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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR DOBAYEV. RADICALIZATION OF ISLAMIST NON-GOVERNMENTAL RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WAYS AND MEANS TO OPPOSE IDEOLOGY OF TAKFIR-JIHADISTS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.¹ // *The article was specially written for the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World.*

Keywords: the radicalization, Islamists circles, "takfir", "jihad", Muslim countries, "Imarat", "jamaats".

Igor Dobaev,
Dr.Sc. (Philosophy), Professor,
Expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don

The process of the radicalization of Russian Islam has passed through several stages:²

1. The first stage: the 1970s - early 1990s. Young people's groups of Salafi orientation emerged in Daghestan under foreign influence. Their leader was the man later known as Magomed Kzylyurtovsky. The special services of the Russian Federation follow their activity and stem it.

2. The second stage: the early 1990s - 1994. Daghestan Salafite groupings become legalized, more and more Islamists circles were formed where their members studied such concepts

as "takfir" and "jihad" in their specific "Wahhabi" interpretation. At the time cultural centers were opened at the embassies of certain Muslim countries, which were engaged, apart from other activities, in distributing Islamist literature in Russia. At the same time similar literature was published in Russia, for instance by the "Santlada" Publishers in Daghestan. Missionaries, preachers and teachers of Muslim disciplines from abroad began to arrive in Russia. Simultaneously, young Russian muslims were leaving the country for abroad in growing number to get an Islamic education. Daghestan was the main territory of Islamization during these two periods.

3. The third period: December 1994 – early 2000s was characterized by the domination of Chechnya in the radicalization process of North Caucasian Islam. The Chechen wars, just as the three-year interval between them, were accompanied by the concentration of foreign mujahedins, mostly Arabs, in this republic. They received a serious ideological, financial and other assistance from foreign Islamist centers. Special study centers functioned in Chechnya to train militants. The biggest one was at Serzhen-Yurt settlement in Shali district headed by the notorious terrorist Emir Khattab, a man close to the "al Qaeda" leader Osama bin Laden. In 1998 radical Islamists headed by their leader Magomed Kizilyurtovsky arrived to Chechnya from Daghestan, where foreign, Chechen and Daghestani Salafites, as well as their fellow-thinkers from other North Caucasian republics formed a sort of an armed union with such a strong basis that they dared start an aggressive campaign in Daghestan in 1999, which was crushed.

4. The fourth period: from September 1999 to 2007 coincided with the second Chechen war, defeat of the armed units of separatists and their switchover to a guerilla war. At that time Chechnya was the epicenter of the concentration of radical Islamists, whose leaders propagated secular separatist projects, such as the proclamation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. During that period the idea of "jihad" spread throughout the

entire territory of the North Caucasus. Its main feature was the spreading of radical Islamist ideology, the institutionalization of their own non-governmental religious-political organizations and groupings, emergence and enlargement of the infrastructure of "jihad" (secret warehouses, dug-outs, bins, etc.), engagement in specific political subversive and terrorist acts, including places far beyond the bounds of the North Caucasian region. The structure of militants' units acquired a network character.

In the fourth period the North Caucasian Wahhabis were represented by moderate-radical and ultra-radical elements, whereas during the second Chechen campaign the local Salafites took to religious-political extremism and terrorist activity under the camouflage of Islamic faith. Nevertheless, there were still moderate radicals in the area, although in a smaller number. However, the authorities, unable or unwilling to distinguish between moderates and ultra-radicals were taking harsh measures against both of them. Such approach curtailed the already small section of moderate radicals, who were gradually going over to extremist positions.

5. The fifth period: 2007-2013-2014. The new leader of the existing Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Doku Umarov, announced the completion of the nationalist plan of building the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and simultaneously published the new geopolitical project - "Imarat Kavkaz". According to it, the new state - "Imarat Kavkaz" was proclaimed on the Islamist principles in the North Caucasus, which would be ruled like the Islamist states of the past (Caliphates). In turn, apart from the existing central institutions of power and management, "Imarat" included the republics of the North Caucasus and would subsequently include other regions of Russia. In turn, these parts of "Imarat" consisted of sectors where primary Islamist cells, or "jamaats," existed which were, in essence subversive-terrorist groupings, in other words, Islamist gangs.

6. The end of the first decade - beginning of the second decade of this century: the growing influence of "Imarat" and its

leaders on other Muslim territories of Russia – along the Volga, in the Urals and West Siberia, primarily, Tatarstan.

7. In the past five to six years more “Islamist enclaves”³ emerged in non-Muslim parts of the country, which grouped around new mosques built there. Similar processes have taken place in the United States and certain West European countries some time earlier.⁴

8. After the neutralization of Doku Umarov at the end of 2013, most network structures, which were parts of “Imarat” and had sworn allegiance to “al Qaeda” of Osama bin Laden joined the terrorist giant – the “Islamic state”. Many Russian Islamists have gone to Syria to join the ranks of the Islamic state militants to fight Bashar Asad’s troops. The radical Islamist movement on the territory of the North Caucasus is deteriorating and turning into criminal gangs, smaller in size and more autonomous. After making rapid pinpoint strikes they go underground or disintegrate.

Despite this, the terrorist movement in the region has not been suppressed, which calls for additional measures aimed at its complete eradication. As is known, the range of these measures includes the following elements: improvement of the anti-terrorist legislation; strengthening of the special services and law-enforcement agencies; undermining of the economic basis and financial channels of the terrorists; ideological and propaganda work among the various strata of Russian society. Unfortunately, these measures are too weak and ineffective.

Nevertheless, the problem is now better understood and more measures are being taken to solve it. After the adoption of the Concept of opposing terrorism in the Russian Federation in October 2009, more attention was paid to prevention of terrorist activity. The National Anti-terrorist Committee has time and again emphasized this point.

It should be admitted that this work is far from adequate, despite the already existing state system of opposing terrorism in the Russian Federation. In detailed examination of various plans

of ideological counter-offensive it becomes evident that quite often the measures proposed deal with a certain amorphous mass of the country's population. Moreover, they are usually addressed to ordinary law-abiding citizens far removed from the ideology and practice of terrorism. At the same time there is a definite shortage of proposals concerning vulnerable categories of young people and bearers of the ideology of religious-political extremism. There are practically no centers of Islamic studies in the country set up and maintained by the state, especially in the South of Russia. Neither are there orders for such investigations, and this is why they are carried on rarely and randomly, more often on the initiative of individual scholars. Naturally, such works are rare and far between and are done mostly by Daghestani scholars in the North Caucasus.⁵ Besides, one should take into account that religious-political terrorism is localized mainly in the youth medium, mainly in the North Caucasus. However, means to oppose it are scattered all over the country, often far removed from young people. It goes without saying that in such conditions there is little hope that such measures will be effective. This is confirmed by the practical experience of the past several years.

A broad information and propaganda campaign has been launched in the country. Thousands of conferences and round-table discussions are arranged, a great many pamphlets, books and various collections are published, the mass media contain many articles and videos, and films and clips are made in a great quantity – all this is keynoted by anti-terrorist spirit. However, the terrorist war in the North Caucasian region of Russia (and not only there!) does not die down. It should be admitted that we have not been able to create an adequate system of opposing terrorism in the information sphere so far.⁶

It is to be hoped that the present Comprehensive plan of informational opposition to terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2013–2018 will lead to a qualitative leap forward in the ideological confrontation with this dangerous enemy.

Meanwhile, we have to admit that the present information, educational and ideological work, which is underway in the Russian Federation, is far behind the requirements of the day and needs qualitative changes. And we should talk not only of informational opposition to terrorism, but also of opposition to the ideology of terrorism. The main task facing us in this field is, along with strengthening the struggle against concrete manifestations of terrorism, to raise effectiveness of opposition to the ideology of terrorism and put up reliable barriers on the way of its penetration in public consciousness.⁷

One of the aims of this struggle is to compromise the ideological doctrine of radical Islamists, which is far from flawless from the point of view of Islamic orthodoxy, and, as a result, to free the potential supporters and followers of Takfir-jihadists from the latter's pernicious influence, thus reducing the social basis of support of terrorists and cut off the replenishment of their units.

There are two important factors which should not be ignored: it is the "Islamic" factor in the formation of ideological doctrines of radical Islamists and the "youth" character of the terrorist and religious-political movements in certain regions of Russia, primarily in the North Caucasus. It is quite evident that the attractiveness of the ideology of radical Islamism, especially among young people, is high enough. However, both these factors should be regarded in close unity and interdependence, inasmuch as in practice they support and help each other.

At the same time it should be admitted that there is no full-fledged government policy of a proper education of the younger generation in the country so far, although there is understanding that the young people who have matured in the years of "troubled times" should not be left without public charge.⁸

The North Caucasian young people have grown in the conditions of permanent fighting around them in one or another form, feeling hardships of social and income inequality, against the backdrop of growing difficulties of self-realization. They

often fall under the influence of extremist religious propaganda and also of “authoritative” people, that is, criminal elements, and this is why they need special care and attention of the state. The situation requires serious systematic daily work among young people and their education with due account of the specificity of ethnic variety and multilingualism. For this purpose it is necessary to begin the training of special teachers with an emphasis on the unbreakable unity of the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation and aversion to all and sundry forms of violence. Apart from that, a program should be evolved to draw creative, sport, military-patriotic and youth associations of the North Caucasian republics to participation in all-Russia and regional festivals, contests, local lore units’ activities, etc., which should strengthen ties between young people of different parts of the Russian Federation.⁹

The religious factor of the current situation in the Caucasus should not be ignored either. Certain scholars of Islam directly speak of the endogenous radicalism in Islam, as well as of the objectively existing connections between separate currents in Muslim faith and terrorism, asserting that excessive political correctness closely linked up with political interest does not give the Russian leadership the possibility of being completely open in this question.¹⁰ Today, there are many people in the North Caucasus, who, arms in hand, are fighting for creating an Islamic state and freeing the lands of Islam. They do not try to help solve this problem by simply increasing the number of jobs or building friendly relations between people.

The religious factor does exist and act. In Islam, just as in other religious, there are radical currents and trends which strive to establish very harsh rules of life and behavior. Ideologists of radical Islamism literally “hammer” in young people’s minds the idea of the need to wage “offensive jihad” against the “infidels”, “apostates”, and “hypocrites”, and the fight against them in the specific conditions of the North Caucasus often assumes the character of vendetta. Thus, local pre-Islamic customs (adats)

merge with the specific features of Islam and even with criminal activity.

There is no doubt that growing religious-political extremism in the North Caucasus is facilitated not only by the crisis of all secular ideologies of the present period, but also the ideological foundations of traditional Islam in the region, which needs thorough modernization. This problem should be tackled in many aspects coordinated with one another.

During the 1990s – 2000s the country's leadership placed big hopes on the authority of representatives of traditional official Islam. However, the social alienation and political passivity of "official Islam", along with its theoretical weakness, shortage of well-educated scholars of Islam and Muslim traditions have only increased the chances of Islamists in their ideological rivalry in the struggle for winning the Muslim population, primarily, young people.¹¹ Despite the fact that many representatives of the Muslim clergy who are despised and hated as "hypocrites" by radical Islamists have been brutally murdered by terrorists, it should be admitted that their sermons proved ineffective in opposition to the man-hating ideology of Takfir-jihadists. However, the confrontation of the Wahhabis with representatives of "official" Islam does not confine to ideological struggle. Wahhabi ideology claims that those who do not adhere to it are the "enemies of Islam," and it calls on its supporters to wage a sacred war against them, that is, jihad. A true Wahhabi must hate all enemies of Islam, and his hatred should take concrete practical forms.¹² Among the "enemies" marked as "hypocrites" are representatives of "official" Islam and the most active of them are under constant observation by radical Islamists.

It is common knowledge that terrorist activities are the most widespread and strongest in the North-East Caucasus (Daghestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia) where "official" Islam is dominated by the Sufi orders (Tariqahs). However, it should be noted that Sufism has been unable to rebuff Salafite ideology in this sub-region, and heated arguments and discussions between

these two trends have been going on for many centuries. Moreover, as shown by the statistical data of terrorist acts of religious-political nature, more and more Islamic young people join the ranks of the Salafites. This is directly connected not only with insufficient opposition to religious extremism of Tariqah ideology, but also with the fact that Sufism itself gives birth to Salafism.¹³

Inasmuch as “official” Islam is striving to draw closer to the state as much as possible, in which it definitely succeeds, opposition to the “official” clergy becomes opposition to the state.¹⁴ This is why, in Z. Abdulagatov’s view, the state should establish contacts with all Islamic confessions. Openness toward all currents, even to those which are rivals to “official” Islam, is an effective way to oppose their radicalization.¹⁵ This idea is supported by the heads of the National Anti-terrorist Committee (NAC). “Intra-confessional confrontation which now exists in a number of North Caucasian republics is a very dangerous phenomenon. It is high time to find common points with ideologists of moderate Wahhabism (Salafites), all those who are ready to oppose terrorism. It is necessary to prevent the reproduction of terrorists. A part of the Muslim clergy which is ready to work with young people and prevent them to enter into armed conflicts with the authorities, which is prepared for theological dialogue and discussion of all disputed questions, is our ally...”¹⁶

However, everything is not so simple. There are doubts concerning expedience of work with moderate Islamists. For one, experts from the Center of Situational Analysis at the Russian Academy of Sciences believe that contacts between the authorities and Salafites are fraught with negative consequences for the development of relations with followers of traditional Islam. For example, an attempt of the authorities of Dagestan to hold negotiations with certain more radical (“forest”) Islamists has resulted in the latter’s demand to appoint their representatives to high posts in local administrations.¹⁷

There is no doubt that in order to oppose radical Islamists at an intellectual level we need well-educated specialists in Islam who are rare and far between in Russia. Serious concern is caused by shortcomings in training the Muslim clergy in Russia, textbooks are written on the basis of medieval scholastics, there are practically no secular experts on Islamic theology, and the number and quality of specialists in the Arab language and experienced translators and interpreters from that language is inadequate.

It is evident that with a view to opposing religious-political extremism the state and society should pay more attention to the system of religious education. It is necessary to evolve our own model of Islamic education, which could help us take the initiative from foreign Muslim universities and centers in the sphere of full-time and virtual education. Students from Russia study Islam in its most radical forms in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North African countries, and are subjected to anti-Russian ideological indoctrination. Quite a few leaders of the armed underground, for example A. Astemirov and M. Mukoyev from Kabardino-Balkaria, have studied at the Central Islamic University of Saudi Arabia, a state dominated by Sunna Islam of the Wahhabi trend.

Russian young Muslims continue to go abroad to get an Islamic education. There are two channels for doing this – official and private. Those going via the former channels receive stipends and have an opportunity to solve their social problems because they go abroad in accordance with agreements signed between the spiritual boards of Muslims of Russia and concrete educational institutions. Moreover, at present the position of most spiritual boards of Muslims is that it would be better to get a higher Muslim education in Russia first, and only then to go abroad to improve it at prestigious universities on the basis of official agreements. Meanwhile, most young men wishing to get Muslim education abroad go there through private channels, more often on personal invitations. They do not get stipends and

social services and this is why easily fall under the influence of local radicals. In all, the number of those who have received Islamic education abroad after the disintegration of the Soviet Union exceeded 10,000.¹⁸ Despite the fact that beginning from 2007 three Muslim study centers have been working in the North Caucasus (in Makhachkala, Nalchik and Grozny) they are unable to compete with their foreign analogues.

Moreover, the system of Islamic education in Russian regions is up to now one of the powerful sources of the formation of fundamentalist consciousness among Muslim young people.¹⁹ As it is noted by the well-known Daghestani scholar I. Shamov, "the curricula of Islamic educational institutions in Daghestan do not include history, geography, mathematics, literature, foreign languages, biology, computer ABC, etc. In short, there is nothing which makes a member of society an educated person and society - a developing one".²⁰ The ideology of opposition cannot but pay close attention to the content of text-books and curricula of the Russian Islamic educational institutions. The state and society should strictly inspect all Islamic educational establishments, especially those which are not subordinated to government bodies. It is necessary to evolve curricula for religious educational institutions at all levels of Islamic education, and religious and secular experts and scholars should take part in this work.

Control over strict adherence to approved curricula should be a special subject matter of the government...²¹

Apart from the creation and improvement of Muslim education in Russia, it is also, necessary to carry on a stable information policy on Islamic problems, including the publication of printed matter (periodicals, study aids, and analytical material), opening of the Internet sites, and actions opposing the various undertakings of radical Islamists. Incidentally, the authorities should pay greater attention to their publishing and distribution activity. There is a considerable number of Muslim books and pamphlets of subversive character

in Russian retail trade, as well as in mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which contain extremist ideas. This situation is connected with the shortage of Russian theological and legal literature connected with Islamic problems. At the same time one can find works by foreign authors, ideologists of radical Islam, including such extremist authors as al-Wahhab, al-Maududi, S. Qutb, al-Umar, al-Fauzan, Bashamil, al-Shakk, and others. It is necessary to emphasize that subversive Islamic literature gets into the country not only from abroad. Up to recently, part of it has been published on Russian territory (for instance, the "Badr" Publishers printed such literature in Moscow and Moscow region). Naturally, such literature should be banned.

Cyberspace calls for special attention, that is, the activities of all and sundry telecommunication networks of the Internet-type. Virtual area is full of Islamic sites, forums and discussions of extremist character. All terrorist acts are registered and lauded on the sites of terrorists calling for "worldwide jihad", as well as in social networks. The activity of certain subjects of cyberspace has a well-pronounced anti-Russian character. Accordingly, opposition to this "ideological subversion" should be of a specific nature. Meanwhile, Russia has not evolved effective means and methods to prevent the use of the Internet for spreading terrorist ideology so far.²²

Work to discredit the ideology and practice of radical Islamists is poorly prepared and carried on. The existing opportunities to do this are used absolutely inadequately. Effective propaganda against the Wahhabis virtually does not exist, their activities are not countered. On the contrary, bodies of power and management sometimes create a heroic halo around these "fighters for pure faith" ("mujahids") and "martyrs" ("shahids"). Inefficiency of the propaganda work of the state facilitates the stepping up of the activities of radical Islamists.

The secular authorities, scholars and representatives of "official" Islam do not mean a thing for the terrorists. The only

moral yardstick for them is the young imams “from the forest” preaching jihad. It should be said that these imams are well trained and have a gift to convince people.²³ Whereas we continue to use expensive but ineffective means.

There is no doubt that we should take measures to strengthen, materially and organizationally, the existing organizations connected in one way or another with Islam – the Fund of support of Islamic culture, science and education, and the Group of strategic views called “Russia – the Islamic World”. Similar approach is necessary to structures which have no support from the Federal Center and regional authorities so far. We mean, first of all, such organization in the South of Russia and the North Caucasus as the “Center of Islamic Studies” at Daghestan State University, and other similar organizations.

Special attention should be paid to training a new generation of scholars of Islam who know the realities and languages of Russian and foreign Muslims, primarily, Arabic. For this purpose a program of regular broad investigations should be worked out on a broad range of Islamic subjects on the basis of cooperation between scholars at the Federal Center and regions under the aegis of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the leading institutes and universities of Russia with an adequate material support of the government. It would be expedient to set up a research center for informational opposition to terrorism, all the more so since this initiative has already been put forward by the National Anti-terrorist Committee of the Russian Federation.²⁴

At the same time it is necessary to uphold the secular character of the Russian state and its equal attitude to all religions and confessions. A modern state can achieve successes in civil construction only on the basis of the values common for representatives of all religions and cultures; moreover, it is only a secular state that can ensure genuine personal freedom of conscience.

Apart from that, it is very important to evolve an effective youth policy in the Russian Federation, taking into account its

regional specific features. At present young people in the North Caucasus form the main breeding grounds for spreading extremist ideas and their further implementation. Youth policy should be based on a reliable ideological platform for which purpose it is necessary to form a modern national ideology. Besides, the elaboration of a youth policy should be tied up with a comprehensive solution of the problems of modern North Caucasian society, and first and foremost, social and property inequality, corruption, embezzlement, nepotism, etc. In other words, for solving youth and Islamist problems it is necessary to use a broad range of measures combining "broad" and "narrow" approaches in opposition to terrorism at the national level and foreign influence increasing it.

Naturally, the above-mentioned proposals and considerations do not cover all measures which should be used to oppose the ideology of terrorism and lower the effectiveness of the factors breeding conflicts, but, in our view, they are the first on the priority list. It is only by joint efforts of the authorities and civil society that the struggle against terrorism could become more effective on the information field.

