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**THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION  
IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: STRATEGIC RISKS  
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA**

The history of the Russian state and the experience of the past two decades convincingly show the exceptionally important role of the North Caucasian region in the economic and political situation of Russia. The problems and contradictions in the development of the national republics in this region, as well as the policy and methods of resolving them give rise to risks for the security and stable development of Russia as a whole in the near future and further on. Hence, a great urgency of the comprehensive and objective study and understanding of the situation in the North Caucasus, which is far from satisfactory. This article is an attempt to shed at least some light on the state of affairs in the region.

The North Caucasian region occupies a territory of 355,000 square kilometers, or slightly over two percent of Russian territory. At the same time the share of its population in the population of the entire country is much higher – 12 percent, and its density is also higher – about 50 people per square kilometer. The North Caucasus unites seven national republics: Adygea, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cheressia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia and Chechnya, and also

Krasnodar and Stavropol territories and Rostov region. All republics and territories of the North Caucasus are part of the Southern Federal district of Russia, which is, in the opinion of most experts, the most complex region from the point of view of socio-political instability.

The low development level of the region is due to the depressive character of its economy, the degradation of big enterprises and the infrastructure, shortage of investments, and a high level of unemployment. The region is also distinguished by its growing militarization, ethnic contradictions, mass migration and organized crime – corruption, smuggling, drug trafficking, and the sale of arms. A merger of local administrative power and business becomes ever more noticeable, which breeds crime and induces the local population to turn increasingly to the ideas of “Wahhabism” (or “pure” Islam).

The region suffers from a destructive influence of a whole range of crisis situations of an internal political character – from the prolonged armed conflict (two wars) in Chechnya to numerous conflicts in Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. After the armed conflict in August 2008 came tension in the relations with Georgia, the problems of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Azerbaijan on the “Lezghin” problem. A special concern is also caused by the fact that Russian state policy in the North Caucasus for the past two decades lacked strategic approaches to tackling complex problems, which resulted in grave errors and failures in economics and politics.

The events of the past two decades have confirmed that a sharp deterioration in the economic conditions of the population inevitably leads to growing social tension and conflicts, which had a negative effect on the situation of the North Caucasian republics. Social stratification in most ethnic formations became especially noticeable against the backdrop of mass unemployment, total corruption, criminalization of economic activity, and the low level of

administrative management. The people's requirements for democracy, political freedom and national independence have acquired the form of interethnic contradictions and conflicts.

The economic development indices for the national republics of the North Caucasus are the lowest in Russia (except certain types of agricultural products). The traditional industries (coal, oil and gas extraction), as well as engineering, metallurgical, chemical and food industries are in a deplorable state. After 1991 their deterioration proceeded especially rapidly.

The destabilization of the socio-economic situation during the past fifteen years had an adverse effect on the entire economic complex of the North Caucasian region. The break-up of economic ties after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., low competitiveness of the state-run economy, the war in Chechnya, and the "creeping" conflicts continue to influence all spheres of life in the region.

The "shadow" (or "black") economy becomes an ever more important sector of regional economic development. Among the main branches of the "shadow" turnover in the North Caucasus, which took shape in the 1990s, are the unlicensed output of oil products, home-made production of caviar and sturgeon and their sale through illegal channels, unlicensed production of alcohol, smuggling of ethyl, etc.

This "informal" economy creates opportunities for employing a certain part of the population and raising its incomes. Practically one in every three inhabitants of the region is engaged in illegal business. By the most modest estimates, the state suffered enormous losses from the "shadow" economy in the North Caucasian region in 2004 – about 50 billion rubles, whereas the state financial donations to it amounted to 47 million rubles.

This could not have been possible without the help to and participation in illegal business of highly-placed officials within the

framework of the well-organized clan system. The corporative communities of these people formed in almost all administrative bodies of power monopolized practically all economic and political resources of the region. Most leading posts in the North Caucasian republics are occupied by persons related to one another (some of them are even close relatives). Such system breeds corruption which has become widespread all over the region.

One of the results of the clan system in the North Caucasus is the practically uncontrolled growth of unemployment which is much higher than the average level for Russia. According to unofficial data, up to 80 percent of young people (under 30) do not have permanent jobs, which is due not only to the crisis situation in the economy, but also to the low level of school education and professional training.

Mass unemployment among young people greatly raises the level of social tension, exacerbates the crime situation and increases the influence of extremist and armed groupings. Hundreds of thousands of fire arm and cold steel units are on hand among citizens of the region, almost in every house, and this makes it possible to turn accumulated contradictions into armed confrontation.

Experience shows that the acuteness of risks and crises in the national republics of the North Caucasus is determined by the multitude of factors, some of which we have already mentioned, but their level also depends on the geographical position of the sub-regions – eastern (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia) and western (North Ossetia, Karachay-Circassia, Adygea). Kabardino-Balkaria is in the center, but some experts refer it to the eastern part by the level of factual instability.

The Eastern sub-region is characterized by a much higher degree of Islamization, however, the main criterion of the difference between the two parts is the political situation which has emerged after the

disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and exists to this day. The “East” is “stably unstable,” whereas in the “West” conflicts exacerbate sporadically, from time to time. Chechnya is not the “champion” of instability any longer, the situation in Dagestan is more explosive now.

Kabardino-Balkaria is on the borderline not only due to its geographical position, but also by instability of the situation. Problems in the relations of the two title national groups in the republic – Kabardians and Balkars – have been growing in the republic for several years already. The peak of the contradictions was reached in the 2000s when the armed clashes in Nalchik, the capital of the republic, put it to the brink of a civil war. The armed phase of the crisis was rapidly suppressed, however, it has not yet been overcome. It is a classical example of a “creeping systemic crisis” periodically exacerbated by flare-ups of violence and socio-political and interethnic contradictions.

The national groups of the republican population try to find a way out of the existing socio-economic situation in stepping up ethnic isolation and gaining privileges. A direct consequence of this was the creation of nationally-tinted political parties and socio-political movements. In most ethnoses it is connected with the restoration of historical and cultural values which directly influences the processes of ethnopolitical mobilization.

For the past two decades a tendency has been growing in the North Caucasus, known as the “differentiating function of conflict.” It is manifested in the disintegration of the previously existing unity into parts with a subsequent polarization of relations. This is evident on the example of two North Caucasian republics – Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Ceressia, each of which is inhabited by two national groups. In Soviet times they were arbitrarily united in unified administrative frameworks without due consideration of ethnic and

linguistic features, way of life and numerical strength of each of these ethnic groups.

The lowering of the general conflict level in the North Caucasus is only possible on condition of the stabilization of the socio-economic situation and implementation of economic reforms with due account of the specific features of the long historical development of this region. Direct financial support from Moscow does not preclude the spreading of the seats of conflict and the growth of separatist feelings which are often taken for “manifestations of Islamic radicalism.” In actual fact, they often represent the bitter struggle of local clans for the redistribution of property and power and the establishment of control over financial flows in the republic.

In recent years the North Caucasus has turned into a source of constant troubles and alarm not only for the powers that be in Russia, but for the entire Russian society. Manifestations of instability in Chechnya were taken as something almost in the right way, whereas the constant worsening of the situation in other republics causes growing alarm. The increasing *Caucasus-phobia* is no less dangerous, for it gives rise to unhealthy elements in the public consciousness of Russia. Public polls present a general conclusion that there is a systemic crisis in the country which is difficult to resolve (if it's only possible).

Respondents to the poll pointed to a whole range of reasons for the existing situation, among which religious intolerance, the influence of radical Islam, unwillingness of some people to live in the Russian state, suspense in resolving socio-economic problems, erroneous policy of the Russian authorities, and fabulous corruption of the local administrations. Only one-fifth of respondents believe that the Russian authorities will be able to restore law and order, another one-fifth maintains that some of the North Caucasian republics will secede from Russia.

According to the data of the Ministry for the Interior, the total number of armed combatants and their supporters operating in the North Caucasus amounts to some 800. This is not too many, but they are constantly being replenished by “reservists” from among unemployed young people or mercenaries from abroad. Young people’s joining the bandits is conditioned by the presence of unresolved socio-economic, ideological and ethical problems in the North Caucasian region.

The illegal military formations are opposed by rather big contingents of the troops of the Ministry for the Interior and regular troops of the North Caucasian military district. Nevertheless, according to official data, the number of terrorist acts in the North Caucasus has considerably increased. It is indicative that terrorism in the region is taking a political form and turning into a confrontation between the authorities and the opposition.

Political figures, political analysts, journalists and scholars in the North Caucasian republics energetically demand changes in the approaches of the federal Center to Caucasian policy. It should be based on the principle of the recognition of the value of human rights, above all, the right to entrepreneurship. As long as a local official, or one appointed by the Center manages or owns local enterprises, the bitter struggle for power and the redistribution of property will continue and separatist tendencies will continue to persist.

In this context it would be appropriate to emphasize that people living in the North Caucasus, just as in other southern regions of Russia, for that matter, are particularly bent on economic freedom and freedom of entrepreneurship. This is why it would be necessary to evolve a program of self-government at the community level and create instruments and institutions allowing man to realize himself as a citizen. In these conditions the solution of the socio-economic

development problems comes to the fore. A no less important matter is to form professional and responsible bodies of power in the North Caucasian national republics.

President D. Medvedev of the Russian Federation ordered to work out new organizational forms to combat terrorism in the North Caucasus in August 2009. He proceeded from the premise that militarization, which was not supported by social programs, would be unable to normalize the situation in the North Caucasus. This approach is absolutely correct.

What are the achievements of federal power in the North Caucasus in the past ten years?

First, the war in Chechnya has been stopped, which was largely due to the establishment of a dialogue with part of the separatists and a split in their ranks. But it is too early to speak of “new forms of relations,” in the view of military experts, inasmuch as in some mountain districts of Chechnya the regime of counter-terrorist operation still exists, and the relations between Moscow and Grozny are largely built on “personalization of politics.”

Secondly, calls for separatism are heard less frequently, although new risks and crises should not be excluded. The problems of internal borders and disputed territories are still unresolved. The border between North Ossetia and Ingushetia remains a matter of conflict. There are disputed territories between Dagestan and Chechnya, and in Kabardino-Balkaria the question has again been raised on inter-district borders and the restoration of Balkar territories in accordance with the laws of the U.S.S.R. and Russia.

Thirdly, the federal Center supported the process of firing the former unpopular managers and administrative officials rejected by local people and appointing new ones who will try to establish sound

connections between the authorities and society as the only possible basis of stability.

On the whole, it can be admitted that the national republics of the North Caucasus, just as the entire region of the south of Russia, remain part of the Russian Federation and the economic and political system of Russia is valid there, too. The difference is that the region is closer to traditional society living by its own laws (ideas and standards) and striving to limit the interference of the Center in its internal affairs. This is why it is necessary to take into account specific features of Caucasian mentality which was formed under the impact of a number of factors during many centuries. Among these factors are:

Confessional –prolonged confrontation between paganism, Islam and Christianity, which largely determines the present situation in the North Caucasus;

Personal orientations and everyday-life values – neglect of this factor can lead to serious conflicts between inhabitants of the North Caucasus and those of other regions of Russia;

Historical memory – the factor conditioned by the wars waged by the Russian Empire for the conquest of the North Caucasus.

Up to the early 1990s the influence of Islam in the North Caucasus, especially in its western part, was insignificant. Traditions of mountain dwellers were always more weighty than Islam, all the more so since the process of Islamization, which began in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was interrupted in 1917. But in the latter half of the 1990s, in the conditions of the growing social protest, which was not properly understood and dealt with by the authorities, the place of democratic movements which began in the epoch of *perestroika* was taken by religion. The network of radical religious organizations became bigger, and now it can safely be said that its cells function in most national republics, including their bodies of power.

By the early 2000s the Moslem population of the region was about four million, and the influence of Islam differed in its different parts. The positions of Islam were stronger in the eastern part (Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) and weaker in the western part (Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cercessia). In eastern districts, above all in Dagestan, despite persecution in the years of Soviet power, the tradition of Arab Islamic culture still existed and its center was in Derbent. At the same time, it is in the east of the North Caucasus that foreign missionaries unfolded their activity after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. which was aimed at radicalization of Islam and its slow entry into politics.

Political leaders of the North Caucasian republics at first preferred not to go deep into the essence of religious arguments, supporting Moscow's position formulated under the influence of the Caucasian opponents of the non-traditional forms of Islam (Wahhabism, or "pure Islam," and Salafism). But soon they began to see in the activity of preachers a threat to their political positions and support of those who were dissatisfied with the situation, after which mass persecutions of Wahhabi supporters began. People of the older generation reared and educated in Soviet times in the spirit of atheism regard accusations of Wahhabism preposterous, whereas these accusations provoke young people who joined Islam to conflicts with the authorities. Besides, for some of young men the revival of Islam is not only the restoration of historical and cultural traditions or religious outlook, but also the restoration of the way of life based on high morality and responsibility.

