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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2018.01.001. SERGEY USTINKIN, EKATERINA RUDAKOVA, DURSUN EMINOV. GENDER STRATEGIES OF NON-COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, "SOFT POWER" AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIETY'S CULTURAL CODE AND STATE IN RUSSIA // "Vlast," Moscow, 2016, P. 6–15.

Keywords: NGO, foreign agent, identity politics, national security, demographic security, social security, cultural pattern.

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The authors note that political nature of activity of foreign non-commercial nongovernmental organizations in Russia is obvious. Disguising as implementation of socially significant environmental protection projects, legal assistance to the people, religious groups and ethnic minorities support, protection of democratic rights and freedoms, promotion of scientific research regarding medicine and education, these organizations dealt in setting up protest and opposition sentiments undermining public

confidence in government institutions working in diverse clusters of the society.

Limiting the impact of foreign non-commercial nongovernmental organizations sponsored from abroad on political process in the sovereign Russian state is the main aim of adopting new laws. November 21, 2012 national law "About amendments being made to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation regarding the regulation of activities of nongovernmental organizations, accomplishing functions of foreign agents" came into force, which in practice legislated a new registration procedure and accounting of noncommercial organizations, which push political ideas in Russia using PR and GR technologies at the expense of foreign states and grantmakers. Since June 4, 2014 in accordance with a new law "On non-profit organizations" Justice Department of the RF has a right to accept a decision about including non-commercial organizations on the register of foreign agents.

In August 2015 there was held a prosecutor's investigation of accounts and records of Russian nongovernmental human rights organizations. Mainly it touched organizations which get financial support from abroad ("Memorial," "Committee Against Torture," "Voice," "Moscow Helsinki Group," "(Center for Development of Democracy and Human Rights," "Agora" and others.) According to human rights activists this campaign became the largest scale in recent history of Russia and procuracy bodies exceeded their authority and violated rights of organizations for freedom of association. Some organizations declared about voluntary dissolution after it, others appealed to a court with a request to recognize public prosecution office activity illegal. In its turn it insisted on the fact that the verification had a routine nature and was aimed at getting actual data about a number of non-commercial organizations in Russia and scope of foreign finance of foreign non-commercial nongovernmental organizations (FNCNO) and also to discover organizations infringing the registration law of non-commercial

organizations and counteraction of extremist activity. There were found out numerous breaches of legislation: lack of documentation in Russian, involvement of legislators, lobbying through powerful institutions, in particular through the Presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, creation of schemes with divergent structure of organizations with an eye to avoid gaining a status of foreign agent and financing activists.

In 2013 Rosfinmonitoring gave following figures: 1 868 non-profit organizations are registered in Russia, annual financial baking of them is 24,2 billion rubles, 215 of them were considered to be with political responsibilities, 22 – come within the provisions of the legislation on organizations, which serve as foreign agent. Almost all 22 organizations don't recognize political entity in their activities and refuse to register as foreign agents, many of them are preparing for reorganization or voluntary dissolution.

In estimating INNO materials there was a complication to classify organizations in politics, which involves problems in legislation and absence of clarity in definition of “political activity of non-profit organization.” Director of Public Prosecutions proposes to enshrine in law clear definition of non-profit organization in politics, to introduce a procedure of annual inspections of non-profit organization, gaining foreign financial baking, to prohibit back-to-back financing, to impose ban for government employee on participating in non-profit organization activity, gaining foreign financial baking that will allow to tighten control in regard to statutory compliance.

The U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany are leaders in financing human rights institutions in Russia. The U.S. fund organizations along the lines of activity of non-profit organization – from supporting independent outlets to environmental and gender projects. Britain specializes in support for movements focused on development of independent outlets, organizations in the field of reproduction and health, human

rights organizations. Norway is traditionally interested in support of environmental organizations, organizations protecting the rights of ethnic minorities – northern first nations, human rights organizations and organizations which address the issue of assistance to refugees and displaced persons. Germany supports a wide range of organizations connected to the issues of environmental protection, gender studies, and fight against corruption, human rights protection and freedom of the press.

Financing of non-profit organizations activity is carried out in a broad range of areas. A share of human rights organizations among all ones is 21%. Environmental organizations are in the second place on level of funding and organizations in support of media development, democracy and civil society are in the third and forth places.

It has its logic: specifically with the help of environmental rhetoric it is simple enough to arrange protest activity especially among the young because this subject is familiar and transparent for any person, the majority is receptive to environmental call and motto. Traditionally projects related to national, ethnic, language, gender minorities are supported, and if carefully developed can become a part of protest movement in Russian society.

So called gender studies and public debate on gender problem questions are one of the main activities of non-profit organizations in Russia. It is referred to use of technologies for creation of positive attitude to pass the gender laws in Russia in the society and state institutions. These laws are just about main markers of democracy level and rights observance for Western countries today (the U.S., the EU, Canada, Australia).

Russian specialists and leaders of national social movements ring alarm bells in relation to such initiatives. In 2012 only by virtue of public rebuff there was not adopted the Act on State guarantees of equal rights and opportunities for men and women and even chances for their realization which was to introduce European gender standards. This law is capable of

fundamental change consolidation in the social structure of the Russian society, abolish state monopoly regarding family, marriage, maternity and childhood protection.

In this regard it is enough to call some criterion of new gender laws. In the modern European legislation there is a tendency towards deletion from the regulatory dictionary a term "biological sex," more often it is possible to find a definition "social sex," "gender identity," "sexual orientation," "emotional sex." The result of such a scramble is substitution of traditional gender studies question area which for 10–20 years in a row moved from examination of men and women role in the society to study of human sexuality, non-traditional minorities' rights, homosexual unions, surrogate motherhood, legalization of child adoption by homosexuals and so on. As a result, institution of the family in Europe starts to disappear, as evidenced by demographers. There are ever less voices standing up for traditional values in Europe they are not almost heard.

Passing of gender bills on a Western model will undoubtedly lead to conflicts on communal grounds. Attack of gender approach advocates towards traditional confessions exponents are final instances which rise voice against gender developments in Europe. Moreover it's planned to pass the law whereunder churches violating gender legislation (e.g. refusing to marry gay couples) will be outlawed. Spate of scandals associated with wearing Christian symbolic (cross), all these initiatives are aimed at final suppressing of church's position over social questions of European policy. Such a practice in Russia will cause protests on the part of traditional confessions representatives, about what leaders of Christianity, Islam and Buddhism have indicated several times.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.01.002. REGINA MUKHAMETZYNANOVA-DUGGAL. RELIGION AND POWER IN RUSSIA IN THE 20th – 21st CENTURIES: THREE MODELS OF STATE – CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS // “*Vlast*,” Moscow, 2017, № 6, P. 100–104.

Keywords: model of state-confessional relations, secular state, Russia.

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R. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal considers in the article a consistent replacement of three models of state confessional politics in Russia in the 20th–21st centuries. R. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal notes that the clerical (confessional) state was characteristic of monarchical Russia, the implementation of reforms that ensured religious freedom was typical of the bourgeois period of Russian history, the construction of an atheistic state was characteristic of the Soviet era.

In the article the author pays special attention to the modern period – the process of formation of a new (separation and then cooperation) model of state-confessional relations.

R. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal points out that today we are witnesses to the exceptional role of the religious factor in the world. One of the reasons, according to the author, is the objective processes of the emergence of a new world order, and its consequences compel scientists to investigate questions of the politicization of religion, the use of its values, attributes and symbols for purely political purposes. The tragic events of recent years, taking place in various parts of the world, but connected by the use of religion as a kind of banner of protest and political ambitions, increasingly show the undivided nature of political and religious concepts in the modern world.

R. Mukhametzyanova-Duggal believes that the priority task of the policy of the Russian state in the field of freedom of conscience is the development of an optimal model based on a reasonable balance of current changes in the role of the religious factor in politics and the constructive Russian experience of peaceful coexistence of faiths.

In the 20th century, three models of state confessional policy were successively replaced in Russia. Monarchist Russia was characterized by a clerical (confessional) Orthodox Christian state, where there was a four-level legal gradation of faiths, each of which occupied a certain place and was appropriated or deprived of the corresponding volume of rights. This policy was determined by ideological considerations and national and political factors. The Orthodox Church was located on the top of the confessional hierarchical structure, "confessing tolerant" confessions and their adherents – Catholics, Protestants (Lutherans and Reformed), Jews, Muslims, Buddhists were a step below.

The author of the article emphasizes the interference in the internal life of other faiths, the desire to limit "foreign" and "other" religions strictly national frameworks, the non-recognition of the individual's right to religious self-determination among other specific features of the religious policy of the state in pre-revolutionary Russia.

The author writes, referring to the work of Yu. Cinelina, that the process of changing the religious outlook in Russia was closely linked with the process of Europeanization and had a cyclical character. The process of secularization began in a high society (the time of Peter the Great's reforms), embraced the entire educated society (since 1861) and gradually new layers of society entered this process (approximately since 1905).

The February Revolution marked the beginning of the construction of a secular state in Russia, the main principle of which was the separation of the church from the state. Not only the right to transition from one religion to another, but also the unconverted state was recognized; the enjoyment of civil and

political rights was no longer dependent on belonging to a religion, no one could now be persecuted and confined to any kind of rights for beliefs in the affairs of faith.

But the Provisional Government left the tsarist laws intact, defining relations between the state and confessional institutions, while demands were made for separation of the church from the state by the politically active part of society, by many representatives of heterodox and heterodox religious organizations. Most of the proclaimed principles have not received legislative consolidation, the bourgeois model of state-confessional relations has not managed to develop.

After the October Revolution of 1917, the peoples of Russia were put before the fact of a radical change in the place of religion in life.

The Soviet era (1917–1991) formed a “Soviet” model of state-confessional relations, characterized by a legal ban on religious beliefs, on the activities of religious associations and all-round support by the state of one worldview choice – atheistic. The Constitution declared secularism, assuming a neutral attitude towards religion, fixing the right of citizens to freedom of conscience, but in fact the state policy was aimed at eradicating primordial beliefs and preventing the emergence of new religious groups and movements. At the same time, the state religious policy of the USSR underwent serious modifications, and the persecutions against believers grew and died down periodically during the years of Soviet power.

Since the mid-1980s, the process of forming a new model of state-confessional relations within the secular state type is underway.

The overwhelming majority of secular states choose one of the two main models of state-confessional relations: separation or cooperation. The guiding principle of the separation model or non-confessional (confessional) state is the principle of equidistance of all (traditional and new) religious associations from the state, the principle of non-interference in the internal

affairs of both the religious organization and the state is implemented. The cooperation model or a form of “cultural cooperation” suggests the priority state relations of partnership, cooperation on a number of important issues in the life of society with traditional, most common confessions.

Our country adopted different models at different stages of its development. Until the mid-1990s there was a folding of the separation model. The RSFSR Law “On Freedom of Conscience” (1990) served as the basis. This law created all conditions for the activities of various types of religious organizations. At the same time, destructive tendencies began to manifest in state-religious relations. They manifested themselves in the spread of new religions and foreign religious missions, weakening of the friendly ties of various faiths, emergence of conflict situations within the confessions themselves. There was a politicization of religion, discrediting scientific knowledge about religion, etc.

However, the trend toward the separation model persisted for a short time – from 1990 to 1993. The author believes that we can talk about the weakening of the movement towards the separation model of the state and the state-confessional relations inherent in this form since 1994. In 1994–1997, neither the state nor society was satisfied with the previous form and model of politics with regard to religious associations.

It has come to understand that any freedom – freedom of conscience, freedom of belief – is a specific intimate state of any person, related to the internal freedom of his will. And it is outside the sphere of legal regulation. And any public activities, including those carried out for religious reasons, must be subject to this or that legal regulation, including if necessary, it can be limited and even banned.

Since the mid-1990s, the state has embarked on a path of toughening religious legislation, and a new law on freedom of conscience was adopted in 1997, which marked the beginning of a new stage in the formation of Russian policy in the sphere of freedom of conscience. The law shifted toward the cooperation

model. The state began to implement priority cooperation with the traditional for Russia religious associations – Orthodox, Muslim, Judaic and Buddhist and began to pursue a protectionist policy towards them. But there was a tendency towards the revival of the elements of the religious policy peculiar to the “confessional state” of the period of pre-revolutionary Russia.

Since the late 1990s, both central and regional authorities have been increasingly involved in the regulation of religious life. The fact of separating the spiritual institutions of believers from the state is often a declaration. The role of state bodies in the life of religious communities is very significant. The methods of regulating the activities of religious organizations have not been eliminated through the use of administrative resources.

The author points out that there is a contradiction in state-confessional relations between the separation model of state religious policy fixed in legislation and actually implemented by the cooperation model. This contradiction leaves an imprint on all areas of the relationship between the state and religious organizations, especially those in which there is close cooperation – social, cultural, educational, etc.

Current problems are still the issues of developing and adopting the concept of state-confessional relations, creating a single body in the field of state-confessional relations in order to streamline and coordinate the cooperation of all government agencies related to religious organizations. Politics at the federal, regional and municipal levels as well as in various subjects of our country is carried out in accordance with the prevailing ethno-confessional situation. At the same time, it is often carried out to the extent of the competence of civil servants in matters of religion and state-confessional relations.

The author writes that the cooperation model of state-confessional relations is closer to modern Russia, which presupposes relations of priority state partnership with traditional religions while fully implementing the constitutional principles of freedom of conscience and religion for all religious

associations that do not threaten state sovereignty, territorial integrity, public order and security.

The author concludes that the historical experience of the functioning of various models of state-confessional relations in the 20th – 21st centuries shows that the state and religious institutions are inherently heterogeneous, called to operate in different ways and in different spheres.

Religions of the Russian people and the state Orthodox Church were an integral part of Russian history, culture, mentality in pre-revolutionary Russia. On the other hand, as the author writes, society should not be aimed at universal clericalization and to replace secular standards of behavior with religious ones.

Author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina

2018.01.003. SERGEI RASTORGUEV. FOREIGN-POLICY HYBRID POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN RUSSIA AND THREATS TO IT: CHALLENGE TO SOCIETY, THE STATE AND ELITE // "Vlast," Moscow, 2016, № 9, P. 15–24.

Keywords: hybrid war, hybrid threats, hybrid possibilities, "soft power."

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The author analyzes hybrid possibilities of modern Russia and threats to it. In the political discourse of the past years the concept of "hybrid war" is interpreted as a conflict of actors using non-military and military methods. A hybrid war includes military hostilities waged by regular troops; military actions undertaken by "independent actors" (rebels, terrorists), economic pressure (sanctions, embargo, undermining of the financial

system), political pressure (mobilization of the opposition to protest actions, diplomatic isolation, pressing at international organizations), social pressing (instigation of internal group conflicts, undermining of the social welfare system), information pressing on the mass media (formation of an image of the enemy). It may be supposed that in the present conditions it would hardly be possible to wage a major war against such a big nuclear power as Russia. A hybrid war now comes to replace large-scale wars and potential nuclear strike.

The author of this article uses the concept of "hybrid war/hybrid possibilities" which include such phenomena as "color revolutions," "soft power," "separatism," and "raw material dependence." Hybrid threats are regarded as a possible dysfunction of various systems of society and the state under the impact of foreign pressure with the use of non-military means. Hybrid possibilities include hybrid threats of state and non-state actors directed outside with a view to changing the behavior of foreign actors in line with the interests of Russia.

The strength of social and state institutions of Russia to withstand hybrid threats and the ability to use hybrid possibilities largely depend on the social, economic, political and cultural situation in Russian society. The characteristic splits of Russian society is conditioned by natural factors (its poly-ethnic and poly-confessional character, great size of Russian territory, unequal supply with natural resources), as well as derivative factors (great differentiation of monetary incomes of the population, differences in regional political culture, etc.).

The timely character of the hybrid threats and hybrid wars problem is conditioned by mutual claims of politicians, military and scientists of various countries who regard their societies and states as objects of impact on the part of their opponents. As a rule, reply or preventive actions of their own country are not analyzed in the context of hybrid war or hybrid foreign-policy possibility. The author of this article examines hybrid threats, possibilities and wars as an inalienable element of the activity of

modern political actors of all countries. Such approach makes it possible to avoid the use of double standards when similar actions of two countries are regarded as diametrically opposite ones, and secondly, legalize hybrid threats, possibilities and wars of any country as objects of scientific investigation.

The multiformity of hybrid concepts prompts a discussion about the time of the emergence of this phenomenon in real life. Quite a few manifestations of hybrid threats and wars could be found in ancient and contemporary history. The author of this article maintains that the emergence of the new phenomenon within the past twenty to twenty-five years is connected with the qualitative development of information technologies, transfer from mass armies to professional ones, and the internationalization of economic and social processes. It was at the beginning of the 2000s that the concepts of “hybrid war,” “soft power,” “color revolution” and “social network” emerged and took permanent place in political discourse.

“Hybrid war” can contribute to a change of an anti-Russian political regime to a regime loyal to Russia in CIS countries, as well as in Asian countries. Theoretically, a hybrid war is possible in any corner of the world, however, it is necessary to take into account the resource limitations, state membership in military-political blocs (NATO), and priority directions from the point of view of the protection of Russian society’s interests. It is not necessary to resort to the combat component of a conflict, ideally, it should be going to nil due to the use of the non-combatant methods of impact. Renunciation of the use of combat methods may be used as a token coin in negotiations with resource actors (NATO, the U.S., the EU).

A threat from hybrid wars comes, primarily, in the possible isolation of Russia within the framework of the world political and economic institutions, introduction of economic sanctions, and reduction of cooperation in many spheres of life. The dependence of budget, investments, and technological progress of Russia on the world economy, as compared to the United

States and the European Union is much greater, this is why combat methods should only be used in case of a direct threat to national security. To provide insurance from such risks it is necessary to set up local and mutually beneficial integration associations (CSTO, SCO, EuAsEc). Simultaneously, there are grounds to believe that the military potential of Russia, above all, its strategic offensive arms and nuclear arsenal guarantee the unfeasibility of using Balkan or Middle Eastern scenarios in dealing with Russia.

The threat of a hybrid war against Russia is the most probably in the context of organizing and supporting separatist movements, primarily in the North Caucasus. Separatism can be analyzed in the concepts of "splits," "ethnic entrepreneurship," "search for identity," "discrimination in the distribution of resources." Manipulation with the history and identity of the peoples of Russia, destructive work of ethnic diasporas abroad, proliferation of radical Islamism and international terrorism are prerequisites for the development of separatism. A guarantee from separatism is the formation of Russian identity, just distribution of resources between the regions and social groups of the country, integration of representatives of all ethnic groups of Russia in the political and economic elite, and realization of federalism not only as a principle of administrative-territorial division of the country, but also as a mechanism of economic, educational and cultural policies.

As a reply to the western policy of "color revolutions" in the countries of the CIS and the Middle East, Russia is capable to oppose a crude force (Syria), a "hybrid war"/treat of "hybrid war." And the elements of "color revolutions," as the author thinks, can be used in the form of non-violent protest of pro-Russian legal opposition forces in Western countries.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.01.004. MIKHAIL RESHETNIKOV. WHAT ATTRACTS THE YOUTH TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS // *"Informatsionnye Voyny," Yubileiny, 2016, № 3 (39), P. 28–36.*

Keywords: geopolitics, democracy, crisis, modern capitalism, youth, terrorism.

