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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2016.10.001. R. SHAFIEV. ECONOMY UNDER SANCTIONS. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES AND POSITIVE OPPORTUNITIES // "Strategia Russia", Moskva, 2015. P. 15–24.

Keywords: economy, sanctions, import, export, banks, trade, manufacturing, budgetary expenditures, investment, crisis, recession, capital flight, structural deformation, imbalances and disparities, the fuel and energy sector, mineral resources, GDP, credit ratings, macroeconomics, a recession.

R. Shafiev,

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of World Economy, Russian University of Economics
named after Plekhanov, the Russian Federation
Civil Service Adviser of 1st class

The sanctions have changed the industrial policy of the country. The investment climate became worse, and the Russian economy was named the least attractive for investment. However, there are sectors where sanctions have had the effect of growth. Prohibitions stimulate the state on the development of its economy. Also, the existing conditions promote disappearance of weaker actors from the market, which enables stable companies to strengthen their positions.

Despite the economic difficulties, Russia managed to avoid a recession in 2014. Economic growth amounted to 0.6%, partly

due to the effect of growth in transport at 1.3% in 2013. Response measures helped to stabilize the economic situation, taken by the Government and the Bank of Russia in due time. In November, there was a transition to a floating exchange rate of the ruble, as well as measures were taken to support the financial sector, including additional capitalization of banks in December. Another favorable factor was associated with the compensating effect of the decline in imports that helped mitigate the impact of deteriorating foreign trade conditions. At the same time a significant weakening of the ruble and trade restrictions have given impetus to a number of small manufacturing industries.

At the same time operational data indicate that there was recession in the 1st quarter - the beginning of the 2nd quarter. GDP decreased by 0.6% in April 2015, after falling of 0.4% in March, 0.6% in February and 1.6% in January, writes R. Shafiev.

The growing recession, of the GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2015 was due to the fall of the dynamics of sectors of industrial production, transport and the financial sector primarily. Dynamics of export taxes, which supported the GDP in the first months of the year, began to have a negative impact on GDP. There was substantial increase in budget expenditures on defense in the 1st quarter of 2015. However, the dynamics of these costs become negative in April. It has become one of the factors of reducing the output in the engineering industries. However, Federal State Statistics Service data on investment are quite favorable. The reduction of import of investment goods from abroad occurs abruptly. The output of engineering industries and construction materials identified the total reversal of the positive trend in the industry in April. The outflow of capital from the private sector also has accelerated, and reached about \$12 billion to \$8 billion in March, which pointed to the risks of accelerating decline in the 2nd quarter of 2015. Ukrainian crisis is not to blame, the researcher notes. The fall in oil prices and the tightening of sanctions began in late July 2014, so their impact on the economy began to be felt only

in the last quarter of 2014. Therefore, its impact will be more perceptible in 2015 and in 2016.

Negative trends in the Russian economy, including the economic slowdown, have been observed over a number of years before Ukrainian crisis. If its GDP grew by 4.3% in 2011, then by 3.4% – in 2012, and it grew by only 1.3% in 2013. The author sees the main reason for it in the accumulation of structural deformations, distortions and imbalances which have resulted from a liberal economic policy, designed on the patterns of the IMF. R. Shafiev identifies four major strains and imbalances. The first is the exaggerated role of the fuel and energy sector and the degradation of the manufacturing industry caused by the orientation of the economy on the export of oil, gas and other minerals. The second is the narrow focus of energy exports to Europe with underdevelopment of other geographical directions of foreign trade. The vast majority of new oil and gas projects have been implemented in cooperation with European and American companies. The third is a intensive build-up of foreign borrowing by Russian banks and companies on the background of large-scale outflow of capital from the country. And finally, the fourth, resulting from the previous two, is a discrepancy of foreign policy course (an attempt to overcome the dominance of the West in the international arena and to construct a multipolar world, in cooperation with the BRICS countries) to foreign economic relations (orientation of financial and trade flows to the West). The model of economic growth, based on the expansion of energy exports and other types of mineral raw materials, has worked in the globalizing world economy and the continued growth of global oil prices, however, completely exhausted itself after the global financial and economic crisis, 2008–2009, highlights the researcher.

It is necessary to develop a long-term program of structural reforms as soon as possible, clearly marking its priorities, objectives, sources of funding, milestones, and to provide for an active role of state regulation. The effectiveness of such an approach is proved by numerous examples of countries in East

and Southeast Asia, including South Korea and China. It is impossible to imagine a state which is not built into the system of world economic relations in the global economy. However, the degree of relationship may be different. This dependence on the world can be reflected in a number of areas in Russia, including provision of the country with strategic goods (food, medicine, technology, components for cars). The main partners in the country's trade balance are: the EU countries (42.2% of imports and 53.8% of total exports), APEC (34.3% of imports and 18.9% of exports); The EAEC (13% of imports and 14% of exports).

The largest of them are China and Germany. The dependence is not uniform in the Russian regions of the economic sanctions of the West. There are several areas where the industry can expect some decline. The sanctions for the Russian oil and gas companies on the export of technologies can complicate maintenance of the current rate of resource extraction on dwindling oil fields in West Siberia. But steel companies and mining companies can get the benefit of the introduction of sanctions.

The author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich

2016.10.002. O. KARPOVICH. ON THE FEATURES OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL POSITION IN THE MODERN WORLD // "Vestnik Rossiyskoy natsii", Moscow, 2015. № 6. P. 206-214. The abstract of the article.

Keywords: globalization, global economic space, convergence, economic and cultural integration, knowledge economy, innovative upgrade, geopolitical conflict, geopolitical competition, socio-demographic component, population decline, the post-bipolar world.

O. Karpovich,

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The author relies on the assumption that the modern world – a world of global competition, and each country aspiring to the role of a great power to be competitive in the geopolitical, geo-economic, socio-demographic and geo-cultural forms of struggle.

According to the author, the leading trend in the development of international relations is the strengthening of the economic component of competition in the context of globalization, which is expressed primarily in rivalry of national economies.

Globalization is a dominant and complex process, involving political, economic, cultural, informational, technological components and identifying the contours of the global economic space. Competition between states in the geo-economic sphere increases with the development of globalization and convergence, the formation of a single world market. These processes make a state dependent on the competitiveness of its national economy, more and more.

Uncompetitive countries lose their military and political potential the lag in the standard of living increases, such countries become socially and politically unstable. Defeat in the geo-economic war is a prerequisite for the loss of sovereignty, becoming a "failed state", the authorities are unable to control its territorial integrity, as well as demographic, social, economic, etc. situation. In 2005 the American magazine "Foreign Policy" and the NGO "American Peace Fund" introduced index of failed states.

The most important factor ensuring the success of the processes of globalization is technological progress, dissemination of modern information and communication technologies, creation and development of the global Internet. Scientific and technological revolution was a powerful catalyst for the

development of the unifying trends, convergence, economic and cultural integration of different countries and peoples since the 1960s.

The key point determining the development of the world economic space in the 21st century is the innovative nature of the economy. Vector of contemporary development in many countries is shifting more and more towards an innovative model of functioning of the economy, based on the use of rapidly growing intellectual resources. The rapid increase in population and the increase in the social significance of the so-called "creative class" are observed almost everywhere. The "new economy" or "knowledge economy" is based on creativity and knowledge, 9/10 world of scientific knowledge has been created over the past three decades.

Therefore, the author writes, the growing influence of the world economy on the socio-economic development of Russia will take place against the backdrop of tightening global competition, increasing the role of innovative development factors in the leading countries, and restructuring of the world economic order. The role of the external economic policy increases substantially as one of the most important factors of socio-economic development of Russia, the innovative upgrade and improving the competitiveness of its economy, as well as the implementation of national priorities and resolution of key social challenges.

The main geopolitical conflict of modern times appears the struggle between the United States competing for the world hegemony, and independent geopolitical actors that defend their right to be independent and play their own role in world politics.

The main resource of geopolitical competition are armed forces, nuclear potential, military and political blocs, government involvement in international organizations, influence on geopolitical processes, the international authority of the state. An important role is played by the degree of activity of the state in solving the main problems of world politics, its involvement in the

resolution of political conflict, implementation of mediation, participation in peacekeeping operations.

The author notes that there are significant benefits of the five powers – the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France, ensuring the predominance in the political competition. These powers act as intermediaries in the major geopolitical conflicts and participate in peacekeeping operations more frequently than others as, first, they have the status of permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus have a decisive impact on global policy, secondly, they have the greatest military potential, and third, they have nuclear weapons.

The author points to the increase in the socio-demographic component of global competition. Today, the world population stands more than 7 billion people, it can reach 9 billion people by 2045, according to forecasts. The birth rate is below the required for simple reproduction of the population in developed countries, the total fertility rate in developing countries is more than 4 children per woman.

Life expectancy is increasing in most regions: it is 67.2 years on average worldwide, 76.5 years – in developed countries and 65.4 years – in developing countries, but only 54.6 in the least developed countries (where there is serious negative impact of HIV / AIDS). In the future, the world's population will grow old, and even more people will live in cities than at present. Increase of population will be observed mainly in the cities of developing countries. By 2050, 70% of the population is likely to live in cities.

There is a population decline in Russia, due to the low birth rate and high mortality due to the demographic crisis, intensified social problems, low population density, which may provoke a violation of the country's territorial integrity and the normal functioning of the Russian economy. However, Russia is still among the top ten largest states' population. A significant number of migrants, entering the country each year, is the evidence of its attractiveness, especially for the population of the post-Soviet

countries, the author notes. There was a positive trend in the birth rate and mortality fall in the demographic situation in recent years.

We must recognize that international relations in the post-bipolar world have become more unpredictable, complex and contradictory. A place of one global conflict has been occupied by a variety of cultural and civilization conflicts.

The main conflict between civilizations is the confrontation of the West, striving for world hegemony, and other civilizations, defending their independence. Examples of such processes are the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–2015, as well as Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism – the emergence of ISIS.

The author notes that the leading role in today's global competition takes not a direct use of armed force, but an indirect one, the so-called methods of "soft power". "Soft power" includes the country's mass culture, understood as a collection of important for the society: values, standards and lifestyles, national achievements; political ideology, including the basic ideas (for example, classical liberalism), models (the same market economy), the interpretation of the world and national history; "people's diplomacy" of non-governmental organizations and ordinary citizens.

Over the last 15 years Russia has managed to regain position of the world economic leader, to restore the competitiveness of the national economy, lost after the collapse of the USSR and the fall of the economy in the course of unsuccessful reform of the socio-economic sphere of the country. The budget deficit has been eliminated, the external debt has been paid, significant reserves have been accumulated.

Natural resources, huge reserves of oil and gas play an important role in the Russian economy. At present, Russia has become an energy superpower, playing a leading role in the global energy market, along with the OPEC countries. However, the development of raw material economy will inevitably lead to the dependence on imports of goods and technology, retaining the role of a raw material appendage of the world economy.

The military potential has a leading role in the global political competition. Modern world-system is unstable, the degree of conflict in international relations and security threats on a global scale are increased. More than half of the total increase military expenditures fall on the U.S. share, and the total military expenditures of NATO countries make up 2/3 of the world military expenditures. The U.S. and its allies are seeking to secure a dominant position in the military sphere. Constantly increasing rate of growth of China's military spending is impressive.

