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**THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE U.S.S.R. HAS
CHANGED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BUT
DID NOT MAKE THEM MORE HARMONIOUS**

The global system has actually been developing in a unipolar world for the past twenty years. Although, theoretically the potential of mutual nuclear containment of the U.S.A. and Russia in the military sphere still exists, its international political significance has dropped sharply. First, because the political will to use nuclear weapon in a large-scale war has greatly weakened in both Moscow and Washington, as compared with "Soviet times." Secondly, because such war is simply incredible. Thirdly, as a result of the emergence of a wide range of new ways and means of using force in the past twenty years, which allow the technologically advanced countries to attain practically any necessary political results with the help of non-nuclear instruments.

The emergence of high-accuracy weapons, a gigantic leap forward in space reconnaissance, a qualitatively new level of controlling military operations, the use of charges with depleted uranium, and other types of the latest weapons have considerably altered the character of wars. Planned wars and those being waged in the post-nuclear epoch have become smaller in scale and more complex

in organization and control. The classical pre-nuclear and nuclear wars have been imagined, above all, as an armed struggle with a view to crushing the enemy and forcing it to accept the conditions of the winner.

Wars in the post-nuclear epoch, beginning with the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, have become international political campaigns, just as military ones. The new strategic logic was now based not on the idea of destroying an enemy state, but that of submitting it politically and economically to the interests of the winner. The meaning of the war has now changed from defeating the enemy by force to “changing it to the order of the attacker.” In the 2000th and the 2010th the political component of wars became equal to the military one, or sometimes even greater in terms of the expenditure of organizational, political, ideological, information, financial, economic, and other non-military resources.

The strike force of war now comes not as its culmination, but as its preamble followed by the stage of resource expenditure during which the military are unable to score victory by their own forces. As a result, wars now engulf more civil specialists of non-traditional profile than before – experts on public relations, religion, political technologists, psychologists, sociologists, and managers of various types.

On the other hand, *there is the need for a military commander of a new type* – not simply a talented strategist and tactician, but also administrator capable not only to win military campaigns and organize peaceful life in a conquered country, but also to obtain changes in that country according to a definite political *design-project which has been prepared by the attacker beforehand*. The ideal commander of today is not a general of Marshal Zhukov or Generalissimo Suvorov type, but rather a general-reformer like Douglas McArthur, who not only “conquered” Japan, but also designed and established the foundations

of its new political system during the American occupation period from 1945 until 1951. This type is represented today by General David Petreus who carried out a pacifying mission in Iraq captured by the United States and is now trying to do the same in Afghanistan.

The new type of war, just as the new type of military commander, is a product of the changed meaning and purpose of military operations. In classical epochs the main purpose of wars was the establishment of direct control over a definite part of land surface with its resources. In our age the political aim of attack is not so much the destruction of the enemy, as the acquisition of a partner. Naturally, not an equal partner, but a junior, minor, dependent and influenced by the stronger partner.

Asymmetrical partnerships existed in earlier times, too. Such were the relations of the United States with all NATO countries, Japan, South Korea and Australia. But these partnerships were taking shape gradually, on the basis of common problems in the sphere of security, and they were formed on a voluntary basis by diplomatic means.

The new experience of the 21st century lies in that the United States switched over to the formation of such partnerships through a war. Washington (and Brussels?) intends to make such partners from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. There is not enough empirical material so far to judge whether such *policy of forced partnership* will prove effective. However, evidently, it begins increasingly to determine international behavior and practice inasmuch as the world's strongest power, the United States, actively contributes to its implementation almost everywhere.

It is not accidental that the phenomenon of forced partnership has come into being within the past fifteen years. It would not have emerged if the relatively weak countries had had a choice. Today the international situation is such that a state which, by any reasons, is

attractive for the United States in the role of a “junior partner” has very few chances to avoid turning into such without risking its sovereignty and security. The reason for the absence of any alternative is the hegemonic position of the United States in the world alignment of forces, and such state of affairs is a direct result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Under the bipolar order it was more difficult to recruit new satellites. To seize an attractive country was rather dangerous, for it could turn for help to the rival state, and this was fraught with definite risks. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the risks have disappeared. Some “socialist brothers” have become NATO allies, which was advantageous to them. It took the United States less than ten years to include their resources in a pool opened for its use.

Later it became clear that it was not enough, or the quality of these resources was not high enough. Anyway, the Euro-Atlantic region with its entire potential seems too small. NATO became interested in Asia. And inasmuch as the idea of voluntary transition to the ranks of “subordinate American partners” was not too popular among Asian countries, it became necessary to resort to compulsion to partnership.

Of course, one could argue about “multipolar structure,” “multiple-vector,” BRICS, China, and even about the non-polar structure of the world. But it would be nothing more than intellectual games or nostalgic hypotheses. The point is not theories or poles, but the type of international behavior. And the type dominating now is the American – NATO, offensive, ideologized, carried on from the position of overall superiority and seldom agreeing to compromises. If the structure of the world is changing (this process is indeed going on), it can barely be noticed at the level of the behavior of certain states so far. Structural changes should not be ignored, but their real significance should not be exaggerated either.

A drop in military-political competitiveness of the international medium has led to changes in the sphere of resolving armed conflicts, where one-sided methods now prevail. Almost all serious regional conflicts in the bipolar epoch were prolonged ones and, apart from direct participants in them, several strong and medium powers were directly or indirectly also involved in them. A case in point was Cambodia, the south of Africa, Central America, or Afghanistan at the time of Soviet invasion. Accordingly, these conflicts ended with broad multilateral solution which, in a number of cases, was termed “national reconciliation.” Except Afghanistan, such reconciliations were quite satisfactory.

The situation today is quite different. Solutions as such practically never happen. During the past twenty years there has been only one more or less viable solution on a multilateral basis, that is, national reconciliation in Tajikistan. It is indicative that participation of the West in it was purely symbolic. Thus, it was not completely symmetrical. This means that symmetrical solutions have ceased to work in the conditions of a unipolar world, and asymmetrical are not very positive and effective because they are not based on compromise, and the interests of a weaker party are suppressed by those of a stronger one.

Hence, a noticeable increase in the number of “frozen,” unresolved conflicts – the Karabakh, Dniester, South Ossetian and even Israeli-Palestine conflicts. And solutions of the Kosovo, Abkhazian and North Cyprus problems can hardly be regarded diplomatically optimal or satisfactory. Stronger parties force their solutions on weaker ones, but fail to secure the necessary international political support to them. The one-sided type of regulation prevails. The sides use equal substantiations for their actions, but the model of their behavior is equally uncompromising.

It's worthy of note that the viability of such solutions should cause serious doubts, but reality is different. Such uncompromising and unresolved solutions demonstrate relative durability. Apparently, they can now be regarded as a kind of unrecognized norm, a new working variant of conflict solution and management in the 21st century.

The absence of a counterbalance to the West in the person of the U.S.S.R. has led to a principal change of the type of solution of international conflicts, having made the conditions of these solutions less balanced and more one-sided, but nevertheless rather durable sometimes. Wouldn't it be more reasonable to acknowledge the objective character of this change and stop wasting time and resources on resolving problems which have already passed the stage of "self-regulation" (as, say, in Kashmir) or have already be solved by force with the definite preponderance of the interests of only one side, but thoroughly and reliably enough (Bosnia, Kosovo, Karabakh, Abkhazia)?

There is another aspect of present-day conflicts. The above-mentioned conflicts have begun as local quarrels without participation of big countries, whereas conflicts in the 2000th broke up as a direct consequence of the attack of the United States on relatively weak Asian countries. The conflicts of the 1990s look like a result of more or less spontaneous manifestations of enmity or misunderstanding between adjoining ethnic groups or peoples. The wars of the 2000th have been planned by one country and seem to be submitted to the logic of one center.

Their formal ideological and political background is democratization with the help of force. This chimera surpasses the Marxist dogmas of the export of socialist revolution. But the ideology of forcible democratization is a disguise. The strategic result of the conflicts of the 2000th is an unsuccessful attempt to consolidate part of

the international periphery under the aegis of the United States on condition of its turning into a zone of predominantly American influence. The absence of rivalry for influence in this international political area makes the process of this consolidation fully dependent on the will and resources of the United States. In the absence of the Soviet Union neither China nor Russia can, or wish to, prevent Washington to lend this area a configuration the most advantageous to it.

A loose, uncompetitive international media provokes the American establishment to gain advantageous positions in the continental part of Eurasia with due account of a possible rivalry with China. Solution of conflicts with the participation of the United States is not a proper solution. It is actually a forcible suppression of the seats of resistance to the expansion of NATO against important Asian territories.

This suppression has been of a preventive character for twenty years already. It is effected under the pretext of the need for democratization of the world in any spot of the planet, if control over it seems necessary to the American establishment for the strengthening of its global superiority, which the United States wishes to preserve as long as possible in the absence of the U.S.S.R.

It is not accidental that Washington reacts to Iran's cussedness – a strong and outspoken enemy of the Americanization of the Middle East and northern parts of South Asia. Iran has not been included in the system of American "submitted partners," it is hostile to the United States and a breach in the belt of the states friendly to Washington from North Africa to Central Asia and borders with the PRC.

After 1991 Russia has retreated on all parameters of international strength and has not reached the status of the Soviet Union during the past twenty years. Non-western countries have gained from that change

not less than the West. China and India have been able to realize the advantages which they acquired in the 1990s when the United States, encountering no opposition on the part of Moscow, began to give much more attention to those states, wishing to prevent their return to blocking with Moscow against Washington.

The international reorientation of India looked especially contrasting, as compared to the epoch of bipolarity and non-alignment. The objective course of the socio-economic development of India brought it to the boundary in the 1990s when it urgently needed an influx of advanced technological experience, foreign investments and broader and closer ties with the most developed and prosperous states for further progress.

The Soviet Union, even if he had continued to exist, would have been unable to provide India with what it needed at the time. On the contrary, the more than half-century orientation of New Delhi to Moscow was an obstacle for the development of its ties with the West. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. removed it at once and proved absolutely painless for India.

About that time it became evident that the heritage of traditional Gandhi-ism became exhausted. A bipolar political system took shape in the country. New people came to head the Indian National Congress, who did not want to break up with the traditional Nehru-Gandhi values, but were able to revise them without being accused of revisionism. New political figures paid tribute to cooperation with Moscow, but realized that the country's priorities were not connected with it.

India has joined the economic globalization processes. Thanks to outsourcing Indian science-intensive enterprises began to work for American corporations, enriching themselves, earning profit to overseas corporations and augmenting the Indian production and technological potential. An economic-production base of Indian-American

rapprochement has come into being and the two countries have begun to display greater political interest in each other.

Pakistan has helped India in this respect, perhaps, contrary to its will. Weakened by the inner struggle between the military and civil elites, confrontation between tribes and their separatist tendencies, as well as the struggle of the secular authorities with Islamic extremists, Pakistan ceased to be a bulwark of American policy in South Asia in the 1990s – 2000s.

What was worse, the acquisition of nuclear weapon in 1998 combined with internal instability has created a threat of the “Islamic bomb,” which contributed to the United States and India drawing closer. Indian diplomacy was able to wrest from Pakistan the role of a privileged partner of the United States in regional affairs. Washington took a favorable position to India concerning its “illegal nuclear status” and recognized New Delhi’s stand on a number of international issues. Thus, the situation of American-Indian partnership has taken shape, atypical of the bipolar epoch, which replaced the traditional scheme of the American-Pakistani alliance.

Pakistan has not simply lost its former principal position in the system of American priorities in South Asia. Scenarios began to be evolved in the United States, according to which Pakistan could become a hypothetical enemy of American policy in the region due to internal cataclysms (seizure of power by religious fanatics). In any case, India has turned to be the privileged regional partner of the United States. However, India does not look like a *junior partner* of Washington. Meanwhile, it is a well-known fact that American foreign-policy tradition does not recognize equal partners. This is one of the main reasons why it has been impossible to build a system of partnership of the United States with Russia. This is why the partnership of New Delhi and Washington is a rather specific

phenomenon in which the element of partner relations is balanced by elements of India's independence. Although India has become closer to American economy and policy, it does not allow its foreign policy "to dissolve" in American one and become its emanation, like foreign policies of Britain, Japan or Poland.

From the point of view of American tradition, American-Indian cooperation cannot be regarded partnership, inasmuch as India retains its foreign-policy independence in its relations with the United States. Perhaps, the relations of Washington and New Delhi represent a new type of "partnership at a distance," detached partnership," as it were.

It is indicative that India is more successful in its relations with the United States than Russia. True, the specific feature of New Delhi's partnership with Washington lies in that India gains more than loses from it. This distinguishes it from the quasi-partnership relations of the United States with Russia, in which Moscow now loses part of freedom of actions, which used to be almost boundless previously.

"Detached partnership" allows India to preserve positive, constructive relations with the U.S.A. and at the same time participate in BRICS meetings and other diplomatic and economic maneuvering. The disintegration of the bipolar world and the collapse of non-aligned policy did not prevent India from using new features of the global situation for its benefit. India hardly has any nostalgic feelings toward the former U.S.S.R, although it is, perhaps, thankful to it not only for its historic services in the matter of strengthening India's independence, but also for the objectively greater international maneuvering, which became possible for them after 1991.

China is another matter. In contrast to Russia and India, it has not proclaimed its desire to establish too close relations with Washington. Beijing cherishes discretion. Partnership for the United States is a sort of a regime of American patronage toward somebody who agrees to it.

Whereas partnership Chinese way is “partnership of symbols and farther goals”: “we are friends and partners in view of a certain danger,” but each of us cherishes friendship and maintains partnership as he thinks fit. The only necessary thing is that his actions should not contradict the proclaimed aim of friendship. This is an original, but effective version.

Such was the logic of Chinese-American and Chinese-Japanese partnership against the “hegemony of one power” (of course, the U.S.S.R.) from 1972 to the time of the 12th Congress of the CPC in 1982. At the time there was a host of frightening hints and statements and ostentatious, almost stormy, diplomatic maneuvering, but...almost no really concrete actions.

In the 1990s and later the rhetoric changed, but the logic seemed to remain the same. It was Chinese diplomacy that introduced the term “strategic partnership” in international parlance. But no expert in the PRC, Russia or the U.S.A. knows for certain its precise meaning. Although it is known that China is connected by this “partnership” with a broad range of countries, big and medium. Among them are the United States and Russia, Central Asian countries, Japan and South Korea, and some countries of the European Union and Southeast Asia.