Taking into consideration the complex character of the socio-economic situation and the interethnic confrontation in the North Caucasian region, the local and central authorities will, sooner or later, be forced to come to the conclusion that it will be more reasonable to

preclude the further spreading of Islamic extremism along the road of public dialogue than to combat it by forcible methods.

The acute character of the relations of several North Caucasian republics with the federal Center of Russia is largely determined by the increased interethnic and inter-personal differences and conflicts of the value orientations of the peoples and elites of the North Caucasus and the central regions of Russia. Emerged against the backdrop of the military hostilities in Chechnya and the terrorist acts outside it *Caucasus-phobia* has acquired a stable character in the mass consciousness of Russians and began to exert an indirect influence on the policy pursued toward that region. Many preceding achievements of national policy were discarded for they did not pass the test of the rapid change of orientation, democracy and reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent establishment of authoritarianism.

What determines the value orientations of the inhabitants of the national districts of the North Caucasus and what is the reason for their conflicting character? Ethnologists have studied these problems for quite some time, and today they are formulated in a whole number of published works. The peoples of the Caucasus (both South and North) have evolved historically and interacted in the conditions of a multilingual, inter-civilizational and inter-confessional dialogue and therefore they were open to all and sundry influences and impacts of various value orientations and systems., Caucasian identity has taken shape of real elements of material, standard, and everyday-life cultures of different ethnoses, having imbibed Islamic and Orthodox Christian mentality, traditions and customs and habits of mountain and plain cultures, and traces of Greco-Roman, Arab and Slav civilizations. In new and contemporary times a great role was played by the integration processes of the Caucasus in the Russian and then Soviet area.

The image of a Caucasian had a positive and negative tint in different historical periods. As to the present unfriendly attitude of some Russians toward representatives of the Caucasian peoples (including those from the North Caucasus), it has become a touchstone of the ill-being of Russian society, which manifests the features of aggressive nationalism and xenophobia, previously alien to it.

There are more profound reasons for the conflict of value orientations of the inhabitants of the Russian central regions and people from the Caucasus. As we have already mentioned earlier, the latter, as a rule, are distinguished by a bent to entrepreneurship, trade and side businesses in order to keep large families with many children and old people. They strive for good living with high incomes. The Caucasians proved more adapted to market reforms by their customs and habits, mentality and psychology. In general, their behavior in everyday life is much more active. This irritates inhabitants of the other regions of Russia, causes protests on their part right up to demands to drive away the “dark-skinned” and liquidate their property.

This engenders serious problems and contradictions. The dislike of the indigenous people of Russian plains for people from the mountains who actively tried to entrench themselves in the Russian economic sphere gave rise to interethnic conflicts. As a result, their reasonable desire to realize their possibilities proved unclaimed and ultimately both sides gave in to ethnic nationalism. Thus, discrepancy in ethnic value orientations can become a serious obstacle on the road of strengthening the unity of the Russian Federation, and in this connection one cannot fail to notice the growing outflow of the Russian population from the North Caucasian republics.

Russian people began to leave the republics of the North Caucasus in the latter half of the 1980s and in the early 1990s this process increased immeasurably, which could be explained by the

destruction of the economy, science and culture in the years of the acute crisis in the country as a whole, and in the North Caucasian republics in particular, the strengthening of the positions of ethnic clans and the emergence of many interethnic conflicts. As a result, in the early 2000s no more than four percent of Russians remained in Chechnya, one percent in Ingushetia, and about five percent in Daghestan. More Russians stayed in Kabardino-Balkaria – 25 percent, North Ossetia – 23 percent and Karachay-Circassia – 33 percent. Mention should be made of the fact that the number of Russian people slightly increases due to the arrival and stay of federal servicemen and their families in the North Caucasus (this especially concerns North Ossetia).

The historical memory of the North Caucasian peoples retained a whole number of episodes on the road of their coming closer to Russia, which were accompanied by diplomatic contacts, bloody warfare and direct arbitrary actions of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the 50-year-long Caucasian war of Russia first against the Chechens and Avars, and then Circassians resulted in that these mountain peoples saw in Russia a generalized “image of the enemy.” In the course of the war a considerable part of the indigenous population was physically destroyed or driven out to countries of the Middle East, and whole ethnic groups ceased to exist.

But the leaders of the mountain people, including Imam Shamil were unable to induce all the population of the North Caucasus to raise the banner of revolt against Russia. Historians explain this by the fact that despite the grave errors of St. Petersburg’s policy toward the North Caucasus, Russia’s pragmatism gained the upper hand. The Russian authorities discarded hasty attempts to change the life and municipal management in the mountains on the pattern of Russian *gubernias* and confined themselves to minimal interference in the life of the mountain people.

After the October 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks successfully used historical inertia of the relations with the Caucasian peoples, and in the years of the Civil war the North Caucasian periphery became a convenient springboard for suppressing freedoms in the South Caucasus. However, the subsequent measures – forcible collectivization, frequent revision of borders between the North Caucasian autonomous republics, and direct crimes of Stalin's regime against the local people (mass deportations of whole ethnic groups to Kazakhstan and Central Asia) had a very negative effect on the formation of mentality of the next generations.

“Historical justice” could have been restored by mutual concessions and compromise decisions, but it was impossible at the time in the conditions of the exacerbation of contradictions, first at the stage of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and later in the Russian Federation. Other forms of ethnonational self-determination (national and national-cultural autonomies) were not taken into consideration either by the Russian leadership or the national elites, and it is still a long way to the formation of polyethnic civil society in the North Caucasus. This situation led to greater tension in the national districts of the North Caucasus, especially against the backdrop of their economic stagnation and unresolved social problems.

Assessing the situation in the region as a factor of strategic risks for the development of Russia, one should not ignore the apprehensions repeated over and over again in recent years concerning the threats to the territorial integrity of Russia in its existing borders. The situation in the national republics of the North Caucasus with its hidden (or “creeping”) separatism against the background of economic depression was emphatically described as the gravest threat. In practice it means that the population, imitating outward loyalty to the present authorities becomes ever more alien to them and finds solutions to its problems

within the framework of traditional society. The system of government in the Caucasian region is inefficient, economic and legal ties between the republics of the region and the federal Center are weak, they are isolated from one another in terms of receiving all necessary information. The regional authorities are corrupt through and through, they are often incompetent and bound hand and foot by the clan structure. The practical loss of control over observance of federal laws means the loss of control over the territory, even if there are no separatist tendencies.

The republics of the eastern part of the North Caucasus – Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan – form a type of a subregion in which the dominating Vainakh ethnos is the connecting link between Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. It is not accidental that the administrative borders of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia with Stavropol Territory and North Ossetia are regarded and guarded as state borders. The western subregion – the republics to the west of North Ossetia – Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Circassia and Adygea are relatively more stable. There are more Russians in the population of these republics (in Adygea – up to 70%). As a rule, these are skilled specialists who serve as a factor of social and political stability even when they are isolated.

All national republics of the North Caucasus are distinguished by systems governed by clan communities in which almost all important posts in the bodies of power and big and important enterprises and offices are taken kinsfolk. The clan-corporative unions are not interested in closer ties with rank-and-file citizens or in a dialogue with them.

On the basis of the above-said one can make the conclusion that not a single republic of the North Caucasus is able to overcome the present financial and economic crisis independently. Even given a

serious support of the federal Center through investing money in the most promising economic branches and granting donations and subsidies to deteriorating industries, the rupture of the previous economic ties and the existence of whole groups of unemployed people do not allow to draw an optimistic conclusion concerning the nearest future of these republics – whether they will succeed in overcoming the crisis phenomena and achieve self-sufficiency. The preservation of all these unresolved problems in the North Caucasian region will mean increased strategic risks for the development of Russia.

*Strategicheskiye riski razvitiya Rossii: Otsenki i prognoz. Moscow, 2010, pp. 195–218.*

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**MODERN KAZAKHSTAN: ISLAM  
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

One of the key tasks in the present-day world is the establishment of mutually advantageous cooperation, or interaction, in various spheres of the economy within the framework of the integration process. In the epoch of globalization and rapprochement of different countries and growing international competition, conditions emerge for the setting up of economic alliances. The emerging problems and prospects for a dialogue between Asian and European countries are often connected with ideological confrontation, and first and foremost, Islam and the ideology of western countries. The word “Islam” in the modern world is for many people a key one, irrespective of their religious feelings. For some it has a positive meaning, for others it is connected with terrorism. Islam is not simply religion. According to some data circulated in the mass media, Muslims have the image of

fanatical extremists in the world, which provokes anti-Islamic sentiments in some European countries. In many European states a greater part of the population (up to 60 percent) takes the Moslem world and interaction with it for a threat. Such is a conclusion contained in a report published by the World Economic Forum (Geneva) in January 2008.

In the existing situation, when a “psychological war” has been declared on Islam, the Muslims should cease to be on the defensive. Europe should realize full well that terror is not Islam, dictatorship is not Islam, oppression of women is not Islam.

If we speak of Kazakhstan, it can be said that the country can not evolve another model of Islam, one of its own. Otherwise, a scenario of the coming of Muslim values to our country’s life could be written by other forces and other ideologists.

The Kazakh Muslims should not divide themselves into sects and currents, should not follow the advice of hundreds of pseudo-scholars or thousands of theological books of ancient time, but should turn to the main source – the Koran. The modern understanding and interpretation of the Koran makes it possible to conclude that the society recommended by Islam is almost completely in line with the interests of humankind. This is not a simple declaration, but an objective conclusion.

In the words of the Minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan Marat Tajin, “Asia is our common home. It is not a simple continent, but one of exceptional variety. However, to our regret, it is an embodiment of many challenges, threats and conflicts. Yet, Asia is the cradle of such world religions as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Judaism, which proclaim and call for kindness, enlightenment, culture, noble traditions, peace and tolerance. “

Kazakhstan is one of the modern independent states of Central Asia. It is a secular state, but has close economic and cultural ties with many countries of the Moslem world. Various peoples with various cultures and confessions lived in Kazakhstan for many centuries, which had a considerable influence on a special character of the development of Islamic civilization in the region.

The development ways of Islam and its influence on ideology, social life and the economy are discussed at various state levels in present-day Kazakhstan. In September 2007, the Assembly of the Peoples of the Republic of Kazakhstan took place in its capital. Representatives of a number of neighboring countries, public and religious figures and persons from international organizations were present. They discussed the problems of Islam in a modern state, Kazakhstan's relations with the Moslem world, the ideology of religious extremism, etc.

Speeches of participants in the Assembly conference showed that Islam is not simply a religion, but a phenomenon of versatile aspects. It exerts influence on the country's economic life, its ties with other Moslem countries, and also with Russia, where Islam occupies an important place in economic, cultural and public life broaden and strengthen.

A special Center of Islamic Economy and Law has been set up at the Kazakhstan Humanitarian University. In June 2008 it organized an international conference on the subject "Islam: Tendencies and Prospects of Its Development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," in which scholars from Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and other countries were present. It discussed the problems of the role of Islam in the modern world and its further development. For such countries as Kazakhstan the questions of economics and legal, political and social science should have the priority character.

With its advantageous geographical position the Republic of Kazakhstan, just as at the time of the “Great Silk Route”, is greatly interested in broadening and strengthening its international connections with Asian and Europe. The country’s geopolitical situation is rather a complex one, taking into account a considerable number of sparsely populated undeveloped districts, and at the same time the presence of districts rich in natural resources (hydrocarbons and minerals). Kazakhstan is busy implementing vast projects in all spheres of the economy. The oil and gas industries develop especially rapidly. The government of Kazakhstan devotes much attention to the development and renovation of the transport infrastructure, especially the port of Aktau on the Caspian Sea, which is one of the major transport hubs in the Europe – Asia transport corridor.

According to the data of Kazakh economists, the total volume of cargo transportation on the Caspian Sea will increase up to 70 million tons in the near future.

The main items of Kazakhstan’s export are oil and oil products, coal, non-ferrous metals, copper, nickel, manganese, ferrous alloys, mineral fertilizers, grain, sunflower, etc.

The Ministry of transport and communications of Kazakhstan has worked out a transport strategy of the republic up to 2020. It determined the priority projects oriented to export to be tackled during the period.

The Islamic sector of the economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan will develop irrespective of whether there is an economic crisis or not, or the activity of its supporters or opponents. The Director of the Center of Islamic Economics and Law at the Kazakhstan Humanitarian University M. Smagulov is an ardent supporter of the integration of Moslem countries of the CIS, who received education at the oldest university of the Islamic world – Al-Azkhari in Cairo. Assessing the

possibility of interaction of Kazakhstan and Russia in the sphere of education, he notes that much could be done in the sphere of studying Islam.

