference, held in Georgia, and on restoration of the autonomy. For instance, “Adyg Khase” of Kabardino-Balkaria declared: “the Adygs are satisfied with their form of existence in contemporary Russia in three self-dependent subjects of legal equality in the RF – Adygeya, Karachayev-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, and there is no question to unite them into one republic”. On the contrary, deputy chairman of the Cherkessian Congress of Adygeya Z. Dzeukozhev said: “We are separated. The creation of the SKFO will further divide our peoples. Before taking such decision the federal authorities should ask the local population whether the people want it”.

The theme of “genocide” directed against the Cherkessian people in perspective may be applied in connection with the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. At present, this theme is being realized within the framework of a moderate-negative scenario: the question is the appeal of the International Cherkessian Association to the President of Russia D. Medvedev, adopted at the meeting in Nalchik on 27 February 2010, with the assertion: “the Organizational Committee of the Olympic Games ignores history and culture of the indigenous population of the Black Sea region – the Cherkessians (Adygs)”. A. Khloponin, the political representative of the President of Russia in the NCFD declared that the House of Culture of the Caucasus would be created and that nobody would question the use of the Caucasian themes at the Olympic Games, which only stresses the need to apply the ethnic policy, although the economic sphere is the main direction of activities of the political representative.

In June 2010, the delegates of the Extraordinary Congress of the Cherkessian People, held in the capital of Karachayev-Cherkessia, adopted the resolution, which was sent to the president of Russia

D. Medvedev, chairman of the government V. Putin, the political president in the North-Caucasian Federal District A. Khloponin with the requirement to restore the Cherkessian autonomy in the Russian Federation with the republican status. The congress adopted the decision providing for creation of the inter-national commission to restore the autonomy. The fact of adoption of this resolution does not change anything: the idea, having existed for a long time and having taken root in political reality of Karachayevo-Cherkessia and in the Caucasus as a whole, has actualized again and has acquired an official form. The president of the Karachayevo-Cherkessian Republic B. Ebzeyev in his interview said that the congress, held on 5 June, confirmed the decisions of the analogous congresses, held in 1994 and in 1995. In words of political observer K. Kazenin, it was easy to foresee the decision of the congress, since the Cherkessian public activists declared that just such decision would be adopted. When “the ball” is on the side of the federal center, all people ask what will answer the federal center or whether it will give its answer at all to this initiative.

Of significance is just the process of this idea realization: the question is the answer of “the center” and the methods of implementation of this idea in the future. As reported “Regnum”, citing some sources in “Adyge Khase”, “the Cherkessian public organizations will form their further strategy on the basis of the federal center’s decision relating to the requests made by the congress”. B. Ebzeyev mentioned: “The principal question is, what objectives are being pursued by these people. Peace, consent, mutual understanding, mutual settlement of the issues confronting the united republic, or evil and hatred among the peoples and the split of the republic and the mire to satiate with?! Think about it”.

To the author's mind, one should pay special attention to the situation relating to the so called "Cherkessian problem" in the context of the coming Olympic Games. The scenario of "Olympic" conflict development with due account of the fact that the Cherkessian public organizations in Russia and abroad will further support their point of view about "genocide", despite the lack of united meaning on creation of the autonomy or "Great Cherkessia", will be subject to influence of the following factors: a) the geopolitical factor; b) the social-economic factor; c) the political factor.

According to Z. Brzhezinski, the Caucasus is included in the so-called "Eurasian Balkans" – the element of a vast region designed by the author as a zone of instability. Z. Brzhezinski writes that the Eurasian Balkans are of great significance from the point of view of historic ambitions and ambitions of security, at least, of three the closest and mightiest neighbors, exactly, Russia, Turkey and Iran, while China also lets to know about its increasing political interest to the region. In light of recent events and perspectives, it is possible to say that the situation in Abkhazia, which is the situation of conflict with Georgia and has been recognized as an independent state by Russia, is of lesser significance than the risk of emergence of crisis relating to the Olympic Games in 2014, although the latter may be additionally completed by the first one. This risk is significant at the regional (in wide sense) and geopolitical levels in the context of ensuring regional security, social-economic and political development of the South of Russia, the macro-region, which includes the North-Caucasus Federal District.

As far as the political factor is concerned, primarily one should again mention the threatening trend to destabilization of inter-ethnic relations in Karachayev-Cherkessia in respect of "the Cherkessian-Karachai population", the theme of "genocide against the

Cherkessians", as well as the growing terrorist activities on the whole territory of the North Caucasus Federal District, directed against undermining of the civil-state efforts taken in the sphere of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the region. Of great significance is the role of economy in life of republican society: the social-economic diversity and polarization of incomes, the lack of equal chances in the professional sphere; these phenomena in the field of education, culture, health care etc. raise the level of social tension and become one of the main conflicting factors in life of the republic.

The aggravation of the regional risks in the North Caucasus as a whole and in Karachayev-Cherkessia, in particular, may be reduced by the anti-conflicting management, including analysis of the complex of regional problems reflected in ethnic-political conflicts. At present, the regional risks are concentrated in the ethnic-political and ethnic-confessional spheres. It is possible to ensure the sustainable development of the North Caucasus only by means of minimization of these risks. The systematic monitoring of regional problems is the basis of anti-conflicting management. This monitoring is carried out by scientists of the Southern Scientific Center of the RAS, who since 2006 publish the *Atlas of the social-political problems, threats and risks in the South of Russia*.

The management of risks as an operation state functioning requires determination of their hierarchy and constant precision with due account of dynamics of regional processes. In this connection, of great urgent significance is elaboration of methods of the risks' appraisal. It is necessary to integrate the knowledge of social, economic, political and spiritual life in the region into a united information-analytical block. The creation of scenarios of regional development with due account of all exogenous and endogenous

factors, the creation of the strategy of realization of positive scenarios opens great chances.

“Yug Rossii: Problemy, prognozy, resheniya”,
R. n./Д., 2010, p. 108–117.

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**WILL THE CAUCASUS STAND
THE LAST CHANCE IN 2020?**

The attempt to have a look at the North Caucasus (NC) in the future of 10 years ahead confronts a number of difficulties. First, the contradictory, even incompatible trends constantly exist in this part of the Russian Federation (RF); second, it is necessary to take into account the subjective factor, i.e. the activities of individual politicians, who take decisions. The personal factor plaid always a very great, often exclusive, role in the semi-traditional Caucasian society. For any reasons one could hardly expect that any scenario whether optimistic or inertial (which should be regarded as negative) will be able to proceed successfully. The situation in NC is inseparably connected with the situation in RF itself, but the perspectives for the nearest decade are marked by a great uncertainty. Recalling the prognoses of the beginning of the 1990s, one has to say that gloomy suppositions turned out to be nearer to the truth: for this period two wars and some local conflicts took place in NC. On the other side, the most tragic variant – the exit of NC from the RF structure and the total civil war – nevertheless, did not occur. For the period of twenty years ago, the pessimistic prognoses prevailed, and they usually discussed the crisis and the way of its development. In 2010, the power proposed a variant of exit out of the

north Caucasian crisis. Thus, the “bi-scenario” approach to some extent was justified.

In the end of 2009, Moscow declared “reloading” of the policy in the Caucasian direction. The president of the RF declared the creation of a new North-Caucasian Federal District (NCFD) and nominated A. Khloponin as the political representative of NCFD, having restored the almost disappeared hopes for improvement of the situation in the region. Indirectly, this step demonstrated that the Center recognized the failure of the former course and intended either refute or correct it. The creation of NCFD with the regions of similar problems gives hope of their complex solving, including political tension, existence of armed opposition and radical Islam. The selection of A. Khloponin, the governor of the Krasnoyarsky krai for the post of the political representative was determined by two circumstances: first, his successful activities as the governor, second, his non-involvement in the Caucasian political intrigues. Thanks to his independence of the local elites he should take self-dependent decisions, keeping aside from the shaped clannish, bureaucratic and corruptive schemes. The high post of the vice-premier of the Russian government contributes to the authority of Khloponin. The new course and nomination f Khloponin were originally related to certain negative aspects. The lack of work’s experience in the Caucasus is not only an advantage of Khloponin but also his disadvantage. At the same time, not all politicians in the North Caucasus expressed his support to creation of the new district. The local politicians expressed their concern about extensive authorized power of “Moscow governor-general” and his additional control over their activities, including the financial sphere. It should be worth mentioning R. Kadyrov, the head of Chechnya, who had created confidential and informal relations with premier V. Putin; Khloponin

for Kadyrov is an additional and unnecessary “intermediate” step in contacts with the highest leadership of the country.