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In the article the author examines the main socio-psychological and socio-political problems of our time, analyzes the stages of formation and state of society. He connects the institution of modern democracy as the leading principle of the social structure of Western Europe with the ideas of the Enlightenment and the Great French Revolution (1789), which contributed to the dissemination and affirmation of the notions of civil rights, equality and freedom belonging to everyone from birth, and all available forms of inequality were viewed as artificial due to obsolete institutions. The author writes that this was the first misconception, since the idea of the natural equality of all people according to their abilities was also laid down in the slogan, and modern science proved that people are not equal in their physical, intellectual and spiritual qualities.

The author reminds that the rights of the "Declaration of human rights and citizenship," and then the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in the middle of the 20th century remained the criterion for the development of the European (traditionally Christian) civilization during the last two centuries.

These principles passed through significant changes in the 20th century, since liberal ideology, the successor of Enlightenment ideas, naturally led to the emergence of socialist, communist and similar ideas, proclaiming the priorities of economic freedom, which resulted in even more obvious

inequality. The liberal model of the economy generated a liberal morality, balancing on the brink of immorality, which was due to dehumanization of the ideas of the Enlightenment.

The author writes that only the idea of economic freedom remained in modernized Western European ideology, gaining a new sound in the speculative slogan of “equality of opportunity,” which never existed either for individuals or for countries and peoples. As a result, the ideas of “proletarian solidarity,” “socialist unity,” etc., including the later idea of the EU or Islamic unity, have replaced the ideas of “universal equality and brotherhood.”

Almost the whole world had been divided between the leading European (existing or future democratic) countries by the beginning of the 20th century and existed in the form of their colonies. Countries that had freed themselves from colonial dependence by the mid-20th century were called Third World countries, and to date many of them have acted as raw materials and cheap labor for former metropolises. The national administration in the countries of the third world has mastered the colonial model of governance.

The author notes that a high spiritual and material culture was created by all-European efforts, but that it is not the only one in the world. The tendency to combine and then confuse culture with technological progress, and later technical progress itself with the civilizing process, appeared in the last century, and the leaders of economically powerful states identify this process exclusively with European civilization, which constitutes only about 21% of the planetary population.

At the same time, democracy was proclaimed the best and most peaceful system of social order.

In the early 21st century, the U.S. and its allies decided to bring democracy to countries and regions where there were no prerequisites for it, forgetting about the two centuries of struggle for the right of everyone to dissent. First of all, there were no citizens economically independent from the state, in addition to the national and religious customs and traditions that were

different from European ones. Everybody knows well what it ended in Iraq, Libya and Syria (and then in a previously relatively stable Europe).

The author asks the question whether the idea of democracy requires rethinking as a kind of “the highest stage of human development,” since it has been heavily discredited over the past two centuries, and more efforts are required to defend democracy.

The world has not become better or safer, and – most importantly – it has not become fairer as democracy develops. Modern democratic discourse does not give any idea of the vector of social movement, moral ideals and the meaning of existence for the population of Europe. High culture was replaced by mass, high politics – populism, high morality – moral poverty.

The author also notes that the process of globalization can be described from different points of view and approaches – geopolitical, economic, social, but there are several markers for a full understanding of this process. Money began to lose its main purpose gradually. The development of new territories is no longer accompanied by the creation and development of production capacities and the settlement of certain regions. The main option is an increasingly technological withdrawal of natural resources and highly qualified scientific and human resources with a regularly unidirectional vector of their movement to the leading countries of globalization. At the same time, there are a number of restrictions on the transfer of high technology to countries that do not belong to the leaders of globalization.

The search for new models of state and public structures and even the formation of the entire modern world order under the slogans of the struggle for justice were conducted for millennia, it was reforms, revolutions and numerous wars that were committed for the sake of this struggle. The idea of justice is closely connected with ideology, the main function of which is to smooth out the contradictions, or rather, to create some kind of explanatory system accepted by the society for the contradictions that have always existed.

The author writes that there are several theories of justice, but offers for consideration only one, most often mentioned in public discussions. The so-called humanitarian theory of justice proves, on the one hand, that all people should have equal rights, and on the other hand, that economic relations should be arranged so that the least successful members of society have the greatest advantages. The latter provision was designated as the "principle of fair inequality" and found its expression in the slogan of "everyone's right to a decent standard of living." This concept was subjected to fair criticism, since the principle of social justice actually eliminates competition in society and generates an uncompetitive economy.

The author points out that certain destabilization is now characteristic of the entire democratic world, which is entering a new era and is undergoing a systemic crisis of changing the paradigm of development.

Practically all the development of mankind and all the changes in socio-economic formations went under the slogans of combating injustice and were accompanied by attempts to establish new and equal economic and socio-psychological relations between people. But inevitably ambitions and greed of power structures led first to discredit high slogans and ideas, and then – to a regular change in socio-economic relations and formations.

The author notes that the whole world is experiencing real concern about Islamic terrorism, but people are much more likely to face domestic fanaticism and criminal and semi-criminal terrorism of their fellow citizens on the territory of their own states. These two types of terrorism differ only in the scale of threats, victims, the presence or absence of political demands and coverage in the media.

The history of the Islamic state banned in Russia demonstrates a qualitatively new stage in the development of modern terrorism. Any uprising and struggle presuppose the presence of powerful ideas appealing to emotions, as well as the confidence of the masses and belief in some other future.

The ideas of socialism multiplied by the radical Islam of the Sunni type became such ideas. Followers of these ideas hate our civilization, cultivate contempt for it, exposing all the above-mentioned vices of Western democracy, alien to Islam (as well as Christianity). That is why “Islamic socialism” comes to the forefront of the propaganda effect in developed countries now.

Now the world enters a new era and is experiencing a systemic crisis of changing the paradigm of development, it is typical that the majority is in a state of crisis of reassessment of the value system, public discontent, revision of all established norms and rules. ISIS propaganda promises a new world in which there will be no rich and poor, “more equal” servants and masters, an unjust court, corruption and bribery, smoking and drugs, alcohol and prostitution, double standards and same-sex marriages, pornography and gay pride parades and etc. For the young, disappointed in the Western way of life, they are more than attractive in a number of cases.

There is no doubt that the ISIS militants in Syria will be defeated by the joint efforts of the Russian Military Space Forces and the Western coalition. But these people will not go anywhere, they will disperse in all the neighboring and remote countries of the world, they will hide with their supporters and sympathizers for a while.

The idea of justice is not only a slogan, but also a marker. The discussion about justice and the periodic increase in injustice go on parallel throughout the history of mankind. However, the intensification of this discussion is a marker of the need for change. Democracy is a very controversial public institution, and as the slogans of freedom, equality and fraternity as well as the ideas of justice and equality of opportunity are increasingly confirmed in real life. One can say relatively confidently only one thing: the senses of life and justice are acquired in the struggle, but this struggle must be waged by civilized methods.

Author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina

2018.01.005. OLEG RYBAKOVSKY, OLGA TAYUNOVA.
MIGRATION COMPONENT OF DEMOGRAPHIC
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA // "Narodonaselenie," Moscow, 2016,
№ 1, P. 90–97.

*Keywords: demographical development
of Russia, migration, immigration potential,
foreign countries.*

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Migrational component of demographic development of Russia means, first of all, the interstate migration influencing general dynamics of the population of a country. After the collapse of the USSR (since 1992) and up to the beginning of 2013 there was a depopulation in Russia, i.e. natural population decline. Without interstate migration in the Russian Federation it would be 13,3mln less permanent residents, and its population base would be reduced from 148,5 million people – to 135,2 million people. But for this period the country received in the form of a migration gain 8,2 million permanent residents, and for the beginning of 2013 the resident population of Russia was 143,4 million people. The migration gain compensated over 60% of natural population decline.

In 2013 and 2014 the migration gain (565 thousand people) integrated and strengthened though an insignificant, but positive natural increase (55 thousand people) of the population of the Russian Federation. Taking into account assessment for 2015 the Russian Federation got 9 million permanent residents of «immigration origin» during the Post-Soviet period. Besides quantitative results, stream of immigration «rejuvenates» the population of Russia, reduces gender disproportion. In 2014 there were 75% of persons at working age in a migration gain (in resident population of Russia – 60%); persons of retirement age

have were 14% of all migration gain (in resident population of the Russian Federation there were 24%). About 62% in arrivals and 53% in migration gain were men. What happened in 2014 with interstate population shift of Russia was, on the one hand, a consequence of activization, deployment of action of the new editorial office «Programs to Assist Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation the Compatriots Living Abroad» approved in 2012. On the other hand, it was a consequence of political events in Ukraine. Both of these factors promoted preservation at a high level of migration increase in population of Russia and to repeated growth of organized compatriots' number – immigrants to Russia. Their number in 2014 was 106 thousand people or 40% of migration increase in population of the country. Neither crisis, nor sanctions, nor the collapse of ruble – prevented from preservation of high level of immigration of the population to Russia in 2014–2015.

By virtue of transformation of migration processes on the former Soviet Union in 1992–2015 there were changes in the national category of the immigrants moving to Russia. If in 1994–2004 the share of the Russian and other indigenous peoples of Russia in constant arrivals from abroad didn't fall lower than 60%, and in net migration – it is lower than 70%, and in 2007 both shares were already less than 40%. In 2011–2015 1,45 million people, including not less than 0,45 million organized compatriots and members of their families moved to Russia. It will make not less than 30% of all interstate migration gain of Russian population in 2011–2015. For the entire period from 1992 to 2015 the share of indigenous peoples of Russia in its migration gain of the country was not less than 55%. It's about 5 million people of “immigration origin,” compatriots of Russians “by birth.” Other 4 million of new compatriots are representatives of the title peoples of new abroad. The former 14 republics of the USSR were and remain the main source of migration replenishment of Russia. More than 96% of all constant immigration in 1992–2014 went to Russia from the former Soviet

Union. For these years 28% of a migration increase in population of Russia provided Kazakhstan, 16% – Uzbekistan, 12% – Ukraine, 7,5% – per Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 19,4% – Transcaucasia, 3,5% – the Republic of Moldova, 3,4% – the Baltic States, etc. Recently still insignificant inflow of the population from developing countries of the old abroad, neighboring to Russia, began to increase. So, in 2011–2014 in migration increase in population of the country there were representatives of China (20 thousand); Vietnam (7,5 thousand); DPRK (7 thousand); Turkey (4,3 thousand); Syria (3 thousand), etc.

Emigratory decline in population of Russia went in 1987–2014 to developed countries of the world, first of all, to Germany, Israel and the U.S. Especially strong outflow was observed in the late 1980s – early 1990s, but in recent years it has weakened and doesn't influence a total migration increase in population of the Russian Federation.

Foreign potential of replacement of Russian population by the migration way is now in seven CIS countries and the Southeast part of Ukraine. It includes, besides representatives of indigenous peoples of Russia – also Russian-speaking Belarusians and Ukrainians. In the CIS the Republic of Kazakhstan and Republic of Belarus have close and almost equivalent migration exchange of the population with Russia. In Kazakhstan there are 3,7 million of Russian people, and all representatives of indigenous nationalities of Russia – not less than 4,5mln. people. In the Republic of Belarus 0,8 million Russians and all Russian-speaking people of East Slavic nationality – about 9 million live. In the Southeast part of Ukraine of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians (without the Crimea and Sevastopol) there were about 10 million people for the beginning of 2014. In five former republics of the USSR (Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) which are close migration partners of Russia and at the same time its migration donors – there are about one million people of Russians and representatives of other indigenous peoples of Russia.

The internal interregional migration influencing accommodation of the population on the world's largest, but poorly and unevenly populated territory has equal importance for social and economic and political development of Russia. In an interregional migration situation negative tendencies remain. The outflow of the population from fringes generated in the 1990s, in particular from territories near-border to China, continues. There is still low and slowly growing migration mobility of overpopulated republics of the North Caucasus which are today the only in-Russian (apart from Moscow) source of redistribution and optimization of population accommodation across the territory of meanly populated Russia. The Moscow region with Moscow, the Leningrad Region with St. Petersburg and Krasnodar Krai are the leading interregional migration recipients of Russia. All other regions, being donors concerning these territories, lost in migration exchange with them 2,5 million people regarding the results of 2001–2014. Also the Belgorod region is among the main interregional migration recipients. It is attractive to migrants from all Russia and Ukraine. It occurs owing to competent policy of immigrants' attraction.

The main migration donors of Russia are the regions losing its population as a result of interregional migrations with the bulk of other regions of the country. It is possible to divide them into three groups: republics of the North Caucasus (plus Kalmykia); regions of Siberia and the Far East; regions of the European North (plus Kirov region). Also this group includes the Republic of Mordovia and the Kurgan region. At the end of 2012 10 regions – migration donors of Russia were included into the list of the preferential “territories of priority settling” defined in the new edition of the Program rendering assistance to voluntary resettlement to the Russian Federation of compatriots, living abroad. This is the Far East except Chukotka Autonomous area and the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, three regions of Siberian Federal District – Zabaykalsky Krai, the Irkutsk region and the Republic of Buryatia. In 2014 the migration increase in population

on these territories from abroad grew almost to 15 thousand people, and more than on 10 thousand people – at the expense of organized compatriots.

Between the main migration recipients and donors defining a vector of migration flows within the country there are almost all the other territories which are “accepting-giving” population. A specific place among them is held by Stavropol Krai and the Rostov region – regions of Krasnodar Krai; The Republic of Karelia, the Novgorod, Pskov and Vologda regions – regions of “The St. Petersburg region”; Smolenskaya, the Kaluga, Ryazan, Tver, Tula and Vladimir regions – regions of “The Moscow region.” All these regions play a role of “filter” on the way of migrants towards the main migration recipients of the country, accepting one immigrants from other regions of Russia or from the CIS and giving in approximately the same number of others. Other accepting-giving regions are in the distance from the main recipients. For example, the Novosibirsk and Chelyabinsk regions are on the way connecting Eastern Siberia and the Far East with the European part of Russia; The Volgograd region is located on a vector “the states of Transcaucasia and the republic of the North Caucasus – the European recipients of Russia.”

Authors of the article characterize the migration situation in Russia at the beginning of the XXI st century doubly. On the one hand, positive tendencies in interstate migration are observed: preservation and growth of migration gain from the CIS; reduction of outflow in the developed countries of the West; reorientation of immigrants from abroad to all regions of the country, including, and not the safest. On the other hand, negative tendencies in interregional migration remain. Migration as the most operated and quickly changing a component of the general growth of the population, according to researchers, is capable to solve a problem of stability of demographic and social and economic development of Russia.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2018.01.006. RUSTAM GIBADULLIN. PROBLEM OF CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL IDENTITY OF TATARSTAN AS A PART OF MUSLIM WORLD: EXPERIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING // *"II Bigievski chteniya – 2015. Musulmanskaya misl' v XXI veke: edinstvo traditsii y obnoveniya: Materiali II Mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-obrazovatelnoi konferentsii, Sankt Peterburg, 17–20 May 2015."* – Moscow, 2016. – P. 251–259.

Keywords: Tatarstan, cultural and historical identity, Islamic world, Islamic studies.

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The author notes that Islam role in the past and present of Tatars and also their place in the Islamic world only begin to be deeply comprehended. For a long time ideological obstacles impeded it: at first attitudes of Christianization of the Russian Empire, and then extreme secularism of the Soviet state. The Islamic studies in pre-Soviet and Soviet Russia were not almost engaged in Russian Muslims, focusing mainly on the foreign problems connected with foreign policy order of the state. During the Soviet period in Tatarstan there were closed down scientific institutes, involved in studying of Islam: local school of Russian academic Islamic studies and Tatar centers of Muslim education

and learning. As a result in researches of Soviet period devoted to history, culture and origin of Tatar people there were no consideration not only of problems through a prism of Islamic values, but also adequate beliefs of Islam and even a mention of it.

Especially evident such situation looks in the sphere of a historiography of the medieval Tatar states history. To get at the meaning of Islam beliefs and the Islamic world for understanding of these states history, it should be noted that all civilization achievements appropriate for them being a subject of traditional pride of Tatar cultural public have Islamic origin. First of all it is the defining role of Muslim merchant factories in creation in Eastern Europe of trade and craft infrastructure which allowed to connect local markets to the Great silk way that became for local societies an important condition of their successful development, and for the world of Islam – a factor of its constant and prolonged presence in the region. This circumstance expanding political, economic and cultural horizons of medieval Tatar society provided its inclusion in an orbit of Islamic civilization and assimilation of its achievements. In the state sphere it is a political and legal system based on Sharia and also an organization model of the central power peculiar to feudal monarchies of the Muslim world (the vizier, a sofa, branch-wise offices, etc.). In the sphere of spiritual culture it is a branched two-level system of Muslim education (mekteba, madrasah), formation of local tradition of genre literature under the influence of acquaintance to works of foreign Muslim authors, perception of scientific achievements of the Muslim world, its esthetics, including architectural styles.

However still official Russian publications consider Tatar medieval states out of communication with Islamic world history. In their names terminology of statehood of the Muslim Middle Ages (“emirate,” “sultanate”) isn't used, it is substituted for the pre-Islamic turco-Mongolian concept “khanate.” Meanwhile the Islamic titulary of local ruling dynasties was due to the fact that they were a part of political system Dar al-Islam. The Bulgar's governors (X–XIII centuries) in search of protection of the

Baghdad Caliph initiated an establishment of diplomatic relations with it and voluntarily turned into the status of its vassals which was expressed in emir's rank. Further Djochi dynasties of Sarai, Kazan, Hajji Tarkhan, Kasimov, the Crimea, etc. (XIII–XVIII centuries) carried a title of sultans – the monarchs politically independent of Caliph connected with each other by mutual contract solidarity. On the similar principles the Eastern European sultans built up the relationship and with sultans of the Arab East as, for example, it took place at the beginning of the XIV century within the contract between Sarai (Sarai-al-Maqrus) and Mamluk's Egypt.

Perspective of Islam was also absent in Soviet and pre-Soviet official interpretations of so-called colonial period in the history of Tatar people (XVI – beginning of XX). Suppression of Muslim communities which won their State, including religious oppressions caused by this liberation, protest movements, always held under the banner of Islam, and all associated with that tragic and heroic events couldn't get coverage in the official history. Power perceived in them one of the ideological sources of traditional Tatar separatism. However, despite this, pride in that they managed to keep Islamic traditions always played an important role in cultural and historical self-identification of Tatars, especially at the level of popular and epic and mass consciousness. And in the cultivation of the sense of pride religious and ethno-patriotic motives often intertwined.

Some, especially foreign, researchers, giving credit to the confessional reliability of Tatar society in the 14–19 centuries, explaining it as a particular “bordering” type of Tatars' world view, formed on the outskirts of the medieval Islamic world where mobilization of consciousness against opposition to expansion of not Islamic world and active proselytism were an important task. Indeed, how else it's possible to explain islamification of neighboring peoples carried out by Tatars under the colonial status which, according to historians, competed with christianized policy of the Russian Empire. Today, when Islam

positions in Tatar society are significantly undermined, mobilization of Muslims' world outlook on historical success looks for an exit in images of heroics of the past, appealing to pages of history of Muslim resistance during the colonial period. The created picture of permanent fight represents the heroic row connected by continuity: from the last defenders of besieged Kazan which death designated the beginning of a colonial state to those whose efforts and victims during the Russian revolutions of the beginning of the 20th century reached civil equality of Muslims in the Russian Empire and their once lost statehood revived.

