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CONTENTS

Vladimir Rimsky. Justice in Modern Russia: Dreams and Use in Social Practice.....	4
A. Mikhalyova. Islam in Arkhangelsk Region.....	11
Madina Aligadzhaeva. National Political Elite of Daghestan: Specifics of Formation and Functioning	14
V. Gadaev. Institute of the Caucasian Family: Some Peculiar Features of its Transformation	18
Oleg Chervinsky. Kazakhstan between Moscow and Beijing	28
D. Aleksandrov, I. Ippolitov, D. Popov. “Soft Power” as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Central Asia.....	35
Dina Malysheva. Secure Development of Central Asia and the Afghan Factor.....	48

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**JUSTICE IN MODERN RUSSIA: DREAMS
AND USE IN SOCIAL PRACTICE**

The notion “justice” has always been connected with relations between people, and this is why it can always be called social. Nevertheless, there is now a special notion in social practice called “social justice,” which is used for assessing the state of affairs in society rather than dealing with concrete social actions of some or other individuals.

The notion “justice” presupposes abstraction from concrete situations and individuals, which leads to endowment of individuals differing from one another with equal rights. Such formal equality of rights in social practice along with vast differences between individuals leads to unequal results of the use of these rights, or inability to ensure the result planned beforehand. On the contrary, “social justice” presupposes control over the results of the activity of individuals, and endowment of citizens with really unequal rights. This is why “justice” and “social justice” as the principles for evaluating social practices differ from, and sometimes even contradict, each other. Besides, in Russian society the meanings of justice essentially differ from one another in different social groups. These differences sometimes reach the degree of contradictions, which largely explain the difficulties to

reach consensus in understanding and applying the principle of justice in society.

There Is No Uniform Understanding of Justice

During the Soviet period the concept of justice was propagandized in our country on the basis of the well-known principle “From each according to his abilities to each according to his work.” This principle was included in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. of 1936.

There is consensus between practically all social groups of our country in adherence to this principle. But its application leads to different assessments of justice of labor relations in different social groups. Sometimes the determining criterion of the level of justice is the subjective evaluation by workers of the policy of the management of one or another enterprise. This conclusion can be made on the basis of comparing the data of sociological surveys in 1996–2004 which show the growing share of workers believing that their wages were unjust (from 36 to 58 percent).

Disproportions in the distribution of incomes support the ideas and views of most Russian citizens about injustice prevailing in our society. Eighty-three percent of Russian citizens maintain that differences in incomes are too great in the country. The overwhelming majority of them believe that those who work should earn more, but at the same time they maintain that their work should be more efficient. Some five persons of one hundred respondents answered that our citizens should tackle their problems themselves, but should not rely on help from the state, or that it was the employer who should mainly be concerned with the living conditions of the people he hired, but not the state.

Dreams of Justice and Unjust Society

Justice is one of the crucial concepts in the Russian socio-cultural model. It has been, and continues to be such, for many centuries. According to the data of the surveillance carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2012, 45 percent of those polled spoke in favor of society of social justice, where all enjoy equal rights, and the state is strong enough to take care of its citizens. About one-quarter of the respondents supported the slogan of democracy and freedom of self-expression and stability in society.

Dreams of social justice are typical of different social groups in different degree. Forty percent of respondents dreamed of life without the need “to count each coin,” 33 percent put a good health in the first place. Sociologists note that third place is taken by dreams of life in a just and reasonably organized society, inasmuch as “the society we live in can hardly be called just and reasonable.”

The main dream of the Russian citizens concerning their country, society and each person has been justice. For 40 percent of them justice is above law, and they regard laws unjust. Russian citizens would like to receive justice from the state, and at present most of them regard the latter unjust. People hanker after justice in all spheres of life and activity.

Justice and the State

Justice is necessary not only for ensuring the rights of the poor and unsuccessful in the market economy with the help of state or public support, but also for high-income and successful representatives of society.

However, under the domination of market rationality, political and government institutions are not always able to contribute to ensuring social justice. This takes place when the bodies of power

submit to the economic and financial interests of participants in various markets who force them to act in line with their demands and wishes rather than act by the social rules.

This is the case of modern Russia where legislative regulation of economic activity is not effective enough and is concentrated in the political sphere, which lowers the effectiveness of such regulation to a minimum.

As a result, the bodies of Russian power prove unable to support and implement just decisions in the economic sphere, and other subjects do not have such ability at all.

Thus the state is unable to ensure justice in society, and citizens feel unable to do it themselves. This contradiction leads to the growing social and political protest activity.

The potential of such mass protest activity is concentrated in two big social groups. One can conditionally be called “dreamers of justice” (those wishing to live in a just and rationally organized society), and the other – “opponents of the present power” (those convinced of “the path which Russia has chosen leading it to an impasse” and the need “to replace the present authorities”). These groups are distributed all over the country unevenly, they are most numerous in Moscow, St. Petersburg and some other big cities. Opponents of the present power are not its ideological enemies. They are mainly against too great differentiation of incomes and unjust system of the distribution of private property in Russia, which is especially noticeable in the above-mentioned cities.

At present the level of the protest movement is rather low. This can be explained by the fact that less than half of all Russian citizens (41 percent) are not concerned with the problems of the global development vector of Russian society, that is, they do not share the

idea of a wrong path along which Russia is going and the need to replace the present authorities.

Another reason for the low degree of the protest activity of citizens is politicization of this process. This activity of participants in protest meetings and their sympathizers is directed by political and government figures to supporting political actions demonstrating honest electoral procedures and correct appointments of officials to high posts, that is, aside from solving the crucial problem of justice of our society.

Significance of Social Demand for Justice

In modern Russia the problem of justice is not solved at the level of management of the state, economy and society. This is confirmed by many social surveys, which show that most Russian citizens are convinced of our society being organized and functioning unjustly. Sixty-one percent of sociological survey respondents gave such answer in 2011.

Demand for justice in Russian society is one of the most significant. Injustice with all varieties and differences in its understanding by different social groups is regarded a widely distributed social phenomenon. This is one of the most frequent cases in Russian courts.

Most Russian citizens would not like to resolve their problems in courts in accordance with the Russian legal standards. The main reason for this is firm conviction that there is no justice in Russian courts. The court order is largely determined by informal rules and standards, which differ for different social groups and situations. There are cases of using corruption or even violence by those who have no sanctions to do this from law-enforcement agencies.

It should be admitted that the problem of justice in society and the state exists not only in Russia. There is much injustice in organization of society, in the economy, and in the state structure in

many countries which are more affluent and secure than our country. One of the reasons for such state of affairs in the world and in Russia, in particular, is the broad distribution of market relations with their rationalism in adopting decisions and constant reproduction of social differentiation. Without them private business loses impetus for its activity, but rationalism and social differentiation are often perceived in society as a manifestation of injustice and low morality. In countries where the state actively fulfills the function of protection of non-market values, including justice in society, from expansion of market approaches, there is more justice by assessments of citizens themselves. But in Russia the state has refused to fulfill this function, and this is why the level of injustice is very high in our country.

How to Raise the Level of Social Justice

In present-day Russia injustice of social system concerns not only the poor and needy, but also the Russian middle class, and representatives of business, even big business. Very few of them can say that justice triumphs in their relations with the bodies of power, or that just laws are in force in our country.

But there is no objective social justice in Russian society, just as in any other society. Each social group assesses justice in society's organization conformably to its own notions and interests, and they differ greatly in the market economy. This is reflected in the ideas that justice should be guaranteed by the state. As a result, it is said that the state cannot cope with this role, is unable to agree on interpretations and priorities for protecting justice for different social groups. At the same time civil activity aimed at achieving social justice, but not justice with regard to individual social groups is rare and fruitless.

It is more and ore difficult to reach consensus in understanding justice by different social groups due to the absence of communications

between representatives of different theoretical concepts of justice. Many researchers think that the concept of social justice is something elusive, which cannot be perceived and has no reference to social being, and therefore plays the role of something ideal, a dream, an unreachable absolute. As a result, the understanding and use of justice in social practice become more difficult.

In the present situation in Russia both the state and developed civil society could effectively support the most important non-market values and virtues so important for both of them. The most important of these values are solidarity, mutual trust and mutual respect, mutual responsibility, protection of rights and freedoms, justice, generally accepted moral standards, possibility of self-realization of society's members, etc. It is only a well-developed and influential civil society that will be able to force the authorities to tackle collective and social problems. But in modern Russia civil society has a very weak influence on the adoption of political or economic decisions and other government actions. It submits to them instead of forming an agenda advantageous to it. Our citizens do not even try to evolve their own principles and methods to regulate some or other spheres of activity and then lobby them in the bodies of power. This is why there are few resources in our society allowing it to really solve social problems, consolidate active citizens, promote and support justice, social solidarity, etc. The work of the bodies of power at all levels is assessed as extremely ineffective. The weakness of the Russian state in these spheres results in corruption. Government officials at high levels and municipal officials at lower levels are often engaged in the realization of private, but not public, interests.

The problem of social justice will never be solved completely, just as many other social problems. However, it is necessary to raise the level of justice in Russian society, for this is one of the urgent demands

of many active citizens. Neither bodies of power, nor private business, nor public organizations or the most active individuals will ever be able to raise the level of social justice or social order in society acting only for their local interests. This can be achieved only through concerted actions of representatives of all social groups in the name of justice.

Society will be able to realize its support of civil activity and establishment of justice as a universal value and virtue along with the activity of political institutions which could ensure accord between all members of society on various problems on the principles of justice in every concrete situation.

The problem of justice in its entirety has never been posed for public discussion. It should be admitted that without solving this problem Russia will hardly be able to ensure the effective functioning of bodies of power or markets, promote and support non-market values and moral standards, observe laws everywhere, and lower the level of corruption. This will result in the preservation of Russia's lag behind the advanced countries of West-European civilization in all important spheres of social activity.

Obshchestvenniye nauki i sovremennost,”
Moscow, 2013, No 5, pp. 27–36.

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ISLAM IN ARKHANGELSK REGION

The northern regions of the European part of Russia are an interesting area for studying the penetration of alien religious practices in a system of stable socio-cultural standards. This process is especially

interesting in juxtaposition and contacts of such different cultural traditions as Christian and Muslim.

Arkhangelsk region is one in which the share of Muslim population does not exceed four percent. Islam has no many-century historical roots there, and the region itself has traditionally been regarded as “Russian” and “Orthodox Christian.” In such regions the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church is strong, as a rule, and public feelings are largely dominated by Russophile and Christian ideas.