An agreement has been signed with a Qatar bank which will open its affiliation in Kazakhstan. The Center of Islamic Economics and Law cooperates with Islamic development banks in Kazakhstan, banks in other countries, and also with Arab banks.

It was planned to hold the 7<sup>th</sup> All-world Islamic Economic Forum in Kazakhstan in 2011. This forum, along with Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the "Islamic Conference" Organization in 2011, are to play an important role in the further strengthening of trade and economic ties between Moslem countries. It is the known fact that about 70 percent of the world oil reserves and half of all natural gas reserves are concentrated in 57 member-countries of the "Islamic Conference" Organization. Their aggregate GDP comprises \$1.7 trillion, or eight percent of the volume of the entire world economy.

For working out a plan for the introduction of the Islamic bank system in Kazakhstan an interdepartmental group has been set up to regulate and supervise the financial market and financial organizations, which consisted of representatives of various republican ministries and departments, and also the Association of financiers of Kazakhstan.

A special interest in the development of the Islamic system of financing the economy of Kazakhstan is connected with the fact that the republic is supposed to adopt a law on the Islamic bank system, which will bring many innovations to this sphere. According to Kazakh economists, many western entrepreneurs were not familiar with the specific features of Islamic business. It is known that the principles of the operation of Islamic banks have practically been untouched by the world financial crisis. This is why Islamic banks now become the

biggest investors in the world and could be a reliable source of financing the growing economy of Kazakhstan for a long time to come, in contrast to European banks, which require the presence of a borrowed property and whose interest rate reaches 20 to 25 percent. And repayment to European banks should be made irrespective of the work of a company. The principle of the operation of Islamic banks is different – a bank takes part in a project on a par with the given company, sharing all risks. If a project fails through, the bank loses money along with the company, and if it is successful, the profit from it is shared half-and-half.

Due to the ban on a bonus in the form of an interest, there is no interest on deposits. Proceeding from the principle of participation of all sides in risks, there is no guarantee of return or recompense on deposits. As a result of its investment activity, an Islamic bank distributes profit among investors in proportion to their deposits, and in case of loss neither clients nor Islamic bank get recompense. Besides, Kazakhstan will adhere to the rules according to which Islamic investors have no right to finance projects which are not in line with the Sharia law, to purchase shares of the companies which produce or sale arms, alcohol, tobacco and pork, deal with the entertainment industry (cinema houses, casinos, etc.), and also insurance and financial companies working at the expense of interest on deals.

At present the government of Kazakhstan and the Islamic Bank of development discuss the question of issuing Islamic securities in the tenge. If they reach an agreement, Kazakhstan will become another country after Malaysia where the Islamic Bank of development issued securities in national currency. Besides, the share of Islamic financing should reach five to seven percent of the Kazakh financial market.

At present the Islamic Bank of development carries on a dialogue with Kazakhstan's Ministry of industry and trade with a view to issuing

infrastructural bonds and financing the development and improvement of the fuel and energy industry in Ust-Kamenogorsk with the participation of AES Company. This question can be solved in the nearest future.

At present private entrepreneurs and rank-and-file citizens in Kazakhstan are not anxious to buy products or services of the Islamic sector. “We want Kazakhstan to become the regional center of Islamic financial transactions, we want the securities issued on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan to be recognized by people who would like to buy these products or get the services according to the Islamic principles of financial operations,” said the deputy chairman of the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan G. Uzbekov.

Meanwhile, it became known that Kazakhstan’s second biggest bank, “Turan Aleyem,” and the “Emirates Islamic Bank” from the United Arab Emirates planned to open a bank in Kazakhstan, which would work on the basis of the Sharia laws. It is envisaged to create a joint venture which would offer corporative and retail products. Each side will have 50% of capital.

The distinguishing feature of Islamic financing is the ban on collection of any interest on credits (nominal, simple and compound, fixed or floating). In order to get income from crediting, the financial institution in question should either be the participant sharing fully all risks and bonuses of the enterprise, or take part in trade and receive profit from the difference between the cost of commodity and its sale price. Trade contracts should be based on the principles of justice and should not contribute to the unlawful enrichment of any party, which, in essence, is the foundation of traditional business.

An important factor existing at present, which can radically change for the better the economic situation of the Republic of

Kazakhstan and each of its neighboring countries is the creation of the Caspian macroregion.

All countries of the Caspian region and their neighbors actively develop all branches of the economy, establish efficient foreign economic ties, and take part in the construction of various transport routes at present. This is seen especially clearly in Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

The latter two countries develop their economic projects in the direction of the arid Caspian shore. These two countries, just as other Central Asian and Caucasian republics – Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan – have chosen the raw material development of their economies as the main direction of economic advancement.

Russia also exerts no little effort to the development of the transport infrastructure on the Caspian shore, which can be seen on the example of building the new sea port of Olya, a 50-kilometer railway line leading to it from the station of Yandyki, and the development of the port of Makhachkala. The authorities of Astrakhan Region implement an active economic program by putting forward promising proposals.

The main obstacle for gaining the desired results by the Caspian countries is their disunity in the economic sphere. Moreover, competition and isolationism are growing between them. This is confirmed by the fact that they are ready to lay out new transport trunk lines and roads parallel to the already operating ones in order to avoid crossing the border with their neighbor. The countries of the European Union pursue a quite opposite strategy developing international transport corridors.

The striving to gain favorable economic and social positions takes the form of regionalization. It emerged as a movement protecting small countries from the threats of globalization and those of economic

take-over by transnational corporations. The basic factor of regionalization, along with territorial proximity, is historical kinship and similar mentality. The striving of the Republic of Kazakhstan and other Asian countries for regional solidarity means that they are unwilling to remain a raw material base of other states.

A vivid example of striving to gain mutual benefit is the construction of the Uzen – Gyzylgai – Bereket – Etrek – Gorgan railway line, which was initiated by the head of the state of Turkmenistan G. Berdymuhamedov. The opening ceremony at the start of construction took place in Bereket on December 1, 2007, with high officials of Iran and Kazakhstan being present at it.

Speaking of the economic expediency of the construction of this new railway, G. Berdymuhamedov emphasized that it would be linked with the transport network of Europe and Asia. Thus, both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan become a transport center of continental importance, which will bring great economic benefit from transit transportation and give an impetus to the further development of all-round international cooperation.

The new transport corridor, which will connect countries of the region in the third millennium, will contribute to integration on the basis of real economic benefit and equal partnership. This was also noted by President Ahmadinejad of Iran in his letter to President G. Berdymuhamedov of Turkmenistan on the occasion of the opening of an exhibition of Iranian commodities in Ashkhabad, in which more than 80 leading companies of Iran took part.

A bilateral intergovernmental commission of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan held negotiations recently in the Turkmen capital, discussing the implementation of the project on building the North – South transport-communication corridor and the construction of the Caspian gas pipeline. A bilateral protocol was signed, defining the

major directions and stages of the project and confirming the readiness of the countries concerned to expand and diversify their mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation, including the fuel and energy sector, agriculture and fisheries, tourism, and the sphere of transport and telecommunications.

The implementation of these plans depends on the political and financial stability in the world, as well as in the negotiating countries. Today, in connection with the slump of economic activity in Kazakhstan and the neighboring countries most projects will be frozen.

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**THE ROLE OF KYRGYZSTAN IN REALIZATION  
OF THE USA STRATEGIC INTERESTS  
IN CENTRAL ASIA**

The events of 11 September were used as a convenient information cover for consolidation of the American military presence in Afghanistan, which became for them a strategic springboard to ensure the control over Central Asia (CA) as a whole. In the end of the same month the USA asked the leadership of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) to provide the air space for operations in Afghanistan and got the positive answer. On 11 December the parliament of the KR confirmed the decision of the government to put international airport “Manas” at the disposal of the USA air force. This decision was coordinated with the partners of DKB and ShOS. Thus, the airbase in size of 224 hectares was created in December 2001 in the KR for military actions and humanitarian assistance within the framework of the USA anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan as a United Nations mandatory

sanction. It was decided to locate in the air base about 40 airplanes and 4000 servicemen. They started to come to the republic since the middle of December. The intergovernmental agreement, including the exchanged American and Kyrgyz official documents, served as a legal foundation to place foreign troops in the republic. In May 2003, the commanding officer of the airbase signed the agreement with the government of the KR on the lease of additional land to locate its equipment.

The USA further paid great attention to its national strategy. On 30 July 2010, the official representative of the State Department proclaimed in Washington in the Carnegie Center five main directions of American policy in the CA: security, energy, promotion of political liberalization, consolidation of market economy, prevention of emergence of ungrounded states. According to the CENTCOM commandment, Americans will stay in the CA “as long as it is needed”. The genuine aim of the American operation in Afghanistan is as follows: to deprive China and Russia as the main continental countries of the strategic rear – the defense springboard in the CA, according to V. Sokor, an analyst of Jamestown Foundation. The operation of western forces headed by the USA in the CA means a geopolitical global revolution, according to him. Armenian political analyst I. Mudyan regards that the USA plans in the CA (including the Caucasus) are constructed with the vector against Russia and China. Professor of the Columbian University R. Legvold considers that Chinese more than Russians are inclined to regard the deployment of the USA forces not only as a feeble idea but as a direct threat to their national security. A. Bolshakov, a known Russian expert considers that in the sphere of political conflicts in the post-Soviet space the USA pursued their definite aims in the CA and formed the pro-American orientation of the region, restrained influence of China and Russia,

created conditions for open clash between Russian and Chinese interests, used the regional capacity for a long-term dialogue with the Islamic world. S. Sultanov, the head of the Center for Strategic Studies “Russia and Islamic World” came to the conclusion that the aim of the American policy in the CA is as follows: to provoke a conflict among Russia, China and the countries of the Central Asian region (CAR) and further to transform this chaos into a directed process, like in the Balkans after disintegration of Yugoslavia.

In spite of periodic promises made by the USA not to create its permanent military presence in the CA and to withdraw its forces after termination of the active phase of battles in Afghanistan, the general trend of the situation’s development is directly opposite. The formation of the Washington’s foreign policy is influenced by activities of neo-conservators, who regard that their main task is to prevent integration of Eurasian countries round Russia as the emergence in the Eurasian space of the significant strategic entity. The American military-political presence in the CA objectively (despite the wish of Washington, the CA countries and Moscow) consolidated the significance of the USA in the post-Soviet space primarily at the expense of Russia. At the same time, Washington suppressed the negative attitude of the bulk of the population of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to deployment of foreign servicemen on their territories.

Since the end of 2001, the USA participates in “democratization” of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the two CA states, which accepted its military contingents. On 20 August 2002, the State Department of the USA issued the special information report, which contained the following tasks of its Bureau for democracy affairs, human and workers rights: to promote formation of political parties in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan by means of grants for shaping and developing parties of democratic orientation; to promote creation of typographic abilities in

these countries, which would ensure the access to free and independent information sources; to give support to the program of consolidation of “responsible journalism” in these countries.

In this connection it becomes quite clear that the created in this way “democratic opposition” with support of “responsible mass media” should sooner or later start a real struggle for power in both states, where the USA deployed its military contingents. Thus, it is clear that the Administration of the USA decided to replace the regimes of Karimov and Akayev by its pro-American clients.

It is not excluded that such pro-American governments of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan may after coming to power question their participation in CIS and ShOS and, in case of Kyrgyzstan, in the Treaty of Collective Security. As a result, the shaped pro-American alliance would probably be marked by stronger anti-Russian feeling than GUUAM. Consequently, the American policy, proclaimed in autumn 2002 relating to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, represented a significant challenge to Russian national interests and might result in a new confrontation between Russia and the USA in the southern flank of CIS.

The embassies of the USA in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan took actions in this direction. The American embassy in the KR openly supported the opposition’s actions against president A. Akayev and the government of the country in March-May of 2002. Following the pre-term resignation of the government of the KR, the State Department of the USA expressed its readiness to render assistance to the government in taking more specific measures to extend the dialogue with civil society for the sake of elimination of accumulated contradictions.

The USA periodically criticized official Bishkek for violation of human rights and freedom of speech, for corruption of officials, actually taking actions against its multi-vector foreign policy course

and diplomacy. Simultaneously the USA demonstrated its favorable attitude to Akayev, recognizing his key role in maintaining bilateral relations. In September 2002 the president of the KR enjoyed a warp reception in Washington. The joint declaration of two countries mentioned development of their mutual cooperation directed to strengthening of security and stability in the region, continuation of democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan and assistance to its economic development by the USA. The clan of Akayev enjoyed financial support given to it by the USA, particularly via charitable foundations controlled by M. Akayeva – the wife of the president.