This partnership allows Beijing to develop relations with Russia, the United States and India pragmatically, without any complications of a political or ideological nature. Chinese diplomacy does not bother itself by searching for any common denominator. The PRC cooperation with each of these countries develops as if in parallel worlds. If it should quarrel on the subject of Syria at the UN Security Council, then its priority will be a diplomatic bloc with Moscow. If trade preferences and investment regimes in East Asia are discussed, pride of place is given to interaction with the United States and Japan. If another series of quarrels around Taiwan is in the offing, the common approaches of

Moscow and Beijing to the problem of the territorial integrity of states come to the fore. Thus “strategic partnership” turns out to be the common decision “to remain friends for a long time” without burdening oneself with obligations to render practical help.

It is difficult to say now whether such attitude of the PRC to partnership will be temporary or principal. Sometimes it seems that China agrees with the American understanding of partnership as one of the leader with the object to be guided. Simply, China is not yet ready to lead too many countries. Beijing realized earlier than Moscow that partners to be led are a burden (this is related to the question of Russia’s relations with its CIS neighbors).

“Deng Xiaoping’s school” has taught the Chinese to measure their desires by possibilities. So far Chinese diplomacy acts on the platform of “easy partnership based on desire and possibility.” It is called strategic. In short, it is partnership as non-aggression.

China’s attitude toward present-day Russia is closely intertwined with its relation to the Soviet heritage. On the one hand, Russia is the legitimate successor to and owner of a great historical heritage whose value it cannot assess properly enough. On the other, it is a country which is unable to become strong enough in order to pursue a policy worthy of a great power. Or to preserve such independence in international affairs as China does and at the same time be as attractive economic partner as China for the countries which are suspicious of Russia, above all the United States.

Then again, that country, respected and accessible as it is, is an object to be used in the interests of China, which wants to find ways for the peaceful development of Russian resources without entering in an open contradiction with it and at the same time taking into account all drawbacks and vices of the Russian state organism and society.

Russia: Power as an Instrument of Drawing Profit

Deceived by Boris Yeltsin, who himself had been deceived by Leonid Kravchuk, Russia disavowed the Soviet Union in the hope to become rich as quickly as possible, having got rid of the need to subsidize the Transcaucasian and Central Asian lands. Twenty years later the international-political losses of this have become quite clear.

Above all, the foreign-policy resource of Russia has diminished, and it has not yet reached the level of the U.S.S.R. First, the material foundation of diplomatic work has not been compensated. Not a single Russian embassy in the CIS countries is equipped as it is fit for the Soviet mission abroad in terms of comprehensive security, including the protection of information. Meanwhile, the special services of many states are engaged in thorough intelligence activity in all CIS countries.

Secondly, the organizational resource of Russian diplomacy has also diminished. Many experienced diplomats have retired or left the diplomatic service due to too low wages. As to the influx of new young people, the latter reason proved decisive for them too.

Thirdly, the cultural, psychological and ideological influence of Russia has greatly decreased. Changes in the cultural-psychological image of Russia, which make it comfortable for people of some of the CIS countries or those of Asian origin, lower the attractiveness of the Russian way of life for those who are used to western tastes and standards.

Fourthly, the three rulers of Russia have failed to take Russia off the oil-and-gas needle during the past two decades. The state has concentrated enormous power in its hands, but the effectiveness of efforts to create science-intensive branches of the national industry is blocked by the system of the distribution of the means of the budget in the interests of the elites both in the center and provinces. The system of enrichment of the elites after 1991 has been based on drawing

incomes in alliance with any business, no matter how shady. Patriotic tasks play no role any longer. State power has become an instrument of drawing profit – such is the principal specific feature of the Russian political system and one of its systemic vices.

* * *

From the point of view of Russian national consciousness, the main result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the reduction of the foreign-policy potential and weakening of the international positions of Russia. With due account of the development of the Russian political system in a vicious circle, there is no grounds to believe that this weakening is reversible. The disintegration of the bipolar structure of the world combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union has given the world order an unbalanced character and not contributed to harmonization of international relations. The U.S. attempt to use the historical chance and bolster up the unipolar structure of the world to its liking has not been successful either. It was partly due to Washington's foreign policy, partly due to objective reasons – a very complex character of the world economic, cultural, ideological, migration, demographic and political processes, which could hardly be regulated by the resources and will of just one country, even so powerful as the United States. *There should be alternatives in the world.* However, not a single great country can, or wants to, offer them.

“*Rossiya v globalnoi politike*”, Moscow, 2011, No 6,
November-December, pp. 58–71.

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TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC LIFE OF MODERN BASHKORTOSTAN

The Muslim umma is divided into two main systems by their world outlook on the territory of the CIS. They are called conditionally Sufi and Wahhabi. We must distance ourselves from the lay belief circulated by incompetent journalists that Wahhabi ideology is extremist, while Sufi ideology is loyal to the powers that be. Attitude to supreme power should not be a yardstick in determining these trends. Adepts of Sufi and Wahhabi can come out as both supporters and oppositionists to the state and secular Russian society. In the early 1990s the separatist strivings of J. Dudayev found support, above all, among the traditional Chechen Sufi Tariqat, which later entered into conflict with Islamic fundamentalists (Wahhabi). The Daghestani Wahhabi did not render support to the units commanded by Hattab and Basayev which invaded their republic in August 1999. Finally, Wahhabism is the official ideology of Saudi Arabia, which does not support terrorism. Accusations of extremist activity are hurled on both representatives of Sufi Tariqats and Wahhabi jamaats.

Sufism is divided into several major trends and some of them are well-known in Bashkortostan. This division is connected, primarily, with the system of tutorship. The Russian institutions of muftis are positioned as proponents of “traditional Islam,” and they often use Sufi terminology, Sufi customs and habits, principles of Sufi education, outward appearance. Mufti institutions regularly hold international symposium and conferences where they confirm Sufism as traditional Islam.

The division into loyal Muslims and extremists passes along the line between Sufism and Wahhabism in the world religious practice.

It would seem that the principal argument between ideologists in the questions of Allah' qualities has a rather passive response among rank-and-file Muslims. In essence, contradictions in commentaries to the Koran are consequence rather than a source. More popular are arguments in the sphere of behavior and prayer practice. The Wahhabis are against pilgrimages to the tombs of saints, which they regard as worship of the dead. They are even against celebrating the Birthday of Prophet Mohammed. The Wahhabites see their main task in fighting for purification of Islam from various alien "admixtures" based on cultural, ethnic or other specific features of some or other Moslem peoples.

There are the concepts of the Koran and Sunna in Islam. The Koran contains universal world outlook postulates, and the Sunna, or the system of knowledge about the life of the Prophet, is used as the guide for prayers and models and behavior. Both the Sufi and Wahhabi maintain that following the Sunna of the Prophet perfects worship. However, the difference between Wahhabi and Sufi is that both of them draw information about the Sunna of Mohamed from different sources. Moreover, the difference between the sources is conditioned by the system of transmitting information. We think that the reason for contradictions between these two trends of one religious system lies in this sphere.

According to Sufi, Sunna is the tradition of tutorship. Mohammed is the main tutor and the sheikhs living in our time are in possession of knowledge which they pass from generation to generation from the time of the Prophet.

For Wahhabis the main source and guarantee of the preservation of Sunna are tales (hadis), written down at one time, about the life of Mohammed and his associates.

The greatest importance for Sufi is the sanctity of man guaranteed by his behavior, whereas for Wahhabi – the sanctity of the hadis proved by scholars.

In other words, differences between Wahhabi and Sufi lie practically on the same plane – in their understanding of the Sunna and religion as a whole. Due to this they are competitive, and in the sphere of world outlook these systems are irreconcilable. However, in practice, especially at a local level, we can observe their variability and even mutual complementariness. There are quite a few other factors, apart from information ties with Sufi or Wahhabi centers, which are conditioned by regional specific features.

Among them is the ignorance of parishioners, even in the very elementary questions. Then there are ethnic stereotypes. Even the most well-informed Wahhabis from among Bashkirs, do not wish to build social systems isolated from the national tradition and try to integrate in civil institutions of Bashkir society.

Bashkir Muslims of Wahhabi trend do not want to build independent “ahlyu Sunna” structures, as the case has been in the Caucasus, Tatarstan, and other regions. However, they actively participate in the socio-political life of the republic and try to penetrate legal mufti systems and Bashkir secular organizations, both government and public. Moreover, Bashkir Wahhabis account for a considerable part of Bashkir Muslims. Although they look down upon mufti institutions, they well realize their significance in the republic and continue to strive for participation in this institution of power.

The most active part of Wahhabi Bashkirs comes from youth organizations of the national movement. Kuk Bure, the Union of Bashkir Young People, is staffed by active Wahhabi Muslims in the capital of the republic Ufa. Nationalist leaders often succeed in drawing Muslims to participation in various functions under nationalist and secular slogans. R. Khamitov noted it in his report to the State Assembly in December 2010: “We see that today nationalists merge

with religious extremists. Previously nationalist and religious extremist movement existed separately, today they are drawing closer".

The mufti institutions proved too weak in the educational and theological spheres. They were supposed to be the main proponents of Russian "Sufism".

The confrontation between the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Wahhabis bears not so much an ideological character as a political one, which could be regarded as struggle for resources plus commercial interests and personal dislike.

The Wahhabi community is facing an alternative. Either it will become closed within its own framework, or will integrate in the secular social system, thereby becoming an inalienable part of Bashkir nationalism. Both variants are possible.

The integration of Wahhabi Muslims in the social sphere will be accompanied not only by Islamization of nationalists themselves, but also by the creation of integrated structures in national public organizations. At present the role of the "gatherer" of Bashkir Muslim communities is claimed by the Shuro formed in the autumn of 2010.

The mufti institutions of Bashkortostan also await reforms in religious policy.

Taking into account a considerable role of Wahhabi Muslims in Bashkir society, the exclusively anti-Wahhabi position of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the republic of Bashkortostan will gradually change. It will become more tolerant toward them and even draw some of them to the Board's work. All the more so since quite a few Wahhabi Muslims have a good knowledge of Arabic and are able to work in this field not only with the mufti institution, but also with the Ministry of Education. Wahhabi Muslim-businessmen are ready to cooperate with local administrations, for instance in organizing hajj.

According to another scenario, the mufti institutions all over Russia will be united under the aegis of one body. Judging by everything this body will be the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims. The local Islamic educational centers and institutes in neighboring regions will take measures to upgrade the teaching staff of educational centers in Bashkortostan and those beyond the Ural Mountains. The first step in this direction will be the creation of an Islamic Academy, which means that the religious sphere will be unified.

The merger of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims will deal a blow at the interests of Bashkir Wahhabi Muslims. There will hardly be any possibility of their cooperation with the mufti institution (even at the level of a dialogue). In general, the process of solution of the “Muslim question” in the Republic of Bashkortostan is rather complex and slow. But its solution will result in that the Muslim umma of Bashkortostan will acquire more authority and support.

The interaction of state power and Muslim leaders can yield definite positive results. If secular society continues to adhere stubbornly to anti-Wahhabi or other positions, rejecting part of Bashkir society, the autonomous jamaats will imbibe elements which may subsequently have a negative effect on stability in our region.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that the Muslim umma itself develops rather spontaneously. The mufti institutions in the republic have no real levers of power among Muslims. Alternative leaders opposed to mufti institutions are disunited and weak. However, work could be facilitated due to the existence and functioning of public institutions in the Muslim medium which could find a compromise between our umma and the rest of society on the most urgent problems.

*“Perspektivy modernizatsii traditsionnogo obshchestva”,
Ufa, 2011, pp. 428–435.*

Asiet Ashkhamakhova, Irina Yakovenko,

Experts on Islam

**THE PRESENT STATE OF RELIGIOUS
CONSCIOUSNESS OF RUSSIAN CITIZENS
(On example of Adygea)**

The development of religiousness in Russia at the present stage is manifested by several processes. The number of people who regard themselves adepts of religions is growing; today 60 to 65 percent of Russian citizens call themselves believers. The level of influence of atheistic outlook becomes lower. Religious organizations are now playing greater role in political and cultural life. According to M. Weber, religious principles are the determining ones in the political and economic activity of society.

Along with the increasing number of devout believers in modern society in the world, including in Russia, outward religiousness and enthusiasm for mysticism, theosophy and occultism still exist.

Inasmuch as the studies of the early 1990s revealed a considerable increase in the share of the population regarding themselves believers, some scholars made hurried statements about religious renaissance in Russia. They believe that turning to religion in the conditions of religious freedom which was established in the country in the early 1990s, was not so much a consequence of spiritual quest as the influence of a kind of "fashion of religion," inasmuch as everything what was not officially encouraged earlier, especially the attributes associated with the prerevolutionary past of Russia, has now become fashionable and prestigious. For example, M. Mcchedlov, A. Shevchenko and Y. Gavrilov come to the conclusion that Orthodox Christianity in modern Russia is now an ethnic, but not a religious feature. They write: "While denying their religiousness in outlook self-identification, many respondents (about 20 percent), nevertheless,

regard themselves as adherents of traditional religious associations. They accept Orthodox Christianity or Islam not only as a religious system, but as their natural cultural sphere, national way of life (“Russian – therefore Orthodox Christian,” “Tatar – therefore Muslim”).

S. Filatov expresses similar opinion about the influence of Islam on people’s consciousness. “Islam plays the same role of a symbol of national identity for the traditional Muslim population – the Tatars, Bashkirs, the Caucasian peoples, as Orthodox Christianity for the Russians (excluding the Chechens, Ingush and most Daghestani peoples). Surveillance polls show that real Islamic religiousness of these peoples is as weak as Orthodox Christian religious of the Russians.”

In February 2009 one of the biggest and most reliable Russian surveillance centers (Yuri Levada Analytical Center) carried out a poll entitled “Religion and Religiousness in Russia.” The results of the poll, which was conducted very strictly and thoroughly, made it possible to answer the question as to what significance Orthodox Christianity has for the hearts and minds of present-day Russians. First of all it is important to note that almost three-quarters of Russians identify their faith with Orthodox Christianity.