Notes

- ¹ The article has been written on the grant to Southern Federal University for research on the subject – "Trans-conflict regions as a phenomenon of geopolitical rivalry: social risks and adaptation resources to humanitarian challenges".
- ² I. Dobayev. *Radikalizatsiya islama v sovremennoi Rossii* [Radicalization of Islam in Modern Russia]. Moscow – Rostov-on-Don. "Sotsialno-gumanitarniye znaniya" Publishers. 2014. P. 227–251.
- ³ *O muslimanskikh anklavakh.* See: Yu. Milovanov. *Anklavizatsiya territorii Severo-Kavkazskogo regiona: soderzhaniye protsessa i problema issledovaniya // Nasiliye v sovremennoi Rossii* [On "Muslim Enclaves." See: Yu. Milovanov. "Enclavization" of Territories of North Caucasian Region: Essence of the Process and Problems of Investigation // Violence in Modern Russia]. Rostov-on-Don, 1999.
- ⁴ See: I. Dobayev. *Ekstremistskiye gruppirovki v SShA: Islamsky faktor* [Extremist Groupings in the U.S.A.: Islamic Factor] // "Mirovaya ekonomika i

mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya. Moscow. 2007. No 1.; I. Dobayev. *Islamizatsiya Evropy: mif ili realnaya ugroza?* [Islamization of Europe: Myth or a Real Threat?] // "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya". Moscow. 2008. No 4; I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev, V. Nemchina. *Geopolitika i terrorizm epokhi postmoderna* [Geopolitics and Terrorism in the Post-Modern Epoch]. Rostov-on-Don. YuFU Publishers. 2015. P. 177–224.

⁵ See: Z. Abdulagatov. *Islamskoye soznaniye v globalizatsionnykh protsessakh: problemy adaptatsii* [Islamic Consciousness in Globalization Processes: Problems of Adaptation]. Makhachkala. 2011; by the same author: *Osobennosti sotsializatsii sovremennoi molodyozhi i sotsialniye deformatsii v molodyozhnoi srede* [Specific Features of Socialization of Modern Youth and Social Deformities in Youth Medium]. Makhachkala. 2011; E. Kisriyev. *Islam i vlast v Dagestane* [Islam and Power in Daghestan]. Moscow. 2004; S. Muslimov. *Religiozno-politichesky ekstremizm glazami dagestantsev* [Religious-political Extremism as Viewed by Daghestanis]. Makhachkala. 2011.

⁶ A. Przhezdomsky. *Informatsionnaya sfera stala polem boyu s ekstremizmom i terrorizmom* [The Sphere of Information Has Become a Battlefield with Extremism and Terrorism] // FSB za i protiv [FSS pro and contra]. 2010. No 11.

⁷ E. Ilyin. *Aktualniye problemy protivodeistviya vovlecheniyu molodyozhi v terroristicheskuyu deyatelnost* [Pressing Problems of Opposition to Drawing Young People in Terrorist Activity]. Electronic version. October 12–14. Rostov-on-Don // National Anti-terrorist Committee [Official site]. URL.: <http://www.nak.fsb.ru>.

⁸ A. Przhezdomsky. *V epitsentre protivostoyaniya ideologii smerti: intervyu sovetnika predsedatelya Natsionalnogo antiteroristicheskogo komiteta* (Elektronny resurs) [In the Epicenter of Opposition to the Ideology of Death // (Electronic version). Official site of the National Anti-terrorist Committee. URL.: <http://www.nak.fsb.ru>

⁹ A. Przhezdomsky *Informatsionnaya sfera stala polem boyu s ekstremizmom i terrorizmom* [The Sphere of Information Has Become the Battlefield with Extremism and Terrorism...]

¹⁰ Z. Abdulagatov. *Osobennosti sotsializatsii sovremennoi molodyozhi i sotsialniye deformatsii v molodyozhnoi srede* [Specific Features of Socialization of Modern Youth and Social Deformities in the Youth Medium]. Makhachkala. 2011. 40 p.

¹¹ *Islam v Rossii: ugrozy radikalizatsii* [Islam in Russia: Threats of Radicalization // Rossiiskaya gazeta]. 2012. April 4.

¹² S. Muslimov. Op. cit., P. 37–38.

¹³ Z. Abdulagatov. Op. cit., 43 p.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁶ A. Przhezdomsky. Op. cit.

¹⁷ *Islam v Rossii: ugrozy radikalizatsii* [Islam in Russia: Threats of radicalization] // *Rossiiskaya gazeta*. 2012, April 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ S. Muslimov. Op. cit., 21 p.

²⁰ I. Shamov. *Religiya ili svetskoye prosveshcheniye* [Religion or Secular Education] // *Dagestanskaya Pravda*. 2001. June 8.

²¹ Z. Abdulagatov. Op. cit., 50 p.

²² E. Ilyin. Op. cit.

²³ A. Sidorov. *Zelyonoye znamya s dvuglavym orlom* [Green Banner with Double-headed Eagle] // *Interfax*. 2009. August 31.

²⁴ E. Ilyin. Op. cit.

NATALIA SEDYKH. PREVENTIVE ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE YOUTH ENVIRONMENT: ITS STATE AND WAYS OF IMPROVING // *The article was specially written for the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World*.

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Natalia Sedykh,
PhD (Sociology), Associate Professor,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don

It is known that the replenishment of the ranks of terrorists occurs at the expense of representatives of the so-called "digital generation" mainly, including in modern Russia. The Internet is the leading way of interaction and the main factor of influence on the process of forming their opinions, opinions, beliefs. As a result, terrorist threats are intensified and new risks are created. These risks tend to increase, as they are a product of advanced modern technologies, including mass media. Thus, the development of the movement of the world "jihad", which entailed an intensification of terrorist threats, is a consequence of global informatization of social space. Total "jihad" appears effective continuation of Islamism – ideological trend in Islamic thought of modern times. Islamism is based on the idea of the need to assert the dominance of a

comprehensive Islamic set of rules of conduct – the Sharia, both in society and in the state in certain geographic and political boundaries or on a planetary scale. As a consequence, the global jihad declared by the leaders of terrorist organizations is the embodiment of religious and political extremism, which is regarded as the extreme ideological and political trend in Islam, which proclaims the establishment of Islamic forms of state power as its main goal through the use of various types of armed and political violence.¹ The leading method to achieve stated social and political goals is “mediajihad”, which is considered equal to the war with arms in its importance, and can account for up to 90% of the total efforts of extremists. It is explained by the fact that information production and information exchange become the basic types of social activity due to the active development of digital technologies. Thus, communication is the main way of forming social space, the main mechanism of management and the creator of the “new social reality”. Therefore, the large-scale ideological and propaganda activity of the leaders of relevant organizations is conducted in the information space, mainly.² Youth is its main object.

Today, terrorists actively exploit the most popular means of mass communication among young people – the Internet. Today, terrorists actively exploit the most popular means of mass communication among young people – the Internet. Experts point to this psychological feature of young users, such as anxiety about non-connectivity, which reaches a level of panic for some. In this regard, information congestion is of particular concern, and as a consequence – a decrease in the ability to form and operate knowledge (i.e. to systematize information, to master it consistently, to build logical links, to structure the material). Along with this, the so-called phenomenon of distributed consciousness is observed. Its peculiarity is that consciousness and all mental procedures are distributed between a person and different devices, to which part of cognitive functions are transferred. As a consequence, there is a change in the processes of perception, memory, thinking and cognitive activity of the individual. So, a modern young man does

not consider it necessary to remember information about a historical event, public figure, scientist, believing that if he needs this information, he will turn to Wikipedia or other similar information resource. At the same time, such permanent attributes of the virtual world, as fragmented and mosaic, destroy cultural memory and historical self-awareness, eradicating the connections between events. At the same time, the personal and social identity, formed in various online communities, undergoes significant changes. Ideologists of terrorism use social media actively as the most popular means of the Internet communication among young people. According to modern scientists, social media are interactive digital methods of information delivery, a means of communication, where the main communicative source is the Internet. New social media includes: social networks, blogs, Internet forums, podcasts, video sharing sites, websites, Wiki, printed, online and mobile products. At the same time, new social media are also interactive platforms for communication and content exchange between users, such as forums, photo hosting and other creative sites. New social media includes: social networks, blogs, Internet forums, podcasts, video sharing sites, websites, Wiki, printed, online and mobile products. At the same time, new social media are also interactive platforms for communication and content exchange between users, such as forums, photo hosting and other creative sites.

Terrorist organizations³ use the Internet as a platform to promote their ideas and recruit new supporters. The information presented by such associations can be divided into two groups conditionally, having different objectives:

- program documents of terrorist groups containing information that induces violent change of the constitutional order and violation of the integrity of Russia, propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens on the basis of their attitude to religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation, etc;

- data on methods of manufacturing improvised explosive devices, methods of carrying out crimes of a terrorist nature.

It should be noted that the Internet is used as one of the sources of financing terrorist activities, and, at the same time, as the most effective "coordinator of activities". "Propaganda of radical ideas and the recruitment of supporters take place in popular social networks: Facebook, VKontakte, Twitter and Youtube, mainly; 84% of young people joined the ranks of the terrorist organization via the Internet, 47% paid attention to the materials (video and text) that were posted online, 41% swore allegiance to ISIS online, 19% used online instructions in preparing the terrorist act (making improvised explosive devices and bombs)", - these are the results of a study by Gulzat Bilyalov, a researcher at the NGO Congress of Religious Studies.⁴

At present, most of the materials refer to the activities of the radical Islamist group "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (IGIL), which simplified the name of the country in its current name, and called itself the "Islamic State" (IS). Formed in 2006 in Iraq by the merger of eleven radical Islamist groups and led by the local Al-Qaeda unit, it has become one of the richest terrorist organizations in the world with an annual budget of several billion US dollars. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began to call himself the caliph. He immediately called on the Sunnis around the world to swear allegiance to him. As a result, about sixty jihadist organizations from thirty countries of the world did this. "The Islamic State" announced its intention to continue "jihad" around the world.⁵

Experts of the American company Soufan Group, which provides security consulting services, said in December 2015 that 4.7 thousand people - natives of Russia and the CIS - fought on the side of ISIS in Syria. The radical project of the Caucasus Emirate (2007-2016), uniting terrorist bandit groups on the territory of the Russian Federation, which Islamists tried to implement in the North Caucasus region of Russia, did not become truly international.⁶ The militant groups existed and operated within local ethnic groups, which led to gradual decrease in activity and potential readiness to make new resonant actions. The main reason was the blocking of financing channels for "foreign sponsors", and, consequently, the

gradual and irreversible criminalization of bandit groups. The effective actions of the Russian security forces, when the jamaats in Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia were completely defeated within 6-8 months, led to a serious change of personnel. The time of participation of Islamist militants in jihad declined from several years to several months. The number of those ready to "leave for the forest" decreased without the spiritual leaders and military mentors, especially after the neutralization of the founder of the "Imarat" Doku Umarov in November 2013. For 2013-2014, ISIS extended the call for the Hijra (resettlement to the Middle East for the implementation of armed jihad) among active Islamists in the North Caucasus, which found many supporters. Office of the religious precepts of Egypt has prepared a report that the purpose of the terrorist group was to ensure the flow of new recruits to their ranks in the first place, while ISIS was aimed still at the Middle East to expand the territorial boundaries of its influence.⁷

Recruitment has various forms, including through social networks for job search. For example, it is reported that "ISIS opens vacancies for young scientists"⁸, or "ISIS opened a vacancy for an oilman with a salary of \$ 225,000 per year"⁹, "ISIS militants are in need of qualified medical personnel and programmers".¹⁰ Along with men, women are actively involved in ISIS. According to the REGNUM News Agency, four natives of Karachaevo-Cherkessia: 23-year-old Dana Mukova, 27-year-old Alina Chotchayeva, and two sisters of the Batchaevs - 25-year-old Madina and 26-year-old Marina - left for Syria between 2014 and 2015 and provided medical assistance to militants in the field hospital.¹¹ The information was also confirmed that the famous Chechen singer Hazan (Aza) Bataeva has been in Syria since the end of 2015.¹² According to some reports, she married a militant there. It should be noted that women in the ranks of ISIS are the reproductive potential of this terrorist state, since their main purpose is to give birth to the "new shahids".

The militants act like true social marketing professionals: they spread selfies with weapons and kittens in Instagram, broadcast fights on Twitter. They have their own mobile application and an

online store where it is possible to buy a T-shirt with a terrorist logo for support. Activists of ISIS have declared themselves in the popular Russian social network "Vkontakte".

The audience of "Vkontakte" represents young people in the mass: according to Brand Analytics, almost 2/3 of the authors of this network are under 25 years old. The more mature audience accounts for a small share: 45+ is only 1.4% of the active social network audience, 35-44 years is not more than 6%. The core of "Vkontakte" is made up of users aged 18-24 - 35.3% of the authors. According to the OnLife study of 2015, typical behavior of the "Vkontakte" audience is active consumption of content (public posts, music, video, etc.). If you take such an indicator as the amount of time spent in a particular social network, then the greatest activity of users is observed in "Vkontakte" according to the data of the TNS WEB Index for April 2015. On average, people spend inside this social network up to 41 minutes a day.¹³

Representatives of the "Islamic state" began their activity in "Vkontakte" after blocking their accounts on Twitter and Facebook. Pages of propaganda units of al-Itisam and al-Hayat militants appeared in the Russian social network. ISIS created the news community of Islamic State News for Russians, and also founded the official projects of the "vilayat" (state provinces) founded by them, where they reported on the construction of a "caliphate" in the provinces in Iraq and Syria occupied by the militants daily and in an open manner. Information about work with youth (recruitment) and executions of "traitors of Allah" was also published there. "ShamToday", the largest Russian-speaking community of supporters of the "Islamic state" in 2015, had 12,000 subscribers and was established long before the start of hostilities. The group in the social network was led by members of the Ministry of Communications of the Islamic State, one of nine agencies subordinate to the head of the Caliphate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.¹⁴

Thus, social media have tremendous management potential and are used by extremists as a channel for spreading radical ideas through the technology of virtual viral marketing, based on the

phenomenon of psychological contamination and aimed at developing loyalty to specific individuals, radical political projects, social doctrines and proposed methods of their implementation.¹⁵ Nowadays, virtual viral marketing has replaced "word of mouth", ideas are transmitted through digital communications, which allows for political manipulation through the organization of various psychological influences. In particular, information-semantic, which disorient people in the social space, information-emotional, which appeal to sensory perception and allow the construction of images of "victims" and "enemies", and simultaneously information-moral, which destroy the notion of "what is good, and what is bad"; Information-historical, which transform the political picture of the world.

The result of Internet manipulation of recruiters of terrorist organizations is the fact that there are more than a thousand criminal cases in the Russian Federation for "participating" and "actively sympathizers". Most of those who fall under the influence of radical ideas are students. It was established during the investigation of criminal cases that half of the cases of the young people's withdrawal into mercenaries are connected with the recruitment via the Internet.

The sternest punishment in the case of recruitment was received by students of the Stavropol Medical Academy in December 2015, who organized a "amaat" consisting of 6 people, 2 of whom were born in Dagestan. They recruited through Internet messengers, direct calls for terrorism, placing posts, texts, videos on social networking sites accessible to all users, personal communication with fellow students, inviting them both in Internet correspondence and personal conversations to meetings, which purpose was to preach the ideas of radical Islamism. Four people, as a result of their activity, went to fight in Syria. The perpetrators were sentenced by the North Caucasian District Military Court to terms of 5 to 7 years in a general regime colony. The perpetrators were sentenced by the North Caucasian District Military Court to terms of 5 to 7 years in a general regime colony. Primarily, there are penalties

in the form of fines (from 1 to 35,000 rubles), conditional sentences of 1 to 3 years, forced labor, as well as from 1 to 3 years of colony-settlement, for public calls for extremist activities and the justification of terrorism in social networks.¹⁶ For example, in the United States, more severe measures were applied to persons supporting ISIS. So, in August 2015, information was published in the media that 17-year-old Ali Shukri Amin from Virginia was sentenced to 11 years of actual imprisonment for the active placement in the propaganda network of ISIS.¹⁷ However, at the present time there is an active radicalization of the consciousness of persons in places of deprivation of liberty (jail, prisons, colonies-settlements). Those convicted of recruiting, publicly appealing to extremism and terrorism, may be targeted as an object of strengthening and developing radical views on the part of the more "experienced comrades" and the subject of influence with the aim of radicalizing the views of "recruits".

As for Russia, Dagestan continues to remain the region of greatest tension in terms of the number of actions of a criminal-terrorist orientation at the present stage. According to regional and federal media, there were 22 cases of recruitment and public justification of terrorism in Dagestan in 2015, and there were already 18 cases in the first six months of 2016. The recruiters were young men, both male and female, aged 14-35 years. Crimes were recorded in other regions of the Russian Federation.

The scheme of attracting young people, used by ISIS recruiters, is quite simple. It consists of three stages: motivation, communication, joining the ranks of a terrorist organization. Terrorists analyze hundreds of accounts in social networks, choosing from them those belonging to young people with big problems in socialization. Often, young men themselves, announcing in their status the presence of personal problems, stumble upon a recruiter who enters his account in the circle of a young man's communication and waits for him to be approached. His main task at this stage is to form a steady interest in the study of Islam, Islamic culture, Islamic traditions. The object of recruiting

studies special educational and methodological literature, plunging into a virtual world where the values of Muslim culture are replaced by simpler and more understandable ideological constructs and concepts of radical Islamists. The object of recruiting of terrorists can not establish that the subject of his study is not traditional Islam, but Islamism, which he perceives as the true teaching of all Muslims. Becoming the so-called "true knowledge" carrier, this young man distances himself from his peers. Internal separation from society acquires a principled character and begins to be expressed in alienated behavior and in appearance. When the ideology of Islam supersedes all other spheres of interests and hobbies in the consciousness of this young man, the lack of communication is most sharply manifested, which must be filled with the establishment of stable ties with the real supporters of radical Islam.

Communication is carried out in the remote form always – through social networks. Separation from objective reality becomes most complete and it is almost impossible to get out of this state independently, as any fluctuations are monitored and attempts to interrupt communication are suppressed.

At the last stage, the object of recruiting is brought to the territory of the terrorist group. The pretext can be a meeting with an ideologist who became an idol and a legend by the time of the meeting; Or the possibility of performing a "special mission". The need to be recognized and to acquire social status is one of the dominant traits and motivations for young people, so getting it as soon as possible becomes the determining motive for all further actions.

At the last stage the meeting place is chosen, the route of travel and the transport map are developed, the necessary documents are prepared, the recruited person is provided with the minimum necessary financial means. At the same time, he is warned that the trip should be organized secretly from relatives and friends, as they can prevent him from "moving up the career ladder". As a result, the young man disappears: he is not at the university, at work, he does not return home, does not answer calls

and letters in the networks. Often a young man already manages to leave the borders of the Russian Federation by that time. After his arrival at the destination, the terrorists make an open recruitment offer, and its non-acceptance becomes an almost unrealistic task. As a result, another representative of the terrorist group is ready to fulfill its new duties. In recent years, large-scale preventive anti-terrorist activities have been carried out in Russia. In particular, only in 2015 access to more than 800 sites of a terrorist orientation was terminated, and extremist information was removed from 4,500 pages on the Internet. Only for the first quarter of 2016, Russian Interior Ministry units blocked about 800 accounts and more than 150 terrorist sites, extremist information was removed from 2.5 thousand pages on the Internet.¹⁸ It should be noted that the high degree of decentralization of the network negates the effect of closing individual accounts, since the vacant seats are quickly occupied with new ones. Most of the servers of extremist sites are outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, located on the territory of the United States, Finland, Germany, etc., some are even located in "networks-anonymizers", providing for absolute anonymity.

Obviously, today the leaders of terrorist organizations rely on information terrorism, which manifests itself in direct influence on the psyche and the consciousness of young people to form opinions and judgments that are necessary for terrorists, and which in some way influence the behavior of young people. Internet technologies allow reach a wider audience and interact with people from different regions, spreading radical ideas that lead to new social risks, penetrating all social strata, groups, some of which are the subjects of risk, while others – its objects.