The creation of Russian air base Kant at the distance of 14 km from Bishkek in October 2003 had a great impact on the state of relations between the USA and Kyrgyzstan. The unique situation emerged in Kyrgyzstan: the military contingents of political competitors were located at the distance of 30 km. As was mentioned by A. Knyazev, the director of the Bishkek branch of the Institute for Affairs of CIS countries, the realization of American strategy demanded the greater guarantees than the balanced policy of A. Akayev. Poor and open Kyrgyzstan could play in the best way the role of a springboard of American interests in the region, while the good geographic situation as well as a small sum of financial contributions and the weakness of local authorities opened to western influence should have promoted it. The complete governance role plaid by the USA in Kyrgyzstan should have guaranteed the achievement of a number of its geopolitical aims. The creation of the alternative object questioned these guarantees.

In March 2005 the disturbances on a mass scale took place in the KR, and their organizers accused supporters of the president of numerous violations in the course of elections. The opposition with the financial and information support of the USA, of various foundations

and non-governmental organizations succeeded to seize the official buildings and to replace the group headed by A. Akayev by a rather pluralistic power with participation of southern clans. Akayev failed to keep his power, left the country with his family and got asylum in Moscow. He accused of his misfortunes the USA and a number of American public organizations, including international human rights organization “Freedom House”, which established in Bishkek an independent printing-works headed by M. Stown within the framework of the project Center in charge of support of independent mass media in Kyrgyzstan. Although the Center is considered as a Kyrgyz NGO, the post of its chairman is occupied usually by an American senator.

This interpretation of these events is not unfounded. In October 2004 the American ambassador in Bishkek expressed his wish that A. Akayev should not propose his candidature for the presidential post for the fourth time. In the end of December by request of M. Stown, a former minister of foreign affairs and former ambassador in the USA, the leader of opposition movement “Ata-Jurt” (“Fatherland”) R. Otunbayeva appealed to Russia to stop to support Akayev’s regime.

According to G. Mikhailov, the correspondent of information agency Regnum, A. Akayev once expressed his intention to withdraw base “Manas” from the country, and soon afterwards a group of Kyrgyz opposition politicians, including K. Bakiyev, visited the USA and had a meeting with officials of the State Department. In March 2005, the opposition, having received a big financial assistance, arranged the “tulip revolution”, and Akayev left the country but the base stayed at its place. As writes known expert A. Knyazev, in November-December 2004 in the course of secret negotiations between the USA and Kyrgyzstan the American representatives wanted to get an agreement on location in airport “Manas” of airplanes E-3A with system AVAKS to arrange regular reconnaissance flight along the border with China. At

that time the Kyrgyz party with great difficulty succeeded to refuse to accept these proposals of the USA, and the president intended to initiate his proposal to the new parliament on withdrawal of the American base from the territory of the republic.

However, participation of external forces in the events of 2005 was not so evident comparing with Ukraine and Georgia. An attempt of coup d'etat and not a revolution took place in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, the Russian party stressed its readiness to cooperate with the Kyrgyz opposition, which came to power, and expressed its hope that the victors would keep the situation under control. The American ambassador Kyrgyzstan confessed of his sympathy to the opposition but qualified Russia as a significant factor in development of situation in the RK. He expressed his assurance that the USA would maintain close cooperation with Russia. At the same time, the American ambassador admitted that by that time the USA invested in the KR the biggest sum per capita of the population than in any other CA state.

It is a mistake to underestimate the role of external forces in provoking and developing of the situation in March of 2005, A. Knyazev thinks. He considers as the main causes of the coup d'etat not only the weakness of the power but also the direct interference of external forces, primarily of the USA, in the course of events. For the preceding period the USA formed and commissioned the specific mechanism of support to the alternative elite by foreign financial assistance. By means of the education centers and NGO's the USA destructed traditional social mechanisms, including foundations of the people's world outlook, promoted shaping in public opinion the rejection of existing situation, stimulated the rise of level of expectations and claims to life, which were not supported at all by real conditions in the republic.

S. Sultanov makes a more critical estimation of the events in March; according to him, the trans-national Central Asian narcotic structure, primarily, narcotic traders of Osh, plaid the key role in the overthrow of Akayev and Bakiyev coming to power. By the eastern tradition, Bakiyev decided to get himself rid of his supporters in Osh. Some of them were killed, others lost their legal business. Bakiyev's relatives successfully increased their share in the narcotics transit. In any case, the events of March 2005 interrupted the legitimate political process in the KR and started chronic instability, permanent vacuum of power and authoritarian family-clan aspirations of the ruling personalities, who make unreal any positive political project, which might be proposed to the republic. In the sphere of definition of the interest of the KR and consequently of its policy in relation to the USA Bakiyev continued his former policy, i.e. he did not step out of the limits of commercial wishes. Kyrgyzstan did not construct any political, economic or other interests. In June 2005, acting foreign minister of the KR R. Otunbayeva and State Secretary of the USA C. Rice discussed the perspectives of further development of relations between the two countries. C. Rice stressed the interest of the USA in strengthening the bilateral partnership with the KR.

On 5 July 2005, the summit of the ShOS proposed to the USA to define the final date of provisional use of infrastructure objects and deployment of military contingents on the territory of member-states of the ShOS; on 11 July the president of the KR Bakiyev declared that the leadership of the republic would consider the issue of expediency of location on its territory of the USA military base; on 26 August 2005 the parliament of Uzbekistan took the decision on withdrawal of the USA military contingent from airdrome "Khanabad" (the American air base was closed in November 2005), and Tashkent started to restore its cooperation with ODKB. The USA reacted to these political

declarations and started to advance the geopolitical conception of “Great Central Asia” (GCA). The main idea of GCA elaborated by John Hopkins University and published in magazine “Foreign Affairs” (July-August 2005) was reduced to creation of the Partnership for Cooperation and Development of GCA as a regional forum for planning, being alternative to EvrAzES and ShOS, for coordination and implementation of the whole series of American projects. The Partnership provided for creation of the united military-strategic and geopolitical entity, including Kazakhstan, the post-Soviet republics in the Middle Asia and Afghanistan, and further creation of the union with the “Great Near East” under the aegis of the West.

The other aim of the project consisted in involvement in the program of Turkey, Pakistan and India, in separation of this enlarged region and in its withdrawal from influence of Russia and China. Pentagon and NATO were defined as the most important instrument of implementation of this American strategy. Under the cover of GCA Washington strived to impose external governance on the CA, a certain soft form of protectorate, creating appearance of “geopolitical pluralism”, promoting illusion in Moscow and in Beijing of their significance in the region by giving them the status (side by side with the West and after it) of guarantors and donors for the modernization process.

In 2007, the State Department started the process of the full scale involvement of the KR in NATO Program “Partnership for Peace”. In the same year the KR joined NATO program PARP (Process of Analysis and Planning) for the sake of extension of its military-technical cooperation with NATO, participation in its peacemaking missions and in actions in zones of armed conflicts. However, for the period of 2005–2008 the USA achieved rather limited successes in the CA. The policy of “aggressive realism” carried out for the second term

of presidency of G. Bush junior created difficulties in the USA relations with most countries of the region, thinks scientific researcher of MGIMO A. Kasantsev. As a result of visit to Bishkek of Minister of Defense of the USA in July 2005 the agreement was concluded on keeping by the USA its military presence in “Manas” as long as its is needed for the military operation in Afghanistan. Pentagon promised to increase its payment for the lease of the base and to give the credit of \$ 200 million. R. Otunbayeva expressed her gratitude to the USA for the support and stressed the interest of the KR in keeping American military presence, the annual American contribution of \$ 45 million for the lease of the base and \$ 25 million for re-fueling of airplanes.

The visit of C. Rice to Bishkek in October 2005 was aimed at neutralizing “the Russian factor”, mainly the agreement on extension of Russian air base in Kant and the dialogue of Russia with Uzbekistan. C. Rice succeeded to get agreement of the KR to locate in airport “Manas” the American infrastructure and servicemen withdrawn from Uzbekistan. Having said that Kyrgyzstan had no reason to make choice between Russia and the USA, the State Secretary on 11 October signed the joint declaration of the USA and the KR on presence of American troops in Middle Asia. Both parties expressed their support of presence of the coalition forces on the territory of the KR up to liquidation of terrorism in Afghanistan – the operation supported by United Nations.

On 19 April 2006, Bakiyev in his TV speech warned the USA about a possible withdrawal from the bilateral agreement on location of American military air base in airport “Manas”. By his blackmail Bakiyev wanted to get a sustainable source of contributions to the republican budget. As a result, on 14 July 2006, the compromise agreement was achieved. Further, the issue of the American air base was used by him not once as an object of bargaining between the USA and the KR. In this connection, the following conclusion of A. Knyazev

seems to be quite reasonable: K. Bakiyev coming to power became a failure of American policy; owing to some subjective reasons Bakiyev to a larger extent than Akayev directed his foreign policy to Moscow and simultaneously to Beijing and Tashkent. It was not a surprise that the USA started to prepare its revenge, since the political uncertainty of Bakiyev behavior had a direct impact on uninterrupted functioning of the military air base in the airport “Manas”.

On 3 February 2009, as a result of negotiations in Moscow, Bakiyev made public the decision of the government of the KR to close the American military base. The following day the parliament of the KR received a draft on denunciation of the note of ministry of foreign affairs of the KR in return to the note of the USA embassy of 4 December 2001, forming together the agreement between the government of the KR and the government of the USA. Soon the agreement with the USA on deployment of airbase “Manas” was denounced, and on 20 February the note of the foreign ministry of the KR on withdrawal of the base was transferred to the American ambassador in Bishkek. The reasons of the taken decision were as follows: the ambiguous position of the American party on economic compensation for the American presence in the KR as well as the killing of a Kyrgyz citizen by an American serviceman. The withdrawal of 1000 servicemen (95% Americans) should have occurred not later than 20 August of the same year. The American mass media with pessimism and irritation against Moscow reacted to this information and concentrated on finding out the amount of damage in relation of the airbase’s loss, on other options of cargo deliveries to NATO forces in Afghanistan via other CA countries, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

Not long afterwards, Bakiyev declared that the issue of withdrawal of American servicemen from base “Manas” remained open

and that negotiations with the USA may be resumed. In its turn, the USA demonstrated its readiness to pay a higher rent for its base to the KR. The American embassy in Bishkek informed on 1 June "Eurasia Net" about secret negotiations with the government of the KR on the affairs related to the base. Meantime, the Chinese party did not insist on withdrawing of the American base from the KR. France plaid a certain role in keeping the base, performing at that time the mediator functions in Middle Asia.

One should not say that these negotiations had a negative impact on Russian-American relations. On the contrary, taking into account the increased difficulties for deliveries of cargoes to Afghanistan by traditional way via Pakistan and the plans of new president of the USA B. Obama to enlarge significantly the American contingent in Afghanistan, Russia rendered assistance to solve the problem of transit via its territory of American non-military cargos. The unloading of American ships started in the ports of Latvia, and further the cargoes were transported by the railways. The transportation corridor of cargo deliveries to the coalition forces was joined by Kazakhstan, which agreed for the transit of exclusively civil goods by land transportation through its territory to give a rear support to the military contingent of the USA in Afghanistan. In this context, the USA and Tajikistan agreed to construct the second bridge over the bordering river Pyanj in the route to Afghanistan. Later both bridges will be used for transportation 24 hours per day. Tajikistan promised to provide its air space for transportation of cargoes and personnel of NATO countries to Afghanistan.

At the same time, Turkmenistan agreed to create an air corridor for transportation of civil goods and of personnel, belonged to NATO, to Afghanistan, while Uzbekistan agreed to allow transport of them through its territory in two directions. First, it was the route by railway

via Tajikistan and further to North Afghanistan, where, according to NATO plans, up to 200 railway containers should be shipped every week; second, it was the land corridor via southern Uzbek city Termez to Afghan Khairaton, located at the distance of 100 km from the city of Mazari-Sharif. Probably, these friendly steps taken by Ashkhabad and Tashkent in favor of Washington pursued the aim to balance influence of Russia in the Central Asian gas market. It was significant for G. Berdymuhamedov to alleviate international isolation of Turkmenistan after death of president S. Niyazov; I. Karimov intended to soften the sanctions imposed for bloody Andijan events in 2005.