In the 1990s, Russia has lost many of the ideological orientations, allowing the Russian society previously to resist attempts of destruction and assimilation successfully from other civilizations. Until the 19th century Orthodoxy was this ideological core, in the 20th century – communism. If in the next few years Russia will not make a modernization breakthrough in key areas, it will have the unenviable fate: The country is not only ceases to play any significant role in international relations, but it can be divided into spheres of influence among the more fortunate geopolitical competitors.

The author outlines the geopolitical threats to national security of Russia, which are related to expansion of the West, hybrid warfare and "color revolutions".

The author of the abstract- N. Ginesina

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2016.10.003. A. SAVATEEV. STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: ACADEMIC PROJECT // The 2nd International Science Education Conference "Bigiev reading." Moslem thought in the 21 century: the unity of tradition and renewal. (Proceedings of the 2nd International Scientific-Educational Conference, St. Petersburg, May 17-20, 2015). Moscow, 2016. P. 300-311.

Keywords: Islamic movements, radical Islam, al Qaeda, Taliban, ISIL, the Islamic Caliphate, the prophet Muhammad, Salafi, P.A. Sorokin, ideationalism, Wahhabism, extremism.

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The author notes that the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Institute for African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences is Implementing the program "The Islamist movement in the world political process: ideological directions of the organization, development trends". Within the frames of this program there is being prepared a monographic publication in several volumes under the title "Islamic radical movements on the political map of the modern world". The main objective of the project is to give an idea about the nature, activities and

development prospects of Islamist movements in the countries where radical Islam manifests the socio-political activity. The subject of the research is the processes generating radical doctrines, goals and objectives of radical organizations, their relations with the official authorities and society. The research is also focused on the mutual influence of the West, Russia and other world politics actors, on the one hand and Islamic movements on the other; the emergence of religious-political organizations, their rivalry and impact on the Moslem society, the relationship between fundamentalist and traditional trends.

The problematics of the phenomenon of the radical Islam, according to the researcher, is extremely diverse. Up to now there is no well-established terminology to define it: such terms as *Islamism*, *political Islam*, *Islamic fundamentalism*, *Islamic terrorism*, *jihadism*, *Wahhabism*, *Salafism*, *revivalism* etc. are in use. They all express a characteristic component of the contemporary global political process – the widespread, often very aggressive movements, aimed at power grab in accordance with the project of creating the worldwide Islamic Caliphate. The political Islam has for the first time in Modern Times declared itself during the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979. Accelerated Europeanization of economic and cultural life in this country, carried out by the Shah's government, met with public resistance resting upon Islamic religious principles, which in a short time brought to power the spiritual and religious leaders of the Iranian society. The events of the Iranian Islamic revolution caused a surge of religious activity in the Islamic countries with a notable Moslem ethnic component. The events of September 11, 2001, when the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York crumbled as the result of the terrorist attacks, became a turning point in the history of Islam. Official authorities accused Islamic terrorists, led by al-Qaeda, of the hijacking and the attack on the building, other experts argued that this was a grand provocation organized by the secret services of the USA and Israel. The name "al-Qaeda" from that time has become a household word for all extremist Islamic groups.

Regardless of their ideological content, it has become a symbol of the Islamic extremism. The talks about the danger posed by radical Islamic organizations, embodied in al-Qaeda, arose all over the world, the major American and European publications devoted their front pages to this subject. In a number of countries in the center of the Islamic world nationally-oriented regimes that had existed for decades collapsed under pressure of the local Salafi forces, and Islamist groups, movements, associations, inspired by various doctrines, mostly Salafi got loose. So, seemingly prosperous Iraq and Libya eventually collapsed, Syria and Yemen became a scene of fierce fighting between Shiites and Sunnis, Egypt has experienced several shifts of power and became unsafe for tourists, who sometimes become victims of extremists.

The apotheosis of the Islamic radicalism is the Islamic State which stormed into the world political life and became the center of attraction for many hundreds of thousands of supporters of the idea of restoring the global Islamic Caliphate. In a few months, the Islamic State (ISIL) advanced to the role of the leader of all Islamist movements. It quickly became the center of attraction for many Moslems of Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, Central Asian countries. The Mujahideen from the US, France and Tatarstan, Dagestan and the UK, Germany and Tyumen region, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, not to mention Islamic countries folded there.

The loss of the central unifying idea, which at the time was construction of the society of economic and social equality contributed to the growth of sympathy for the radical schools of Islam; the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated inefficiency of the socio-cultural project focused solely on the achievement of financial results. The lack of uplifting human imperatives has led to the fact that the Islamist doctrines have come to the forefront. They feature the active idea, but in the form of unconditional acceptance of Islam by all citizens of Russia and the CIS countries and establishment of an Islamic theocratic state. And, in the absence of a nationwide solidaristic idea, they proved to be topical.

The advantage of this doctrine as compared with the hoarding ideology was that it appealed to the soul of man, appealed to the "ideational representation of the world", which the Russian-American thinker P.A. Sorokin distinguished as one of the types of cultural mentality. Carriers of ideationalism strive to bring their souls closer to God, and to save not only their own souls, but those of others people. That is, according to the classification given by P. Sorokin, the active ideationalism, which is demonstrated by the deeds of great religious reformers. In the case of the latest Islamic movements, such as ISIL, Taliban, al-Qaeda, the individual groups in Libya spiritual and material needs and goals are balanced, but the material needs are clearly subordinate to the ideational, i.e., spiritual ones. Because of this, radical Islamists, including fundamentalists "in oneself" or "for oneself", tend to the eternal, imperishable values. Their philosophy of Being is the eternal, unchanging existence of society and political relations represented a thousand times since the time of the prophet Muhammad. The true apostles of the purity of Islam who declared themselves fighters for the faith, consider the external values of the material world only from the point of view of their usefulness for attaining the eternal, global purposes, primarily creation of the Caliphate where all Moslems of the world and all areas where there is at least one true believer would be unified. Being ideationalists from this point of view, the Sunni radicals represented by their leaders (the brightest among them are Ayman al-Zawahiri, the late Osama bin Laden, etc.) are, on the whole, indifferent to any values, illusory and vain, in their opinion, and in some cases even hostile to them as the causes of erosion of the soul and violation of "revolutionary resistance" and harmony of beliefs. In this radical society, material success and wealth cannot become the predominant value, they can be perceived only as a necessary condition for achieving a high, transcendent goal. Devotion to the religion, absolutist ethics, piety and knowledge of the Sharia law, the hadiths — that is, according to the belief of the Salafis, the ideal of a true Moslem. But in particular it consists in protection and

reconquering the commandments set by Allah and conveyed by the Prophet, accomplishing not only the five basic principles (pillars) of Islam, but also the sixthone: to wage the military Jihad.

In Russia of the Modern Times Islam, as a significant political factor, has begun to assert itself since 1991, after the elimination of Soviet power and the relevant socio-cultural insights. Most sharply it manifested in Chechnya. The resulting vacuum was quickly filled by religious dogmas, including Islam. In the North Caucasus there emerged and intensified the movement of the radical Islam. And in the states of Central Asia, where the party of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, etc. asserted themselves, the activity of Islamists, in some cases, put the political leadership of these countries to the brink of survival. The powerful influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has spread to Pakistan and become a real danger for the existence of the former Soviet republics -Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan.

The impact of Islamic radical movements on society, the nature of inter-state and inter-confessional relations in previous times also occupied one of the main places in Russian and foreign Islamic studies. No less interest for researchers is the understanding of the endogenous features of the Islamic religious tradition: theological ideas about the nature of power, interrelation of public and legal institutions. The current surge of politicization of Islam, its emergence as a direct factor in political life resulted in a wave of publications in Russia and abroad. Political aspects, the effects of the radical statements of Moslems – that is what occupies the minds of Russian and foreign analysts.

In the new study of the Institute of Africa the radical Islam is considered from the position of the civilizational approach, primarily, as a socio-political phenomenon. The areas of Islamic religious (ideological and practical) activity, which oppose themselves not only to public and interstate status quo, but to the current interstate and intercivilizational order are regarded as radical ones. And here the question arises: should we consider

radical the brands in Islam in any country (no matter how extremist they may have shown themselves in the international arena, such as Wahhabism), if they have acquired the official status? However, it is clear that the origins of radicalism and aggressiveness of that same Wahhabism should be sought in the Saudi state, in those historical political and religious circumstances that led to the emergence of Wahhabism in its current form and without examining its role in the Saudi Kingdom one can hardly hope to understand the mechanism of action and significance of this phenomenon in the countries of Asia and Africa. A religious component in such a study is necessary, as well as politological analysis. However, both methods fit into a broader and deeper civilizational approach, which *a priori* implies them as elements of scientific analysis.

Radicalism is not confined to purely political or social phenomena. This phenomenon in itself is an expression of the nature of Islam, its desire to preserve and establish itself as the striking element of all-embracing, universal civilization. Having no equivalent technological means, the extremists resort to the use of force to offset the weakness of their values, norms and technical backwardness especially in opposition to the doctrines of alien civilizations. At the same time, the authors of the study proceed from the idea of the multiplicity of radical brands and their incarnations. They struggle fiercely for leadership, for the right to represent themselves as spokesmen of the thoughts and sentiments of the entire Ummah as more than others observing the spirit and letter of the laws of Allah.

Each volume of the monograph is divided into two parts. The first part includes general theoretical works: a synthesis of research into the nature of the radical Islam, its historical roots, philosophical, legal, religious studies, reflection in the economy. The analysis of works of the classics of the Islamic thought and doctrinal works of Moslem lawyers and theologians, which contain an excuse or justification for extremist activities will also be included. These basic texts will make the theoretical basis for

understanding the concrete manifestations of the Islamic radicalism presented in the second part of the monograph. The second part includes regional blocks of articles, consolidated by the idea of the common history and socio-cultural past and present of the peoples inhabiting the region where the Islamic movements will be seen through the example of a particular region of the world. First there will be presented analytical articles examining the historical, cultural and social preconditions of the spread of Islam, the degree of its penetration, and influence on public and political life of the region.

The sequence of the studied regions is determined by their role and value in the Moslem world in general, the severity of the fight of radical forces against the state. The first volume, containing the analysis of the political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa, has already been published¹. The choice of this region as the content of the first volume predetermined the intensity of crisis events where the primary role is played by Islamist groups. This volume will be followed by the second one dedicated to the situation in the North Caucasus and the CIS republics – Azerbaijan and Georgia. Articles on all the republics have already been collected, and the editorial board has begun to edit the materials. The contents of the third volume will probably be the Islamic State, advanced to the first place as a factor of geo-civilization meaning and now playing a leading role in the global Islamic movement. The fourth volume will be given, apparently, to the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia.

Part of the materials is supplied by the authors. Next, the "African" volume will follow, dealing with the studies of the influence of Islam on African societies and states, contributing to the transformation of the relations of the Islamized Africa with the Western world and the Ummah in general. The sections dedicated to Islamist tendencies in Russia, Western and Central Europe will follow in the descending order of socio-political opposition and weakening of the influence of radical groups.