The data about the number of Muslims living in the region differ: official statistics gives the figure of eight thousand (2010). Regional mass media cite the figure of thirty thousand, and Muslim leaders think that the more correct number is twenty thousand.

Despite a comparatively weak number of Muslims living in the region, their religious and cultural tradition can hardly be called exotic for the local community. Islam emerged on the territory of Arkhangelsk region in the first half of the 19th century, when the first mosque was built there for Muslims serving in the Russian army. The next wave of Muslim migration in the region was caused by famine in Kazan region in 1899 – 1901 and the development of “colonial trade” controlled by Tatar merchants. On August 26, 1905, a new mosque with a minaret was opened there, which functioned until it was closed in 1931.

Contrary to historical tradition, the Muslim community of Arkhangelsk region is dominated not by Tatars, as before, but by Azerbaijanis. Changes in the ethnic composition of the umma took place between 2002 and 2010. The first Muslims in the region were of Tatar origin, whereas the present-day regional umma consists mainly of people from states bordering on Russia. According to official statistics, in 2010 there were 2,335 Tatars, 2,605 Azerbaijanis, 435 Uzbeks, 401 Tajiks, and 394 Bashkirs in the Muslim community of

Arkhangelsk region. But today the number of people from Daghestan reached 876, that is, about 11 percent of the regional umma.

Due to the historical conditions, geographical distance from “Muslim” centers, and little quantitative resources, the institutionalization of Muslim organizations in Arkhangelsk region began later than that in the Central European regions of Russia and was initiated by the local ethnic elites. Until now the work of religious organizations are closely intertwined with the activity of national cultural autonomies.

The first Muslim organization in the city of Arkhangelsk was registered in April 2004. Its members include not only Tatars. Among them are Avars, Darghins, Chechens, Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Russians, and others. The number of parishioners varies from 2,500 to 9,500. The community has a rented building used as a prayer house. The Arkhangelsk Muslim organization maintains relations with similar organizations in neighboring regions, as well as with the Orthodox Christian community, and issues a weekly newspaper “Put istiny” (“The Path of Truth”) distributed freely. It also carried on a religious educational, charity, and public activity.

Another Muslim organization called “Nur Islam” was set up in April 2005. It has a mosque, which some people regard “the northernmost mosque in the world.” But there are mosques in Russia, which are much farther to the North than the one in Arkhangelsk: for example, the mosques in Norilsk, Salekhard, and Novy Urengoi. “Nur Islam” carries on social and charity activity with support and material assistance of the trade company of the Republic of Tatarstan – “Tatarstan-Arkhangelsk.”

In recent years local Islamic leaders have intensified their efforts in order to create an Islamic infrastructure in Arkhangelsk region, however, its present state leaves much to be desired. For example, they

devote much attention to setting up a network of shops selling special food products for Muslims, and organizing religious courses to study the Koran and Arabic.

Despite certain difficulties in the development of the Muslim community in Arkhangelsk region, the leaders of Islamic organizations emphasize the unique opportunities of the region. They single out a quiet and friendly situation and good relations among local inhabitants there.

The situation around Islam in the region can be called calm enough and favorable for the further development of the regional umma. The process of institutionalization of Muslim communities of Arkhangelsk region has begun later than in other regions of Russia, which made it possible to avoid superfluous politicization of the 1990s and refrain from radical methods in rivalry for leadership at the regional level. The leaders of the regional Muslim community have presented themselves as active and reliable partners. Institutionalization of Islam goes on along ethnic channels: by now two Muslim organizations have legally been registered – Tatar-Bashkir and Caucasian. The gradual development of the elements of an Islamic infrastructure will continue, just as an increase of the Islamic presence in the region.

“Islamovedeniye,” Makhachkala, 2013, No 1, pp. 45–53.

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**NATIONAL POLITICAL ELITE OF DAGESTAN:
SPECIFICS OF FORMATION AND FUNCTIONING**

National relationships are implemented through the activities of the national elites that express (or think they express) goals, interests, hopes and aspirations of their nations, peoples, ethnic groups.

In 2013, the author conducted a survey “National political elite of Daghestan” for revealing such specificity of Daghestan, as the problem of its elites and their conflicts in public life.

The total sample consisted of 820 survey respondents and covered various social groups – intellectuals, politicians, students, workers and the unemployed.

The problem of state power in Daghestan is one of the most acute and painful problems associated with the nationality question. The national clan system in power structures constantly generates interethnic tensions in regions.

The author suggests the following working hypothesis: Daghestan was formed on the territorial basis rather than the national one, there has never been a “titular” nation on behalf of which the republic was named. As a result the psychological and axiological stereotypes have become widespread among the population of Daghestan, according to which human moral qualities (honesty, courage, loyalty, kindness, compassion, justice, humaneness) became more important and valuable than ethnic affiliation. This is a positive factor for Daghestan, as there is no contradiction between the “main” nationalities and the rest – “minor”, “second-rate” ones, and there is still scope for democratization of the national and ethnic spheres of public life.

Unfortunately, multinational ethnic diversity and dynamism of Daghestan have a negative side.

The main question of research was: “What are the principles of including people in the political elite of the Republic of Daghestan?” The answers were as follows: 76.9% of respondents said that it was the clan principle, 19.2% of respondents stated that it was family kinship, and 15.5% – one’s own efforts. Consequently, there is a national clan system, though behind the scenes, which informally hands out key government posts and official positions on ethnic grounds.

The following answers were given to the question “What is the principle of the formation of the political elite after the President of Daghestan was re-elected?”:

- 1) The President selects the best representatives of the people;
- 2) The President selects loyal people personally;
- 3) By nationality;
- 4) On the basis of relationship;
- 5) Your answer.

Answers were as follows:

- 1) 40% (added – on the present situation, after the removal of the former president for taking bribes; considered their relationship, not counted educational level, honesty, commitment);
- 2) 36%;
- 3) 11.5%;
- 4) 27%;

5) It is necessary to consider all variants: worthy representatives; personal acquaintance; by a corrupt scheme; on advice from Moscow; preposterous to claim that there are honest people in Daghestan; professional qualifications.

Yet, surveys show that people are optimistic, want to believe in and hope for positive changes with the coming to power of the new

President of Daghestan

The following answers were received to the question “Are the interests of ethnic equality and ethnic groups the main distinguishing features of the political life of Daghestan?”

- 1) “Yes” – 47% (ministerial posts given out along national lines).
- 2) “No” – 33% (The Daghestani people exist, although the government of Daghestan seems to ignore this fact sometimes).

The following answers have been given to the question: “Is there discrimination encouraged by the national leadership in relation to other nations?”

- 1) “Yes” – 41%.
- 2) “No” – 24% (Makhachkala residents, mostly)
- 3) “Do not know” – 11%.

What does this mean for the citizens of Daghestan?

First of all, the objective differences between the peoples of Daghestan are based on ethnicity.

Executive posts are reserved for representatives of the main national elites almost officially, so that most other nations are cut off from these posts.

The following answers were given to the question “Is it important for you which nationality a person belongs to?”

- 1) “Yes” – 20%;
- 2) “No” – 64.5%

It has already been mentioned that moral values are a priority in comparison with nationality for the peoples of Daghestan.

We received the following answers to the question “Are you for the separation of Daghestan from Russia?” “No” – 98% of respondents, “Yes” – 2%.

The following answers were given to the question of national identity:

- 1) Russian; Daghestani – 51%;
- 2) Living in Russia – 43%;
- 3) Nationality “Daghestani” does not exist – 7%.

We have made three conclusions, summarizing everything mentioned above:

1. The multinational character of the inhabitants of Daghestan has not allowed us to determine the titular nation.

2. The territorial principle of federal subordination of Daghestan contributes to the maintenance of peaceful relations between its peoples.

3. The historically established priority of the moral principle over national identity of a person contributes to the maintenance of peace in Daghestan.

“Vlast”, Moscow, 2013, No 10, pp. 146–147.

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**INSTITUTE OF THE CAUCASIAN FAMILY:
SOME PECULIAR FEATURES
OF ITS TRANSFORMATION**

Family problems have always been an important aspect in the life of society. Recently the interest in them has increased from representatives of various social sciences and humanities, as a result of the complex and contradictory processes in the modern family and family relations. These processes have been caused by global contemporary problems, facing humanity today.

The family undergoes dynamic changes in accordance with the new political-economic and socio-cultural realities, just like any other social formation as a whole does. In this country, large, or extended families in many regions, have begun to disintegrate. A number of lone-parent families is increasing, as well as a number of the so-called parent families where the woman is the sole breadwinner. In some families, many spouses, and sometimes, their children, are subjected to

alcoholism and drug addiction, which lead to reduction in births. There is a growing number of families with one child, and there is also a tendency of children born out of wedlock.

Investigations show that more and more women prefer to have children out of wedlock, confirming a familiar truth: “Where there is marriage without love, there is love without marriage.”

Crisis in family relationships has influenced the “Caucasian family.” This means families of people living between the Black, Azov and Caspian seas in an area of about 440 thousand square kilometers. These families can be identified as “Western family,” “Asian family,” “African family” etc., based on the territorial criteria. As for the “Caucasian families,” nationality is implied in the first place, with the peculiar features of their culture, traditions, customs and religious beliefs. “Caucasian families” have been scattered all over the planet because of migration processes, dynamically developing in the modern world. Now it is difficult to answer the question as to what can be considered a “Caucasian family”:

- 1) “Caucasian family” in Europe.
- 2) “Caucasian family” in the East (Jordan, Syria, Turkey, new migrants from the Caucasus in the Middle East).
- 3) “Caucasian family” in Russian regions.
- 4) “Caucasian family” in the CIS countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Belarus, etc.).
- 5) “Caucasian family” in the Caucasus.

Factors of cultural and spiritual influence on the Chechen family in Europe

1. Western culture.
2. Muslim culture of migrants from the East.
3. Chechen national culture.

Factors of cultural and spiritual influence on the Chechen family in the East

1. Arab-Muslim culture.
2. Culture of Eastern nations.
3. Chechen national culture.

Factors of cultural and spiritual influence on the Chechen family in the Russian Federation

1. Russian culture and the culture of the peoples of Russia.
2. Culture of Russian Muslims.
3. Chechen national culture.

Factors of cultural and spiritual influence on the Chechen family in the CIS countries

1. Secular culture of the local people.
2. The religious culture of local denominations.
3. Chechen national culture.

Factors of cultural and spiritual influence on the Chechen family in the Chechen Republic

1. Russian and other peoples' cultures.
2. Chechen traditional Islam.
3. Non-traditional Muslim beliefs.
4. Chechen national culture.