On 11 May 2009, I. Karimov confirmed the utilization of the cargo airport in the city of Navoi as a staging post for air transportation of non-military cargos of NATO for coalition forces in Afghanistan. As mentioned American journalist D. Tynan, the agreement on Navoi left the Kremlin in a deadlock and might be considered as a clever move of the State Department. For the last years, Moscow fixed as a main geopolitical aim the liquidation of American military presence in the region and succeeded to get in this direction certain successes by means of financial assistance in exchange for withdrawal, attained with the Kyrgyz leaders in the beginning of 2009. Probably, the rigid declaration of Karimov against deployment of the Russian base in the south of the KR under the aegis of ODKB should be considered in the same context. The foreign ministry of Uzbekistan in its official declaration stressed that the Uzbek party does not see any need and advisability in realization of the plans of deployment in the south of Kyrgyzstan of an additional contingent of Russian forces. The memorandum on military cooperation signed on 1 August by the presidents of the RF and the KR had the same content. The position of Tashkent was supported by the USA.

The above said confirms the conclusion made by A. Kazantsev that for the period of the 2000s the geopolitical rivalry between the RF and the USA in the region repeatedly resulted in changes of the correlation of their forces: weakening of influence of Russia led to about equal rise of influence of the USA and vice versa... For the second part of the 1990s, the USA and Russia more often started to play “the game which is not worth the candle”, since the interest of both powers to the CA increased rapidly and simultaneously but the way of harmonic cooperation was not discovered. As a result, American (and, as a whole, western) influence in correlation with Russian influence started to resemble “a swing”. For the period of the 1996–1999 and the 2001–2003 the western influence was growing, while the period of 1999–2001 and 2004–2008 was marked by the rise of Russian influence. As a whole, under conditions of great uncertainty and of significant unsettled issues the policy of the USA in the CA for the 1991–2008 was marked by rather low consistency and efficiency. The constant change of the situation in the CA and “reshuffle” of different American projects results in the lack of stability of hierarchy of the USA interests in the region. One should agree with the meaning of I. Muradyan that by the present time neither Russia nor the USA succeeded to consolidate their positions in the CA.

On 7 April 2010, on the wave of anti-government disturbances another coup d'etat occurred in the KR. The group of Bakiyev lost its power. The opposition formed the provisional “government of people's confidence”, headed by a former foreign minister R. Otunbayeva. Russia rendered assistance to the provisional government. In this way it expressed its attitude to the overthrown regime of Bakiyev, which kept in the KR the military American base despite the promise to get rid of it in exchange for the Russian material assistance.

Under these conditions, the State Secretary of the USA H. Clinton supported the ally of the anti-terrorist coalition and offered humanitarian assistance to the KR. On 12 April the State Department supported the intention of R. Otunbayeva to ensure governance of the country and return to democracy, proposed to arrange international investigation and engagement of police detachments of OSCE in the zone of conflict, and promised to give financial support to the KR. On 23 June the special representative of the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE for the CA proposed at his press-conference in Bishkek to send international police forces to the KR.

The meeting of the foreign ministers of 56 member-states of OSCE, held in Alma Ata in July 2010, took the decision on sending of international police forces to the KR (52 peacekeepers and further 50 officers) for the initial period of four months with probable extension of their presence depending on the situation in the regions of Osh and Jelalabad. Indian political analyst M.K. Bhadrakumar made the conclusion that the decision of OSCE was the key element of regional policy of the USA, which drafted the scenario of ensuring regional security for the period after the war in Afghanistan, of renovation of OSCE with certain advantages in preventing and regulating conflicts in the CA and promoting working out the complex and multilateral policy of the USA in the CA, which consisted up to present of separate bargains and which would additionally attract attention to Afghanistan.

The president of Uzbekistan I. Karimov supported the proposal of international investigation of events in the KR. As was mentioned by pro-American Kyrgyz politician B. Beshimov, many public organizations in Uzbekistan, controlled by the authorities, addressed themselves not to Russia but to United Nations, OSCE, to the president of the USA and to the leaders of European Union with the appeal to

carry on international investigation of the situation in the KR. As a result, the KR became closer to the USA, and new closer relations emerged between the USA and Uzbekistan with a perspective of regional cooperation. Kazakhstan changed its attitude to the western intervention in Kyrgyzstan from cool reticence to open support. As a result, Russia turned out to be in “the gray” zone. Having abstained from interference in the crisis in the KR and being unable to mobilize ODKB for this interference, Moscow made false signals of its emergence relating to cruel Islamists and narcotics mafia threatening regional security and lost the chance to come forward against decisions of OSCE, M. Bhadrakumar concluded.

Stressing its loyalty to the USA, the provisional government of the KR arranged the constitutional referendum and transformed the country into a first state with parliamentary regime in Middle Asia. The term of the agreement with the USA on the air base “Manas” was prolonged, transforming the base into a Pentagon center of transit shipment with the purpose of support of the international coalition’s operations on the territory of Afghanistan. The USA informed about its readiness to render assistance to the KR in liquidation of consequences of mass inter-ethnic disturbances in the region of Osh. And in August 2010 the USA declared that it intended to construct the second military base in the south of the KR – “Osh training ground” – to cover the rear of American servicemen in case of destabilization of the situation in the region. At the same time, the USA continued to ignore the idea of forming a system of mutual action with ODKB, proposed by Moscow.

Despite refusal of Moscow to recognize OSCE as a principal guarantor of security in the KR, Washington sticks to this plan and, on the contrary, stubbornly intends to realize it. Washington carries on its offensive against traditional leading position of Russia in Kyrgyzstan and at the same time asserts constantly that it works in cooperation with

Moscow, notes M. Bhadrakumar. The USA succeeded to prevent in September 2010 the conclusion of the significant agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on the long-term presence of the Russian army in the KR. The American mass media with big intention discussed the issue of the payment for the lease of land provided for location of foreign objects, comparing the annual payment of \$ 4.5 million by Russia with \$ 60 million annually paid by the USA.

The meeting of the presidents of the USA and the KR in September 2010, held in New York, was devoted to discussion of the situation in Afghanistan and the common aims in the sphere of development and security. B. Obama thanked R. Otunbayeva for the contribution of the KR in achievement of these aims. Highly estimating her actions in restoration of democratic institutions in the republic, he expressed optimism in connection with agreement of Bishkek on deployment of the police consultative group of OSCE composed of 52 persons and on creation of the international commission, which would investigate the causes of the tragic events in June.

Actually, the USA gave support to the regime of “the parliamentary republic”, which under conditions of the clannish structure of society can not be either strong or efficient. What is more, as S. Sultanov considers, as a result of the thoughtful and well organized operation, with the connivance of Americans, the political forces based on the resources of the international narcotic mafia came to power in the KR. According to him, the key group of the “enraged population” storming the government’s offices was composed of the fighters armed by modern arms, including sniper rifles (with holographic rear-sights), who quite professionally suppressed fire of the special force. The opposition, which came to power, would hardly be able to organize it. Exactly the Osh detachments with the support of masses of people organized by the official opposition threw down

Bakiyev. The position of the American party was marked by elements of a new policy directed to transformation of the CA into a territory of chaos with further governance of regional conflicts and crises, thinks S. Sultanov. The USA, according to him, will count on disappearance of the existing state structures, with probable exception of Kazakhstan characterized by special relations with the USA. As far as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and other countries are concerned, the Yugoslavian model becomes quite probable. The question is that the USA count on the long-term governance of the crises, the expert regards.

Despite these evident successes of American diplomacy, the conservatives in the USA regard as inadequate the efforts taken by the Administration of B. Obama. In particular, a senior researcher of Heritage Foundation A. Cohan made the proposal to reconsider in general the USA policy relating to Russia and the post-Soviet republics on the basis of realistic appraisal of the Russia's intentions and actions. To his view, the American national interests demand as follows: weakening of the growing influence of the Kremlin in the Central Asian region, extension of the military-political cooperation with the countries of the CA, including training and delivery of arms, preparation of the ground for creation in the center of Eurasia of new sphere of security, strengthening of projects for laying trans-Caspian gas pipelines and of Nabucco pipeline in cooperation with the countries of European Union, as well as promotion of openness, democracy and legal power, of responsible state governance in the region. Expressing the point of view of foes of "resetting" of American-Russian relations under conditions of Moscow, he insists that the most important task of Pentagon in the shaped circumstances is the appraisal of chances for deployment of advanced military bases in the states of the CA and for barring the transferal of base "Manas" to Russia.

However, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the American successes in the KR. It is sufficient to say that the new prime minister of the KR A. Atambayev made his first foreign visit to Moscow, where on 27 December 2010 he was received by prime-minister V. Putin. Having noted “strategic partnership” of two countries, Atambayev mentioned the intention of his country to join the Customs Union together with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Expressing the negative attitude of the new government to the American military base, he also declared that it would probably be closed soon. In his turn, V. Putin promised to render financial assistance in the size of \$ 25 million as well as to provide deliveries of 1.4 million tons of grains.

And what is more, appraising the situation in the KR as a whole, it is important to stress that it is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Owing to various reasons Kyrgyzstan maneuvers among the interests of Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and periodically makes declarations about strategic partnership with the RF, the USA and the countries of the EU. As was marked by one of French journalists, Kyrgyzstan lacks a strong power: the lawful state and calm democracy, the authoritarian president or the dominant external force. Being alone, the system may deviate at any time in the most unexpected direction. At present, the feeling of unstable balance prevails in the country being mixed with the fright of a new explosion of forceful action. I. Muradyan considers that the KR is in need of a very strong economic and military-operative guardianship and that its leadership confronts the task of preservation of the state integrity. For this reason, A. Knyazev thinks, any thoughtful and tested foreign policy strategy does not exist. It is replaced by a pragmatic tactical approach displayed in “multi-vector direction” of foreign policy and in the wish of the ruling political elite to keep a comfortable space for reciprocal actions in the external world. All foreign policy steps of the Kyrgyz leadership,

concludes A. Knyazev, demonstrate its firm intention further to look for getting a profit in contradictions among external actors, showing the full absence of strategic political thinking and the short-lived pragmatism.

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**SOCIETY AND FAMILY IN UZBEKISTAN**

The republic of Uzbekistan as a sovereign independent state is on the threshold of its 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The previous period was the time of dynamic consolidation and development enjoyed by the support of great masses of people and numerous institutions of civil society. A significant place in the system of civil society is occupied by the social institution of family, which may be considered as a quality state of society produced by social actions of individuals within the framework of a particular culture. In this case it is worth mentioning the point of view of a well known scientist J. Toshchenko, who considered social society in the aspect of “sociology of life”. To the mind of the scientist, civil society should be defined as an “aggregate of historically organized forms of common activities of life as well as the common human values, which are used by the people as the guide to action in all spheres of social life...Just therefore civil society should be regarded in the light of “phenomenon of human being”. The public opinion poll carried on in February 2011 concludes the analysis of the results of the research in dynamics for 2009 and 2011. The sample aggregate consisted of 4000 respondents from all regions of the country.

The social orientations and aims of Uzbek families. One of the main tasks of the research was to find out the meaning and the views of the citizens of the country about the main functions of family in life of society. The poll showed that the perceptions of the Uzbek people for the studied period had changed insignificantly: the number of citizens, who consider that the main function of family consists in education of the young generation, had reduced to some extent. It may testify to a rise of the percent of the population replacing the educational function exclusively on education institutions. However, the population of the republic attaches great importance to the rising family's role in consolidation of stability and security in the country.

The poll showed as follows: a rather small rise of the number of respondents (from 46.8% in 2009 to 47.6% in 2011), who consider that family gives strength to certitude in life. In the opinion of 38.3% of the citizens, the main function of family in human life is birth and education of children. For the period of the research, the number of respondents considering that family was needed for the support of old people increased by 5.2%.

One of the factors having impact on creation of the harmonic family is the age of the married man and woman. The Uzbek society is marked by the rising number of people, who think that the men should marry at a mature age of 26–27 years or 28 years and older. The number of men, who marry at the earlier age of 21–23 and 24–25 years (55% and 45.4%, correspondingly), is subject to reduction.

The almost equal number of respondents in city and rural regions consider that the men may and should marry at the age of 24–25 years. A greater number of city dwellers (38.4%) than rural districts' residents (35.4%) answered that the most favorable age for marriage should be the age from 26 years. As far as the most desirable women's age for marriage is considered, its definite rise was marked. In 2009, most

respondents (52.1%) considered that the best age for marriage is the period from 18 to 20 years, while in 2011 the number of citizens giving the same response was reduced by 13.2%. The number of respondents considering that young women should better marry at the age from 21 to 23 years rose almost by 13.9%. The number of respondents, who regard that the age from 24 to 25 years as the best wage for women to marry, rose insignificantly.