The regional blocks will be based on the chapters dedicated to individual countries, which most fully express the specificity of radical thought and practice of the modern Islamism. In the country article, in addition to scientific analysis, the author is to give information about the existing radical Islamic organizations to specify their goals and objectives, to describe their connections with religious and secular associations, not only within the country, but also abroad. The ultimate goal will be achieved, writes A. Savateev, if the author presents a forecast of the evolution of the studied radical structures.

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The author of the abstract V. Schensnovich

2016.10.004. L. ALMAZOVA. REVIEW OF THE MOSLEM IDEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE VOLGA-URAL REGION (20-21 CENTURIES) // "Bulletin of the Kalmyk Institute for Humanities Research RAS", Elista, 2014, No. 2, P. 40-46.

Keywords: Islam, neotraditionalists, reformers, modernists, the Qur'an, the Prophet Muhammad.

L. Almazova,
Ph. D., Associate Professor,
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L. Almazova examines the process of modernization of Islam at the late 19 – early 20 century. The researcher notes that collision of the two worlds – the booming West and the "frozen in its medieval dreams" East – was marked for the Moslem cultural area by epoch-making changes in the field of world perception, particularly in the capitals of Islamic countries, among the

enlightened elites. In the Moslem community there are appearing various ideological directions, defining the vectors of development of society from quite different positions. Since in most cases all the issues – political, social, cultural – were viewed through the prism of religion, the basic division is defined by the determination of religious positions.

By the end of the 19 century the Moslem community featured two main forces: the conservatives (traditionalists) and the reformers. The phenomenon of traditionalism is characterized by such features as adherence to taqlid¹, desire to preserve the power of Moslem scholars, predominance of medieval traditions in the field of education and unwillingness to change over time. Reformism, in turn, can be divided into the type of fundamentalist reform and that of modernist reform. The first involves the selective assimilation of Western technological and institutional achievements and bringing Islam in line with the Islam of the time of the Prophet Muhammad as it is seen by their proponents. However, by the end of 19 – beginning of 20 century the second type of reformism comes to prominence, and it may be determined by the term "modernization". If modernization is a change in the course of time of all the aspects of society, technological, scientific and institutional progress, then, accordingly, modernism is an ideology that seeks to change consciousness in accordance with the changing conditions of life. Modernist reform represented by its leaders Jamaliddin Afghani, Muhammad Abdo, Qasim Amin, and others – became the dominant trend in the early XX century.

Its characteristics were: theological justification of the idea of free will, absolutization of the role of reason, calls for renewal through ijтиhad, reinstatement of woman's rights. All this was accompanied by a surge of attention to the text of the Qur'an as the primary source of decision-making and, as a consequence, increase of its role in fiqh (Islamic law). Equally important features of modernist reform are relief of the religion of prejudices and accretions of later centuries. Referring to the Tatar-Bashkir community of the late 19 – early 20 century, L. Almazova discovers

the same ideological tendencies. The stronghold of traditionalists, who did not want to change over time, was the magazine "Din va Maishat" ("Religion and life"), headed by its editor - Galimetdin Khanislamov and one of the most prolific authors Ishmi-Ishan Ishmuhametov (the latter studied in Bukhara). Among the ideas cultivated in their environment, there should be mentioned criticism of jadidism², preservation of the Bukharan system of education, waiver of any European borrowings (theatre, tradition of holding musical evenings, studying Western and Russian languages, etc.), strict adherence to gender segregation, the apology of taqlid and the preaching of isolationism for the Moslem community in Russia. The traditionalists had their own, quite a wide audience, although it should be noted that by the beginning of the second decade of the 20 century they had significantly backwatered, which was particularly felt in the field of Moslem media and education.

A prominent role in the ideological space was also played by the adherents of modernist reforms: Musa Bigiev, Ziaeddin Kamali, Zakir Kadiri - disciples of Muhammad Abdo, who were educated in al-Azhar³. They were the most well-known public figures among the Moslem population of the interior Russia. Their interpretation of the basic Islamic concepts such as polygamy, gender segregation (hijab), Holy war (Jihad) and a number of others, very significant for understanding of the modernist type of religious reformism. They preached the same ideas of coincidence of the Quranic edicts and reason, as their foreign co-thinkers.

If the Bolshevik regime put an end to the modernist reform of Islam among the Tatars and the Bashkirs, in the foreign East its decline is associated with other historical events, especially the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the accession of Pro-Western, often purely secular regimes in Moslem States: Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Pakistan, and some others. While the Soviet Union fought against religion, in Moslem countries, in the hands of Pro-Western bourgeoisie, there arose new ideological currents that can be considered continuation and development of the

fundamentalist reform of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who proclaimed the return to the "purity" of Islam at the time of the Prophet Muhammad and its purification from the non-Islamic late components. So by the time the Volga-Urals region returned to the arena of ideological processes in the Islamic Ummah, the balance of power was completely different.

The Moslem community in the Volga-Urals region over the past two decades has undergone significant changes: earlier Tatars and Bashkirs, on the wave of religious revival, completely filled up the mosques on Fridays, now the situation has changed. Besides, various factors of historical, cultural, social, economic and psychological nature brought about changes in the composition of the congregation. In Tatarstan and Bashkortostan where the level of religiosity is rather high (79-80% of "ethnic" Moslems respondents declared themselves as believers) only 4-7% are practicing Moslems. If in the middle of 1990-s parishioners the mosques were filled mostly by elderly people - aged 60 and above, now most of the worshipers are young people from 18 to 35 years. Similar trends start to occur a bit later in the composition of the Moslem clergy, which is now noticeably "younger".

Two main ideological camps formed among the Moslems at this socio-religious background: neotraditionalists, Hanafi-oriented⁴ supporters of the local forms of Islam, and fundamentalists / Salafists, followers of the "pure" Islam. Besides, there are other powers having less numerous supporters: representatives of liberal Islam, members of the movement "Hizmet" ("Service") founded by Fethullah Gülen, the so-called "faizrakhmanists"⁵, the Sufi direction "suleymanji"⁶. Local neotraditionalists - Hanafiyah⁷ - enjoy the most privileged position. Spiritual administration of Moslems (Muftiyat) and the system of professional religious education are within the sphere of their influence, the same can be said about the vast majority of parishes (except for certain areas of East Bashkortostan and oil producing districts of Tatarstan). The leaders of neotraditionalist Islam studied in either Bukhara religious school or (younger

generation) in local schools, and later underwent training at short-term (1 year) overseas courses.

The main ideologeme of neotraditionalists of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, appealing to Russian authorities, is preservation of the local traditions of Islam, adapted to the existence of Moslems in the environment of a different confession. And since Islam has for many centuries been an instrument of preserving the national identity of the Tatars and the Bashkirs, in our days, the traditionalists also defend the use of the Tatar language as the language of the Friday sermons. The recognition of legitimacy of the adat (local customs, including those of religious nature), compliant with Sharia has made possible the functioning of many religious rites, uncharacteristic for Islam in other areas (Quranic gatherings, commemoration of the dead, pilgrimage to local Holy places). Historical relationship with the Central Asian centers of Moslem scholarship led to adoption of the Hanafi school of law and assimilation of Maturidi principles⁸ in the interpretation of creeds. The Tatar Islam, forced to develop in the context of constant pressure of Christian missionary work, isolation from the rest of the Moslem world, having suffered all the trials of atheistic propaganda in the Soviet period, could not, for objective reasons, maintain universalistic features. The sphere of influence of neotraditionalism covers mainly the older generation of Moslems, as well as a certain part of young people, primarily graduates from local and foreign educational institutions loyal to the older generation, who found their place in the structures of the spiritual administration of Moslems and their subordinate parishes.

Their opponents – the so-called fundamentalists / Salafites have their own point of view on some religious issues. In general, the local fundamentalist / Salafi discourse is quite universal: the idea of the return to the purity of Islam of the first centuries, respectively, interpretation of the divine attributes in the spirit of the provisions of Ibn Taimiya, condemnation of innovations in the field of religion (visiting of "Holy places", celebration of mawlid⁹, etc.), negative attitude to Sufism and Kalam¹⁰, adherence to the

language of interethnic communication in the course of a sermon (in the Russian context the Russian language). A significant part of fundamentalists / Salafites are quite loyal to the authorities, but the society has not develop unambiguous attitude to this part of the adherents of "pure" Islam, which may be seen from the actions of the official Moslem clergy. They are sometimes denied the right to directs mosques: for example, Shaukat Abubakirov was removed from the management of the community mosque Anilar in Kazan, Ishmurat Khaybullin was forced to leave the post of the Imam of the mosque Falaq in Ufa, they meet problems applying for job. The sphere of influence of this movement encompasses, first of all, young people, emigrants from Moslem republics of the CIS and non-CIS countries, which are not used to the local version of Islam. Moslem converts from among the Russians and other historically non-Moslem peoples also often choose the Salafi version of Islam, where worshipping is, as a rule, in Russian.

One more trend, which was essential for formation of religious discussions, especially in the early 2000-s, is presented by the liberal Islam. However, says the researcher, the influence of liberal Islam in Moslem community is actually irrelevant. Thus, the trends of the Islamic community development in the Volga-Ural region are very similar to the global processes. In the beginning of the 20 century the reformation modernism was the most influential group opposing the official traditionalism, but in the early 21 century a considerable part of believers in the region turns to fundamentalism / Salafism in its more or less moderate form. In the Volga-Ural region during the two studied periods the state religious policy in relation to Islam is characterized by a pronounced line of succession, being armed with all the same goals, allies and forms of combating undesirable elements. In the 20 century, as well as in the early 21 century, the government is interested in control over the situation, which is ensured, on the one hand, by law enforcement agencies, and on the other hand by the Spiritual Administration of the Moslems as the official structure of the Moslem clergy. Both in the past century

and now the state relies on the traditional supporters of preservation of local forms of Islam. However, the state support does not provide popularity and credibility among ordinary Moslems to adherents of local neotraditionalism. Despite the fact that all the controls and power were in the beginning of 20 century and are now in the hands of the traditionalists, their ideological competitors have certain advantages. Opposition from the part of the authorities and their ideological independence gives them a certain moral advantage. In the beginning of the 20 century reformers-modernists were opponents to traditionalist modernists, and now various fundamentalist leaders are playing this part. Neotraditionalism is still retaining control over the Moslem community only due to persecution of not officially recognized Moslem leaders and their supporters. The events of July 2012 – assassination of the deputy mufti Waliullah Yakupov, the most prominent leader of the modern Tatar neotraditionalism, and the attempted assassination of the mufti Ildus Fayzov are the evidence of serious miscalculations in the field of the state religious policy and the need for its revision. As stressed by L. Almazova, a more differentiated approach to the dissenters in the field of religion is needed, as well as support of a variety of forces, providing information space for expression of a spectrum of opinions to the movements which are in the field of the Russian law.

The author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich

References

- ¹ The principle of taqlid – following opinions of Moslem scholars (ulama) in dealing with controversial issues – is opposed to the principle of ijтиhad – the independent judgment based on provisions of the Quran and the Sunnah (the collection of statements and a statement of the acts of the Prophet Muhammad).
- ² Jadidism – the phenomenon of the reform of religious education among Moslems of the Russian Empire (late XIX – early XX century).
- ³ The University of al-Azhar – the most authoritative school in the Islamic world, opened in 988, in Cairo (Egypt).
- ⁴ The Hanafi school – one of the four legal schools of Sunni Islam.