According to certain experts, there are two groups of reasons for increasing interest in religion. The first group is related to social being. The economic, ecological and political ill-being in most countries of the world causes uncertainty and fear for the future. Moreover, in the epoch of global problems this fear assumes eschatological scope. The other group of reasons concerns the spiritual state of society. The loss of identity, or to be more exact, pluralism in its interpretation characteristic of the epoch of Post-Modernism, makes the individual turn to religion as a universal means for self-identification. For one, this

is typical of Russian mass consciousness. It seems that despite all and sundry economic and political upheavals of the post-*perestroika* years, it is the latter group of reasons for increasing religious consciousness in this country has proved the most significant. As certain experts emphasize, at present “previous social ties are broken and people cease to understand what they believe in, what community they belong to, who their friends and who their enemies are. This is why fraternity, community or parish in religious life proves more important than the abstract symbol of faith.” These words can well be applied to Russian religiousness these days.

Samuel Huntington believes that the late 20th century witnessed all-round revival of religions, which was manifested in an increase of religious consciousness and the stepping up of fundamentalist movements. In his view, religious revival is connected with the crisis of identity due to social changes in modernizing societies. Secondly, it is a reaction to atheism, moral relativism and connivance to once own weaknesses, confirming the values of order, discipline, labor, mutual aid and human solidarity.

Along with the growing number of adherents of Orthodox Christianity, the number of adherents of Islam also increases. For over 1,350 years Islam has been an inalienable component of the history of the Caucasus and one of the determining elements of the spiritual and material culture of many Caucasian peoples. Islam in the Caucasus has been playing a multifunctional role and is present in all spheres of public life. At present its influence is growing, it becomes politicized and is used in the national self-identification of the North-Caucasian peoples for fanning nationalistic and separatist sentiments. One of the reasons why part of Muslims takes the road of radicalism is their superfluous ideas about Islamic culture.

In the early 1990s the process of Islamic revival began in Russia, thus Russian Muslims realized their adherence to Islamic civilization and the world Islamic community. Among the main results of Islamic revival mention should be made of the growth of religious self-identification, the greater number of mosques and of people observing Muslim rites, the formation of a system of religious education, re-establishment of broken ties between Soviet and Russian Muslims and their foreign co-believers, and politicization of Islam.

The renaissance of Islamic education in Russia after a long interval began in the mid-1980s and proceeded in two directions: first, the education was organized via summer schools at mosques, where the basics of Islam were taught to adults and children; secondly, through the system of religious education at Islamic madrasahs, colleges and universities where Muslim clergy was trained.

The restoration of professional Islamic education in Russia had certain advantages. It was possible to organize the contemporary religious education without restoring old forms, which is often not easy to do.

All Russian professional educational institutions – both madrasahs and universities – are concerned with the dissemination of general religious knowledge of Islam as a whole.

An analysis of the socio-political situation in our country shows that Islam is the basis of national-religious self-identification for a definite part of the population of the Russian Federation.

The number of the Muslim population of Russia, according to the 2002 census, was 14.5 million. By 2006 it exceeded 15 million. Muslim spiritual leaders claim that the number of Muslims in Russia reaches 20 million, which amounts to 12 percent of its entire population. The total number of Muslims in the North Caucasian region amounts to six million.

The situation in the Republic of Adygea is rather original. In 1999–2000 a sociological surveillance was carried out in the republic under the title “The State and Prospects of Islam in Adygea”. The first tendency revealed by the poll was that there was no total Islamization in Adygea. Only 35 percent of those polled called themselves adherents of Islam and ten percent followed the precepts of Islam. Thus, there is a frequent paradox when people regard themselves adherents of one or another faith, but are sort of “outside it”. They do not follow the strict standards of religious behavior and know badly, or not at all, their religious cult. According to the well-known American expert on the religious situation in the CIS countries, Kent R. Hill, “...the words ‘I believe in God’ should be understood as a form of denial of atheism rather than confession of deep faith”. The surveillance mentioned made it possible to confirm conclusions that ethnic identity is more widespread among the Adygea people and it is founded on traditional cultural values rather than on religious ones. Answers of respondents also point to this, because only six percent of them maintain than Islam is more important than traditional culture.

The results of the poll have been summed up as follows: “Most of those polled view Islam primarily as the opportunity to realize their spiritual and ethical requirements. There is no total Islamization in Adygea today. The assertion ‘I believe in God’ should be understood as a form of turning down atheism rather than admission to being deeply religious. Most respondents believe that in some 10 to 20 years Adygs will hardly become ‘true, devout Muslims’.

In 2010 a poll was carried out on “Interethnic and Interconfessional Relations in the Republic of Adygea as Viewed by the Leaders of Public Organizations.” As a result, of the poll it was concluded that within the Islamic community of Adygea contradictions become noticeable between “popular” Islam and Koran Islam.

Penetration and spreading of radical ideologies, including radical Islam, seems quite possible, inasmuch as radicalism is more often than not a form of active protest against the existing injustice and drawbacks of the social order.

Another form of social protest is departure from reality to a “sect.” In the present conditions a reduction in the number of adherents of “non-traditional confessions” can hardly be expected. Rather, the contrary, their number may increase.

In April 2011 the Adygea Republican Institute of Humanitarian Research carried out a sociological investigation on the subject “The Situation in the Muslim Community of the Republic of Adygea as Assessed by Muslims and Municipal Officials.” According to the data received, the overwhelming number of Adygs regards themselves Muslims. However, according to approximate data, only from two to five percent of them visit mosques regularly. Twenty percent regularly attend prayers. In this lies the main difference of Adygea from the republics of the eastern part of the North Caucasus where Islam is more deeply-rooted and more influential.

According to polls and interviews, the situation in the Islamic community is satisfactory. This view was expressed by all respondents without exception, although some voiced serious reservations and ambiguities. They boiled down to reports that a small number of orthodox (non-traditional) Muslims (bearded and scull-capped men) emerged in several populated centers, whose views run counter to “traditional Islam” in Adygea.

Ambiguity of certain answers could be seen and felt in that in response to request to give an assessment of the situation in a local Islamic community, respondents used different criteria. At the same time, the positive aspect for Muslim believers was the fact that their number was growing, and this was why the situation in the community,

from their point of view, was satisfactory, and officials proceeded from the fact that the positive situation was determined by the absence of religious extremists. Most respondents (48 percent) were sure that there was no real threat to socio-political stability in the republic due to “radicalization of part of Muslims”. Only 15 percent believe that such threat does exist.

Speaking about the development prospects of the situation in the Islamic community of the Republic of Adygea, researchers come to the following conclusion: “In our view Adygea will inevitable repeat the path which has been traversed in this sphere by other republics of the North Caucasus.

“The emerging trend of drawing young people to Islam will grow, inasmuch as turning to religion remains the only way of spiritual existence in the world which encroaches, from the point of view of many people, on the very foundations of human morality and ethics.

“Differentiation within the Muslim community will also increase: there will be adherents of traditional Islam, “young Muslims”, that is, adherents of hanafism, traditional for Adygea, but devoid of pagan traces, and adherents of “pure Islam” claiming that Islam is not religion of Abu Hanifa. Islam is religion of Allah. We have the Koran and Sunna of the Prophet”.

However, global re-Islamization of Adygea, as it was the case of Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, will not take place in the foreseeable future. The number of adherents of Islam is growing too slowly.

With growing differentiation of the republican Muslims into “traditional”, “young Muslims” and “pure Muslims”, the possibility of conflicts between them is also growing, but it is far from menacing so far.

Islam is used for anti-state, destructive purposes, but not in the interests of the consolidation of society and the state. Expert N. Volodina writes: "This takes place not due to the nature of Islam, but because the Russian authorities proved to be unprepared to the large-scale intrusion of Islam into political life". One can observe numerous trends of Islam, which are non-traditional for Russia. According to various estimates, the Wahhabis account for from two to ten percent of all Russian Muslims. Their share is especially high among Muslims in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol Territory, as well as among novice Muslims (in the latter case it reaches 50 to 60 percent. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist religious movement in Sunna Islam based on social organizations in the form of small communities embodying the idea of fraternity, equality and justice. It has a strong ideological potential capable to mobilize individual social groups (unemployed young people and students). One of the central places in the ideological platform of Wahhabism is non-recognition of any power deviating from the Sharia law. Characterizing North Caucasian Wahhabism, A. Yarlykapov writes: "Extremism of the North Caucasian Wahhabites is an important and complex problem. It can hardly be solved through negotiations, inasmuch as Wahhabi ideology denies the possibility of talking with infidels. The state based on human laws should, in their view, be destroyed. The world should be dominated and live only by divine laws".

The factors contributing to popularization and distribution of fundamentalism manifest themselves especially clearly in the conditions of a systemic crisis of society. Z. Brzhezinski believes that the general growth of popular discontent caused by a drop in the living standards, feelings of the loss of hope, prospects and confidence in the morrow create prerequisites for the strengthening of social tension. And awareness of vast differences in the material well-being of individual

groups of society evokes natural feelings of envy, indignation and enmity. Z. Brzhezinski thinks that the social basis for the adherents of fundamentalism is formed by the lower sections of society. Among them are simply failures, criminals, and those who have no place in society. Similar view is expressed by M. Kerimov. He names social inequality, poverty and western modernization, which violated the established social and cultural systems of traditions, as the main reasons for the emergence of radical and extremist trend in the North Caucasus. It should be noted that Muslim culture is based on general human values and means and methods of the socio-cultural organization of society and it is in close interaction with other civilizations types. The extremist trends in Islam have nothing to do with its values oriented to bringing people closer together. In modern Russia Islam is regarded as one of the spiritual pillars of society and the state.

Along with the popularization and distribution of religious faiths traditional for Russia – Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism – new forms of religious and spiritual life began to emerge. New religious groups and movements have entrenched themselves in Russia and they should also be investigated. A. Ozhiganova and Y. Filippov characterize them in the following way: “New religions strive to be not only supra-ethnic, thus imitating world religions, but also supra-confessional. However, despite their ‘universalism’, many new religious movements have either vivid ethnocultural or evident confessional tint”.

Thus, in a sociocultural measure religion as a tradition is one of the most important mechanisms of the reproduction and translation of moral standards and spiritual values without which it would be impossible to imagine any culture. Many national states use the sociocultural potential of religion for consolidation of society, its greater stability, and also for legitimization of their political actions.

At present a state policy which does not take into account the religious factor is regarded near-sighted. In the conditions of globalization the preservation of the national and religious way of life traditional for a given country is absolutely necessary for its survival as a unified state.

In modern Russia mutual understanding between different confessions and creation of ways and means to establish respectful and tolerant relations between confessions is a task of great urgency.

*“Etnos. Religiya. Politika”,
Krasnodar, 2012 pp. 50–63.*

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**THE CONFESSİONAL FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (THE REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN
AS AN EXAMPLE)**

Russia represents a striking instance of poly-ethnic and poly-confessional state, where internal confessional and inter-confessional relations acquired a great significance.

The contemporary model of state-confessional relations has been enriched by the diversity of regional models depending on specificity of confessional space of individual region. In particular, it is characteristic for the republics of the RF with higher political-legal status, where ethnic and confessional belonging had a great influence on formation of the national-regional identity. For instance, it concerns Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia.

In terms of ethnic-confessional relations, Dagestan was always regarded as one of the complicated republics, since representatives of 100 peoples living there, including 32 indigenous peoples, form almost

all confessions: Islamic, Christian and Judaic. The enormous confessional variety and multi-nationality of the republic is connected with history of Dagestan and with its geographic location.

It should be stressed that the notions “religious” and “national” are closely connected in consciousness of Muslims in Dagestan. The perception of unity of national and religious factors was consolidated in consciousness of peoples in Dagestan for a long historic period. Following adoption of Islam the peoples of Dagestan turned out being united by common religion. The process of confessional unity on the national basis was accompanied by specific features absorbing local national custom, traditions and rituals. The traditions and custom in the religious form were accepted as entities with religious content created by God, as was marked by K.G. Guseva. The lack of understanding and the incorrect appraisal of national specifics are often displayed by attitude to existing religious rites and traditions. For instance, arrangement of funerals and funeral repast, the rite of giving name (sunnat) are regarded in Dagestan both by believers and non-believers as a national custom.

This phenomenon is explained by the fact that for the Soviet period many people kept to Islamic custom and rites accepting them as a popular and not religious custom. This situation is characteristic not only for Dagestan but also for Muslims in the Volga Basin, the Ural Basin and the North Caucasus.

According to some sociological research, 64.1% of respondents consider themselves as believers, while 38.7% of them observe religious rites, and 25% of the respondents do not keep to any religious rites. About 200 thousand people are really deeply religious Muslims, according to E.F. Kisriev. The results of research demonstrate that the prevailing type of religiousness in Dagestan is marked by existence of believers, who do not practice regularly the rites.

The attitude to religion is different in various ethic groups: Avars – 38%, Dargins – 20%, Kumyks – 14%, Lezgins – 10%, Laks – 4%, other nationalities – 14%. The share of wahhabies and Tarikatists among deeply religious Muslims is small (from 3% to 4%). The ethnic feature of re-Islamization process is as follows: it is characterized by its intensive process in the north-western districts, particularly among Avars, Dargins (excluding Kaitags), Kumyks, while it is displayed less among Lezgins, Laks, Tabasarants, Dargins-Kaitags.

The contemporary regional model of confessional policy in Dagestan to a large extent is determined by the social-economic and political-legal development of the region and by the confessional structure of the population as well as by psychological peculiarities and business quality of political and confessional leaders. The contemporary confessional situation in Dagestan is characterized by the following features: 1) the growth of religiousness not connected with the regular rites practice; 2) the high level of religiousness depending on the place of birth and ethnic belonging; 3) the developed form of religious (Islamic) education; 4) the politicization of traditional Islam in Dagestan (the branch “Nur” of the all-Russian Muslim movement – the Islamic Party of Dagestan); 5) the existence of various religious trends, including religious-extremist trend – wahhabism; 6) the poly-confessional situation. The factors, such as politicization of traditional Islam and religious extremism, represent a threat to security not only of Dagestan but also of the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation.

For Dagestan of great urgent significance is existence of the conflict potential in inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and internal confessional spheres. The Islamic confession is split into two trends: the adepts of traditional people’s Islam and the supporters of the reactionary wing of Mazhab of Khanbalits (wahabism and salafism). The spread of wahhabism is caused shortly by the external and internal

factors. According to Z. Abdulagatov, the external factors are as follows: Muslim education abroad, missionary activities, activities of foreign non-governmental organizations, economic interests of transnational companies and geopolitical interests of various states and other reasons.