In this search of heroics there is often not only defining Islamic, but nationalist motivation. It is eminent on the example of ideological heritage revival of Mirsaid Sultangaliev – the leader of Russian communist Muslims who decided on a political union with the Bolshevik party which won the revolution of 1917. After M. Sultangaliyev's death his name for many years appeared under a ban in Stalin torture chambers. However his concept of a historical mission of Russian Muslims based on geopolitical and social and liberating ideas of modernized Islam this party attracted interest abroad, including from the European scientists and some leaders of the Islamic world. Today the Tatar nationalists, free from the former bans returned a name of M. Sultangaliev on pages of history, but only as a heroic fighter for national statehood of Tatars. And the Islamic component in his ideological heritage continues to remain poorly studied.

It is also telling the fate of the ideas of another outstanding Tatar thinker – Moussa Bigiev whose approaches to understanding of Islamic dogma focused on revelation of as much as possible social and converting and civilization potential for creation of such society in which along with the political and economic rights of Muslims there would be provided their “moral revolution.” In Soviet Russia from where M. Bigiev, after arrest and prison, had to emigrate, his ideas were “thoroughly forgotten” while in the Muslim abroad they continued to attract interest. Considerably exactly thanks to it in Post-Soviet time return of ideological

heritage of M. Bigiev home became possible that was a certain indicator of Islam condition and Islamic studies in Russia.

The Post-Soviet period revealed new problems and new opportunities in studying of history and current state of Islam in Tatarstan. It was caused by increase in value of an Islamic factor in domestic policy of the Russian state and also the fact that processes of liberalization favorably affected position of Muslims, and a condition of science. On the one hand, researches of many, including foreign, scientific began to be encouraged, at the same time a choice of scope of Islamic studies research, methodological attitudes and approaches to understanding of problems weren't regulated any more by the state as it was earlier. On this positive wave Tatar scientific community had an opportunity to begin to restore their positions in the field of Islamic studies. On the other hand, in general also conditions of development of Muslims changed favorably: the political and legal and financial position of their communities and official structures was strengthened, the level of awareness and activity of the Muslim public grew.

During the Post-Soviet period also certain shift was planed in overcoming of Muslims Tatarstan feeling of provincial abandonment in the world of Islam. As community, they always experienced difficulty in considering themselves a full-fledged part of the world of Islam as in traditional understanding by this world of its identity there is no concept of Muslim community existing beyond its limits in non-Muslim country. It is no coincidence that such situation isn't even provided in the classical Islamic right. In former times the problem was aggravated by that contacts of Tatarstan with countries of the Muslim world were artificially minimized and limited to purely production ties which didn't have social meaning. The capital of Tatarstan – Kazan was almost suspended from the cities allowed for visit and long stay of Muslim foreigners including diplomats, scientists, students, actors, public and religious figures. Today it is observed a progress in development of such direct contacts by Tatarstan as the attitude towards them from the Russian Foreign Ministries

became considerably more liberal. Essentially new situation is characterized in addition that in Kazan consulates of Iran and Turkey function – the fact symbolizing in the opinion of Muslim public of Tatarstan historical break of its long political isolation from countries of the Islamic world. Strengthening of participation feeling of Russian Muslims to the world of Islam was promoted also by granting Russia in 2005 the status of the observer in the Islamic Conference organization.

Against the background of these positive changes nevertheless obstacles for an objective impartial research of a modern perspective of Islam remain. First of all, it is that public atmosphere of suspiciousness around Muslims and Islam in general which developed today not only in Russia in connection with aggravation of extremism and terrorism danger. By recognition of authoritative Russian specialists in Islamic studies, in mass consciousness, media quite often cultivate negative, excessively politicized image of Islam. Though today such tendentiousness doesn't any more look so hopelessly invincible like it was in Soviet period. There is a wish to hope, the researcher writes that through collision and reconsideration of the ambiguous and unsettled discursive practices, controversial problems and doubtful decisions in Russia there is a search of the new approaches to studying of Islam capable to realize its creative potential. It is necessary the innovative look which would show possibilities of strengthening of a creative role of religious factor in transformation and modern society development. In this regard it is important to understand and estimate Islam role in the past and present of peoples of Russia, including in the history of Tatarstan and Tatar people. It will promote also understanding by the world of Islam of the original cultural and civilization borders. Today all of them are defined by valuable criteria more – presence at regional Muslim communities of aspiration to participate in realization of high and noble purposes following from a creative and historical mission of Islam.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.01.007. GAIDULLA GILYAZOV, ROSA NURULLINA. PROFESSIONAL RETRAINING AND UPGRADING OF IMAMS IN TATARSTAN: SOCIAL PRACTICE, ASSESSMENTS AND VIEWS // *"Islamovedeniye," Makhachkala, 2017, Vol. 8, № 1, P. 29–36.*

Keywords: religious education, upgrading, educational programs, polling of imams.

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Despite the presence of a great number of religious educational institutions in Tatarstan, its mosques and other public organization are still short of high-skill specialists at various levels, especially in religious education, including in retraining and upgrading the imams.

There are ten professional educational institutions in Tatarstan subordinated to the regional Spiritual Board of Muslims. In the republican capital Kazan the Islamic University, eight madrasahs and an Islamic college are functioning. A special place in the system of Islamic education of Tatarstan is taken by the Russian Islamic Institute (RII), one of the first professional establishments of Islamic higher education founded in 1998. Its main aim is not only to train imam-khatybs serving in mosques, but also upbringing and educate modern Muslim intellectuals and highly educated specialists in Islamic theology, history, law, the language and economics who will make a worthy contribution to the progress of the Muslim ummah of Russia. A decision was adopted at the government level in 2015 to open the Islamic Academy in the town of Bulgar, which is to combine the potential of authoritative Russian and foreign Islamic scholars and become a real alternative to Islamic education in other countries.

All opportunities are created in Tatarstan to enable Muslim priests to upgrade and broaden their systematic education. In most madrasahs short-term courses are set up for the purpose. At the “Ak Mechet” in Naberezhniye Chelny an institute for upgrading imams and preachers has been opened where about 250 imams from various parts of the republic study annually. In Kazan a center for upgrading religious workers and teachers at Muslim educational institutions was opened in 2011. Rural Muslim priests and religious teachers are obliged to upgrade their knowledge and skill every four years.

The curriculum presupposes the preparation of a tolerant Muslim citizen capable to do business and be active in various fields with due account of confessional features. It includes various aspects of Islamic faith, law and history, as well as everyday practical activity of Islamic communities in the Russian Federation, personal relations within the mosque collective, and relations with other believers.

The study course lasts ten days. In this period mosque priests are taught a number of disciplines connected with their professional everyday work. It includes the rules of reading the Koran, duties of the imam, trends and sects, foundations of psychology, Russian legislation in the sphere of freedom of conscience, family and succession law, etc. Among the teachers at this Center and other courses are graduates from such prestigious Islamic universities as Al-Azkhar in Egypt, International Islamic University in Malaysia, and other Muslim educational centers.

The first students of the Center included 15 imams from Buinsk district. In the past six years more than 1,000 mosque priests from all parts of the Republic of Tatarstan attended these upgrading courses.

The Center of Islamic Studies of Tatarstan’s Academy of Sciences polled 700 mosque priests who studied at the upgrading courses from 2011 to 2016. The poll data showed that professional upgrading is in great demand among Muslim religious figures. About half of them studied more than once at different centers, such as Kazan Federal University or numerous madrasahs in Saratov,

Perm, Ufa, Penza, and elsewhere. More than 80 percent plan to continue studies, including Arabic, the rules of reading the Koran, Islamic law, history of Islam, Islamic ethics, etc. Some of them would also like to receive knowledge about secular disciplines: psychology, rhetoric, linguistics, philosophy, history of Tatarstan, interreligious relations, etc. About 90 percent of those polled pointed out that they were quite satisfied with the quality of teaching.

The material of the sociological survey, as the authors of this article conclude, demonstrates a whole range of views and assessments of imams concerning the problem of upgrading their educational level. These data can be used for improving the work of Muslim educational institutions, public organizations and religious associations.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.01.008. OLGA TSVETKOVA. TRANSFORMATION OF SUBNATIONAL POLITICAL AREA OF THE CAUCASIAN REGION // *“Vestnik Rossiiskoi natsii,” Moscow, 2016, P. 116–131.*

Keywords: multinational country, Caucasian region, regional factors, geopolitical position, administrative-territorial system, territorial conflicts.

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The author emphasizes that the transformation of the subnational political area in such multinational country as Russia can bring about a threat to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. The North Caucasus is distinguished by a great variety of natural-geographic conditions, as well as by the multinational and polyconfessional composition of the population. It is inhabited with people of many nationalities and on its territory different

cultures come into contact with one another and territorial identity is distinctly pronounced. At the same time the individual parts of the Russian Federation (republics) come across territorial disputes and conflicts caused by possible changes of their subnational borders.

The North Caucasus occupies a special geopolitical position. The 20th century was marked with more than forty territorial repartitions. Each one of them, while solving one problem, invariably gave birth to another. Changes in the ethno-territorial composition took place horizontally, as it were (border changes), and vertically (change in the status of national-territorial units). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union a tendency emerged toward politicization of ethno-national relations, when the ethnic self-identification of most peoples of Russia has acquired a more pronounced political character.

The Caucasus is viewed as one of the most important geostrategic regions. Geopolitically, it is divided into two parts: the North Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus. The former is part of the Russian Federation and included Rostov region, Stavropol and Krasnodar territories and republics of Adygeya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Circassia, North Ossetia and Chechnya.

The territory of the Trans-Caucasus is divided into three independent national republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Besides, the Caucasian region has not only national, but also subnational borders.

In accordance with serious geopolitical changes at the present stage a crucial question arises of protecting the state borders between Russia and the Trans-Caucasus (especially in Russian-Georgian relations). The model of the political behavior of Russia in the South Caucasus up to the middle of the 1990s was aimed at maintaining the Russian dominant position. It was during that period that the basis of the relations was laid, which is now a serious obstacle to the implementation of an efficient and balanced policy in the South Caucasus at the present time.

The foreign geopolitical regional factors include:

The trends of the formation of the Southern Caucasian region and complex mutual relations between the three main states; the subjects of international relations, primarily the United States, which has an interest in the North Caucasian region, as well as in other ethnic groups living in the North Caucasus Federal region; the growing interest of NATO in the region. Strategic control over the Caucasus would give an outlet to the United States to the Central Asian region.

The internal geopolitical regional factors which influence the policy of Russia in bilateral and multilateral relations include: different levels of democratic development in the three states of the South Caucasus; different political interests and the different scale of threats and risks (conflict of Azerbaijan's interests on the one hand and Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, on the other; Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia); diametrically opposite approaches of the South Caucasian states to the problem of a settlement of the ethno-political conflicts of the region.

The creation of national-territorial units (Union autonomous republics and regions) in the 1920s – 1930s, their frequent reorganizations throughout the Soviet period have provoked claims of some ethnic groups to others, which resulted in ethnic and territorial conflicts. The threat and risks to stability exist in the entire region to this day. The socio-political situation in the North Caucasus shows traces of destabilization. The ethnic-clan system of power in national republics gives birth to mistrust of the population in the authorities and leads to ethnic segregation. Small peoples and ethnic groups have set up, on permission of the official authorities, their own bodies of power, national municipalities, which has led to the fragmentation of the North Caucasian population by national-territorial features and cultivation of seats of ethnic tension. Many national-territorial units in the North Caucasus become a source of a prolonged ethno-territorial conflict.

On the whole, the researcher notes, the North Caucasus, due to its geopolitical position, will always be drawn in large-

scale and contradictory interethnic relations (for example, relations between the Trans-Caucasian states and the Russian Federation in the 1990s). In the South Caucasus the process of disintegration was accompanied with bloody ethnopolitical conflicts in which all three Trans-Caucasian republics were involved. A negative role is played by the influence of a number of foreign countries (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others), which pursue their own geopolitical aims in this region. The population of the North Caucasus is drawn in Oriental cultural area and in the zone of interests of the traditional centers of Muslim culture.

The author of the article examines the historical stages of the national-territorial construction in the North Caucasus. The process of the administrative development of the North Caucasus began in the 18th – 19th centuries, when a considerable part of the territory of the region joined the Russian Empire. During the Soviet period the integration processes in the region were going on with account of the specific features of the local population. The national-state construction of the 1920s not only realized the people's right to self-determination, but also mapped out the problem of the economic solvency of the national autonomous units being set up. The administrative-territorial transformations taking place in the 1920s – 1930s led to the frequent changing of the status of these units. The next stage of transformations took place in the 1940s – 1950s. During that period serious changes were introduced in the administrative-territorial system of the North Caucasus. Deportation processes were going on at the time, which led to the disbandment of certain national autonomous units. After 1953 the eliminated national autonomous units were reinstated. At the same time new subnational borders sealed ethnopolitical contradictions which became the breeding ground for discord and future conflicts.

From the latter half of the 1950s and up to the 1980s the administrative-territorial system and subnational borders have not been subjected to changes, and corrections have only been

made at the municipal level. The reason for administrative-territorial conflicts was the restoration of the abolished autonomous units of the deported peoples. Researchers connect the negative phenomena in the sphere of interethnic relations and reasons for interethnic conflicts in the territory of the Russian Federation in the past decades with the nationalities policy carried on in the conditions of the "socialist experiment."

A crisis in the administrative-territorial system in the North Caucasus took place at the end of the 1980s – beginning of the 1990s and was caused by a sharp deterioration of the socio-economic and ethnopolitical situation in the country and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. All this contributed to the growing national self-consciousness and raising the status of some parts of Russia (withdrawal of autonomous regions from territories, transformation of autonomous regions and republics into republics as parts of the Russian Federation). Legislative acts adopted there fixed their sovereignty as state units. However, these tendencies gave rise to serious apprehension of "non-titular" peoples who feared that in the new conditions they might be subjected to discrimination. The most radical forms of protest were expresses in demands to withdraw from the new republics and create their own new state units (republics). The Balkars and Kabardians began to demand the division of the Kabardino-Balkarian republic into two independent parts (Kabarda and Balkaria). The Karachais and Circassians, Abazins and Nogais, as well as the Terek Cossacks also expressed their desire to form autonomous regions, and some time later republics of their own.

The problem became quite acute in the 1990s when power in Chechnya was seized by illegal armed units, and the Federal Center virtually ignored the situation in the republic for quite some time. It was only in 2003 that the Constitution was adopted as a result of a referendum, which proclaimed the Chechen Republic part of the Russian Federation. Apart from that, in other parts of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus premises about their sovereignty were deleted from their constitutional acts.

The indetermination of the subnational borders of parts of the Russian Federation is of special significance in the internal geopolitical area of the North Caucasus. The frontiers of the Caucasian border region with former republics of the U.S.S.R. do not have natural, historical and ethnic-areal limit. The state borders of the Russian Federation coinciding with the subnational borders of parts of the Russian Federation in this region have not been demarcated, which gives ground for new territorial conflicts (for example, the events of the August of 2008 in South Ossetia). One of the specific features of the Caucasian region is the predominance of conventional borders, for instance, between Azerbaijan and Georgia. The main problems of border demarcation are connected with the ethnic groups living on a given territory, which were divided by a state border, which tends to increase ethnic-territorial tension.

The author of the article pays special attention to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict because it is an inner territorial conflict which arose between parts of the Russian Federation on the problem of the restoration of the territorial rights of the deported peoples and the drawing of subnational borders of part of the Russian Federation. The Ossetian-Ingush conflict of the autumn of 1992 was the most acute phase of a prolonged and unresolved confrontation between the two neighboring North Caucasian republics – parts of the Russian Federation – concerning one district and one part of the city of Vladikavkaz. To date, the exacerbation of interethnic relations is connected with the repartition of the subnational border district between Chechnya and Ingushetia. The problems emerge due to the absence of the demarcation line of the subnational border between the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia.

The author of the article makes a conclusion that the specific nature of territorial conflicts on the problem of subnational borders lies in the problem of divided peoples, which has a high conflict potential. There are three groups of these peoples. The first group is the peoples divided by the

administrative borders of the Union republics, which became state borders after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. The second group includes peoples which became divided by administrative borders as a result of the policy of mass deportations, changes of ethnic territories, mass migrations during the pre-revolutionary period and in Soviet time. The third group is represented by the divided peoples who were subjected to division not by territorial borders, but by cultural and civilizational ones, because the Caucasus is increasingly turning into a zone of civilizational breaks, which increases ethnopolitical tension in the region.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.01.009. SURHAI GALBATSEV. CHALLENGES AND RISKS OF STABLE DEVELOPMENT IN REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN (ETHNOPOLITICAL ASPECT) // *"Caspian region: politics, economics, culture."* Astrakhan, 2016, № 2(47), P. 123–128.

Keywords: Republic of Daghestan, stable development, ethnic rivalry, identity, ethnic minorities, territorial dispute.

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The stable development of the Republic of Daghestan, the author notes, is threatened by numerous challenges and risks due to a host of problems, the most pressing and specific of them being the presence of a great many ethnic groups living side by side with one another with their own interests and claims. The intertwining of the local poly-ethnic elements and the geopolitical factor increases the threat to a stable development. Due to the fact that local conflicts are used as a geopolitical instrument and tend to aggravate vulnerable ethnic and religious problems the

question of a stable development of the republic becomes ever more pressing. The elaboration of a sound strategy to stabilize the situation and resolve conflicts and further develop the republic is an urgent problem for the national security of the country.

This can only be achieved if all ethnic groups are represented in the bodies of power on a just basis and have an equal access to social benefits. Meanwhile, in a poly-ethnic society with a different numerical strength of ethnic groups and their representation in the local elites, justice and equality cannot be easily achieved, and these problems often remain a pain in the neck for ethnic minorities. The Republic of Daghestan is a case in point.

Ethnopolitical conflicts that have emerged in the post-Soviet area after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. are one of the grave threats to the stable development of the entire country and region. Especially difficult ethnic conflicts take place in the southern parts of Russia. A complex ethnic composition of the population of the North Caucasus, especially the Republic of Daghestan, contains a potential threat of ethnopolitical tension.

In 2013 the republic was headed by the well-known Russian expert on nationalities problems Ramazan Abdulatipov. But this did not help overcome complex ethnopolitical problems and calm down the confrontation of ethnic clans in the republic. Daghestan and its people are not yet ready for radical transformations in the republic.

At the same time the poly-ethnic character of society gives birth to a high degree of civic identity, which is a specific feature of the inhabitants of the Republic of Daghestan. According to sociological polls carried out in Daghestan recently, 98 percent of Daghestanis do not see themselves living outside Russia, 51 percent identified themselves as "Russians," and 43 percent as "Daghestanis," emphasizing that "they live in the Russian Federation," and only five percent positioned themselves as representatives of a concrete ethnic group. These data show that there is now a common collective Daghestani identity, especially in towns. However, it is not yet stable and it exists predominantly in

the conditions of interethnic calm and quiet. Any ethnopolitical tension, outside influence, or information medium can move the ethnic factor to a dominant position, as it often happens in real life.