- 5 Faizrakhmanists – supporters of Faizrakhman Sattarov, the founder of an Islamic sect not recognized by Moslem official structures.
- 6 Suleymanji – supporters of the Turkish preacher Suleyman Hilmi of Tunahan.
- 7 The official website of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Tatarstan (hereinafter DUM RT) specifically provides that "DUM of RT" conducts religious policy in accordance with the legal school of "Abu Hanifa" [www.dumrt.ru].
- 8 Maturidism – one of the directions in the interpretation of the Muslim dogma distinguished by a high confidence to reason in seeking solutions to religious issues and the concept of free will (Ikhtiyar).
- 9 Mawlid – the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad.
- 10 Kalam – religious scholastic philosophy of Islam.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2016.10.005. K. TRUEVTSEV. THE MIDDLE EAST NODE AS THE EPICENTER OF CONFRONTATION OF THE MODERN PAN-ISLAMIC PROJECT AND THE NATION STATES // "Natsii i natsionalizm na muslimanskom vostoke", Moscow, Institute of Oriental Studies, 2015, P. 93–115.

Keywords: the civil war, threats of invasion, armed conflict, "Arab spring", ISIS, internal situation, escalation of the conflict, the Sunni and the Shiite.

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In recent years, the epicenter of the conflict in the Middle East has moved into Syria and then Iraq. Today, both countries seem partially disintegrated geographically and institutionally, most of their space is covered by the civil war. In fact the interstate Sunni and Shiite axes were formed in the region, taking the total character at the regional level.

The author notes the unpredictability of the conflict, since the terrorist Islamic State is at the center of it, is not controlled from the outside by anyone and is self-sufficient in financial, economic and military terms. No state in the region is free from the real threats of invasion, armed conflict with its neighbors and the internal collapse. This applies particularly to Turkey, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

The author emphasizes that the current Middle East conflict has passed several stages in its development, each of which is characterized by a change in its dynamics, composition of participants, as well as a consistent escalation and expansion of the territorial limits and the number of participating forces. The conflict began in Syria as an internal one and was considered an integral part of the "Arab spring" at the first stage. Later Syria was removed from the general temporal context of the dynamics of the Arab Spring by the escalation of this conflict.

The opposition's demands and a tough response of government forces intensified the confrontation excessively and many politicians and analysts have come to the conclusion that the Assad regime would fall to the summer of 2011. The author draws attention to the fact that the Assad regime has recognized the validity of a number of the protesters' demands. Mass demonstrations in support of B. Assad were held in several cities, indicating the presence of a major base of support for the regime in the country.

Further, the author gives various explanations ISIS phenomenon and the reasons for its victories. The main reason is considered the supply of weapons and money to the Islamists from the West, and above all the U.S. and also their allies from the Middle East - Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey (some add Israel). After a massive influx of mercenaries from the Islamic world, from Europe, America, the former Soviet Union, ISIS has transformed this quantitative accumulation into a new quality, and thus there was this expansionist explosion.

Certain steps have been taken to enhance the social and political base of the regime and at the same time to stimulate the disengagement of the opposition. This policy was justified. The conflict passed a number of phases from the summer of 2011 and up to the present time, which have been caused by both external and internal Syrian and regional factors and events, giving it a full-fledged features of a regional conflict already. The author examines in detail the stages of the conflict, as well as the

participation of the Western powers and other countries – Syria's regional neighbors. By the second half of 2013, not only the internal situation in Syria, but the international situation around it began to take shape in favor of the regime of B. Assad: the regime managed to oust the opposition forces inside the country; Practical formation of the Shiite "axis" has begun in the regional plan; With respect to neighboring Syria Sunni countries, by mid-summer 2013, Turkey was virtually neutralized, Lebanese Sunnis could not provide effective military support to the Syrian opposition, Jordan did not want to participate in the conflict.

As is known, the escalation of the conflict has been avoided primarily due to the position of Russia, it became possible to unblock the situation by reaching an agreement with the Syrian government on the elimination of chemical weapons. Since the activities of ISIS had an obvious, Sunni shade, the opposing the Shiite "axis" was formed in the region. Thus, there were two opposing political and confessional "axis" – the Sunni and the Shiite – in the framework of the armed conflict in the region, and this confrontation was a potential threat to the total spread of the conflict at the regional level.

ISIS was declared the state by itself, there was a professional military leadership, as well as high quality planning and implementation of military operations. There was a combination of two main opposition forces of the Sunni area – radical Islamists, of the former "al-Qaeda" in Iraq, and the Baathist guerrilla movement. This was the reason for the success in capturing much of the "of the Sunni Triangle" in the western and central parts of the country.

The author points out that Islamic State (ISIS) as the caliphate became a reality for the first time in recent history. The conflict finally crossed the borders of individual states after the creation of ISIS. The terrorist state directly affects the territorial interests of at least three other countries in the region, just threatening their territorial integrity, and the very existence of Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina.

2016.10.006. E. KASAEV. OIL PROJECTS OF RUSSIA IN IRAQ // "Vestnik Analitiki", Moscow, 2016. P. 66–72.

Keywords: Iraq, oil projects, investments, oil and gas fields.

E. Kasaev,
Ph. D. (Economics)

E. Kasaev notes that despite the seizure of the Northern and Western territories of Iraq by militants, Russian oil companies increasingly assert themselves in the South of the country, implementing a number of major projects.

In 2012–2013 Moscow the Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki visited Moscow. After talks with Russian political leaders and representatives of big business, he noted significant progress in the oil and gas partnership. The Iraqi Minister of Oil Abdul Karim Luaibi stated that recently 10 new oil fields have been discovered in Iraq, and the development of these fields requires substantial foreign investment, including from Russia.

Last year Kurdish delegation headed by the President of Iraqi Kurdistan Massoud Barzani paid an official visit to Russia. The delegation made an attempt to shift Russian foreign policy towards Erbil (the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan), urging Moscow not to concentrate exclusively on the deals with Baghdad. Last winter the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov visited Baghdad. In the course of talks with Nuri al-Maliki and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq Hoshyar Zebari it was pointed out that in recent times Russian players stepped up its activities on the oil field of Iraq. In the spring of 2014 the President of "LUKOIL" Vagit Alekperov had a meeting in Baghdad with Iraq Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Hussein Shahristani. The parties discussed the progress of implementation of the projects of development of West Qurna-2 Deposit and exploration of Block-10 as well as other prospective projects in Iraq, where the Russian company could participate.

One of the most promising projects is the creation of a joint company with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, which is going to undertake oil and gas fields exploration. The parties discussed the investment project of the Russian company in the field of petroleum chemistry in the province of Basra and the construction of a refinery in An Nasiriyah. The plans of LUKOIL to organize production of associated gas at the West Qurna-2 field were also approved by the Iraq party. Oil production in the field started in March of the current year. According to the assessments given by the company, the investment in West Qurna-2 up to 2014 inclusive amounted to about \$ 4 billion. LUKOIL is now discussing the possibility of oil deliveries from West Qurna-2 with the Chinese companies Sinopec and CNPC. The contract for such deliveries may be concluded for a period of one year with subsequent prolongation.

The West Qurna-2 field, located 65 km north-west of the major port city of Basra, is one of the largest undeveloped oil fields in the world, its recoverable reserves amount to about 14 billion barrels of oil. The additional agreement to the contract signed in 2013 defines the project target level of production of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day (expected in 2017) for 19.5 years and extending the overall life of the contract to 25 years. In June this year another additional agreement to the contract was signed. According to this agreement the list of works should also include the construction of Tuba-Fao pipeline, as well as changing the order of reimbursement of the project costs. The project "Tuba-Fao" involves the construction of two pipeline legs, with a length of up to 120 km each, from the existing Tuba tank farm to Fao tank farm, the main export hub in Iraq, at the Persian Gulf coast. The new pipeline, according to Alekperov, will permit the export of Iraqi oil in the amount of 3 million barrels per day (comparable to the total current production of Iraq. - E. K.).

As for compensation pattern, the Iraq party is to reimburse the contractor for the expenses incurred and the remuneration for the produced oil. Additional costs, not directly associated with oil

and gas operations, but which Iraq may ask the contractor to make (for example, mine clearance, pipeline construction, improvement of infrastructure) are reimbursable as well. Under the terms of the service contract all the crude oil produced belongs to the government of Iraq, which is to pay the Russian company a service award in the amount of \$ 1.15 per barrel and reimburse the cost price of the produced oil (\$3 per barrel). After the certain level of production is achieved, the contractor will receive a portion of oil produced as remuneration.

The Russian company has another project in Iraq. The contract for Block 10 located 120 km west of Basra, was signed in November 2012, the block is operated by a consortium of "LUKOIL overseas" (60%) and Japan's INPEX Corporation (40%). The contract territory of the block is being cleared of mines. Development of Block 10 is associated with very high risks. Due to withdrawal of the Norwegian company Statoil from West Qurna-2 project, the Russian player refused to find a partner before starting oil production at this field, is independently implementing the active phase of its development and, consequently, assumes all risks and capital costs. On the one hand, Block 10 is in the vicinity of West Qurna-2, which permits LUKOIL to hope for successful exploration. However, the new site has no proven deposits, and in accordance with the provisions of the service contract, even if the exploration has a positive result, Iraq has the right not to recognize the field as a commercial one if recoverable reserves of the site do not exceed 200 million barrels. In this case the contract shall be terminated upon expiry of the exploration period. Should this happen Iraq compensates the contractor for additional costs only, and exploration is not paid for separately. Even if Baghdad recognizes commercial strike of Block 10, the start of production may be postponed for 7 years, according to the law. If the contractor does not want to wait for resumption of the work, it may receive reimbursement of its expenses, without any additional payments, and withdraw from the project. In future this scenario may be applied to "LUKOIL Overseas", because Iraq may come up

with its obligations to OPEC and the lack of appropriate infrastructure within the country as the reasons to "freeze" the work on the project for several years. In this context the Russian company has no choice but to wait patiently and miss lost profits. If the group deems it necessary to leave the project, its place may be taken by a new contractor showing up when everything is already running fine.

E. Kasaev stresses that American and European heavyweights still remain in the shadow of the Russian and Asian companies actively operating in Iraq. It is anything but coincidence. The rapidly developing economies of Asia require ever-growing volumes of energy. And the Asians are willing to take risks in various energy fields to obtain it. The oil and gas business in the US, in its turn, as well as many other Western countries, efficiently distributes forces, and skillfully avoids acute angles; it does not get involved in Baghdad complex twists and turns, but cooperates effectively with the Kurds in the North, spending less effort and getting more dividends. However, it should not be assumed that now Western players are left out for several reasons. The West was actively involved in the current political dispensation in Iraq. American and European lawyers were advisors in the course of development of the tender legislation which primarily takes in consideration the interests of Iraq. Consequently, in future Baghdad is quite capable to start lobbying for access of Western corporations to the local market. To avoid such a negative prospect, Russian oil companies and political players have to continue strengthening close contacts with the Iraqi authorities as well as to discuss with Baghdad the exact terms of the agreement for Block 10. In addition, says E. Kasaev, it is advisable to minimize high legal risks caused by the lack of a framework hydrocarbon law, which has not still been accepted in Iraq since 2007.