More than half of the city and rural residents regard as an optimal women's age for marriage to be the period from 21 to 23 years (54.3% and 53.5%, correspondingly). There are more rural residents than city dwellers, who are convinced that the girls should marry at the age of 24–25 years. The prevailing meaning in public consciousness is as follows: the young people should be informed about each other as much as possible before they come to the important and responsible decision in life concerning marriage and creation of family. It is shown by the growth of the number of respondents (from 50.3% to 55%), who consider the boys and girls should meet for the period of time from a half of year to one year before they decide to create their family. To the mind of 27% of the respondents, the period of preliminary acquaintance should be not less than one year, while 28% of the respondents considered that this period should last not less than half a year.

Under present conditions, of great importance is preparation of young people for creation of the family: 26.4% of respondents assert that the mother should educate her girls for family life; to the mind of 15.9% respondents, the father was responsible for preparation of his sons for marriage. The number of people considering that school and other education institutions should be responsible for preparation of young people for family life rose by 2.4%.

In Uzbekistan, there exist legislative foundations, which obligate young people to be subject to medical check-up before marriage. All

polls, carried out for the last years, showed that the absolute majority of citizens support this provision of the law. The results of the poll in 2011 demonstrate the growth of this trend. The analysis of the data by gender and age of the residents discovered complete identity of meanings on the need of medical examination of the aspirants for marriage.

The results of the poll showed the rise of the people, who are convinced that the parents should have a deciding voice in marriage. It demonstrates that the tradition to recognize the parents' authority in all matters, including marriage, is still widely spread. The poll fixed the changes in relation to the procedure of taking decisions on creation of family in the minds of citizens: Uzbeks and other indigenous representatives of the peoples of the Central Asia. Thus, in 2009 the number of Uzbeks considering that the parents should have the deciding voice in the question of family creation was almost by 2% less than the number of Uzbek respondents, who provided the decisive voice in marriage for the young people (boys and girls); in 2011 the proportions changed, and the percentages became almost equal. The research discovered the direct proportional connection between the age of the respondents and their position on the question of who should have the deciding voice in the process of creation of family.

The consciousness of many generations was firmly marked by the perception that the esteem of the parents and the elder people was an important indication of culture, morality and ethic. This conviction is incorporated in consciousness of the contemporary Uzbek generation proved by the poll's results: the absolute majority of the respondents (99.8%) hold the meaning that the parents' blessing is the needed condition for marriage. The analysis of the data received by the poll showed that the citizens, irrespective of age, religion and material situation and nationality, express respect to their parents and take into account their views before marriage.

The issue of the attitude to the marriage contract was studied in the course of the research. According to article 30 of the Family Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the marriage contract may be concluded both before the state registration of marriage and in the period of marriage. The number of respondents, who regard that the marriage contract should be concluded before the state registration, was reduced almost by 1%, while simultaneously the number of advocates of a more free approach to marriage rose by 5.9%: the marriage contracts may be concluded by the accord of the future married couple. The social-demographic analysis of this issue showed that the marriage contract is supported mainly by citizens at the age of from 40 to 59 years, who do not stick strictly to the religious way of life.

The poll of the public opinion showed that the Uzbeks occupy the different approach to decision of the question of the needed conditions for creating the family. Each second resident of the country considers that first of all it is necessary to ensure the material independence of the newly married couple. The number of the people, who are convinced that primarily to create a new family the young people should marry for love, was reduced by 4.9% comparing with the previous research. Almost every third respondent (31.2%) considers as a deciding condition for marriage the good health of the young people and their ability to give birth to a healthy child: the number of such respondents increased almost by 2%. Each fifth respondent (21.6%) shares the view that the newly-weds should possess the permanent separate apartment before they create their family.

Thus, the majority of citizens in Uzbekistan hold the view that the pre-conditions for the solid and happy family are as follows: content, peace and calmness, mutual understanding and respect, love and spiritual alliance (62.6%), as well as material well-being ensuring a

good level of living (25.3%). Every eleventh respondent answered that the family members are happy, if they have children (14.8%).

## **Reproductive directions and health of citizens**

The poll showed the trend to consolidation of reproductive directions of citizens. Over half of the population of the country fully agrees with the assertion that the children provide the family with the main sense and value. For the last two years, this index has risen (from 45.6% in 2009 to 58.6% in 2011). The children have been and are the main value of the Uzbek family. This conclusion is proved by the fact that the great majority (81.6%) of respondents has children, and this indication has been stable for several years. According to every third respondent (36.9%), it is better to give birth to four and more children and to have them in family. There has increased the number of respondents, who regard three children in family as an optimal number. The number of responses, which mention “two children”, was reduced by 8.7%. Every fourth respondent considers that the optimal age of women for birth of the first child should be from 20 to 22 years. The main condition of keeping the reproductive woman’s health is the need to keep to the time interval between the births. According to medical indications, it lasts not less than three years. The answers of the respondents in the course of the poll demonstrate a rather great rise of knowledge’s rate of citizens in Uzbekistan in this matter for the late years.

The received results demonstrate a stable conviction of the citizens, who regard that the decision on the birth of the other child should be taken jointly by husband and wife. This indication actually remained at the level of the year of 2009 and made 75.3%. The number of respondents fixing the exclusive right of husband for deciding the question of birth of the next child rose insignificantly (by 0.9%).

For one third (32.6%) of the country's citizens the main factor having impact on the birth of another child is the wish to have not only one child, while for the other group of people (23%) – the material factor. In 2009 the family's material level of living was the deciding factor for 18.6% of the respondents. The percent of respondents, who made the decision on the birth of another child with due account of health of mother, was risen. The majority (48%) of citizens of Uzbekistan regard the mother's ability to give birth to a healthy child as a reproductive health. Each fifth respondent mentioned the health of mother and child, while the health of father was not mentioned by them.

The reproductive right is the right for non-interference in personal life, which means an independent reproductive choice and provision of all services in the sphere of protection of reproductive health. The number of respondents, who are aware of this notion, consisted of the following groups: 43% of respondents regard that it is connected with the individual's right for health, 28.1% – with the right to give birth or not to give birth, 15.1% – with family planning, and for 8.9% of respondents the reproductive right is associated with the right for free medical treatment. The attitude of citizens to the issues of family planning was also revealed. The received data showed the annual growth of the share of those, who estimates family planning as a needed and positive measure which provides family with healthy and wished children, their material well-being and good education.

The number of respondents supporting the devices against not wished pregnancy was augmented. For instance, the corresponding index rose from 76.7% in 2009 to 81% in 2011. The negative attitude to abortion was revealed as follows: 40.4% of respondents admit abortion only in case of a threat to health of mother or child. Every eighth respondents expressed the negative attitude to abortion.

## **Parents and children. Education**

The poll showed that 60.2% of the respondents consider the role of the parents, who primarily exert efforts to foster in children the national traditional values to become a good person. To the mind of 27.3% of respondents, education of children consists in preparation of them for their self-dependent life, i.e. the parents' duty is to give them good education or to give them a chance to learn a trade, to inculcate in them a healthy way of life. The majority of them (77.8%) think that both parents (mother and father) should be equally charged with education of children. Each seventh group of respondents (14.6%) has the meaning that education of children is the exclusive obligation of mother, while 5.4% of respondents hold the view that it is the father's obligation. The following order of the character's features subject to education by the parents in their children was determined: diligence, patriotism and respect for parents (38.6%); humanity, generosity and honesty (19.6%); quickness of wit, education and competence (18.7%); adroitness, enterprise and competence (15.6%); cleanliness, truthfulness, breeding, decency and healthy way of life (15.7%); self-dependence (8.1%); love and solicitude, kindness (7.9%); purposefulness and persistence (7.2%); responsibility and discipline (2.8%); patience (1.8%).

## **Mutual relations among family members**

The family structure characteristic for the Uzbek society was brought to light in the course of the research. The poll once more proved that the nuclear family was characteristic for Uzbekistan, i.e. the family composed of two parents (father and mother) and their children (58.1%). For the last two years, the number of nuclear families reduced almost by 5% with simultaneous rise of the number of three-generations families, which occupy the second place in the family structure.

By definition, the three-generation family type is the family composed of parents, children and grand parents. For the last two years, the quantity index of such families has risen insignificantly. Taking into account the fact that some functions devoted to education of children are performed by elders, the joint residence with grandfather and grandmother may be regarded as a positive factor of forming the completely valuable young generation.

The great majority of Uzbek families are characterized by good relations among family members (80.3%). At the same time, in 2009 the proportion between the families with good and satisfactory relations was 10:1 (i.e. for 10 families with good mutual relations there was 1 family with satisfactory relations), while in 2011 this proportion was 5:1. Of the whole number of the respondents, 42.5% of them said that their family relations were based on mutual respect, mutual understanding, tolerance and spiritual kinship, while the meanings of women and men on this matter were actually identical. What are the realized and the wished relations of domination/subordination in Uzbek families? As the poll showed, 80.5% of the respondents admitted that in their families the domination belongs to father/husband (the patriarchal family type). Besides, almost in every twentieth family the domination is performed by the elders (grandfathers and grandmothers).

According to the great majority of the questioned citizens (92.9%), each family should have the head of the family (the paternalistic family type). The adepts of the consensual family type (1.8%) regard that in general there should be no head in the family. The others (5.3%) found difficulty in replying. The argument that without its head the family would lack the order was expressed by more than half of the respondents (53.5%). According to the meaning of 22.2% of the respondents, the family needs the indisputable authority, since otherwise a conflict will be inevitable. Each seventh respondent

(15.8%) expressed the meaning that the family head is needed for a reasonable and calculating governance of the family budget. The meaning that the family head is needed for maintaining the natural authority of the man was expressed by 8.5% of the respondents.

The consolidation of legal and economic equality of men and women determined the passage from authoritarian to democratic system of relations in the family. The results of the poll prove it. For instance, important family relations are taken by consent between husband and wife in 35.9% of Uzbek families, while in each ninth family (10.8%) – by all its members. At the same time, the level of these indexes rises. The final decision on important issues concerning all and individual member is taken by father/husband in 45.2% of families. The level of this index goes down.

Simultaneously, it was revealed that the city turned out to be more democratic comparing with the rural region, since over there the important family decisions are taken in 36.7% of families jointly by mother and father, by husband and wife. For 26.4 % of families the primary conditions for creation of firm, happy and successful family are the spiritual values; for 27.4% of families the material-financial well-being is an important condition; the third place is occupied by mutual respect and tolerance (20%). The main foundations of traditional respect for the parents and elders, which are the main national cultural values of the Uzbek people, remained unshakeable.

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The analysis of the research results revealed the following tendencies: for the great majority of Uzbeks the family remains a significant social institution. It does not forfeit its value for the country's population and remains the sphere of the efforts exerted to achieve success in life. The perceptions of citizens of Uzbekistan on the

key family's functions changed insignificantly. The citizens see the main predestination and social function of family in society's life in ensuring and strengthening of stability of the state as a whole. Much prominence is given to the fact that there grows the share of citizens, who consider that the main function of family consists in education of the harmonically developed generation. At the same time, the population regards as its necessity to intensify participation of education institutions (schools, colleges, lyceums and higher education institutions) in the process of enlightenment.

The polls of the public opinion revealed the emergence of new trends in relation to the age census of the young people, who marry and create families. One may see the evident growth of the percent of the people, who mention the optimal age for marriage both for men (26–28 years and older) and for women (21–23–25 years). More and more citizens of Uzbekistan come to hold the meaning that the young people before marriage should get profession and become self-dependent in terms of their economic position. The priorities of the citizens of Uzbekistan in questions of marriage gradually started to change. Despite the fact that most respondents as usual consider that the most stable and prosperous families were based on mutual life, the percent of citizens sharing this point of view decreased.

Every year grew the share of citizens, who consider the family planning as a necessary and positive measure giving a chance to have healthy and desired children, to ensure their material well-being and good education. One could note the greater number of respondents, who were convinced in joint responsibility of husband and wife for family planning. More and more citizens regard that the most essential decisions on significant problems of family life should be taken by father and mother, who jointly educate their children. According to the research data, over half of the citizens of Uzbekistan (53.6%) prefer the

consensual family type (the important decisions in the family should be taken jointly, and husband and wife equally are responsible for education of children), while 46.4% of the respondents were supporters of the Uzbek paternalistic model of family (man as the head of family takes important decisions, he is the bread-winner, mother is the keeper of family hearth).

The data of the poll demonstrates that the perceptions of citizens on the status of man and woman in family were not subject to changes. As usual, the great majority of families (80.5%) consider that father/husband should be the family head, and his key obligations consist in ensuring its material well-being, while the main functions of woman are as follows: education of children, carrying out of home work and determination of moral climate in family. For the years of independence, thanks to creation of conditions for the growth of economic self-dependence of women, more and more women started to be engaged in business activities, which positively contribute to the rise of family income and of its well-being.