All families are influenced by many complex processes due to socio-economic, political, legal, spiritual, cultural, and religious factors that lead to significant changes in them. Here are some of them on the example of the Chechen family.

1. The division of the extended families has taken place, especially outside the traditional residence of this ethnic group (Europe, Middle East, Russian Federation, etc.).

2. Cultural and spiritual factors that influence the Chechen family have changed significantly. It is caused by the place of residence of Chechen families, cultural environment, etc.

Universal human values are inherent in the “Caucasian family”: industriousness, respect for the elders, parents and relatives, hospitality, mutual support, patriotism, and tolerance, and they are manifested stably and clearly. At the same time, the Caucasian family gradually loses its value under the influence of globalization. These processes are more intense outside the Caucasus – in the diasporas of Europe, Eastern countries and Russia. National traditions have faded under the strong influence of European culture. In such families, the father is out of the family in search of a livelihood. The mother becomes the carrier of national culture, at the best. Children spend much time in preschool institutions, schools, colleges, etc., outside the influence of national culture and the language. They feel more comfortably speaking the language of the country of residence. Parents, especially mothers, come under the influence of their children, gradually giving up their ethno-cultural roots. In the Caucasus there are significant changes in the traditional household, in spiritual and moral order, which undermine the family foundations.

This occurs under the influence of new economic, moral, political, social and cultural factors. Capitalism has come to the Caucasus, destroying its unique national culture.

The new historical epoch has caused significant changes in all spheres of life of the Caucasian highlanders, including the family. Here are some of them.

1. Replacement of traditional family values and priorities. The Caucasian highlanders' family has always been characterized by the priority of the spiritual over the material, aspiration to the highest values, sensitive attitude to public opinion, loyalty to the Fatherland, tendency to bring up decent members of society. The patriarchal family of the Caucasian highlanders has cultivated in their children openness, generosity, hospitality, and compassion. The new historical epoch requires discipline, order and punctuality, so the modern Caucasian family should develop these qualities in their children. Theologians call for remembering the moral values, but, unfortunately, it is only good wishes for today's morally deaf people.

2. For centuries, the Caucasian highlanders' family has sought to create new generations with such moral qualities as feelings of equality and brotherhood, modesty, and respect for the individual. A sudden welfare has changed the consciousness and behavior of many Caucasians. Today the worldview of the nouveau riche is formed in many wealthy families, that inevitably engenders the caste of elite and hostile attitude towards the destitute. In turn, "the lower classes" do not feel much respect for "the upper classes." The current situation leads to a permanent social conflict in the future.

4. In the past, the Caucasian family consisted of several generations (parents, children, grandchildren, close relatives) living together, or in the neighborhood. Parents, grandparents, older relatives, older siblings were the first teachers of children. They studied traditional culture, spiritual and moral values, unique family rules, habits and customs. Every young highlander was a carrier of not only human virtues, but the unique moral and ethical views of their family-clan. Nowadays, extended families continue to disintegrate. This process leads to a sharp change in the entire system of the Caucasian highlanders' values, weakening blood-related feelings. The destruction

of traditional families has negatively influenced the mechanism of transfer of national culture to the younger generations. The new generation cannot be mentally stable and spiritually strong, and harmoniously developed, because it has not grown in the system of national and spiritual values. Previously, children's spiritual world was formed individually in extended families. In the past, talented authors put their hearts into their work, creating masterpieces of painting, literature, music, thereby influencing and educating the younger generation. Today, in our technological-information age, the spiritual world of young people is formed by the mass media: the Internet, TV, etc. In our century, the process of "stamping" spiritual production is too intensive, which leads to the destruction of real culture.

5. Speaking about the Caucasian family, we should mention polygamous marriage, which can often be met among mountain Muslim nations in the North Caucasus, especially in the post-Soviet period. Polygamy exists in two forms – polygyny, when a man has more than one wife (in Islam – four) and polyandry, when a woman has several husbands (India, Tibet, Nepal, Hawaii). Polyandrous families are: fraternal (one woman marries several brothers) and unrelated (husbands are not relatives). Polygamy was the result of a periodic gender disproportions in society due to various social and biological factors.

In the contemporary world, polygamy exists in two forms: formal (legal) and informal (illegal). Polygamy exists due to the following factors: gender disproportion (in Russia there are 11 million less men than women, and in China for every 100 girls born there are 130 boys), sexual frustration, social disadvantage, or vice versa: the socio-property glut. There are also biological interpretations of the genesis of polygamy, according to which the nature created a man as a polygamous creature, but a man himself has created the institution of

monogamous marriage, violating the fundamental laws of nature. This attempt has not been fully successful, and, as a result, monogamy and polygamy coexist, sometimes passing into each other.

What is the outlook of the family evolution as a social institution? The following picture emerges if you compile views of the most authoritative researchers. The patriarchal family (consisting of three generations) was dominant in the era of agrarian civilization, and the economic function had priority in the family. The power of the older family members was unlimited, and so were the parents' rights to children, while the latter were indebted to their parents. Spouses' feelings (love, tenderness, etc.) were not of primary importance. Survivals of the patriarchal family exist in the Caucasian families up to this day. The emergence of capitalist relations with a concentration of a huge number of workers in the same workplace at the beginning of the industrial era (17th century) has undermined the foundations of the patriarchal family, contributing to the emergence of new form of the family (husband, wife, children), which dominates up to this day. New economic relations have destroyed the need to live in the "traditional" extended families. In new families marriages began to be concluded not only for pragmatic reasons (physically strong, healthy body and spirit), but also on the basis of the psychological factor (love, first of all, friendly communication, intimate relations, warmth, support, etc.).

We are witness to the arrival of a new post-industrial society, new information civilization, which has made significant adjustments to the institution of the family and family relationships. Economic independence of women has increased rapidly, and their dependence on men has decreased, which led to women's social emancipation, including sexual one. In our time, the institution of marriage (at least in

western civilization) gradually loses its second important function – that of regulating the monopoly of intimate relationships.

The industrial family has emancipated the feelings (made them a personal matter, without control of relatives or public), and the post-industrial family does the same in the intimate sphere (sexual life is a personal matter of any free citizen). Economic independence of women has led to the loss of strictly defined roles of both women and men, destroying the classical concept of marriage and encouraging the development of the single-parent families. Nowadays people try to legitimize homosexual marriage (sometimes they succeed in it). The complete abandonment of the strictly limited roles in marriage according to one's gender (male-father, female-mother) is prevented by the fact that only a woman can give birth. However, progress in biotechnology will solve this problem in the foreseeable future, directly influencing the evolution of the family and family relations. Any family, regardless of the sex of its members, will be able to have a child (including the use of a surrogate egg).

There is one last traditional function of the family – raising children after the loss of the second traditional function – a monopoly on “legitimate sex” within the legal marriage (the first loss was “family – economic unit”). It could be surmised that the family of the future will consist of people with common views, interests, mutual attraction, and wishes to raise children together. Perhaps, people in a future society will overcome the view that only one type of the family is normal and moral, and others – moral pathology. A wide variety of family types in addition to the traditional can be seen today in the technologically advanced countries: homosexual marriages, communes, groups of older people living together to combine costs (sometimes having intimate relations), tribal ethnic minority groups, and other types of relationships that have not existed previously. There are arranged marriages,

contractual marriages, serial marriages, family groups and close ties, in which intimate relations may or may not be.

All the above applies to the European family based on liberal values. As for the eastern family (including the Caucasian family, especially the Muslim one), the principle of the strength of the family is a priority as regards the principle of gender equality or the liberal values of Western culture. Many young Muslims who grew up in the West, do not marry European girls with liberal values, but invite Muslim brides from their historical homeland. Muslim girls are not familiar with ideas of “gender equality” and “free love”, but ready to fulfill the basic female function, required by Islam: give birth to as many children as possible and raise them well.

Nowadays the modern world, both natural and social, tends to diversity, as well as in all times. This led to a crisis in the dominant model of the family, to more frequent divorces, to increased number of civil marriages. Obviously, the old system of family relations is in crisis now. The new paradigm is defined clearer and clearer, denying dialectically obsolete forms of the family, offering variety of its forms, keeping the most important ones, i.e. mutual love, common views and interests, and concern for the upbringing of children.

What will happen to the Caucasian family, taking into account both the traditions of the patriarchal tribal customs of agricultural civilization and the family of industrial civilization, avoiding diversity of families of post-industrial civilization? If we examine the problem more closely, it is the collision point between Eastern traditions and Western innovations.

Experience shows that the West is unable to withstand the onslaught of post-industrial civilization and modifies its institutions (including the Family) in accordance with its requirements.

Will the East resist this power to preserve the age-old religious, ethno-social, spiritual and moral values, customs and traditions in order to save the spiritual culture and social institutions, including the traditional Caucasian family?

It should be emphasized that the new era of post-industrial civilization has not destroyed the past and present of mankind, but only approved democratic and progressive forms of human relations, effective ways to solve problems in the life of modern humanity, including in the sphere of the Family. The Family's diversity seems to be established in synthesis of traditions and innovations, bringing positive and viable traditions, rules and regulations of the past into a new era. Even now the objective social reality demands the experience of the ancient patriarchal family, in which the economic function was the priority.

People worked in their own homes and the on surrounding land in the distant era of agrarian civilization for more than 10,000 years, and economic, administrative, cultural, spiritual, educational processes have always been associated with their hearth and home. These strong ties had been severed because of the capitalist system of production, when people had moved into the city and concentrated around industrial enterprises. Postindustrial civilization can return working people to the family hearth. This trend is evident in the West and the East in the sphere of high-tech manufacturing. Several generations of one family (parents, children, grandchildren) can now work together at home, as it was in the patriarchal family in the past, if there are computers and other necessary equipment.

In the context of the Caucasus, this new mode of production can breathe life into the social institutions of old civilizations. Consequently, post-industrial civilization does not destroy the

patriarchal and ordinary new families, but revives them on a qualitatively new basis.

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Grozny, 2013, № 1 (18), pp. 165–171.*

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KAZAKHSTAN BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BEIJING

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Our country possessing very rich deposits of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, has been left without access to world markets. Situated in the center of the Eurasian continent between Russia and China, Kazakhstan was unable to export its oil and gas even in small volumes, which it extracted in the conditions of the economic ruin of the early 1990s.