In this regard, new ways and methods of implementing ideological, propagandistic and explanatory activities in Russia should be developed. Further development of methods of information antiterrorism is necessary. Counteraction to the ideology of terrorism, according to experts, should become an integral part of the overall information policy of the state. It should be noted that the information policy of the state is the ability of

policy subjects to influence the consciousness, the psyche of people, their behavior and activities with the help of information in the interests of the state and civil society. Information security is one of the objects of the information policy. Its structural components are information and psychological security, implying the effective use of all available information resources to ensure the society protection, its individual groups and individuals from the negative impact of destructive forms of information. According to the official position of representatives of the National Antiterrorist Committee (NAK), it is necessary to influence public consciousness and create a self-reproducing system of ideas and effective channels for their dissemination in order to prevent the development of various forms of destructive social behavior, including terrorism.¹⁹

At the present stage, the task of preventing recruitment to extremist groups becomes a priority for the entire world community. The set of measures is necessary for its implementation, aimed at the formation of a national identity. For example, in Austria, the "Together: Austria" program has been in operation since 2011, which combines an information campaign on the Internet and elements of the school curriculum.²⁰ An important mechanism of the Austrian program for the integration of migrants is the involvement of successful representatives of diasporas for lectures in schools. In 2014, the program was supplemented by a new initiative, "I am Proud", which has become one of the most successful information campaigns of the Austrian government in the social network Facebook. Users were invited to shoot and upload a short video about what they were proud of in their country. Particular attention was paid to the migrant audience. During only the first two weeks about 50,000 users downloaded material on Facebook, and 2,500 people used the Twitter service. Associations of national and religious minorities actively joined the campaign. An example of such a campaign in Russia is the project "I remember, I am proud!", the symbol of which is the St. George ribbon.

At the same time, it is necessary to work out a program to combat extremism in the education system. The experience of

France is very impressive, where the special program of the Ministry of Education and Science "Greater mobilization of education in support of the values of the Republic" works, published on February 9, 2015.²¹ Similar measures have been taken in Austria and Germany.

It should be emphasized that the creation of special software for monitoring Internet activity in the context of global informatization in order to prevent recruitment to extremist communities is of fundamental importance. In the UK, schools should use special software that will monitor students' online activity for characteristic terms used by terrorist recruiters, according to the new anti-terrorism legislation, which came into force on July 1, 2015.²²

The experience of some Muslim states is of practical interest, for example, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the authorities' strategy to counter terrorism includes three components: "people, money, minds". "People" - is the identification, arrest and conviction of terrorists, the destruction of their structures. "Money" is a measure to strengthen control over financial flows that go through different channels to terrorists and extremists, including the transportation of money by couriers. The struggle for "minds" is the most complex component of the counter-terrorism strategy and requires a long time, according to the Saudi authorities.

"Struggle for minds" includes a number of measures to counter extremist ideology, in addition to official statements by the Saudi government and religious leaders, among them: an active anti-extremist campaign in the media using various kinds of advertisements, billboards and the Internet; Distribution of books and pamphlets, videodiscs and cassettes in schools, madrassas, mosques; Re-education of those theologians who preach an extremist ideology. This is done by preachers in 20 thousand of 70 thousand mosques, therefore the Saudi authorities constantly hold "enlightening" seminars and lectures in them.

The program for the rehabilitation of persons convicted of terrorism or extremism is carried out in prisons, including prisoners handed over by Americans from Guantanamo Bay prison. Only in 2004-2009 this program was attended by 4,300 people. Relapses

were observed in about 20 percent of participants after its completion, and therefore it can be considered quite effective.

The measures taken by the Saudi authorities reduce the level of the terrorist threat. Nevertheless, terrorism remains an actual phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. In this regard, it is recognized that it is necessary to take additional measures, both legislative and executive and ideological, to counter terrorism on the part of the authorities.²³

The experience of the struggle of foreign, including Arab, states proves the need for an integrated approach to solving the problem of spreading the influence of the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism in the Russian Federation, which has social, political, economic, cultural, historical and religious-ethnic roots. An effective opposition of the state to this threat can be achieved with the combined efforts of all state institutions, offensive information counteraction and the presence of government support from influential religious and public figures, civil society.

Necessity has also arisen in carrying out a complex interdisciplinary research aimed at creating information and communication methods based on the positive potential of Islam and based on verbal and semantic constructs that allow deny the propagandists of radicalism in the information space and prevent the involvement of youth in the activities of terrorist organizations. It is obvious that social media should become effective channels for spreading not destructive, but creative ideas in modern conditions. Thus, the need to increase the effectiveness of activities in the implementation of the information policy of the youth segment, the development of effective strategies, methods of using social media in ensuring information security and preventing terrorist mercenarism in the youth environment was actualized.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

NATALIA ROMANCHENKO. STRUCTURE AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF TERRORIST RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN POST-SOVIET PERIOD // *The article was specially written for the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World.*

Keywords: Islamism, extremism, radicalization, terrorist organizations.

Natalia Romanchenko,
PhD (Political sciences),
expert of Center of regional investigations,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russia

Examining the radicalization process of the activity of terrorist religious-political organizations in the North Caucasus, one can single out three periods: imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet.

During the imperial period in the course of the Caucasian war of the 19th century Islam in Russia had a political tint: numerous armed units gathered under the banners of imams to wage a struggle against the czarist army with a view to forming and upholding the Islamic state – Imamat. After the termination of the war the opened armed confrontation of the mountainous people took a hidden form of fight against the local authorities with the use of terrorist methods in order to influence Russian authorities. It became a prototype of the modern gang underground.

The Soviet period was marked by the tendency of creating official Islamic organizations whose activity was under the influence of Germany, Britain and Turkey and oriented to the setting up of state-controlled bodies in the North Caucasus. This activity acquired a radical politicized character. These organizations waged a hidden struggle against Soviet power. In the situation of prolonged contradictions in the traditional Islamic ummah, the Muslim countries of the Middle East were engaged in distribution of the ideas of "pure Islam", or "Wahhabism" in the North Caucasus calling for fight against the "infidels" with a view to building an Islamic emirate on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan.¹

In the beginning of the post-Soviet period the Islamic factor in the North Caucasian region comes out as an ideological and organizational camouflage for realization of practical interests of all and sundry separatists, nationalists, mafia groupings and clans, and dyed-in-the wool criminals gathered together under the banners of radical fundamentalism with financial and ideological assistance of the international terrorist movement. It should be noted that Islamist extremism and terrorism in the North Caucasus acquired ethnic-national features based on archaic forms of social behavior of mountainous people during the imperial period, including vendetta. These factors have strengthened the positions of Islamism, using its customs and habits to justify its political practices and mobilize believers to jihad against the "infidels" in order to reach their basic ultimate aim – the proclamation of independent Ichkeria and its secession from the Russian Federation. This aim determined the emergence of nationalist-radical movements engaged in the struggle against the Federal Center in the form of sporadic terrorist acts perpetrated by small groups (explosions of buildings, mass seizures of hostages, etc.), which provoked armed actions of the federal forces with a view to establishing the "constitutional order" in the course of the 1st Chechen war. The beginning of armed actions gave an impetus to the radicalization of the activity of the Chechen separatists, who were helped by foreign "mujahids".

After the defeat of the Chechen militants during the first months of the 2nd Chechen war, the priorities of the Islamic extremists and their ideological foundations have changed. In order to draw additional forces and supporters they changed their former ethnic separatist plan of severance of part of the "self-determinant" territory from Russia into a new religious idea, namely, the creation of an independent Islamic state based on the Sharia law in the Caucasus. This idea removed ethnic differences between Caucasian peoples, inasmuch as in the sacred war there are neither Chechens, nor Avars, nor Karachais, nor Ingush, but only the warriors of Allah, which considerably enhances the strength of radical Islamists. Along with this, the Islamist idea of resistance made it possible to draw the attention and sympathies of the fighters for Muslim religion the world over with their vast financial opportunities. Thus, the change of the ideological foundation of extremists has led to the spreading of the radical Salafite movement in other republics of the North Caucasus and transformation of groups of "resistance" into mobile terrorist groupings, using guerilla methods and means and forming a vast uniform underground network.

During the post-Soviet period of the development of terrorist religious-political organizations in the North Caucasus was characterized by the formation of a terrorist gang underground as a classical social organization with a firm hierarchy and linear forms of interconnection at various levels, which increase their effectiveness and secrecy. This is why the modern polycentric North Caucasian extremist system is well prepared to meet "challenges from the outside", and despite its limited systemic potential it retains its considerable destructive possibilities.²

During the post-Soviet period the development of terrorist religious-political organizations in the North Caucasus was characterized by the formation of terrorist bandit underground, effective enough and well hidden.

Examining the modern North Caucasian terrorist underground as a network organization it is necessary to note that its main structural unit is "jamaat" (terrorist organization or

gang). We should emphasize that these extremist “jamaats” have nothing in common with the traditional social structures of North Caucasian societies which are also known as “jamaats”.

During the post-Soviet period terrorist jamaats changed their tactic and strategy and switched over from frontal battles to subversive and terrorist acts called “beehive” tactic. They are now able to change places, manoeuver, and if need be, join similar groups. Stable communications have been established between these bands. At present the structure of the terrorist movement, which has developed in various parts of the world, is based on the network principle (“spider’s web” principle). In other words, after the termination of the war in Chechnya the militants’ activity has not died down. It has spread to other parts of the North Caucasus and taken the form of terrorist acts.³

The organizational structure of separatist communities – jamaats – does not coincide with the structure of the traditional Muslim communities of the region also named “jamaats”. Traditional jamaats include the population of just one rural settlement or definite sections of a town grouped around mosques. In other words, traditional jamaats in the North Caucasus are organized on a territorial basis. Separatist jamaats are ex-territorial and scattered around. One such jamaat may include a multitude of small groups united in one or several networks. The jamaats’ structures consist of virtually autonomous groups each one with a very small number of members, who quite often do not know one another. Such network is difficult to break inasmuch as finding one cell does not lead to discovering others. This makes it difficult to manage the system and direct its work, but it is also difficult to trace and catch it.⁴

Thus, the extremist “jamaats” can be regarded as a network structure, which includes groups of people connected with one another in common activities. The jamaats with many connections are called “hubs” and serve as important components of the terrorist network.

The “Wahhabi jamaats” are small gangs or groups scattered across a definite territory. The head of such cell is amir (as a rule, a local resident) with one instructor – liaison person (as a rule, he is from among foreign mercenaries), and a group of militants under their command. They are in charge of arms and technical equipment, take care of food and medicines supplies, etc., as well as do reconnaissance and recruitment work. A greater part of jamaat members is militants who come back where they live. But on order from the amir they are bound to join him there and then and fulfill his orders.

The composition of Islamist “jamaats” is diverse. Their main contingent is Muslim young men of the region, and this is why they are often named “youth jamaats”. As a rule, there are mainly representatives of North Caucasian peoples, but sometimes one can meet there men from other countries – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Middle East countries.

In the first decade of this century most “jamaats” of this type were in Daghestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia. A fewer number of them was in Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayev-Circassia, but their number was on an increase all the time.

Here is some information of the distribution of jamaats by regions:

Daghestan: jamaat “Sharia” and jamaat “Jennet”;

Kabardino-Balkaria: jammat “Yarmuk”, jamaat “Kabardino-Balkarsky”;

Ingushetia: jamaat “Khalifat”, jamaat “Taliban”;

Karachayev-Circassia: jamaat KChR;

Northern Ossetia: jammat “Kataib-al-Houl”.

These jamaats and others, smaller terrorist and radical Islamist groups were engaged in individual activities in the early 2000s. In May 2005, the leadership of the unrecognized “Republic of Ichkeria” undertook measures to unite the scattered “jamaats”. The new “president” of the self-proclaimed “Republic of Ichkeria” Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev, who came to replace the neutralized Aslan Maskhadov, issued an order on the formation

of the Caucasian Front of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria – the association of the Islamist militant terrorist groups in the North Caucasus outside the boundaries of Chechen territory, which included the following autonomous regional sectors:

Daghestani sector (Jamaat Sharia, Derbent Jamaat);
Ingush sector (Jamaat Galgaiche);
Ossetian sector (Jamaat “Kataib al-Houl”);
Kabardino-Balkarian sector (Kabardino-Balkarsky Jamaat);
Stavropol sector (Nogai battalion);
Karachayevo-Circassian sector (Karachayevo Jamaat);
Adygeye sector;
Krasnodar sector.

After the 2nd Chechen war the separatists have formed, for propaganda purposes, special battalions organized on the ethnic principle. At the end of the 1990s – beginning of the 2000s, the Nogai, Karachai and other “ethnic” battalions came into being. They were theoretical rather than real military units. Raids, terrorist acts and similar operations ascribed to one or another battalion were committed by members of separatist “jamaats” of a corresponding ethnic group.

After the neutralization of Saidulayev on October 7, 2007, the “Imarat Kavkaz” was proclaimed leader of the separatist movement in the North Caucasus as the only body uniting various organizations. It was sort of the upper chamber of parliament, which had advisory functions. Besides, within its competence was the election of the new amir in the event of the death of the present one.

The ruling regime of “Imarat Kavkaz” may be termed authoritarian. All its bodies had only consultative functions. Anzor Astemiroiv, the supreme judge and one of its former leaders, who had been killed, once said that there was no division in the leadership of the supreme body. Religious, political and military functions were concentrated in the hands of the amir.

The structure of each jamaat had a network character. This showed that terrorist underground existed and acted on almost the entire territory of the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation.⁵ This was declared by Doku Umarov, the new president of unrecognized Ichkeria. He proclaimed himself the supreme ruler – “amir of the mujahids of the Caucasus”, “leader of jihad”, as well as “the only legitimate authority on all territories of mujahids”, that is, the territory from Tatarstan to Buryatia in East Siberia.⁶

The situation changed very rapidly, and within five years “Imarat Kavkaz” turned into the center of most extremist and terrorist groupings scattered over a vast territory. In actual fact, it was not only the political and ideological mouthpiece, but also the guiding body of the terrorist underground in the entire North Caucasus.

Territorially, “Imarat Kavkaz” looked like a federative quasi-state. Initially, the territory it ruled was divided into six parts: Daghestan, Nokhchiicho (Chechnya), Galgaiche (Ingushetia), Circassia, Iriston (Northern Ossetia), Nogai steppe (Stavropol territory), as well as Balkaria and Karachayevo districts. In May 2009 Doka Umarov ordered that Iriston be included in Galgaiche.

Each part was headed by the amir who had almost absolute power on its territory. He was selected from among the amirs of local jamaats, who were also commanders of mobile armed units. These amirs, just as the supreme amir, had a consultative body (majlis) under them made of the most authoritative representatives of the community. Among other duties, the majlis had the function of distribution of the common fund which was formed by dues and donations of community members.⁷

Each jamaat consists of about 10 to 20 men who take direct part in jihad. And the rear and sympathizers whose number is difficult to ascertain can number several hundred, or even thousand. They include those who supply the underground with

information, helps with food products, means of transportation, rented housing, etc.

“Imarat Kavkaz” and its amir had structures resembling ministerial departments. Among them - “ministry of defense”, “KGB”, “ministry of public relations”, etc. In the spring of 2009 Doku Umarov convened a special representative body - “Majlisul Shura”. It included heads of parts and jamaats (local militant and extremist religious units. (*see Drawing 1*).

IMARAT KAVKAZ					
Daghestan	Nokhchiicho	Galgaiche	Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai	Cherkessia	Nogai
Republic of Daghestan: Jamaat Sharia (Dzhennet) Derbentsky jamaat (Forest Brothers, or Southern grouping)	Chechen Republic: Numerous scattered jamaats	Ingushetia: Jamaat Caliphate Northern Ossetia: Kutaib-al-Houl (Powerful battalion, or Ossetain battalion)	Kabardino-Balkarian Republic: Jamaat Yarmuk	Karachayev-Circassia Karachayevsky jamaat (Muslim society No 3)	Nogai Savropol territory Nogai jamaat (Nogai subversive battalion)

Drawing 1. Structure of “Imarat Kavkaz”

All experts agree that “Imarat Kavkaz” was part of the international terrorist movement, its activity was coordinated by the extremist Islamist structures of the Middle East and expressed the ideas of al-Qaeda”.⁸ Thus, the international Islamist movement using the terrorist methods to fight the “infidels” created the North Caucasian terrorist hub within the framework of global Salafite jihad. Despite its being distant territorially, it was well connected with all big international clusters of terrorist movement.

Assessing the development of the terrorist movement in the North Caucasian region of Russia one can definitely notice certain changes in it during the 2007-2013 period.

First, the inner structure of the gang underground changed. Instead of the former independent groups and units headed by ambitious commanders a flexible network structure emerged, which was more convenient for operations and survival.

Secondly, new sources of replenishment of the ranks of radical Salafites have come into being. Along with the real supporters of Islamic fundamentalist ideas whose aim is to improve and educate society by strict religious education and the introduction of the Sharia law in everyday life, as well as marginal and criminal elements who have joined them, we can note the emergence of quite a few non-Muslims newly converted in Islam. Experience shows that they are sometimes more ardent adepts of radical Islam than Muslims by birth. For example, Said Buryatsky (prior to turning into Islam he was A. Tikhomirov – neutralized in 2009) was the new ideologist of the gang underground, and one of his major tasks was to draw more Russian-speaking young men in extremist activity.

Thirdly, more frequent cases of the wider use of shahids for perpetrating terrorist attacks have been registered in the region. Beginning from the 2nd Chechen war (in 1999) and up to now they have been an almost ordinary phenomenon. In the history of the North Caucasian peoples there have been very few cases of purposeful and conscious suicide. The phenomenon of suicide is alien to the way of life and spiritual and cultural perception of the North Caucasian peoples. However, the forces of radical Islamism have turned it into a political phenomenon and it is inculcated in certain people on the territory of the North Caucasian republics.⁹

Fourthly, the sources of financing have changed, too: in the 1990s radicals received financial help from the degrading Russian army, whereas in the past decade they have been helped by their brethren from all parts of the world, and also due to a vast

support of the local population. The financial basis of the activity of the gang underground is mainly formed by voluntary donations from Muslim countries. As is known, all Muslims must donate 2.5 percent of their incomes to charity. This is the income tax imposed by the Sharia law, which is used by the Muslim communities, is given over to charity funds and distributed among the poor and needy.¹⁰ As a result of thorough investigations of major terrorist acts in various countries (including the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S.A.), it became clear that the terrorist organizations which committed them, had been financed from the funds of legal Islamic religious-political and charity organizations of various kind which received voluntary donations from rank-and-file Muslims.¹¹

After September 11, 2001, control over financing terrorist organizations has become stricter, but in any case, one channel remains open and it is impossible to close it so ar. It is the so-called *khawala*, an informal way of transferring money based on business and family relations.¹²

Opportunities have also changed. Previously, underground commanders propagated their ideas exclusively by personal example, whereas at present the militants are actively using digital technologies. This enables them to get in touch with broad masses of people and effectively draw supporters and followers to their ranks. Modern international terrorist organizations are equipped with the most up-to-date technical means and use international and national information and telecommunication networks and systems for spreading the ideas of radical Islam and terror.

In this connection a new form of management has emerged on the part of international terrorist organizations to supervise the activities of the North Caucasian terrorist "jaamats" through network communications, the Internet and other technical means. At present there are several hundred extremist information portals in the global network. In 1998 about half of thirty organizations, which the United States considered terrorist, had

electronic pages, whereas at present absolutely all radically-minded groups are represented in the global network. And they translate their material into more than forty languages.

After the neutralization of Doku Umarov, the leader of "Imarat Kavkaz" in 2013, most network structures – members of that organization sworn to "al-Qaeda" of Osama bin Laden became subordinated to the new terrorist giant – the: Islamic state". Many Russian Islamists have gone to Syria to join the war against the government forces of that republic loyal to President B. Asad. According to official data, several thousand Islamists from the post-Soviet area have gone to Syria. The groupings left in Russia are weak and less numerous now, but they are still dangerous because they destabilize the situation in various localities, mainly in the North-East Caucasus.

At present the radical Islamist movement in the North Caucasus is in a state of degradation. It is criminalized, decentralized, weaker and more autonomous. Now small groups of militants try to deal rapid pinpoint blows at people and objects after which they go underground and finally disintegrate.¹³ "Sleeping" terrorist groups have emerged recently which operate against U.S. and EU citizens.

Thus, the modern radical Islamist organizations in the North Caucasus have changed. Today, their participation in the terrorist movement has shifted to support of international terrorist organizations operating in North Africa and the Middle East.