The change of geopolitical role of the Republic of Dagestan is one of the most important factors of dissemination in Dagestan of extremist ideology of wahhabism. After emergence of independent trans-Caucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) and the political instability in Chechnya and other republics of the North-West Caucasus just Dagestan became the key subject of the geopolitical situation in the south of Russia. The dissemination of ideology of wahhabism was promoted by many internal reasons: the social-economic instability, the unemployment, the poverty of the population, the degradation of morality, the dominance of the clannish system in Muslim regions of the North Caucasus, the uncertain policy of Moscow relating to the region, the low level of authority of the clergy.

The main threat to public security on the part of wahhabism consists in its urge towards imposing to society of the model of “Islamic state”, including armed forceful suppression of a different trend of thought. Its spread in society is marked by global extension. The challenge of wahhabism as a form of radical politicized Islam is displayed not so much in the religious as in the social-political sphere. In the North Caucasus wahhabism possesses certain mobilizing ideology and is based on the support of international Islamist organizations and other external forces, which render it rather great financial, material, cadre and propaganda assistance.

For the sake of keeping stability the state bodies, the public and religious organizations of the Republic of Dagestan should work out the program of complex measures directed to attainment of ethnic-

confessional tolerance, preservation and consolidation of ethnic-confessional space of the republic, peaceful coexistence and cooperation of various peoples and confessions within the framework of the united territorial and religious space of Dagestan, of Russia and also should create the foundations of the religious model of confessional policy taking into account of the region.

“Rossiya i ee regiony v poiskah grazhdanskogo edinstva i mezhnatsionalnogo soglasiya”, Ufa, 2011, pp. 77–80.

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ETHNOPOLITICAL-PROCESSES IN POST-SOVIET KARACHAY-CHERKESSIA: LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The ethnopolitical processes going on in the post-Soviet area during the past two decades draw close attention of Russian scholars (E. Stepanov, L. Polyakov, V. Tishkov, and others). Many of them note that one of the common features for all post-Soviet regions is that everywhere tension in the relations between various ethnoses and conflicts provoked by this tension hampers the implementation of economic and political transformations and retard the unification of the public around humanistic demographic ideals.

These problems are urgent to this day, including in the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia, and they call for thorough investigation.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in August 1991 and the proclamation of independence of a number of former Union republics caused the rapid growth of separatist sentiments and determined the main development vector of the ethnopolitical processes in different

regions of Russia. The Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia has lived through at least four acute political crises: in 1991–1992, 1994–1996, 1999–2000, and in 2003. All of them, in one way or another, were connected with the attempts to realize political, territorial and status claims of the peoples living there.

During the year 1991 the following republics were proclaimed one after the other: the Republic of Karachay, two Cossack republics, the Republic of Abaza (Abazinskaya Republic) and the Cherkessian Republic.

The Law of the Russian Federation “On Rehabilitation of the Peoples Who Suffered from Reprisals”, which also envisaged territorial rehabilitation, adopted in April 1991, rendered unintentional support to these claims.

In December 1991 several congresses of Karachay Republic took place, which put forward the demand to restore the autonomy of the Karachay people abolished in 1943. As a result, a draft of the Law “On Restoration of Karachay Autonomous Region and Cherkessian Autonomous Region within the bounds and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation” was prepared.

In turn, the Cossacks of the Zelenchuk and Urup districts took a decision to secede from the Karachay-Circassian Region and join the Krasnodar Territory. The proclamation of the Zelenchuk-Urup Cossack Republic at the end of 1999 had serious repercussions. A continuous meeting was convened in the city of Karachayevsk calling for the creation of the Republic of Karachay. Tension was growing between the Cossacks and Karachays which was actively fanned up from without.

Other peoples living in Karachay-Cherkessia also put forward their demands.

Among the main demands of the Abazins were the return of lands to Abazin mountain villages which had been confiscated at

different times, and the creation of the independent Abazin national district.

The Nogais were also quite active. There were 14,000 of them in the republic, less than one quarter of all Nogais living in the North Caucasus. However, it was precisely there that the idea originated to form an independent national-territorial unit in the Nogai steppe area.

The Cherkassians were dissatisfied with their status and claimed the leading position in the political and economic spheres, despite their small number.

The peak of the exacerbation of the situation in Karachay-Cherkessia was reached in 1991–1992, when the present and future of the newly-proclaimed national-territorial units was discussed and simultaneously parliamentary elections were held in the republic.

The “Organizing Committee for Stabilization of the Situation” was set up, and consultations were carried on between the leaders of the associations of the Cossacks and the Karachays, as well as a general meeting of the inhabitants of the Zelenchuk district was held, at which the sides reached mutual understanding. As a result a confrontation between the Karachays and Cossacks was prevented from breaking out.

The successful solution of the conflict was also facilitated by raising the status of Karachay-Cherkessia to the level of republic – an independent part of the Russian Federation at the end of 1991.

An important role in resolving the conflict in 1991–1992 was played by two referendums on the preservation of a unified republic within the Russian Federation on March 28 and June 11, 1992. Surveillance polls showed that the overwhelming number of the republican population (78.6 percent and 89 percent respectively) wanted to preserve the unity of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic.

The next political crisis (in 1994–1996) coincided with the general crisis of power in the republic connected with the expiry of the

term of office of the People's Assembly of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic. The situation was determined, as before, by political ambitions, heat and self-esteem of leaders, big and small, the irrational behavior of chance people, and influence of various chimeras, like old ethnic offences and claims.

The political interest of different national elites, financial groups and criminal groupings was one of the key components of the conflict during the period under investigation. Claiming that a policy advantageous to one people and infringing on the interests of others is impermissible, they at the same time tried to achieve their own personal aims and promote themselves or those serving them to power. All this caused an exacerbation of interethnic contradictions which often turned into ethnic conflicts.

During that period the question about the division of the republic on the national basis was raised again. On December 24, 1994, a Unifying Congress of Cherkessians, Abazins and Russians took place at which it was proposed to create the Cherkessian Autonomous Region as part of Stavropol Territory.

Quite a few problems emerged during the discussion of the system of the legislative branch of power. In 1994 it was suggested to make the People's Assembly a two-chamber body, the upper chamber to be elected on the ethnic basis at citizens' congresses: five deputies from each people – the Abazin, Karachay, Nogai, Russians and Cherkessians, and two deputies from each other nationality.

After prolonged debates the Constitution of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic was adopted in March 1996, which envisaged direct elections of the head of the region. V.I. Khubihev remained the head of the republic until the expiry of a five-year term. The republican parliament was one-chamber and elected by the usual system proportionately to the number of different ethnoses living in the

republic and with territorial districts equal in size. Thus, tension was alleviated and brought to a latent state. However, all conflict-provoking factors have not been eliminated.

A multitude of unresolved problems have resulted in a flare-up of acute interethnic tension in 1999. The pretext for it was dissatisfaction of part of the voters (mainly Cherkessians and Abazins) with the results of the first elections of the head of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic (V.M. Semyonov was elected head of the republic representing the Karachay and Russian part of the population).

After the elections of the head of the republic, the supporters of S. Derev, who lost the elections, put forward the demand to create the Cherkessian autonomy within Stavropol Territory.

The conflict in the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic continued to grow quite rapidly, and the republic faced the threat of political destabilization and mass disorders.

In the obtaining situation the federal authorities, after a prolonged pause and non-interference in the conflict, undertook a number of urgent measures in search of a compromise between the Karachays and Cherkessians. Prime Minister V. Putin, during his meeting with V. Semyonov on August 31, 1999, reaffirmed unofficially his powers as the head of the Karachay-Cheressian Republic, spoke in favor of the unity of the republic and emphasized that the Central authorities were not going to send military units to the republic. Earlier, the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation issued a statement to the effect that the creation of a new subject of the Federation could only be made in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation. In this connection V. Semyonov and S. Derev jointly adopted an appeal to the citizens of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic calling on them "to stop their feud and look for reconciliation."

After the stormy elections of 1999 Vladimir Semyonov took his office. In order to mitigate the conflict S. Derev was given the job of Counsellor of the Presidential representative in the Southern Federal Region. The problem was taken off the agenda, but only for some time.

V. Semyonov, who won the elections in 1999, which nearly turned into an ethnic armed conflict, failed to create an efficient team of fellow-thinkers, establish constructive relations with parliament, organize an interethnic dialogue, and rally together the people of the republic.

In 2003 there were another elections of the President of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic. By that time the Karachay-Cherkessia was split into different ethnopolitical and social groups which were hostile to one another, and torn apart by different national elites and financial and criminal groupings. The economy was in a state of stagnation, unemployment was very high, the population's standards of living dropped considerably, and crime was rampant. People's trust in the state and bodies of state power, which were in disrepute in the republic, was critically low.

After the first tour of the elections of the President of the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic in March 2003 the results were absolutely clear to everybody. The choice was made in favor of Mustafa Batdyev, who succeeded in rallying around himself the public movements of all nationalities of the republic, regional sections of various political parties and national elites and formulating a clear, understandable and attractive economic program. Besides, he was able to organize his election campaign properly and draw support from most voters in Karachay-Cherkessia.

After M. Batdyev came to power ethnopolitical problems changed their form and essence. The acute interethnic confrontation was replaced by intra-ethnic problems. However, it is too early to make

an analysis of the current situation or predictions of its subsequent development.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above-said:

1. The ethnopolitical processes in post-Soviet Karachay-Cherkessia are distinguished by an objective character of their origin, cyclic nature of emergence, short duration, rather high tension and concomitant conflicts, contradictory nature of the tasks put forward by their participants and incompleteness of arising ethnic conflicts.

2. The main reasons for the periodical breaks-out of ethnopolitical conflicts in the Karachay-Cherkessian Republic during this period, in our view, are connected with the attempts to realize various wishes and aspirations of separate nationalities of the republic which lends an objective character to these processes. However, one cannot fail to see that more often than not ethnopolitical conflicts and processes were initiated and supported by different mononational financial groups and clans with a view to promoting their representatives to state power bodies and protecting their economic interests. As soon as the personal interests and ambitions of some or other “behind-the-scene leaders” were satisfied, the tension of conflicts went down, ethnopolitical processes retarded, but the conflict itself remained unresolved.

The ethnic conflicts under investigation can be referred to a territorial-status type by the aims and demands put forward by their participants. They include: changes of administrative-territorial borders; higher status; greater volume of real rights and powers of a given ethnos.

In the early 2000s the ethnopolitical processes in Karachay-Cherkessia for the first time acquired a confessional component, both Muslim and Orthodox Christian.

Religious leaders and religious rhetoric began to be actively drawn in the current ethnopolitical processes. In our view, this is a rather dangerous trend for the positive development of our republic.

The ethnopolitical processes under review also show the weakness of the regional and federal authorities of the time and the unwillingness and inability of the federal center to resolve a regional or local conflict even with the use of force, if necessary.

They demonstrated the alienation of the local authorities from people and the absence of a constant and equal dialogue between society and the powers that be on the most vital problems, in short, the undeveloped character of civil society in the republic.

In our view, the absence of a federal nationalities and national-cultural policy and large-scale program of training political and managerial personnel has a negative influence on the ethnopolitical processes going on in the republic. In this context, the project of the “United Russia” party of creating a professional reserve of the country is quite timely.

*“De Caucaso: Istoriko-etnograficheskii almanakh”,
Karachayevsk, 2011, pp. 103–109.*

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**THE CONTEMPORARY CAUCASUS:
UNSTABLE PERIPHERY OF “GREAT NEAR
EAST” AS A NATURALLY DETERMINED
RESULT OF THE POST-SOVIET DEVELOPMENT**

The rising geopolitical role of the Caucasian region as a main geopolitical trend of the XX century attracted a greater attention to it on the part of regional and global players. The Soviet Union sustained a

defeat in global opposition, which has a direct impact on the situation in both in Russia and in other states having emerged on the territory of the former united country. The attempts of some “fragments” of the Soviet state to play a self-dependent role at least in some spheres (attained a result in the present balance of forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia) confronts and will inevitably confront a rigid counter action in various forms of American “surveillance” and the corresponding actions taken by other players (first of all, Iran, Turkey and European Union) creating, on the one side, a chance for a manoeuvre and, on the other side, increases greatly the risks connected with the lack of a common system of regional security. The terms “latent instability” or “frozen instability” used by some commentators concerning some states of the South Caucasus or some subjects of the Federation of the North Caucasus may be applied to a greater extent to the region as a whole.

Sometimes an impression may be formed that Obama’s Administration pays less attention to the Caucasus. However, in reality it may mean only a temporary change of political, diplomatic and other resources used by Washington for solving more urgent problems. It is possible to suppose that the course for consolidation of American influence in the South Caucasus will be continued, but at some stages, for instance within the framework of “reset” policy an agreement may be achieved that Moscow would exert efforts to settle the issues, which are impossible to settle under present conditions (primarily in Nagorno-Karabakh). The rising concern of NATO about going on regional conflicts in the South Caucasus should not be ignored.

The external factor has a direct impact on not only the external political orientation but also on the internal dynamics in the region, including the scientific research of the Caucasus. In the past, several attempts were made to create in the North Caucasus a confederation

(federation) outside Russia: in the middle of the XIX century the Imamate headed by Shamil united for some time the territory of present Dagestan and Chechnya; for the period of 1917–1920, there was formed the Provisional Tersk-Dagestan government. The Mountainous Republic (recognized in 1918 by Germany and Turkey), the Union of Mountaineers of the North Caucasus and Dagestan, the Northern Caucasian Emirate headed by Gotsinski were supported by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia; for the period of 1994–1999, the idea was proposed to establish a new Imamate from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea under the wahhaby banners, while armed structures were created and military actions were provoked; for the period of 1990–1994, the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus carried out its activities in the North Caucasus rendering military and material assistance to Abkhazia in its confrontation with Georgia: the idea of creation of an independent state of mountaineers of the Caucasus was proposed.

As far back as in the XIX century the so-called Chechen committees of England and Turkey were used mainly not for support of Chechnya but in the interests of Europeans-renegades, who got good posts for themselves in the reformed Ottoman army and later in the Polish emigration. The documents of the peace negotiations in Paris (spring of 1856) show the merely tactical steps of the Turkish and English-French diplomacy, which resorted to various tricks and manipulated ideas of independent Cherkessia and Dagestan. As it is shown in some studies, the Caucasian wars and the Chechen mutiny may be discussed in the discourse of non-typical nature of these events against the background of the long historical period of peaceful coexistence and mutual action between the Russian state and Islam. The oath taken by imam Shamil to be loyal to the czar represents the paradigm of new relations established between the region and the Russian authorities after 1859.