The Chinese direction did not exist at all because there were no pipelines going to the South. The only export arteries were oil and gas pipelines leading to Russia, which it naturally used in order to reach its geopolitical and economic aims.

A vivid example of “pipe pressure” on the neighbor was the history of the development of the unique Karachaganak deposit. It was discovered in 1979 and is one of the biggest oil-and-gas condensate deposits in the world. In the north-western part of Kazakhstan, near the border with Russia, the deposit occupies a territory of over 280 square kilometers. Its hydrocarbon reserves are estimated at nine billion barrels of condensate and 48 trillion cubic feet of gas. The industrial development of the deposit began in 1984 by the Ministry of gas industry of the U.S.S.R. The technological scheme of the deposit development envisaged that the mined raw materials would be

delivered for processing to the Orenburg gas-processing plant. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the “Gazprom” Corporation has offered the government of Kazakhstan to engage in the joint development of the deposit. But the Kazakhstan authorities turned down the offer, having stated that they intended to invite foreign companies as partners. In an international tender, in which such companies as Eni / BG Group and BP / Statoil, the former turned to be the winner. In 1992 the government began negotiations with the companies “Eni” and “BG Group” on the conditions of an agreement on division of products on Karachaganak. Three years later the agreement was signed. But these foreign firms came across the problem of selling the product. On order of the Ministry of oil and gas of the Republic of Kazakhstan all rights for the mined condensate were transferred to the little-known company “Vaeco Europe.” Having shipped the product extracted during two years to a sum of about \$74 million, both the shareholders and the government received nothing.

The opposition later accused Kazakhstan’s government of cooperation with a little-known trader, which did not bring in sales revenue from export to the country. Moreover, the trader himself was under control of influential Kazakh clans, having a reliable political protection. However, there was no official reaction to these allegations, except several publications in the local mass media. Nor was there any official investigation of this deal.

After the cancellation of the contract with “Vaeco Europe,” Kazakhstan was faced with a dilemma: either to terminate extraction on the deposit or again turn to Russia. At long last, the consortium “Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V.” (KPO) has resolved the problem of marketing its products, by including the Russian company “LUKoil” in its partners. True, Russia as the monopoly owner of

pipelines from the deposit retained the opportunity to dictate its conditions on the cost and volumes of deliveries. Such state of affairs continues to this day, though in a slightly changed form. The KPO has an opportunity to supply oil for export through the pipeline system of the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC), but in actual fact, all volumes of gas are bought from it by the joint Russian-Kazakh venture “KazRosGaz” controlled by state-owned companies of the two countries.

Prior to 2001, when the Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline was commissioned built by CPC, the main oil export artery for Kazakhstan’s oil was the Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline fully controlled by Russia. The regular annual coordination of export quotas for Kazakhstan took the form of political bargaining. The same is true of the problems of leasing the space-launching site Baikonur, and the preservation of Russian military proving grounds on Kazakhstan’s territory, participation of Russian companies in oil-and-gas projects in Kazakhstan, demarcation of borders and the division of the water surface of the Caspian Sea. The field for maneuvering was vast enough, and the Kremlin was engaged in an active game on it.

In order to get rid of this dependence Kazakhstan initiated in 1992 the creation of an international consortium on the construction of an oil pipeline from one of the biggest deposits, Tengiz in the western part of the country, to the Russian port of Novorossiysk. In 1992, an agreement was signed between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Sultanate of Oman on July 17, 1992, on the setting up of the Caspian pipeline consortium. A month later this agreement was joined by the Russian Federation. However, Oman proved unable to provide enough capital, and in 1996 the project was joined by eight private shareholders representing the interests of the world’s biggest mining companies of seven countries working in Kazakhstan and Russia.

Today the CPC oil pipeline pumps up to 35 million tons of oil a year; 30 million tons of this volume is the quota for Kazakhstan. At present the CPC shareholders implement a project of lengthening the trunk oil pipeline, as a result of which its capacity should increase to 67 million tons of oil annually, with Kazakhstan's quota being 52.5 million tons.

Apart from that, during the years of independence Kazakhstan has implemented several more major pipeline projects, including the strategically important pipeline from Kazakhstan to China. In 2012 the country mined 70.2 million tons of oil and gas condensate. Of this amount 68.6 million tons were meant for export. It can safely be said today that Kazakhstan got rid of the need to ask Moscow for export opportunities for its oil. Apart from the already-mentioned increase of Kazakhstan's quota by almost twofold, after completion of the project to enlarge CPC, another important project will be implemented, namely, the second tranche of the second stage of the construction of the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline with increased capacity of up to 20 million tons of oil a year. Work has also been planned to increase the capacity of several sections of three oil pipelines, which will make it possible to increase the volumes of oil shipments through the sea port of Aktau. These three directions, along with the Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline, will completely satisfy Kazakhstan's export requirements for the next few years.

At the end of 2013 the commercial mining of oil should begin on the Kashagan deposit on the Caspian Sea shelf. Kazakhstan intends to start the earlier project of "Kazakhstan Caspian System of Oil Transportation" (KCSOT). Within the framework of this project it is envisaged to create a new oil-transportation infrastructure on the Kazakh shore of the Caspian Sea, to construct the Eskene-Kuryk oil pipeline, to create new capacities for shipping oil, as well as to enlarge

the sea port of Kuryk, from where oil will be delivered by tankers via the Caspian Sea to the pipeline system Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. It is planned that KCSOT will provide for the transportation of 25 million tons of oil a year at the initial state, with a subsequent increase up to 38 million tons.

In the gas sphere of bilateral cooperation with Russia Kazakhstan has traditionally been playing the role of transiter. Two trunk gas pipelines pass through its territory: Central Asia – Center and Bokhara – Urals, which pump Turkmen and Uzbek gas bought by “Gazprom” to Europe. In 2005–2007 the transit system of Central Asian gas to the Russian Federation via Kazakhstan’s territory was practically restored, and the volumes of deliveries were close to those in Soviet time. In 2008 the volume of Turkmen and Uzbek gas through Kazakhstan reached 52 billion cubic meters. In turn, the volumes of gas transportation, which Russia buys from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and exports to other countries, via Kazakhstan, Russia and further on by the “Gazprom” system, amounted to 46 billion cubic meters in 2008. Kazakhstan has been a responsible and reliable partner, and with this end in view the presidents of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed a joint declaration on May 12, 2007, on building a Caspian gas pipeline. In December of that year a tripartite intergovernmental agreement was signed on cooperation in building this gas pipeline. The project envisaged reconstruction of the old pipeline from Central Asia to Center, from Turkmen Bekdash to Kazakh Beineu with a capacity of up to 10 billion cubic meters a year. The second stage of construction (2010–2017) envisaged the building of a new gas pipeline from Aleksandrov Gai on the Russian–Kazakhstan border with a capacity of 20 billion cubic meters a year. As a result the Caspian gas pipeline system was to be created with an annual capacity of about 30 billion cubic meters. Turkmenistan was

supposed to supply twenty billion and Kazakhstan – ten billion cubic meters.

However, a drop in gas consumption in Europe, which began recently, put in question “Gazprom” requirements for such volumes of Central Asian gas. In this connection it has been decided to freeze the project of the Caspian gas pipeline. In this situation Kazakhstan, which has been increasing gas production with every passing year, had nothing to do, but turn to the bottomless market of China. In December 2010 the construction of the trunk gas pipeline Beineu – Bozoi – Shimkent began, which was supposed to connect gas extraction districts in western and central Kazakhstan with its southern regions suffering from a shortage of energy.

More important: along this pipeline gas can be delivered to the trunk gas pipeline Turkmenistan – Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan – China, which was opened in December 2009 and whose annual capacity is to be 40 billion cubic meters. The first stretch of the Beineu – Bozoi – Shimkent gas pipeline is to be commissioned in 2013, and the second stretch will be started immediately after.

Thus, the only big bilateral Russia – Kazakhstan gas project is cooperation on Karachaganak deposit through the joint venture “KazRosGaz.” Apart from that, “Gazprom” may rely on the joint development of two additional deposits: Imashevskoye situated in between the two countries on a territorial stretch near Astrakhan and Atyrau (prospected reserves amount to about 100 billion cubic meters) and Central in the Caspian Sea (prospected reserves are estimated at 20.2 million of standard fuel of C1 category and 149 million tons of standard fuel of C2 category).

Thus, Kazakhstan can today and in foreseeable future engage in marketing gas independently, without Russian help. Besides, gas from Aktyubinsk and western deposits can be exported to China. This year

extraction of gas is to be started on the shelf deposit Kashagan, which will be supplied to the domestic market.

In order to ensure its geopolitical security Kazakhstan has been relying on the many-vector policy in exploiting its natural wealth: among claimants to its natural resources should be representatives of different states. As a result, the first private owners of oil-extracting companies in Kazakhstan were concerns from the United States, Europe and China.

The Russian presence in the Kazakh oil-and-gas sphere is represented by “LUKoil,” which was able to build good relations with the young political elite of Kazakhstan and its President Nursultan Nazarbayev. “LUKoil” is the biggest Russian investor in the oil-and-gas sphere of Kazakhstan: it is taking part in seven mining projects on land, four prospecting projects, and also in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC). From 1995 the “LUKoil” investments in Kazakhstan’s economy comprised over \$4.7 billion.

“Rosneft” takes part in two projects in Kazakhstan and “Gazprom – also in two. On the whole, Russian companies account for eight percent of the total volume of oil and 15 percent of gas mined in the country. At the same time the share of American companies amounts to 29 percent of the present volume of oil, and the share of Chinese companies is 24 percent in the country’s oil-and-gas sector. Chinese companies are very active in buying oil-and-gas assets. According to reliable sources, China’s share in the oil-and-gas sector of Kazakhstan will reach forty percent. Thus, despite the creation of the Unified economic area and Customs Union by three allied states, the business sphere for Russian investors in Kazakhstan is shrinking steadily.

*“Pro et Contra,”
Moscow, 2013, January–April, pp. 35–40.*

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“SOFT POWER” AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. POLICY
IN CENTRAL ASIA
(Continuation)

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has occupied a special place in Central Asia in the implementation of the western project for the area. The U.S. airbase “Manas” (now a Center of transit transportation) is the region’s biggest infrastructural object ensuring the military presence of the United States in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, just as all countries of the region is a party to the Council of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, and is taking part in the NATO program “Partnership for Peace,” including in the process of analysis and planning, enabling it to receive consultations and technical assistance of NATO members.