The expert community views on a chance to change the regional situation are marked by the evident division. The analysts, close to the power, express their expectation in favor of inevitable positive changes, while independent experts express skepticism. They regard creation of the new district and nomination of Khloponin as a palliative: the replacement of politicians instead of actual modernization. The official optimism relating to NCFD and nomination of Khloponin do not seem to be convincing. The “new course” seems rather to demonstrate how the power cherishes a desperate hope that a newcomer to the Caucasus with his magic wand suddenly will be able to use “the golden key” to solve its problems. It seemed that Putin–Medvedev tandem in this way wanted to replace the liability for the Caucasus to the outside successful manager. Nevertheless, creation of NCFD and nomination of Khloponin were the starting point of the probable optimistic scenario. His alternative remains the inertial scenario, i.e. the existing situation in NC. In the beginning of 2010, an impression might emerge that the new course consists of two parallel directions: first, – the social-economic, innovation direction, while the political representative is liable for it; the second, – the maintenance of stability, the struggle against terrorism, which continues to carry out its activities. The power enforcement bodies are liable for the second direction.

In January 2010, the president of the RF D. Medvedev at his meeting with the head of the North Ossetia T. Mansurov said that the key of solving the problems of the district and its regions consists not in raising passions and constantly repeating talks on the rooted in the region problems: criminality and terrorism...The key exists in the social-economic development. The president spoke also about advisability of achievement of the first results already in 2010. The

“Khloponin scenario” did not suppose a detailed elaboration of the new approach to stability’s maintenance. Meantime, it is difficult to expect stability without elaboration of new measures, and it is impossible to carry out a new social-economic course without stabilization.

First, the question is the limitation of the forceful component of the federal policy. The stress on forceful actions has been kept since the second Chechen war; but if in the beginning of the 2000s it was justified, today it has been reduced to zero. The special operations of the local and federal law enforcement bodies cause enmity and fright of the great part of the population promoting the rise of hidden and evident sympathies to the fighters. The peaceful population suffers often due to forceful actions. It is very significant to minimize the number of victims among civil persons.

Second, it is important to make officials of the law enforcement bodies comply with the law, to exclude unlawful detainments and use of tortures, to forbid practice of “collective punishments”, when punitive measures are applied to relatives of the participants of the armed resistance.

Third, it is necessary to find out a certain form of recognizing the radicals as an opposition and to adopt a differentiated attitude towards the participants of the protest movement.

Fourth, there should be created normal conditions for contacts and dialogue with the differently thinking Muslims, with bearers of non-traditional Islam, including those, who share fundamentalist and other ideology. This kind of informal experience has been already accumulated. The reduction of the high level of passions is promoted by consent initiatives of local politicians, for instance of Yunus bek-Evkurov, the president of Ingushetia, who addressed to Khloponin with the request on pardon or release of those, who went to underground but

did not commit grave crimes and was ready to return to normal and peaceful life.

Fifth, of significance is the establishment of practice of public judicial processes over participants of the armed underground. It might provide the power with an additional argument for justification of its truth and simultaneously to deprive extremists of the halo of heroic fighters for justice.

Sixth, finally, the Administration should admit its mistakes and the people, who are liable for these mistakes, should be punished. It is able to raise its low level of authority in the eyes of the population.

It is evident that after the long-term opposition and mutual cruelty it is very difficult to make concession and to stress consent so much, as under the conditions of the uninterrupted terrorist activities. G. Khan, an American researcher on the basis of his analysis of Russian published materials demonstrated the dynamics of terrorist acts in NC. For 2010, the activities of terrorist not only intensified but after a decrease for some years were extended outside the borders of the region – in March two terrorist acts in Moscow subway resulted in 40 assassinated persons. In November 2009, the train “Nevski Express” Moscow–St.-Petersburg was exploded. In the region itself the terrorist acts became almost daily occasions: for the period of 2009–2010, the attempts at life of the heads of three Caucasian republics took place, in July 2010 the terrorist act took place at the Baksanskaya GES in Kabardino-Balkaria. It shows the permanent high potential of extremist both in military-technical and human resources terms. In some sense, the terrorist intensified activities may be considered as the response to the declared new policy of Moscow in the North Caucasus. The radicals are afraid not of more rigid forceful measures, since they have learned how to respond to them, but they are afraid just of their

weakening, since it leads to marginalization of the fighters and complicates recruitment of their new supporters.

It is useless to try to achieve a complete unification of Islam under the aegis of local Spiritual Departments or to try to strengthen the prestige of local Spiritual Departments of Islam to direct their activities for the sake of separation of the region's Muslim from extremists. Islam always combined different trends in terms of theology and ideological aspirations. Therefore the optimistic scenario supposes not even the consensus among various trends but the transfer of discussion mainly into the theological framework. It is impossible to de-politicize Islam completely, the more so, since certain secular politicians, for instance, R. Kadyrov, urge towards politicization. The measures mentioned above may help to decrease tension, i.e. to approach to realization of the optimistic scenario, although this bargain may look to be naïve and not attainable in the nearest time. The risks are very high, and the main risk is as follows: the enemies of the power may regard it as a display of the power's weakness. On the other side, for the next decade a complete victory over the radical religious opposition seems to be impossible. The main real probable aim is weakening of the protest movement, its deprivation of new recruited young supporters. Given wise actions on the part of the authorities, the terrorist acts will cease to be committed systematically. One may reckon also that it would be possible to stop the practice of strikes delivered on infrastructure started by the fighters since 2009.

The inertial scenario supposes that the stress on the dominant forces will be kept, while the mentioned measures will not be used. The continuation of the former (slightly corrected) policy will mean the existence of the same responded reaction on the part of the fighters. The events will go on in a circle "challenge-response-challenge"; the enmity of the local population and disbelief in the ability of the

authorities to stabilize the situation will grow. In May 2010, Khloponin declared that he is interested in taking part in the process of nomination of any federal officials. A new staff of officials of the law enforcement bodies was formed in NCFD under his guidance. His advisor was nominated A. Edelev, while E. Labezin kept the post of the head of the Principal Department of the MIA of the RF for NCFD. Moscow seems to let Khloponin be in charge of purely economic affairs, leaving the issues of security to the competence of the adepts of the old policy. Some declarations of federal politicians, including Khloponin, cause concern, since the latter said that under the mask of terrorism and religious extremism... there tried to work the bandits' organized criminal groups, which were engaged in re-distribution of property. The similar words are comprehended in the Caucasus as follows: "on the top" the region is perceived as a bandits' hotbed. As a result, the option of the inertia scenario only increases.

The liquidation of the leaders of the radical group by itself does not permit to change the situation in NC. Evidently, the law enforcement bodies will not renounce this tactic, and there will be a lot of words about liquidation of the fighters' leaders and of total band formations. The polemics on the choice between the force priority and the more subtle and "soft" line confronts the direct question: is it possible the very rigid policy carried out by R. Kadyrov to spread to the whole Caucasus? Most politicians and experts consider that application of the Chechen experience of "pacification" to the whole region is fraught with the responded force and public disturbances. According to G. Khan estimates, in Chechnya there were killed 34 fighters in 2008 and 98 fighters – in 2009. In August 2010, the minister of internal affairs of Chechnya R. Alkhanov informed that since the beginning of the year there were liquidated 48 and detained 128 fighters. The number of fighters participating in military actions against Kadyrov is

unknown, but it is evident that they enjoy support of a part of the population, including the close circle of Kadyrov himself.