The arranged poll of public opinion gave the conclusive proof that historic and cultural values as well as original traditions had been kept in society of Uzbekistan and were transferred from generation to generation. To the mind of citizens of the country, the resuscitated spiritual values, including family values, are regarded as a process of growth of national self-consciousness, a return to the spiritual sources of the people. The policy aimed at support of the family institution carried out in Uzbekistan is met with approval by all peoples of the country, since it is not engaged in terms of any ethnic group, i.e. this policy is directed to support of family irrespective of its ethnic origin. The great majority of the population of all social strata, ages and nationalities (96.5%) approve and support the strategy of the head of the state directed to consolidation of the family institution, particularly

of young families as a significant condition of preservation of peace and stability in the country.

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M., 2011, N 10, pp. 8–98.*

## **EDUCATION, YOUTH AND ISLAM: GROWING POPULARITY OF PRIVATE RELIGIOUS LESSONS IN DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN**

M. Stephan of the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Humboldt University in Berlin, explains the constantly growing popularity of private religious lessons in Dushanbe by the fact that they contribute to satisfying the growing interest of the urban Moslem population in the foundations of Islam, help parents to tackle educational tasks and allow young Muslims to take part in public life and express their religious affiliation. Besides, the growing number of study groups at mosques shows the strengthening positions of Islam in Tajikistan, and at the same time the weakening of the state educational system.

According to a Tajik tradition, “javoni” (“youth”) is the time when a Muslim prepares himself for fulfilling duties in the family, at work, and in social life. At this stage of the life cycle a special role is given to education (“tarbia”). This notion covers a whole range of educational and pedagogic measures which the elder members of society carry on in order to show a young person the “right way” (“rohi rost”), teach him to live according to the existing cultural tradition and system of relations. The Tajiks have always given special meaning and significance to religious education. Public polls carried out among the inhabitants of Dushanbe show that representatives of all social groups without exception consider the standards of Islam to be the most

important regulator of public life. The traditional postulates like “religion” (“din”), education (“tarbia”), morality, modesty and the proper rules of behavior as Islam teaches us are taken for incontestable truths.

In the post-Soviet period religious education began to return gradually to the life of urban dwellers also in the form of religious lessons (“sabak”) attended by the growing number of young people. Studies are organized on the basis of standard programs for previous religious schools at mosques (“Maqtab”). As a rule, students of these schools familiarize themselves with canonic texts “Chahor qitob”<sup>1</sup> and “Haftiyak”<sup>2</sup>, and works by classics of Persian literature Saadi, Bedil and Hafiz. Students are also taught correct performance of religious rites, above all, prayers. They are told about the meaning, significance and order of fasts and ablutions. The study of religious literature is necessarily accompanied with moral instructions. The latter should teach adolescents discipline and show them how family and society life should be organized on the basis of religious laws. Such notion as “hurmat” (“respect,” “homage”) is of special significance. “Hurmat” is related to all questions pertaining to public, religious and political life of Muslims in the region, and it strengthens the authority of the older generation and its domination over the younger generation, relations between the believers and the Divine forces, just as the relations between sexes.

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<sup>1</sup> “The Collection (in four parts) of prosaic and poetic works in the Persian language by different authors is one of the standard study aids on whose basis one of the local Islamic traditions of the Muslim population of Tajikistan was formed. The collection contains the basic premises of Moslem faith and serves to pass from generation to generation the rules by which the relations in the family and local community are formed.”

<sup>2</sup> “The book containing excerpts from the Koran.”

The growing interest of parents in their children attending religious lessons can be explained by various reasons. The main one is that people connect with them their hope for the revival of old traditions which were interrupted by the years spent in the U.S.S.R. under the rule of atheists. Most of those who send their kids to religious schools are poor settlers from rural districts. Having been forced to abandon their native places and settle in modern urban districts, they found themselves torn off from the habitual way of life in which children grew in the community medium, learned customs and habits necessary for adult life, and became used to the important principles of human relations.

Besides, religious education has specific gender aspects. Young girls attend special lessons at which they are told how important it is to adhere to high moral principles (“sharmu hae”) and to be modest and chaste, for if a woman smears her reputation, it has an adverse effect on all her relatives. Girls are taught to dress properly in accordance with tradition and the rules of faith, and also to manage household. In the words of one “bibihalifa” (tutor) from Dushanbe, lessons should teach girls things to be done in family life. Taking into account the fact that most Tajik women have very few career prospects, the ability to acquire knowledge and practice of how to do house chores properly is vitally important to them. This is why many parents in Dushanbe prefer religious education for their daughters rather than secular one.

To learn the basic principles of Islamic morality is no less important for a young Tajik lad. According to tradition, he will be the mainstay for his wife and children, and will also have to support his elderly parents. Previously, young men gradually learned their duties, observing the life of their own family and the families of people around them. However, a very difficult economic situation in post-Soviet Tajikistan made serious corrections to family life. Many families were

forced to leave their native places. Parents proved unable to rear and educate their children properly because many of them had to leave the Motherland for other countries in search of work and income, while many mothers, apart from doing household duties, face the urgent need to find a job to feed their kids. So quite a few adolescents and young men live freely, are unattended and without any control of old folk. This is why many parents regard religious upbringing and education a good measure of control over the behavior of their sons and daughters. Attending private religious lessons is for young people a form of leisure activity, and creates a feeling of closeness to the life of the local community, which is especially important for the children of migrants from rural districts.

One mullah by name of Inoyat gives everyday lessons to sixteen adolescents from 12 to 16 years of age at the local mosque. Lessons take place in the afternoon, which enables the students to join adult men in the evening common prayer, and also to help keep the mosque in order (clean rooms, make tea, etc.). In this way religious studies are an alternative to the street, that is, a place which has a negative connotation for the older generation of Dushanbe Muslims as the seat of alcoholism, drug addiction, crime, prostitution, etc.

Religious lessons put to rights the everyday life of waifs and strays, teach them responsibility and give them an opportunity to take part in public and religious life of their district. These lessons are not simply an acceptable alternative to the “street.” With their help young flotsam and jetsam, city migrants living in the periphery and having few social contacts, if any, and who, due to their abject poverty, do not take part in public life, receive a place for themselves in a definite social structure and a system of social support, which gives them a feeling of belonging, can replace absent relatives, and makes it possible to integrate in the local medium. At the same time, attendance of

mosque classes enables them to raise their self-esteem and status. Occupying the marginal position in society, they attend “sabak” in the hope that it will enable them to gain respect in their community and increase the chances of social mobility.

Despite their narrow special purpose, religious lessons in present-day Tajikistan grant an opportunity of personal development for part of young people. Even living in Dushanbe many young people do not have access to elementary education, let alone good one. Quite often, elder children in poor large families are forced to drop school in order to help in household chores and look after younger children (this concerns mainly young girls). To attend religious lessons is for them the only form of intellectual activity. In the process of studying religious literature they learn quite a few useful things. For instance, the need to memorize sacred texts and then recite them contributes to developing memory and improving articulation, and reverent attitude to sacred books is then passed to books in general. Besides, for some adolescents attending “sabak” is the only opportunity to get distracted from nail-biting and spend hours with people of the same age.

In Tajik society with its patriarchal ways, young people have to live within the bounds determined for them by older generations. Such state of affairs considerably limits the opportunities for personal development. In this respect the study of the foundations of Islam (despite the fact that it takes place with the knowledge and approval of senior people) brings certain entertainment and variety to young people, broadens their outlook and gives food for thought and an impetus to independent conclusions and discussions with their counterparts. Those who succeeded in breaking with strict rules and take their own way feel even more independent and free. An example of such “freethinking” is the independent choice of spiritual tutor. Some young men leave the

tutor (“mullo”) who received classical religious education (“pesh-hondagi”) in Soviet times and choose a tutor from among those who received “new education” (“novhondagi”). As a rule, these tutors are young themselves, they know foreign languages, use modern means of communications, follow new trends in Islamic literature, and even dress differently than the old Islamic clergy. In the eyes of the latter these young people are the embodiment of “pure,” “transnational Islam,” which undermines the local age-old traditions.

It is not only young men, but girls too, who choose the “novhondagi.” It is indicative that the main reason for this is the “alternative Islamic dress” of young women-tutors. They wear a wide veil and a head-kerchief tied in a special way. On the one hand, such manner to dress and other fashionable details (modern fabrics, cosmetics, manicured and painted nails show that “Islamic modern” has come to the Tajik capital, too, in which fashion and aesthetics are combined with moral principles, beauty and piety). On the other hand, wearing such clothes can be seen as a form of protest, and the desire to become self-asserted and recognized by other people as such. A young woman become “noticeable” when wearing a veil and head-kerchief, and this runs counter to the local ideas of female morality (“sharmuhae”), in accordance with which woman should never draw attention to herself.

In conclusion the author writes that religious lessons which become ever more popular in Tajikistan enable Tajik young people to broaden their horizons determined for them by the older generation and old traditions without entering into confrontation with their parents. At the same time, in the conditions of abject poverty and the lack of real career prospects, Islam offers urban young people a “noble” way to raise their social status. It “serves as a pillar for young people in their

search for identity and their struggle to become recognized by society and to get the status of the “adults.”

*N. Shuvalova. “Referativny zhurnal ‘Vostokovedeniye i Afrikanistika’”, Moscow, 2011, No 4, pp. 56–61.*

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**PECULIARITIES OF STRUGGLE**

**AGAINST TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA**

**UNDER CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS**

Extremism and separatism in the Central Asian region as well as concomitant terrorism represent the complicated and multi-aspect phenomena with political, economic, social, criminal and military components. This region is marked by operations of international terrorist organizations or their branches, radical Islamic fundamentalists and extremist groups, which causes anxiety of both the states and of the whole world community. It is important to take into account the fact that their emergence has the internal reasons, which are similar in various countries. At the same time, their activities are firmly connected with ideological trends out of the boundaries of the region, while the terrorist organizations of Central Asia maintain close contacts with the international criminal community, which keeps under control the trade of arms, narcotics and people.

One should take into account that separatism represents by itself a definite political movement, while extremism and terrorism are the means of achievement of political aims, which may be and are widely used both by separatists and representatives of other political trends. In other words, if separatism is the substance of definite political ideas, extremism and terrorism are the forms of their realization.

The main reasons of emergence of separatist movements in Central Asia are as follows.

The disintegration of former republics of the Soviet Union and their transformation in new independent states caused strengthening of nationalism and inter-ethnic tension with the threat of their further splitting up. This danger increased the weakness of the state power usually accompanying the initial period of their formation. The Russian scientists estimated that for the period of disintegration of the USSR 180 regions existed on its territory, which were marked by higher inter-ethnic tension, including the Middle Asian republics. It was explained particularly by existence in these states of a great number of complicated mixed ethnic enclaves. For instance, in Fergana valley they represent actually all Central Asian nationalities. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the administrative borders of these republics in Soviet time repeatedly and arbitrarily were changed, causing border problems, which have not been regulated finally up to the present time. It does not promote the ethnic good neighbor relations rousing the wish to re-unite with the main mass of the related people.

One of the reasons of separatism in Central Asia is the unevenness of social-economic development of various Central Asian states. For instance, the level of living in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is essentially higher than in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This circumstance explains the intention of national minorities, living in border regions of the less developed countries to re-unite with their ethnoses, living correspondingly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The present separatism in the states of Central Asia is accompanied by the struggle for territorial autonomy within each country, if the people of one its part dislike the dictate of representatives of the other part, which is the result of the clannish approach to formation of the authorities. This circumstance duplicated

by uneasy inter-state relations in the region, by the overpopulation of its many districts, by limitation of water resources and other problems prevent consolidation of stability of the region. The local separatists from time to time use terrorist methods of struggle, which under conditions of complicated inter-ethnic situation may result in grave consequences.

Out of all regions of Central Asia marked by the strongest separatist feelings the enclaves Sokh and Shakhimardan should be mentioned, which are situated on the territory of Kyrgyzstan with the population from 40 to 50 thousand people.

These enclaves are separated from the main territory of their states creating significant difficulties for the population. The Uzbek leadership takes attempts to conclude with the Kyrgyz colleagues the agreement on exchange of the territories in order to attach enclave Sokh by a wide belt of land to the “mainland” of Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan was proposed to get the southern part of Sokh. However, the Kyrgyz party considers such proposed agreement as a disadvantageous deal, since in this case two districts of the country – Leilek and Batken – almost completely would be cut off from the rest territory. The problem is aggravated by discovery of oil fields in Sokh. At present, both parties resorted to forceful seizure of specific oil fields. Uzbekistan having more powerful military forces uses this advantage and increases its military contingent on the border with Kyrgyzstan and in enclave Sokh.