However, prominent scientific centers of the West and the Near East continue to work out various aspects of the Caucasian war and of the further periods of history. As an example, it is possible to mention the International Shamil Symposium convened in 1991 in England on the initiative of St. Antonia College at Oxford University and the Center of Asian Studies at London University. The decisions and recommendations of the Oxford conference constituted the basis for further studies on Shamil research and the national liberation struggle of Caucasian mountaineers. And this is only one example of determined synchronization of scientific measures taken by the foreign research of the Caucasus accompanied by further steps in the political sphere. Exactly science plays an essential role in inventory making and further actualization of certain tendencies ((for instance, applied to the late period of Soviet society, readiness for centrifugal trends, which was mainly displayed just in the Caucasus). At present, politicization of the corresponding studies is in particular evident, for instance, in the context of the appraisals of the final stage of the Caucasian war in the North-West Caucasus.

Some years ago, former crown prince of Jordan Al Khasan ben Talal noted that the Near East was plunged into the abyss of ferocious forceful actions and conflicts, which lack any sensible explanation. It seemed, as he said, that it had become the useless region, which was incapable to get out of the quagmire of crisis and depression. The increased negative external influence undermined security and stability of some states of the region, having put it closer (by models of governance through the controlled chaos) to the projected so-called “Great Middle East”. According to certain supposition, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia may later link their destiny with destiny of countries in the Near East, which turned out to be enveloped synchronously by vigorous public-political troubles. It is impossible to

separate the internal causes of troubles in Tunis, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan from external factors. The contours of evident and hidden preparation of these events are seen against the background of seeming sudden unexpected events.

Since 2003 by proposal of Washington, the infrastructure of the so-called “initiative of Near East partnership” started its implementation by actual actions: establishment of the offices of American representatives in UAE and Tunis, enlargement of the personnel of American embassies etc. The main aim of these structures consisted in maintenance of humanitarian contacts, organization of various contests and exhibitions, arrangement of trips of journalists and Arabic public activists to the U.S. for the sake of “study of democracy” in the place of its origin. It seems that in this context one should consider the intensification of activities of American embassies in the capitals of the states in the South Caucasus, which in a number of cases was difficult to separate from open interference in the internal affairs of the host countries.

The “Forum of Future” took place in Morocco in 2004 with participation of the State Secretary of the U.S. Colin Powell. The forum paid great attention to development of civil democracy in the countries of the Near and the Middle East, including creation of NGOs oriented to the youth, promotion of small and medium business, as well as attention to many nationals from the corresponding states, who settled in the U.S. and in Europe.

The western strategy in the region “Great Near East” is marked by close contacts with both the authorities and the opposition. The destiny of the ruling elite and specific leaders, although they position themselves as ardent adepts of the United States, automatically is questioned in case of growing social-economic protests. The working contacts with the opposition groups provide the external manipulators

with freedom of volatile actions and with a chance to direct the popular dissatisfaction in a skillful way.

It should be stressed that social inequality, poverty and other social hardships of the East supposed to be eliminated by advancement of “democracy” and “civil society” to a large extent were aggravated by the neocolonial policy of the West. For instance, the food assistance alleviated for a short time social tension but for a long perspective decreased the stimuli for the agricultural growth and had a negative impact on the situation of the rural population etc.

However, the most pernicious social consequences characterized the programs of assistance by IMF and IBRD directed to the structural reconstruction of economy. Since the end of the 1970s–1980s these programs were proposed to developing countries confronting economic difficulties. The credits were provided on condition that radical transformations should be made in economy: decrease of the role of the state sector, decrease of the deficit of the state budget by decrease of social expenses, rejection of price regulation, raising the role of private business, correction of the overrated currency exchange rate and others. The population of the countries, which the first had to go through the painful consequences of such conditions (Egypt, Tunis and Morocco), reacted to the acceptance of these conditions by arrangement of popular troubles and mutinies as far back as in 1977–1984.

Having studied execution of these programs by 1990, the experts of United Nations came to the conclusion that in this way many efforts of developing countries aimed at raising the quality of life had been reduced to nothing. The renunciation from price subsidies for food products in half of developing countries receiving loans for structural economic reconstruction resulted in decrease of provision of secured standard needs per capita of the population. As a result of these structural reforms in developing countries there appeared a new social

stratum – “new poor people”, state officials and workers of the state sector, who lost employment after liquidation of unprofitable or not very remunerative (but needed to the country) enterprises, after reduction of the personnel in the state administration, liquidation of subsidies and grants to scientific, cultural, sports and other social establishments and organizations. Were not these people or their direct ancestors the generation’s representatives, who turned out to be without means for living and perspectives in their countries and who composed “the striking force” of mutinies with not yet clear but not less serious religious motivation? The other edge of these “reforms” is the unseen social stratification (including total dependence of the ruling classes on the West), enormous corruption and rapid rise of unemployment and other distinctions of social situation typical for the countries of “developed liberalism”...

Thus, the known scheme is being reproduced in the post-Soviet Caucasus as follows: the way of imposing political, economic, social, cultural-ideological models, not inherent in it and not historically characteristic with this region, leads to economic degradation, rise of social and inter-ethnic tension, while its victims, as a rule, are the less protected groups (a characteristic example – Russians in the North Caucasus and generally – “non-title” minorities).

* * *

The events in the Caucasus, particularly for the recent time, underline the intensity and dramatic consequences of disintegration of the Soviet Union, which were hardly appraised 20 years ago. In particular, the recognition of new independent states Abkhazia and South Ossetia demonstrates still going on processes of national-state separation, which may continue further in different forms. The forceful attempts taken in order to settle the conflicts existing in the Caucasus

proved their complete failure. The mechanisms of settling them proposed by the international community would hardly be adopted by the conflicts' parties without due account of "national factor" specifics and without the context of the accumulated experience (Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and South Sudan). Given the lack of the efficient system of regional security, the mechanism of ensuring security in zones of conflicts for the recent future will remain the international recognition supported by corresponding military-political, economic and other resources.

The risen urgency of politicized pro-Islamic trends is characteristic primarily for the North Caucasus and partially for the South Caucasus (some signs of the process show it, for instance the rapidly grown popularity of wearing "kerchiefs"). The processes of state construction, public-political and social-economic development in the north and the south of the Caucasian region are marked by some common features, demonstrated in the primary orientation to utilization of existing resources (natural, intellectual, geopolitical etc.). However, for instance, construction of pipelines (politically motivated and economically inadequately justified) accompanied by hopes for comfortable living thanks to the communication rent resulted, if resulted at all, in flourishing of a small part of the population in the states of the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan and Georgia) against the background of aggravation of social-economic problems of the main part of the population (reduction of budgetary expenses, rise of public utilities expenses, high inflation, great unemployment, stagnation in the real sector of economy, increase of taxes for small and mid-size business, rise of national burden of tax payment etc.).

The inevitable in this situation passage to more authoritarian forms of governance, to "formal democracy" do not guarantee at all the stability of internal political systems under conditions of deficit of

social, ideological and psychological factors able to maintain their internal stability.

The ideological vacuum formed after disintegration of the USSR in a natural way is being filled with the most radical trends based mainly on manipulations, which do not promote further positive development of the region. The ethnic (even ethno-bureaucratic) characteristic of many state entities greatly aggravates the existing conflicting potential, aggravates the existing and creates new separation lines, which has a negative impact on ensuring national security of Russia and other states.

This process is promoted by the rising share of primitive relations and growth of archaic social-economic relations, by simplification of the social structure of society, by washout of social strata of those, who were occupied with intellectual work. The limited wholesale and retail trade is the main form of existence of the population's majority. The social-economic structure formed for the last fifteen years has no analogy both with the Soviet period and with the previous period. One of the consequences of the created situation is, for instance, the lack of competitiveness of local products, when meat and fruits produced in Dagestan cost higher and are of lower quality than the analogous products exported from Latin America or Turkey. The similar situation does not correspond to the needs of further development and hinders solving acute social-economic problems.

The policy carried out by Russia relating to the peoples of the North Caucasus did not distort their development, including development in the legal sphere. It was displayed in formation for the XIX century of legitimization of traditional legal entities (Adat and Shariah) and of their utilization in regulation of social and ethnic relations side by side with the law of Russia. At the same time, one

should not ignore the processes of legal de-modernization for the post-Soviet period. The popularity of Shariah ideas expressed in rather radical form quickly rises among the people, including educated young people.

As the positive trend it is worth mentioning the signs of change of attitude to radical Islamism as an efficient multi-level consolidation (primarily between Russia and the West) in the struggle against international terrorism, while the existing political discords (in relation to Georgia, concerning attitude to Olympic Games in Sochi in the context of “Cherkessian genocide” etc.) are able, unless not repudiate, at least significantly limit the contemplated cooperation.

Appraising the common heritage of national traditional studies of the Caucasus, it is worth mentioning their close connection with the processes of state construction in the region. In particular, the fundamental changes in theoretical and methodological foundations of the Russian and Soviet studies of the Caucasus were conditioned not so much by accumulation of empiric data, which needed the review of the predominant paradigm (according to the theory of “scientific revolutions”) as by the radical changes in political, social-economic and cultural-ideological development of Russia at least twice for the XX century – in 1917 and in 1991.

The administrative borders along the Great Caucasian Mountain Range existed as far back as twenty years ago almost instantly became the state frontiers having created principally new geopolitical situation, which was interpreted for the following years. This process is going on, however, and it becomes more evident that the “reconstruction” ideologically oriented to the West and presented in the states of the Near East as “overtaking development” turned out to be a failure. The attempts to reproduce this “Near Eastern model” in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia will result in new conflicts, the deepening

social stratification and finally a public explosion. At present, much more than in the past the situation depends on the answer to the question: whether the intellectual elite will be able to propose an alternative to development of these countries, which corresponds to social-cultural and economic traditions of their peoples.

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THE RUSSIANS IN KAZAKHSTAN

The mass social mobility of the Russians on the territory of Turkestan started approximately since the middle of the XVIII century. The people of Slavonic extraction of the population of tsarist Russia and of the USSR came to the territory of contemporary Kazakhstan in different time. The distinctions of the Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Cossacks were actualized with disintegration of the USSR and formation of independent Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, with rebirth of Cossacks as a self-dependent territorial-ethnic group. Besides, since the XIX century the Ural (in the Ural region) Cossacks and the Semirechensk Cossacks (in the south-east of the republic near Almaty) traditionally lived in Kazakhstan. The ethnic Russians in the Slavonic aria of the RK (since 1938, the author lives in Kazakhstan and never met people speaking Ukrainian or Byelorussian) prevailed in numbers always. And the text below is devoted to them.

For the period of consolidation of new independent states in the 1990s about 2 million Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, as well as 0.8 million Germans left the RK. The population of Kazakhstan was

reduced from 16.9 million in 1991 to 14.9 million in 1999. The reasons of exit of the population were as follows: the vagueness of the social-political situation, the inability to have two (in the RK) citizenships, the fear of being cut off from the historic Motherland, the apprehension of inter-national conflicts, the introduction of internal currency (tenge), the liquidation of former passport system, the severance of family ties and many other reasons.

The Russian people represent today the second in number ethnos in Kazakhstan. The population's census in March 2009 fixed 33% of non-Kazakhs (most of them are the Russians). Russia and Kazakhstan are separated by the longest in the world state boundary (7.5 thousand km), and 12 Russian and 8 Kazakh regions are located near this boundary. Many districts of the regions of Kazakhstan (Atyrauskaya, Uralskaya, Aktyubinskaya, Kustanaiskaya, Severo-Kazakhstanskaya (the center – Petrozavodsk, Akmolinskaya (the center – Astana, former Tselinograd), Pavlodarskaya and Vostochno-Kazakhstanskaya (Ust-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk) are contiguous with Astrakhanskaya, Volgogradskaya, Saratovskaya, Samarskaya, Orenburgskaya, Chelyabinskaya, Kurganskaya, Omskaya regions and Altaiiski krai of Russia. Despite this fact, in Kazakhstan the specific existence of Russians should be regarded to be not Irredenta but a Diaspora.

And what did allow the Russians to adapt successfully and to live in the Turkic language area (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Uigurs, Turks, peoples of the North Caucasus, Dungans, Kyrgyz and others), to stay there in the complicated post-crisis and modernization time, to live there at present without conflicts? It is worth mentioning some social-psychological factors, which promote formation of the unique Diaspora specifics of the Russians' living in Kazakhstan. The

author's deliberations are founded on his living in the RK for twenty years.

First, the Russians survived and occupied their place in the social structure and the local custom order not by means of colonial methods (as think some local researchers) of pressure on the local population (not to identify with institutions and representatives of the administration) but by their qualities (family, collectivism, steadfastness and diligence). For the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century, the Kazakh population consisted mainly of nomads. Kazakhstan is the zone of risky farming. Siberia marked by its ferocious frosts is nearby. Up to two thirds of the harvest may be lost in case of bitter frosts, which may occur every third year. Thus, the Russian (Slavonic) re-settlers could produce harvest only by hard agricultural labor without help of friendly nomads. The labor became a creative image of the Russians in Kazakhstan. The separation from the historic Motherland, the way of living in other ethnic and language civilization with different specialization of work created a rather great life motivation among wide strata of the Russian speaking population.

Second, the Russians in Kazakhstan, unlike their Russian compatriots, better remember and respect their relatives, who live far away. They find out more occasions for contacts among relatives than marriages and funerals. The fact of living among representatives of other ethnos stimulated the contacts of relatives to maintain sustainable relations and render mutual assistance. As a significant motivation was behavior of the Kazakhs, who have positive tradition of relations between members of the same group (zhuz) of the population, including the right of living with the family of a distant relative for a very long period of time. This ethnic behavior is a rather complicated custom for understanding by Russians ("the uninvited guest is worse than a Tatar", "it is time to remember about honor"). The wish of a Kazakh boy to

marry a Russian girl confronts this stereotype and represents a significant hindrance (from the point of view of relatives of both parties). The Kazaks know that the Russians have no tradition to keep at home a relative for a week. Probably, the risen number of contacts among their relatives was the outcome of this family practice against the background of possible ethnic incidents in such situation in the family; the positive result of closer family contacts contributed to the successful working process and daily life. It is significant that there are more than 400 thousand children born as a result of mixed marriages.