At the same time, clans (ethnic clan relations for the Daghestani people are one of the sources of difficult problems) are regarded by experts as one of the reasons for instability in the republic. The main problems are those of inter-clan contradictions (political rivalry between influential ethnic elites).

There is another, daily, level of conflicts – a conflict of the interests of ethnic groups (territorial, land, status, etc.).

In recent years, due to a land shortage or its great distance from suitable places, economic ruin, curtailment of industries, shortage of jobs, quite a few people had to abandon their native parts in search of work or better living conditions. Many ethnic groups historically live in difficult-of-access rural areas, on mountain slopes, in far-off economically backward places of the republic with few transport routes. The living conditions in these districts are still very difficult. Their inhabitants are gradually resettled to more convenient places in flatlands. Thus, resettlers' communities have formed in Nogai, Kumyk and Chechen villages. Consequences of deportations, land conflicts, difference in upbringing, culture and mentality give birth to arguments, too heated sometimes, and tension, displeasure of the indigenous population of flatlands. Latent conflicts flare up from time to time which can take a more acute form.

The exacerbation of the geopolitical situation in Russia and the growing influence of the geopolitical factor in ethnic, especially in religious conflicts, call for closer attention to ethnopolitical processes. In order to oppose the impact of geopolitical factors it is important to carry on an efficient ethnic policy, take into account multiform ethnic interests, prevent the negative consolidation of ethnic groups instigated by ethnic leaders pursuing their own selfish interests, contribute to just relations with ethnic minorities, and give them guarantees and opportunities for ethnic self-preservation, and the study of the

language and culture. It is necessary to lower the impact of conflict-provoking factors, carry on timely monitoring, and reveal controversial problems, but not ignore them.

It is important to optimally combine general civic identity with the preservation of ethnic group identity, historical and ethno-cultural traditions, which stem from the mentality and values of people's culture necessary for maintaining stability along with the preservation of the historically-formed traditions of mutual respect and friendly relations between ethnic groups, and sound ethnic rivalry.

The poly-ethnic character of the republic, plurality and contradictoriness of interests, territorial disputes, activity of ethnic leaders, errors of Soviet nationalities policy and unpreparedness for compromise hamper solution of current problems and become obstacles to stable development, the expert concludes.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. COUNTRY BETWEEN TWO FIRES: HOW AZERBAIJAN BALANCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN // *The article was specially written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Trans-Caucasian republic, Sunni Turkey, Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations, Azerbaijani-Israeli Relations, Iran, South Caucasus.

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After gaining formal independence in 1991 and the opportunity to pursue its own foreign policy Azerbaijan, just like other former republics of the Soviet Union, stepped on a difficult path of searching for its own place on the geopolitical map of the world. The establishment of relations with different countries has

not always been based on the historical and cultural past of this young Trans-Caucasian republic. Apart from the traditional ethnic and religious components, which are important for foreign policy, Azerbaijan was guided by pure pragmatic considerations. Partnership and even allied relations were sometimes established with countries whose historical past or ethnic and confessional features were at variance with those of Azerbaijan. As a rule, pride of place was given to economic interests and the current geopolitical situation in the region.

For example, in the 1990s the Azerbaijani leadership pursued a course at drawing closer to secular Sunni Turkey, but not with the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran, although most Azerbaijanis are Shia Muslims. Apart from that, in the past Azerbaijan was part of the unified state of Persia (now Iran) and was waging uninterrupted wars with the Ottoman Empire. The foreign-policy choice of Baku in favor of Ankara has been prompted, first and foremost, by the secular character of Azerbaijani society at the time,¹ the ethnic and linguistic closeness of the two Turkic peoples,² and also Tehran's position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which was close to that of Armenia. At the same time Azerbaijan positioned itself as a secular state in the Muslim world. In 1991 the young republic was accepted to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).³ In that situation Azerbaijan had no problems in the development of close relations with Israel at the time, although the latter has very strained relations with the Muslim world to this day due to the still unresolved Palestine problem.⁴ Friendly contacts between Baku and Tel Aviv have largely been established due to the fact that tens of thousands of people from Azerbaijan now live in Israel, as well as there is a numerous Jewish community in this Trans-Caucasian republic.

Economic and military contacts have successfully been developing between the two countries which coincided in time with the exacerbation of Iranian-Israeli contradictions in the Middle East. The hostile rhetoric of Tehran and Tel Aviv at the

end of the 1990s – beginning of the 2000s began to seem quite dangerous, especially when the two sides resorted to direct threats to use crude force against each other, and down to nuclear weapon. Against this background Azerbaijan is forced to balance between its southern neighbor – Iran, whose interests it is bound to take into account, and one of its closest ally in the entire Middle East – Israel, which is one of the biggest importers of its oil and suppliers of arms for the Azerbaijani military forces.

We shall now look more closely at the young Republic of Azerbaijan, which has recently marked the 25th anniversary of its independence, namely, at how it manages to preserve a balance in relations between two hostile states.

Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations

The classics of neo-liberalism Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye in their well-known work “Power and Interdependence” (1977) wrote that relations between neighboring countries are always more complex than between countries which are at a considerable distance from one another.⁵

As it has already been noted, Azerbaijan cannot disregard the interests of Iran, with which it has the longest border – 689 kilometers. Apart from that, Iran is inhabited by about 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis, or there are more of them than in Azerbaijan itself. The present situation is a heritage of the time of the Russian Empire and Persia. By the Peace Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and Peace Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) Northern Azerbaijan (about the entire territory of present Azerbaijan) was included in the Russian Empire; Southern Azerbaijan, Eastern Azerbaijan and Western Azerbaijan remained parts of Iran.

The bilateral relations of Baku and Tehran have become rather difficult due to several reasons.

By the mid-1990s the leadership of Azerbaijan became greatly worried by the growing Iranian Shia influence in the republic. Indeed, a great many missionaries were very active in

the country reading lectures and giving sermons at universities and institutes and mosques. To counter this the authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan gave more opportunities to religious organizations from Sunnite countries. The most active was the Turkish "Hizmet" movement headed by Fethullah Guelen, which unfolded broad activity, building schools and lyceums and developing the mass media in that Caspian republic. One way or another, the influence of clerics from Iran began to wane, and in 1996, by an order of the then President of Azerbaijan Geidar Aliyev, any missionary activity in Azerbaijan was banned.

Another obstacle is the unsettled legal status of the Caspian Sea. Iran and Russia regard it as a sea.⁶ Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan consider it a lake.⁷ Contradictions on the demarcation of frontiers of the Caspian Sea have gone so far that in July 2001 the Iranian naval forces undertook an armed operation against several Azerbaijani sea-exploration vessels. This incident has brought the two neighboring states to the brink of an open armed confrontation, but due to persistent diplomatic efforts the conflict was quenched, and by 2010 Iran and Azerbaijan began to reestablish and increase their economic and political contacts. Both countries displayed interest in implementing joint projects, especially in the oil sector of the economy. In 2016 trade turnover between Baku and Tehran reached about \$1.1 billion.⁸ The interaction of the two countries within the Azerbaijan – Iran – Russia format seemed quite promising. In the course of a meeting of the leaders of these three states in Baku in August 2016 the foundations of the implementation were laid down of such projects as a "North – South" transport corridor and a "Great Energy Bridge of Russia – Azerbaijan – Iran."

Despite a relative stabilization in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations in the past several years and elimination of certain contradictions, official Baku is still worried by the dual position of Iran on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the one hand, the spiritual and political leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran speak out in support of Azerbaijan from time to time, appealing

to Islamic solidarity between the two countries, on the other hand, friendly political, economic, humanitarian and other contacts between Tehran and Erevan cause serious concern in Baku. As Thomas de Waal notes, it was Iran that became Armenia's main partner in the period of the armed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991–1994. "If Armenia had not have trade ties with Iran, it would have been unable to live through the hardest winters of 1991–1992 and 1992–1993," the expert believes.⁹ And by estimates of G. Nadzhafov, the continuing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is necessary for Iran's leadership in order to contain the negative influence of Baku in Southern Azerbaijan – part of Iran where a big Azerbaijani community lives comprising about 30 percent of the country's population.¹⁰ S. Chernyavsky is convinced of the fact that Tehran regards the existence of the state of Azerbaijan as a direct threat to national security and stability.¹¹

As we see, the bilateral relations of Baku and Tehran develop quite ambiguously. Due to the presence of mutual claims the two sides are engaged in a cautious game against each other. And friendly relations between Armenia and Iran enable the latter to give real tests for Baku's reliability. In turn, Azerbaijan resorts to the same tactic, using its contacts with Israel, the sworn enemy of Iran.

Azerbaijani-Israeli Relations

It is believed that the initial point in relations between Baku and Tel Aviv was a visit of Israeli Premier Binyamin Netanyahu to Baku in August 1997. The development of bilateral contacts between the two countries at the time was prompted by several reasons. First, in the late 1990s Israel was greatly interested in Caspian hydrocarbon raw materials and the construction of transport routes Caspian basin to the Mediterranean region across Turkey's territory. Secondly, Tel Aviv had great hopes for building a military-political axis Baku – Ankara – Tel Aviv with a

view to bolstering up its positions in the region. For one thing, Israel regarded it quite profitable and promising to have a partner or ally in the Caspian region.¹²

Tehran looked at the rapprochement of Tel Aviv and Baku with a certain apprehension, especially in the context of the worsening of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations at the time. Being aware of the beneficial character of the Israeli factor in its foreign policy (especially for bringing pressure to bear on Iran), nevertheless, Azerbaijan did not want to enter in an open confrontation with its southern neighbor. For instance, the Azerbaijani leadership did not agree to give permission for the opening of Israel's Embassy in Baku.¹³ Tel Aviv showed full understanding of this fact.

Just as in the case of Iran, in its relations with Israel Azerbaijan is guided mainly by the purely economic interests. To date Azerbaijan is in fifth place by the volume of trade turnover with Israel (\$3.5 billion), the world's biggest partner of Israel and the first among the countries of the former U.S.S.R. Israel imports about 50 percent of the oil it needs from Azerbaijan.¹⁴ Relations are rapidly developing between the two countries in such spheres as education, health service, pharmaceutical industry, tourism and agriculture. Transport connections between the two countries are well underway: there are regular flights between Baku and Tel Aviv. It should be borne in mind that the first Azerbaijani operator of the cellular communication system "Bakcell" was created by the joint project of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Communications and the Israeli Company GTIB in 1994.

Arms trade occupies a special place in relations between the two countries. Azerbaijan is one of the biggest purchasers of Israeli arms and military equipment. The contracts signed are worth \$4.85 billion.¹⁵ Israeli drones, anti-vessel missiles, anti-aircraft complexes, and radar stations are especially popular with the Azerbaijani military.

Israel adheres to an unequivocal position in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem: official Tel Aviv is in solidarity with Baku.

This was confirmed in 2009 by the ninth President of the State of Israel Shimon Peres. During his visit to Azerbaijan he said the following, among other things: "We are for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. One state has no right to occupy the territory of another state. We support the desire of Azerbaijan's leader to take back his country's lands by political means."¹⁶ In 2016 Israel's Minister of Defense Avigdor Lieberman stated that the position of Azerbaijan in the course of April 2016 fighting was "quite justified." Moreover, he accused Armenia of provocation.¹⁷

As we have noted earlier, a considerable role in supporting friendly contacts between Tel Aviv and Baku is played by a great many people from Azerbaijan living in Israel today, as well as a large Jewish community in this Trans-Caucasian republic. Mention should also be made of close connections between the Azerbaijani and Israeli lobby in the United States which joined efforts in 2001 and achieved the repeal of the "amendment 907," which had limited Washington's economic assistance to Baku for quite a long time.¹⁸ In 2002 Israel tried to realize the project of installing radio-electronic equipment on the southern border of Azerbaijan to monitor Iranian territory. It was supposed that the equipment would be supplied by American companies, but the U.S. Department of State blocked the deal.¹⁹ It was largely due to the fact that during that period "the Iranian nuclear problem" was quite close to being resolved, and any exacerbation of the situation was undesirable for the entire international community.

On the whole, Azerbaijan is very cautious in using the "Israeli aspect" in its foreign policy, seeking to maintain a balance between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic. When Tehran feels that a threat may be coming from the Azerbaijani-Israeli tandem, it always has an opportunity to remind Baku of its "Armenian resource." For example, a concealed signal of Tehran answering a visit of Israel's Premier Benjamin Netanyahu to Baku on September 13, 2016, was a trip of Iran's President Hassan Rouhani to Erevan a week later – on December 21, 2016.

Conclusions

An analysis of the bilateral Azerbaijani-Iranian and Azerbaijani-Israeli relations shows that in its foreign policy Azerbaijan often relies only on the current geopolitical situation in the region. The Israeli factor is beneficial to Baku for bringing pressure to bear on Iran, but the possibilities to use this instrument are rather limited. Similarly, Israel is not able to use the entire potential of its friendly relations with Azerbaijan for bringing pressure to bear on Iran due to a serious influence of Tehran on Baku's policy (mainly because of the "Armenian factor"). Besides, the situation is also influenced by the positions of the foreign actors with their own interests in Azerbaijan, Iran and in the South Caucasus as a whole.

In our view, Azerbaijan should be viewed from the point of view of political realism. As the classic of this trend Hans Morgenthau claimed, the only driver of all international processes is pragmatism and the cold-blooded calculations of international actors.²⁰ This formula can well be applied to the policy pursued by Azerbaijan toward its partners.

Proceeding from the fact that Azerbaijan's policy is distinguished by pragmatism, its further interaction with Iran and Israel will depend on the alignment of the political and economic forces in the Caspian Basin and the Middle East. In the conditions of the existing confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv the greater interaction of Baku with one of the two sides will cause a more painful reaction of the other side.

Notes

- ¹ In Soviet times, when religion was not welcome by the authorities, the number of believers in Azerbaijan had markedly diminished. That was why the secular experience of Ankara was much closer to Azerbaijan than the experience of Iran, where clericals came to power in 1979 and announced that from then onwards the supreme law in the country would only be the Sharia law.

- 2 At the same time it's worth mentioning that Soviet Azerbaijani historiography was for a long time dominated by the theory of the non-Turkic origin of the Azerbaijani people, according to which the modern Azerbaijani ethnos originated from the ancient state of Media (8th – 6th century BC), which had been approximately within the bounds of modern Western Iran and populated mainly by Iranian-language tribes.
- 3 From 2011 the official name – Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
- 4 Turkey, Egypt and Jordan with which Israel has diplomatic relations are the only exception.
- 5 Robert Owen Keohane, Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. 1977, pp. 165–220.
- 6 If the Caspian Sea is determined as a sea, its legal status should be regulated by the UN Convention on Law of Sea of 1982.
- 7 If the Caspian Sea is determined as a lake, it should be divided on the sector principle. As a result, the best sectors should be in possession of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
- 8 [Electronic resource] <http://interfx.az/view/681506/az>
- 9 Thomas de Waal. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. 2003. P. 205.
- 10 G. Nadzhafov. Iran i gosudarstva Yuznogo Kavkaza // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz [Iran and Countries of South Caucasus // Central Asia and Caucasus]. 2008. No 1 (58). Pp. 41–51.
- 11 S. Chernyavsky. Azerbaijan: vybor kursa [Azerbaijan: Choice of a Course]. Moscow: Azer-Media 2003, 334 pp.
- 12 A. Veliyev. Treugolnik: Izrail – Turtsiya – Azerbaijan: realnost i perspektivy // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. 2000. No 2 [Triangle: Israel – Turkey – Azerbaijan: Reality and Prospects // Central Asia and Caucasus. 2000. No 2]
- 13 An Israeli diplomatic mission has been functioning in Baku since August 1993. A mission of Palestine in Azerbaijan emerged in June 2011.
- 14 [Electronic resource] <http://xalqgazeti.com/az/news/politics/80590>.
- 15 Israel – Azerbaijan – weapon aimed backwards – oil. [Electronic resource] <http://stop-news.com/oryjie/izrail-azerbaidzhan-oruzhie-v-obratnom-napravlenii-neft>.
- 16 Israil Prezident Simon Peres. [Electronic resource] http://anl.az/down/meqale/azerbaycan/azerbaycan_iyun2009/84444.htm
- 17 Avigdor Lieberman: Azerbaijan's position in Karabakh conflict justified [Electronic resource] <https://en.trend.az//Azerbaijan/politics/2515494.html>.
- 18 “Amendment 907” was adopted by the U.S. Senate in 1992 under pressure of the Armenian lobby. The document denounces the blockade of Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by Azerbaijan. In accordance with the amendment Washington sharply curtailed material assistance to Baku.

- ¹⁹ In this connection it would be appropriate to mention the role of foreign actors influencing the positions in the Baku – Tehran – Tel Aviv triangle. Apart from the United States which has considerable economic interests in the Transcaucasus, Russia and Turkey, too, are traditional actors in the South Caucasus.
- ²⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau. *Polityca Among Nations*. 1973, pp. 27–30.

2018.01.010. STANISLAV PRITCHIN. UZBEK TRANSIT FOR CENTRAL ASIA // *“Russia in Global Politics,”* Moscow, 2017, № 1, Vol. 15, P. 150–159.

Keywords: Uzbekistan, Central Asia, elite, power, elections, president, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, history, Turkmenistan, reforms, investments, migration, China, Kazakhstan.

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On December 4, 2016, early presidential elections took place in Uzbekistan in connection with the death of President Islam Karimov on September 2. Four candidates from each of the registered political parties took part in the elections. But the indisputable favorite was Shavkat Mirziyoev, who held the post of prime minister from 2003. He gained the biggest number of votes – 88.61 percent. Having scored victory, he declared the priority targets of his five-year term, some of which look revolutionary enough, as, for example, direct elections of heads of regions and reforms of government service. Thus, Uzbekistan has entered into a new epoch, and taking into account its weight and importance in Central Asia, its neighbors will not be able to ignore the course of Uzbek transit.

The question as to who could replace Karimov was solved during closed negotiations. By a decree of parliament Sh. Mirziyoev was endorsed as the head of the state commission for Karimov's funeral. Several days later the joint session of the two chambers of Uzbek parliament approved the disqualification of self by the senate speaker N. Yuldashev from the post of the provisional head of the republic, which he should have taken in accordance with the Constitution of 2011 in case of the President's death or loss of capacity to fulfill his duties until the election of the new head of state. Sh. Mirziyoev was elected acting president, and early elections had to take place on December 4, 2016.

Foreign experts criticized the decision of the disqualification of self by the speaker of the Senate and the endorsement of the premier as the acting president. Articles 95 and 96 of the Constitution on the procedure of announcement of early elections and appointment of the acting head of state in case of the death or loss of capacity to work of the incumbent holder of office do not deal with such nuances. At the same time the prime minister in the Uzbek political hierarchy is the third person, and in such situation it was quite logical that it was he who replaced Yuldashev after his disqualification of self. It is necessary to understand the specific features of Uzbekistan's political culture. The sacral position of the head of state is so high there that it is difficult to imagine two centers of power even for a brief period of time – acting president and the most probable candidate. On the one hand, this could have brought about dangerous behind-the-scenes games, and on the other, to create diarchy in public consciousness.