At the same time religious views characteristic of the Arab world become popular among a considerable part of the North Caucasian population, which is due to the active work of preachers from Saudi Arabia and representatives of the Turkish Islamic foundations, as well as members of international terrorist organizations in the Afghan-Pakistani zone. As a result of the influence of alien Islamist ideology the foundations of traditional Muslim religion are undermined and conditions are created for the politicization of the religious factor and, consequently, for possible manifestations of extremism. This process resulted in

that many representatives of the North Caucasian ummah of traditional Islam and also representatives of other confessions display greater interest in the situation in Syria and join the hostilities on the side of the Islamic state. According to the published data, the number of militants from Russia on the side of radical Islamists in Syria reaches five thousand.¹⁴

After the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation by the Russian armed forces in Syria on September 30, 2015, and the worsening positions of the Islamic state, militants of Russian origin began to return to Russia, primarily, to North Caucasian republics. Their coming back home may seriously aggravate the situation in the North Caucasus. These people are now bearers of hostile ideology preaching the creation of a world caliphate on the basis of the Sharia law by forcible means. They have been well trained on Syrian battlefields and can now begin activities to draw new supporters and followers to well-hidden terrorist organizations. They replenish the ranks of the "sleeping" jamaats oriented to supporting the activity of international terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and also ready to deal pinpoint terrorist blows at various objects on the territory of the North Caucasus and entire Russia.

At the same time it should be emphasized that the weaker activity of the North Caucasian extremist groups was largely due to a whole range of the anti-terrorist measures of the Russian special services, including the liquidation of the leaders of "Imarat Kavkaz", including its founder Doku Umarov.

According to official statistics, in 2016 alone the Russian special services and law-enforcement agencies prevented 42 terrorist acts all over the country, including in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and Nizhni Novgorod. Large quantities of arms and explosives were captured and many channels of their supply to Russia closed. Last year 129 militants were killed, including 22 gang leaders in Russia. Nearly 900 bandits and their helpers were arrested. Several leaders of the supporters of the Islamic state in the North Caucasus were killed.

The leadership of the terrorist groupings acting on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic was liquidated.

The number of the discovered extremist Internet-resources has grown to 26,000. This is twice as many as in the previous year. Apart from that, it was possible to stem the Internet-propaganda of several terrorist organizations and groups. In August 2016, cells of the international Internet-community spreading radical ideas and recruiting militants for international terrorist organizations and collecting money for the Islamic state were abolished.

The special services have frozen financial accounts of over 2,000 persons suspected of helping terrorists and prevented the departure from Russia of people going abroad to join international terrorist organizations. The activity of people recruiting Russian citizens to terrorist groups in Russia was stopped.¹⁵

Comparing this situation with the previous one, a conclusion can be drawn that the religious-extremist underground of the North Caucasus has seriously suffered due to the growing activity of the special services and law-enforcement agencies. But it is too early to assert that terrorists and terrorism have been done away with on Russian territory. It should be noted that the traditional methods of anti-terrorist struggle can hardly solve the problem radically. Neither the liquidation of the widely-known terrorist leaders (Dudayev, Maskhadov, Basayev, Umarov, and others), nor the abolition of "jamaats", nor anti-extremist propaganda will be able to stop terrorism. The gang underground in the North Caucasus is organized in such a way that the killed amirs are immediately replaced by new ones, and the ideas of religious extremism and national separatism are still very popular, and the destroyed "jamaats" are constantly replenished.¹⁶

Moreover, the financial assistance from international terrorist organizations, like "al-Qaeda", which was stopped, is

compensated by the system of racket widely practiced by the militants.¹⁷

With due account of spreading radical Islamist ideology in the entire North Caucasus and forming prerequisites for the creation of radical Salafite groupings in the Crimea, Volga area, the Urals and West Siberia,¹⁸ as well as in the Muslim enclaves of Russian metropolitan cities, the recruitment of Russian citizens and their departure for the zones of military hostilities, and subsequent coming back home present a real threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and require the adoption of a whole range of counter-measures.

It seems to us that it is necessary to adopt urgent measures at the Federal level in information and propaganda activity, particularly to distribute in the mass media patriotic material prepared by highly-qualified experts and journalists.

With due account of the strong propaganda campaign waged by the leaders and supporters of the Islamic state it seems expedient to work out and implement a range of counter-propagandist measures, including those with the use of theologically substantiated theses about the anti-religious character of the activity of the Islamic state, and the utopian nature of building “Caliphate” in the modern world.

Parallel with this it is necessary, in our view, to stiffen the legislation of the Russian Federation with regard to the responsibility of the Internet-providers for violation of rules and regulations in the sphere of opposition to distributing the ideology of terrorism in the Internet.

Local authorities should step up work aimed at formulation of a platform to develop ethnicity as the key component of all-Russian identity. In evolving ethnic-confessional policy it is necessary to proceed from expediency of supporting spiritual leaders from among the indigenous population oriented to moderate Islam and traditional ethnic culture. It is also necessary to carry on a policy for raising the prestige and quality of

education at Russian theological institutions with a view to restricting the influence of foreign preachers.

The state security bodies, along with preventing recruitment of Russian citizens in the armed conflict zones in Arab countries, should step up control over those who have left international terrorist organizations and returned to their permanent place of residence and, if necessary, start criminal action against them. It is also important to reveal and stem money transfers from the accounts of those taking part in the conflict in Syria to their relations on Russian territory.

Thus, a successful opposition of the country to terrorist threats is only possible on condition of combining efforts, including of all institutions of the state, informational opposition, and support and assistance from the government, influential religious and public figures, and the entire civil society.

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Alexander Kozikov,
PhD (Politics), Astrakhan

Modern political processes taking place in the post-Soviet states of the Caspian region are characterized by attempts to pass over to a democratic political system, the author writes. After the collapse of the USSR, the states of this region faced the problem of forming a new system of state organization and management. To solve the problems of transition to the democratization of their political space and for the further development of the state, it was necessary to form new institutions which would be effective and would entrench the foundations of the new social and political system. By the time of obtaining sovereignty, none of the post-Soviet states was ready for democratic transformations. A certain period and forms of transition from a totalitarian system to a democratic one were needed. Historical experience shows that this implies first a gradual transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism, and only after that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The post-Soviet states of the Caspian region took another way, trying to speed up the advent of the era of democratic development, having no necessary prerequisites for this. This affected the specifics of the process of forming effective institutions required by the very logic of creating a democratic state.

A. Kozikov considers features of formation of the basic political institutions, in particular, institutions of presidency,

parliamentarianism, free elections and civil society in the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkmenistan. The first stage in the transition from a totalitarian political system to a democratic one was the stage of formalizing the constitutional foundations of these states. Within the frames of their constitutions, democratic principles were fixed as fundamental. The democratic, republican, legal, secular and social character of the state was established. Human and civil rights were recognized as the highest values. Political pluralism and diversity of opinions and assessments, private property, free and competitive elections were recognized. With certain common features, these processes have their own peculiarities in each of these states.

The researcher identifies five stages in the political process of the Republic of Kazakhstan

According to the President of Kazakhstan N.A. Nazarbayev, at the first stage – from 1991 to 1995 – from the moment of real independence to adoption of the Constitution of the sovereign Kazakhstan, the state focused on overcoming disintegration processes, forming the foundation of Kazakhstani statehood, moving from the dictates of the one-party system to political pluralism, creating the foundations of democratic development. During this period aggravation of the contradictions between the branches of power as well as within the elite there came about. The contradictions between the President and the Parliament were the most serious ones. They were being resolved by strengthening the executive power, capable of managing the processes of economic life.

A new stage, 1995–2000, became the stage of the process of creating the foundations of the modern political system in Kazakhstan. During this period the country set the course for introduction of the principle of separation of the power branches. Its advent was marked with the adoption in 1995 of a new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. It entrenched the transition to the presidential form of government. The presidency

became the leading political institution. In the country there were laid the foundations of the new statehood, there was formed a unified state power capable of regulating and directing public development, and a professional bicameral Parliament was created. The concentration of power in the hands of the president triggered growing public debates about some authoritarian features allegedly assumed by the Kazakh political system. During this period the program of democratization and political reforms in the country, set forth by the President N.A. Nazarbayev in his Message to the People of Kazakhstan in 1998, started being implemented.

The next stage of 2001-2005 was marked by the adoption of a 10-year strategic development plan for the country. In accordance with this plan, in the sphere of political and state construction for the period up to 2010, the emphasis was made on resolving a number of key tasks: creation of an effective system of interaction between the three branches of power; decentralization of public administration; improving the mechanisms of the electoral process; promoting the development of political parties and civil society institutions; strengthening of internal political stability; expansion of the rights and freedoms of citizens. An important role in political development belonged to a new political institute, established at the end of 2002, the Constantly Operating Meeting (COM) for developing proposals for further democratization and development of civil society.

The next stage of political reforming can be divided into two parts: the preparatory one and the practical one. The first one started in 2005 and ended in May 2007 with the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the country. At that time, the main directions of political modernization were identified and determined. A serious step for translating the idea of political modernization into practice was the activity of the State Democratization Committee, set up under the chairmanship of the President. In particular, it was decided to expand the functions of representative power bodies: the Parliament and

maslihats of all levels. This strengthened the role of this branch of power in the state and political structure of the country. It was decided to form a government based on the party of the parliamentary majority.

The practical part of this phase began in May 2007, with the announcement of amendments to the Constitution. In a generalized form, the meaning of adopting these amendments was to continue political liberalization, to create a new system of balance between public and state interests. The amendments provide redistribution of power and responsibility in the direction of increasing the role of the parliament; strengthening the role of political parties; development of local self-government; improvement of the judicial system; ensuring interethnic harmony and strengthening the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan; further development of civil society institutions; strengthening the system of protecting the rights and freedoms of citizens. Amendments to the Constitution provided the election of the president for 5 years instead of 7 years.

As for the Republic of Azerbaijan, A. Kozikov points out, in the process of analyzing the political process and the political transformation of the state, it is necessary to proceed from the consideration of the influence of not only internal factors but also the external prerequisites and conditions which are of great significance. It is customary to attribute the influence of traditionalism in the socio-political life of this state to internal factors. The external one is connected with the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and other factors, especially oil.

The first stage of formation of the Azerbaijani statehood and democratic institutions turned out to be very controversial. The transition period in the formation of the Azerbaijani democracy was characterized by manifestation of anarchy, formation of a new political elite, the ongoing war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and the geopolitical situation of Azerbaijan. In such conditions the formation of new political institutions began. During the period

from 1991 to 1993, two presidents of the country, who found themselves under serious pressure from the masses demanding not only democratic reforms but also the victory in the war against Armenia, were replaced. In fact, the process of formation of political institutions of the state began with coming to power of the third President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Geydar Aliyev. Coming of Geydar Aliyev to power was the result of compromises of almost all political forces, with the support of the society which awaited the leader capable to bring order to the country. An important feature of this process was that, in complex and contradictory conditions, a step away from "classical democracy" to a strong authoritarian power became a step towards the development of a democratic state and the establishment of order therein.

In 1995, the first Constitution of Azerbaijan was adopted in a nationwide referendum, and in 2002 amendments and additions were made to it. The amendments made to the Constitution in 2002 actually became the basis for the "legal continuity of power" in the Republic, as a result of which Aliyev's son Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003. First, he became the Prime Minister, and later was officially supported by the current president of Azerbaijan, G. Aliyev, as his successor to the post of President of the Republic.

Despite the adoption of the Constitution of a democratic type, the Republic of Azerbaijan remains a semi-democratic state. The democratic political regime in it is still being formed. Firstly, a transfer of power in a democratic state cannot be exercised by appointing "successors", which happened in Azerbaijan, where the power was in fact transferred from the father to the son by inheritance. Secondly, there is a weakness of the opposition forces, as a result of which the pro-presidential party "New Azerbaijan" won the majority of seats in the new parliament.

The process of formation of the political system in the Republic of Turkmenistan is, as a whole, characterized by two

periods: the first is connected with the presidency of S. Niyazov, the second one - with the presidency of G. Berdimuhamedov.

Under the first President of the Republic of Turkmenistan, Saparmyrat Niyazov, the Constitution entrenching broad powers of the president, which became the center of state power of the country, was adopted. In addition to the president, the government and the parliament, a special supreme body of people's representation, the Khalk Masla-haty was created. Also, Turkmenistan's permanent neutrality was declared. Actually, President S. Niyazov established a regime of the lifelong power: first his powers, without elections, were extended for 4 years by the 1994 referendum, and in 2002 the Khalk Masla-haty proclaimed S. Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) the president of Turkmenistan for life. S. Niyazov's rule was completely reminiscent of a totalitarian regime, where the role of the head of the state played the leading role, and where no political parties existed, the people dissatisfied with the regime of Turkmenbashi were arrested and detained.

The second period is associated with coming to power of the new president of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov. This event had its own peculiarities: for the first time in the history of the Republic of Turkmenistan, elections were held on an alternative basis. Six candidates took part in them. At the same time, although Berdimuhamedov appeared to the Turkmen society as one of the preachers of democratic transformations in the country, he was in effect appointed as the "successor" to the then acting president S. Niyazov. At the presidential elections held in 2007 in connection with the death of S. Niyazov the victory of this candidate was highly probable.

In the years 2007-2008, under the new president G. Berdimuhamedov, a constitutional reform was carried out in Turkmenistan. Its result was abolition of the supreme body of the People's Representation, Khalk Masla-haty. This allowed to proceed to the classical system of organization of higher bodies of power. Many norms that were in fact survivals of the

Turkmenbashi era, where the modern legal system combined with feudal traditions were removed from the Constitution of the country,. The principle of separation of powers was restored, a classical unicameral parliament, the Mejlis, was established. In these days the president calls for setting up the second official political party, which would make a pair to the ruling party – the Democratic Party. The coming to power of the new President of Turkmenistan was a turning point in the modern history of this republic. A new stage of democratic reforms has begun in the country.

The process of democratization in the states of the Caspian region in question has both specific and common features that do not always fit into the notion of “democratization”, the researcher concludes.

The author of the abstract V.N. Schensnovich

2017.03.002. SERGEI ABASHIN. ISLAMIC CHALLENGE TO THE IDEA OF THE NATION? SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EXAMPLE OF CENTRAL ASIA // *“Cross-border Challenges to the National State”, SPb., 2015, P. 375–387.*

Keywords: nation, national state, Islam, Central Asia, Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir

Sergei Abashin,
Dr.Sc. (Hist.), professor,
European University, St. Petersburg

The author considers the interaction of the idea of nation and Islam in modern Central Asia (hereinafter CA). National statehood has appeared in Central Asia relatively recently. The principle of national statehood was brought there from the imperial and later Soviet Russia, as well as from the Ottoman Empire, then Turkey, which, under the influence of Europe, was

then experiencing the stage of its own national reorganization. The union republics, created in the 1920s in CA, were not fully-fledged states, since they were parts of one political community, the USSR. But they had all the attributes of statehood in its national form, that is, they had an indispensable "titular nation" in the capacity of their ethnic basis.

Central Asian states gained independence in 1991 and after that the policy of forming and strengthening the nation became even stronger. This process must be viewed not as theologically predetermined and self-deploying, but as the sum of the effects of various, often chaotic events and actions.

Understanding, that nationalism is determined by specific subtexts, permits to see various trajectories of nationalism in the states of CA. With all similar features, national ideologies and practices of the construction of the states of the region differ significantly from each other. Not a single version of dominant nationalism exists, but its different versions, which are in the state of constant discussion and competition between themselves. In addition, alongside with the political and intellectual elite, which is not united itself, in the countries of CA there are many different social communities having their own interests and strategies. Sometimes these interests fit into national projects and strengthen them, sometimes they do not, and then there arise some effects alternative to nationalism. These include, for example, formation of influential regional groups of elites in all the countries of the region. In Tajikistan, the rivalry between them led to the civil war in the 1990s, in Kyrgyzstan, periodic revolutions are also based on the conflict of regional identities.

The interaction of nationalism and Islam in Central Asia is of a special and ambiguous nature, due not only to the general contradiction between particularism and universalism, which are interpreted differently in these ideologies, but also by the peculiarities of the region's history. Islam in the past, even before creation of national states, was the main force in CA, with the help of which any political or proto-political union gained its

legitimacy. Moslem identity was the transcultural framework that permitted to create social coalitions from multi-tribal and multilingual societies. The Soviet power viewed any religion, Islam in particular, as a reactionary ideology, and therefore, along with the construction of Soviet nations, fought a fierce struggle against religiosity, opposing these two identities to each other. The policy of modernization and emancipation, which was being enforced, could not completely destroy religiousness and religious practices, but it transformed them.

After 1991, national states, freed from the Soviet ideology, began to make even greater efforts to nationalize Islam, regarding the latter both as an additional cultural resource, and as a new source of strengthening their legitimacy. References to religion were included in public speeches of local politicians, religious attributes appeared in the official space, major Moslem holidays were recognized, many Moslem figures of the past entered the pantheon of glorified cultural heroes, religious literature was published widely, numerous religious buildings and monuments were restored or rebuilt. At the same time, one of the main conditions for recognition was the opportunity to fit religious symbols and practices in the national framework. The governments of the CA states attempted to maintain effective institutional control over religious activities, using for this purpose spiritual departments and committees for religious affairs.

However, despite the efforts in the sphere of nationalization, Islam retained its transcultural potential. Even in the Soviet times, sometimes secretly, sometimes semi-legally, there existed grassroots, sometimes competing networks, which united believers of different nationalities. The activists of these networks formed their own intellectual and political agenda criticizing the existing order and putting forward the demand for religious unification of local practices as conditions for overcoming moral and social flaws. Return of Islam to public life at the turn of the 1980s – 1990s turned these activists into participants in the political struggle for power, and inevitably

there arose a confrontation between the idea of the nation and calls for the Islamic revival. The idea of nation and national statehood were monopolized by a narrow group of the ruling elite of Soviet origin, the political opposition lost to it in this field and was forced to oppose the idea of religious solidarity and religious moralizing to the idea of the nation.

The opposition, having declared itself a religious party, gained access to the financial and organizational resources of international and regional Islamist networks that had been formed by then in the Middle East. This international influence also brought to CA the notion of an Islamic state as a special political form, different from the national political one, which was actively discussed by various political forces. The attempts to establish this form in practice, undertaken in a number of neighboring countries, such as Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, have now become an important experience for evaluation and a model to emulate.

Further S. Abashin cites three examples of Islamic challenge to the idea of nation in modern CA and shows three different versions of development of the conflicts derived from this challenge.

The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Members of the party date its birth back to 1973, when its previous leader Sayd (Sayid) Abdullo Nuri organized the first secret religious group. However, it is better to count from 1990, when there was established the Islamic Party of Renaissance, which tried to unite all the Moslem communities of the USSR. In coalition with other nationalist and democratic parties, the IRPT in the middle of 1992 achieved a certain political success. A few months later, the political struggle escalated into a civil war, won by the former Communists. The IRPT became the central force of the United Tajik Opposition which entered into struggle against the regime, many of its leaders fled abroad, some to Iran, some to the Middle East, and key positions were occupied by warlords who did not care much about ideology. The confrontation lasted

from 1992 to 1997, it was a purely inland Tajik conflict and the lines of separation often ran not in conformance with the attitude to Islam, but along regional lines. However, the IRPT attempted to mobilize supporters by references to Islam, to emphasize its universal and traditional for the region values, to attract to its ranks people of different nationalities. At the same time the leaders of the party were forced to seek the assistance of Islamist forces outside the country: primarily in Afghanistan, where they were at first supported by the Northern Alliance, and then cooperation with the Taliban was established.

The conclusion of peace in 1997 changed the situation. The opposition managed to achieve a very favorable agreement having received 30% of the seats in the higher echelons of power in Tajikistan. The IRPT obtained legal status and could compete in the elections. The former Islamic opposition, having occupied important positions and established control over certain sectors of the economy, strengthened national orientation. The links with the Arab and Afghan paramilitary groups were broken, the party no more maintained close contacts with the Uzbek and Russian Islamist movements. The new leader of the IRPT Mukhiddin Kabiri chose a new political trend of combining moderate Islam with the secular statehood refocusing the interests to the Tajik political arena.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). This movement also rose in the wave of local conflicts generating unstable political associations or protoparties with religious overtones. The most famous of such protoparties was the Namangan group Adolat (Justice), which had in its program many features of the late-Soviet anti-communism. In the early 1990s, the leaders and supporters of the Adolat and similar groups were arrested, many of them disappeared, fled or went underground. The flight automatically included members of the Uzbek opposition in transnational Islamist networks. Part of those who fled found their way to military camps and madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan , others joined the United Tajik Opposition.