Besides "LUKOIL overseas" another Russian company "Gazprom Neft" is successfully working in Iraq. It began industrial production of "black gold" at the Badra field in May 2014, in the

territory of Wasit province in Eastern Iraq. According to preliminary estimates, geological reserves of the field amount to 3 billion barrels of oil. The contract with the government of Iraq was signed in 2010 according to the results of the tender held in December 2009. The tender was won by the consortium of "Gazprom Neft", Kogas (Korea), Petronas (Malaysia), TPAO (Turkey). The share of "Gazprom oil" in the project is 30%, Kogas - 22,5%, Petronas - 15%, TPAO - 7,5%. The share of the Iraqi government, which is represented in the project by Oil Exploration Company, OEC, is 25%. "Gazprom Neft" is the project operator. The field development project is designed for 20 years with possible prolongation for 5 years. Production start is planned for the current year, and by 2017 the volume of production should reach 170 thousand barrels of oil per day (about 8,5 million tons per year) and remain at this level for 7 years. "Gazprom Neft" is also implementing three projects in the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, according to the information provided by company, the work is still on the preparatory stage. According to the statement of General Director of "Gazprom oil" Alexander Djukov, in future the company plans to deliver the oil produced in Iraq to European and Asian markets.

In his speech at the Russian-Iraqi business forum in Moscow in June 2014, the President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Iraq Jaafar al-Hamdani highlighted the contribution of Russian companies to increase of oil production in Iraq. This statement permits to count on favorable prospects not only for the mentioned players, but also for other Russian companies that already have projects in Iraq and can start work in the oil fields of the country in future.

"Bashneft" obtained the right to develop oil projects in Iraq too. This year it plans to begin exploration at Block 12. This was announced by Vice-President of "Bashneft" Michael Stawski in the autumn last year. The company is engaged in development of Block 12 in consortium with Premier Oil. Its share in the consortium is 70%. The consortium has already signed a contract

on exploration, development and production with the Iraqi party. Investments in the exploration program at Block 12 amount to \$ 120 million. for the next 5 years. "Bashneft" has already granted to its subsidiary Bashneft International a loan of \$ 110 million for exploration in Iraq. The block is located in the provinces of Najaf and Muthanna, and is a part of the Western desert – an unexplored region with the greatest oil potential in Iraq.

Apart from "LUKOIL Overseas" and "Gazprom Neft", "Rosneft" and "Zarubezhneft" consider the prospect of joining the Iraqi projects. It the beginning of this year, Vagit Alekperov confirmed that LUKOIL thinks it possible to join the "Nasiriyah" project, including through creation of a consortium with both Russian and international companies.

The results of new deals with Iraq (if any) will not be obtained soon as Arab officials and businessmen, as a rule, wary of foreign investors seeking to get profit in the shortest possible time. The Iraqis are more willing to cooperate with those who are focused on long-term projects, with attraction of modern technologies and a large number of jobs for the local population.

Despite the many economic and political risks, said E. Kasaev, the Russian players continue to earn credibility in the Iraqi market. However, the extremely unstable situation in the country is able to make serious adjustments to the plans of domestic companies. The South of the country with the impressive hydrocarbon reserve is still under Federal control, and it may get in the hands of the Islamists.

The author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich

2016.10.007. G. SMIRNOVA. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN LIBYA AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF M. GADDAFI // "Economic, socio-political, ethno-confessional problems of the Afro-Asian countries: Memory of V. Rastyannikov / Under the editorship of O. Bibikova and N. Tsvetkova / IOS RAS - Center for Strategic Trend Studies. Moscow, 2015, P. 143–155.

Keywords: Libya, M. Gaddafi, radical Islamists, civil war, oil, economics and politics.

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G. Smirnova says that three years after the fall of the Gaddafi regime another round of civil war began in Libya as the result of the actions of opposition forces and NATO bombing another round of civil war began. This time it is the confrontation between armed groups of radical Islamists and units of the Libyan army, under the control of Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar. Fighting against radical Islamist groups associated with "al-Qaeda" and "Ansar-al-Sharia" ("Supporters of Sharia"), and the organization "Moslem Brotherhood" operating in Libyan territory, began in May 2014. And from mid-July, the Islamists launched a military campaign, dubbed "Libyan Dawn" (the military operation of NATO coalition forces against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, was called "Dawn Odyssey". – G. S.).

After the overthrow of Gaddafi' the political and economic situation in the country took a turn for the worse. The Transitional National Council (TNC) created with the support of Western backers and headed by Mahmoud Jibril, had no clear program of action. In July 2012 the country held the first parliamentary elections after the overthrow of Gaddafi with 142 newly formed political organizations participating (during the 42 years of Gaddhafi's reign political groups had been banned, but in 2012 the TNC lifted the ban on the establishment of parties on religious,

tribal and ethnic lines). Only the most influential and numerous of them were able to qualify for the mandates in the highest legislative body of the country. These are "Alliance of National Forces" (ANS), which brought together more than 40 parties and 200 social organizations and liberal groups and was the coalition of liberal forces. These forces were headed by the leaders who were in exile outside of Libya. They stood for moderate Islam, liberalization of economy, openness to the West. The leader of ANS, Mahmoud Jibril, headed the government during the transition period. Another liberal political party was "National Centrist Movement", headed by Ali Al-Tarhouni, Oil Minister in the transitional government of the NTC.

The political organization "Party of Justice and Development" (AKP) was in fact a political wing of the Islamic movement "Moslem Brotherhood" in Libya, which had for a long time been in the underground or abroad. The party "al-Watan" ("Homeland") was set up and is supervised by the radical Islamist group "al-Gama'a al-Islamiya" in Libya. It is headed by a known Islamist activist, the former military commander of Tripoli, Abdelhakim Belhadj, one of the leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting group (LIFG). The movement of Salafi - supporters of one of the most conservative sects of Islam was represented by "al-Asal" ("Basis"), headed by Sheikh Abdelbasit Havila. The Libyans were to elect 200 Parliament members, who were to form the new government and the Expert Council. The latter was to prepare the draft of the new Constitution, which was supposed to be submitted to referendum, and then hold presidential elections.

On August 8, 2012 the TNC which governed after the overthrow of Gaddafi handed the power over to the new Libyan Parliament - the General National Congress (GNC), formed after the elections held on July 7. The new government was headed by Ali Zeidan. According to the Egyptian newspaper "al-Ahram al-Arabi", a number of Islamic radical activists-Islamists managed to take positions in the power structures of Libya. Among them

were 14 prominent figures of the Islamist groups who had fought against the government 20 years ago. Many of them had been in the ranks of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in prisons, fought against Gaddafi. After the transfer of power from the Transitional National Council to the General National Congress - the GNC (interim Parliament) - the situation in the country did not improve. It can be explained by the fact that the GNC was composed of representatives of the most diverse segments of Libyan society. A large number of "independent" MPs represented different regions and tribes. The contradictions between regions, between the Islamists and supporters of the secular, liberal way of development, between opponents and supporters of the ousted regime were intensifying as well as the separatist sentiments. In addition there were tribal disputes, where tribes had their own armed forces, which took control over economic facilities, especially oil fields, claiming a share of oil revenues. All these disagreements were primarily based on the struggle for oil resources and redistribution of financial flows from their sale. Five governments, in turn replacing each other, were unable to establish control over the whole territory of Libya. The major part of the country was controlled by various groups of Islamist militants, the armed groups of tribes and regional elites. The day after the celebration of the third anniversary of the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime (17 February 2014), the rebels issued an ultimatum to the Parliament of Libya with the requirement to resign. Representatives of Islamist political parties tried to push through the GNC a vote of no confidence in the current government headed by Ali Zeidan. The aim of the Prime Minister Zeidan was restoring order in the country, disarmament of illegal armed units, fight against terrorism, reforms in the economy, in particular development of the industries not related to oil, attraction of foreign investments. The attempt of the Islamists was not a success, but it was an evidence of political instability and the looming political crisis in the country associated with the deteriorating economic situation, inability of the central

authorities to ensure safety of the population, with separatist sentiments in certain regions. In March 2014, the GNC insisted on the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan. On February 20, 2014, the elections for the Constitutional Assembly were held. The Constitutional Assembly was to work out the new Constitution. On April 23, 2014 a Libyan politician and economist Ali Tarhouni, who had been a staunch opponent of Gaddafi was elected the Chairman of the Constitutional Assembly. After years of staying abroad he returned to Libya in 2011 and was appointed Minister of Oil and Finance at the TNC.

In June 2014, Libya held parliamentary elections and according to their results there was formed the House of Representatives (Parliament) which dismissed the GNC, where the Islamists held strong positions. As far back as in December 2013, the GNC decided to make Sharia the basis for the legislation of the country. It was announced that the legal rules prescribed by the Qur'an, and the hadiths will form the basis of the activities of all state institutions and agencies. According to the Minister of Economy Mustafa Abu Fanas, Libya was to transform its economic and banking system in accordance with the Islamic law prohibiting the charging of loan interest. The Deputy of the GNC Salah Mahmoud told the conference that Libya would join the international process of introducing Islamic principles in the banking system, which is gaining momentum due to the banking crisis in the US and Europe. The Islamists and representatives of political parties cooperating with them, the losers in the parliamentary elections, refused to reconcile and continued functioning of the GNC, appointing Omar al-Hassi as the Prime Minister. The House of Representatives, ousted by the Islamists from Tripoli and forced to meet in Tobruk, approved, Abdullah-al-Thani on this post. Actually, the country found itself under dual power. On the one hand, the Pro-Islamic GNC in Tripoli and on the other hand the Parliament in Tobruk elected at the general parliamentary elections. Thus, the country had two parliaments – the Tripolitanian and the Tobruk – and two

governments – that of Omar al-Hassi and that of Abdullah al-Thani. The House of Representatives has at its disposal the National Army of the General H. Haftar, created in the spring of 2014, backed by Egypt, GCC countries, the air force, the Navy and supported by certain tribes in Eastern province. The GNC, in turn, relies on the forces of the Libyan army, and the well-armed groups "Brigade of the Martyrs of February 17" and the Islamists, as well as on assistance of the Berber tribes. The Tobruk government is supported by the world community and the Tripoli government – by Qatar and Turkey. Fighting in the country does not stop: troops of the General Haftar are fighting with various Islamist groups, in particular with the movement "Ansar al-Sharia" associated with "al-Qaeda", recognized guilty of attacking the American Embassy in Benghazi in September 2012 and of murder of the American Ambassador and officially declared by Washington a terrorist organization.

The international community made certain efforts to resolve the conflict. With the mediation of the UN special representative for Libya Bernardino Leon the parties began peace talks. The first phase took place in late September 2014. In the result of it two resolutions have been adopted: "to start a political process to resolve the problem of state institutions and to appeal to the warring sides calling for ceasefire". The next stage of the negotiations is to be held before long, however, according to some experts, a break in at the second and following stages of the negotiations is hardly probable, and the UN appeal to the warring parties in Libya to start a political dialogue for restoring stability in the country in the foreseeable future will not be heard. Libya faces many problems, the main of which is the destruction of statehood and the absence of civilized tools to normalize the situation. There are more than 1.5 thousand of armed groups operating in the country: radical Islamists, Gaddafi supporters, local tribes adhering to political views of all kinds. It is doubtful that the parties fighting for at least three years, would agree to a truce, if each of the groups will not receive the corresponding dividends.