The West, especially the United States, “plant and nurture” groups of influential persons of pro-western and nationalistic orientations in Kyrgyzstan who are hostile toward Russia and China.

It will be appropriate to mention that certain tragic events in the latest history of Kyrgyzstan, such as the coup in 2005, were directly connected with the desires of Americans who were striving to test their technologies of entrenching themselves in the country. It can be assumed that it was precisely employees of western agencies who exerted maximal efforts, after the change of power in 2010, to establish a weak parliamentary-presidential form of power contributing to the further downfall of the state.

Technologies of “soft power” are the most important instruments for implementing the western project in Kyrgyzstan. Ideological influence on the population (primarily young people) is taking place through a network of dozens of western non-governmental

organizations, educational programs financed by the West, and the Internet. It is not accidental that the American University of Central Asia, which is the main center of training pro-western elitist personnel for the entire Central Asian region, is situated precisely in Kyrgyzstan.

It is important for the West, especially for the United States, that Kyrgyzstan with its liberal ruling regime, political instability, and at the same time an outlet to all countries of the region and China, should remain a hotbed of sort of liberal destructive ideas, from whose territory numerous non-governmental organizations patronized by American foundations and other organizations could continue their destructive pseudo-democratic activity in Central Asia.

Talking of American programs in Kyrgyzstan, one can single out three basic directions of the U.S. work in the republic: economic cooperation programs, programs in the sphere of security, and the most important sphere connected with political, information and ideological influence. Such American organizations as USAID, NDI, "Soros-Kyrgyzstan" Foundation, IRI, Freedom House, and Peace Corps are actively working along the above-mentioned lines.

It should be noted that American organizations rendered a great, even "decisive," help to the opposition during the preparation of the first coup in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005. Officially, during the first several months prior to the coup, the coalition of non-governmental organizations "For democracy and civil society" received from NDI about \$400,000 and the international center "Interbilim" got financial aid of \$170,000.

Later, President K. Bakiyev, in contrast to A. Akayev, despite close contacts with Americans, was striving to restrict U.S. actions inside the country, including in their support of non-governmental organizations. However, during a couple of years after the coup of 2010, the influence of these organizations and foundations increased,

because President Rosa Otunbayeva of the transition period, who was closely connected with the West, and her entourage did much for the coming of the “new wave” of non-governmental organizations, including pro-American ones.

Support of corresponding pro-American non-governmental organizations in Kyrgyzstan is arranged in such a way that their financing and personnel training is done simultaneously by different, but mutually connected, American organizations.

An important role in supporting pro-American non-governmental organizations and political forces is played by the Democratic commission of the U.S. Embassy. It is in charge of grant donations, both big and small, up to \$24,000. In 2011 a considerable part of grants was earmarked for supporting non-governmental organizations dealing with elections, as well as the mass media and the monitoring of presidential elections. The commission finances research groups for studying concrete political tasks. It is believed that it had direct connections with financing the election campaign of the “Ata Meken” party and its leader O. Tekebayev.

USAID concentrates its activity on comparatively big projects connected with state management, development of civil society, and institutional construction. Inasmuch as Kyrgyzstan is one of the main states in the region for USAID, the budget of the Agency is stably high: in 2011 it exceeded \$41 million and in 2012 – \$47 million. Financing for 2013 was to be the same.

USAID economic programs touch on problems of macroeconomic policy, finances, trade, land relations, fiscal policy, business climate, and energy and agriculture, that is, the key branches of Kyrgyzstan’s economy.

USAID programs in Kyrgyzstan also concentrate on the so-called “assistance to democratic and just governance.” In essence, this

“assistance” represents influence in the political, ideological and information spheres. Within this framework American organizations get in touch with Kyrgyz public organizations and parties, including opposition ones, and the national mass media. They finance them and organize various seminars, training sessions and programs, and also work for creating political background.

Among such programs are: Support of the mass media (regional budget – \$15 million, partner – Internews Network); Legal support of civil society (regional budget – \$3.97 million, partner – ICNL); Prevention of slave trade (budget – \$4.27, partner – international organization for migration IOM); Program for strengthening the legal system in Kyrgyzstan (budget – \$4.49 million, beginning of realization – 2011, partner – International organization of legal development IDLO); Program for assistance to Zhogorku Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic (budget – \$3.24 million, realization since September 2010, partner – Corporation of alternative development, DAI); Program in support of active workers in the sphere of human rights (budget – more than \$1.5 million, realization since March 2010, partner – Freedom House); Development of political parties (CEPPS, budget – \$4.28 million, partners – International Foundations of election systems (IFES and International Republican Institute, IRI); Trans-border cooperation of young people (budget – \$0.46 million), and Young People’s Theater for peace (budget – 0.60 million, partner – IREX).

USAID programs in the sphere of public health are aimed at reforming the management and financing of the system of Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry for Health. The Agency is working in the sphere of mothers’ and children’s health, and struggle against cardio-vascular and infectious diseases (AIDS, tuberculosis, flue, etc.). Among them mention should be made of the following programs: Improved medical-sanitary aid (regional budget – \$72 million, partner – Abt Associates);

Medical-demographic investigation (MDI, budget – \$2 million, partner – ICF Macro); Dialogues on AIDS and tuberculosis (budget – \$15 million, partner – Population Services International, PSI); Assistance for control over tuberculosis (regional budget \$11 million, partner – Mission of Central Association on combating and preventing tuberculosis of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, KNCV).

Among humanitarian programs mention should be made of the “Food in the Name of Peace” program, according to which 46.9 tons of food products for 81 social centers across Kyrgyzstan are distributed annually, including aid to children, pensioners, mentally sick persons, and those suffering from tuberculosis (budget \$388,000, partner – Research and Policy Exchange, RPX).

USAID projects in Kyrgyzstan also deal extensively with “assistance to democratic and just governance.” In essence, this “assistance” is nothing but influence in the political, ideological and information spheres. Within the framework of this line American organizations establish contacts with Kyrgyz public organizations and parties, including opposition parties, and with the national mass media, finance them, organize various seminars, training sessions, etc.

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It should be noted that USAID timely reacts to changes in the socio-political climate in the country. After the coup in 2010, in May of the same year, a special program of the so-called transitional initiatives of the Kyrgyz Republic began to be implemented (partner – International Resources Group, IRG), presupposing additional efforts to provide “additional incentives to democratic processes.”

The IRI is represented in Kyrgyzstan by an office in Bishkek. In April 2010, the office was ransacked, but soon it resumed work. In recent years IRI has stepped up its educational programs for political parties. Beginning from 2008 the IRI courses were attended by representatives of the major political parties, including the Communist party of Kyrgyzstan. One of the spheres of IRI work is organizing surveillances on political and social subjects.

The NDI working in the republic from 1996 concentrates its activity on work with young people, and support of opposition parties. It also works in close contact with non-governmental organizations, renders financial support to the “independent mass media,” etc.

Talking of joint projects with American organizations it should be noted that especially active in this field are the Kyrgyz coalition “For democracy and civil society,” the international center “Interbilim,” and the “Legal clinic Adilet.” American organizations also finance the coalition of non-governmental organizations “Taza Shailoo.”

Americans work rather actively and support financially certain youth organizations. One of the most promising American projects for training the future young elite is the project of “Young people’s parliament” (Zhogorku Kenesha), which is closely connected with the work of the real parliament. Fifty-eight deputies take part in the work of this parliament of young people aged from 18 to 26. An important role in forming and training the pro-American young elite is played by the American University of Central Asia.

A special role in the system of American influence has traditionally been played by the “Soros-Kyrgyzstan” Foundation. It was precisely this organization that took a direct part in preparing people for the coup in 2005. However, after the “tulip revolution” the Foundation has reduced its activity in the republic. It was largely due to the fact that George Soros was not quite satisfied with the results of the coup. Although his foundation had trained a number of young leaders in advance, they were unable to work properly in those conditions. Subsequently, the Soros Foundation has concentrated work on other projects.

The educational aspect is an important part of programs for Kyrgyzstan. Political activists and government officials are sent for probation work to other countries (for instance, to Georgia, Hungary, and other western states). The Soros Foundation invites specialists from the Central European University in Budapest to train young Kyrgyz activists. The total sum of the “Soros-Kyrgyzstan” Foundation’s expenditures comprises more than \$1.5 million annually.

On the whole, it should be noted that the Soros and other American foundations and organizations have established and supported connections between representatives of the ruling regime in Georgia and official and non-governmental organizations of the Kyrgyz Republic during the past two years. The U.S. associations and

foundations have helped organize a visit of the former head of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili to Kyrgyzstan for the inauguration of the new President of Kyrgyzstan A. Atambayev on December 1, 2011 and a speech of the Georgian leader at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek.

It should be noted that there are quite a few lobbyists at the Ministry of Education and other government offices of Kyrgyzstan for Soros programs. In general, the American educational projects in Kyrgyzstan are represented by a wide range of spheres and use different forms of education: from exchanges of students and teachers to studies by American standards in Kyrgyzstan itself. The American University of Central Asia is the center of U.S. activity in this sphere. Educational programs are also implemented by USAID, the Peace Corps, ACTR/ACCELS, and IREX, there is also a program of small grants from the Democratic commission of the U.S. Embassy.

The American University of Central Asia was organized in 1993. Its mission was expressed in the words: "Work for democratic transformation of Central Asia." Representatives of the University openly say that it is called upon to foster future leaders of this transformation.

At present the University is managed by the International Council of trustees and issues certificates in ten specialties: American studies, anthropology, business management, European studies, international and business law, international and comparative politics, journalism and mass communications, psychology, sociology, and software projects. Four master's programs are also offered: business management, Central Asian studies, environmental problems, economic development. The University also has foreign-language courses (English, Arabic, Spanish, Italian, Chinese, Korean, Kyrgyz, German, Russian, Turkish, French and Japanese).

At present there are students from 25 countries (primarily from Central Asian countries, but also from Russia, Ukraine, Baltic countries, the U.S.A., Germany, Canada, and Britain). The number of students is over 1,200, and teachers – over 130.

Since 2001 the University has been a member of the Association of American international colleges and universities. All graduates from the American University of Central Asia receive a Kyrgyz certificate and a diploma of the Bard College of the American pattern.

In 2009 the Bard College and the American University of Central Asia created a partnership program which envisaged a high-quality education in Central Asia. In recent years they have been busy introducing international standards of education in all aspects of the University curriculum.

Apart from that the University takes part in a number of partnership programs with many universities and organizations all over the world. The Institute of open society, the Mellon Foundation and USAID actively support the University of Central Asia. They help it evolve new academic programs and donate money to buy new technological equipment; for example, in 2010 the University received a grant of \$2.7 million.