On the other side, both in Moscow and the Caucasus there exists a kind “enchantment” by successes of Kadyrov, who owing to his cruelty was able to achieve certain stability, unlike events in Dagestan and Ingushetia, where armed forceful acts take place actually every day. It is possible to hear in these republics that in Chechnya the order has been installed though and in due time even more rigid measures might be needed in other republics. In case of Dagestan it will lead to a tragedy. Given this development of events, the inertial scenario will become a catastrophe; instability acquires a deep chronic characteristic. The social disturbances will spread to the still rather fortunate western part of the region, where the significant pre-conditions have shaped for their emergence. Thus, the Chechen experience of “pacification” remains an exception, while the extraordinary measures are connected with the need to overcome the consequences of two wars. The federal power will need at best some decades to solve social-economic problems. It is impossible to expect that as a result of gradual improvement of economic situation religious extremism will disappear by itself and the contradictions between the power and society will disappear. The reciprocal relation between policy and religion, macro- and micro-economy, unemployment is evident but not direct. The terrorist acts emerge not among people, who delve into garbage cans ... The terrorists are not the people, who have problems with search for employment. They join the groups of radicals, since they lack political realization, mentioned analyst S. Markedonov. The decision to reckon on economy, which is the sole “locomotive” able to put the Caucasus to the right way, is totally incorrect. The modernization of NC has to be started under conditions of its continuing de-modernization.

The optimistic scenario pre-supposes principal changes just in politics. The main of them is overcoming the gap between society and the local and federal power. For attaining of this aim of great significance is the need of transparency in work of local authorities, participation of the leaders in public “round tables” and their accessibility – a chance to keep a dialogue with them and to put questions to them in Internet. The development of events on this way supposes that the officials are liable for their actions before the population, that the legislative structures function more efficiently and the existing parties are less connected with local clans. The normal conditions should be created for activities of non-governmental organizations. The distribution of financial means, primarily of the means coming from the federal as well as from local budget, should be kept under the strict control.

In 2010, at the conference of United Russia in Kislovodsk deputy of the City Duma O. Timofeeva said to the prime-minister that a half of money coming to NC would be again stolen, while V. Putin kept silent. (B. Yeltsin in his time publicly complained that he did not know where the money allocated to the Caucasus had disappeared). The optimistic scenario supposes that compliance with the federal law will help to put a barrier to “disappearance” of financial means.

The relations between the power and society are regulated by law; the rigid compliance with it determines the social-economic development of the region. The arduous task consists in making the laws function under very unfavorable conditions for their compliance with the laws. The federal center plays the main role in this respect. The compliance with the laws hinders corruption. The allotment of Khloponin with “unprecedented authorities”, according to A. Kravchenko, the chief of GUVF for Volgograd region, was made with the view of “liquidation of the corrupted component”. The level of

corruption in NC turns out to be inevitably higher than in the other parts of Russia due to the traditional feature of society, due to regarding from force of habit an administrative post as a source of material wellbeing, as well as due to the clannish system of loyalties. The corruption is inseparably connected with existence of the shadow sector, which in the former SFD, the forerunner of the NCFD, accounted for 40%–60% of economy (twice larger than in Russia).

In 2004, the uncontrolled incomes in the SFD were comparable with the amount of the state assistance delivered to the subjects of the District. For the last five years, the size of the shadow economy not only did not diminish but, probably, rose. Exactly this sector, not estimated by the official statistics, to a large extent ensured the survival of the population. The lack of economic collapse in the region is explained by functioning of the shadow economy. It is necessary to take into account the role of shadow economy for maintenance of relations with the subjects of the region. Being engaged in bargaining with the Center relating to the size of financial assistance, the local leaders deliberately keep silent about the role of the shadow economy trying in eyes of Moscow to present their republics as poorer entities than they actually are. It is necessary to legalize a great (greater?) part of the shadow sector and to make corruption “predictable”. The similar experience exists in Chechnya. Thus, mentioning a success (partial) one should imply not liquidation of negative trends but their reduction and introduction into the determined framework. In this way it seems to be possible to achieve a result.

It is not worth describing in detail the impact of the inertial scenario. Some evident circumstances should be mentioned. The reciprocal enmity of the people and the power will grow. The laws, as usual, will not function, the systemic corruption will exist and will transform, side by side with clanship, into the main mechanism of

distribution of material resources and of administrative posts. Under these conditions, the shadow sector will cover the whole economy, and economy itself will finally become “a black hole” swallowing money of the federal budget.

The control of the Center remains nominal, and it is realized by means of personal connections between the representatives of the Moscow and local elites, while the position of the latter increase radically. In spite of the grown self-dependence of local elites, the separatist trends remain marginal and do not step out of the limits of “great policy”, but at the same time there forms a phenomenon of “internal separatism”, i.e. the existence of semi- or non-governed at all territories within the frameworks of the country. Sooner or later the Center will comprehend this circumstance and will try once more “to restore the order in the Caucasus”, but at that stage the large-scaled use of forceful methods will be extremely painful and may result in a long-term armed conflict.

The issue relating to the inter-republican borders and to the borders inside certain subjects remains unsettled. First, the question is the border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia. For the last two years, the presidents of both republics with participation of the Center exerted great efforts to regulate the territorial dispute connected with Prigorodny district. The optimistic scenario supposes achievement of the decision to solve finally this problem, and in principle it is possible to do. The present consensus between the Ossetian and Ingushi elites, as well as the fatigue of society due to permanent tension promotes such outcome: the level of reciprocal enmity has decreased comparing with the situation for the 1990s. The borders between Ingushetia and Chechnya as well as between Chechnya and Dagestan remain dangerously explosive. However, until the local politicians will not be evidently interested in aggravation of the situation, the border issue will

not play a great role at all. Should such agreement be achieved, at the internal republican level the issues of creation of ethnic enclaves will be regulated as soon as it will be needed; the constant contacts will be maintained with the organizations representing interests of ethnic minorities. Thus, the inter-ethnic contradictions in some republics go away to the periphery of political life, emerging from time to time as a result of provocations on the part of some radical individuals.

According to the inertial scenario the border issues transform into the most acute inter-ethnic clashes and destabilize the situation in the whole region. The Ossetian-Ingushi conflict provokes a wide opposition involving Chechnya, where discussions on restoration of the Soviet borders of Checheno-Ingushetia (with dominance of Chechnya) emerge periodically. The conflict may assume also the religious form, since the majority of Ossetians are Christians. The restoration of Checheno-Ingushetia becomes one of the main slogans of the Chechen leadership; its ambitions grow, and demands started to be heard about the change of the border between Chechnya and Dagestan. The former residents of South Ossetia (Kudarts), who played a significant role in the tragedy of 1992, are being involved in the resumed Ossetian-Ingushi conflict. The idea of “Great Ossetia”, i.e. creation of the Republic of Ossetia as a united subject within the borders of the RF is being reanimated. The feelings in favor of establishment of the Republic of Cherkessia as a separate subject of the RF are supported by a part of Cherkessians (except Cherkessians themselves, these views are shared by Kabardins, Adygs, Shapsugs, Ubykhs and Abkhaz). The more radical appeals have been proclaimed: to establish “The Great Cherkessia”.

The tension in the inter-ethnic relations grows among Cherkessian peoples and their neighbors in Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the

opponents of Cherkessians and Kabardins – the Karachais and Balkars have been Islamized to a greater extent, while their jamaats maintain contacts with the authoritative leaders of Imarat of the Caucasus. As a result, the Russian-Georgian relations deteriorate further. All this has a negative impact on the international situation of Russia: the blame placed for intention of annexation of a part of Georgia will be added to the reproaches of recognition of separatists. The Russian leadership is being accused of its failure to solve internal problems and of its readiness to take a great risk for the sake of support given to Ossetians and Abkhaz. The border issue is easily used by different forces to aggravate the situation in the region and outside it. The preparation for the Olympic Games in 2014 has led to aggravation of the so-called Cherkessian issue, which seemed to some observers to have been lost its acuteness. Some organizations of Cherkessians came forward against Olympic Games, which, from their point of view, is arranged “on Cherkessian graves” (the places of graves of dozens of thousands of the relatives of migrants, who left the Caucasus for the XIX century).