After reconciliation in Tajikistan, natives of Uzbekistan declared themselves a separate Uzbek Islamic party, named the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The culmination of the new phase was a series of terrorist and military actions in 1999 and 2000. At the same time there appeared proclamations of the leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, declaring that the new party aimed to overthrow the ruling, "tyrannical", in their opinion, regime in Uzbekistan and create an Islamic state. But, it seems, within the movement there existed different currents, with different views of the future of the region. However, the contradictions between them, if any, had no fundamental importance, and, in general, the IMU, most probably, was guided by the experience and relative success of the IRPT. Apparently, initially there were plans to unite the forces of the Uzbek opposition with the opposition forces in neighboring countries, including Uighur resistance in China, into a single organization. However, in 2001, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was overthrown, which resulted in changing configuration of the networks in which IMU fitted. The bases of the movement shifted to southern Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan (Waziristan), where creation of the non-national Islamic state was declared.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT), or the Islamic Liberation Party. This cross-border religious-political party is not tied to a specific country, it operates everywhere where there are Moslems. It was founded in 1952 by members of the Palestinian branch of another well-known religious party, Moslem Brotherhood. The cross-border nature is declared by the main program attitude of the HT, which sets recreating a global Caliphate recognizing no national borders its ultimate goal.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has some differences from the IRPT and the IMU. It clamours against the armed seizure of power. In the dogmatic sphere the HT members propose a not very strict version of Islam, that in many respects appeals to the society to a certain extent modernized but preserving the Islamic identity. They are much less concerned about the reforms of local rites and

customs. In politics and economics the XT program features superequalitarianism and criticizes the “capitalist” reforms. Based on the goal to recreate a global Caliphate, HT openly criticizes the principle of nationality, labeling it as the idea of colonizers, specially introduced in the Islamic world in order to destroy the Moslem solidarity. Ideological attitudes of Hizb ut-Tahrir contradict not only the Quran and Sunnah, but also the teachings of the Hanafi madhab (traditional Islamic school), practiced by the population of Tajikistan.

The relationship between nation and Islam in modern Central Asia is of a contradictory, dual nature. On the one hand, they are in clear opposition to each other, which stems both from the universalistic, supranational claims of the world religion and from the history of secular-national building in the region and the nature of the political confrontation between different elites. On the other hand, there is a constant interaction and interdependence of nation and of Islam, the desire to nationalize religion encounters with the desire to strengthen, remaining within the national framework, the religiosity of the society, which results in collaborative, symbiotic projects. These two tendencies coexist and occasionally interchange. Islam promotes establishment of cross-border networks and implementation of joint actions, and in the political field the Islamic identity and rhetoric are most rapidly mobilized among the part of the opposition devoid of legal opportunities to fight for power. Today, this opposition turns for support to international Islamic organizations. Some opposition movements come to a radical criticism of a national state and offer completely new political forms such as a supra-national Caliphate. The ruling Central Asian elites begin to experience difficulties because the cross-border networks fall out of their control because the moralistic religious language poorly conforms to the principle of national exclusivity.

Depending on the circumstances, the opposition Islamist parties pragmatically use both national and non-national ideas. The opposition turns to cross-border networks, finance, actively

exploits them, but it quits the networks easily if it turns out that the national state provides for it its own resource. The Islamists, too, either enter cross-border networks and are fighting for Islamic values or quit these networks and begin to protect their national specificity and autonomy. The challenge that Islam presents to the idea of nation is not absolute and unidirectional. The death of the national statehood and its replacement by the Islamic statehood as the result of the actions of Islamist opposition forces is not predetermined. It is more likely, says Sergei Abashin, that under the impact of cross-border networks and ideas a complex process of reconfiguration of the political and ideological fields is under way, and it, in its turn, causes the destabilization of many institutions and principles and generally increases the unpredictability of events.

The author of the abstract V.N. Schensnovich

2017.03.003. DMITRY POPOV. CENTRAL ASIA IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. CENTRAL ASIAN LOBBY IN WASHINGTON // *"Tsentrálnaya Aziya vo vneshney politike SShA. 1991–2016"*, Moscow, RISI, 2016, P. 189–195.

Keywords: lobbyists, lobbyist organizations, lobbying activity, Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, Astana, the "Aliyev case".

Dmitry Popov,
PhD (legal),
Head of the Ural Regional Information
and Analytical Center of the Russian Institute
for Strategic Studies, Yekaterinburg

The author notes that at present many countries, formerly part of the USSR, secretly promote their interests in the United States through a system of lobbyist organizations legalized there.

Foreign governments use the “gaps” in the U.S. law, preferring to hire lobbyists through intermediaries in the form of non-governmental organizations, chambers of commerce, lawyer groups and other similar structures registered in third countries, particularly in Europe. They manage to circumvent legally the requirements of the U.S. Foreign Registration Agent Act 1938 (FARA) with this combination. Mediation scheme is subject to a “soft” act on the regulation of lobbying activity (LDA) in 1995, providing the ability to mask the involvement in Washington policy.

The author notes that little is known about the lobbying efforts of the Central Asian states. Elites and businesses of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan possess the most real opportunities for this.

The task of restoring contacts with the U.S. leadership after the crisis in the U.S.-Uzbek relations 2005–2008 was assigned to Abdulaziz Kamilov, the Uzbek Ambassador to Washington. Significant assistance in working with the Senate and U.S. executive bodies was provided to him by the local community of Bukharian Jews. In 2010, A. Kamilov returned to his homeland in the status of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs already, and in January 2012 – headed the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan.

Opponents of the Uzbek leadership were also seen in the field of political lobbyism. During 2008–2010, the law firm Maynard, Cooper & Gale received almost \$ 800 thousand from the opposition coalition “Sunshine Uzbekistan”.

The author notes that Kazakhstan is the most active among the republics of Central Asia in lobbying national interests in American instances. And the lobby in the U.S. was largely created by Astana for fear that Washington would support one of the famous political opponents of President Nazarbaev – his former son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev.

According to the representatives of the government of Kazakhstan, the ultimate goal of R. Aliyev's actions was to create the image of a dissident in the United States, obtain political

asylum there and continue the struggle for power in the Republic of Kazakhstan with the help of Washington.

R. Aliyev sought to attract the potential of the American judicial and political system for the return of assets, requisitioned by the authorities of the republic after the aggravation of his relations with N. Nazarbayev.

The leadership of Kazakhstan was extremely worried about what was happening in the U.S., fearing that the US administration could make political cooperation with Rakhat Aliyev. The U.S. Embassy in Astana recommended to the State Department to exclude the involvement of the US administration in the "Aliyev case", perceived as "a matter of life and death by President N. Nazarbayev".

The author emphasizes that, according to American diplomats, it is incorrect to consider the disgraced politician as the "golden boy of democracy", taking into account his direct involvement in large-scale corruption schemes during his period of being in power.

Astana did not limit itself to the prevention of American partners through diplomatic channels. In 2008, Kazakhstan hired lobbyists in the US, allocating a share of \$ 3.7 million to start for three local firms for three years to create a parliamentary group "Friends of Kazakhstan" in Congress. There was a proposal to nominate N. Nazarbayev for the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to nuclear security. A special fund was created to make cash payments to "Friends of Kazakhstan" on behalf of N. Nazarbayev allegedly.

Another conductor of the interests of the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United States was a small Washington firm Policy Impact Communications, which in late 2009 helped to create in Congress another loyal Astana parliamentary group called "Central Asian Kokus" in cooperation with the Kazakh embassy.

The lobbyists provided a number of positive statements by members of Congress on the success of Kazakhstan, which was

important for President N. Nazarbayev, whose reputation has suffered in connection with the publication of the book of revelations "Godfather-in-law" by R. Aliyev in Russia and Germany in 2009. The planned chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the OSCE in 2010 required improving the image of the republic as well.

Positive reports on Kazakhstan were released by several authoritative American analytical institutions specializing in Central Asia, including the Johns Hopkins University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which received \$ 350 thousand from the Republic of Kazakhstan for three years. In addition, Kazakh diplomats carried out work on the creation of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Legal Association in February 2013. As a result, the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Washington, together with hired consultants, largely neutralized the consequences of the lobbying initiatives of Rakhat Aliyev and the Khurani brothers, which, according to the author, forced the latter to adjust the strategy by applying to the court.

In May 2013, the Federal District Court of Columbia rejected the claims of the Khurani brothers to A. Mirtchev and denied them the right to file a similar suit in the U.S. in the future as a measure against the abuse of the U.S. legal system. Rakhat Aliyev was detained at the request of Kazakhstan in Vienna, where in February 2015 he was found hanged in a solitary cell of an Austrian prison.

One of the results of the confrontation between the authorities of Kazakhstan and R. Aliyev was that the republic, in comparison with other countries of Central Asia, lobbies its interests in the U.S. most intensively. If other Central Asian states, as well as affiliated commercial structures, resort to the services of overseas consultants and public relations managers, then on a smaller scale. The author points out the cooperation of the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General's Office and the law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on legal issues and the promotion of the idea (disputed by Tashkent) of the construction of the Rogun HPP in Tajikistan by the aluminum company TALCO, which

paid \$ 600 thousand to the lobbyists of Washington-based Fabiani & Company in 2013.

In general, the consequences of the activities of American lobbying groups in the interests of the Central Asian countries are not comparable to the counter influence of the soft power institutions deployed in the region by the U.S. government. However, taking into account the properties of the American political system, the author claims that they sometimes make notable adjustments in bilateral relations, including those that could potentially cause an acute conflict between Washington and Astana around the “Aliyev case”.

Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2017.03.004. ANATOLY KHAZANOV. SYRIAN TRAGEDY: WHAT GAMES ARE THE TIGERS PLAYING? // *"Konfrontatsia mezhdu Zapadom i Rossiei: s kem vy, strany Azii I Afriki?"* Moscow, Ivran, 2016, P. 5-17.

Keywords: the military coup, the confessional minorities, Sunni, Shiites, Alavism, Christians, Druses, the principle "takyya", Syria, the Asad regime, Kurds, "Damascus Spring".

Anatoly Khazanov,

Dr.Sc. (Hist.)

Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

The author of the article characterizes the Syrian Arab Republic as multi-confessional and multi-ethnic, located in southwest Asia, on the Mediterranean coast, where half of the population is Sunni, about 25% Shiites, 12% Alawites and 10% Christians. In 2011 there were 20.8 million people in Syria, but to date about 13 million people have fled the country.

As a result of the military coup and the rise to power of the Alawite Hafez Asad in 1970, representatives of the confessional minorities were appointed to all senior positions in the country (Alavism is a small offshoot of Shiite Islam, contrasting itself with the Sunnis.)

The author notes that the power is in the hands of the Sunnis in almost all the Arab states, and they are making every effort to establish the Sunni regime in Syria. The rich Arab

monarchies of the Persian Gulf openly interfere in the internal affairs of the country, violating the delicate balance established by the efforts of the Asad regime in this multi-confessional and multiethnic country and fueling the situation in the once-calm Syria.

The author writes that Hafiz al-Asad managed to establish relations with representatives of the Sunni class in business and relied on them in his policy. Thus, there was and is an opportunity to establish a dialogue between Sunnis and Shia Alawites in Syria. The situation is only aggravated when external actors violate the sovereignty of the country, pursuing their own mercenary aims and interfering in its internal affairs.

As for the Christian community of Syria, many of its members support the Asad regime, realizing that they will lose the religious freedoms granted by Asad as soon as the Islamists seize power in the country.

Druses are the most cohesive ethno-confessional community in Syria. Their creed is a mixture of beliefs of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. They practice the principle "takyya", i.e. any druse has the right to fictitiously accept the belief of others, keeping his true faith in his soul. Druses are actively engaged in the work of state institutions, and they fully support Asad's authority.

Kurds are mostly Sunni Muslims, with their own language and culture. They live in the territories of four countries – Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq. And they have been subjected to harassment for a long period in all these countries. Kurds were constantly oppressed by the Asad government. They are in opposition to both the ruling Baath Party and Arab nationalism in general, and to the rebels.

The author notes the difficult situation in which Bashar Asad turned out after being elected president. On the one hand, he was subjected to pressure from his father's supporters, on the other hand, from people who expected new democratic reforms from the president. In March 2001, Bashar Asad made it clear that

national unity, the Baath Party, the armed forces and the course of H. Asad were not subject to condemnation and criticism. The society was put under total control.

“Damascus Spring”, the Syrian “thaw” ended in Syria, barely having time to start. The security forces and, above all, the special services again began to play a dominant role in the country. B. Asad revived the model and style of leadership of the country, which adhered to his father. He focused on the development of the economy of Syria. However, the economic situation of the country remained extremely difficult, as the economy was based on an inefficient public sector, and oil reserves quickly dried up. At the same time there was merging of the party-state and military elite with the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. Corruption has penetrated into all spheres of the state apparatus.

It is not surprising, the author writes, that the country was covered by protest movements in 2011. During 2013–2014, the situation began to move rapidly towards a full-scale civil war. Various armed groups opposed the B. Asad regime in Syria, starting from the most moderate groups and ending with the most radical.

The moderate wing of the opposition is represented by the liberal-minded Syrian intelligentsia, advocating for democratic reforms, a multi-party system, and freedom of speech against the monopoly of the power of the Alavite Asad clan.

In 2011, on the territory of Syria, the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) was created – the largest armed force in the ranks of the opposition. The ideological basis of FSA is the worldview of a secular-nationalist character.

Russia does not consider FSA a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the FSA has provided information about the location of a number of objects of the ISIS. The author writes that Russia is conducting negotiations with it on joint actions against ISIS. Asad is not against it. FSA does not disdain racket, taking

from the local population a kind of tribute to the “cause of Allah”.

The radical wing of the opposition is represented by a number of extremist Islamic terrorist organizations.

The Islamic Front of Syria (IFS), founded in July 2012, seeks to overthrow the regime existing in Syria and establish a civilized Islamic society in the country. It is a Syrian version of the Jihadist Salafism, and its difference from Al-Qaeda is that most of its members are Syrians.

The Jabhat al-Nusra organization does not have global ideological plans but is more focused on combating the Asad regime, unlike ISIS, the most significant armed force. The author writes about ISIS that the wild Middle Ages are revived before our eyes, and it is going to dictate the conditions in which we all should live.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS now) arose against the backdrop of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the U.S. command dissolved the army of S. Hussein, and began the formation of a new Iraqi army.

The soldiers of the army of Saddam Hussein and members of the Baath party formed the backbone of ISIS. In 2006, the group declared “Islamic state of Iraq”, which includes 8 provinces, inhabited by Sunnis. The militants from the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (now ISIS), associated with Al-Qaeda, have terrified even the soldiers of the Free Syrian Army with their atrocities. Asad and the Iranians threw the fighters of the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah to the front to defeat them: the Shiite fanatics had to be set up against the Sunni fanatics.

ISIS is becoming a recognized leader of the radical anti-Western part of the Islamic world more and more, attracting radical Islamists from different countries. It is no longer limited to the goal of establishing a caliphate in any one Arab country, but seeks to cover all the territories with the Muslim population.

The author notes that the U.S. does not depart from its short-sighted policy of eliminating the regime of Bashar Asad, not regulate its relations with Iran and does not do everything to attract Sunnis to the ranks of fighters with ISIS in Iraq and beyond.

In 2014, ISIS proclaimed the Islamic Caliphate. This quasi-state has great wealth. It receives more than \$ 1 million a day from oil production and export, selling it to Turkey, Jordan and other countries. The slave trade also brings great profits to Islamists. In addition, the wealth of the Caliphate is also built on the legalized robbery of the local population. ISIS already has a clear administrative structure and it is divided into "emirates" and "vilayets" with the capital in Syria's Rakka.

The author writes that the U.S. has razed the Middle East with its ill-conceived policy, and ISIS is a direct product of their policies in the region. Regional and extra-regional actors are involved in the Syrian conflict. The whole region of the Middle East has now split into two camps. The Shiite countries are on the side of Asad, and the Sunni countries are against him.

Turkey has the second largest land army in NATO. Ankara has its ambitions in the region, which in the past was a part of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's position is largely related to the Kurdish problem.

Iraqi Shiites – the militants of the "Mahdi Army" and Badr's Brigades, as well as the militants of the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah are fighting along with the Syrian army on the side of the Asad regime. Hezbollah (the "Party of Allah") is supported by 3 million Lebanese Shiites and occupies one of the first places on the list of 28 terrorist organizations, published by the U.S. in early 2001.

Iran stands firmly on the side of Asad, considering the Asad regime in Syria and "Hezbollah" as its main allies in the Middle East. The goal of Iran is to strengthen the Shiite community in Syria, it seeks to create and lead the coalition of Shiites of Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, SA, Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon and

Syria, controlled by Hezbollah, and further to the Gaza Strip (Palestine), where the Palestinian organization "Hamas", which is allied with Iran, is in power. The creation of the axis of the pro-Iranian forces caused an unprecedented aggravation of the Sunni-Shiite confrontation in the region.

The author characterizes the positions of the countries opposing the Asad regime on the Syrian question:

The position of Qatar on the Syrian crisis is related to the dream of the Qatari emir to eliminate the Asad regime, which prevents him lay a gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, SAR and then to the final destination - to the European consumer. Since Doha would be able to fulfill its primary strategic goal - to remove Russia from the markets of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe and Turkey.

Saudi Arabia is considering Syria as an ally of his eternal enemy - Iran. Riyadh fears that if Bashar Asad wins, Iran will become the leader in the region. At the same time, ISIS activity provokes serious concern in Riyadh.

The author notes that the military presence of Russia, its participation in the war in Syria, has become an unpleasant surprise for the U.S. and further he explains how the positions of extra-regional actors primarily Russia and the U.S. are conditioned.

The author lists the goals of Russia and the United States.

The goals of Russia: Do not be an outsider on the world stage and once again become one of the leading actors. To prevent the strengthening of ISIS and other terrorist organizations which pose a potential threat to the security of the Russian Federation and the CIS countries. Provide a Russian military presence in the Syrian port of Tartus, so that the Mediterranean Sea does not become the internal sea of NATO. Support our old ally - B. Asad and his regime. Save Syria as a traditional market for the sale of Russian weapons.

The U.S. aims in the Syrian crisis: To eliminate the regime of B. Asad, to proceed to the destruction of the Iranian regime

then, hated by Washington. To create disruptions in the world energy market to raise oil and gas prices and to "choke" with these high prices its main competitor in the world market - China. To create chaos in the Middle East in accordance with the American concept of "managed chaos" in order to ensure the dominance of the United States in this most important strategic region of the world. To provide orders for the military-industrial complex, since to satisfy the requests of influential arms magnates. Barack Obama and the Democratic Party needed some impressive successes on the foreign policy front on the eve of the elections.

The author does not doubt that although ICIS has not yet suffered its defeat, the spring that set in motion the ISIS Islamist army has already burst.

Author of the abstract - N. Ginesina

2017.03.005. KHRISTINA TURINSKAYA. LIBYA. IS THE RETURN TO FEDERALISM POSSIBLE? // *"Asia i Africa segodnia"*, Moscow, 2015, № 8, P. 18–23.

Keywords: Libya, federalism, disintegration, autonomy, unitarianism, M.Gaddafi, H. Haftar, Islamic extremists.

Khristina Turinskaya,
Ph.D. (Hist.),
Institute for African Studies,
Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS

The author writes that one can observe the general increased interest in federalism and the desire to change the principles of statehood in the face of growing instability in many countries, the emergence of new foci of separatist movements. Modern Libya is one of the examples of the return, or turning anew to the federal idea.

The “fix” to historic areas is being observed in the disintegration process in Libya today. The return to federalism becomes a popular subject in public and political discourse, regional and tribal identity of the Libyans remains unchanged. Cyrenaica politicians require the return to the federal system for the whole country. Cyrenaica, an Emirate in the past, later the Eastern province of the federative Libya, and now a self-proclaimed autonomy again appears as an independent political entity in the region, while occupying an intermediate position. De jure it remains part of a formally unified Libya, de facto Cyrenaica is a quasi-state with its own authorities and army.

The attempt to consolidate Western Tripolitania – the Western territory, Cyrenaica – the Eastern one and Fezzan – the Southern one into a single colony was carried out by Italy in the first third of the twentieth century. During the Second World War, Libya was divided: the British occupied Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Fezzan was occupied by the French. After the war, by the decision of the UN these historic regions became a sovereign federative state: in December 1951 on the territory of Libya there appeared an independent United Kingdom. Idris I (1890–1983), the head of religious and political order of Senussi and the Emir of Cyrenaica, was proclaimed the king of all Libya. Tripoli, the capital of Tripolitania, and Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica, became equal status centers of the newly formed state.