In February 2012 the American University of Central Asia announced enrollment of a new generation of students (New Generation Academy, NGA) from among Kyrgyz school graduates. They will receive 70 grants for the entire course of studies. Such grant fully covers the cost of studies, board and lodging, and textbooks and study aids. To prepare school graduates for enrollment special courses of the English language have been opened.

The University plans to open a new campus with an area of about three hectares near Bishkek. It is also going to open a new student

hostel with a view to drawing more students, especially from Europe and the United States.

The University takes care of further education of its graduates. More than 1,500 of them have continued studies at various universities and institutes of the United States and Europe: Harvard, Yale, Indiana, Sorbonne, and the Central European University (CEU). After graduation some of them get a job at various companies and official bodies in the United States, Europe and Asia.

USAID also supports projects implemented by other foundations and organizations. For instance, the Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia implements a project of crediting students, with a budget of \$250,000. This project also helps graduates to find job in the business sector.

Another USAID project is one for improving the quality of education. It has a regional character status and is also implemented in Tajikistan. USAID partner there is the non-governmental organization Creative Associates International (CAI). Within the framework of this project teachers are trained to use the most modern methods.

The Peace Corps has been active in the sphere of education in Kyrgyzstan since 1993. Its volunteers are active in several regions of Kyrgyzstan where they teach English at schools, work in the sphere of health protection, and at non-governmental organizations.

In 2012 a summer English-language program “El Campo” was carried out in Bishkek with support of the Peace Corps volunteers. Within the framework of this program school students took part in various social projects, went to “ecological camps” in rural districts, and attended meetings of various kind at which discussion were held on socio-political subjects in the English language.

The project “English resource center at schools” is aimed at organizing centers of the English language at Kyrgyz schools. Volunteers discuss with school pupils in English problems connected

with AIDS, alcoholism and drug addiction, “gender problems,” business, etc.

Peace Corps volunteers grant technical equipment and literature to schools where they work. Some rural libraries now open “American corners” equipped with audio and video installations and books and study aids in English.

American councils on international education ACTR / ACCELS have been working in Kyrgyzstan since 1993. Their main aim is to create opportunities for professional development and academic/cultural exchanges.

Since 2005 a special program has been implemented called “Communities Connections.” According to it, specialists of different type can take part in short-term specialized training courses in the United States. The program is financed by USAID (its Bureau for Europe and Eurasia). It has been evolved in order to contribute to the development of popular diplomacy through exchange of ideas and cultural values between participants in the program and the families and organizations which receive them in the United States. Among its participants are entrepreneurs, municipal officials, lawyers, heads of non-governmental organizations, and others. All participants should pass an open contest, and selection is made by the local mission of USAID.

To encourage the development of an open market and the sector of private entrepreneurship in Central Asia the American Central Asian educational foundation has been set up, which takes care of providing accessible and adequate education in western business technologies to local people. Thanks to this foundation, certain higher educational institutions will create favorable conditions for the development of private business and free entrepreneurship.

The main aims of the activity of the foundation are to give needy students educational grants in the sphere of business at three specially selected universities in the region; to evolve and introduce special programs for training teachers of business subjects and improving curricula in each of these universities; prepare the basis for practical studies in order to enable students to work and study abroad, in democratic countries with a well developed market. In Kyrgyzstan this foundation closely cooperates with the American University of Central Asia. Its work is to last until 2022.

Another program – “Open World” gives an opportunity to young leaders from Kyrgyzstan to visit the United States for attending conferences and delivering speeches and reports about the professional sphere of delegates. Within the framework of this program the United States train popular bloggers for Kyrgyzstan. From 2007 about 100 young men working in different fields have left Kyrgyzstan according to this program. The “Open World” maintains contacts with its graduates even after the end of their travels. Ten conferences of these graduates have been held in Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia, and it is planned to continue this practice. Graduates from the “Open World” meet representatives of the U.S. Embassy and take part in various functions organized on the money granted by the U.S. government. The U.S. Embassy in Bishkek takes part in selecting candidates for participation in the “Open World” program.

Programs of student exchanges are also implemented by IREX, which coordinates an international program of the Educational and Cultural section of the U.S. Department of State (GLOBAL UGRAD). It gives an opportunity to students to study at a university or college in the United States for one year.

Within the framework of the Democratic commission of the U.S. Embassy two more programs (“Humfrey” and “Fulbright”) are

implemented, according to which local students can go to the United States to study or work for a probation period.

There is also a program called “One Beat” for young musicians, as well as the “TEA” program for teachers of English, “International Visits” program, and the “Cochrane” program connected with agriculture.

The “Soros-Kyrgyzstan” Foundation donates several grants for support of Kyrgyz citizens. For one, the Open World Institute started a program of academic development in 2004 with a view to supporting the reforms of higher education in the Kyrgyz Republic. It also supports teachers of humanities and helps young teachers studying abroad to return to their Motherland. This program is implemented in the entire Central Asian region and in Mongolia.

On the whole, during the period of Kyrgyzstan’s independence American influence in all key social institutions has been increasing. Infiltration of pro-western people from American educational institutions in state power bodies and the business elite of Kyrgyzstan has been a noticeable trend of recent years. Taking into account the influence on the Kyrgyz state apparatus of Georgian and East European structures, one can expect attempts on the part of the United States to step up the formation of new pro-American elite of Kyrgyzstan.

(To be continued in the next issue)

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SECURE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE AFGHAN FACTOR

In the first half of the 1990s, soon after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. many people predicted that Central Asia would become one of the most unstable regions of the world. Has this prediction come true? At first glance, it has not. It should be admitted that during the years of independent development the Central Asian states, except Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have been lucky to escape fratricidal civil wars. Nevertheless, Central Asian realities show that peace and stability in this part of the post-Soviet area are fragile and shaky. In the view of the well-known American political analysts Boris Rumer, “the developments of September 11, 2001, have made Central Asia the epicenter of geopolitical shock at a global level.”

Having been drawn in a complex geopolitical balancing due to the shift of many global processes from Europe to Asia, the post-Soviet states of Central Asia tried to avoid association with any one world or regional center. They have taken a course to maintaining good relations with all participants in the competitive struggle in the region, which is determined by the two main factors; the rich natural resources of Central Asia, and the fact that it has turned into the “basic springboard” for access to Afghanistan, where the forces of the international coalition headed by the United States have been trying, since 2001, to restore law and order and get rid of international terrorists, who have entrenched themselves there.

In 2014 the international operation in the Afghan-Pakistani zone of military operations should end, which can be followed by increasing domestic and foreign risks, threats and challenges to security in Central

Asia, including the possible radicalization of Islam and stepping up of religious-extremist movements and organizations in the region.

Threats to Security and Challenges to Development

The withdrawal of the U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan planned for 2014 will be crucial for Central Asia, which may face growing threats of destabilization in the region.

The possible future *outside* risks and threats to Central Asia after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan are as follows:

Resumption of a large-scale civil war, escalation of violence in the northern districts of the country, and spreading of military hostilities to the territory of Central Asian states, primarily Tajikistan;

Return of militants (ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks) from Afghanistan and Pakistan to their Motherland, which can prompt participants in the local religious-political movements in Central Asia to uniting with them and starting a sort of a guerilla warfare like the one in Tajikistan in the first half of the 1990s;

Increase of drug production and trafficking, because “harvests” of drug plants in Afghanistan have become 40 times greater during the past few years, and more than 50 percent of Afghan heroine is shipped through Central Asian countries to Russia and further on to Europe;

Growth of trans-border crime and terrorism

All this may aggravate the difficult situation in the sphere of security in the Central Asian region, where militant Islamism is always ready to step up its activity and use any political destabilization and social problems to discredit and undermine the secular ruling regimes.

The growing influence of drug mafia is closely connected with religious extremism. No wonder that the threat of the radicalization of Islam is regarded the principal one by all Central Asian leaders.

The President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov said in his statement on the results of the Russian-Uzbek negotiations in Moscow on April 15, 2013, that religious fanaticism is especially dangerous in Central Asia. A possible destabilization in the region with the help of the “Islamic weapon” has real grounds connected with certain recent events in Central Asian countries and the experience of their interaction with the troublesome southern neighbor – Afghanistan.

We mean, first of all, the temporary disintegration of Tajikistan in the 1990s as a result of the civil war, which was an outcome of taking power in Dushanbe by an Islamic-democratic coalition of different political forces. Secondly, it was the “Batken events” of 1999 and 2000 in Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, when the military forces of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and the fighters of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IDU), which tried to break through to Uzbekistan through Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan), clashed with each other. Thirdly, it was the Islamic “Mojahed” project realized in Afghanistan in the 1990s, which resulted in the radicalization of the Central Asian umma and the stepping up of Islamic radical movements in Central Asia, which established close ties with transnational terrorist organizations stationed in Afghanistan. The biggest and most influential of them was “al Qaeda,” whose units were either liquidated or marginalized, or squeezed out from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Africa and the Middle East and other countries. However, this has not removed the grave danger of growing religious-extremist movements in the Afghan-Pakistani zone. It is possible that these movements, as well as other internal forces may begin an armed struggle for power in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces

from there in 2014. Then, due to close proximity of Central Asian countries and unreliable and badly guarded borders between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, violence and disturbances may switch over to the territory of Central Asian republics.

This prospect is quite realistic, inasmuch as Islamism is coming to the fore in world politics. An example of it is provided by the tumultuous processes going on in the Middle East and North Africa, which are interpreted by their participants as “revolution,” “uprising,” “awakening,” etc. but which are better known as the “Arab spring” outside the boundaries of the Arab world. Having begun under the slogans of social and political changes, democratization of social life, and the change of ruling regimes, these events have resulted in other developments, namely, the coming to power of members of Islamic organizations in a number of countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya), replacement of the secular paradigm of development with a religious one, wide penetration of Islamic terrorist groupings (“al Qaeda,” “al Qaeda in Iraq,” “al Qaeda in Maghreb” (AQ), “al Qaeda on Arabian Peninsula,” and others) in the social life of these countries. They undermined territorial integrity and stability of a number of countries, provoked civil wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and, possibly, in Lebanon and Jordan, and exacerbated old national-ethnic disputes and religious contradictions (primarily Sunnite – Shi’ite). Close connections between the Islamist movements and terrorist organizations operating in the Arab East with the radical elements based in Europe, in the Gulf region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Caucasus have now become quite visible. It is only natural that the secular states of Central Asia view very cautiously the prospect of the possible import of liberal sentiments borne of the “Arab spring,” but tinted in religious shades of political violence, chaos of social life, and terrorist wars.