A specific feature of Uzbek transit is its maximal consolidation. Not a single leading actor claiming the highest post wishes to destabilize the socio-political situation. Moreover, all claimants were interested in preserving the strict vertical of power and maximal cohesion of the ruling political class. In this situation the competing groups preferred behind-the-scene

negotiations and putting forward a single candidate instead of public debates. Another stabilizing factor, undoubtedly, was the Head of the National Security Council R. Inoyatov, who, due to his venerable age, had no personal presidential ambitions and, most probably, played the role of the key moderator of the election of the new President of Uzbekistan and his accord with the principal political actors.

The reforms spoken of during the election campaign and after it should touch on all spheres of life. The new President suggested several initiatives aimed at the improvement of the investment medium: restrictions are to be introduced on inspecting business by government bodies; measures are put forward to facilitate the conversion procedure of the national currency – the key problem for foreign investors. President Mirziyoev proposed to examine the possibility of electing heads of regions by all people's vote. If this initiative is introduced, it will become a precedent for the entire Central Asian region, because in all its countries the heads of local bodies and administrative units are appointed or removed by presidents. At present a concept of the administrative reform is evolved calculated for the 2017–2021 period. Meanwhile, the rigid vertical of power and the course aimed at secularization of socio-political life are preserved, and the spreading of the radical Islamist ideas is banned.

One can hardly expect serious changes in the foreign-policy priorities of Uzbekistan at the present stage. First, all internal political problems should be solved and a new balance of forces formed, and only after this one can expect any changes in the international priorities. The primary task of the new President will be to receive support and recognition of his legitimacy from the key actors – Russia, China and the United States.

Speaking of long-term interests of Uzbekistan, it is the development of cooperation with Russia, inasmuch as more than two million Uzbek citizens work there. Russia is also an important economic partner and the biggest investor, primarily in the oil-and-gas sphere. A certain move toward the EAEC is

also possible, but not at the level of full-fledged membership so far. Close cooperation will continue with China, inasmuch as the latter is an important investor, primarily in the transport sector, and a major purchaser of Uzbek gas.

As to the foreign-policy preferences and priorities of the second President of Uzbekistan, one may take the statement of Sh. Mirziyoev made at the ceremony of his endorsement as the acting head of state. First on the list of partners are Uzbekistan's Central Asian neighbors, and only then come Russia, China, the United State, Japan and South Korea. As to Kazakhstan, there is a pragmatic strategic alliance with it. Strained relations persist with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan due to the unresolved border issues and a conflict over the water-and-energy situation. At the same time the personal contacts of the presidents of Central Asian countries play a no small role. For example, the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmon flew to Tashkent to attend the funeral of Islam Karimov, although they had rather difficult personal relations. He met the head of Uzbekistan and talked with him on certain problems of interest for both countries. It is to be hoped that Sh. Mirziyoev as the new head of Uzbekistan will do his best to resolve all problems and contradictions with his country's neighbors and bring mutual relations to a new level.

The risks connected with transfer of power are primarily connected with the domestic political situation. Islam Karimov was the key figure of the system, and being over and above the scuffle ensured stability due to establishing a balance between the main political and regional groups of influence. In any case, the author of the article notes, any exacerbation of inter-elite struggle after the election of the President will hardly lead to destabilization in the republic, but will only be limited to redistribution of influence between the ruling groups.

Author of the abstract– Elena Dmitrieva

NIYAZI AZIZ. RUSSIA – CENTRAL ASIA: QUALITY OF LIFE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. TO THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION // *The article was specially written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Central Asia, United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index, Economic sustainability, Social sustainability, economic structure, integration.

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In 2016 it was submitted one more Human Development Report in 188 counties of the world by the United Nations Development Programme. It's given the recent data about the Human Development Index (HDI) which traditionally unites its three basic investigations. Life expectancy at birth reflects the ability to lead a long and happy life. Average time of education and its expected duration demonstrate the capability of obtaining knowledge, and gross national income per capita presents the opportunity to achieve an adequate standard of living. These three measurements are standardized by means of number values from 0 to 1 geometric mean of which is an aggregate measure of the HDI ranging from 0 to 1. Then states are ranked on the ground of this characteristic¹. The HDI shows an aggregate measure of level of human development in the country, because it is sometimes used as a synonym for "quality of life."

¹ Classification by the level of human development is based on fixed particulate points of this index corresponding to quartiles of allocation of component indicators. There are following particulate points: for a low level of human development – HDI less then 0,550, for an average level of human development – 0,550–0,699, for a high level of human development – 0,700–0,799 and for a very high level of human development – from 0,800 and higher.

With the aim of more sophisticated measurements of human development in the report for 2016 there are delivered four composite indexes. The HDI corrected for inequality emends the HDI in view of inequality level. Gender development index compares values of the HDI for men and women. The gender inequality index shows an amount of empowerment for women and the multi-dimensional poverty index reflects measuring poverty, not related directly with income. In estimation of country's rating there are also taken into account such factors as: the situation of human rights and civil liberties, possibility for citizens to participate in public life, social security, measure of territorial and social mobility of the population, rate of cultural development, access to information, unemployment rate, criminality, protection of the environment by index of ecological efficiency (EEI)¹ and others.

It should be noted that the report serves as a supplement to the sustainable development agenda for the period up to 2030 and it's also based on 17 goals accepted under the United Nations auspices¹. These mutually aiding international documents reveal the most serious problems of modernity, put forward conceptional and practical tasks to overcome global systemic crisis – critical interconnected problems of the world financial system, economy, energy, trade, environmental degradation, depletion of natural resources, social protection.

The main emphasis in the concept of human development is placed on gorgeousness of human lives, and not just richness of economies it's broader than an approach in terms of human resource satisfying people's main material requirements. The conception supposes empowerment of human choice, the extension of their influence on potential for development and well-

¹ The data on Index of environmental performance in Russia and Central Asian countries are presented in the article: Aziz Niyazi. Russia – Central Asia in environmental dimensions // Russia and Moslem world. Scientific Information bulletin /RAS Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences. Oriental Institute. Centre of scientific information researches of global and regional problems. – M., 2017. №7. P. 20–26.

being. Nonetheless economic growth is considered to be as an important mean of human progress but not as the overall goal.

It's important that the HDI report 2016 provides ecological and socio-economic indicators of sustainable development for the studied countries. Its developers note the need for an integrated approach to the concept of sustainable development. It cannot be limited only by protection of the natural resources and the environment-they suppose-because ecological decay exercises prepotent and unequal influence upon the poor, disenfranchised and vulnerable people and climate change affects the most those countries and nations which contributed to it least of all. This way from the point of view of human development, sustainable development embodies social justice.

Authors note that in the Human Development Report 2011 sustainable human development is determined as "extension of substantive liberties of fellow men with the simultaneous efforts for prevention of serious violation of such freedoms towards the future generations." This definition – they write – is similar to many simple notions of environmental sustainability. But it also reflects a deeper conception of generality in which life experience of all individuals within one generation and between generations is equally important.¹

The following are some comprehensive and selected indicators representing quality of life of Russian citizens and countries of Central Asia and key markers of sustainable development. They permit to conclude the way people's life changed after the collapse of the USSR, trace the dynamics of developments, and elicit difficulties on the way of sustainable development. The tables and explanations are prepared by the author on the ground of a small part of extensive material of Human Development Report 2016 r.²

¹ Human development report 2016. P. 93.

² Human development report 2016. P.194–268. Full version of the Report in Russian is at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_report_russian_web.pdf (Reference date: 14.06.2017.)

In the tables a dash between two years, for example, 2005–2014 indicates that information is shown for the most recent year of this period. A slash between years, for example, 2005/2014, means that there is an average index for these years. Growth rate usually constitute average annual growth rate for the period between the first and the last year of the period. In the tables there are used notationkeys: ... - no data; 0 or 0,0 – zero or a number which can be rounded to zero; – not used.

Table 1¹

Human Development Index and its components

HDI country rating	Human development index (HDI)	Life expectancy at birth	Expected duration of education	Average duration of education	Gross national income (GNI) per capita	Rating by GNI per capita minus rating by HDI	Rating by HDI
	Value of 2015	(in years) 2015	(in years) 2015 ^a	(in years) 2015 ^a	(in USD 2011, by PPP) 2015	2015	2014
49. Russia	0,804	70,3	15,0	12,0	23286	1	48
56. Kazakhstan	0,794	69,6	15,0	11,7	22093	-3	56
105. Uzbekistan	0,701	69,4	12,2	12,0	5748	21	108
111. Turkmenistan	0,691	65,7	10,8	9,9	14026	-32	111
120. Kyrgyzstan	0,664	70,8	13,0	10,8	3097	32	120
129. Tajikistan	0,627	69,6	11,3	10,4	2601	30	129
World in general	0,717	71,6	12,3	8,3	14447	-	-

¹ In the table 1 “Human development index and its components” the countries are ranged in accordance with values of HDI 2015 and values for three HDI components are detailed for each country: longevity, education (characterized by two indicators) and income. Furthermore the table presents differences between HDI and gross national income per capita ratings and also HDI 2014 ratings calculated by available in 2016 historical data with newest adjustments.

Notation keys: a-data belongs to 2015 or the last year with available information.

Definitions:

Human development index (HDI): a combined index measuring mean achievements in three basic explorations of human development: health and longevity, knowledge and decent living conditions. More details about the

process of calculating HDI values see technical note 1 on the Internet at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2016_technical_notes.pdf/

Average duration of education: an average number of education years obtained by people at the age of 25 and older, recalculated from educational characteristic of population taking into account official duration of each level of education.

Expected duration of education: the number of education years which as it's expected can get a child who reached formal age for school enrolment, if during his life prevailing trends in the area of age indicators of education coverage indicators will be saved.

Gross national income (GNI) per capita: total return of economy from production and ownership of factors of it, minus usage charge of economic resources, belonging to the rest of the world converted into international dollars using purchasing power parity rates (PPP) and divided into mid-year population.

GNI rating per capita minus HDI rating: a difference of GNI rating per capita and HDI rating. Negative exponent means that GNI rating is higher than HDI rating.

HDI rating 2014: value of HDI rating 2014 calculated with consistent data available at the moment of HDI 2015 calculation.

Table 2²

Tendencies regarding human development index 1990–2015

HDI Rank	Country	Human development index (HDI)				Changes in rating by HDI	HDI annual average growth	
		Value					%	
		1990	2000	2010	2015	2010-2015 ^a	1990-2000	1990-2015
49	Russian Federation	0,733	0,720	0,785	0,804	5	-0,18	0,37
56	Kazakhstan	0,690	0,685	0,766	0,794	7	-0,07	0,56
105	Uzbekistan	...	0,594	0,664	0,701	6
111	Turkmenistan	0,665	0,691	2
120	Kyrgyzstan	0,615	0,593	0,632	0,664	3	-0,37	0,30
129	Tajikistan	0,616	0,535	0,608	0,627	2	-1,39	0,08
	World in general	0,597	0,641	0,696	0,717	–	0,71	0,74

² In the table 2 “Tendencies regarding human development index 1990–2015” there are time-series of HDI values making it possible to compare HDI 2015 values with ones of previous years. The table presents the newest corrections of historical data available in 2016 and it's used the same methodology as for HDI 2015 rating calculation. The table includes changes in rating of the countries by HDI over the past five years and average annual growth rate of HDI for four time intervals: 1990–2000, 2000–2010, 2010–2015 and 1990–2015.

Remarks: a- positive value is indicative of rating enhancing.

Definitions:

HDI average annual growth: antialiased growth of HDI year-on-year in a given time calculated as annual growth compound coefficient.

Table 3 (1)

Sustainable development³

Environmental sustainability

Countries groups (tertiles)

Upper third***	Middle third**	Lower third*
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Use of the symbol * (*** ** *) for coding allows show graphically a fractional classification of countries by indicators. Countries by each index are divided in three approximately equal groups (tertiles): upper third (***), middle third (**) and lower third (*). See note to the table.

HDI Rank	Country	Renewable energy sources consumption	Carbon dioxide emissions		Forest area		Freshwater consumption	Natural resource depletion
		(% of final energy consumption) 2012 d	Per capita (tons) 2013	Average annual change (%) 1990/2013	(% total land area) 2015	General change (%) 1990–2015	(% of total volume of renewable water resource 2005–2014 c	(% GNI 2010–2014 c)
49	Russian Federation	3,2*	12,5*	...	49,8	0,8**	1,4***	9,5*
56	Kazakhstan	1,4*	15,4*	...	1,2	-3,3**	18,4*	13,7*
105	Uzbekistan	2,4*	3,4**	...	7,6	5,7 ***	100,6*	9,0*
111	Turkmenistan	...	12,8*	...	8,8	0,0	...	35,7*
120	Kyrgyzstan	22,5**	1,7**	...	3,3	-23,8*	32,6*	6,1**
129	Tajikistan	58,0***	0,4 ***	...	2,9	1,0**	51,1*	1,1**
	World in general	17,4	4,7	0,0	30,8	-3,2	6,9	2,2**

³ Remarks: Ecological indicators introduce a set of measures of level and fluctuating data of energy consumption from renewable sources, blowout volume of carbonic oxide, forest area and freshwater use. Indicators of economic sustainability show the degradation of natural resources, national savings rate,

external debt, and volume of state research and development expenditures and an extent of economic diversification. Three-colored coding gives the possibility to present a partial classification of the countries by indicators. The countries are divided in three approximately equal groups for each indicator (tertiles): upper third, middle third, lower third.

The drafters of the table don't intentionally offer threshold requirement or target value for these indicators. Secondary correlation of genders numbers is an exception: the countries are divided in 2 groups-natural, with range of values from 1,04 to 1,07(inclusive) and tendentious in gender respect (if a value exceeds the limits an the natural diapason). Details of the partial classification in this table see technical note 7 on the Internet at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2016_technical_notes.pdf/

a – this column isn't intentionally coloured as it was meant to provide a context for fluctuating data of forest area.

b – the data refer to 2012 or the last year of the period for which statistics are available.

c – data belong to the last year of the period for which there is a statistics.

d – the projections based on average option of dynamics of birth rate.

e –data refer to 2011.

Definitions:

Renewable energy sources consumption: a share of renewable energy sources in bulk of final energy input. Renewable energy sources include hydroelectric, geothermic, solar power, tidal energy resources, wind, biomass and biofuel.

Carbon dioxide emissions per capita: anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide result from fossil fuel combustion, flaring and cement production divided into mid-year population base. Include carbon dioxide emitted by forest biomass with depletion of forests.

Forest area: the land area stretching more than for 0,5 hectares with trees more than 5 m high and vegetation cover occupying more than 10% of this space or trees capable to reach these threshold values in vivo. This indicator doesn't include the lands being mainly in agricultural or city land use, the lots occupied with trees in agricultural production systems (for example, on fruit plantations or in agroforestry systems) and trees in city parks and gardens. This indicator involves territories, averted for reafforestation which didn't , but as it's expected , must reach 10% level of vegetational cover and 5meters height of trees also temporally deforested territories in the result of natural causes or human interference in which reafforestation will be realized as it's expected.

Fresh water consumption: complex selection of fresh water to total volume of renewable water resources.

Natural-resource depletion: depletion of energy, mineral and forest resources in monetary terms, as a percentage of overall gross national income (GNI).

Adjusted net savings are equal to net national savings plus expenses for education and minus exhaustion of energy, mineral substances, exhaustion of the woods and damage from emissions of carbon dioxide and firm particles. Net

national savings are equal to gross national savings minus value of consumption of fixed capital.

External debt: debt for non-residents repayable in foreign currency, goods and services, in percentage terms to gross national income (GNI).

Research and development expenditure: current and capital expenses (state and private) on creative work systematically implemented with a view to increase knowledge, including of knowing human sciences, culture and society and their use in new spheres. Research study and development whelm definitive study, applied research and experimental development.

Export concentration index: indicator of concentration level of a product in the export from the country. Index value close to 1 shows that export from the country focuses largely on narrow range of products. On the contrary indexes closer to 0 reflect more homogenous distribution of export volumes among several items indicating a high level of economic diversification.

Quintillion income coefficient (average annual change): change in attitude of median income of 20% of the richest to average income of the poorest 20% of population for the period 2000–2014 divided in correspondent number of years.

Gender inequality index (average annual change): gender inequality index change for the period 2005–2015 divided in correspondent number of years.

Population living in multidimensional poverty (average annual change): percentage change of population living in conditions of multidimensional poverty for the period 2005–2014 divided in correspondent number of years.

The average demographic burden of older people: projected ratio of population aged 65 and over to people aged 15–64 represented as dependency ratios per 100 people of working age (15–64 years).

Table 3 (2)

Sustainable development

Economic sustainability

HDI Rank	Country	Adjusted net savings	External debt	Research-and-development expenditure	Export concentration index
		(% CHI) 2005–2014 ^c	(% GNI) 2005–2014 ^c	(% GNI) 2005–2014 ^c	Value 2014
49	Russian Federation	11,9**	...	1,2***	0,370**
56	Kazakhstan	3,0*	83,3*	0,2*	0,668*
105	Uzbekistan	...	20,4***	0,2*	0,281**
111	Turkmenistan	...	1,0***	...	0,756*
120	Kyrgyzstan	-5,8*	101,1*	0,1*	0,175***
129	Tajikistan	14,3***	44,3**	0,1*	0,406*
	World in general	13,0	21,4	2,0*	–

Table 3 (3)

Sustainable development***Social sustainability***

<i>HDI Rank</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Quintillion income coefficient</i>	<i>Gender inequality index</i>	<i>Population living in poverty</i>	<i>Dependency ratios</i>
		<i>Average annual change (%) 2000/2014</i>	<i>Average annual change (%) 2005/2015</i>	<i>Average Annual change (%) 2005/2014</i>	<i>The aged (65 years old and older) per 100 people aged 15–64 2030 d</i>
49	Russian Federation	1,6*	-2,3***	...	29,5*
56	Kazakhstan	-2,5***	4,5***	-9,9***	15,6**
105	Uzbekistan	11,9**
111	Turkmenistan	11,0**
120	Kyrgyzstan	-1,3**	4,2***	-5,5**	12,1**
129	Tajikistan	-0,1**	-1,2**	-8,6***	9,1**
	World in general	–	–	–	–

As it can be seen in the table № 1 in the list of 188 countries Russia belongs to the group of countries with a very high level human development. But in this group consisting of 51 countries it occupies 49th not very honorable place. Since 2014 Russia shifted on it from 48th place that is connected with economic difficulties. Kazakhstan is on the 56th position in the group of states with high level of HDI. Uzbekistan is the last in this group occupying 105th place rising from 108th one in 2014. Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan form part of the group with average level consequently taking the 111th, 120th and 129th places. Compared with 2014 HDI rating didn't change in these three republics and Kazakhstan that reflects socio-economic stagnation.