The optimistic scenario provides for alleviation of this problem and decrease of the tension connected with protests of the Cherkessians. At present, a chance exists to reduce passions and to prevent transformation of the conflict into a direct clash. The efforts of the local and the federal powers will be needed for this outcome. It should be comprehended that the Cherkessian peoples very painfully accept some episodes of their history. But at the same time, the aggravation of the inter-ethnic relations in Karachai-Cherkessia and in Kabardino-Balkaria should be prevented by all means, particularly, if it concerns the distribution of administrative posts.

In case of the negative development of events, the Olympic Games in Sochi become an additional destabilizing factor. If the federal power ignores the feelings of the Cherkessians, it will aggravate the

negative attitude to the Games and will provoke its enemies to start more resolute actions. The more probable manifestations will take place more often as the time of the Games will approach, including a more radical reaction, right up to terrorist acts on the eve of the Games and in the course of the Games. The coordination of actions between Imarat of the Caucasus and the radical Cherkessian groups might be probable. Up to the present time, the cooperation of this kind was not observed, since the appeal for creation of “Great Cherkessia” on the basis of ethnic common feature contradicts the principal aim of the leaders of Imarat – to unite the Caucasus on the basis of Islam. However, the existence of a common enemy in the name of the Russian power may provoke their united actions. Should this, if temporary, mutual action emerges, it may jeopardize the arrangement of the Olympic Games or may result in tragic excesses in the course of the Games. The terrorist acts directed against the Olympic Games, the acts, which could be prevented with very great difficulty, according to experts, will discredit the policy of Moscow in NC and will question its ability to ameliorate the situation in the region. Russia will be considered as “a weak link” in the world international struggle against terrorism. It is difficult to overestimate the damage suffered by the Olympic direction due to the negative scenario. Although the question is the probable events before 2020, their negative consequences will be marked by a long-term feature.

The future of NC may not be prognosticated without taking into account the rapidly growing influence of the local tradition. In NC the ethnic-cultural tradition, religion (Islam) is inseparable from politics, and one will be under great delusion to expect in the observed future and all the more in 2020, that secularism will be established there. In case of the optimistic scenario, the influence of the tradition on the social and political situation will exist and remain a rather great phenomenon even in time of successful modernization of economy,

restoration of legality and order, reconstruction of education etc. However, in case of the favorable situation, when the all-Russian legislation functions and the authorities strive for ensuring social justice, when the population sees that the power actually protects the interests of the people, the appeal to the tradition is limited and the influence of the tradition is restricted and has an impact mainly on the family sphere and ethic of behavior. Under these conditions, it is possible to reduce politicization of Islam and its protest potential.

The creation and sustainable functioning of the contemporary tourist sector not only involves dozens of thousands people (the construction of only five mountain-skiing centers may create 160 thousand jobs), and the population of the region obtains a chance to get acquainted with modern technologies, to extend its mental outlook, to have contacts with new people. The federal power also thinks about a chance to use efficiently the local tradition: the initiative of D. Medvedev was aimed at this direction, when in 2010 he charged A. Khloponin with establishment of the Council of Elders in NCFD. The wise and delicate use of the tradition will help to involve the Russian population in the Caucasian affairs. The question is not the return of the Russians, who have left this region, but the attraction to the Caucasus of specialists from other regions, like it was done in the USSR for the 1950s, with the distinction: those, who may go to the Caucasus for higher wages, will not settle there for ever. Within the frameworks of the optimistic scenario it is possible to postpone the process of return to the traditional custom and to find out an optimal balance between tradition and modernization. This sustainable symbiosis ensures stability in society, promotes overcoming the identity crisis. The all-Russian civil values will be accepted in the Caucasus more adequately and favorably, while the region itself ceases to be regarded as an “other/alien” territory (loses the dubious glory of

“internal abroad”) and becomes a valuable part of Russia with its specificity, though.

The inertial scenario means a non-reversible process of return to the tradition, which becomes the main mechanism of regulation of public relations. The de-modernization of society will pass the point of non-return, and the region will finally transform into an “other-alien” space (“internal abroad”). The influence of shariat will grow, since just shariat represents by itself a total legislative system in all spheres of life. The federal laws are applied quite formally or are not applied at all. (At present, use of adat and other traditional laws challenges the Russian Constitution). The existing in Chechnya and Dagestan Sufi tarikats (Nakshbandiya, Kadyriya and Shaziliya) become the main and most important political players. Their political influence acquires additional legitimacy, since many politicians in Dagestan are myurids (adepts) of Sufi sheikhs. The secular power is replaced by traditional institutions – shariat courts, councils of elders etc., or merges with them.

At the same time, this power itself appeals to the tradition as a convenient instrument to keep society under control. The state actively interferes in the religious affairs. Since the middle of the 2000s, R. Kadyrov pursues this course in the most consecutive way. Yunusbek Evkurov expressed openly his interest to traditional institutions (in 2010 he suddenly expressed his interest to them and said that exactly the tapes might make their input into development of tourism and keep under their control the reconstruction of famous Ingishi towers). Although the competition between the bearers of non-traditional (salafit, fundamentalist) and traditional Sufi Islam goes on, it accompanied more often by cooperation of the rivals for the sake of achievement of the common aim – Islamization (shariatization) of society. This hidden cooperation goes on already now and becomes

systematic and public. All this creates favorable conditions for Islamization of the opposition. The society starts to be polarized: not all people share the idea of Islamization (all the more shariatization), but the supporters of the secular state remain in minority. (The phenomenon of the growing impact of tradition is not an exception. The same process takes place in the Central Asian countries – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the influence of Islam on society as well as on politics becomes more noticed. In Tajikistan the re-traditionalization has passed the point of non-reversibility, according to experts).

The tradition, primarily religious tradition, is completely self-sufficient; its supporters do not want to be limited by the legal and cultural frameworks of the RF, and the tradition gradually transforms into an instrument of opposition to the Center. The greater is the influence of the tradition, the greater difficulties experiences the power to keep under its control the affairs in the region, the actions of some politicians, for instance of Kadyrov, whose public declarations sometimes are marked by provocative characteristic. Although the ruling elites keep loyalty to Moscow, the idea of a probable return to the political sovereignty of the 1990s model is taking root (it seems to be kept under the condition of the present level of financial support of the federal budget).

It's worth regarding development in the social-economic sphere according either to the optimistic or the inertial variant only in connection with successes or failures in the political sphere. At the same time, the social-economic development is inseparably connected with the characteristic of relations between the power and society, as well as with the level of stability, the degree of involvement of Islam, precisely of various trends of Islamic ideology in public-political life.

Given the ignorance of mutual relations of these factors, any economic and social strategy becomes utopia and wishful thinking.

In January 2010, at the meeting on the issues of NCFD development A. Khloponin defined five priority directions: 1) elaboration of the complex strategy in the region and of the clear plans for each republic on its basis; 2) adoption of special decisions on improvement of the investment climate, creation of regional and industrial parks; 3) elaboration by the federal structures and natural monopolies of special investment programs on development of infrastructure; 4) improvement of the quality of life and accommodation of the people; 5) arrangement of the order in the state apparatus and in the power structure.

It is possible to speak in addition also about other problems mentioned not once by the Center and the political representative: rapid decrease of unemployment, modernization of the agrarian sector, purposeful mobilization of local resources, creation of the All-Caucasian market, formation of special economic zones, improvement of education system. The proposals about development of tourism with allocation of 480 billion rubles were described in detail. It should be stressed that the arrangement of the order in the state affairs was mentioned by Khloponin as the last, fifth point. Evidently, after some months followed his appointment the political representative comprehended that the political issue is the main one. However, his initial feeling clearly shows the inadequate account and simple misunderstanding of the Caucasian specifics. At the inter-regional conference of “United Russia” the republican leaders proposed immediately 126 projects (20 of them were determined as the priority projects and 6 – of high priority. The excessively long list of the immediate projects raises concern and feeling of the lack of the clear conception of reconstruction of the Caucasus.