Nevertheless, the “Arab spring” scenario in Central Asia will hardly be implemented in real life because the strictly centralized power in all states of the region has created a system of harsh control over the special forces of security, the opposition, and the printed and electronic mass media. The clan structure and authoritarian methods of rule create a formidable barrier in the way of actions by the supporters of the “Islamic alternative.” Apart from that, Central Asia has weak ties with the Middle East and its Muslim organizations (except, perhaps, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), there are no traditions of mass public protests or mechanisms to mobilize society to protest actions, which exist in the Arab East. Countries with rather high incomes from the oil-and-gas export (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) can use the opportunities to play down the population’s discontent by adopting social programs, raising pensions, unemployment bonuses, etc. Finally, there are no external forces (at least up to 2014, when it is planned to complete the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan) interested in destabilizing the situation in Central Asia. The United States and NATO, which are largely dependent on Central Asian countries and their transit and transport possibilities, are trying to create an important strategic corridor in the region for delivering military cargoes to and from Afghanistan, and also for pumping oil and gas to Europe.

Potential external threats to regional political stability are aggravated by a great number of domestic problems, mostly of political and socio-economic character. Instability is manifested in many forms: interethnic tension, confrontation between regional elites and clans, impoverishment of the population and wider gaps in people’s incomes and hence, growing social disproportions and high unemployment level, corruption, and low efficiency of government bodies.

Among the serious problems complicating the safe development of Central Asian countries are relative instability of their legitimate authorities, and also consequences and processes which can be provoked by the weakness or rapid changes of the highest officials due to natural causes (death or illness) or political violence (coup d'etat, revolutions, etc.).

Contradictions between states still exist in the Central Asian region. First of all, there is rivalry for the water and energy resources. We have in mind tension caused by the plans to build the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan and the Kambaratin hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan on the trans-border rivers Amudarya and Syrdarya. These projects cause special concern in Uzbekistan, which has already resulted in growing tension between these three Central Asian states, and also problems in Russian-Uzbek relations due to the fact that Russian companies take part in both these projects. Nevertheless, Moscow prefers to agree with all countries of the region on these projects so that the struggle for the imaginable energy sovereignty of some states (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) should not bring harm to other states, primarily Uzbekistan, which is an important economic and strategic partner of Russia in Central Asia.

Secondly, unresolved border disputes become a serious challenge to security in the region. They touch most republics in the region, especially Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where ethnic overlapping and the absence of generally recognized borders are aggravated by a shortage of land and water resources, which gives these conflicts a pronounced socio-economic tint.

Thirdly, the complex unfinished processes of national construction and the formation of state ideologies going on in Central Asian countries often boil down to territorial claims to neighbors, or

claims to regional leadership, which is a typical case of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

On the whole, the main challenges to security in Central Asia are conditioned by internal socio-economic and political problems. There is no direct connection between the development of states in the region (except Tajikistan) and the domestic processes going on in Afghanistan (struggle for power, interethnic and inter-religious conflicts, etc.). All ethnic groups in Afghanistan are interested in strengthening their positions primarily inside the country, but not outside it, and the local Uzbeks and Tajiks, for example, will hardly look for support from among their kindred people in Central Asia. Likewise, it is difficult to suppose that the Talibs, who are mainly Pashtun nationalists, will spread the zone of their influence on to neighboring Central Asian republics, whose population is alien to them and where they can hardly find understanding and support. The “al Qaeda” cells based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and other terrorist organizations, including the Uzbek IDU terrorists, present a more real threat to the countries of the region. After the withdrawal of the main military contingents of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, these groupings may become more active and transfer their destructive influence on to Central Asia.

The combination of potential external challenges from Afghanistan with the really growing internal political risks and a possible merger of the social and religious factors are especially dangerous, when in the conditions of instability and war between different clans, the Islamists receiving fabulous profits from drug trafficking and outside financial support from their brethren in faith become an element of a total disorder and chaos. To oppose such variant of developments the states of the region should have, apart from a strong army and specially trained rapid reaction forces, strategic

answers to internal and external challenges and risks, both collectively evolved and national. It is not clear so far how the existing security structure will be able to correspond to this difficult task, because it is still weak and unfinished.

Two-level Structure of Security in Central Asia

At the *regional level* security in Central Asia is ensured by such military-political and military organizations as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has all Central Asian countries as members (except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan); affiliated security structures – Collective rapid deployment forces of the Central Asian region and Collective rapid reaction forces; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO). The functions and tasks of these organizations are different.

The CSTO singles out Afghanistan among the problems connected with collective reaction to emergency situation within the zone of its responsibility. It characterizes the situation in that country as unstable and almost completely unpredictable. Taking into consideration the fact that the terrorist activity of the irreconcilable armed opposition is not weakening, moreover, it is even increasing in some districts of the country, there is no progress in the fight against drug production and drug trafficking, the level of corruption is very high, and the national armed forces and law-enforcement agencies are virtually unable to control the situation and ensure the country's security, the Collective Security Council of the CSTO adopted a number of decisions to oppose the growing threats from Afghanistan at its session in Moscow on December 19, 2012. It envisaged, among other things, to take measures in order to diminish the negative influence of extremist and terrorist organizations on the situation in the

CSTO member-states after the withdrawal of the main part of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

The CSTO also intends to use specialized structures of the organization more actively to fulfill the tasks facing it. The collective rapid reaction forces are an important element of the CSTO and they are faced with the task to rebuff military aggression, carry on special operations in the struggle against international terrorism and transnational armed organized criminal activity, drug-trafficking, and also liquidate consequences of emergency situations. The military component of these forces consists of units in constant combat readiness capable for operations in any point of the zone of the CSTO responsibility. At the same time these forces are subordinated to the national commands of their countries.

The SCO, although it is not a military organization or a platform (like the Regional ASEAN forum) on which security problems are regularly discussed, includes the struggle against terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking in its priorities. Thus, by decision of the Council of the heads of state of the SCO member-countries adopted on June 15, 2011, it endorsed the Antidrug strategy of the SCO member-states for 2011–2016; earlier, on the initiative of China, a three-level mechanism of antidrug cooperation was formed.

Along with Russia and China, all Central Asian countries (except Turkmenistan which has a status of a country invited to the SCO summit meetings, and observer-countries (Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan), and partners on a dialogue (Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka) are represented in the SCO. Such potential of the SCO enables it to be a powerful mechanism for solving complex problems of regional security, including those related to the situation in Central Asia and the Afghanistan – Pakistan zone.

The elements of the *global level* of security are connected with the membership of the states of the region in the UN and OSCE, interaction with NATO and participation in certain programs of this organization. Thus, within the framework of its many-vector foreign policy the Central Asian countries accept the military guarantees of security given them not only by Russia and CSTO, but also by NATO, the latter often becoming a rival of the CSTO and SCO in Central Asia.

In view of the forthcoming completion of the Afghan campaign new opportunities have opened for the United States and NATO to broaden military cooperation with the countries of the region, which includes granting permission to the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan to fly over the territory of Central Asian countries, and leasing their military objects to some of them; including the U.S. military base functioning in the “Manas” airport in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) since 2001, the base of French military units in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), a military airport in the city of Termez (Uzbekistan) used by Germany, and the airport in Chimkent (Kazakhstan) given to France on January 16, 2013, to withdraw troops and equipment from Afghanistan.

National security strategies of Central Asian countries differ. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, along with elements of military-political cooperation with the United States and NATO, mainly connect their policy in this sphere with participation in the CSTO and the strengthening of their allied ties with Russia. Uzbekistan, which suspended its membership in the CSTO in the summer of 2012, does not refuse from broadening its military cooperation with the United States and NATO; Turkmenistan maintains neutrality in the internal affairs of the region and in the sphere of security, taking no part in regional or global structures responsible for it.

It seems that the regional structures of security in Central Asia may require additional efforts – military-political, diplomatic and economic – to preclude destabilization in the region after 2014. Neither China, nor non-regional political forces (the United States, NATO, the European Union) will assume responsibility for maintaining an acceptable security level there. For the United States, after termination of the war in Afghanistan (or, at least, its participation in it), which is geographically distant from the region, Central Asia will, most probably, lose a considerable part of its military importance, although it may retain, if indirectly, its significance as a place of rivalry with Russia for resources and influence in the region. Definitely, the United States will not be interested in Russia's returning to Afghanistan, all the more so in the strengthening of the Russian military and economic presence in Central Asia. Thus, new realities and opportunities emerging in the region in connection with the Afghan situation will be determined primarily by the position of Russia itself.

Russian Interests in Central Asia

Central Asia retains its priority significance for the Russian Federation, and the geographic factor plays a no small role there: the point is that a greater part of our country's territory lies on the Asian continent, and only one-fifth of it is in Europe. Central Asia is also valuable for Russia in the geopolitical and economic aspect, inasmuch as the region is an important communication bridge leading to South Asia, and a major source of fuel and energy resources. In general, the geopolitical potential of Central Asia can be used by Russia for tackling practical and status tasks as a world and regional power.

An improvement of the situation in Afghanistan by 2014 answers the interests of Russia, inasmuch as it will allow it to exclude any repetition of the scenario of the 1990s, when religious extremists and

separatists acting in the North Caucasus received support from the Afghan-Pakistani source. In this connection the hypothetical “Islamic alternative” for Central Asian countries seems absolutely undesirable to Russia. It is important for our country that the regime in Kabul, which will rule Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the greater part of foreign troops, should neither be Islamist nor puppet pro-American and that Afghanistan should acquire the status of an independent neutral state and its territory should be free from foreign presence. Finally, Russia is interested in stopping drug trafficking going through Central Asia from Afghanistan. It should be admitted that the hopes on cooperation with NATO in the struggle against Afghan drug trafficking are unrealizable. The United States and the North Atlantic Alliance have clearly defined their position on this problem: the struggle against drug production and drug trafficking is not a priority task for them, all the more so since their main efforts at present are concentrated on the maximally safe and smooth withdrawal of the international coalition troops from Afghanistan.