The provinces had broad autonomy, its own legislative and executive power bodies.

In the early 1950s, the introduction of such a system met the interests of the king: the federative monarchy consisted of de facto independent regions, and Cyrenaica acquired equal status, compared to Tripolitania, which would become a potential dominant, were Libya a unitary state. At the same time, the Senussi managed to neutralize the Tripolitania leaders who formed the political opposition to the king and advocated unitarianism. The key to survival of the young United Kingdom was to smooth contradictions between the provinces, to balance their relations with the federal center.

Not only the UN's position on the Libyan issue, but also the country's dependence on Western aid, political pressure from

Britain and Pro-British sympathies of Idris I can explain the fact of introduction of federalism in Libya. Britain suggested a federative model of government for many countries of its former realms when it granted independence to them. However, in most cases, these "imposed" federations were in a short time replaced by unitary systems: African leaders perceived federalism as a tool of neo-colonialism and an obstacle to construction of a single nation-state.

In Libya the unitary system was also introduced and regional autonomy was abolished. "The fragile product of bargaining and compromise", the result of the struggle between various internal and external "interest groups", the federal state in Libya "lasted" for 12 years. In 1963, in accordance with the amendments to the Constitution, the country was named not "United Kingdom", but "Kingdom". The "united" Libya has become the "unified".

Instead of the three provinces the state was divided into 10 governorates (mukhafaza). With the consolidation of statehood, ideology of Arab nationalism, emergence of mass movements Pro-Western orientation of Libya was undergoing certain changes. Discontent with wide economic and military presence of the Western powers was growing in the country. In 1964, the Parliament raised the question of the elimination of the British and American military bases placed in its territory, which is what happened after the fall of the monarchy, with the change of the regime.

Gradual transition from the orientation to the West and refusal of its help became all the more possible when significant oil reserves were discovered in 1959 in Cyrenaica, that is, in the Eastern part of the desert of Kartika in Selten area. Its export began from 1961. In subsequent years new oilfields were discovered and sales of hydrocarbons to external markets increased sharply. Thus, the influx of petrodollars into Libya began in the period of existence of the federative system in the country. According to Petroleum Law of 1955 the territory of Libya was divided into four zones for the placement of concessions. With the start of full-scale production and export of oil, the state budget increased significantly; the economy, the

demographic situation, social and cultural development of Libya began to change rapidly.

It was in the midst of the “oil boom” that the federative model started to be seen as inefficient and burdensome for Libya, as an obstacle in the path to formation of a national state, slowing economic development and planning across the country. The autonomy of the provinces limited the ability of the central government to use the growing oil revenues, and Idris I initiated changes in the constitution providing for the rejection of federalism. The purpose of the unitary monarchy was to put an end to the rivalry of the regions and the two capitals, to make Cyrenaica oil the property of a unified Libyan state. Now only the central government in the person of the king could distribute oil revenues.

The military coup of 1969 and the rise to power of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011) marked the transition from an elite-clannish, oligarchic system through republic to a “direct democracy”, the economic basis of which was state capitalism. The functions of unitary system in Libya were changing. After 1969 the unitary system continued to work on concentration of power in the hands of Gaddafi. Unitarianism opposed the centrifugal tendencies in the state, helped to mitigate the regionalism, ensured redistribution of the oil rent across the country, expanding the social base of the regime. Strengthening the unitary system in Libya, the “Arab nationalist” Gaddafi forced the creation of international associations of the countries of Africa. Libya was recognized as not only part of the “Arab nation”, the “Arab Fatherland”, but also as part of Africa. Pan-arabist aspirations of Tripoli in 1970–1980s took the form of federative projects involving the North African countries (Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco), as well as Syria. All the attempts to organize unions in the “Arab trend” failed, as well as Gaddafi's claims of to be the leader of the left forces in the Arab world.

Under Gaddafi the administrative and territorial structure of Libya changed several times. Despite the fact that the historic areas were divided into smaller territorial units the concepts of the former three provinces and their borders remained.

Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan relived after Gaddafi. The researcher notes the importance of Cyrenaica in the country's history. This region was the backbone to the authority of the king, his "patrimony", the center of Senussism in Libya. The first oil deposits, which significantly influenced the course of development of the state were discovered there. It was not by chance that in 2011 Cyrenaica and its capital Benghazi became a stronghold of the opponents of Muammar Gaddafi, and in the "post-Gaddafi" era – the center of the movement for the return to federalism. It was a federative model that would enable Cyrenaica to have an independent economy, and give the local elites the possibility to control the oil resources of the region.

Libya "after M. Gaddafi" is in the state of territorial disintegration, economic crisis, socio-political fragmentation. The new regime in Tripoli proved to be unable to control not only Cyrenaica and Fezzan, but even Tripolitania itself. Power was concentrated in the hands of regional and local leaders, chiefs and warlords, illegal armed formations (militias) and religious extremists became very active, social marginalization of Libyans and mass apathy increased, inter-tribal strife exacerbated. The oil and gas facilities are subject to constant attacks, the illegal export of oil is practiced. In 2012, autonomy was declared in Cyrenaica and the return to the Federal Constitution of 1951 was announced. The leader of the autonomy and the self-proclaimed Transitional Council of Cyrenaica is Sheikh Ahmed al-Senussi, from the family of Idris I.

In 2013, the autonomy was also proclaimed and in Fezzan. The regions declared that they do no longer intend to accept the policy of the center ignoring their interests. The Senussi, supporters of federalism, threatened that the Eastern territory would withdraw from Libya, in case their requirements were not satisfied. Local activists were dissatisfied with the allocation of seats in the national Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, opining that the interests of the regions were not taken into account, and advocated the equal representation of regions regardless of population size. Administrative decentralization as a reasonable alternative to federalism does not satisfy the Cyrenaica autonomists. Federalism in Libya was abandoned in

the 1960s, not only because the central power perceived it as a hindrance to overcoming the regionalism and fragmentation, but also because this system proved to be expensive, cumbersome, leading to dysfunction of management. The emerging territorial disintegration will inevitably affect the operation of the existing infrastructure, including the transportation of petroleum products and fresh water. Besides the economic element, it is important to consider the socio-political aspect of the problem. Not only in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica federalist ideas and slogans face opposition.

The debate over federalism reflects the struggle of interest groups and opposition leaders at the local, regional and national levels. Some experts support the introduction of the federative system as a way to fix the balance of power established in the days of the revolution and during the time elapsed since the overthrow of Gaddafi, to legitimize new local centers which do not want to obey the authorities in Tripoli. The opinions of Libyans divided: whether they should consider the federalism a path to the inevitable collapse or, on the contrary, the means of preserving the territorial integrity of the country. In the current climate of chaos, it is impossible to solve the political, social, and economic problems of the country. The fracture of the Libyan society is following several lines simultaneously: clan, tribe, region, religion, ideology. The statehood is in a systemic crisis, and it could be the only guarantor of fulfillment of the Libyan people's demands.

The country still has no permanent constitution, the temporary Transition Period Constitutional Declaration approved by the national Transitional Council of the Libyan Republic in August 2011 is still in force. In February 2014, elections for the Constituent Assembly (CA) were held. The CA must develop a draft Constitution and put it to the referendum in 2015, The CA headquarters not in Tripoli, but in Eastern Libya, in El-Beida, and tries to be "equidistant" from all political factions. The legislators understand that the delay in adoption of the new Constitution affects detrimentally the already tense situation in the country. The return to the monarchy and to the Constitution of 1951, as amended are debated. Perhaps the planned new

Constitution would set out the principles of administrative decentralization, which could act as a reasonable substitute for the full transition or return to the federative model

The balance of power in the country is constantly changing, the power "flows" from one center to another. Fighting of armed groups among themselves and against the government continues, the confrontation between the Islamists and the anti-Islamist is going on. The economy and infrastructure of Libya suffer new destructive blows again and again. Internal contradictions are aggravated by the direct or indirect influence of external players (Egypt, UAE, Qatar, Algeria, Sudan, Turkey, USA, EU countries, particularly Britain, France, Italy) on the political situation in Libya.

Currently Cyrenaica federalists stand on the side of the retired Libyan Army General Khalifa Haftar, a supporter of the former Prime Minister A. Zeidan. Troops under the command of Haftar with the support of Zintan militia and separate units of the Libyan army went forth in the framework of a military operation "Dignity" against the Islamists from the group Dawn Libya supporting the former temporary legislative body, the General National Congress (GNC). The Islamists seized control of the Western part of Libya and joined the struggle for the possession of oil resources in the East. By the end of 2014, the epicenter of fighting between pro-Islamist and anti-Islamist forces was located in the area of Benghazi. In early 2015, the preponderance in this opposition was in favor of the troops led by the Haftar, with the support of Egypt and the UAE.

The governmental crisis, that arose after March 11, 2014 when the CNC under the pressure of Islamists sacked Prime Minister A. Zeidan, continues. Since mid-2014 there are two governments and two parliaments in Libya. The government in Tripoli and the government in Tobruk do not recognize each other, challenging the legitimacy of the status of the "opponent". The House of Representatives chosen in the general elections of June 25 with headquarters in Tobruk which started its work on August 4, 2014, and the General National Congress in Tripoli are functioning. Formally, the central power of Libya moved from Tripolitania to Cyrenaica: the internationally recognized anti-

Islamist government headed by A. al-Thani, based, for security reasons, not in the de facto capital of Benghazi, but in Tobruk, controls mainly the Eastern part of the country with the help of the units of the Libyan National Army and enjoys the support of Cyrenaica federalists.

The country has developed a formal, di-, and actually - polyarchy. The structures of the Islamic State (IS) take advantage of the resulting power vacuum and institutional crisis to organize their terrorist attacks. The real power in Libya is not in the hands not of politicians, but of the constantly changing their "political orientation" field commanders and businessmen who support them. And the federalists got seats in the House of Representatives and joined the anti-Islamist bloc, considering such alliance promising and useful for achieving their political goals. The role of the "third force" in Libya, is now, instead of federalists, played by jihadists, who swore allegiance to the radical group Ansar al-Sharia, and then to Islamic State. Taking advantage of the absence of a functioning central power and weakness of the regular army, the Islamic extremists seized control of some key locations in Libya, e.g. in Derna, Sirte, as well as in some districts of Benghazi, Tripoli, Sabratha.

Actualization of the federalist discourse is just one of the products of the process of "de-gaddafiification" and "somaliazation" of Libya after the "Arab spring". And it proves impossible to achieve national unity exploiting only the idea of negation of Gaddafi 's heritage, the opponents accuse each other of betraying the ideals of the revolution. The intra-Libyan negotiations on the settlement of the conflict and establishing an inclusive dialogue running from January 2015 under the auspices of the UN are called by experts the last chance for the country which found itself in the state of instability and "half-decay".

If the return of Libya to federalism occurs, and it is possible, it will be a "new" federalism in content. According to the researcher, it is premature to talk about the federal future of the country: the work of the Constituent Assembly over the draft of the new text of the Basic Law is still under way, the political conflict is not resolved. The search for the all-national consensus

on the form of the state structure and determining of democratic ways out of the political impasse is going on.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich

2017.03.006. ANNA ZURKAN. SYRIA'S CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION // *"Problemy evropeiskoi bezopasnosti"*, № 2, Moscow, 2017, P. 124–144.

Keywords: Syria, Russia, USA, the U.S.–Russian relations, cessation of hostilities.

Anna Zurkan,
PhD (Politics), research fellow,
Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, RAS

In the article, the author analyzes the cessation of hostilities in Syria in February 2016 as a result of cooperation between Russia and the United States as co-chairs of the International Support Group for Syria (hereinafter ISSG). The author notes that at that time there was no confidence in the U.S. ability to influence the opposition, as it lost control over it, as well as in the fact that the Russian Federation would stop striking at the ranks of the opposition under the pretext of combating ISIS and "Jabhat an Nusra" as In the possibility of halting a five-year civil war and moving to a political settlement process. ISSG called on the conflicting parties to a cease-fire in October, 2015. A separate task force was established, chaired by Russia and the United States, to carry out the assigned task, which was to conduct intra-Syrian consultations involving the government and the opposition.

The author emphasizes that the process of intra-Syrian consultations, as well as the coordination of the positions of the two ISSG chairmen, was far from smooth – the existing peace initiative was not developed because of the critical impossibility

of Moscow and Washington to agree among themselves in the context of the aggravation of the relations between the two countries that occurred after the Ukrainian events.

In previous years, Russia and the United States could not find common ground on the further development of the political process, despite the fact that relations between the two countries were in a better condition than in 2016. The stumbling block to both then and now was the fate of President Asad, but at the time of writing the article, the fight against terrorism came to the fore.

The author notes that the military forces of the United States and Russia, participating in the struggle in Syria, were on opposite sides of the barricades. The author notes that both the U.S. and Russian efforts and the general fatigue of the protracted conflict not only among its immediate participants but also in the countries of the involved Middle East region, as well as the necessary guarantees, received from certain ISSG participants, played a role in concluding real Agreements. The regime for the cessation of hostilities was respected until the end of April 2016, which did not mean the cessation of all bombings on the territory of Syria. Russia and the coalition of countries led by the United States, as well as official Damascus and opposition groups continued to conduct military operations against the terrorist organizations of ISIS and "Jabhat an Nusra". Nevertheless, the number of human victims in the conflict area has been reduced by several times.

Consultations were held, the result of which was the statement of the Russian Federation and the United States of 9.05.2016 on the commitment of both sides to the observance of the ceasefire, and certain steps were taken to implement it. An agreement was reached on the creation in Geneva of a joint Russian-American Center for rapid response to violations of the ceasefire.

Nevertheless, the situation in a number of areas could not be stabilized as before, although the ISSG co-chairs periodically

left no attempts to implement the ceasefire process after the establishment of the center in Geneva.

It was known that the Russian and American groups held regular meetings in Geneva. As a result, on September 12, 2016, at midnight, the seven-day ceasefire was reintroduced. The banning of air operations against moderate opposition groups for Syrian government troops, the actual status quo on the ground based on the ban on the conquest of the territories of the warring parties, and the opening of roads for free humanitarian access was a fundamental difference. Russia and the United States have traditionally made commitments to guarantee compliance with the regime for the cessation of all military operations by the official Damascus and the opposition, respectively.

However, a number of armed groups refused to follow the agreements, as a result, the very existence of the ceasefire regime, co-sponsored by Russia and the United States, was questioned. Thus, Russian-American cooperation stalled because of the changed perception of Russia in the political arena because of the situation in Ukraine and the referendum in the Crimea.

The author asks the question whether the settlement of the conflict in the foreseeable future is beneficial to Russia. If the so-called image of enemy leaves the information field of Russia, then internal problems will come to the fore, in particular, the budget deficit in terms of sanctions, anti-sanctions, the general economic crisis.

The author believes that unlike Russia, which actively supported the Asad regime, America did not take active steps to overthrow his regime. America needs Russia as a partner capable of influencing Asad. The author also notes that neither the U.S. nor Russia sees an alternative to the process of bilateral contacts despite frequent violations of the cessation of hostilities, since both parties involved and external actors have not yet been able to offer another way to stop the bloodshed in Syria.

It is still difficult to imagine any long-term program to revive the Russian-American dialogue in the conditions of a

change of administration in the United States. It is especially important for Russia to try to reach certain agreements with the new American administration. Although the next U.S. president will have to work with the agenda that Obama has shaped, but the situation with his arrival can radically change for Moscow – and not for the better.

Author of the abstract – N. Ginesina

2017.03.007. GEORGY KUTYREV. ITALY'S POSITION IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS: BETWEEN THE WEST AND RUSSIA // *"Problemy evropeiskoi bezopasnosti", № 2, Moscow, 2017, P. 145–172.*

Keywords: Italy, Syria, Russia, Syrian civil war, international relations, Arab Spring, Middle East, IS.

Georgy Kutyrev,

PhD (Political sciences), senior research fellow,
the Department of Europe and America INION RAS

In the article the author analyzes the foreign policy position of the Italian Republic in relation to the civil war in Syria, considering the internal and external factors affecting the process of foreign policy making by official Rome. In this context, the author pays special attention to the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis, which turned Italy into one of the most "sick countries" of the European Union.

The author examines the phenomenon of the "Arab Spring" – anti-government movements that took place in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other countries of the Middle East. He points out that scientists differed in assessing the factors underlying the phenomenon, noting certain symptoms of the crisis in the Arab world, and proposes dividing the experts' opinions into three large groups.

The first group considers socio-economic factors as reasons for the "Arab spring": economic stagnation, poverty, inequality, corruption and unemployment. The second group believes that the "Arab revolutions" are connected with the spread of "new media", the demographic explosion and the rapid expansion of higher education. The third group believes that the influence of electronic and social media, as well as a number of economic reasons (high unemployment, economic inequality, etc.), is unproven, but inflation and corruption were important for the emergence of revolutionary situations in the Arab countries.

The author writes about the beginning of the government crisis in Syria, highlighting its characteristic features: the division of the population according to the ethno-religious sign; Ethnic composition of the Syrian society; Transformation of the conflict into a local war, and then into an acute global conflict; Involvement in the Syrian conflict of almost all world centers of power, which is connected with the struggle for Syrian energy resources; The Syrian Armed Forces and its allies; The political regime of Asad; Political opposition, New political parties; Armed anti-government groups.

The author also cites the words of one of the experts that at the present stage the Syrian war is a "strange war" and none of the warring parties needs and simultaneously does not need a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Syria now. Besides, the external sponsors of the conflict are not limited in time.

The author notes that 60 states were included in the Global Coalition to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) at the time of this writing. The Italian Republic is one of the most influential members of NATO and active members of the International Coalition. The Italian Republic is one of the most influential members of NATO and active members of the International Coalition.

The author examines Italy's military policy in the context of the armed conflict in Syria. He proposes to pay special attention to the factors that significantly influenced the development of the

country's military-political course: the global financial and economic crisis, NATO and the Atlantic Partnership, the Russian vector of foreign policy.

Referring to the principle of the "path of dependence" that sets the framework for the foreign policy course, the author emphasizes that foreign policy is influenced by the intellectual, cultural and institutional heritage of the past, which imposes a traditional behavioral and organizational imprint on the actions of political forces, which affects the development of the foreign policy course.

The author lists the following constants of Italy's foreign policy:

- The feeling of vulnerability.
- Edge international position
- Asymmetric alliances.
- Deficiency of opportunities.
- Limited interest in international affairs.
- Political science and international relations.

The author writes that, according to the new concept of defense policy of Italy, the focus will be on the "Euro-Mediterranean region", covering the EU countries, the Balkans, the Maghreb, the Black Sea and the Middle East.

The new concept is characterized by the following differences:

- The concept was developed not only by the Ministry of Defense staff, but also by representatives of other ministries, think tanks and universities.
- A departure from the previous course is fixed in the new concept based on the maintaining traditional balance between "Atlanticism" and "Europeanism", in favor of more pragmatic and decisive actions, taking into account the national interests of the country; Clearer priorities have been set for the Ministry of Defense.
- The White Paper 2015 demonstrates Italy's new approach to transatlantic cohesion and European integration.

- Special attention is paid to the reform of the armed forces in the new concept.

The flexibility of the organizational structure of the army is a priority for the reform of the armed forces, for which it was decided to focus on the five main functions of Italy's defensive and combat organizations: political leadership, military-strategic leadership, personnel policy, rapid deployment and support forces.

Since 2015, Italy has been involved in the NATO operation "Resolute Support" in Afghanistan, "Inherent Resolve" in Iraq, in the anti-piracy naval operation "Atlanta" in the Indian Ocean, as well as in various operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, Mali, Serbia, Uganda, Ukraine.

Italy is an important international political actor in the naval operation to combat illegal migration and smugglers (EU NAVFOR MED), launched by the EU as part of a comprehensive response to the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean.

The author refers to Italy's position on the Syrian crisis. Initially, Italy adhered to a cautious and balanced policy towards Syria protest movements in Syria. The importance of maintaining the "stable and protected from external influences" situation was emphasized, and also confirmed Italy's desire to "support the country on the way of democratic reforms".