Certainly, the optimistic scenario does not mean fulfillment of all planned. It will be possible to speak about movement in the needed direction as far as the following tasks are achieved: creation of the reliable investment climate, primarily of ensuring sustainable state guarantees to private investors; creation of 400 thousand jobs promised by Putin; commission of a powerful tourist cluster; radical improvement of the situation in agriculture; creation of conditions for small business. Solving other problems depends on achievement of these first-rate tasks. In case of success, the efficiency of republican economics will grow, the internal investments will appear and various local industries will emerge, including agricultural production. The local economic activities will promote reduction of unemployment. Against this background, it is possible to expect the rise of level of living of the local population, emergence of chances for development of local social infrastructures, amelioration of the situation in the sphere of culture and sport. The settlement of ecological issues may also start from the dead point; at present, the environment is in the state of catastrophe, particularly in Chechnya after war and in Dagestan. As a result, it is possible to reckon on reduction of migration of the Caucasian youth to the central regions of Russia. The general success, which was expected for a long time, will be a break of negative trends, realization of postponed anticipations, emergence of the faith in the future.

The inertial scenario means that the above mentioned tasks remain unachieved. And one should mention the circumstance, which may play a malicious trick on those, who count on tourism. The gigantic and unique tourist cluster may be created in the North Caucasus. The intention to build a network of highways in the region of Mineralnye Vody, Karachayev-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria testify to its large scale. Khloponin spoke about construction of three

stars hotels for the mass tourism. However, even if the corresponding infrastructure is created, it is impossible to predict whether the local tourist industry will be able to attract Russians to come and whether the services of the local tourist industry will be competitive. The Caucasian hospitality is not equal to professional servicing provided for clients, while the prices for a qualitative rest in Turkey and Europe often turn out to be lower than in Russia. Therefore the positive outcome of the tourist complexes may turn out to be far lower than the expectations. Evidently, apart from the two extreme scenarios there exists the intermediate one: the stagnation, as well as de-modernization, somehow reduced inflows from the federal budget, which may acquire sluggishly passing forms and may continue endlessly. This is the scenario of permanent instability marked by negative trends and a slow movement to a collapse. Thus, the intermediate scenario turns out to be nearer to the inertial scenario, being actually its prolonged stage.

The development of the situation in NC should be regarded in a wider historic and political context, including the position of NC in the USSR. The Soviet policy in NC was principally different from the present policy, in particular, it leveled the specifics of the inter-ethnic and religious relations, arbitrarily determined the internal borders, expatriated the peoples on the brink of their extermination. The modernization in Soviet times promoted development of the region, but was, like in the whole country, characterized by its limits and finally led it to a cul-de-sack. The transformation of society slowly but surely turned out to become stagnation. Many problems were not solved but postponed waiting for its time. This time came after the disintegration of the USSR.

The present events in NC are not unexpected, thinks political scientist I. Yakovenko. According to him, it would have been strange, if they did not occur. The appeals “to live in peace and friendship” and

invocations about inseparable destinies are senseless, he thinks. Up to present, the central Russian power has not been able to propose the exit fro the deadlock, where NC turned out to be. And not only the Center is to blame, since its policy in the region was marked by many mistakes, including criminal ones; the local elite is responsible for its own mistakes, since it was concerned about its own well-being, ignored the social problems and relied on Moscow considering that it is its liability. The Caucasian politicians underestimated, more precisely, did not want to recognize the religious-political opposition, trying to convince themselves and Moscow Center that they confront the criminal groups, simply “bandits”. The long-term period, which will be not limited with life of one generation, will be needed for solving the problem of the Caucasus. One of the most important reasons is the circumstance that, according even to the point of view of optimists, the terrorist activity will not become less for the next 15–20 years. The terrorism enveloped in the religious form is the logical product of historic process, the result of numerous mistakes, made by Muslim, European, American and Russian politicians.

The NC is the concentration of many problems, which relate to economy, internal policy and security; this list may be supplemented by the inter-ethnic relations, the identity crisis, the collisions in Islam as well as relations with the Center. The thorough and competent study of the whole complex of the problems is the must to comprehend the future of NC and its place in the widest sense within the framework of the new Russian state. The optimistic scenario of 2020 may turn out to be the last chance for the region.

“*Pro et Contra*”, M., 2010, *Iyul-Oktyabr*, p. 96–110.

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**CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL
STATEHOOD IN KAZAKHSTAN**

The societies of the transitional period emerging as a consequence of disintegration of bigger states confront a number of problems on the way of construction of national statehood.

First, the newly formed countries often try to construct their own statehood refuting the former period and losing positive achievements of the preceding political regime.

Second, under conditions of globalization the economic freedom of individual citizens and of corporations leads to the situation when one of the foundations of national statehood in classical meaning is lost. As a result, the state has to elaborate new forms of reciprocal action with the outside world.

Third, most countries of the transitional period are characterized by ethnic heterogeneity. The question is that for the period of existence of the region as a component of a bigger state the internal migration processes –natural and provoked by the mobilization type of development like in the USSR – make changes in its ethnic map. Thus, the national question becomes urgent in new states: various ethnic groups have to co-exist under conditions when the significance of one of them prevails in relation to others, which raises tension in relations among representatives of various ethnic communities.

For creation of a strong state in terms of political and economic terms the society has to determine the values common for the whole population, which would become the foundation of constructing the new statehood. The construction of statehood in being transformed societies often goes on with a certain purpose, with the comprehended choice of one or several most probable ways of development: the

support of the ethnic component and ethnic national identity, or the creation of the united nation by forming the common national-state identity as a foundation of statehood.

The experience of Kazakhstan in the sphere of statehood construction on the basis of formation of national identity illustrates well these trends. Since the establishment of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1991 the leadership of the country took the course to construction of new statehood on the basis of ethnic identity of the title nationality marked by the attempted assimilation of representatives of other nationalities. In particular, the obligatory teaching of the Kazakh language was incorporated in the curricular since the first school year, while the school programs were enlarged by additional subjects, for instance the history of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh literature. The new names of cities and streets were approved and the known names were translated into the Kazakh language. The re-creation of historic memory was going on, a great attention was paid to the search for heroes in history, and the streets were renamed, and the names of not known historic characters were actively introduced to the daily life. At the same time, a great enlightenment work was carried out, primarily by means of mass media, for shaping in consciousness of the people of Kazakhstan an image of a powerful and independent state. For instance, one of the central streets in a big Kazakh city – in Karaganda was renamed from Soviet to the Bukhar-Zhyrau main street, which was accompanied by installation of the monument to this public speaker on one of the squares of the city. The name of Bukhar-Zhyrau was known only to a small group of philologists, and rather great information efforts were exerted by the state to explain his role in history of Kazakhstan to residents of Karaganda and of the whole country.

The calendar was changed as well: the festive days were supplemented by the Day of Independence, the Day of Constitution and the Day of Republic recalling the stages of getting sovereignty by Kazakhstan. The Muslim festive day Nauryz became a state festive day; on the contrary, most state festive days celebrated in the USSR were abrogated.

However, the attempts to construct the statehood in Kazakhstan on the basis of consolidation of the Kazakh ethnic identity and assimilation of other nationalities did not lead completely to the wished results. First, it occurred due to the fact that a rather great part of the Russian speaking population of the republic turned out to be not receptive to similar initiatives. In spite of all measures taken to keep the inter-national peace in the state, for instance, providing for the Russian language the status of the language of inter-national communication, a certain national tension remained in the country. It was caused primarily by the uncertainty of the further development's perspectives. Many representatives of non-title nationalities threatened by the inter-national conflicts in neighboring states and the perspectives of further measures concerning assimilation, preferred to emigrate.

In the beginning of the 1990s, a rather great part of ethnic Germans, Jews and Russians resettled to the historic Motherland. However, it is worth mentioning that these processes not to a lesser extent were caused by the social and economic uncertainty characteristic for development of all states in the post-Soviet space, by readiness of recipient countries to accept the flow of cheap work force and by the lack of hindrance for exit from the country on the part of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan did not hinder the outflow of the population and concluded a number of agreements with neighboring countries on a simplified regime of citizenship acceptance. Actually, it meant that all

representatives of the Russian ethnic group might easily leave for Russia.