For the last years, the rise of nationalist feelings in the Uzbek Diaspora also in other districts of Kyrgyzstan became quite evident. Its representatives used corruption of local authorities and try to obtain the key posts in some branches of economy, trade, agriculture and services, particularly in the governing bodies. The formed by them organizations advanced the demands of the obligatory quotas for Uzbeks in the

organs of authorities and of the post of governor of the Ash district and of the mayor of the city of Osh.

However, the main region of Central Asia characterized by activities of separatists is the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR) of China. The conflict in this region is characterized not only by ethnic but also by religious features, since the Uighurs are Turkic Muslims. They wish to establish independent state Uighurstan, or Eastern Turkestan. This aspiration has deep historic roots. The Uighurs – represent one of the oldest nationalities in Central Asia. Although the Chinese settled in the native territory of Uighurs already in II century B.C., the territory was marked by formation of Jungar khanate populated mainly by Uighurs. And only for the period of 1757–1759 this territory was conquered by China, which named it “New Territory” in Chinese. The indigenous population periodically organized revolts against the Chinese dominance. After creation of the CPR the territory got autonomy and received the status of the autonomous region. But it did not solve completely the national question in the north-western part of the country, and the anti-Chinese feelings still exist there.

The disintegration of the USSR and the example of being blessed with independence and actual statehood by a number of peoples in Middle Asia contributed to the rise of nationalist feelings. On this wave the leaders of the movement proclaimed the intention to continue the struggle for separation from China “in any case and irrespective of victims”.

The Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan is the main separatist organization of Uighurs, which enjoys the greatest support of representatives of this ethnos in the region. The World Uighur Kurultai, held in Istanbul in the end of 1996, proclaimed the armed struggle for its independence. The majority of participants expressed their intention

to support “Chechen option” of developments as the most efficient ones in solving Uighur problem with the final aim of creation of the state of Eastern Turkestan. At present, according to the official data of the CPR, the population of the SUAR exceeds 15 million people, including Muslim Turkic peoples in size of 9 millions, i.e. 60% (over 7 million Uighurs, 900 thousand Kazakhs and 130 thousand Kyrgyz). The aspirations of the movement’s participants exceed the borders of the SUAR. They intend to include in the new state some regions of other states of the region, primarily of the states with a considerable Uighur Diaspora (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan).

The Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan has about 600 fighters trained in the camps of Islamists in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Chechnya. The structure of the organization includes the religious-political center of political guidance, mobile bands, detachments of intelligence and counter-intelligence, as well as the organs in charge of propaganda and material-technical equipment. The leaders of the movement count outside the SUAR on a big Diaspora of Uighurs in the mentioned countries and pay attention to the other parts of the region. According to some data, the number of Uighurs settled outside the SUAR make over 200 thousand people. As a result of these activities, the movement succeeded not only to obtain financial support of the Uighur Diaspora in the states of Central Asia but also to create in these states of their own organizations (for instance, “Uighar Ozatshik Tashlakhty” in Kazakhstan) and to maintain close relations with them. Following these contacts the new organizations start to support the armed terrorist actions as the methods to achieve the formulated aims. In July 2009, in the city of Urumchi (the SUAR) the most extensive actions taken by Uighurs occurred, and 186 persons were killed and over 1000 people were wounded, while 1400 participants in these troubles were arrested. It should be stressed

that these events became the most extensive troubles in China after the events taken in the central square of Beijing in June 1989; the troubles were suppressed only by the regular troops of the army.

The Chinese authorities consider that the troubles were provoked by R. Kadir, a businesswoman, living in the USA, and the leader of the World Uighur Kurultai. Some representatives of this organization said that the troubles were caused by the factors, such as the mass resettlement of Chinese to the territory of Sinkiang, providing them with economic advantages, which deprive the indigenous population of the SUAR of a chance to find jobs, as well as limit the sphere of spread of the language and of religion of Uighurs. It should be taken into account that the growth of the number of Uighurs thanks to the higher birth rate surpasses the increase in population of Chinese. The mass immigration of Chinese in the SUAR reduces economic chances of the growing indigenous population, which contributes to dissemination of separatist and nationalist feelings in Uighur Diaspora.

The Islamic extremism is the second main reason of terrorist activities in the CAR. Its sources are first of all connected with rapid politicization of Islam in Central Asia. Islamic extremism in the CAR is not a radical trend in religious society, it is extremism under religious banner, and it pursues primarily political aims. For the last years, the trend to essential politicization of Islam in the Central Asian states transformed into a significant factor having impact on the growth of social-political tension in the region. To the author's mind, it is conditioned by several reasons.

Following the collapse of Communist ideology there appeared an ideological vacuum, which actually started to be filled with ideology by Islam.

The rapid rise took place in national consciousness of the peoples, which found their own statehood with simultaneous support by the authorities of the process of rebirth of Islamic traditions.

The difficulties in the social-economic sphere promoted the growth of protest movements, which used the slogans of Islam defining it as a society of social justice.

The destruction of legal norms and social guarantees existed in the Soviet period promoted establishment in mass consciousness of the Muslim population of positive attitude to Islam as an alternative law.

The prevailing existence of low level of religious enlightenment of the population, the lack of qualified theological training and education of the official Muslim clergy, the uncontrolled education of students in questioned religious education institutions abroad should be stressed.

The existence of multinational structure of the population is of significance in these countries, where Islam comes forward as a uniting and consolidating force and also as an instrument of regulation of relations among ethnoses.

The common aim of various Islamist organizations in Central Asia is as follows: to overthrow the secular authorities, to establish the state of caliphate on the territory of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and the SUAR in China. They carry out not the religious but political activities, and these organizations differ greatly from the organizations, which are engaged in missionary activities, due to contradictions in understanding of religious problems. The list of the region's extremist organizations includes not one dozen of groups with almost similar methods and characterized with different rate and scale of activities. The most significant organizations are mentioned below.

The Party of Islamic Liberation (Khizb ut-Tahrir) was established in Palestine (1952) with the aim of overthrowing the secular governments in Muslim countries and installation there the Islamic form of governance with further creation of a united state. The party's branches function not only in some states in Near East, Central, South and South-East Asia but also in Europe – quite legally in most of them. The main forms of the party's activities are as follows: ideological propaganda, recruitment of supporters, purposeful work aimed at the split of society.

The governments of some states in Central Asia underestimate the extension of influence of this organization. Its leaders do not recognize the existing contemporary states and divided the whole world into regions and provinces ("vilayats"). The party's branches are built by principle of circles (separate for men and women) – small groups with rigid discipline in charge of propaganda of party ideas.

In their work directed to the population the extremists take into account psychological features of various strata of the population in each country; for instance, the extremist literature in Kyrgyzstan is disseminated in Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages. The books, brochures and leaflets are written in rather simple but not primitive language. The publications contain many citations of Koran and Sunna. The text is logically constructed in the way to indicate the reasons of hardships of the people and to show them the exit out of the shaped situation, which evidently consists in joining some or other extremist party or group.

The leadership of "Khizb ut-Tahrir" rests upon first of all three groups of citizens: the socially unprotected strata of the population (unemployed people, pensioners, students, fathers and mothers of large families); the representatives of power structures and officials of law enforcement bodies and of other power structures. According to some

data, for the last years the social base of the party, for instance in Kyrgyzstan increased from 2006 to 2008 from 5 thousand to 15 thousand members, while 20% of these people, except local residents (Kyrgyz and Uzbeks), consisted of Tatars, Russians, Kurds, Chechens and Turks-Meskhets. The main and most active part of the organization consists of Uzbeks from Fergana valley. The members of the party pay greater attention to Islamic intellectuals and youth. The activists of the party concentrate their work in time of election campaigns on the support of individual candidates. At the same time, many candidates maintain contacts and cooperate with the party's organizations striving for victory at the elections. And what is more, some candidates to deputies, primarily supported by opposition, apply themselves for the party's support, including material assistance.

At the same time, the Party of Islamic Liberation makes the most of not only legitimate ways of activities. Its agitation materials contain appeals for change of the constitutional system of the countries, where it carries out its activities, which is a direct violation of these countries' laws. The arrests of the organization's members in various countries of the world revealed many cases of armed actions taken by them. According to information of secrets services, including the Russian services, the party maintains close contacts with international Islamist organizations, regarded as terrorist organizations by the world community. It should be said that some members of the party were trained in the camps of Islamic fighters.

As was stressed by the secret services of Uzbekistan, the Party of Islamic Liberation jointly with another extremist organization – the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan organized the extremist activities in the country. One of the local circles of "Khizb ut-Tahrir" – organization "Akromia" assumed responsibility for the events in Andijan in 2005.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the Islamic Party of Turkestan) represents the second in terms of scale organization in Central Asia. The organization was founded in 1996 with the aim of overthrow of I. Karimov regime and for establishment on the territory of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states of the World Islamic Caliphate with Sharia form of governance. The activities of the organization are directed and sponsored by foreign Islamic clerical centers, which urge towards creation in Uzbekistan and other region's states of the network of religious-extremist organizations. Their activities are utilized for destabilization of the internal political situation in the corresponding countries by means of terrorist actions, subversive acts, provocations on the borders, capture of hostages etc.

The political leader of IMU is T. Yuldashev, while D. Namangani is the head of the party's military formations. The number of the organization's fighters makes from 2000 to 5000 party members, and they are located mainly in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is one of the most active organizations in the region. It arranged two armed invasions to the territory of Uzbekistan via Kyrgyzstan of several hundred fighters in 1999 and 2000, as well as active participation in Andijan events in 2005.

In September 2006 T. Yuldashev disseminated audio-information that IMU members were struggling against the coalition forces in Afghanistan jointly with Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The leader of the fighters threatened the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with punishment for persecution of Muslims. Just at that time the secret services of these countries arranged the persecution of IMU fighters, who some months before the audio-information had attacked the customs border point and the Tajik border guards post in Fergana

valley. The fighters planned to seize arms and further to cross the border and enter the territory of Uzbekistan to commit terrorist acts.

For the last years, the number of members of IMU diminished. The organization failed to create in Uzbekistan a significant social basis. It became evident that the majority of the republic's population does not share the ideas of the movement.

Therefore the Uzbek fighters turned out to be in the international Islamic movement proclaiming global aims. T. Yuldashev proved the change of priorities in one of his appeals to Muslims and said: "if earlier the IMU struggled against mainly Islam Karimov regime, now the organization started the struggle against all enemies of Islam on the planet".

Thus, the main aim of Khizb ut-Tahrir and of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan contains in creation of Islamic Caliphate in Fergana valley with its further extension to the whole territory of Central Asia.

The organization of Islamic Jihad (Jamaat of Mojaheds) was established in March 2002 on the territory of Afghanistan after the split in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The most radical fighters of the IMU joined this organization and received support of functionaries of such publicized terrorist organization as Al-Qaeda. The organization proclaimed as its aim the overthrow of existing secular governments in Muslim countries and establishment of the states with Sharia form of governance, as well as realization of acts of sabotage in military objects of the countries-members of the anti-terrorist coalition carrying out its activities in Afghanistan. The majority of the organization's members were trained in camps of various international terrorist organizations, took part in military actions in the North Caucasus of the illegal armed formations. The organization assumed responsibility, for instance, for the explosions in Tashkent and Bukhara in March 2004. In October

2005, its leadership expressed its intension to form a special group for arrangement of terrorist acts on the territory of the whole former USSR.

In May 2009, the fighters of this group launched an attack against the block-post OVD/SNB in the city of Khanabad of the Andijan region of Uzbekistan, while in Andijan itself the terrorists committed criminal acts – not less than four suicidal explosions. The organization Islamic Jihad declared its responsibility for these actions. In June of the same year the fighters-participants of the attack against the Uzbek block-post were detected and liquidated by secret services of Kyrgyzstan. It was found out that the liquidated fighters had been trained in one of the fighters' camps on the territory of Pakistan.

The activities of extremist organizations may be characterized by certain features.

1. These organizations are marked by the multinational composition irrespective of the territory of their activities in one of the states in Central Asia. The composition of these organizations is as follows: side by side with ethnoses of Central Asia, they include representatives of Slavonic nationalities, peoples of the Caucasus, fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2. The activities of these organizations are supported by the international financing. For instance, the IMU gets financial support of Al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations of Near East, while Khizb ut-Takhrir keeps its representation offices in dozens countries of the world.

3. These organizations maintain close connections with organized criminality. All extremist organizations of Central Asia are engaged in narcotic business, arms trade and illegal migration etc. for the sake of getting financial means to carry out their activities.

4. The extremist organizations are gradually involved in terrorist activities. Regretfully, it is possible to say that some Islamic extremist

organizations long ago passed from dissemination of religious ideas to terrorist means of carrying out actions of political struggle, which, to their mind, are more efficient and above all will much faster lead them to the achievement of the fixed aim.

*“Mirovye derzhavy v Tsentralnoi Azii”, M., 2011, pp. 183-195.*

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