Third, internationalism and tolerance relating to other peoples should be mentioned. As a whole, this feature is inherent in the Russian character historically. Representatives of many peoples lived always on the territories populated by the Russians, who maintained friendly contacts with them. This attitude is of special significance under conditions of Kazakhstan with Turkic-language population. It was of particular significance to ensure tolerance and respect to the Kazakhs on the part of the Russians. The risen tolerance is characteristic also to the Kazakh people. The nomads traveled for many centuries from one territory to another one and had to keep friendly relations with the local population.

Fourth, of great significance is the responsible attitude to service obligations. One should take into account that direct nationalism and open enmity to the Russians did not, is not and will not exist. However, the representatives of the authorities being members of the indigenous ethnos may have merely more attentive attitude to the Russians, formulating the demands about working hours, diligence in work. At present, in case of failure of a given worker or official to observe the demands of the administration the person may be fired or discharged. It is a common secret that most high officials in Kazakhstan are Kazakhs, who know Russian as a state language, although many of them do not

speak Russian, having received education abroad. The relations among relatives are much closer among Kazakhs than among Russians, and Kazakhs are almost obliged to help their relatives to get a job even if this relative is not qualified for it. The question is not the display of nationalism: the Kazakhs, representatives of another zhuz may also become subjects to this “pressure” of the administration. (Zhuz literally translated from Turkic means “a hundred”. In a figurative sense this word is regarded as “hundred relatives”, represented in Kazakhstan by three zhuzes: “the senior”, “the medium” and “the junior”. Sometimes zhuz is understood as a “clan”, and several dozens of them exist in the republic. For instance, zhuz Argyn numbers over three million representatives, who consider themselves relatives.) The recent period of almost twenty years of development of market relations in Kazakhstan started to break the tribal stereotypes and a more evident new orientation in the cadre policy is being effected concerning education, period and experience of work as well as professionalism. However, the process develops slower than one wishes it. Therefore an additional need of higher motivation in life, adherence to principles in the course of fulfillment of working obligations, in forming and keeping the image of probity at work are being developed by the Russians.

Fifth, the issue of Orthodox Christian religiousness is worth being discussed following the repudiation of religious prohibition after collapse of the Soviet power. This process had its specificity in Kazakhstan. At present, two religions successfully exist in the republic: Islam and Orthodoxy. Both of them are permitted by law. Although the secular state exists in Kazakhstan, the interest to religiousness is stimulated privately. The social status of the clergy grows, the religious education is appreciated, the religious rites are performed freely and the religious symbols are sold and used without restriction. The rebirth of

religiousness in the republic is going on according to the ethnic type: the Kazakhs are Muslims, while the Russians are Orthodox Christians. It should be noted that professing of other religions (Krishnaism, scientology, Bakhai and others) and adherence to sectarianism (particularly Muslim) is disapproved publicly. The adoption by the Kazakhs of Christianity (more often) and by the Russians – of Islam is criticized mildly. It seems that under these conditions the Russian Orthodox Church in the RK (in a modern way) starts to acquire also the status of the center-club for maintenance of contacts in daily life.

The sixth, it is worth mentioning the language “dumbness”. The Kazakh language is being dispersed in daily life contacts and in business. The attempts to accelerate the mass teaching the Kazakh language among representatives of other ethnic groups of the population came to grief. They were made without any systemic foundation and the corresponding education preparation. Of great significance is the social-psychological factor. The Russian language is in greater demand than the Kazakh language in personal contacts, in education, in mass media. It is no secret that the Russian TV and radio programs are more popular, despite the law, which demands that 50% of them should be televised and broadcast in the Kazakh language and 50% – in the Russian Language. The greater number of the Russian people is older than 30 and even 40 years, and at such age it is more difficult to master the Kazakh language. Besides, the motivation for study the language of the indigenous nation is rather low, since in daily life particularly in cities the Russian language is used more frequently than the Kazakh language. The stimulus to study the Kazakh language for the sake of carrier does exist, but it is difficult to do it because of wide use of the Russian language. Therefore it is difficult for the Russians to get some administrative-political posts. For the Turkic language ethnoses groups (Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Turks, Uigurs,

Dungans and others) the way of social communication is much more accessible. Formerly, in offices and enterprises the Russian language was widely used by people of different nationalities, and it was done partially thanks to the respect to the Russians, who did not speak the Kazakh language. At present, the Kazakhs and the Turks speak the Kazakh language, while the Russians try to master the oral Kazakh without great success and get into the situation of “half-dumbness”, which results in uniting themselves more closely. Of great significance is the fact that this situation does not result in a splash of nationalism in daily life. And what is more, it caused the following situation: the Russian speaking parents started more often to place their children to crèche and kindergarten with the Kazakh speaking educators with the hope that their children will learn the Kazakh oral language and will not grow “dumb” like their parents. It is another sign that not all Russians intend to leave the republic.

The process of dissemination of the Kazakh language in the republic will grow on: first, thanks to the higher birth rate in the indigenous population, particularly in the rural districts; second, thanks to the continued resettlement of the Kazakh speaking people from Mongolia, China, Iran and Turkey.

The processes of restructure and modernization in time of crisis decrease the chances of employment particularly in rural districts of the country and further promote migration of the rural population (mainly of the Kazakh youth) to the cities raising the percentage of the Kazakh speaking people. The share of the Russian population, probably, will decrease. Consequently, the significance of the Kazakh language and way of life will grow, while the sense of ethnic discomfort on the part of the Slavonic people and the Russian speaking people in Kazakhstan will exist. The low birth rate, the high mortality and insignificant tempos of natural increase of population are characteristic for the

Russians. The coefficient of birth rate of the Russian ethnos is lower than the average republican rate by 1.7 times, while the dearth rate is higher by 1.4 times. The average age of the Russians in Kazakhstan makes 45–47 years comparing with 25 years of the Kazakhs, and the longevity of the Russians accounts for 60 years.

At the same time, the majority of the Russian contingent would like to live in Kazakhstan. This fact is one of the reasons of the mass support given by them to the president Nazarbayev, who publicly declares the European principles of international policy, has agreed to create the Custom Union jointly with Russia and Belarus, often makes visits to Moscow; it is a tradition of Russian presidents to make one of their first official visits to the RK.

About four million Russians (the exact number of them was not shown by the population census in 2009) intend to remain citizens of Kazakhstan. A lot of talk relates to positive features in life of the Russians (also assertions that they allegedly are “wealthier” than the Kazakhs). However, revelation of acute problems is always more significant. It makes it possible to notice the painful points and in good time to take measures to avoid conflicts particularly in the sphere of inter-national relations, where there no victors.

Why some Russians leave the republic today? It is difficult for them to be employed according to the profession (the diploma), and the risk to lose it is high. They are worried about the destiny of their children, about their education and carrier. The prices go up for all items. They have to pay a lot for education, while the medical treatment is characterized by low quality. As a whole, it is not the specific of Kazakhstan. They still have hopes that it will be better for them in Russia (Russian mass media are accessible in the RK and contribute to it). According to some views, the Russians in the RK have not attained their new identity, are unable to consider themselves as a united group,

although the movement “Lad”, the Russian Community and the Cossacks in particular have become organizations marked by the national status. The Cossacks in Kazakhstan represent a special phenomenon of great significance thanks to their traditional agrarian-military way of living, close contacts with Cossacks of Russia and potential readiness for forceful actions. However, the behavior of the Cossacks is not typical for all Russians living in Kazakhstan.

At present, the Russians living in Kazakhstan seem to differ from their Russian compatriots in terms of history and culture. They have their own interests, specific socialization and the way of living. Therefore they should continue to look for their local identity and to develop it, they should recognize that they differ from the Russians living in Russia, and it is possible that morally and psychologically they are closer to the Kazakhs than they thought themselves up to the present time. It is significant for them to master all forms of education (including abroad, in Russia), various professions. Despite emerging (sometimes negative) events, all the above said will let the Russians, even under conditions of the crisis, of the complicated period of modernization, of gradually decreased quantity of the population, keep the high social-political status and the role of informal representatives of the “fourth” zhuz, who have been inherent in the country for more than one hundred fifty years.

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**THE SPECIFICS OF POLITICAL CULTURE
OF WOMEN IN CENTRAL ASIA
(THE EXAMPLE OF TURKMENISTAN)**

The urgency of the theme is determined by the need of developing political culture as one of the most significant conditions of social-political progress of society. The profound reformations for the last 10-15 years in various spheres of society stipulated the changes in public-political and state order in the countries of Central Asia. The formation of new institutions of the state power and the essential change of its characteristic as well as consolidation of self-dependent system of local self-government relating to the state makes it possible to speak actually about reanimation of policy in post-Soviet countries of Central Asia. This factor, like many other factors, creates the need to study the dynamics of the power, its correlation with politics and the reciprocal influence within the framework of the whole social system.

In the contemporary situation marked by the active role of politics in daily life of great significance is the process of taking into account the role and place of political culture in public life, its impact on civil position of the population. The study of historic development of society, of its present state lets reveal its specifics, which have been inherited and which are reflected in its political culture.

The activities of women are of great significance in the political transformation of contemporary society. The political culture of women plays an important role in stabilization of social-political life of the state, solving regional and ethnic-political problems as well as utilizing its peacemaking potential. The situation of women in society is a historic phenomenon, i.e. it is subject to development and change in due course. The consolidation and development of women's situation

depends on the chances given to them by society. At the same time, it is considered that just the changing situation of women reflects the level of genuine democracy in one or other country. The dynamics of development of contemporary democratic society, the growing number of problems under conditions of its transformation raise the demand that women should display initiative, look for new forms, means and technologies in order to have influence on social-political processes in the country.

The studies made by various international centers demonstrate as follows: the participation of women in the sphere of governance at all levels represents the factor of stabilization. In the countries characterized by the considerable (30-40%) participation of women in the power structures, the society is marked by more stable development and greater social orientation, primarily in the field of employment, education, health care and child's protection, protection of environment, nature and peace.

For many centuries of its history the Turkmen people deified women. At all times, the Turkmen women experienced maternity happiness and felt their high status in society. In 1885 historian N.Latkin described the position of Turkmen women as follows: "The Tekin woman is not a slave of his husband, like in other parts of Muslim Asia, but a citizen enjoying full rights, having civil and political rights equal to her husband. She does not hide her face by a shawl (chadra), she has a rather great influence not only in family but also in public affairs: her opinion is taken into account like opinions of others. In this relation, Turkmen have come greater forward comparing with other peoples of Asia and Europe".

Actually, no public significant historic event occurred without participation of women. The movement of women in Turkmenistan is connected with all stages of history passed by the whole Turkmen

people. For the 1920s, the first women clubs appeared and the women meetings were held; the movement of the first women activists was formed. For the Soviet time, the women organizations copied to a large extent the work of party and trade union organs: they listened to the reports, noted shortcomings and sometimes took to task.

The traditional image of eastern woman is associated primarily with the role of mother and faithful wife, keeper of family hearth, moral and cultural values and acquires more democratic contours in the channel of the world civilization's trends. Of great significance is the fact that Islam has no influence on realization of rights, qualities and chances of women of Turkmenistan and that there are no limitations of women's activities within the framework of religious traditions.

The sphere of women's activities formerly reduced to upbringing of children, house keeping, needlework and handicraft, was extended. Given development of education system and the sphere of social insurance, the women assumed the leading role over there, which, in its turn, enlarged the framework of their activities – from exclusively the family economic to the state-public sphere. The founding basis of this change is the Constitution of independent Turkmenistan, which provides for women the rights equal to the men's rights in all spheres: political, cultural and social. The timely complete and true statistical data on the situation of women and on gender differences play an important role in elimination of the existing stereotypes and in achievement the gender equality.

The Code of Turkmenistan on marriage and family guarantees all married women of equal and joint decision with the husband the questions of upbringing children and solving family problems. The married woman is free in the choice of occupation, profession and place of residence. The family situation has an influence on demographic indexes, such as mortality, migration, education and economic

activities. According to the census of the population, 62% of women older than 16 years are married, 12% – are widows, 22% are single and less than 4% are divorced. The share of married women is higher in rural districts than in city settlements, which has an impact on their reproductive activity. Of significance for the situation of a woman is her age of marriage, since it is closely connected with her reproductive activity. The average age of the first marriage in Turkmenistan is optimal – 22.4 years.

The literacy of women in Turkmenistan makes 99.9% of literacy level of men. The level of education of women, city residents is much higher than the level of education of women in rural areas. It is connected mainly with greater disposition of the women as rural residents to the family and house keeping. For the period of 1992-1998, despite potential chances, there existed the trend to reduction of the number and of the share of women in higher education and high education institutions. It could have an impact on the level of their education, since it is a common knowledge that the level of education is connected with the problems of health care and development of women. The reduction of the number of students in these education institutions is not connected with discrimination of women but is the result of abrogation of external students' education and the evening forms of education as non-efficient, as well as due to reduction of places for the full-time tuition.

Some changes have been made also in professional orientation of women. The share of women increased in 1995 among students of the higher education institutions in the following special spheres: industry and construction, transport and communication, agriculture, health care, physical culture and sport. At the same time, the share of women decreased among the students of higher education institutions in the sphere of economy and law, education, arts and cinema. In other words,

the professional training of women in the country acquired a natural and technical trend, which, according to international practice, should promote higher remuneration. Of significance was the fact, that since 1997 the share of the state expenses in GNP resumed its growth. At the same time, the objective became urgent to define the needs of economy in specialists and their training in higher education institutions of the country for the mid-term and long-term perspectives. It concerned women as well.

The training of specialists was arranged to ensure women a chance to represent the country on the international arena. The share of girls makes 40% in the department of law and international relations in Mukhmutkuli Turkmen State University. Approximately the same number of girls study international relations and international law and economics in the Turkmen Institute of People's Economy. The great part of training consists of learning foreign languages, computer literacy and utilization of new technologies.

In Turkmenistan women equally with men have access to owing land and to getting credits and loans. The women take active part in economic activities of society. Under conditions of transition to the market relations, one of the main motives in economic activities of women is their striving for realization of their professional capacity, for getting jobs corresponding to educational and professional qualification level and allowing the rise of the family budget and financial independence and in this way consolidating their social and political status.