The new stage of construction of national identity of citizens in Kazakhstan resulted in the need of forming common civil values, which could become the foundations of construction of statehood. This stage of society development was marked by searchers for new resources of creating national identity and the nation-state on its basis. The preceding experience of the state construction showed the need of finding common civil orientations, which might unite the population and gradually form the nation in Kazakhstan. The efforts exerted by the authorities for formation of identity should have met a warm response of the population for their successful realization.

Within the framework of the state policy of forming the nation in Kazakhstan, in 1996 the Conception of Forming the State Identity in the RK was adopted; the conception officially declared the course for constructing the state-nation on the basis of democratic-legal statehood with due account of the historic experience for the sake of actually full ethnic homogeneity of society. The conception determined the state identity as the correspondence of all elements of the state with the signs of independent state. At the same time, as the foundations of statehood development were determined the economic and humanitarian integration in the world community and social integration in the national state; and as the condition of attainment of the wished aim there was determined formation of national identity of the citizens, who would perceive themselves to be part and parcel of the united people irrespective of ethnic belonging. By that time, the social and ethnic composition of the state's population, having been subject to changes immediately after getting independence, acquired the state of relative stability kept up to the present time, could be considered as a support for the statehood construction.

The documents adopted for the following years, particularly, the strategy of national development “Kazakhstan 2020”, consolidated and specified in details the development directions proclaimed in the Conception. At the same time, the main stress was made on the rise of social wellbeing and achievement of high economic indexes. Kazakhstan declared as its aim the belonging to the group of the most competitive countries of the world. Thanks to its geographic position and the chances for political and social-economic development the country positioned itself as the center of the Central-Asian region and the connecting link between Europe and Asia. On the analogy of “Asian tigers” Kazakhstan should have corresponded to the image of snow leopard inherent with wisdom, cunning, intelligence and energy. This image reflected the historic perception by the Kazakhs of existing symbolic beasts with the sense connecting the future of the country with traditions of Kazakhstan region. The state policy directed to forming the image of contemporary Kazakhstan was based, *inter alia*, on strengthening in the citizens’ consciousness of an image of the great state, which existed before these territories joined Russia.

The social and economic reforms were actively carried out in the republic for the sake of achievement of the fixed aims. For instance, as the basis of economic wellbeing of the country was proclaimed to be the small and midterm entrepreneurship; the measures, such as simplified registration and bookkeeping, tax benefits etc., were taken. The construction of civil society was summoned to promote adoption of the state social order – the practice of support to non-governmental organizations by means of grants. The education system was reformed to comply with the international norms: there was introduced the united national test, combining the examination for the school-leaving certificate with the entrance examination for studies in the higher education institution; the system of higher education was reformed in

accordance with the norms of the Bologna Convention. As an example of realization of the thesis to make Kazakhstan a forge of highly qualified cadres may be regarded the presidential education program “Bolashak”, which makes it possible for young citizens of the country, having passed the competitive examination, to get the right for free studies in the best universities of the world. The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan, adopted in 2010, declares that the orientation to competitiveness should become the most important part of the all-national spirit. Each citizen of Kazakhstan should comprehend it as an urge towards becoming better, wealthier and cleverer and as a need to do everything for flourishing of the country. It means that the power, on the one side, forms the wished image of the state, which is shared by citizens, and, on the other side, on the basis of the forming image consolidates the statehood, while the constructed national identity comes forward as a resource of the statehood development.

The activities of the national leadership for the years of sovereignty directed to integration of the state in the world political and economic systems, the policy aimed at consolidation of social sphere and civil-legal aspects of the state makes it possible to speak about realization of the declared course of creation of national identity and statehood on the basis of principles of tolerance, professionalism and civil activity. The results of the efforts exerted for construction of the politically and economically powerful national state will be possible completely to appraise in the nearest decade. But already now the image of a successful and dynamic country is being purposefully formed: according to the official statistics, for the last 10 years the annual rise of GNP in Kazakhstan accounted for 10%, while Kazakhstan occupies the third place in the world in terms of per capita GNP. On these grounds one may speak about efficiency of the carried out policy.

At the same time, the policy of the state aimed at formation of national identity confronts a number of restrictions. They are caused by the problems characteristic for the post-Soviet societies and hindering their social consolidation. First of all, it is the social inequality and the gaps in the level of wellbeing and access to cultural resources of development of various groups of the population. Although the differentiation in the level of incomes is displayed in Kazakhstan not as much as in Russia (according to the official data, in 2008 the correlation of incomes of 10% of the most poorest and the richest strata of the population made up 6.2, while Dzhini coefficient for 20% of the population groups accounted for 0.274), the stratification of society is characteristic also for Kazakhstan. The economic efficiency of the state is estimated by the citizens in the context of their personal achievements. Evidently, the more successful strata of society in Kazakhstan more readily appraise such new values as economic success, formerly not characteristic for society in Kazakhstan. And the residents, who are less successful in terms of economy, are less receptive to these priorities of the state's policy. Although the identity in Kazakhstan is constructed on universal principals, the majority of the population shares the traditional values jointly with the practice of state paternalism inherited from the Soviet past. Of some significance is also the ethnic heterogeneity, which demands the consecutive construction of common cultural space. However, the kernel of national identity of the young nation logically is being formed round historic symbols of the title nation, and the attainment of synthesis turns out to be a difficult task.

The existing in Kazakhstan traditional clannish relations marked by zhus and tribal division also hinder consolidation of civil identity. The restrictions of the regime where the president comes forward as "the leader of the nation" as the personification of its identity creates

significant limitations on the way of development of civil self-consciousness, which is the must for creation of political nation.

The state policy purposefully is oriented to formation of national identity in Kazakhstan and, consequently, of national statehood not only on the basis of common language, culture and history of the people but on the common urge towards economic and social progress. In this case, it is possible to say that, side by side with the parameters, such as the language, cultural and religious common character, the economic development and social stability of the country is one of the resources for construction and consolidation of national identity and, consequently, national statehood.

*“Identichnost kak predmet politicheskogo analiza”,
M., 2011, p. 119–123.*

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ENERGY SECURITY OF TURKMENISTAN AS A FACTOR FOR ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION STRENGTHENING

Security concept itself is so widely-used that includes all the spheres of a person and society life and therefore, also a state. It is impossible to ensure complex security without paying attention to all aspects of a state activity. The history makes a number of examples when a state security ensuring turned out a military potential of the country growing, economic strength increasing and the other narrow-oriented measures. As a result it brought to unreasonable armament race or total unbalance in economy of the country. This multidimensional concept of security involves the same multidimensional policy to ensure it.

At the end of XX century the role of energy as a main mover of economic and social development was strengthened in the system of the international relations. Energy-requirement is increased by 2% each year. There must be a broad network of energy supply transportation because of their distribution irregularity over the countries and continents. So, it's necessary to protect energy carriers from the time of their production (as there are some debatable fields) until the time of its delivery in that or any country. Lately the situation becomes complicated because of the international terrorism blasting pipelining for frightening purposes or rather for act of vandalism. So, there were explosions in Turkmenistan, Iraq, Turkey, Nigeria and other countries during the last years. Correspondingly, energetic security ensuring is the element of the national security.

The foreign-policy strategy of Turkmenistan carried out by the President, Berdymukhamedov, is the important factor to strengthen the international authority of Turkmenistan and its role in the regional and global policy. The foreign policy orientation of Turkmenistan for favorable international condition creation is constant to realize effectively all the package of the further country integration in the world community. One of the most important terms is to ensure the national security of Turkmenistan as a whole and energetic security, in particular.