In the meantime, according to G. Smirnova, the West has removed itself from the problems encountered in Libya after the overthrow of Gaddafi. The government of the U.S., the UK, Germany, France and Italy agree that the military solution to the Libyan crisis does not exist, and the key to the problem of saving the Arab State is a peaceful internal dialogue under the auspices of the House of Representatives (National Parliament) of Libya, elected on June 25, 2014.

The bloodshed in Libya is going on. On December 20 2014 the radical Islamist group "Libyan Dawn", which established control over Tripoli and Western parts of the country attacked the largest Libyan ports. The terminals were stopped. In late December, the militants of that group fired several missiles at the tank farm in the port of As Sidr and burned a few tanks. The militants of "Libyan Dawn" repeatedly attempted to seize the coastal stripe of Libya, the "Oil Crescent". This stripe begins 500 km East of Tripoli, and the area houses major oil terminals. Thus, Islamist groups are trying to establish control not only over oil production but over oil exports as well. In his address to the UN Security Council the special UN representative for Libya Bernardino Leon said that the Libyan leaders should act quickly and decisively, otherwise the risk of losing national unity and territorial integrity of the country would be real and inevitable.

Unfortunately, these fears have come true. In these days members of the Islamist organizations "Libyan Dawn" coordinate their actions with the radical group "Islamic State". Infiltration of the radical Islamist group "Islamic state" into Libya began in the spring of 2014, when Libyan fighters who had fought on the side of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, began to return home in order to found a branch of the organization there. Libyans who went to Syria in 2011, joined the existing local jihadist organizations, or set up their own ones. In 2012, one of the groups fighting for the Syrian rebels, proclaimed foundation of the "Brigade of Battar." Later, the soldiers of this brigade have confirmed their fidelity to the IS and fought for it, as well as for its rival "al-Qaeda". In the spring of

2014, many of the soldiers of the "Brigade of Battar" returned to Libya, and founded in Derna (the stronghold of the extremists) the organization "Islamic Youth Shura Council" (IYSC). Among those who joined IYSC there were members of a branch of the organization "Ansar al-Sharia" in Derna. They declared enemies all those who refused to recognize their power, killing journalists, judges, military officers and members of the "Brigade of Abu Salim" associated with "al-Qaeda". Derna was captured by the extremists immediately after the overthrow and killing of Gaddafi, in particular by the militants of the movement "Ansar al-Sharia" (declared by the UN a terrorist organization).

In September 2014, a delegation of the IS arrived in Libya to meet with IYSC. After the meeting this organization swore allegiance to the leader of the IS Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (real name Ibrahim Abdallah). Armed squads of the IS identifying themselves as "soldiers of the Caliphate in the province of Libya" seized the radio and TV centre of the city of Sirte and use them for broadcasting their propaganda programs. The IS militants control military training camps in the vicinity of Derna. From October 2014 to April 2015, IS have formed, in addition to the Derna, a network of affiliated cells in other towns: Beida, Benghazi, Sirte and Tripoli. In November 2014, the supporters of al-Baghdadi declared the Barka province in the East of Libya, "a province of the Caliphate". Tripoli and Fezzan were also declared the provinces of the Caliphate. The IS division in Cyrenaica counts 800 fighters who have created a number of training camps¹². The group has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on police stations in Tripoli, the oil refinery in al-Ghani, kidnappings and executions of foreigners. This organization also accounts for the massacre of Egyptian Copts in February 2015 and Ethiopian Christians in April 2015, attacks on diplomatic missions of foreign states. The presence of the Islamic State inside Libya was headed by one of the leaders "of the Libyan fighting Islamic group" Abdelhakim Belhaj. He started his career in the ranks of "al-Qaeda", successfully fighting against the American occupation of Iraq. In 2012, when

the US and NATO began military actions in Libya, he became a "fighter for freedom" and fought against the "tyrannical despot" Gaddafi, was arrested and imprisoned with other members of LIFG (after the victory of the rebels with the help of NATO forces it was renamed to "Libyan Islamic Movement"). Washington did its best to release the "fighter for freedom" and place him at the head of the Pro-Western Islamist factions fighting against the Libyan army.

ISIS is expanding into Libya, using the chaos, the lack of strong centralized authority, contradictions between the two parliaments and governments, between regional elites, the feud between the tribes. ISIS is broadcasting propaganda programs proclaiming the rapid expansion of their Caliphate in Libya. However, according to some foreign researchers -Frederic Wehrey, Ala' Alrababa'h, strengthening of the positions of the IG is actually prevented by the contradictions in the Islamist movement, in particular between IYSC and pre-existing Jihad groups. The tension intensified still more when the Islamist organization "Brigade of the Martyrs of Abu Salim" (Derna) was criticized by more radical Islamists for support of the GNC elections held in July 2012, which were considered anti-Islamic by the members of "Ansar al-Sharia". In the course of fierce clashes IYSC managed to dislodge from Derna the "Brigade of the martyrs of Abu Salim and Ansar al-Sharia", strengthening of the positions of the IG ideologically strengthening of the positions of the IG to "al-Qaeda". This enabled the supporters of the IS to strengthen its foothold in Derna. The government of Libya in Tobruk is extremely concerned about the situation in Libya, which is turning into a base of terrorism. On February 18, 2015 at the meeting of the UN Security Council the head of Libya's Foreign Ministry Mohammed al-Dairy appealed to the international community to help the country in combating the international terrorism and, first of all, equip the army, which requires lifting the embargo on arms. At the meeting with the Minister of Foreign of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov in April 2015 the Libyan Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani asked

Moscow to assist in the reconstruction of the country and its state institutions.

The complicated internal political situation in Libya after Gaddafi's overthrow was accompanied by a sharp deterioration of the economic and financial situation. As a result of the political crisis resulting from the armed insurgency of the opposition forces and the civil war, oil production in the country fell drastically, from 1.66 million barrels per day to 480 thousand barrels per day (in 2011). Due to the takeover of some oil facilities by armed units and local tribes and, a series of strikes in the oil fields, blocking of the maritime terminals by militias, the situation in the country deteriorated sharply. Oil production fell to 200 thousand b/d., and according to some data, even to 100 thousand b/d. Militants seized the largest oil deposit, Ash-Sharara, which produced 200 thousand b/d. The major oil ports in Eastern Libya were not functioning due to the fact that they were occupied by armed troops who tried to sell oil independently. As a result, according to the Minister of Economy of Libya, the losses of Libyan economy in 2013 exceeded \$ 10 billion. GDP fell by 12.3%.

According to the data as of January 2014, Libya's GDP fell by 12.1% as compared with the previous year. The reduction in oil production affected primarily the status of the financial sector. The state budget deficit of Libya in 2014 reached the record level of 43.5% of GDP against a deficit of 3.6 percent in 2013. Due to the deteriorating financial situation in the country depending mainly on the export of hydrocarbons, the government intends in 2016 to abolish fuel subsidies (10.6 billion LD in 2013). The budget for 2014 due to the duel power in the country was not adopted. In the absence of funds to finance current expenditures and investments in the economy, the authorities were forced to spend forex reserves of the Central Bank, which at the end of 2012 were estimated at \$ 120 billion. According to the evaluation of the World Bank, if the situation in the country does not stabilize, the forex reserves of the Central Bank of Libya will be spent over the next four years, causing collapse of the economy.

Under the circumstances of continuing fragmentation of the Libyan society, it actually being a confederation of separate areas and cities, often warring, tribes and clans struggling for the increase of their share in oil production revenues, and some regions are not controlled by any of the central authorities, it is premature to make optimistic forecasts. Moreover, Libya is in the state of civil war again and the outcome is not yet known. Outlining the forecasts for further development of Libya, we should not forget that this North African country has huge reserves of high quality oil and natural gas (not properly explored yet). Libya ranks first in Africa in oil reserves and fourth in gas reserves. The main buyers of Libyan oil were European countries – Italy, France, Germany, UK, Spain. At the end of the 2000s, it was reported about the alleged availability of new oil basins in Libya. This heated the interest of Western countries for Libyan oil in accordance with their desire to limit oil supplies from Russia and Iran. Maybe, the information about large reserves of hydrocarbons was one of the reasons for the return to Libya of the US oil companies hoping to reap significant profits. The interest of outside forces in Libya oil and gas resources will probably lead to competition between them and support one or another of the warring factions. Given the difficult political situation, the destruction of the system of statehood in the country, the absence of a strong central government, clan and tribal nature of Libyan society, the large number of armed groups, restoration of order in the country and economic recovery can prove be a long and difficult process. Besides, the situation was sharply complicated by infiltration into the territory of Libya of militants of the terrorist group of the ISIS, which fact may lead to further destabilization throughout the region. At the same time without achieving political stability Libya will not be able to attract foreign investment and to achieve reactivation of the oil industry – the basic condition development of its economy and the welfare of the popul.

The author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich.

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2016.10.008. D. MUKHETDINOV. ON THE ISSUE OF THE RUSSIAN ISLAM // "Islam v Sovremennom Mire", Moscow, 2015, Vol. 11, № 4, P. 82–90.

Keywords: social and cultural practices, "Russian Islam", ethnicity, distinctive practice of Islam, Muslim cultures.

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The article deals with the specifics of the Tatar Muslim socio-cultural practice using, as an example, the particular socio-cultural realities of the Russian Muslim culture. It is divided into two parts.

The author proves in its first part, that the posing the question about the features of the social and cultural practices is consistent with Koran and the Sunna.

The term "Russian Islam" refers to all the Russian citizens, including those who do not consider themselves ethnic Russian, so the term should not be perceived as an imperial and chauvinistic.

The author believes that the term "Russian Islam" is incorrect, because Islam can not be either Russian, or Arab, or Tartar, or Turkish. Islam is an idea, granted to all nations.

The author examines the question of the relationship of Islam as a universal religious message, on the one hand, and on the other

one – ethnicity, and the existing forms of life, thinking, worldview, which are characteristic of each individual nation.

The author examines the question of the relationship of Islam as a universal religious message, on the one hand, and on the other one – ethnicity, and the existing forms of life, thinking, worldview, which are characteristic of each individual nation.

The author points out that ethnicity does not play a significant role on the position of Islam – Islam is beyond ethnicity, therefore, ethnicity of a person does not matter, the main thing is his belonging to the Ummah.

The second part of the article deals with the specifics of the Russian Islam as a social and cultural reality.

The author writes that one of the most important tasks of the Russian Muslims is to show on the basis of historical and religious analysis that the Russian Islam is a distinctive practice of Islam, which has the specificity of the cultural, philosophical, social and domestic terms.

The author concludes that the main intellectual and spiritual task for the Russian Muslims is to understand their own existence and their place among the other Muslim cultures.

The author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

2016.10.009. A. VAVILOV, YU. ZININ, A. KAZANTSEV, A. KRYLOV, A. ORLOV, A. FEDORCHENKO, A. CHECHEVISHNIKOV, A. YARLYKAPOV. "ISLAMIC STATE": PHENOMENON, EVOLUTION, PROSPECT // "Analytical reports (Institute of International Studies) Moscow State Institute of International Relations (U) of the MFA", Moscow, 2016, Vol. 1 (45), P. 5–44.