Generally it's possible to state a big gap in the quality of life of Russian and Kazakh people on the one hand and the four

remaining republics in Central Asia from the other one. Their HDI is lower above the global average and Russia's and Kazakhstan's is higher. Similarly gross national income (GNI) per capita in differs significantly, in Russia and Kazakhstan it's noticeably higher above the global average, in Turkmenistan it's almost the same as the global one, in other three republics of Central Asia it's notably lower. At the same time negative exponents of Kazakhstan and particularly Turkmenistan by GNI rating per capita minus HDI rating show frequent situation when the quality of life falls behind and sometimes significantly from economy growth with resource orientation and focus on heavy industry. Turkmenistan furthermore demonstrates the worst rate for life expectancy, and all studied countries fall short below the global average. It also has the lowest indexes of expected duration of training and its mean time. Note that by the latter figure Russia and all Central Asian countries surpass the averaged global level. However the quality of education generates a question what and how do they teach?

The table № 2 reflecting the tendencies in the sphere of HDI since 1990 to 2015 clearly demonstrates a serious declining of quality of life in the studied countries after the collapse of the USSR and its long-term slight increase, being in arrears of worldwide average index. In this context it is apparent that human development is not always connected directly with gross national income, enhanced economic growth and type of government. For example Kyrgyzstan is the first country in Central Asia which put radically in place economic, political and legal reforms following the neoliberal form shows serious slowdown of human development potential in the first two decades of independence and its low growth. According to the values of HDI it hardly gets ahead of war-torn and slowly recovering Tajikistan with pseudo-democratic and obviously clannish regime. In both cases economic growth is insignificant, but political and economic freedoms differ greatly.

Sustainable development ecological indices of the table № 3 demonstrate prominent discrepancies in the studied countries on consumption of renewable sources of energy. High indexes of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan surpass average ones around the world, related to the extensive use of hydropower because of natural and geographical conditions. In all the remaining countries they are low and keep up considerably with the global indicators. Primarily it's connected to traditional consumption of own hydrocarbons and weak developing alternate energy sources policy. Consequently the indices of carbon dioxide emissions vary. Diverse situation is observed with forest conservation. The most favorable situation is in Uzbekistan due to state programme of their extension. The worst one is in Kyrgyzstan. In all republics of Central Asia it's noted a stringent situation with fresh water use. Furthermore Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and particularly Turkmenistan demonstrate disturbing rate of environmental depletion. Precarious situation in this sphere is seen also in Russia.

Upon indications of economic security the Russian Federation takes the lead among the reviewed countries. Let's turn attention to expenses of Russia and Central Asian countries with regard to scientific researches and developments. Although Russia remains short of the global reach even so they are satisfying while in the countries of Central Asia they are very low. In all countries except for Kyrgyzstan it is observed high dependence on the export especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At the same time Kyrgyzstan outruns other states in Central Asia on the external debt, it exceeds universal level in Kazakhstan, but it's extremely low in Turkmenistan.

Available data on social sustainability for all countries is in general satisfactory. Attention should be drawn to problem dependency ratios in Russia. It significantly surpasses indexes in Central Asian countries.

Since the preparation of the recent Human Development Report 2016 the situation in the countries under review hasn't fundamentally changed. In the meantime in the framework of the

Eurasian Economic Union it was continued the development of integration among Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, at the bilateral level with Uzbekistan. Tajikistan which earlier established strategic partnership with the RF prepares to get an observer status with the Eurasian Economic Union. Friendly business relations are maintained with Turkmenistan.

From now forward preserving congregative tendency Russia can become a driving force of technology breakthrough towards priority development approval in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union of a single scientific and technical, industrial and agricultural policy. Multispeed and split-level integration supposes division of labor among republics on sectors. Such a successful experience took place in the USSR. It should be used. However distribution of productive capacities claims scrutinous revision depending on environmental conditions, economic structure, correlation of rural and urban population, population process in diverse republics. We have to go take into account the quality of employee's work of different specialties and also traditional values of Russian and Central Asian nations. Advanced social and environmental technologies may successfully steer to matrix of developed for centuries social interactions, building them in life arrangement.

There is reason to believe that when developing integration processes in Central Asia in the coming decades it will be possible to overcome serious economic, environmental and cultural problems of the region, enhance remarkably the quality of people's life.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

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Keywords: the Middle East, the Middle East settlement, «the Arab spring», radical Islam, «Islamic state», Syria, Iraq, Libya , Egypt, Arabian monarchies, Yemen, Israel, National Palestinian Autonomous Territories, the Middle East national economies.

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The authors note that the Middle East has recently been high-conflict area. Former confrontation gained even greater edge in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State (IS) started a wide-scale expansion, in consequence of sanguinary battles part of territory of these states came under the control of Islamists.

In Libya influence of the IS was rising, separatism was increasing, battles between government forces and formations of Islamists were waged. Islamic groups in Egypt always tried to organize mass sedition. In Yemen Islamists suffered defeats – Houthis insurgents secured their control not only over the

Northern but the Western part of the country, reached the Red sea, captured the capital Sana. It caused international punitive expedition headed by Saudi Arabia. Internal contradictions became aggravated in the face of rivalry increasing between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey and Syria, Israel and the Palestinian territories. Years of the Arab spring demonstrated that Western countries still try to use geopolitical changes in this region for their purposes, including revision of postwar international legal system.

The U.S. Middle East policy crisis

The U.S. Middle East policy crisis is undoubted. The plan of democratic development of Libya after M. Kaddafi toppling made under the scenario of NATO faulted. The government not only controls the situation in the country, but also can't ensure its own security. On the territory of Libya there are armies which consist of paramilitary forces numbering many hundreds of thousands of combatants. Terrorists and tons of weapons are brought from Libya to the hot spots of North Africa and the Middle East. Richest oil fields which NATO states strived to monitor are controlled now by radical Islamists, tribal militias and smugglers who import million barrels of crude oil by illegal channels.

In 2012 the U.S. supported deposition of H. Mubarak and rise to power of «Moslem Brotherhood» in Egypt. However the short-term period staying in power of «Moslem Brotherhood» proved that the U.S. made another mistake making a bid for a party which didn't have government control experience and then it was neutralized by army headed by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Civil war in Iraq is in full swing. American invasion in 2003 disrupted the balance of political, confessional and ethnic powers in the country established for a long time. Intended by American politologists "democratic changes" and specifically assembled puppet government of Nouri al-Maliki broke down. The government of al-Abadi which changed the previous isn't without

bias capable of stabilizing the situation in the country and far less confronting adherents of medieval caliphate restoration.

B. Obama administration in August 2014 sanctioned bombardment by aircraft and missiles against combatants of the “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria. Regional allies of the U.S. in the Middle East and particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar finance and equip Islamists parties and factions, including the “Islamic State” aimed at strengthening the positions of conservative Islam in the Arab world and countereffort to “Shia Muslim expansion.”

Phenomenon of the “Islamic State”

The “Islamic State” was established in 2006 in Iraq in the result of embodiment of eleven radical Islamist groups separated from “al-Qaeda.” Spiritual leader and close companion of Osama bin Laden – Abu Musab al-Zarqawi took an active role in this organization founding. Until 2013 the “Islamic State” grouping was among Sunni autonomous militant groups and estimated not more than 4 thousand people. However in a short span of time the organization became the centre of attraction for jihadists migrating among countries of the Middle East. North, West and East Africa. Nowadays about 80 thousand people (50 thousand in Iraq and 30 thousand in Syria) fight under the black banner of the “Islamic State.” According to European media sources, about 3 thousand people from Europe, the U.S. and republics of the former USSR as well from Russia (generally from Chechnya) took sides with army of the new “caliphate.”

Judging from the fact that its literature of propaganda the “Islamic State” publish in 5 European languages there are a lot of recruited people outside the Middle East.

Using grievances of Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis against ruling authorities the “Islamic State” got a wide social support. On the territories controlled by the IS there were held populist actions: there were organized distribution hubs of free medicaments and food, sweetmeat and toys for children, families of died

combatants got allowances and other benefits etc. Now the “Islamic State” involves in the sphere of its influence tens of thousands of local Sunnis, also combatants from other Islamist organizations and adepts of jihadism from abroad.

The “Islamic State” became widely known in summer 2014, when fighters launched a large-scale assault on Northern and Western districts of Iraq. During a month radicals could take control over a few major cities including Mosul and Tikrit and come to grips with Baghdad. In Syria extremists of the IS occupied Northern province of Raqqa in the central town of which there is the same name headquarters of the organization. The IS spreads by hotbeds. Beyond Iraq and Syria the IS could consolidate in Libyan Eastern province Barka (Cyrenaica). On 5 October 2014 Shura Counsel of Islamic young people in Libya declared Barka the territory controlled by the “Islamic State.” By February 2015 “caliphate” adherents established order in Dern, Nofaliya, al-Mabruk and also besieged regions of oil recovery in Sirt.

Principles of drawing power of the “Islamic State” are next. First, policy of Al-Maliki puppet government was aimed at strengthening Shia dominance in Iraq, that moved the Sunni citizens forward armed resistance. In Syria conflict between power and opposition has nature of outright resistance of Shias (Alawites) and Sunnis. Caliphate considered being a sincere and ideal on its installation formed in VII–IX centuries is opposed to modern forms of government control which inevitably give rise to social injustice, lawlessness, corruption, oppression of the poor and abuse of power of the rich stratum. In millions Sunni’s consciousness caliphate is a unique Islamic institution which can eradicate all exertions of state nepotism, protect Muslim community from foreign political and economic dependence and religious and cultural impacts. Secondly, the “Islamic State” doesn’t need a financial support from abroad. Caliphate obtains billions of dollars due to banks and shops robberies, confiscated property of people of other faiths, hostage swapping for ransom, slave trading, control over drug trafficking and illegal channels of oil spread. The “Islamic State” is the richest

terrorist organization with the budget 2,3 billion of dollars and daily enriches its active assets in 1 million dollars at the expense of speculations in oil black market.

Self-proclaimed “caliphate” has all attributes of a state. It has wide controlled territory and own capital – Raqqa. Sunni people basically support new regime. The regime executes state strategy, including principles and methods for solving social, political, economic, national and religious and other problems and goals through a structured mechanism of state management. “Caliphate” of Al-Bagdadi has two deputies (sharifs). 12 governors (vali) of controlled “Islamic state” districts of Syria and Iraq and ministry are dependant on it. The particular role belongs to the deliberative board (Shura) consisted of warlords and Muslim theologists who consider every decision of governors and ministers concerning their correspondence to Sharia’s laws.

The “Islamic state” is a flexible structure capable of restoring. Its horizontal networks doesn’t coincide with schemes of modern armies network activities. This structure is more germinative there where national borders are transparent in Northwest Africa, Somali, Ethiopia. Actual absence of borders helps to shift, high level of ethnic conflicts also favours it.

Researches suggest that to localize the IS there are indispensable systematic efforts aimed at recreation of central authority in Iraq and also decisive moves for resolving conflicts in Syria. Fight against the IS should be waged by combination of political, military, economic and social measures. Moreover it should be coordinated at the international level. Among non-military methods of fight against the IS there should be controlled illegal oil supplies through Kurdistan and Turkey and isolated jihadists from international financial system by blocking work of banks arranged on the territories occupied by terrorists in Iraq and Syria.

The Palestinian-Israeli deadlock

In Palestinian-Israeli area until 2013 Obama administration didn't announce initiatives which would have been admissible for both parties interested in Middle East settlement. When B. Obama came to power first of all he intended to confront Iranian nuclear programme. In August 2009 the U.S. State Department offered their main partners in NATO to consider the possibility to realize "transactions" which imply toughening Western sanctions capable of shattering Iranian economy in exchange for building freeze in Jewish settlements. This suggestion caused negative reaction both in Israel and National Palestinian Autonomous Territories (NPAT). Benjamin Netanyahu let see that his government would not impede building in big enclaves Ariel, Modiin, Gush Etzion, Ma'ale Adumim (about 10% of all the territory of the West Bank) and also Jewries of East Jerusalem. Furthermore recognition of the legitimacy of some enclaves on the West Bank meant de-facto waiver of previously supported resolutions of the United Nations Security Council requiring of Israel withdrawal from occupied territories in the war of 1967, the territories where there should be created Palestinian state. It's clear that such an "initiative" wouldn't be approved by the United Nations Security Council member states. Russia, China, Britain and France oppose policy of development of Israeli settlement sector on the West Bank including East Jerusalem. The U.S. demand that Israel freeze its settlement activity however it shouldn't be a condition for resumption of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.

After victory in the second presidential elections B. Obama administration reviewed negotiation process negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians and the role of the U.S. in this process. The team of advisors of the American president on the Middle East was considerably widened and enhanced. The majority of crew members took part in preparation and holding of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations which were held under the

aegis of B. Clinton in 2000–2001 in Washington, Camp David and Taba. 12 years later in conditions of serious progress absence on Palestinian-Israeli track the U.S. again tried to galvanize the plan of territory exchange. Arab peace initiative 2002 proposed recognition of Israel by Arab states in the case if it withdraws its troops from the occupied Arab territories and would agree to creation of Palestinian state. B. Obama administration hoped to achieve the diplomatic breakthrough in the beginning of 2014. It was supposed that in January 2014 J. Kerri would submit a plan to resolve problems of the Middle East settlement on the basis of 1967 borders and territory exchange. In the plan there would be included schedule of its implementation. In would also raise problems of regional world, Arab peace initiative and would contain a programme of Palestinian economy development.

However the new government of B. Netanyahu formed by the results of special elections in 2013 adopted 84 drafts of additional construction in settlements stressing that it was neither going to freeze nor to stop settlement activity on the Palestinian territories. Negotiations between two states for solving Israeli-Palestinian conflict lost any significance whereas Israeli politicians and lawmakers have in fact embarked on an accession procedure of the Jordan Valley to Israeli borders. The Jordan Valley and Northwest coast of the Dead Sea occupy a special place in military strategic estimations. On modern Israeli maps this territory is included in borders of State of Israel. The territory bordering on Jordan frontier is a «closed zone». Creation of entire field by natural river bed permits Israel to control allocating of Jordan water resources and regulate the movement process of Palestinians and goods to Jordan and back on the territory of the West Bank. Military control over the West Bank territory provides cutting off the access to the Jordan Valley. Separation of the Jordan Valley from the West Bank rules out the possibility to create a proper Palestinian state.

A logic outcome of American initiatives failure based on the idea of territory exchange became more serious changes in

the region of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Triple negotiations through the intermediary of the U.S. (2013–2014) were primarily doomed to failure. While “Likud” block is in office Israel won’t take concrete steps for positive solving of the conflict with Palestinians under no circumstances. Government formed on 14 May 2015 with the support of religious and nationalist parties headed by B. Netanyahu can’t objectively fulfill serious changes in internal or external policy of Israel. Still it will be intensified anti-Iranian atmosphere, will be continued policy of total blockade of the Gaza Strip and spreading of settlement activity on the Palestinian territories on the West Bank. Negotiation process with Palestinians will remain in deadlock and hence solution of main definitive status problems will be frozen for an undefined period.

Perspectives of Arabian monarchies modernization

Relative calm is observed in Arabian monarchies. They are still out of Arab “thaw” zone (excluding Bahrain). Authorities of these countries are able to maintain political and social stability based on combination of three factors. First, hydrocarbons export revenues give a possibility to eliminate real and potential hotbeds of social protest. Secondly, the regimes support alliance with conservative religious groups and leaders of tribal clans. Thirdly, national security is guaranteed by Western powers chiefly the U.S.

At the back of societies there are complicated social-economic processes. In spite of partial modernization of political systems in the counties of GCC during the existence of this organization the process is slow and has a “multispeed” character. There is a burning issue of transition of supreme power which is concentrated in hands of 80–90 years old founders’ of the state children, in Qatar and Oman the supreme power required the search of supreme ruler successors. Shrinking and inconsistent modernization doesn’t transform political elite itself which continues to play its traditional patriarchal role of

“benefactor” as for the lieges. Accelerate transformation of the Arab world affected this peninsula of seeming tranquility. Leaders of GCC states are forced to advance reforms to prevent the proliferation of the “Arab spring” on their territories. However changes go with inertia not as rapidly as in other Arab countries.

In some states of the Arab peninsula measures are being taken for strengthening constitutional dual monarchies (Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE with especially specific form of government control in Emirates). Problem of succession is put on the back burner because of more «democratic» procedure of supreme leader change. Conflict among clans is added by growing claims of emerging civil society to restrict coercive powers of monarchs. In the longer term it can lead to transformation of constitutional dual monarchies into parliament monarchies.

In other counties of GCC the problem of succession is urgent, because absolute and absolute theocratic monarchies experience generation change. If in Qatar this change has already happened then in Saudi Arabia and Oman important ones are being prepared. With regard to future developments in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar there are no grounds to expect that monarchical regime will be changed after succession of generations and there will originate conditions for establishment of constitutional monarchy. There will be needed many years to overcome absolutism inertia.

Death of the King Abdullah on January 23, 2015 lead to change in the balance of power in the Saudi leadership but not in the system of succession. After acceding to the throne King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (on January 23, 2015) reshuffled top government echelons of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In defiance of contemplations of some experts the seat of heritor occupied not the eldest son of demised monarch prince Mut’ib but prince Muhammad bin Nayef. Many people call him the most influential man after the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Muhammad bin Nayef is considered to be a reformist and relative

liberal. It is possible that he will be the first Saudi monarch with Western education. As a result of tipping the balance of forces destabilization of power may happen in the ruling elite. Advances in internal and external policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia many people associate with accession to power the successor – M. bin Nayef. Personal changes can result in positive shifts in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia policy relating to Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Shape and perspectives of Yemen conflict

In the South of the Arab peninsula in Yemen high expectations were aligned with convocation if March 2013 of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) with participation of leading political parties and movements. The NDC formally stopped its work in January 2014. Its results had interstitial nature as resolution of the main item – about state – administrative arrangement-was put aside and entrusted to Khadi interacting with most influential political parties representatives. Moreover such important primarily proclaimed goals of the conference as publication of a new constitutional draft, announce of constitutional referendum and election dates weren't achieved.

Convocation and arrangement of the NDC didn't mean ceasing war conflicts on the country's territory. Efforts of national reconciliation were made with large-scale offensive of Houthis in the North and continuation of military coups and terror attempts in the South. Offensive tactics of Houthis brought them military rewards. In the result the central leadership of the state lost control over the North. Houthis form authorities here provide people with security. In spite of their promises to surrender heavy weapons and take part in national reconciliation they probably seek to re-establish in one form or another theocratic subnational entity in this part of Yemen.

Having seized the military initiative and virtually invading the capital Shias made demands to public policymakers: adherence to main decisions of the NDC, including property

redistribution in concordance with decisions of the conference (in their favour) resignation of the government and implementation of Houthis in executive authorities, lowering of fuel prices to pre-crisis levels. But their main goal was elimination from the political and economic arena of "Islah" party and supporting its internal forces. In the result in September 2014 Shias and country's leadership signed an armistice agreement. In accordance with it the government submitted resignation. Houthis in turn affianced to withdraw their troops from the capital and surrender captured weapons. Traditionally this agreement wasn't fulfilled. Units of Houthis left in Sana'a continuing to control vehicular entrance to the city and strategic assets, to seize houses of people for reinforcement of their military positions. They tried to establish control over oil extraction area Ma'arib about 120 kilometers east of the state capital and advanced towards sea port in the Red Sea – Hodeida city.