If to characterize Ashkhabad's concern on the subject of the energetic security ensuring one should note that Turkmenistan has substantial reserves of gas and oil and is one of the largest producers of electricity in the region. Today more than thousands of perspective oil and gas structures are discovered in the country both overland and at sea in Turkmenistan, more than 150 deposits are discovered and only 50 among them are being mined. And, prospecting and exploration of the new deposits aren't stopped in spite of substantial reserves. So, one

published a document at the end of 2009 where the tasks and purposes of Turkmenistan were assigned for 2010 and one speaks about a modernization of the whole fuel-energetic sphere, oil production increase by 105.2% and building and putting into commission of three gas-turbine power plants.

Turkmenistan is gradually taking measures to bring energy supplies for the world markets. In spring 2007 one voiced the idea on capacity increasing of gas-transport system passing along the Caspian Sea cost during the Turkmen-Russian-Kazakh meeting at top level in the town Turkmenbashi. Just here the leaders of three countries signed Joint declaration of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan on the Caspian Coastal gas pipeline having declared about their intention to extend cooperation in strategic-gas sphere.

According to the Turkmen-Chinese agreements Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline building was the absolute breakthrough in the development of the international energetic cooperation. Expansion of gas-transport capacities of the gas pipeline the Central Asia-the Center traditionally linking the CIS countries will be the important step on the way of a global partnership establishing in the energetic sphere. This theme together with the other problems was discussed during the state visit of G. Berdymukhamedov in Uzbekistan in 2008. During the negotiations the leaders of two countries confirmed their intention to continue developing mutually beneficial partnership in fuel-energetic sector.

Construction project of Trans-Caspian gas main line is also urgent because it allows bringing energy carriers from the perspective Caspian oil-gas bearing region into the energetic markets of Turkey and Europe. The Trans-Afghan gas pipeline can improve well-being and strengthen social and political stability of the region and its construction initiative also belongs to Turkmenistan. As Turkmenistan

is very interested in entering the world markets and its interest is being strengthened for building of the new ways of energy supply transportation the problem on security ensuring of the Turkmen energy carrier transportation into the world markets was raised in Government of Turkmenistan.

As this problem is complicated and many-sided the President of Turkmenistan addressed to UNO from a rostrum in September 2007 with the initiative to create the international mechanisms of reliable protection and security for energy supply transportation into the world markets. The given initiative underlined the problem importance and impossibility to solve it in one country or in the groups of countries as there must be the efforts of all the world countries to provide integral energetic security as many threats are global. The initiative suggested by the President of Turkmenistan became innovative indeed and no doubt that it meets to the purposes stated in Declaration on foreign-policy course of Turkmenistan in XXI century:” The main problem of Turkmenistan’s foreign-policy activity is to bring its raw material resources into the international markets, first of all, energetic ones”.

Turkmenistan also takes steps for diversification of energetic resource export and project implementation of multi-vector routes to deliver them into the world markets. The first step was the international conference at top level conducted in 23-24 April 2009 in Turkmenistan to discuss the problems on energy carrier transportation into the world markets. The idea of open wide international dialogue on this theme initiated by the President of Turkmenistan is being practically realized.

*“Sovremennye problemy mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii
I mirovoi politiki”, M., 2010, p. 228–232.*

Arkadiy Dubnov

journalist

**UZBEKISTAN: WORN-OUT
AND SUBTLE STABILITY**

A wave of rebellions having spread the North Africa and the Middle East disgraced the professors of a political science and the professionals of the secret service; none of them foresaw the perturbations which, possibly, formed a new picture of the world and not only the Arabic one. It's naturally that a question arises whether a continuation will be and if yes then where will it happen? There were indications for the region of Central Asia and the South Caucasus among the first answers. One names Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the most exposed from the point of perturbations like those having taking place in "the Arabic street".

The Moslem outskirts of the former soviet empire were mentioned during the Tunisian and Egyptian events. The ruling at best authoritarian but often totalitarian regimes during the decades being characterized with nepotism, corruption, neglect of the human rights, awful poverty and misery, unemployment and the lack of social lifts can be used for Central Asian reality description.

Before the events in Libya one could speak only about likeness of the internal reasons for disturbances in these countries discussing a possibility of the Egyptian-Tunisian scenario repetition in Central Asia and Azerbaijan but now some CIS-countries must take into consideration more serious spectrum of the threats. Owing to the Libyan resolution of Security Council of UNO the frameworks for the foreign interference into the internal affairs of a sovereign state are widened under the pretext of a civil population protection from the armed violence of the authorities. Any inter-ethnic conflict can be such

reason. Besides, interference can be considered as necessary to forestall bloodshed before its beginning.

For example, such situation can happen if there is a threat of event repetition being similar to those in June 2010 in Osh and Jalalabad at the south of Kyrgyzstan. The conflicts between the Kyrgyz and the ethnic Uzbeks when several hundreds of peoples were killed made the leadership of Russia, the neighboring states and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) quickly consider a problem concerning peacemaker sending or some other interference. The more especially as there was such request from the Kyrgyz leadership.

The Osh events began on 10 July 2010 when there was the summit of SOC in the capital of Uzbekistan. After the meeting of the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan, N. Nazarbaev, D. Medvedev and I. Karimov late at night the last called the aroused clashes as “internal affair of Kyrgyzstan”. This point of view became determinative in CSTO with respect to the situation.

Uzbekistan’s refusal to interfere into Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs can be explained by the intention to avoid a dangerous precedent threatening to Tashkent itself. The riots can also break out in Uzbekistan like those in Andizhan in May 2005. In 2009 the main motive was the intention not to allow developing a legitimate supporting information for intervention when Tashkent blocked a consensus decision adoption allowing using the Collective forces of aggression of CSTO in case of force majeure situations in some country of the organization. Now after a military campaign in Libya approved by UNO the precedent is. Moreover, according to information of the Uzbek sources by the German expert on Central Asia, V. Volkov, Tashkent is ready to defend fellow tribesmen in the neighboring country more resolutely up to bringing in troops in case of the tragic

event repetition in Kyrgyzstan. But it can bring, first of all, to the ruling regime removal there.

It's more difficult to foresee CSTO's response for the situation escalation in the region. Nevertheless, as there are three countries in the zone of the greatest risk which the Fergana valley is divided between – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – one can suppose that the position of official Tashkent will determining as before. But it means that interference of the external forces into the internal affairs of that or any country will probably be on two-sided basis without CSTO's mandate. Such scenario as appropriate will allow coming to agreement between the western partners and interested states – the members of CSTO.

It's even more difficult to foresee how a wave of riots organized by the Islamic radicals at the north of Afghanistan at the beginning of April 2011 will tell upon Central Asia. In Mazari-Sharif populated by preferably the Tajik and the Uzbeks the crowd carried massacre in the mission of UNO warmed by a sermon of the local imam. The expert of the Russian center of studies for modern Afghanistan, A. Serenko, considers that a tragedy can be a portent of a new active protest in the Moslem world, "movement of Koran defender" (the reason was Koran's burning in Florida). The Afghan Uzbeks and the Tajik are probably much more religious in comparison with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. But there is no doubt that the Islamic radicalism can find a fertile ground there.

It isn't appropriate to discuss the Arabian curve of instability in public Uzbekistan. Now and again one can discover the every evidence in mass media being completely controlled by a government that somewhere in Libya a civil war is going on. The Uzbek press preferred not taking notice of the last events in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.

Only very attentive observer could catch some apprehension in the words of the president of Uzbekistan said on the occasion of

Novruz celebration on 21 March. Islam Karimov appealed the citizens to “preserve order and international and harmony”. The Uzbek political scientist, R. Saifullin, doesn’t observe reasons for drawing analogies between the events in the Arabian countries and in Central Asia. His conclusions are based on obvious interest of the external forces in the regional destabilization excluding an analysis of the internal factors to erode stability in the countries of the region. The political scientist affirms that USA and EU need Central Asia as a strategic corridor with a two-sided movement – goods transit for the military coalition in Afghanistan and opposite transit of oil and gas in Europe. And the ruling regimes don’t oppose to it.

The Russian scientist, A. Arbuzov, is sure that if disorders begin in such republics as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan they “will be suppressed in their first stages very severely and very quickly”. Probably, this confidence is based on the riot suppression in Andizhan in May 2005 when almost 200 persons were killed according to official date but in several times more – according to unofficial ones. The Uzbek authorities take already measures to control Internet. In the middle of March the Uzbek agency of communication and informatization asked the operators controlling Internet access to inform a government about mass suspicious mailings and obliged them to switch off Internet-users on the first demand.