In 1997, the share of women in the amount of economically active population accounted for 46%. At present, the share of women has got closer to the share of men -70%

(and without counting the number of women engaged in housekeeping). The changes in the structure of women's employment

take place under conditions of economic reforms. The share of women employees in the enterprises of different forms of property (the so called formal sector) accounted for 38% in 1989, 30% – in 1995, and was marked by oscillatory movements within the limit of 32-41%, while at present this index makes 44%.

If in the beginning of the transitional period the share of women in the state sector of economy was reduced for some extent, since 1997 up to present in the small and mid-size business the share of women has grown twice, while the share of men was reduced. In other words, the process of as though ousting men by women from the sphere of entrepreneurship is seen in Turkmenistan. The greater share in the total number of small enterprises (in small business) accounts for the spheres of economy, such as trade, industry and services. The greater number of women is engaged in small enterprises, primarily in the sphere of services (46%) and in industry (30%) The employment of women in mid-size business (in cooperatives) in industry made 48% and in services accounted for 41%.

The reduced production in the state sector has an impact primarily on women, since the state is the biggest employer of women occupied in the formal sector of economy. The conditions of work and the social guarantees are higher, while the gender differences in payment are smaller in the state sector than in the private sector. At the same time, in Turkmenistan there are no legal restrictions for women with high level of education and professional training to have the same access as the access of the men to the employment in new private enterprise. Nevertheless, the women's employment traditionally is concentrated in the so called “women” professions, which usually are less profitable and less prestigious. The share of women employed in the industries of material production is less than 50% of the total employees, while in some economy's branches (like transport and

construction) it is less than one fifth of the employed people. More than one half of office employees and service people consist of women, while this trend is characteristic for both state sector of economy and for the enterprises belonged to the small and mid-size business.

On the contrary, in the offices of the non-industrial branches, such as health care, education etc., the trends in women employment differs from other branches of economy. For instance, 60% of working women are employed in the state sector (health care, education and science, culture). At the same time, the share of women of the staff in the prestigious spheres, such as finances, crediting and insurance made from 38% to 40% for the period of 1997-1999 and accounts for 42% at present.

The state sector, where the level of remuneration for work is higher than its general level, even in traditional “women” branches, such as health care and education, the share of women among employees in 1999 was 40%, while today it is 45%. The attraction of women to more dynamic spheres and branches of economy is quite evident. The more so, the high level of education and professional training to a large extent condition striving of women for hired labor. According to statistics, the education level of women engaged in economic activities in Turkmenistan surpasses the level of education possessed by men. Only 18% of men occupied in economic branches have higher education comparing with 21% of women, who have it; over 2/3 of men have high and incomplete high education, while 46% of women have it.

Under conditions of existing family traditions, when the women assume all forms of care for children (the birth rate in Turkmenistan is one of the highest in the world) they turn out to be in less advantageous position than the men, who are able to devote their full attention and energy to their professional activities. Therefore “the triple burden” of

women at work (industrial, social and reproductive) may be the reason of their higher share in non-prestigious and less paid professions comparing with the share of men. The existing statistical data does not let determine the gender differences in incomes, including payments for work. This information may be received in materials of sample surveys relating to households. According to the Statistical Committee of Turkmenistan, the housekeeping headed by a woman has higher economic status than the housekeeping headed by a man.

In Turkmenistan the woman has the right to participate in state governance bodies. The women occupy the key posts not only in the education system and the health care system, in mass media and organs of culture but also in the law enforcement bodies and in the government. At present, two women occupy posts in the high echelons of power of Turkmenistan: the chairman of the parliament and the deputy head of the government. The representation of women in the parliament is the basic and systemic criteria, since it demonstrates the specifics of the party systems and the attitude of the parties to programs of gender development. Being half of the mankind, the women traditionally represent a social minority in politics and do not have impact on taking decisions on financial issues, problems of economic development and distribution of resources, on the state security.

In the world women occupy only 14% of the posts in governing structures, 6% of the posts of ministers and not more than 10% of them are members of the parliament. Although women display evident activity at the elections, their political representation is marked by a very slow progress. In 1995 only 10% of members of parliaments were women, and the same number was registered in 1970. The number of women, members of parliaments reduced rather greatly in the countries of the Eastern Europe, including Russia: from 25% in 1989 to 8% in 1995. Almost in 100 countries-members of the United Nations

Organization there are no women, elected to the parliaments. In the parliament of Turkmenistan the number of women makes 16%. According to United Nations, this number exceeds the corresponding data in the following countries: Azerbaijan (11.3%), Kazakhstan (10.4%), Georgia (9.4%), Ukraine (8.7%) and Armenia (5.3%). The dynamics of the number of women, deputies of Turkmen parliament, was as follows: the first convocation – 9 women, the second convocation – 13 women, at the elections for the parliament of the third convocation (19.12.2004) – 23 women in the course of the elections claimed to occupy 50 places in the parliament. In 1998 women made 8% of the members of the Peoples Assembly; in 2003 women accounted for 12.3% out of 65 elected deputies. At present the share of women makes 14% of the members of the Peoples Assembly.

The influence of women on activities of the trade unions of Turkmenistan is rather great. The post of the Deputy of the National Trade Union Center is occupied by a woman; the leaders of two (out of five) regional trade union organizations are women, and 45% of local trade union organizations are headed by women. In the Central Election Committee 53% of its members are women. In the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan 37.9% of its membership consists of women, while 30% of members of the Political Council of this party are women. The composition of Khalk Maslakhaty (the Peoples Council) is marked by the fact that 30% of its members are women. The trend to the growing number of women in participation in governance of the country is quite evident. For instance, in 1992 the share of women in the general number of officials in the organs of governing made 39%, while at present this number increased up to 42%. The quota for women in the parliament is fixed by 18%. More than 60 women occupy the key posts in the parliament and the government of the country, in its law

enforcement bodies, at the diplomatic service, in the system of education, health care, social insurance and in mass media.

At the same time, the share of women occupied in the organs of state governing in Turkmenistan is lower than the average data. The general share, including the elected state heads and governing heads of central banks, makes 4% (the average index for the world makes 7%, while the index for the developed industrial countries accounts for 13%). However, it should be taken into account that usually in Asian countries the level of participation of women in taking state decisions outside house keeping is lower than in other countries. It is connected with both national specifics and with greater orientation of Asian women to the family and the children.

The main indexes relating to the situation of women and gender differences in development of Turkmenistan show that a certain progress was achieved in various fields. The rights and liabilities of women, like other categories of citizens of Turkmenistan, are fixed in the Constitution of the country, which provides women and men with equal rights in all spheres of economy, state affairs, in cultural and public-political life. The women of Turkmenistan have more rights and benefits than the men. It concerns protection of maternity, conditions of work, sphere of small business, pensions etc.

The most influential women's organization is the Union of Women of Turkmenistan, which numbers about one million members. The highest organ of the women's organization is its Congress composed of the delegates empowered by its territorial branches. The Central Committee and the Chairman of the Union are elected by the Congress and are in charge of its activities. The women's non-governmental organizations represent the basis of the forming in the country civil society. The radical changes in life of society resulted in changes of the activities of women's organizations.

The women's social centers created at the initiative of the Union of Women of Turkmenistan contribute to development and realization of initiatives on the part of the women's movement. The first social centers were established in 1998, and at present 30 centers exist in the country. Most of them perform their activities as the women's information-resource centers. Their main mission consists in promotion of the principle of gender equality and in improvement of reproductive health of the population. They take actions in order to prevent the spread of unhealthy habits, conduct propaganda of gender equality at the level of family. They utilize in their work various forms and methods, such as rendering consultative, educational and practical assistance. For the nearest perspective, they are faced with preservation of the achieved gains and to take measures directed to further reduction of gender differences in development of men and women.

At present, the women of Turkmenistan support and actively participate in the process of national rebirth, in carrying out the policy of friendship and peace. All this demonstrates political and working activity of the Turkmen women, of evolution of their traditional image in the contemporary democratic world, their readiness for participation in solving problems of the state.

The growing interest to the problem of development of women's political culture is also determined by the fact that today the women come forward as a significant political force. They are able to have direct and indirect influence on all social-political processes, on the characteristic, content, direction and results of the social-economic and political development of the country. It is impossible today to solve the problems confronting the state without due account of their interests and their capacity. They quite often express the opinion in mass media that up to the XX century the world was the world of men, but that today (the present time of our life) "the era of women" has set in. The

issue is subject to discussion, but it is evident that in the contemporary world the woman occupies a significant place, if this society is oriented to high humanistic values.

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REVOLUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE NORTH AFRICA: POLITICAL PRAGMATISM AND «CONTROLLED CHAOS» TECHNOLOGY

The wave of recent revolutionary events in the North Africa successfully dismantled a set of political regimes, which seemed to be absolutely stable and unshakable, and this wave of events was marked by some peculiar features.

First, all of them were developing (in case of Libya continue to develop) according to the same scenario, or “revolutionary” pattern, which was similar to the scenario of “colored revolutions”.

Second, “revolutions” in various states of the North Africa started almost simultaneously, and this factor actually always excludes any element of fortuitousness and supposes a high level of coordination (in time) from a foreign “revolutionary center” or the fact of the special operation thoroughly planned by external forces.

Third, “the fire” putting into political chaos the most stable and “European” country (Tunis) was caused by the insignificant ground: self-immolation of a local resident. Nevertheless, immediately it was a signal for the start of a mutiny in the whole country. At the same time, arrangement of a mutiny is practically impossible without previous

preparation, recruitment of fighters and accumulation in the zone of the prepared conflict of big financial and material resources.

Fourth, “the fire of revolution” covered the North African countries in the strict order one by one, and it makes one think about evident selection: Tunis-Egypt-Libya-Syria, Bahrain-Yemen etc. At the same time, Algeria, Morocco and other African countries characterized by the same social problems and “conservatism” of political regimes were left aside.

Fifth, “the revolutions” in the North Africa and in the Near East are characterized by one other key element of “colored revolutions” technology: the mechanism of reverse connection, which is obligatorily utilized in any special operation. Its essence is as follows: the initial scenario of “the revolution” is tested as an example in one country, and further is corrected (by means of reverse connection) and as the following action is staged in another country mentioned in the list. This method makes it possible to take into account in good time and to correct mistakes of the original scenario, to adapt it to the specifics of the region. This is the versatility of contemporary technologies of “colored revolutions”, and at the same time it is their main indication, which makes it possible to decamouflage them.

Finally, all “revolutions” in the countries of the North Africa are marked by the strange absence of the necessary component of any revolution – the revolutionary ideology. At the same time, the genuine revolutionaries are idealists: the lofty ideals (freedom, equality, brotherhood and justice) or the ideas of national-liberation movements. The Arabic “revolutions” have nothing of the kind: the heterogeneous protest movement quickly transforms into “the political mob”, which pursues its main aim – to overthrow the existing legal power and to arrange disturbances. The people’s wrath is personified and is not directed against the political system. The aim of such revolution is

reduced to put to power new people, who are not better than the old rulers but have a romantic image of “revolutionaries”, who have not rendered services to the country and appeared on the national arena at the last moment in the atmosphere of political chaos. For any world leaders interested in the given region this is the best moment to put their protégé to power.

The lack of revolutionary ideology, strange as it is, reveals in the events in the North Africa the typical Anglo-Saxon method of special psychological operations. The technologies of “colored revolutions” have been tested in dozens of countries, including states of Central Asia with Muslim population. The British and the Americans, as is known, made an attempt to arrange “the green revolution” in Iran. However, contrary to the countries oriented to the western liberal values and psychology of individualism, the banal ideology of “colored revolutions” does not operate in traditional eastern societies: in the East, where still exists the communal and tribal way of life, the interests of individual are nothing, while interests of the community means everything.

The individual in the East does not ever realize himself outside his community: if he separates himself from the community, he will fall into oblivion and finally will perish as a citizen. At the same time, the community gives a lot to the individual, namely, primarily support and protection, which often surpasses the probable protection of the individual on the part of the liberal state. In the East freedom is comprehended in a different way than in the West: it is not the personal freedom of bans and restrictions but the freedom to use chances and resources of the community in order to bring to the community and finally to the given individual greater flourishing. In this context the ideology of colored revolutions carries direct threat to freedom of the individual and his relatives living in traditional eastern society. Shortly

speaking, the western slogan “freedom” does not find response in the East.

The meaning of justice in the traditional eastern societies is also determined by the formula: as justified is the phenomenon, which brings fortune to the community. In the internal policy it is expressed in the urge towards high state posts for representatives of his clan, which, besides, does not differ actually from the internal political struggle among the biggest families: Kennedy, Bush and others. The principle of the people’s representation is reduced to the tribal, clannish or communal representation; the traditional custom and rules of behavior adopted by the communes being at power are spread to the whole internal state policy in order to consolidate it and to make it sustainable against any external actions. The western slogan asserting that justice should be expressed in the right of everybody to govern the country causes in the East a genuine misunderstanding.

Leaving aside the version on the full spontaneous and accidental characteristic of “revolutions” in Tunis, Egypt and other states of the North Africa and the Near East (which has the right for existence), it is worth supposing that the events in the countries of Maghrib occurred not by accident and were ordered by the external customer. In this case some key questions appear instantly:

-how these “revolutions” were realized and which schemes, models and technologies were used;

-who is the real customer and executor of “revolutions” in the North Africa and the Near East;

-what genuine aims are pursued by “revolutions” and what is the main aim of the going on events and why for achieving this aim it was necessary to explode the whole African North characterized by stability and sustainability of the ruling political regimes.

Models of Control Over International Conflicts

The contemporary international conflicts, despite their seemed unique and unpredictable character, possess the big similarity and develop according to the same conformity of natural laws making it possible to predict their further development and consider these conflicts as an object of external development, to introduce such notions as the field of conflicts, to formulate their generalized and statistical characteristics. The contemporary conflicts may and should be controlled proceeding from their common appropriateness of emergence, evolution and solution. The perception of international conflicts as a purely individual and not prognosticated phenomena leads to the tardy and inefficient reaction to the fact and to the practice of political improvisations.

In contemporary conflicts the technologies of information-psychological impact are utilized within the framework of four dominant cultural-civilizational models: Anglo-Saxon, East-Asian, Near-Eastern (Islamic) and Roman-German (West-European) models, which urge towards transformation of political systems of the conflict's parties according to their own picture of the world. Today, all these models efficiently function in the zones of international conflicts avoiding disagreements among themselves and often mutually supplementing each other. Their efficiency in peaceful settlement of conflicts lets regard these models as a real alternative to forceful peacemaking, which at present is being actively advanced by western political propaganda to the sphere of international relations.