After mass protests against B. Asad in 2011, Italy condemned the repression of the regime, and called on Damascus to end the violence, carry out reforms and start a dialogue with the opposition. Italy continually stressed that it followed the EU's course on this issue, but adhered to the idea of a peaceful and gradual transformation of the B. Asad regime, continuing to participate in the coalition against ISIS.

Italy is particularly active in the field of international initiatives for the protection of cultural heritage in Syria, which is under threat of destruction and looting. February 15, 2016 Italy signed with UNESCO a Memorandum on the protection of cultural property in areas of armed conflict, undertaking

obligations within the global coalition "Unite for Heritage" to send groups of experts "Caschi blu della cultura" and groups of carabineros to Syria for the protection of cultural heritage affected by ISIS.

Many factors had an impact on Italy's foreign policy in relation to the Syrian civil war: ISIS control of about 45% of the territory of Iraq; Increasing the flow of refugees; Russia's desire to become the main actor in the settlement of the Syrian crisis.

The author emphasizes that Italy is one of the most important partners of Russia among the EU member states. The Russia-NATO Council was established precisely on the initiative of the Italian side in 2002. Italy ranks third among the EU countries in terms of trade and economic ties with Russia, after Germany and the Netherlands.

Italy called for maintaining a dialogue with Russia throughout the Syrian crisis, since it was impossible to resolve the crisis without Russia's participation. Italy was concerned about the likelihood of chaos in Syria, a similar situation that occurred in Libya. In February 2016, Italy refused to participate in the ground operation in Syria, arguing that it was the second country on the international scene in terms of involvement in international security operations, and also citing the situation in Libya after the overthrow of the regime of M. Gaddafi. Italy and Libya have always been closely connected. Recently, oil and gas deliveries from Libya, providing about 15% of Italy's needs, were under threat, while flows of emigrants from Libya to Italy were endlessly flowing.

In these circumstances, official Rome seeks to enlist the support of Russia to involve it in the settlement of the Libyan situation, while at the same time assisting the United States in the implementation of the peacekeeping mission in Libya, strengthening its status in the world arena. Italy will seek ways to bring together the position of Russia and the United States in the fight against ISIS.

2017.03.008. BORIS DOLGOV. ISLAM IN FRANCE: MUSLIMS AND SECULAR REPUBLIC // "VOSTOK – ORIENS" Moscow, 2015. № 4, P. 123–133.

Keywords: Islam, Muslims, France, secular republic, democracy, civilization identity, integration, extremism, fundamentalism, Islam-phobia.

Boris Dolgov,

PhD (Hist.), senior research assistant,
Arabic and Islamic research Centre,
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

The Muslim community in France has existed in the conditions of secular democracy, notes the author. France is the only country of the European Union, which proclaims secularism as official state ideology. At present relations between the state and religion are based on and regulated by the law of the separation of the church from the state adopted in 1905. This law guarantees freedom of conscience, and the state does not render material support to any confession. President Francois Holland during his visit to Tunisia in July 2013 said that Islam did not contradict democratic values, which is confirmed by France's experience.

Secular ideology formed in France within the framework of the confrontation between the republican state and Catholic Church, which soon after the French revolution of 1789 took rather harsh forms. Subsequently, the emergence of the concept of Christian democracy in the 1980s brought the positions of the two sides closer. At the same time the Church was striving to win more points of contact with the non-Catholic part of society for promotion of "Christian European culture". This was confirmed by the proposal voiced by Pope John Paul II in 1984 to include a passage about Christian culture in the preamble of the text of the European Constitution. However, in the 2000s the problem of

Islam and its relations with "French identity", one of the main components of which is secularism, greatly exacerbated.

The Arab-Muslim community in France is the biggest in the European Union. This is explained by a complex history of relations between France and North African countries – former French colonies. According to various data, there are from five to six million Muslims living in France (by 2014 the population of France was close to 66.2 million), and about 82 percent of it is of North African origin. Part of French Muslims has adapted itself to European culture and way of life and integrated in French society, but many of them still preserve traditional beliefs and culture.

In the 1980s young immigrants from North Africa began to fight for their recognition as full-fledged members of French society. They were striving to receive European education and demanded the opening of radio and TV broadcasting in Arabic and Berber, etc. In the early 1980s, various associations set up by immigrants organized demonstrations and protest marches against the attitude of the French authorities to North Africans as "second-rate citizens".

The traces of the Algerian war, which gave rise to mistrust and hostility toward Muslims in French society, as well as evident differences in the way of life, culture and traditions of the French indigenous people and the immigrants were a serious obstacle on the way to their integration in the new society.

Many North Africans believed that an emphasis of Islamic identity would, first, express their protest against discrimination, and, secondly, would give them an opportunity to acquire full-fledged citizenship. From the latter half of the 1980s the supporters of this view began to organize conferences, in which Muslim associations took an active part, build mosques, and openly observe Muslims customs and habits, including wearing Muslim dress, head kerchiefs and yashmac for women. One of the first most influential Muslim organizations was the Union of Young Muslims founded in Lion in 1987, whose leaders

demanded that the French authorities recognize the right of Muslims to openly demonstrate their adherence to Islam and publicly mark their religious feasts. The Union published its own journal "Tauhid" (dogmat of Allah as the only God and recognition of His divine nature) on the basis of the Muslim cultural association of the same name created in 1986. The journal contained materials of conferences and works by outstanding Islamic ideologists.

During that period the Muslim communities formed in a number of French cities, including Lion and Marseilles, began to demand permissions to build big cathedral mosques. These projects met with opposition on the part of many citizens of these cities who maintained that such buildings were incompatible with the historically shaped architectural ensembles.. Street prayers with a big number of believers during Muslim feasts also evoked great discontent.

In 1989, more attention to the spreading of Islam in the country was caused by wearing kerchiefs and yashmac by Muslim girl-students. Meanwhile, they did not identify "genuine Islam" in France with that practiced in North African countries where their parents had come from, which they regarded as "too traditional and problematic". Representatives of the younger generation, these Muslim girls born in France with French citizenship, whose main language was French, were striving, nevertheless, to retain their Muslim identity. They attended courses to study Islam and Arabic, attended lectures and sermons of Muslim preachers, including those from Arab Islamic universities. Many students took part in annual mass Muslim conferences in Paris suburb Le Bourget at which well-known Islamic ideologists spoke.

Teaching and Islamic educational centers in France in the 1980s differed from those in Muslim countries. Teaching in the "new Motherland" was in the French language, teachers and preachers represented different theological schools, and this was

why the studies took into account the global Islamic discourse and French realities.

Islamic educational centers in France included private schools and courses attached to mosques and various Islamic associations. The teachers were mainly young Muslim intellectuals, including imams who had received education in Arab countries. The heads of Islamic educational institutions took part in Muslim conferences and public debates in the mass media. The imams of the two biggest cathedral mosques in Paris and Lion, who had the title of rectors, took part regularly in various functions and appeared in the mass media remaining loyal to the French authorities. However, certain young French imams have accepted Salaphite ideas popular in the Muslim diaspora.

The socio-cultural progress of the Muslim community was accompanied with the emergence of several trends of the perception and practices of Islam. The most widespread is classical Sunna Islam. It is preached by the imams and theologians of the Grand Paris Mosque founded in 1922, which is one of the most popular mosques in Europe. The imam and rector of it is Dalil Boubakeur, who has close ties with the Algerian diaspora, Algerian Embassy and the authorities of that country.

In 1985 the National Federation of Muslims of France was organized, which has close contacts with the Moroccan and Turkish communities. In 1986, on the initiative of Muslim religious leaders of the fundamentalist trend the Union of Islamic Organizations of France was formed, which arranges annual symposiums in the Paris "Le Bourget" suburb at which problems connected with the life of the Muslim community and various theological subjects are discussed.

In 2011 a group of Muslim figures set up the Union of Muslim Associations headed by Hassen Farsadou, a former member of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France. At present it is spreading its influence in Paris suburbs where it has nine mosques, including the biggest one them in Saint-Denis.

In the early 2000s the Muslim activists in Strasbourg organized the Party of Muslims of France. As Boris Dolgov notes, the law regulating the relations of the state with religious organizations and banning the creation of parties on religious foundation was adopted in France in 1905. At that time Strasbourg was part of Germany, and there was no such law at the time. In its program the party advocates recognition of religious organizations, including Muslim ones, as social partners and implementation of the strategy of community ties, which presupposes creating original zone-communes based on the Sharia law in the districts of compact habitation of Muslims.. This party is the only example of a political party based on Islam in Europe. It is small, has no practical influence and remains virtually underground.

In 2003 on the initiative of the Minister of the Interior of France Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the French Council of Muslim Cult was set up. In the idea of its creators, the Council had to represent a greater part of the French Muslim community. The French authorities would then be able to maintain closer and more effective contacts with diasporas. In June 2013 the well-known Muslim religious and public figure Muhammed Moussaoui was elected President of the Council.

A new and original phenomenon in the religious practice of French Muslims is individual Islam. It is mainly practiced by Muslim intellectuals and part of the younger generation. They consider religious beliefs a private matter, in which their position coincides with the general attitude to religion in French society.

In 2003 the Movement of Secular Muslims came into being in France whose participants adhere to republican and democratic principles. Its well-known representative is Fadela Amara, a member of the French socialist party and active participant in the women's movement coming out against wearing yashmac. Participants in this movement regard their Muslim identity primarily as cultural and not connected with religious dogmas. However, this movement is not a mass

phenomenon and reflects the mood of a minority of the representatives of the Muslim community of France.

Along with these movements in the ranks of the French Muslim community there is a growing number of adherents to neo-fundamentalism. This trend is characterized by non-admission of European values and refusal to integrate in French society. Their leaders support the idea of closer commune ties. In France there are supporters of radical Islamism trying to open mosques or prayer houses under the guidance of self-proclaimed imams. This trend whose supporters are few and far between has unofficially been named "Islam of suburbs and garages".

At the same time 80 percent of French Muslims are "non-practicing believers" and only 20 percent scrupulously fulfill all precepts of Islam. About five percent are orthodox fundamentalists - Salaphites and followers of the Tablig movement rejecting European values, striving to fence off from "Godless society" and live by the Sharia law. Isolation from economic and social life, a high unemployment level among these people, especially young ones, their partial marginalization contribute to the growing influence of jihadist ideology. About a thousand adherents of jihad are members of clandestine and semi-underground Islamist organizations.

Most problems connected with the Muslim diaspora bear a socio-economic rather than inter-confessional or inter-civilization character and touches on unemployment, education, and social position. The mass dismissals from work in the 1990s - 2000s in the automobile industry, whose workforce was by 50 percent represented by migrants from Algeria and Tunisia, have contributed to a great rise in the number of the unemployed. One of the reasons for job losses was the withdrawal of industrial enterprises from France to countries with a cheap workforce. Unemployment and failure to find one's own niche in society provoke Muslim young people to social protest, which often takes aggressive forms and is ably used by radical Islamists in their interests. For several years already in the suburbs of big

French cities clashes with the police, burning of cars, shattering of shop windows, and other lawless actions have been taking place from time to time, in which mostly young people from North African and Asian countries participate.

The problem of drug trafficking and addiction is still pressing and does not seem to diminish. It is precisely in the suburbs where drugs are widespread that semi-illegal Islamists organizations are acting and radical Islamism and jihadism are widely popular.

At present in France just as in many other countries of the European Union the growing influence and spreading of Islam is observed, both in religious and socio-political spheres. This is manifested, among other things, in putting forward by Muslim communities of their candidates at municipal and parliamentary elections, their increasing membership in public and human rights organizations, as well as the growing Muslim influence on public thinking in France. In 2012, for the first time in the country's history, about 400 French citizens representing the Arab-Muslim diaspora, were among candidates to parliament, and ten of them were elected.

Representatives of French Muslims are actively working at the National Consultative Committee on human rights protecting religious rights of immigrants. The Union of Muslim Organizations in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis inhabited by about 450,000 Muslims, regularly publishes on its Internet-site various materials describing the life of the Muslim community, municipal election campaigns, as well as critical remarks concerning the authorities, who allegedly encourage Islamophobia and racism. Such activity can hardly be viewed as one aimed at integration in French society. It rather reflects the desire of a considerable part of the Muslim community to preserve its Islamic values, traditions and religion.

The growing number of Muslims and greater activity of the Muslim diaspora in France causes different reaction of the indigenous population of the country. Part of French citizens, the

political establishment and scientific circles accepts the position of this category of Muslims. For them Islam becomes a component part of the French socio-political and cultural spheres. In turn, part of the French community of Oriental scholars shows interest in Oriental metaphysics and Islamic esoteric theories. The well-known French philosopher and ideologist of individual Islam Abdennour Bidar made a report on the subject at a conference held at the Higher School of Social Sciences in May 2014.

At the same time the thesis of the acculturation of Islam is put forward, that is, a possibility for a Muslim to reveal his identity from the position of Muslim culture rather than from the position of religion. Debates on this problems are going on in the French Muslim community, just as in the Muslim world. Debates on this problem are going on in the French Muslim community, just as in the Muslim world in general. However, at the present moment most Muslims, including the Sunna ideologist Yusuf al-Qaradawi, do not agree with this thesis. Arguments are still going on concerning French national identity and the role of Islam in it. Part of the political establishment and Oriental scholars, Gilles Kepel (a well-known French scholar of Islam) one of them, are worried over the growing influence of Islam and indifferent attitude to this problem by secular republican France. A reflection of these worries can be seen in the adoption of the rules banning manifestation of religious affiliation (wearing kerchiefs and yashmac by Muslim women and girls) in public places.

The foreign Islamists movements have a strong influence on the French Muslim diaspora. For example, the sponsors of the creation of the influential Muslim socio-political organization - the Union of Islamic Organizations of France in the 1980s were the followers of the Tunisian Islamic party "Nahda" ("Revival") and the Egyptian Islamist organization "Muslim Brotherhood". In 2012 the Tunisian sheikh Ahmed Jaballah, Muslim ideologist and preacher adhering to "Nahda" and "Muslim Brotherhood" was elected its Chairman. The "Muslim Brotherhood" in France

actively cooperates with the Turkish Islamist organization "National Vision", which took part in the creation of the National Federation of Muslims of France.

A factor exerting an influence on both the French Muslim diaspora and the country's domestic and foreign policy is the character of its economic relations with Islamic countries, for instance, Qatar. This emirate, which is part of the regional organization of the Council of cooperation of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, has become one of the most privileged financial-economic partners of France in the years of the rule of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa at Thani. Qatar investments in France exceed \$100 billion. In 2012 alone they reached \$30 billion. The new field of Qatar investments is the social sphere - the development of French suburbs where the biggest part of the Arab-Muslim diaspora lives.

At the same time, part of the French political establishment, particularly, the leader of the Popular Front, Marine Le Pen, regard the present situation as the "Qatarization" of France, maintaining that the financial-economic support of French suburbs by Qatar has an aim "to promote Muslim fundamentalism to the heart of France". Nevertheless, cooperation between France and Qatar continued under new leaders - President Francois Hollande and Emir Tamim.

Meanwhile, in 2013-2014 the growing anti-Islamic sentiments and acts of aggression against Muslims were registered in France, which was confirmed by human-rights organizations. These manifestations of Islam-phobia could be explained by the continuing illegal immigration of Muslims, among whom were criminal elements, drug traffickers and radical Islamists. A considerable increase of immigration is connected with the negative consequences of the "Arab spring". Anti-Islamic sentiments are also caused by such tragic phenomena as the case of the "Toulouse shooter" - a French citizen of Algerian origin connected with "Al Qaeda", who shot and killed six people in Toulouse in 2013. Frenchmen are also worried by the fact that

quite a few French citizens leave for Syria to take part in the "jihad" against the ruling regime there. If they return to France, they may create a certain threat to public security. This is confirmed by a whole number of terrorist acts perpetrated by people who gained a bloody "jihadist experience" in the ranks of the ISIL fighters. The most terrible events were the attack on the "Charlie Hebdo" magazine, which published cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, and the capture of hostages in one of the shops in Paris (7.01 – 9.01.2015) in which 17 people were killed and eight wounded. The attack was carried out by three radical Islamists who had been trained in one of the "Al Qaeda" camps.

The French mass media, just as society as a whole, started public discussions after the terrorist acts in Paris in January 2015 concerning the need to reform Muslim organizations in France, particularly, the French Council of Muslim Cult. The French political establishment initiated a dialogue with Muslims after the terrorist acts in January 2015, which presupposed participation in it of various Muslims associations and well-known Muslim figures and clerics. The dialogue was aimed at stepping up the activity of a new generation of authoritative leaders capable to influence the situation in the Muslim ummah. The President of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France Amar Lasfar, considering a possible reforming of Muslim organizations, spoke in favor of creating a theological structure, which could take the form of a "council of ulama", which could issue Fatwas (religious messages) within the framework of the law of 1905, regulating relations between the state and religion. Certain political figures joined the discussion on the problems of Islam in France. One of the leaders of the party "Union for Popular Movement" Alain Juppe, the Mayor of Bordeaux, conducted negotiations with the Union of Muslim organizations at which he suggested to its leadership to work out proposals for reforming the French Council of Muslim Cult.

A great part of the Muslim community in France continues to preserve its Islamic identity adhering to traditional moderate

Islam. This is largely due to France's policy to grant each citizen real freedom of conscience. However, Muslim migrants have been unable to integrate fully in French society, even those who were born in France and had French citizenship. On the one hand, radicalization of part of Muslim young people is taking place, which leads to growing extremism, which, in turn, provokes greater Islam-phobia. On the other hand, a process can be observed of Islam becoming closer to French culture. This is certainly connected with the weakening of the Christian Church in Europe, France included, as well as with the formation of religious pluralism and the growing role of Islam. Nevertheless, far from all Frenchmen accept these realities, which conditions a definite dissociation in French society, Boris Dolgov concludes.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

KOMIL AVAZOV. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS OF MODERNITY, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE MODERN SOCIETY AND THEIR AFFINITY // *The article was presented for the publication in the bulletin Russia and the Moslem World.*

Keywords: geopolitics, national idea, ideological threat, ideological vacuum, ideological immunity, security, terrorism, globalization, fanaticism, religious extremism.

Komil Avazov,
Senior teacher,
Institute of Upgrading Teaching Staff
in the Surkhandarya Region

As a rule geopolitical goals are concordant with other components of ideological policy. Ideological effect develops into the most influential geopolitical instrument. Distinct political forces mean creation of ideological environment to subordinate to their consciousness interests and thought of diverse social groups particularly the young exercising ideological effect. Ideological threats are peculiar to the modern world of globalization.

Overriding priority of ideological wars is focused on ideological effect and manipulating of public conscience, taking and grip on power, gaining political, military and economic advantage with no regard for states' interests, which come short of economic, political and military might, which can pose the risk of intergovernmental relations.

By spiritual threat it is meant an ideological, informational aggression aimed at any person in spite of language, religion, faith against his liberty, exactly for the purpose of total violation of spiritual peace.

Formation of ideological immunity is a framework for provision of security and stability.

During the speech of the first president of the Republic of Uzbekistan I.A. Karimov said: "An ideological range is hugely more powerful than a nuclear one, and the sake of ideological immunity will lead the world to chaos and poisoning".

A great battle is being held at the ideological range in the whole world. As an example there can be contributed situations in neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, in countries of former Soviet Union republics- Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova.

The conflicts develop due to a formed ideological vacuum in people's consciousness.

Nomadic peoples got along with sedentary ones, Iranian tribes with Turkic, Muslims with Jews and Christians in some regions for centuries.

Studying the history of intellectual culture of Uzbekistan in the Central Asia it is possible to get sight of an important phenomenon. In the medieval period the development of exact sciences was under way in the region - geography, mathematics, astronomy, medicine. Along with it famous in the Muslim world theologists lived and exercised their talents their, fighting humanistic, moral features of Islam.

Secular sciences and religious attainments didn't counter or contradict each other.

Almost all secular scientists in the region were respectful of theology and many of them were faithful, except in rare circumstances. They admitted spiritual, ethical aspects of Islam, didn't oppose its philosophy, contemplating the outside world in the light of sense and truth.

The process of democratization of public policy life in Uzbekistan produced a supportive environment for establishing distinct parties, movements and organizations for development of their enterprise. All of them far and wide support the activity of Uzbekistan government aimed at maintenance and reinforcement of stability in the society, irreversibility of economic and socio political transformational changes, foundation of a secular state.

As it happens in other young countries, powers resisting elected government may also emerge in Uzbekistan.