As for a protest potential in Uzbekistan one have to make conclusions on the base of studies conducted during several years by the director of central Asian program of the center “Memorial”, V. Ponomarev as there is other reliable information being received from this practically closed country. In the last report published in March 2011 one analyzes data about the political persecutions in Uzbekistan in 2009–2010. One notes that a repression a surge of which was at the end of 2008 and exceeded violence scales associated with the events in

Andizhan in 2005 “became a part of everyday life of Uzbekistan involving public at large”. According to Ponomarev’s data the thousands of people are in the prisons because they studied Islam unofficially or communicated with the friends on religious or political themes. One affirms in the report that under conditions when the terms “religious extremism”, “fundamentalism” aren’t clearly legally defined there are the ample opportunities for arbitrary court trials with respect to the Moslems. Taking into consideration the regime specificity defined by the character of 73-year old leader, I. Karimov, the situation I hardly to be changed up to the end of his government. One can add a possibility of a palace revolution to the described threats of stability which a protest from below carries out being Islamic by a form and social by a character. Its perspective will be real if intra-elite struggle for a political heritage of I. Karimov being controlled by him up to now draws a response with a high social activity outside of the elites. However, if such metamorphosis happens so quickly like in neighboring Turkmenistan in December 2006 then the external world will have only to take into consideration the new realities.

“*Rossiya v global’noi politike*”,
M., 2011, March-April, p. 128–138.

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THE ISLAMIC FACTOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC MOVEMENT

In the modern period the international Olympic movement (IOM) faced with the necessity to optimize the efforts in order to neutralize “the Islamic factor” influence on its activity. The Moslem states and

organizations seek to apply their religion specifics to the principles of Olympism. The problem is political that, correspondingly, demands from IOM to protect its principles using the political methods.

In the modern period the Internal Olympic committee (IOC) faced with a problem of “the Islamic participation” in the international Olympic movement that demands to find solutions as soon as possible. The given problem study urgency is caused by a growing activity of the Islamic states and the Islamic organizations which try to make taking into consideration their own principles associated with religious specifics of Islam. What does put the Olympic movement and its organs in the difficult position when they have to review the fundamental rules of its functioning?

One of the most discussed moments when “the Islamic factor” became apparent was a demand of the Moslem states to advance the date of the Olympic Games which must take place in summer 2012 (27 July – 12 August) in London. The games concur with Ramadan (21 July – 21 August) when the Islamists have to refuse from food during a daylight what won’t allow the Moslem sportsmen participating in sports. A sporting life practically “comes to a standstill” in the Moslem countries during Ramadan.

The response of the Internal Olympic committee for the Islamic organization appeal was negative and it refused to advance the date of the Olympic Games. Such decision was motivated by the economic factors. However, the experts note that even if to consider the competitions themselves the Moslem sportsmen seldom compete for a medal in spite of the fact that they account for 1/3 of all the participants so their participation doesn’t influence on directly sports element of the Olympic Games much or on the contrary influences positively as quotas for the developing countries (many Islamic states belong just to

this category) are obligatory in the interests of a wide representation and popularization of the Olympic Games.

A political aspect comes to the fore in the given problem. One has already mentioned the importance to observe the principles of a wide representation when all the states are allowed to be a member of the International Olympic committee and take part in the games themselves being consent to follow the fundamental principles of the Olympic charter regardless their religious preferences.” The purpose of the Olympic Games is a countrywide placing sport in the service of harmonic development of a person in order to promote a peaceful society establishing which takes care of a human dignity preserving”. So, the Olympic movement appeals to unite peoples but not to separate them. One also should take in consideration the second aspect analyzing a political constituent of the problem. The Olympic Games 2012 were planned several years ago before the demands in 2006 when the most part of the economic measures was began. Therefore, some Moslem country and organization demands aren’t constructive but mostly declarative and protest.

In this connection it’s important to underline that the Olympic Games are strictly secular. One should also note that the representatives of the other confessions have never tried to change the rules of the international Olympic movement and adapt them to religion specifics of the sportsmen.

The stated apprehensions were confirmed by the events happened in China during the Olympic Games. Then the Islamist separatists from Sin’tsyan-Uigurskey autonomous region used the Olympic Games for their own political purposes. The attacks for the police stations were carried out on the eve of and during the sporting events within the Games in two Chinese towns (Kashgar and Kuga). These separatists also assumed their responsibility for explosions in the public transport

in July 2008. These actions weren't strictly against the Olympic Games, however, the international Olympic movement was involved into the given events having attracted additional attention of separatists; they have expected to influence on Chinese authorities seriously in such a way.

In this context one should agree with V.V. Stolbov's opinion who notes the importance of the fact that "universal, moral-ethic and humanistic principles and standards must be constant in the international sports acts (the Olympic charters, in the regulations of International Union of Pharmacology and etc.)" at the modern stage. It seems that the states and the organizations refusing to follow these principles oppose themselves to the other participants of the international Olympic movement.

One more problem being raised by the Moslem countries before the International Olympic committee concerns the women participation in the Olympic Games. As stated in the principles of the international Olympic movement it's important to observe the human rights including an equal participation in sporting competitions of both men and women. However, not all the Moslem states support this principle and are ready to follow it. The problem is complex and there is no consensus here.

In 2008 the article of the director of the Persian Gulf Institute, Ali akh-Akhmed was published in the European (International Herald Tribune) and the American (The New York Times) where he made an animadversion on those Moslem country positions not allowing their women to take part in the international competitions especially in the Olympic Games. The article was named "To bring the countries to a stand prohibiting women to go in for sports!"

One doesn't pay much attention to the problem on infringement of the Moslem women rights, however, it's still urgent and it's

necessary to solve it. As stated in the principles of the Olympic charter “any form of discrimination with respect to a country or a person based on a race, religion, policy or a sex isn’t consistent with a membership in the Olympic movement”. Some sportsmen from the Moslem countries of Africa prefer moving in Europe and are caped for the European countries. Such phenomenon is analogical to “brain drain” as it deprives the African states the potential champions in the Olympic Games.

The same serious situation is in the Saudi Arabia taking place in the Olympic Games, however, women discrimination is very strong. Not once information came to light in the periodical press that the women part of the population of the Saudi Arabia is interested in the situation changing, for example, there was a football match between two women national teams for the first time in history. So, one can’t affirm that the Saudi Arabia will take into consideration the demand of the International Olympic Committee. But until the present USA having a determining influence in this organ of the Olympic movement blocked its exclusion from the Committee. As one can see in spite of the fact that the Olympic movement must struggle for discrimination problems in the Moslem countries it’s politicized at practice.

A political factor elimination, namely –a possibility to follow the political interests of the national states as it happens in case with the Saudi Arabia and USA must be directing efforts to neutralize “Islamic factor” as an obstacle for the International Olympic movement development. One should also develop a complex of measures legally protected (in particular, in the Olympic charter or some other document of the international Olympic movement) and exclude a political protest what has occurred during the Olympic Games in Peking. The scandal associated with concurring of the Olympic Games dates and Ramadan is also a political factor so the International Olympic Committee must

propagate its fundamental principles in the Moslem countries, namely, discrimination elimination based on a race, religion, policy and sex.

Summarizing, one should note that there are two points of view concerning the existing situation when the Islamic states claim their special rights: the first – the principles of the international Olympic movement don't satisfy the modern reality and it's necessary to change them; the second- the problem isn't in the principles developed by the International Olympic Committee, namely, in “the Islamic factor” when the Moslem countries and the Islamic organizations want to use their religious and cultural standards for political purposes.

Based on the given analysis one can state that there is the second situation. It means that a complex of measures is necessary to “depoliticize” the international Olympic movement.

*“Gosudarstvennaya vlast’ I mestnoye samoupravlenie
v Rossii: Istorya I sovremennost’”,
St.-Petersburgh, 2010, p. 318–322.*

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