Keywords: Middle East, Iraq, Syria, "Islamic State", caliphate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Prophet Muhammad, the "Arab Spring", "Hezbollah", "Moslem Brotherhood", "Al-Qaeda", "Taliban", religion, fundamentalism, terrorism.

The analytical report submitted by the writing team headed by A. Orlov (Institute of International Studies of Moscow State

Institute of International Relations (University) of the MFA) provides a scientific rationale for the phenomenon of the "Islamic State" and its prospects. Undeveloped state institutions are typical for the Middle East. The unexpected increase of popularity of the "Islamic state" (IS) should be studied in the context of the search for alternatives to the traditional state system in the Middle East. The IS has adopted not a real model of a state in the Moslem world, but the concept, which was developed in the writings of Moslem jurists. It depicts the ideal "fair state" according to Quran and proposes to consolidate in a national state not a nation but an Ummah, a community of believers. That is why, according to the researchers, it makes no sense to consider the IS as a state in the modern sense. The IS is a "Daula" (the Arabic word for a state). In the classical period of Islamic history Daula meant above all a dynasty, not a territory, and sovereignty is not its characteristic feature.

Thus, the IS has found the best formula of legitimization among the Sunni population of the Middle East and some other regions, because another tool of political influence of the IS is fidelity to the "caliph" (at the moment this title belongs to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). How long will this model be able to exist? Politicians and scientists, and the general public around the world are trying to answer this question.

The authors of the report are examining theoretical models of the "Islamic State." The use of the phrase "Islamic State" bring forth the associations with such concepts as fundamentalism and integrism, supposes referring to the sources of sharia, and the "golden age" of the reign of Muhammad and the first caliphs. In fact, Islamic fundamentalists base their ideas on the fact that the classical Islamic state is theocratic by nature, and the rulers, straying from this principle, are proclaimed the "infidels." Over the past 150 years there have been three waves of Islamic fundamentalism. The first one in arose the XIX century, within the framework of anti-colonial expansion in the Middle East. The new rise of Islamism fell on the period of the struggle of the Asian and

African peoples for independence and self-determination in the middle of the twentieth century. It was marked by the appearance of prominent Moslem theorists of this trend. The most important of them were Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979), who lived in India and then in Pakistan, his organization "Jamaat-e-Islami" enjoys great influence even now; Egyptians Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) and Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the ideologists and creators of the "Association of Moslem Brotherhood" (AMB) in the Arab world. They rejected the "imported" ideas of nationalism, capitalism and socialism and put forward the Islamic ideal as the only true alternative of development for achievement of equality, brotherhood and prosperity of the people. The AMB, a charitable and educational organization in the past (1928–1936), has developed into a political organization, using terror as a means of struggle.

A new wave of politicization of Islam rose in the last quarter of the XX century – beginning of the XXI in the course of mass movements in the whole Afro-Asian world. The authors attribute this to the influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which stimulated the rise of fundamentalist ideas and the Islamic boom in the Middle East, the radicalization of the Palestinian movement, "Hezbollah" and other religious groups in the Arab world, as well as in some other parts of Asia. The rise of political Islam in the Arab region – a part of the Islamic world – did not mean the automatic and general radicalization of this movement. The political Islam is heterogeneous, depending on the region where it has originated and is promulgated, and bears the imprint of the specifics of each country.

Next, the researchers analyze the evolution of the "Islamic State" (IS). This terrorist organization, known before proclamation of the "caliphate" in June 2014 as "Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (Levant)" (ISIL), originated in 2003 amid the invasion of the NATO coalition forces led by the United States in Iraq. The intervention destroyed by the state structure that existed under the regime of Saddam Hussein, including its armed forces.

Furthermore, it broke the already delicate balance between the major religions of the country - Shiites (about 60%) and Sunnis, most of whom were the Kurds (about 20%). Natural reaction in the current contradictory situation was the formation in 2004 of several branches of "Al-Qaeda", which also included some former members of the Army of Saddam Hussein.

After the death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006, the Iraqi branch of "Al-Qaeda" was headed by Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and at the time more than a dozen disparate Sunni jihadist guerrilla groups were consolidated into a single structure. The new entity was called the "Islamic State of Iraq".

Prior to the events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011 the group consisted of no more than 4 thousand members. Its activities were primarily funded by the oil-producing Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. The militants of the "Islamic State of Iraq" maintained a series of successful operations against Iraqi soldiers fighting on the side of the NATO occupation coalition. But by April 2010 the American troops based in Iraq had managed to liquidate the leaders of the new Islamic group, which resulted in its considerable weakening.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the commander of a small detachment of jihadi "Mujahideen Shura Assembly" who replaced the liquidated ringleaders (February 2011), in a few years became the head of the most powerful terrorist organization of the beginning of the XXI century, posing itself as a state-legalized system. After the aggravation of the situation in Syria and Iraq in 2011 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi changed his tactics, and shifted to self-reliance and self-financing by means of looting, racketeering, reallocation of fiscal flows, capturing of profitable enterprises, hostages for ransom, and so on. The tactics proved to be efficient. Now, according to Russian and Western sources, the "Islamic State" numbers about 80 thousand people: 50 thousand terrorists in Syria and 30 thousand in Iraq. As of November 2015 more than 25 thousand foreign terrorists-militants, including those from the Arab countries, Europe, Russia and other CIS countries fought

under the banner of the IS. Thus, the IS has become a center of attraction for the jihadists migrating between the countries of the Middle East, North, West and East Africa.

The group has developed the reputation of one of the most violent Islamist organizations. The IS terrorists are responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against the NATO forces on the territory of Iraq, mass executions of Iraqi and Syrian soldiers, genocide of adherents of other faiths and involvement of children in criminal activities. The immediate aim of the organization is to create an Islamic Sunni state, living under Sharia law, at the territory of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Outside the territory of Iraq and Syria the IS extends its presence by focal method.

On the first day of the month of Ramadan, July 29, 2014, the IS announced the creation of a "caliphate" on the controlled territory of Iraq and Syria. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was proclaimed the "Caliph" under the name of Ibrahim Baghadtadi. a "caliphate" has some formal attributes of the state. It controls the territory, comparable with the territory of the UK. It has its own capital, the city of Raqqa. It is believed that the Sunni population at this territory principally supports the new government.

The "caliph" has two deputies (emirs): Abu Moslem al-Turkmani (responsible for Iraq) and Abu Ali al-Anbar (responsible for Syria). 12 governors (wali), of the regions of Syria and Iraq, controlled by the "Islamic State" and the cabinet are subordinate to him. Currently, there are six ministries: the Military Department; General Security; Finance; Ministry for Prisons and Prisoners; Transport and Communications; Ministry of Work with Foreign Mercenaries. Representation and advisory functions are the prerogative of the Advisory Council of the "Islamic State" (Shura), consisting of 11 warlords and Moslem theologians, who inspect every decision of the governors and the ministers for their compliance with Sharia.

A special role in the governing bodies of the IS is given to the Council of Muftis, consisting of three religious authorities who resolve the matters relating to Shariah and Shariah Court. The

Council of Muftis directs the activities of the Islamic police (al-Shurta al-Islamiya), a kind of morality police. This establishment holds the key to markets, schools, mosques, catering, filling stations and so forth. The Council of Muftis of the IS also controls the network of religious schools, which are at the same time the centers for propagation of the ideology of jihadism, and recruitment of new levies for militias.

The information department is an important link in the organizational system. The central figure in the multidivisional media structure of the IS is Mohammed al-Adnani al-Shami. It is usually him who makes official video appeals, he is in charge of a powerful propaganda machine, comprising four divisions: «Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production» – the basic information bureau of the "Islamic State"; "Al-I'tisam Media Foundation", a studio for production of films and other video products; «Al-Hayat Media Center» publishing printed materials in foreign languages designed for foreign customers, including the large-circulation magazine "Dabik" and "Al-Ajnad Media Foundation", specializing in dissemination of Islamic songs, music and poetry, acceptable from the point of view of Shariah norms and morality to a Moslem audience. Local information offices functioning in various provinces of Syria and Iraq, provide propaganda and psychological impact on the public consciousness in print or electronic format.

The "Islamic State" is a very flexible, relatively viable and quickly recovering structure having a horizontal network configuration and able to move beyond the present borders of the "caliphate". It is difficult to give a clear definition of the ideology of the IS because of its eclecticism. Most experts define the ideology of the IS as Salafist, Salafi -jihadist, or as Sunni Islamism. At the same time the majority of Salafi groups do not recognize the IS not only a Caliphate, but even considers this draft anti-Islamic.

There is a version, according to which the IS ideological roots can be traced in the ideology of Wahhabism. This version is not groundless: the earlier groups which later formed the core of the IS

made up the branch of "Al-Qaeda" in Iraq, and "Al-Qaeda" was created by the immigrants from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, brought up in the Wahhabi ideology. To understand the Wahhabi roots of the IS ideology it should be taken into consideration that in the KSA there appeared signs of mutation of the contemporary Wahhabism, and now it is not as whole as before.

The IS adheres to the extremist interpretation of Islam, justifies violence on religious grounds, declares the infidels and apostates all those who do not accept its interpretation of Islam. The group advocates return to the orders of the first centuries of Islam, which is reflected in the IS symbols. Modern Moslems, which, in the opinion of the ideologists of the IS, have forgotten the Divine Law and follow the law of the secular nation-states, are unbelievers. The IS attributes to the same category both the current Saudi royal family and the government of the KSA.

The ideas of the IS were widely publicized thanks mainly to the propagandist establishment of the organization, especially the use of technological innovations in the field of multimedia network, proven during the "Arab spring". The rhetoric of the propagandists features high emotional intensity. It convinces people of their superiority over other faiths, warms up the hatred to dissenters.

To justify their ideology and practice the IS officials constantly refer to the Quran and other sources sacred to Moslems. They artfully snatch quotes, distorting them, deliberately ignoring the other suras and hadiths.

The Islamist elite is also clever in conspiracy explanation of its mistakes or errors, laying the blame for all failures to external forces. Their rants are filled with references to the schemes of organizers of the plots which are devised in the world, especially in the West. The main thesis is as follows: the IS is chosen as the defender of Mashreq (Arab East) from external and internal enemies. The external enemies are "America, Shia and the Arab regimes." The internal enemies are the "unsteady" Moslems infected with the virus of secularism that threatens the very nature

of the faith. Thus, the organization adheres to the concept of jihad against the two evils: the "close enemy" and the "distant enemy". The close enemy is represented by corrupted local governments and renegades, and the distant one by the West and Israel. The purpose of the fight against the close enemy is to intimidate all the dissenters, to make them obey and recognize the power of the IS.

And the killings of civilian Europeans, which they call "Crusaders", contribute to the widespread growth of Islamophobia. This is in line with the intention of the IS: to make the Moslems living outside the Islamic world a sort of hostages. The IS is interested in ghettoisation of the Moslem diaspora. Then it will be easier to put them under control, to make a kind of an incubator to spread its doctrine there, to train personnel. The tactic of the IS is obvious: to create the bloody image of Islam to intimidate Europeans, to "privatize" Islam to manipulate it for their own purposes. The "Caliphate" continuously issues categorical statements about the future victory of Islam over Europe and the United States, the imminent arrival of "hegemony over the entire planet."