In spite of a clear imbalance of power in favour of Shias' armed forces and weakening of the central authority the trends of further development of the situation on the North of the state weren't defined. It is noteworthy the mixed character of conflicting interests and aims of internal and external forces which are specifically or by implication involved in Yemeni conflict. Shia community crippled Islamists and significantly widened its controlled territory including the capital. Adherents of compromise over decisions of the NDC M. Kata'ibi and A. Ansari headed the party "Islah." From the outside players supporting Houthis Iran got benefit from it. The former Yemeni president Saleh by the hands of Shias could settle accounts with those who supported "Yemeni revolution" and ousted them from power, strengthen positions of its clan representatives and thus obtain new possibilities of influence on the state's fortune. The president Hadi using others weakened his main political and economic rivals – Islamists from "Islah" party. Compromise with the South became closer to reality. However Hadi and his suite are afraid of further advance of Houthis taking into account their aspiration to restore power lost in 1967.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the most incorporated outside player is interested in containing Houthis, restrain their political role by weakening Yemeni analogue of Moslem Brotherhood. The position of this state is quite defined: "Houthis did the deed and can leave." Positions of Saudi authorities and Yemeni president (on the need to restrict influence of Iran in Yemen and introduce Shias activity in the north of the country into a certain framework) broadly coincide as evidenced by Saudi-Yemeni negotiations at the summit level in September 2014. Considering maintaining of conflict interests of various political, religious and ethnic groups in Yemen, Saudis defend a plan of reaching compromise among state leadership, Houthis, Sunni's tribal head, the former president Salih, Southern "Harakat" reaching agreement about an alliance in new development process of political situation. It can become a continuation of national dialogue but in conditions of new power balance. Such a scenario involving limiting control of Houthis over Zaydis provinces and preventing the creation of an Iranian bulwark in Yemen is good enough for the U.S.

According to experts the events in Yemen stay within a notion which calls "big Sunni-Shia war" where one party is backed by Iran and the second one by Saudi Arabia. The U.S. is in a difficult situation as somewhere they gently support Sunni and their traditional ally Saudi Arabia, and somewhere as in Iraq they are obliged to support Shias in their struggle against the IS and at root enter into factual alliance with Iran. The only power apart from southerners who get benefit from the civil war is advocates of "Al-Qaida" who seized control of the territory from Hadramaut and Abyan to Ma'rib after erosion of security agencies of A.M. Hadi. This organization can gain preference in case of Houthis crushing defeat becoming factual manager of Yemen which risks converting into "failed state" and just another "black hole" of anarchy in the Middle East.

One of the main factors motivating Saudi Arabia and its "Gulf" allies for affirmative actions in Yemen are problem of oil

transit through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, prospect of its overlapping by Yemeni Shias in case of total assumption of power by Houthis can hurt complex oil strategy of Riyadh which includes not only countermeasure to the plans of Iran to enter the oil market but fight against shale oil producers in the U.S. and create difficulties for traditional oil exporters on the world market. Among scenarios of possible conflict escalation there is potential speed march of Houthis to petroleous Eastern province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the majority of the population of which are Shias, with the object of "Shia revolution" stirring.

Saudi-Iranian struggle for influence on Southern Yemen can well end with merger into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The majority of Yemeni southerners confess Sunnism. They are reconciled with the Kingdom by the fact that many people of South sent their families there. The power of Saudi Arabia economic attraction for that matter can hardly be overestimated. For of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia possible access to the Arabian Sea is strategically important, bypassing Iranian threat in Strait of Ormuz (the bulk of Saudi trade flows pass by maritime routes). As a first step for integration into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of strategically important Yemeni province Hadramawt experts consider decision of Saudi authorities to contribute the Yemenis living in Hadramawt visa-free entry into of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Among the possible consequences of the civil war in Yemen there may become creation of united Arab armed forces as it was announced at the summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) which took place in Egyptian city Sharm el-Sheikh in late March 2015. The goal of these armed forces is "quick military intervention" in zones of regional military conflicts, response to emerging threats to security. A condition for intervention is recourse to the LAS of official authorities of various conflict-ridden Arab countries. In the summit communiqué it is envisaged voluntary participation in joint military establishments of the LAS member-states. Consequently, military operation

“Decisive Storm” pulled off by Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen, where most of the country is controlled by Houthis will culminate in establishment of one more pan-Arab structure, this time of military purpose.

Judging from the perspective of using the LAS armed forces, it was to be hoped that these units will help to coordinate actual and potential international and intrastate conflicts in the region. They could be estimated as future counterweight to NATO in this part of the world, as an instrument for crisis situations resolution not by outside players but with the help of Arab states. At the same time it cannot be overlooked the presence of serious constraints for fulfilling peace-keeping potential of this military contingent. Through the history of the LAS there always were contradictions among member-states in reaching Arab unity.

Problem of economic lag overcoming

Among the problems requiring quick resolving in the Middle East are economic reforms. It's noteworthy the structural economic lag on the regional countries. In recent decades economic growth and imbalance of industrial structure has left the most urgent problems in the strategy of market reforms in most countries of the region. Endurance and incompleteness of the process of regional economy structural adaptation for world economic situation come from the high level of etatism of Middle Eastern countries economic mechanism that typologically conciliates them as geographic location determines affinity of natural climatic conditions for these states. Problems which encounter the Middle East today are insufficient high profile of participation in international division of labour; weakening of industry comparative advantages on the world markets in consequence of imbalance of technological solutions spreading in the world; inflexibility of economic mechanism, and excessive nationalization of which doesn't allow to respond quickly on

frequent changes in external demand; growth of external debt. In virtue of population boom economy cannot absorb millions of workers that provide sustenance for international terrorism.

Only countries specializing in hydrocarbon extraction could avoid marked aggravation on domestic economy situation and minimize economic component of opposition sentiments. Political and economic trends in the region are due to the fact that MENA region stay world reservoir of energy feedstock for access to which there is an intense competition among main centers of economic power in the name of the West and the East. In such a case countries with capital excess stay running, just as main part of the Arab world achieved a stalemate in its socio-economic development. Separation from advanced countries is compounded by consequences of the Arab spring.

At the same time geopolitical changes in future can stimulate creation of regional poles relatively growth balance: Saudi-Egyptian alliance, Kurdistan, Iran, representatives of advanced world – Israel and Turkey.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

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The exacerbated contradictions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years and their foreign policy strongly influence

the situation in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Bahrain, Egypt, and other countries in the region. The cause of these contradictions is the claim of each of them to leadership in the Muslim world.

The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The events of 1979 are a factor exerting a profound influence on Saudi-Iranian relations up to the present time. The United States, having lost its positions in Iran has turned to a containment strategy toward that country. Saudi Arabia, being one of the key American allies in the Middle East and one of the leaders of the Muslim world has been playing a major role in this strategy. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a threat to the national security of Saudi Arabia. The Iranian spiritual leaders headed by ayatollah Khomeini have always criticized the Saudi regime and called on all Muslims to stage revolutions in their countries, including Saudi Arabia. In order to stem the revolutionary threat from Iran Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf monarchies supported Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iranian-Iraqi war of 1980–1988. After the war and the death of ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have somewhat improved. Iran was striving to overcome international isolation and lower the level of confrontation in its relations with Arab countries. In 1990 Iran denounced Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait, which resulted in a certain progress of contacts between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1991.

In 1997 a summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation took place in Iran. In 1998 and 1999 Iran's President Mohammad Khatami visited Saudi Arabia and among the major problems discussed there were security in the Persian Gulf zone, concerted actions on the oil market, the situation in Iraq, and elaboration of a common approach to regional problems. In 1998 Saudi Arabia and Iran signed an agreement on cooperation in trade, economy, culture, science and technology. In 2001 a Saudi-Iranian agreement was signed in the security sphere. Thus, during the presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997) and

Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) relations between the two countries improved, although they were far from friendly. They rather reflected the desire of the two regional powers to avoid sharp contradictions.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime have changed the balance of forces in the region. The occupation of Iraq brought risks to Iran, inasmuch as a powerful armed grouping of the United States has come close to its land borders. On the other hand, new opportunities have now opened for Iran, inasmuch as under Saddam Hussein Iraq came out as a strong regional rival of Iran. Sixty percent of the Iraqi population are Shi'ite Muslims, just as most Iranians. This is one of the factors contributing to interaction of the two countries. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein Iran was able to bolster up its regional influence. Saudi Arabia was greatly worried by the U.S. military operations in Iraq. The Saudi authorities refused to give its territory for dealing blows at Iraq. This was due to a change of the U.S. policy in the Middle East into a direct military interference and a possible growth of Iran's influence. Iraq in the conditions of the U.S. occupation has become a place of a proxy-war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Prior to the coming to power of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran (2005–2013) relations between these countries began to deteriorate. Under Ahmadinejad the confrontation has increased in various places of the Middle East. In Lebanon countries supported the rival forces. Ahmadinejad criticized Saudi inactive position on the Palestine-Israeli conflict. In Yemen in 2009 Saudi Arabia took part in the conflict with the Kushites in order to prevent the strengthening of this group receiving Iranian assistance. For its part, Iran accused Saudi Arabia of financing the Baluchis living along the Iranian-Pakistani border. The "Arab spring" events of 2011 led to clashes of the interests of the two countries in new regions – Egypt, Syria and Bahrain.

Under President Hassan Rouhani (since 2013) the confrontational trend of Iran's foreign policy became weaker as

compared with the time when the conservative leadership was in power in the country. At the press conference after the election victory he declared that an improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia would be a key priority for him. The change of the leadership of Saudi Arabia after the death of King Abdallah bin Abdel Aziz has given hope for a possible détente in Saudi-Iranian relations. However, these hopes were not destined to materialize. Moreover, soon after the enthronement of King Salman bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud and the change of the order of appointment of the heir apparent as a result of which Muhammed bin Nayef and Muhammad bin Salman became heirs to the throne, Saudi Arabia began a military campaign in Yemen. The main reason was to prevent the increasing Iranian influence in the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, a whole number of factors, among which the U.S. position on the Iranian nuclear program, the change of American Middle East policy, the new leadership of Saudi Arabia, and others, have resulted in a considerable worsening of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years.

The author of the article states that Saudi Arabia has noticeably changed its foreign policy. Traditionally, it was conservative in the latter part of the 20th century. The Saudites did not claim leadership openly, preferring to solve problems with the "soft power" methods and considerable financial means. This was revealed in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in interaction with Iraq for containing Iran, and in relations with the United States. By now the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia has become more active. In recent years the kingdom has been drawn in conflicts outside its borders – in Yemen, Syria and Iraq.; in 2011 on an invitation of Bahrain's leadership army detachments of Saudi Arabia were involved in suppressing antigovernment, mainly Shi'ite, demonstrations in that country. One of the main reasons for the change of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is the strengthening of the geopolitical role of Iran and also the change of power in Er Riyadh in 2015. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime has given Iran greater opportunities for a

geopolitical onslaught in the Middle East. Iran is now strengthening its influence on Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Bahrain, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. From the Saudi point of view, the regional role of Iran is growing to the detriment of Saudi Arabia.

Coming across the gradual lowering of its geopolitical role in the region Saudi Arabia has chosen the strategy of containment of the growing Iranian influence. In strategic documents elaborated by Saudi Arabia Iran is interpreted as the key threat to its national security. At the beginning of 2016 the Center of Study of Gulf Problems in Jeddah submitted a report on security problems. Its authors assert that the Arab states of the region should build up a joint system of strategic containment aimed against Iran's interference in the affairs of the Arab countries. Apart from that, Saudi Arabia feels its inadequacy to protect its own security independently. In this connection it is forced to seek interaction with strong countries, primarily the United States.

Iran is interested in a gradual withdrawal from isolation and in greater involvement in the Middle Eastern affairs. In this connection its confrontation with Saudi Arabia is to its disadvantage. People in Er Riyadh realize that using peaceable rhetoric Iran is expanding its influence in the region. Due to this the attitude of Saudi Arabia toward Iran is harsher and oriented to containment and isolation of Tehran. The latter is not interested in direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia. This can be explained by several reasons. Iran has just begun to emerge from international isolation. A considerable part of the Iranian elite was bent on tackling the tasks of economic development and drawing foreign investments and technologies, whereas a major armed conflict could throw the country several years backwards and worsen its image. During the past several years Iran has increased its influence in a number of countries of the region, and a direct armed confrontation with its neighbors will probably cause a strong reaction on the part of strong foreign countries, which could weaken Iran. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia

will avoid a direct military conflict. However, proxy-wars will continue, bleeding white not only these two countries, but mostly neighboring states (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen), and preventing the establishment of peace and stability in the region.

In 2016 contacts have strengthened between Saudi Arabia and ethnic and religious groups which can influence Iran from within. On July 9 a conference of the Iranian opposition group "Mujahadin-e-Khalq" took place in Paris. This organization was banned in Iran. The author states that the crisis in Saudi-Iranian relations is entering a new phase when Er Riyadh begins to meddle in Iran's internal affairs for reaching its aims and support a grouping which is described by the Iranian leadership as "terrorist." Saudi Arabia acts together with the Kurdish groupings opposing the Iranian authorities. In June 2016 armed clashes took place between the militants from the Democratic party of Kurdistan and the government troops of Iran, which signified a violation of the truce signed in 1996. In general, there is no revolutionary situation in Iran, Saudi Arabia's stake on the Iranian émigré opposition and its allies cannot destroy the present political system in Iran. There are problems with ethnic minorities in the country, but they are not critical for national security.

At the same time the bolstering up of opposition groupings in Iran by Saudi Arabia may bring about a new round of the Iranian-Saudi confrontation. An example is the strained situation in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain. So far the Shi'ite majority in Bahrain and Shi'ite community of Saudi Arabia are loyal to their royal regimes and only demand equal rights, which shows that there is no revolutionary situation. However, in an event of an exacerbation of the situation in bilateral relations or in case of the emergence of economic problems in Saudi Arabia, Iranians may create cells of Shi'ite underground cells, destabilizing the situation in the Persian Gulf States.

In recent years Iranian-Saudi rivalry in the Middle East has assumed more acute forms. After the beginning of the "Arab spring" the confrontation arena between the two countries has

included Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. In these regions the war between Iran and Saudi Arabia is waged by the forces of their allies. The major theaters of hostilities for Er Riyadh are Yemen and Syria. The former has a long common border with Saudi Arabia, and the situation in Yemen is of crucial importance for the national security of Saudi Arabia.

The Arab revolutions of 2010–2011 threatened the interaction of Saudi Arabia and Iran with a number of countries in the region. However, both Er Riyadh and Tehran made attempts to change the results of the “Arab spring” for their benefit: the former supported the As-Sisi regime in Egypt, prevented a revolution in Bahrain, prompted resignation of A. Salekh from the post of the President of Yemen, and carries on anti-Assad policy in Syria. Iran, too, has strengthened its positions in Syria and Yemen. On the whole, the “Arab spring” has resulted in growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East. There is hardly any possibility that Saudi Arabia will succeed to set up an effective system of containing Iran with the help of Arabian monarchies, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey and Egypt. Pakistan and Turkey develop interaction with Iran on a broad range of problems. Besides, the Persian Gulf monarchies have historically built their relations with Iran directly.

Saudi Arabia, even jointly with other countries, will hardly be able to effectively contain Iran, hence Er Riyadh’s policy toward Tehran will not lead to desired results, and Iranian influence in the Middle Eastern region will continue to grow, the researcher believes.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.01.013. BORIS DOLGOV. SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TUNISIA AND STRATEGY OF "AL-NAHDA" MOVEMENT // *"Aziya i Afrika segodnya"*, Moscow, 2017, № 3, P. 9–16.

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The movements of "political Islam" in the Arab Muslim world have become much stronger after the "Arab Spring," which began with the social protest in Tunisia, having resulted in the collapse of the regime of Zin al-Abidin Ben Ali in February 2011. The first free parliamentary elections in Tunisia in October 2011 brought victory to the "al-Nahda" movement headed by Rashid Gannushi (40.1 percent of voters). It gained 90 seats in parliament (out of 217).

Support of that Islamist movement could be explained, first, by the fact that many Tunisians regarded it as a force resolutely fighting the corrupt dictatorial regime, but not because they shared its ideology of political Islam. Secondly, support of the "al-Nahda" was due to its proclaiming the development road based on traditional Islamic values shared by a greater part of the country's population. At the same time, the heads of this movement proclaimed themselves national leaders expressing the interests of all citizens of the country, irrespective of their religion or nationality. This declaration attracted many people, including those who did not share the concepts of political Islam, but were against the previous regime.

Second place in parliament was won by the party "Congress for Republic" (13.82 percent of voters), its chairman was Moiseff Marzuki positioning himself as a supporter of socio-democratic concepts.

Third place was won by the party "Democratic Forum for Labor and Freedoms," which also proclaimed secular and democratic principles. (9.68 percent of voters). These three parties created a coalition of the Three headed by the "al-Nahda." The coalition formed the bodies of legislative and executive power. Hamadi Jebali of the "al-Nahda" became the Prime Minister; Moiseff Marzuki was given presidential powers (mostly representative ones); Mustapha ben Jafar, Chairman of the "Democratic Forum" party, became the speaker of parliament.

After the collapse of the authoritarian regime in Tunisia a real opportunity has emerged to build a more just and democratic state, which could express the interests of most citizens and would be based on the common historical traditions and Islamic religion and would be tolerant toward other confessions and political views, which has been stated by the leaders of political Islam in their election program. Its implementation largely depended on finding consensus with the Islamist forces that had come to power and other political movements also fighting the dictatorial regime.

However, the Islamist leaders succumbed to the trends of monopolizing power and implementing their special aims to build their Sunnite "Islamic project." The political strategy of the Islamists used two languages: one for their supporters, and the other for those who did not share Islamist ideology. The first turned to democracy as a democratic cover, and the second - to violence as a means for the realization of their program. In actual fact, the "al-Nahda" movement has become the ruling party in the Three and placed its men to the key posts at all levels of the state administration at central, provincial and municipal bodies of power, the Foreign Ministry, Ministry for the Interior, Intelligence bodies, the mass media, including the TV, the official newspaper "Journal officiel," as well as at the key structures of the economy and business, such as, for example, the Tunisian Electric and Gas Company. Such position and actions of the Islamists have caused discontent among the political forces which

took an active part in overthrowing the dictatorial regime. Now they felt squeezed out of real power and the adoption of decisions on the further development of their country.

Along with the exacerbation of socio-economic problems and the situation in public security, the policy of the Islamist leaders to increase the role of Islam in socio-political life has caused anxiety and protest among part of the population which wished to preserve secular values. President Marzuki, despite his socio-democratic views, advocated an alliance with the Islamists, above all the "al-Nahda" movement. Meanwhile, a considerable part of the liberal-democratic and left-wing political forces were sternly opposed to the country's Islamization. Such situation, aggravated as it was by manifestations of terrorism, which were not typical of Tunisia (the murder of Shukri Belaid and Muhammed Brahimi – leaders of Tunisian left-wing democratic movements, in 2013), provoked instability and socio-political tension. Many Tunisians accused the "al-Nahda" movement and its paramilitary units, and also the radical Islamist grouping "Ansar ash-Sharia" of organizing these acts of terror and murders. An alliance of the secular and left-wing democratic forces has been formed to make a rebuff to the radical Islamists. It was represented by the party "The Call of Tunisia" headed by Beji Caid al-Essebsi. In the early 2013 the political bloc "Union for Tunisia" was formed, which united "The Call of Tunisia," "Republican party, "Democratic and Social Path" and "Socialist party." Their leaders accused the "al-Nahda" movement of the desire to establish its domination in the country.