The Anglo-Saxon model considers that the settlement of conflicts will be achieved by the complete forceful transformation of political systems of the conflicting parties, exactly of the opponent, who should accept the political norms and standards of the Anglo-Saxon civilization ("democratic institutions"). Traditionally the Anglo-Saxon

model includes both methods of forceful pressure (“forceful peacemaking”, “humanitarian interventions”, “struggle against international terrorism”) and methods of non-forceful impact (“soft force”, “velvet revolutions”, “psychological war”). The Anglo-Saxon model is based on the world outlook of Protestantism and the ethic of success, the benefit derived from the final result.

The East-Asian model proceeds from the purpose of settlement of the conflict situation in the course of gradual and long-term incorporation (integration) of political systems and values of conflicting parties, opponents in its own system of political relations (for instance, Taiwan problem, “restoration” of Hong-Kong: “one country – two systems”), gradually dissolving in its system the national identity of political systems of weaker participants. It is the common knowledge of disappearance of some peoples and ethnic groups in China as a result of the long-term assimilation (Manchurs, Dinlins, representatives of the Tashtyk culture, and other barbarians).

The Near-Eastern (Islamic) model regards the process of settlement of conflicts as a transfer, projection of historic and traditional Islamic mechanisms of regulation of social-political relations to the zones of conflicts *inter alia* by means of extension of the area of Islamic world and by dissemination of influence of Islamic ideology. The division of the world according to the religious principle restores the spirit of religious wars, jihad, which includes both the peaceful means of settlement of international conflicts and the armed struggle for the faith. The Shiite trend of Islam, which is dominant in Iran, lacks any appeals for jihad against “the unfaithful”, and what is more, the leaders of the country make proposals on the inter-civilizations’ dialogue, come forward for the search for mutual understanding between Christian and Muslim countries and peoples not by means of

repudiation of values' aims but by the way of acceptance (exchange) of cultural and technological achievements.

The Roman-German model based on its civilization's and political ethic, according to some authors, is burdened by stereotypes, the set of "common" or generally obligatory ethic perceptions, which do not always coincide with the perceptions of other civilizations. Therefore, for instance, it is difficult to arrange the dialogues of the French and German representatives with the Chinese participants of the dialogues: "the forums are held but the dialogues are not arranged". In this connection the Roman-German model proceeds from the perception that the process of settlement of the conflicting situation consists in the change of views of its participants mainly by means of acceptance of the consolidated and dominant in this civilization ethic norms and stereotypes. This model of psychological ascendancy over the conflicts does not set the task by means of direct interference of changing political systems of its parties but urges towards the control over consciousness of political ruling elites in the states-participants of the conflict, as well as over consciousness of various strata of the local population and of the international public circles, and induces them to perceive the conflict according to the conflict's image proposed to them, i.e. to comprehend it in the same way like the European community.

The Anglo-Saxon model is realized by the U.S.A. and its allies in their policy carried out in the form of psychological operations, when utilization of direct armed force is regarded as a service given to technologies of information-psychological control over mass and individual consciousness of the population both in the zones of international conflicts and outside them. The model of such operation consists of the consecutive phases: political stratification of society, political polarization of the strata, controlled behavioral reaction (on the

bases of known psychological technique of “anchor”) and psychological correction of some groups of the population and the targeted auditoria based on the principle of reverse connection.

Usage of psychological “anchor” technique becomes particularly dangerous under conditions of ethnic-political conflicts: many varieties of mass psychological states shaped for the period of development of national self-consciousness, including transitional and aggressive states, have been already put in ethnic memory and practically in the unchanged way unconsciously (i.e. at the level of collective subconsciousness) are transferred from one generation to another generation. There is no need to form them for adaptation to the specific psychological operation. The well known historic mechanisms for initiation of these states were frequently used with success in historic practice of inter-national conflicts: in order “to switch” the population of some ethnic enclave from psychological state of peaceful good neighborhood to the state of unmotivated aggression it was sufficient only to adapt slightly the format of psychological impulse initiating the psychological mechanism of “the states’ switch”, characteristic for the given ethnus, to the contemporary conditions. Exactly these psychological devices and technologies were displayed exclusively clearly in the course of “date revolutions” in the North Africa.

Technologies of Political Overturns and “Controlled Chaos”

The methods and technologies, which make it possible to split rallied traditional societies into separate fragments putting society into the state of disintegration and political chaos submitting to its laws, are called the technologies of “controlled chaos”. At present, many experts and observers see the application of exactly these technologies in the North Africa and the Near East. American strategist, diplomat and

political analyst Steven Mann is one of the authors of “the theory of controlled chaos”, which is popular in the West. The essence of the proposed conception is as follows. The objective of any special psychological operation consists in ensuring the voluntary submission of the person, who represents a certain interest, to utilize his services later freely and without limits for the operation’s interests as an inanimate instrument, resource and consumed material. It is rather easy to achieve this result in western liberal societies, where every citizen is an individual, who in his life pursues exclusively personal objectives, although he enjoys some support and protection of the state, mainly struggles and survives being alone. It is rather easy psychologically to break such individual and “to re-program” to any stereotype of political behavior, including the so called “democratic” stereotype, since no person and even the strongest personality is able to withstand the pressure of the system and the applied technologies of psychological persuasion and compulsion. Therefore in the societies of the West there are popular and efficient numerous technical devices of hidden manipulation, “brains’ washing out” and reflexive control, while the sects rather easily recruit adepts and indoctrinate them. In order to get an adept it is necessary to break his personal protective natural barriers provided to him by birth for protection of his psychic from negative external ascendancy and to replace his system by its own system of values.

The situation in traditional societies with collective subjectivity is different. Over there, the individual deeply integrated in society, in clan, kin or tribe is protected by this society from any negative psychological influence, including the most powerful one. To oppose the negative influence or any form of information aggression any member of this society may count and base on the resources of the whole society and on assistance of any its member, and therefore it is

not easy to break him. It is necessary to break the external line of defense – the traditional structure of society's construction and to put society into political chaos, which deprives any person in its maelstrom of collective support and converts him into the individual, who is concerned only about affairs of his personal survival. The model of bringing society in chaos is simple: the political coup or the armed mutiny accompanied by powerful information-propaganda campaign to discredit traditional values. Such process will lead to a fast “atomization” of the closed traditional society with collective subjectivity in the foundation of its structure, which as a result will “open” and mix it. As a result of destruction of traditional custom and devaluation of values there will emerge ideological vacuum, which should instantly be filled with ideology specially worked out by the producers of “revolutions”. The change of values under conditions of chaos will occur imperceptibly: any person, who is torn away from his traditional way of life and has lost support of his family or clan, will seize any ideological conception guaranteeing his survival. The change of system of values in society under conditions of chaos ensures voluntary submission of all his members and transforms society into the obedient instrument of realization of foreign policy interests of another state. The chaos becomes a controlled process.

The theory of chaos is added to dynamic systems with many moving components and represents in essence a new unlined planning of events in complicated schemes. Mann himself defines this conception as a real revolution, which forms new approaches to the military strategy, while its impact may change both the characteristic of the war and etalons of strategic thinking. Structure and stability are within the evident chaotic and unlined processes, according to the American strategist. The key role is plaid by the starting parameters,

since, to the mind of the author of the conception, such “chaotic” systems show subtle dependence on the original conditions.

In accordance with this theory, the voluntary submission of the countries of the North Africa to the interests of a foreign state demands the previous mixture of clans and communities uniting their population, i.e. the present traditional social system existing in the North Africa should be demolished and mixed. Exactly this process is going on in the states, which have become victims of “the new revolutionary wave”.

Probable Customers, Authors and Organizers

The certain words and declarations of the authors of “colored revolutions”, “controlled chaos” and conception of “Great Near East” indicate probable customers, authors and organizers of “date revolutions”. All of them are citizens of the U.S.A. The authors of conception “Great Near East” assert that the contemporary Islamic world represents a new form of Fascism and point out that Fascism plays without rules, and therefore it is possible to gain victory in the struggle against it only with the assistance of the analogous Fascism – by extremely rigid and aggressive actions, which defy some basic norms of democracy for the sake of “good” intentions. They directly mention the countries of the North Africa and the Near East, where events of “date revolutions” take place, which are regarded as a kernel of the Islamic world representing a threat to democratic world.

These states, due to the form of their existence, are not ready for acceptance of American values, since their social order represents a community, a clan and a tribe with dominant ethnic factor. Against this background, in most these countries there were built secular political regimes headed by the authoritarian irremovable leader and marked by rigid hierarchy and often by state of emergency, supported by the army and secret service as the main guarantees of keeping order and united

ideology. The political form of these national states is characterized by the authoritarian rigid vertical power and a clearly expressed ideological basis.

The political authoritarian regimes demonstrating superficial loyalty to the U.S.A. did not let the outside world include completely the controlled by them territories to the global social network. All this hindered the activities of the American institutions of development of civil society in these countries; the formal loyalty of many political regimes created additional limitations compelling them to take into account the position and views of these political regimes.

Probably, it is high time to change radically the situation shaped for the last decades. It is known that in case of coup d'etat a new power comprising in general dubious elements, almost unknown to the world community, will be concerned primarily about its own international recognition and will be ready to waive any national interests for the sake of it. Consequently, such leadership will be much more compliant in solving key political and economic problems. It will be possible to reconsider economic agreements and to amend them for the benefit of the external power in exchange for insignificant political overtures to a new power.

The process of changes in the North Africa and partially Near East started just now, and the time of reconsideration of former agreements between some Arabic states and the U.S.A. (the authors of mentioned technologies), probably, has come. If exactly Washington is behind “the date revolutions”, the new formation of the map of the North Africa and the Near East may pursue two main aims.

Aims of “New Colored Revolutions”

The genuine aims of “date revolutions” in countries of the North Africa and the Near East are much deeper than the mere change of

political regimes and replacement of generally loyal but badly controlled (due to their continuous existence) authoritarian leaders of Arabic stated for puppets permanently dependent on the external political support. It is necessary to consider these “revolutions” not as regular internal civil conflicts but as events in the system of coordinates of global policy. In this system of coordinates the region of Maghrib is the point of crossed interests of the biggest world political forces, which made the North Africa to be a peculiar testing area and springboard for coming struggle for the whole African continent; and this struggle will be the greatest struggle after proclamation of independence by former colonies. This combat will become a new territorial and energy re-division for the black continent, to the mind of many analysts.

There are some most important reasons of strategic meaning of Africa for world economy, *inter alia* for geopolitical interests of the U.S.A. and China as the biggest players of the world market. The main of them is oil. The aggregate oil reserves of African countries make 16.6 billion tons (10% of the world reserves). By this index Africa is inferior only to the Near East and Eurasia. At the same time, new oil fields are registered annually. The leaders by the indicated reserves are as follows: Libya (5.7 billion tons), Nigeria (4.8 billion tons), Angola (1.8 billion tons), Alger (1.5 billion tons), Sudan (0.9 billion tons). The share of West Africa in the oil imported by the U.S.A. makes 15%, and this index will attain 25% for the nearest 25 years. The oil fields have been discovered on the shore of Angola, San-Tome, Gabon and Nigeria. The U.S.A. tries to reduce the energy dependence on the Near East; therefore for the last years Africa became a special object of American political interest.

The share of African countries in the Chinese oil import make about one third. Angola, having left behind Saudi Arabia, became the

main supplier of African oil to China. At the same time, the economy of the PRC to a great extent orients to African gas. The resources of gas account for 14.65 trillion cubic meters (7.9% of the world deposits). By the explored and blocked out reserves Nigeria and Alger (5.22 and 4.5 trillion cubic meters, correspondingly) are inferior in the world only to Russia, Iran, Qatar, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE but surpass such leading exporter of gas as Norway (2.91 trillion cubic meters). It should be mentioned that the PRC is the biggest partner of such Africa countries as Sudan, Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Democratic Republic of Congo.

The hydrocarbons are not the sole African natural resource needed by the PRC. It is interested in ores and metals: zinc, cobalt, copper, uranium and bauxite, which are imported from Zambia, Zimbabwe, UAR, DRC, Gabon and Morocco. The PRC itself has rather big reserves of non-ferrous metals, which mainly are not adapted for the artificial enrichment. The gap between the rise of demand for non-ferrous metals thanks to the industrial rapid growth of the PRC and the supply caused by the reduction of internal reserves may result in emergence of the significant problem for economy of the country.

Thus, today Africa and the Near East represent the crossing point of vital interests of two great powers – the U.S.A. and China, – which have been engaged in the irreconcilable struggle for access to the energy resources and political influence in the region. For Washington the Maghrib countries represent the key region on the world map; the control established over this region will make it possible to manage the global transit of hydrocarbons and other strategic resources for the biggest developing economics (primarily, China). The U.S.A. is left behind its main rival – China and becomes more dependent on its rapidly growing economic and political might. Under these conditions, Washington policy may try to keep under its control by any means the

big hydrocarbons' reserves, to prevent their deliveries to China and Europe in order to reduce their economic growth. One of the methods of attainment of this aim is the use of national separatist and extremist movements to destabilize the uncontrolled regions – the so called “controlled chaos”. At present, these technologies are used in countries of the North Africa and the Near East, where “date revolutions” occurred or still occur. This is the primary aim of the U.S.A. and the cause of “revolutionary” events in the region: it is not excluded that for the new leaders, who came to power by means of technologies of “colored revolutions” and “controlled chaos”, the following task will be formulated: to prevent (or greatly to reduce) export of energy carriers to China.

The second main aim of Washington may relate to the coming struggle for Africa and its energy resources as a whole. The African continent definitely presents a dainty pray, which will be a pretext for a new geopolitical division of the spheres of influence and the rivalry of great powers. The African continent is the youngest region of the world. The average age of its countries, except Ethiopia, is less than 40 years. The great majority of the states emerged after disintegration of the colonial system for the second half of the XX century. It is not excluded that in the nearest future the new political system will replace the colonial boundaries. The U.S.A. intends to play the key role in this new geopolitical reconstruction and advance the conception of new geopolitical entity – formation of “Great Near East”. The chain of “colored revolutions” in countries of North Africa and the Near East may become the first step on the way of its realization.

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