Excessive politicization of Islam, observed in recent decades has been caused by the fact that the modern national states deprived the traditional theologians of the function entrusted to them - the reform of Islam. The resulting gap has been filled with various Islamic movements, which often acted illegally. The results of such politicization hit Islam itself, weakened it, opened the gates to return to the confessional and sectarian discrimination, for the elevation of some communities over others.

Today, the media, the academic circles of the Middle East countries, are debating about the roots, ideological origins, threats of the IS, the ways of confronting it. The dispersion of estimates and opinions of the Arab political scientists and analysts about the prospects of duration and existence of the "caliphate" is very broad. Some of them believe that this entity is doomed to disappear, because it acts contrary to the logic and regional mainstream. It is believed that the current coalition of the "Islamic

"State" will fall apart because of the contradictions existing between its diverse components.

Considering the financial and economic foundations of the IS existence, the authors of the report note that this quasi-state does not require large-scale financial injections from abroad, as the "Al-Qaeda", "Dzhabhat en-Nusra" and the "Free Syrian Army", the opposition to the Syrian regime. The self-proclaimed caliphate became self-financing: it receives billions of dollars by robbing banks, seizing the property of the infidels, exchanging hostages for ransom, slave trade, control of drug trafficking and illegal channels of oil supplies. Now the "Islamic State" is the richest terrorist organization with a budget of approximately 2.3 billion dollars. The leaders of the "Caliphate" base their policy on the fact that financing of social programs for the population may become a no less effective means of ensuring loyalty and support than mass repression. The authors conclude that the IS is a new type of terrorist organization, where financial security plays the key role, and in a rather organized and controlled form, a kind of the budget process.

The main objective of the IS in the industrial sector is oil production and refining industry, which, as the jihadists plan, is to ensure a high and stable level of income for their regime. The proceeds from the sale of oil from fields controlled by the extremists make up the main part of the income.

The IS entrusts trusts the sale of oil and petroleum products to dealers - traders who buy crude oil directly from fields, deliver it to processing plants, supply petroleum products to the population, power plants, combat units and administrative services of the IS, other terrorist groups. but for these traders, who usually buy from the IS a barrel of oil for \$ 25-30, and sell it to refinery companies for \$ 60-100, the "Caliphate" would not be able to orient the captured fields to replenishing of its budget. High oil prices (until the sharp fall on the world markets) attracted to oil refining, transporting and smuggling large numbers of Syrians,

Iraqis, Turks, seeking to obtain their share of the profits from the "oil pie", seized by the IS.

The authors, however, indicate that despite the importance of this source of income, it cannot be considered stable and reliable in the long term. First, the IS has no resources and technical capability for effective management of these assets. The "Caliphate" is experiencing an acute shortage of sophisticated technologies and qualified specialists in this field and for this reason only a part of the potential volume of production can be extracted. Primitive technologies give limited amounts of oil and oil products of poor quality. Second, the world prices for oil have fallen. Third, the strikes of the Russian aviation and the Western coalition are destroying production capacities and disrupting the system of products delivery to intermediaries and final consumers. The air strikes destroyed several oil refineries that forced the IS to shift to the use of modular refining units which resulted in dramatic quality decrease of the final product.

The other source is the income from criminal business which the IS does not even try to conceal. We are talking about expropriation of cash stored in banks, property, stock, vehicles, hostage-taking for ransom on the territory of the "Caliphate". In the field of financial services the IS became the owner of the cash resources available in the state banks, it confiscates the funds of the non-Sunni refugees who left "the territory of the IS", as well as those of the private banks depositors who were unable to provide information about the origin of their savings and the purposes of their future use acceptable for jihadists. The houses abandoned by refugees, the shops deprived of their owners are leased and bring the IS the monthly income of \$ 3 million in the form of rent payments. In the agrarian sector the "Islamic State" established control over the granaries, captures farmers' agricultural machinery for subsequent lease of the same to the former owners. Water resources are used after the same pattern. Smuggling of cultural relics is also a profitable criminal business. The IS profits from this in two ways: selling trophy artifacts and collection of fees

from smugglers transporting them through the occupied territory. The "Islamic State" occupied over 4,500 archaeological sites, some of which are world heritage sites of the UNESCO. 90% of cultural monuments of the country are located in war-torn regions which creates conditions for embezzlement on a large scale.

Human trafficking is another source of income. At the "slave auctions" of the IS people are sold and re-sold for ransom. The IS also profits from the stream of refugees bound for Europe: terrorists collect money for illegal transport to the EU. At the end of 2015 commercialization of the "channel of refugees" enabled the IS to get more than \$ 300 million.

"Direct" money transactions from abroad are also kind of reserve. Transfer of different types of funds, including charitable funds, conspiratorial financial investments of security services and other state authorities of Qatar, KSA, Turkey is in the first place. This money is not meant only for the purchase of arms. So, Turkey pays for treatment and rest of the militants arriving from Syria in Turkish military hospitals. Turkish territory houses Islamist military training camps. Qatar is also involved in financing of the IS volunteers heading from Turkey to Syria, as well as of supplies coming via this route of supply is involved and Qatar. The second place belongs to traditional Islamic taxes, donations in the form of regular voluntary contributions of the believers. It fits into the legal framework: the collection of donations, their distribution to the poor, spreading the idea of Islam around the world. This is the situation, when the money legally collected in different countries become illegal. According to reports, the IS received through this channel about 400 million rubles only from Russia,. The third source is fundraising in social networks. The transfer of money is simplified due to modern banking technologies. "Crowdfunding" as a way of attracting donations from large groups of people, helps raise a significant amount while maintaining the anonymity of the donors. There also exists the traditional Islamic money transfer system, known under the name of hawala.

Nevertheless, the authors say, in the long term, the question of the economic viability of the "Caliphate" is not clear. It is difficult to imagine at what account economic revival of the occupied territories could be effected. It can be assumed that on the stage following the period of expropriation and racketeering they are planning to announce the building of the Islamic type economy.

The IS is attractive for some young Moslems because of the promises of social justice, which they were desperate to see in their homeland. Corruption, cronyism, lack of social mobility and the prospects are pushing young people to seek the way out in the Islamist ideology, in utopian projects of introduction of Sharia law to resolve all the problems of modern society. Some years ago young extremists were looking for their place in the ranks of the militants of the "Caucasus Emirate" (CE), the rise of the IS in 2013-2014 gave them a new idol. On the territory of Syria and Iraq they saw a really controlled territory where the Islamic rule was declared and Islamic laws were allegedly successfully operating. The IS is important to them as a socio-political experiment in which they are given a chance to find what they did not expected to get in their own countries and regions, the opportunity not only to try to make a career, but also to participate in building a "fair" society, based, as they believe, on the laws of the Lord.

Russia (together with Georgia and Azerbaijan) faced network terrorist Islamist organizations in the late 1990s - early 2000s. In 2007, on the ruins of the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria", the terrorists announced the establishment of the "Caucasus Emirate", which became a division of "al-Qaeda" in the North Caucasus, receiving funding from this organization. The beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011, interpreted by the extremist propaganda as "the revolt of the Sunnis against the oppressive Shiite government", agitated the radical Islamists around the world. Some of them called to move to Syria to join the ongoing civil war, which thereby transformed from a domestic problem to an international one. This movement also affected the Russian

citizens, primarily from the regions of the North Caucasus. The number of people joining the fighting in Syria was growing every year, and in 2013 reached such level that the "Caucasus Emirate" operating on the territory of the North Caucasus lost most of its fighters. The percentage of the Caucasians who joined the IS and fought on its side, is disproportionately large: at the end of 2014 it amounted to 7-10% of combatants, according to the accessions given in social networks by Salafis themselves. Most of these Caucasians were immigrants from the Russian North Caucasus.

All these facts are the result of the change of the IS policy in the North Caucasus: if earlier the IS regarded the IC as a source of "cannon fodder", now it regards it as its own branch. This is evidenced by the announcement of July 24, 2015 of foundation of the "the Vilayat of the Caucasus Islamic State."

The threat of "trickling down" of the IS terrorists to Central Asia is also obvious. In this regard, one of the key problems is the migration of militants and their subsequent return from Syria and Iraq. Another major problem is that the neighboring Afghanistan is actually a "failed state" whose government does not control its territory. Afghanistan has long been a base for international terrorists. Currently in Northern Afghanistan directly bordering Central Asia, the process of penetration of new terrorist groups is going on actively.

There is a threat that the international community will concentrate too much on the situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya and forget about Afghanistan, where the danger is also significant. In this context is the problem of penetration of militants into Afghanistan and their further distribution in Central Asia is particularly acute. Both Afghanistan, and Central Asia in the IS belong to the new territorial unit - "the Khorasan Vilayat". On the whole, the rising threat of militants returning from the Middle East and intensification of threats from Afghanistan coincided with the rise of extremist organizations, in particular in the IS, and in Central Asia itself.

In conclusion, the authors of the report say about the prospects of the "Islamic State" development. Its legitimacy, sovereignty, territorial integrity and many other attributes of statehood in the modern sense appear to be unattainable. At the same time, even in case of circumstances favorable to the forces opposing the IS, there is a possibility of preserving the vitality of this model of terrorist activities, pretending to gradual formation of a new (with a strong admixture of old medieval) state type. This gives the impression that state-building is not the main goal of the IS leaders. By the end of 2015 due to significant intensification of the multilateral opposition of the anti-terrorist coalition to the "Islamic State" the territory controlled by the Islamic State had reduced in Iraq by 40% and by 20% in Syria. As a result of it the IS was forced to move from offensive to defensive tactics. However, the researchers agree that the top of the "Caliphate" is still able to attract and mobilize a large number of foreign jihadists to strike everywhere and to maintain manageability of the entity.

The nutrient medium for survival of the "Islamic State" is created by the fact that the tangle of contradictions and many political, ethno-religious, socio-economic problems that fostered the growth of Islamism in the early twenty-first century is still existing. Against the background of Islamization of the region one may see the deepening of splitting along confessional, racial, ethnic, tribal and other lines, both at the national and at the sub-regional and regional levels.

The authors note that a kind of "Weimar syndrome" is gaining strength in the region: the feeling of loss to the civilizations that are successfully adapting to competition in the new global world, the feeling of injustice of the outside world, especially the West.

Islamization is seen by many in the Middle East as a kind of a new model, the third way, the Islamic version of democracy and renaissance. Using the weakness of state power and the acuteness of inter-ethnic, inter-tribal conflicts, its bearers hope to increase the number of their supporters and strengthen the influence. But their

power is insufficient, so they seek to destroy the system of public administration and in the chaos and power vacuum to stand at the helm of a new, as they believe, hybrid entity.

The fight against radical Islam in general and against the IS in particular will give the desired results, the researchers conclude, if, first, the territory under their control continually shrink, and secondly, if a consolidation of the opposing forces, including those in the camp of the so-called moderate Islamists takes place , thirdly, there occur significant changes in improving living conditions in the countries where the radicals are mobilizing the bulk of its human and other resources.

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