In the light of the above-said, and also in view of the worsening situation in the region, Russia and the military-political structures it patronizes face a difficult task, namely, to step up their efforts to ensure their own security. An agreement with Kyrgyzstan reached in the autumn of 2012 that the Russian military would remain in the country for at least twenty years, and the military base in Kant would receive Russian long-range planes seems quite important. Similar long-term agreement was signed with Tajikistan during an official visit by the Russian President Putin to that country in early October 2012 (a large military base with some seven thousand men and officers is stationed there). Under the agreement the Russian military base will stay in the republic until 2024 with possible prolongation for five-year periods. Besides, the servicemen at the base and their family members are equal

in their status to the administrative personnel of the Russian Embassy. (This is also true of the Russian servicemen at the “Manas” base in Kyrgyzstan).

Undoubtedly, a more significant role in the future could be played by the SCO and its specialized structures for stabilization in Afghanistan. For this purpose Russia will have to develop the organization and bring it to the level of an efficiently functioning international organization working in a multiform format as a mechanism of successful regional interaction.

As to the CSTO, with due account of the Afghan factor, its primary task will be work on the southern borders: improvement of control along the border between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan with a view to putting up barriers to trans-border organized crime and illegal migration; greater coordination of the operation of the special services of the Central Asian countries and Russia; better interaction with the SCO for preventing political threats and risks in Central Asia. Thus, the joint actions of Russia and the Central Asian CSTO member-states can be directed toward creating a new reality, which would allow them to minimize many risks and threats, including those coming from Afghanistan. This is not going to be an “alliance against,” but common work of good neighbors against the real threats. This means that CSTO is for Russia not only an important instrument in regional politics, but also an organization aimed primarily at joint work against threats from religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking.

Russia could offer the Central Asian countries a strategy of answering internal and external challenges and risks, because it is vitally interested itself in the liquidation of potential in Central Asia, including the Islamist threat. A reasonable alternative could be a profound economic integration initiated by Russia, which would

contribute to the preservation of a secular character of the political systems of the states in the region.

Development of Central Asian States during Transition Period (up to 2014)

According to a report of the International Monetary Fund, there were positive prospects of economic growth in the region in 2013. On the whole, Central Asia has succeeded so far to avoid major political cataclysms, despite the presence of difficult problems retarding development in every state.

Tajikistan is still the most vulnerable state from the point of view of security, because it has the longest and poorly guarded border with Afghanistan passing through a very difficult mountain terrain. After 2014 a flow of refugees of ethnic Uzbek and Tajik origin from Afghanistan may begin, which will be driven by a civil war, if it starts. Besides, Tajikistan, more than any other country, may suffer from attacks by such radical religious organizations as IDU and “al Qaeda.”

To prevent the development of such negative scenario of events the Tajik authorities tried in recent years to strengthen their military-political positions with the help of non-regional forces. For one, to strengthen the country’s outside border with Afghanistan they turned to the European Union, especially to its “Border Management Program in Central Asia” (BOMCA). However, due to the fact that the attention of the European countries was turned to the struggle with their own economic and financial crisis, Tajikistan has not received any tangible assistance. Its hopes that international financial institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) will help it cope with the crisis phenomena in its economy and social sphere proved futile. True, the United States and NATO did render certain help to Tajikistan in strengthening its defenses: they created the national center of combat

training, laid out new communications lines and built bridges over the River Pyandzh. Tajikistan did not refuse from western assistance and at the same time developed military cooperation with Russia.

The economy of *Kyrgyzstan* remains the most open in the region, and this republic (along with Tajikistan) is one of the world's biggest recipients of money transfers from abroad (29 percent of the GDP; in Tajikistan – 47 percent). This money is sent back mainly from Russia. The latter also renders the bulk of economic aid. Thanks to this the political situation in Kyrgyzstan gradually becomes stabilized. Besides, the population is tired of “revolutions,” which shattered the country during the past few years, and resulted in a slump in production, inflation, mass migration of people in search for jobs, and politically – in deformation of the state institutions and loss of their prestige.

Kyrgyzstan is distinguished by permanent instability and unresolved problems (especially in the south of the country). Any upheavals, no matter where and when, can trigger off a new political or interethnic conflict. The possible stepping-up of extremist and terrorist movements in the republic can be regarded as a serious challenge to security. This explains the interest of the republican leadership in outside help to rebuff potential threats and challenges. This is why Kyrgyzstan maintains cooperation with the United States and NATO, and also with Russia and CSTO at a sufficiently high level.

In turn, the United States, although it intended to curtail a greater part of its operations in Afghanistan by 2013, does not refuse from keeping its base of Manas in the Kyrgyz capital after 2014.

However, in the autumn of 2012 the Kyrgyz leadership made a certain shift toward greater cooperation with Russia in the military-political sphere. There are plans to turn “Manas” into a joint Kyrgyz-Russian logistics center.

The plans to transform the American base into a civil hub show the country's reorientation to Russian projects in the sphere of security. It is confirmed by the results of the Russian-Kyrgyz summit negotiations in Bishkek on September 20, 2012, when documents were signed on the Russian military presence in the country. The Russian-Kyrgyz agreement fixed the status and conditions of the Russian military base on the territory of Kyrgyzstan which will enter into force on January 29, 2017, and will be valid for 15 years, with possible 5-year prolongation.

The Russian military base will include four objects: a base for underwater weapon tests in Karakol, a center of military communications in Kara-Balt, a radio seismic laboratory in Mailuu-Suu, and an airbase in Kant. Russia has written off a many-million debt of Kyrgyzstan, given a large sum to support its budget, and become a big investor in its energy branch, which shows that Russia has stepped up its foreign-policy activity in Kyrgyzstan.

The political development of such big Central Asian state as *Uzbekistan* has long demonstrated tendencies to isolationism and reliance on its own resources to ensure its security. However, in recent years this course has been combined with certain expansion of its military cooperation with the United States and some NATO countries. A great role has been played by the fact that Uzbekistan has been assigned the main role in the "Northern distribution network" created for transit of American-NATO cargoes from Afghanistan. The United States regards the territory of Uzbekistan as a convenient platform for creating big transport hubs of regional importance and temporary military bases. It is not accidental that Uzbekistan decided in June 2012 to suspend its membership in CSTO. Among the reasons for taking this step was the hope to receive U.S. guarantees of security after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, as

well as the promise to be given a great part of hardware, arms and ammunition shipped from that country.

On August 30, 2012, Uzbekistan's parliament adopted a law prohibiting the deployment of foreign military bases and objects on its territory. There are certain indications that the republican elites will be able to reach consensus on the problem of succession of power and thus avoid serious political upheavals in the future. However, up to 2014 Uzbekistan's leadership will actively develop military-political cooperation with the United States in order to diminish internal threats and block possible efforts to destabilize the domestic political situation from without.

There is a danger that a rather unstable situation concerning succession of power in Uzbekistan, just as in certain neighboring Central Asian states, can be used by the radical Islamist circles. Carrying on anti-government propaganda among the socially active part of the population, primarily young people, they may try to use the existing protest potential to undermine the secular foundations of the state. Realizing this danger and regarding radicalization of Islam as one of the gravest dangers to the country's security, the ruling elite of Uzbekistan is striving to enlist Russia's support.

The President of *Turkmenistan* G. Berdimuhamedov, reelected on February 12, 2012, for a new term of office, continues to pursue a policy of positive neutrality. It is supported by the UN, its structures, and the leading global players, which is largely due to their interest in the richest gas potential of the country and its major projects in the energy and transport spheres. One such project is TAPI (Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India) – a gas pipeline which will be able, if realized, to change the entire geopolitical picture of South and Central Asia.

Turkmenistan is the only country which has not signed agreements with the United States and NATO on transit from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan hopes to keep the previous level of relations with the ruling regime of Afghanistan, irrespective of what forces will come to power there after 2014. All the more so since that country will long depend on Turkmen fuel which is now supplied to its several provinces in the form of petrol and liquefied gas, as well as electric energy. Turkmenistan is also one of the main routes of transit for Afghan cargoes to Europe.

For *Kazakhstan*, due to its great geographical distance from Afghanistan, the level of threats and risks from a possible civil war there is much lower than in any other Central Asian country. Nevertheless, exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan and unpredictability of its political future after the withdrawal of the main part of the international coalition forces and transfer of responsibility for maintaining security in the country to the Afghan national forces can have a negative influence on Kazakhstan whose southern districts are closely connected with the rest of Central Asia. Any destabilization in the states of the region bordering on Afghanistan may directly or indirectly touch on the interests of Kazakhstan. In case of a direct military threat on the part of Afghanistan, which is hardly possible, one can suppose that Russia will take part in defending its ally in one form or another.

Kazakhstan, which has been considered an island of stability in Central Asia, has come across problems of ensuring internal security in recent years. On May 17, 2011, a terrorist act was committed in the town of Aktobe. It was followed by acts of terror in Atyrau, Astana, Almaty and Taraz. From January 1 to September 21, 2012, five anti-terrorist operations were carried out in the republic. Responsibility for terrorist acts were taken by the previously unknown Islamist grouping

“Soldiers of Caliphate” (“Jund al Khalifah”), which had close ties with “al Qaeda.” Islamist attacks have become more frequent after Kazakhstan has established closer ties with Russia, joined the Customs Union, and began to build a Uniform economic area with Moscow.

In the southern districts of Kazakhstan with a big Uzbek population, which is growing due to the constant inflow of illegal labor immigrants from Uzbekistan, there is a threat of radicalization of Islam. Kazakhstan’s special services have found traces of the activity of the banned Islamic organization “Khizb-ut Tahrir,” and anti-government leaflets have been distributed for quite some time. In other words, Kazakhstan is unable to stay aside from the processes of Islamization, including in the form of religious extremism.

Up to 2012 Kazakhstan took a priority place in the Central Asian strategy of the United States. However, after joining the Customs Union and Eurasian economic area, along with Russia and Belarus, it will interest the United States and NATO primarily as an exporter of fuel and energy resources.

In the event of Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from CSTO, the border of Kazakhstan will become its southern boundary, and economic integration within the Customs Union and Eurasian economic area may be strengthened by a military-political component.

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In view of the fact that Russia and Kazakhstan bear greater responsibility for maintaining stability in the Central Asian region, it is necessary to carry on a profound bilateral dialogue. Its aim is to discuss ways to oppose the destructive global and regional tendencies, strengthen the existing security structures, and turn them into effectively working mechanisms.

Evidently, such strategy can hardly be evolved and carried on by the Central Asian countries without Russia, which is fully aware of its responsibility and is ready to use various instruments for the purpose – the CSTO, the Customs Union, the Unified economic area, and the Eurasian Alliance.

*“Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta.
Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika,”
Series 25, Moscow, 2013, No 2, pp. 105–123.*

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