The history of the humanity demonstrated the danger of fundamentalism of any kind. Nowadays there are some ideologists who advocate for denial of all positive events, irrecognition of any social norms and rules which are not endorsed by religious zealots.

Diverse sects of Islam in Uzbekistan have inherently been fundamentalistic. Originally professional clandestine structure which was uniformly built, resided all of them. They imposed horrible conditions on their members, focused on irreconcilability and subversion, toppling of secular government.

An analysis of ideological philosophies, organizational structures of different extremist, fundamentalistic religious parties, movements, organizations, judging by their names in Uzbekistan, provides evidence of Wahhabism ideology export. In Uzbekistan they were created by a pattern sometimes only titles of organizations were changed fractionally. Such organizations as "Moslem Brotherhood", "Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami" didn't even change their names.

Islamic movement of Uzbekistan adopted the title from Iraqi and Lebanese ones-IMI, IML, akramia (advocates of faith) - from Iranian organizations, warrior of Islam (Islom lashkarlari) - from "army of Allah" (Syria, Palestine, 60s) and so on.

Attitude of fundamentalists toward authorities: unreconcilable opposition to official powers, overthrowing of their regimes; political and state self-determination of Muslims,

including force in the capacity of jihad, that is creation of a theocratic Islamic state.

However the actual situation in the country with regard to Islam testifies to the contrary. Nowadays in the society it continues to persist a judgment that Islam can introduce people to supreme spiritual, moral and cultural values. Islam keeps being an important component of national consciousness, activating of religious one comes most through pursuit of determinate groups to ritualize.

Radical ideologists of Islam can't suppress secular social development and oust secular view of life, which has long-standing traditions in Uzbekistan. Secularism still holds key positions in life of the society.

On the other hand, vacuum originated in the Central Asia because of an impact of former Soviet ideology and breakdown of religious environment, prepared an opportunity for spreading radical Islamic groups, based on unfamiliar for peoples of the Central Asia religious cultural traditions.

Averting of the threats connected with an influence of radical Islam particularly depends on dynamics of democratization of the society, solving vital socio-economic, ecological, demographic problems, providing such socio-political and economic conditions, which would contribute to harmonization of financial and spiritual person's life. Peace and tranquility, civil consent, religious tolerance, equal participation of exponents of different cultures in public life are a distinguishing feature of modern Uzbekistan, experience of which is of value for strengthening and abetment of interfaith and intercultural dialogue.

Islam Karimov in his book "Our goal is free and prosperous motherland" pointed out the necessity to advance religious literacy of people by spread of knowledge, and for purposes of political and juridical culture promotion for people, preeminently the younger generation, which brings knowledge about legislation, devoted to activity of religious organizations, rights and obligations in this sphere.

In the article of the Constitution of Republic of Uzbekistan it is stated: "It is prohibited the establishment and activity of political parties and other nongovernmental organizations which aim is to change a constitutional form of government by force, campaigning against sovereignty, integrity and security of the Republic, constitutional civil rights and liberties, advocating war, social, ethnic, racial and religious strife, encroaching on health and morality of people, paramilitary forces, political parties on account of their ethnic and religious descent. It is prohibited to form secret societies and associations".

Islam Karimov in response to questions of an executive editor of «Tafakkur» magazine said in 1998: "It is possible to fight against and argue with an idea only by an idea, with a thought – by a thought, with ignorance – only by education. Now when the humankind entered the new millennium, struggle of new and old ideologies gains momentum. Diverse and sometimes completely controversial world views, debates among political, national, religious trends, sects at times go beyond the scope of discussions and results in deadly clashed, mass murder cause disasters for people".

We must raise ourselves in good faith. In the ideological picture of the modern world activity of "ideological ranges" stands out as a growing tendency, waging war by various means affecting consciousness and souls of human beings. Such ideological ranges arise from exacerbating the struggle for seizing people's consciousness and souls, this battle is carried out not by military weapon but primarily by ideological one.

On the territorial principle the world is divided in different regions and continents. These territories have distinct limits. Although by the end of XX century humanity has encountered problems, passing all bounds. Among them such problems as regional, ethno-religious conflicts, on the basis of nationalism and chauvinism, spiritual crisis, drug addiction, terrorism and so on.

Furthermore a number of issues arise in connection with a process of globalization, accelerating information flow. The worst

thing is that there is a range of elements, trying to extend the sphere of their influence by different ideological means, purchase people's consciousness and soul, making entire nations and states follow them. The main principle estimating the ideological world view is just in it.

The term "range" is taken from a Greek word which means "complexity". Range usually involves a specific field where weapon and equipment are tested, where troops are under preparation and military exercises are carried out.

The historical experience has taught that types of military weapons have constantly been improved with a view to seize alien territories or protect own ones.

They were made for annihilation of manpower and facilities of a real or a supposed enemy. Nowadays the ideological range is a world outlook of the whole humankind and every nation. Only a nation with purchased soul and consciousness can be defeated. The notion "ideological range" was first used by I. Karimov in response to questions of the executive editor of "Tafakkur" magazine.

Nowadays a man lives experiencing a permanent influence of spreading from different ideological sources which serve interests of certain states and political powers.

Forming of ideological immunity is determined by compliance with humans nature, way of living and mentality, and the most important- the way it reflects national interests and people's aspirations. Only such an ideology will withstand the test of time and life, people will believe it and accept it as a creed. Only then it will gain spiritual and moral strength and will become more forceful than the most modern weapon.

Achieving our lofty goals, final getting rid of old ideological doctrines, prevention of ideological vacuum, protection against encroachment of unknown ideas, upbringing of full development of the human personality al these claims formation of a new ideology meeting interests of our society. No people understanding its vital objectives, taking the long view

never lived and will never be able to live without national idea and ideology. Any country or society not to mention a person will inevitably miss its way without an idea.

It is important under the current circumstances of overcoming ideological vacuum to provide people with an ideological immunity above all with the younger generation. This job must be done rationally and cautiously in common with an experienced gardener-Aqsaql who gently and carefully grows young planting stock.

There is no necessity to set forward the increased role of ideology in the contemporary conditions when in an atmosphere of the information explosion and process of globalization certain powers tend to extend the sphere of their influence dividing the space in a battleground. There must be clear the need of taking into account the ideological situation on the ground of the former Soviet Union, conditions in the Central Asian region, importance of filling gaps emerged in the result of refusal of the old ideology with a new ideology of national independence, to react against attempts of foreign ideology and destructive ideas infiltration in Uzbekistan.

The security of one or another region depends not only on internal factors. Sabotage elements within some states, such as separatism, interethnic problems or an impairment of political rights parlay significant geopolitical actors for empowerment. In this context commercial interests are often veiled by political mottos and advancement of Western values.

For today the Central Asian region as a cohesive whole is in practice not prepared for current challenges and risks. Such a state disquiets because according to some forecasts threat to security both in local and universal context will have a steady tendency towards reinforcement, especially in case of a possible conflict around Iran and further uncertainty of Iraqi and Afghan problems. If it occurs under the pressure of internal and external threats serious sabotage consequences may bargain the Central Asia itself.

The Central Asian region is not ready to resist these processes to the full extent. At this point there may be the minimization of negative phenomena in the region. Especially actual may be an activation of interplay among Central-Asian countries. The local actors as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization could play a decisive role in it.

It is not a secret that every country of the region defines its domestic and foreign policy in their interests, geographical location, commercial reserve, linguistic and cultural affinity with former Soviet Union and other foreign countries. This way such concepts as «neutral pragmatism» come in front of us.

In terms of the national interests there is nothing wrong, although from the point of view of local security it gives rise to concern.

It is absurdly but the Western countries, which are all above in want of the Central-Asian region resources, as in the beginning of 1920s, persist making political demands in the modern world. However an experience of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and especially Ukraine demonstrated that “color revolutions” cannot be a firing mechanism for development. They push the society for a permanent struggle of political forces for power.

Religious fundamentalism is one of the most commonly encountered destructive ideas and ideologies. Its advocates in defined periods predominated in the West and the East. Now it springs up in diverse forms and different regions. Fundamentalism advocates join around an idea of terrorism, religious extremism by means of warrant for arms and drug traffic. In fact the purpose of fundamentalism and extremism advocates pursued from penetration in the Central Asia, was not the restoring of religious values. Their main goal is to create instability, interregional and interethnic squabbling by using these ideas and ultimately – to seize power. These attempts may lead to irreparable consequences. They want to force in particular

our country into a whirlpool of bloodshed and fratricidal, as it happens in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and Syria.

At present time there is a possibility that on the part of religious extremists terrorist attacks may have place in the region.

The leader of Uzbekistan I. Karimov in his work "Uzbekistan on the verge of XXI века: security threat, stability condition and development guarantee" denoted: "Many politicians, scientists, journalists tried to impart their understanding on the grounds of phenomenon which got different names in XX century - "Islamic Renaissance", "re-Islamisation", "phenomenon of Islam" and so on. Not to go into discussion about terms we wish to focus on the fact events going on in the name of Islamic values reappearance are diverse which are sometimes controversial and even dissimilar».

It should be emphasized that Pakistan has recently become more active in the Central Asia. Up to date the only obstacle for rapid development of normal relations was the presence of terrorist groups in cross-border region with Afghanistan endangering the security of the Central Asia and recent attempts to force them out are conceived positively.

This can be confirmed by a concrete agreement signed by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and Pakistan about railway building from Uzbek Termez to Pakistani Peshawar though Kabul. In return China plans to build a part of the railway which will unite its Western regions with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Rich resources of this region attract not only the Western countries.

It is worth mentioning about the Afghan factor of demoralization. International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan doesn't give weight to local aspects and doesn't have chances for success. It seems that Western countries primarily the USA fight against not terrorists but for the right of retention of their presence in this region as long as possible.

Hence the Afghans tired of waiting any easy ride and life improvement gradually come over to Taliban movement.

Moreover there are propositions that the West spurs the government of Afghanistan into action to make terms with Taliban. Afghanistan can turn into a large-scale trouble spot with returning of Taliban movement to power after coalition forces leaving. Controlled republics of the Central Asia will experience it above all others. In brief, specialists are not optimistic concerning controllability of the regions.

It should be remembered that structure of security in the Central Asia is in developmental stage. For a variety of reasons this process is painful.

First, it claims mutual credit and concessions but heads of states are not always prepared for them. Hence there is another problem: normalization of national interests for all the parties involved. Sometimes they contradict each other.

Policy formulation broadly depends on interests balancing of exterior players which have differing degrees of impact on the regional countries. Solving of tight knot of problems turns on activating of local structures. Security of a particular country is incogitable without its providing in the Central-Asian region in bulk.

Globalization has passed into progressive phenomenon of social life, politics, economy and culture of the recent epoch. Its benefits in all world states should not be forgotten. Although Arab spring started in the second decade of the XXth century in a number of Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Yemen may switch over to other states.

Populism is a delinquency in duties that is a cause for economy shrinking of Morocco, Yemen, Libya what resulted in chaos, disorder and unrest.

The first years of our Republic independence under a mask of Islamic religion advocates of religious fundamentalism started to penetrate, among them "Hizb ut-Tahrir", "Taif", "Tawbah", "Tablighi", "Nurovtsi". They acted with an aim to win minds and souls of the young by teaching supposedly of fundamentals of the Islamic religion, Quran recitation and in the result they were

prepared as people countering current constitutional power. They tried to do harm for the purpose of knocking down the socio-political system created by people in the development of national statehood.

The dream of Islamic fundamentalism is an idea of unanimity to form a state under the auspices of caliphate, a unique empire. However life and imperative of time don't allow running counter to progress of history and humanity. And the nation will not want it.

Nonetheless adherents of this idea continue struggle against legitimacy, the constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, shaped by the nation. Fundamentalists organize in secret political race by unauthorized studies. They spread blackwash as if "Uzbekistan violates religion". They attract the young as wishmasters. Formation of "zombie fighters" is one of the ways of radical religious groups.

Peculiarity of extremists is that they consider only their own ideas and movements to be right. Bigots don't accept other ideas, justify only their views, though they are not right.

This can be evidenced by a movement of bigots Wahabis in Namangan in December 1991, and also establishment of anticonstitutional religious movements "Adolat", "Islom lashkarlari", in some areas "Nur", "Tawbah", sending of the young to Turkey for training terror in 1992, publication of brochures "Jihod" and guidelines for waging partisan war and different literature of an extremist nature, teaching the young in religious schools in Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, training in clandestine and religious centers.

The emergence of the ideological vacuum in the first years of independence served not creative but destructive power for the Republic. That led to undue influence on believers; intolerance to another faith, appearance of religious bigots, exercising influence on not shaped consciousness of young people.

The position of Uzbekistan in the Central Asia is quite specific. In this region Uzbekistan is the most populous state

(more than 32, 5 million people) has a huge economic and scientific potential. To all this, there is an elaborated particular transition model of market economy which is brought off. In the Central Asia Uzbekistan has a high intellectual potential, is rich in ground and underground resources, labor force. It is a bridge between Europe and Asia, conducts policy of peace, actually maintains political stability.

As we know from history there were many attempts to conquer this land. The quantity of them is not less nowadays. There are used diverse methods of struggle: violence, seizure, terrorism and others. They file ordinary and illiterate people especially the young. More than 10 religious groups nowadays continue clandestine struggle for winning minds of the part of young people.

Why do our ideological enemies recruit into their ranks just the young?

They can be easily deceived. The desire of ideological enemies is to implant their destructive ideas under the guise of teaching religion from an early age. Some young people cannot understand the notion of religious fundamentalism. Current religious extremists under the mask of Islamic religion try to entrap unformed young people with a view to seize the reins of government into their hands. Using them for dark purposes they have a negative impact on our sacred religion.

This way forming of ideological immunity is defined by compliance with people's nature, way of life and thinking, and the most important – the way it reflects national interests and people's aspirations. Only such an ideology can withstand the test of time and life, people will believe it and accept as conviction. Only then it gets spiritual and moral power and will become more powerful than the most modern weapons. With the support of wide audience, intellectuals, scientists and artists, particularly and workers of spiritual educational sphere it is necessary to take to a higher level an activity aimed at perfecting and adoption of principles of national independence ideology in

peoples minds. It should be emphasized the main goal is to turn national idea and ideology of independence into the basis of outlook, spiritual core of every person in our country.

Nowadays at people's disposal there are as many arms and supplies that it is possible to destroy the world a few times. However the most serious danger is a permanent ideological struggle for people's souls and consciousness especially the young. Today fights on ideological front play a pivotal role rather than on nuclear ranges. We should never forget this distasteful truth.

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Anton Shmelev,

PhD (Hist.), associate professor

the Institute of International Relations

and World History

Yulia Potapova,

a student of Nizhny Novgorod State University

The authors of the article note that Russia has historically been a multi-national and multi-ethnic country. Traditionally, the Moslem Ummah has been an inalienable and essential part of Russian society, as it is today, thanks to vigorous influx of people from different countries. At the moment, 40% of the total number of migrants in Russia come from Moslem countries. In the era of globalization, the world has become more open, migration processes are gaining momentum, especially those from the countries of the former Soviet Union. According to 2010 data, 489 357 migrants were temporarily residing in Russia, about half of them came from the CIS countries – 208 782 people. Migrants can be conditionally divided into three large groups.

1. Working migrants. According to the All-Russian Census of 2010, the largest flow of people comes from Uzbekistan (73 248 people) and Tajikistan (36 111 people). The main purpose of the move is earnings: 63 979 people from Uzbekistan and 30 803 people from Tajikistan came to Russia for this reason. The characteristic features of this group are: voluntary migration, high chances of adaptation and an interest in finding a job; the main part consists of young and middle-aged men without families.

2. Forced migrants and refugees. A significant contribution to the increase in the population of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was made by the inflow of trade migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons from the Caucasus. The specificity of this group is the prevalent number of families with children, which in the majority would like to return to their homeland.

3. Educational migration. In most cases, radical developments in Islam are brought to Russia by young Moslems who studied abroad in Islamic educational institutions, as well as by foreigners who interpret Islam in theological educational institutions not in the way traditional with the Moslems of Russia, but from the standpoint of radical nationalist Islamism .

All these categories have their own influence with the Moslem community. The majority of people come to find a job. In our country there is a shortage of cheap labor force, today, according to the statistics, there are 1.800.000 vacancies, and in Moslem countries, on the contrary, population growth is observed, but the labor market is not yet able to provide the place for every potential employee. Migrants come to Russia in the most part legally, but some of them work without proper registration of documents, they poorly orient themselves in the country, speak Russian with great difficulty. They need to adapt to the new way of life and culture; need socialization and moral support; need communication with representatives of their people. The main spiritual and religious center for the orthodox Moslem is a mosque. But most of the modern Moslem migrants experience serious difficulties in adapting to the new conditions, such as fear, distrust, external factors (media, law enforcement). They come to earn their living and help their family, left back home.

Most of them have no appropriate education, which in many ways is the main reason for religious fanaticism. People, who are poorly developed spiritually, can fall under the influence of terrorist groups whose activities are aimed at overthrowing secular power or destabilizing the situation in the region. Thus, the migrants come to Russia with a certain planted outlook, through the prism of which

they communicate with the world around them and influence it. The inability to distinguish between good and bad and pure ignorance lead to sad consequences, such as conflicts and terrorist acts.

Today, more and more ethnic conflicts are associated with Islam. This happens, the authors write, for the following reasons.

1. The struggle of religious associations. Controversies arise between the Central Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Russia and the Council of Muftis of Russia, about supporting Wahhabism, receiving material assistance from foreign Islamic centers associated with Wahhabi terrorist groups. For the state, this is a serious problem, which creates tension not only in government circles, but also projected onto society itself.

2. Opposition of migrants to the indigenous population. Such actions as voluntary refusal (caused by distrust, hostility) from socialization, rejection of the host country's rules, ignorance of laws and their own rights, generate conflicts on both sides. On the one hand, one can note the attempt to commit arson to mosques in Volgograd and Astrakhan, on the other hand, there is an illustrative example of setting up prayer rooms for reading namaz five times a day for working Moslems. Their number is growing, especially in the markets where working Moslems are especially numerous. But at the same time there arises a real threat of terrorist attacks, directly related to the prayer rooms. Setting up and distribution of prayer rooms is a consequence of the lack of mosques in the country, which leads to decrease in the level of interaction between Moslems, which gives rise to the forming up small religious closed groups. But most Moslems are interested in religious activities in the framework of official mosques. Conflict situations are many, it is also necessary to take into account the fact that cases of manifestations of intolerance and disrespect towards representatives of different nations are often demonstrated on both sides.

3. Negative influence on the Russian Moslem community. From what has been said above, it follows that these conflicts in most cases have a negative impact on the indigenous Moslems of Russia who have lived on this land for a long time and have

established themselves as respectable neighbors. Unfavorable events associated with representatives of their nationality can radically undermine the trust that has been being built for centuries.

The problem of the influence of migrants on the Moslem community of Russia today is extremely acute. Vladimir Putin urged the Moslem leadership to pay special attention to the development of adaptation policies for Moslem newcomers. In Russia there are many special programs, including the federal target program "Strengthening the Unity of the Russian Nation and the Ethno-Cultural Development of the Peoples of Russia (2014-2020)". It is also worth noting that Russia has a large number of Moslem cultural centers, youth and women's centers, as well as scientific and educational clubs. Moslem holidays are held in many cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod), exhibitions and concerts are organized with the main goal to raise the cultural level of Moslems and a to pay a kind of tribute to traditions and their history.

The authors of the article see main problem in the fact that the particular image, which has already been formed thanks to the mass media and visitors themselves, demonstrates discord and confusion, and the traditions of Islam are presented in a negative way. The unhealthy image forms an appropriate attitude not only to migrants, but also to the indigenous Moslem population. Migration centers for newcomers exist, but they either cannot cover the entire flow, or the migrant themselves do not want to socialize. Therefore, it is necessary to direct efforts to work with the younger generation, which can become a reliable support for development in this area.

It is necessary, the researchers emphasize, to fundamentally change the attitude of Russian people both to migrants and to Islam in general. At the same time, the paramount task is to create conditions that would stimulate migrants to adaptation and acculturation. Spiritual departments of Moslems are able to become a leading institution in implementing this policy in relation to migrant coreligionists.

Author of the abstract – V. Schensnovich

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Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам РАН,
Нахимовский проспект, д. 51/21,
Москва, В-418, ГСП-7, 117997

Отдел маркетинга и распространения

информационных изданий

Тел. (925) 517-36-91

E-mail: inion@bk.ru

E-mail: ani-2000@list.ru

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