In January 2014 the National Constituent Council (parliament) of Tunisia adopted a new Constitution defined by experts as the most democratic one in the Arab world. The Constitution proclaimed the country a "civil state," it guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly and demonstrations of a peaceful character, the freedom of forming political parties, trade unions and organizations, which are bound to carry on their activity in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the country.

At the same time, Islam was proclaimed as state religion and Arabic as the national language. It was reaffirmed that the state patronizes religion, guarantees freedom of conscience and neutrality of mosques and religious cults with regard to the activity of political parties. The author states that the political forces in the country adhering to secular positions succeeded to protect and preserve the civil character of Tunisian society, which was achieved during the rule of the first President of the country Habib Bourguiba (1957–1987), promote democratic transformations and prevent the Islamisation of public and political life of Tunisia – something which was striving for by the “al-Nahda” movement.

As a result of the parliamentary elections in October 2014 the most seats (186) were won by the secular party “The Call of Tunisia” headed by Beji Caid as-Essebsi. Second place (66 seats) was taken by the “al-Nahda” movement headed by Rashid Gannushi. The bloc of the left-wing democratic forces “People’s Front,” which was strongly influenced by the Communist party of Tunisian workers headed by its founder Hamma Hammami, received 15 seats. Beji Caid as-Essebsi was elected President of Tunisia (56 percent of voters) in the elections in November – December 2014. Having elected the leader of the democratically-oriented party “The Call of Tunisia” a considerable part of the country’s population reaffirmed their choice of a secular path of development.

However, the growing socio-economic problems, misbalance of state structures, including law-enforcement agencies as a result of the revolutionary change of the ruling regime and a difficult transition period, along with an increase of radical Islamism have resulted in a new exacerbation of the domestic situation. In the summer of 2015 two major terrorist acts were committed in Tunisia: one in the capital Tunis and the other at the resort town of Sus. Among those killed were many tourists from Britain, France, Belgium and Germany. These monstrous acts were committed by Tunisian citizens connected with the radical Islamist groupings. The government agencies took serious

measures to suppress radical Islamists, dozens of people suspected of terrorist activity were arrested, many mosques whose imams preached radical Islamist views were closed, and the activity of the so-called National leagues in defense of revolution controlled by the Salaphite groups was banned. Security measures in the tourist zones were tightened with the help of the army.

In July 2015 the Tunisian parliament adopted the Law against terrorism. Along with this, border control was strengthened on the frontier with Libya and Algeria. It was due to the fact that after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime the radical Islamist groupings in Libya have markedly increased their expansionist activities in neighboring countries.

Tunisia restored diplomatic relations with Syria, which contributed to coordination of law-enforcement activities of Tunisian and Syrian special agencies, preventing the penetration of participants in radical Islamist groupings of Syria into Tunisia. These measures helped stabilize the situation in Tunisia.

In answer to criticism and accusations of the striving to usurp power and Islamisation of socio-political life in the country the "al-Nahda" leaders have announced a major reforming of their movement and "democratic evolution of the concepts of political Islam." Wide debates were going on at the 10th congress of the "al-Nahda" on May 20–22, 2016, at which the questions of socio-economic policy and the strategy and inner structure of the party were discussed. The question was put forward of the possible division of the political and religious components of the party. Religious sections should be withdrawn from the party structure and remain connected with it only ideologically. This fact speaks of a possible evolution of the "al-Nahda" movement and its transformation from an Islamist party into a political one based on democratic principles, along with its support of the new democratic Constitution and entry in the coalition government headed by the leader of the "Call of Tunisia" B.C. as-Essebsi, as well as its statements on the need for "national accord." This was

an important development in the political practice of the “al-Nahda” movement.

The problem of a possible evolution of Islamist movements, in particular, the “al-Nahda” movement, seems quite important, inasmuch as the trend of a possible evolution may determine the further development of political processes in the Arab Muslim world, and also in global policy as a whole. Theoretically, the hypothetical possibility of an evolution of the Islamist movement can be admitted. However, practically, the radical evolution of the “al-Nahda” movement, presupposing its principal changes, is hardly possible. One could presume or talk of only theoretical concessions or compromises, which shows only a certain softening of the rhetoric of the “al-Nahda” after it has lost its position of the ruling party after the “Call of Tunisia” party came to power, Boris Dolgov concludes.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.01.014. EKATERINA ELKINA. HYDRO-POLICY IN THE NILE BASIN // *“Asia i Africa segodnya,”* Moscow, 2015, № 8, P. 30–33.

Keywords: Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Africa, “Renaissance Dam” on the Nile.

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The author draws attention to disputes around Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam building on the Blue Nile. Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Ethiopian prime-minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir took part in the summit on March 23, 2015 in Khartoum. The point at issue was about the Nile’s waters and disputes solutions connected with the Dam building. Three leaders

adopted “Declaration of principles” devoted to their cooperation resulting from Grand Dam building. There are no any particularities in the declaration. It is said about striving to solve problems on the basis of “mutual understanding, common interest, good intentions, benefit for all and international law principles” and also about the necessity of cooperation in terms of “water concerns” in the countries upstream and downstream of the Nile.

Parties admitted that the dam is being built to generate electricity and contribute to economic development and transnational collaboration. They decided that they will fulfill recommendations of the international technical experts commission at different stages of damming. It was accepted a principle of not causing damage for any party.

Grand Dam is about 15 km from Sudan’s frontier. Contracted capacity of the hydroelectric power station is 6 ths. megawatt. It will become the largest one in Africa and the 11th in the world like hydroelectric station of Krasnoyarsk. Water storage reservoir 1561 sq. km. will contain about 79 billion cub. m of water.

Ethiopia is a poor country. 40% of its 87.9 million population (outlook for 2014) live below the poverty line. There is almost no industry. Economy largely depends on oil import. In spite of developed reserves oil on the territory of the country isn’t still produced, it is necessary to buy oil-products and oil itself. In regards to the Ethiopians oil for the Gulf states is a dower as the Nile’s waters for themselves. The Ethiopians ask a question-why do the pay for oil, but get nothing for water?

In the world practice there are cases when countries lying downstream the river pay for water with that they are upstream. That is why the Ethiopians consider damming on the Nile economically viable basically “gate to the future.” Damming project realization should turn poor agricultural Ethiopia into prosperous industrial country at the expenses of using cheap electric power. Damming will give thousands of workplaces.

After end of construction electricity will go for needs of Ethiopia itself and neighbouring countries including Sudan and perhaps Egypt. It will be possible to invest in infrastructure of international tourism. The dam and the hydroelectric power station have ambitious political aspect; they should become a symbol of Ethiopian national revival. The criticism of the project is considered to be unacceptable.

The Egyptians have another position. Egypt is “the gift of the Nile”: it is deemed to be an axiom. Getting of sufficient amount of water for this state is a question of life and death. Water in the river can vary and these fluctuations are unpredictable.

To avoid the consequences of possible droughts and harmful floods in 1960–1971 with the help of the USSR it was built high-rise Aswan Dam. It let agriculture of Egypt switch to year-round irrigation and gather the harvest up to three times a year. Although maintenance of the reservoir level – the lake Naser depends on contribution from the Blue Nile.

Possible influence of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam over downstream countries causes disputes. The lake Naser loses about 12% of water because of evaporation. The Ethiopians claim that Grand Dam located upstairs with lower average annual temperature and smaller water-surface lake area will subsequently decrease evaporation and even increase water flow in Egypt by 5%.

In Egypt there are worries about the fact that while the reservoir will fill water influx in the Naser lake will shrink and as a consequence electric power output by Aswan Dam hydroelectric power station will fall to 25–40% (representing just 3% of Egyptian electricity production). This huge reservoir can hardly fill with water during a year that would cause ecological catastrophe in Egypt. At any rate impact with Egyptian agriculture will be launched.

The Nile basin, except for Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, incorporates Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo, Uganda, Kenya,

Tanzania and South Sudan. Namely Egypt has legally enforceable right to use waters of Great River. First treaty on water distribution was signed in 1929 by Egyptian government and England being a colonial power acted on behalf of Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. Later in 1959 it was signed the second treaty whereunder 83% of the Nile waters got Egypt and 17% – Sudan. Moreover Egypt got veto right in using the waters by other upstream countries.

These at first sight unfair treaties, E. Elkina writes, have merit – all of the countries through which the Nile flows only Egypt and Sudan differ by arid climate and almost don't have other sources of water. 97% of water for irrigation and also industry and domestic needs Egypt gets from the Nile.

As before the Nile is a Lifeline for the Egyptians. However today the country has problems with fresh water. In 1959 its population was 30 million people and for each person there were about (in line with the Nile treaty quotas) 2,1 thous. cub. m of water per year. By 2006 the population increased to 80 million people that reduced consumption per head to 790 cub.m. per year (at rate of 1 thous. cub.m. reportedly by the UN). The population of the country continues to grow and program of Water Resource Planning in Egypt predicts that in 2025 337 cub.m. of water per year will fall on one human it means that without sacrificing current policy of the state the best part of plowed fields of Egypt won't be irrigated.

Water supply engenders a provision of food problem (chronic shortage of own food) that is one of main component of Egyptian national security. Government carries out works in regards to water distribution systems and introduction of new technologies of its use. Apparently it will be necessary to withdraw from ambitious projects of irrigation of more desert parts with the object of turning them into gardens and fields.

In 1993 Egypt and Ethiopia concluded a framework agreement in which they obliged not to act against the interests of one another and take measures at lowering dumping in the river.

In 1999 it was created a group of the Nile basin countries – the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which included besides Egypt and Sudan-Burundi, Ruanda, Uganda, DR Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. Countries from the Upper Nile region prepared a draft of a new framework agreement on use of waters but Sudan and Egypt refused to join it because it was intended a revision of the Nile treaty. Ministers of 9 African countries within the NBI met in 2009 in Alexandria but set aside a question of water redivision and then the group split. Adoption of the new agreement was blocked by Egypt and Sudan discordant with coming reduction of annual quotas. Other countries of the basin strive for a new system of water resources distribution and reducing of quotas for Egypt and Sudan.

In March 2015 the president of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to Ethiopia with three-day visit. He met with the Ethiopian president, prime-minister and patriarch (Egyptian Copts and Ethiopian Christians belong to one Monophysit branch of Christianity, close to Orthodoxy). Thus step by step parties go to understanding on the basis of compromises.

Problems related to water shortage during thousands of years of Egyptian history arose repeatedly. After all they have never been as grave as they are now. It is referred to manmade effect on water regime of the Nile. Now the experts not only beyond Egypt but within the country it is clear that plans for standstill are not realistic. Attitude “all or nothing,” the author emphasizes, is counterproductive. To avoid serious conflicts it is necessary to advance a dialog and diplomatic negotiations. “Declaration of principles” signed by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia will undoubtedly become an important step on this way.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

ODIL ERNAZAROV. TEN YEARS OF TOKYO MUSLIM SCHOOL ACTIVITY (1927–1937) // *The article was specially written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Ibn Hurdadbeh, "Wakwak Lands," Abdurrashid Ibragim, "Muslim pact," Tokyo Muslim school, Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali.

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Annotation: The article is devoted to history of Islam in Japan and cultural relations between Japanese and Muslim nations. In the article there are also facts about Tokyo Muslim school which played a significant role in spiritual transformation in Muslims' lives in Japan in the first half of the twentieth century.

History of existence of Islamic community in Japan, rather than other states, covers a relatively short period. References to the history of Islam emergence in Japan are very rare. It's possible to draw just little information on this subject from medieval Muslim sources, a report of the Yuan Dynasty about expedition to Japan, from annals of Minh period, from Portuguese quarries and also from modern literary works about Japanese culture.

In historic Muslim chronicles of the medieval period name "Japan" was first referred writings of Muslim cartographer Ibn Khordadbeh [1]. In his work the author mentioned Japan twice as "Wakwak land." It's rich in gold, so that local population makes chains of this metal for their dogs and reins for monkeys. They produce shirts made from gold stitching. From forest trees in this region it is possible to fabricate first class wood substance. Gold and ebonies are exported from here to neighboring countries [1]. On the map charted by Mahmoud Kashgari in the 11 century

eastern boundary of the Great Silk Way terminates by the territory of Japan eastern part [2].

Primary appearance of Muslims on the territory of Japan by some accounts on history of Islam in the Land of the Rising Sun, written in Japanese falls at the beginning of 18 century. Entirely history of Islam in Japan is short enough, but rich in events. First Muslim communities in the country were created by Indian and Malaysian sailors who came for earnings in Yokohama and Kobe cities during the period of Meiji (1868–1890) [3].

In the XX century relationship history of Japan with Muslim world was marked by many outstanding events. The main place in that period is occupied by extension of contacts between Japanese government and Muslim countries. Imperial government of Japan set about weak until then affiliation with Muslim world. Particularly by circles close to the emperor there was prepared and signed “Muslim pact” providing guarantees of spreading Islam in Japan. Among leaders who signed the pact there were Tsuyoshi Inukai (later became Vice prime minister of Japan) Ryohei Uchida (charge by appointment of the emperor) and Mitsuru Toyama (Japanese influential political leader). On the part of Muslims Abdurresid Ibrahim engaged in ratification of the pact. As a tangible embodiment of the pact October 2, 1927 in Okubo district of Japanese capital in three-room building. “Tokyo Muslim school” started its work. It became a remarkable event for such a short history of existence of Islamic religion in Japan and exercised spiritual education overturn in lives of rare local Muslims [1, 44].

An opening of Muslim school in Tokyo was a special feat for 27 century old history of Japan Empire which played its role in spreading Islam in the Far East. In schools functioning before Muslim school in Tokyo there were no books (even Koran) and instruction was given using lithography rewritten by hand.

At that time in Turkic-Tatar schools of the Far East discrepancies and corruption in spelling noticed about. In some schools Tatar words were written with mistakes, Arabic words

were twisted, there was confusion in names and other difficulties. Furthermore Muslims' children who were taught in local schools couldn't write names of their parents in Tatar and distinguish Arabic letters with points and without them.

Children of Muslim migrants arrived from the Far East and got over to Japan were set adrift in religious and spiritual sphere they not only were taught of Islamic religion basis and on the contrary attended schools of other nations and started speaking foreign languages. That way children born in Japan talked to parents in Japanese not in native language and didn't understand parents who communicated with each other in Tatar. Children who went to English schools talked with each other in English. It ran up to that some children asked parents whether they should learn Tatar and know Islamic religion.

Parents sacredly keeping religious traditions and national spirit were keen their children to get Islamic religious education and national upbringing in Harbin 30 located at 3.100 km from Tokyo but didn't have opportunities to achieve their dream. On the one hand it was risky to let kids go all the way here and on the other – it was expensive to spend 50–60 yens per child on travel expenses. That is why many parents leaved the matter in abeyance for an indefinite period.

In such conditions Turkic-Tatar migrants Muslims living in different regions of Japan and the capital-Tokyo decided to unite and in January 1925 formed a Muslim community. Sermons after Friday prayer in this religious community promoted revival of religious feelings and national identity of flock. After a festive namaz on the occasion of Kurban Bayram sacrifice in 1927 influential community members gathered for a council and agreed to open an Islamic school in Tokyo for bringing children up in the spirit of national traditions and Islam grounding. Consequently chief imam of the community and school's teacher Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali wrote an appeal to Japanese government. After obtaining a licence on October 2 the same year in Okubo district it was opened an Islamic school and pupils set

about lessons by national and religious disciplines on the basis of lower grades programme.

In the aftermath of meeting all requirements, imposed by laws of Japanese empire applicable to enlightenment, the school was opened on December 5 in 1927 under command of Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali. In such a manner it was added to the list of public schools. Islamic school was conferred rights and privileges which official schools of Japan used. Besides it was allowed to expend activity of the school to the level of secondary school and even higher educational institution.

The Islamic school which was opened due to the efforts of migrants Muslims in the beginning of its activity was located in a building of three rooms in the quarter Okubo in Tokyo. However later for some reason it had to leave that building and in January 1931 moved to another place. This new building number 1461 was in the district Tomigaya 32, next door to Yoyogi park in the south-western part of "Emperor Meiji garden" in Tokyo. In such a manner the educational institution got not only academic building but a mosque.

Tokyo Muslim school in concordance with State Education Programme was settled as an eight-year-old school – six years of primary education and two years of preparatory classes. In the first school year teachers council consisted of director Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali, teacher of native language Rabiya Komkino, Russian language teacher Robiya Nasyria, gymnastics teacher Khon Tamir Ninish, art and handicrafts teacher Minimy Tokisy and history and Japan geography teacher Okubo Kugi(Rizo). The same year there were admitted 14 pupils: 4 of them to the first form, 4 – to the second, 1 – to the third and 4 – to the sixth form. With a view to learn Russian language a Russian girl Zina Ibdasikina joined them.

In the following years the number of pupils was regularly rising. For instance, 33 students graduated school in 1932 (the fifth school year). Five of them were awarded by a silver badge regarding termination of the primary stage. Teaching staff

changed for various reasons every year (due to marriage of a teacher or relocation). Since the sixth school year some gifted graduates of preparatory classes were accepted at work in the quality of primary school teachers.

Tokyo Muslim school was financed at the expense of monthly payment from children's parents (7,5 yens), monthly financial aid of Muslim community members and also charitable donations, especially from offerings in the days of Islamic holidays. For its part, pupils from needy families enjoyed preferences their monthly payments were reduced. For carrying out financial and economic activities of the school it was chosen a college comprising of seven representatives of Muslim community. The head of the college was Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali and chief assistant accounting monthly spendings and payments executed Khodga Ahmad effendi Vahhab.

In Muslim school religious sciences were considered to be the most important and there were also taught such subjects as "akida" (theology, dogmatics), "phikh" (Islamic law), "tazhvid" (Koran accentuation), Islamic ethics, wisdom and Sharia philosophy, Arabic language and speech, history of Islam expansion and life of contemporary Muslims, Qur'anic exegesis and Hadith (legendary of Prophet). The second place after religious subjects was occupied by lessons of native language, it which there were taught reading, spelling, Tatar language rules, speaking, short addresses, homilectics, lectures, mysteries and wise sayings in Tatar, prose and music, Tatar literature, dialects of Turkic people (exposure to dialects of Turkestan people, Ottoman Turks).

Apart from human sciences at school there was geography, Environmental Studies, mathematics, physical education. Teaching was in Tatar. Additionally to the programme of primary education on demand of Japanese government it was included reading, spelling and speaking in Japanese and fluent Russian and English.

Furthermore for the six-year-old programme approved by Japanese government at the primary level there were taught lessons of in drawing and handicrafts. At handicrafts lessons boys were trained to manufacture different tools, draw Arabic letters for publishing at the school, and girls were trained of machine sewing and cross-stitch, spinning yarn and art of creating compositions of flowers.

Tokyo Muslim school since its first days encountered lack of books. According to the treatise "Collection of photos of Tokyo Muslim school": "although about 500 Muslims lived in Japan at the time, but there was no one Koran exemplar for ten people." There were found books of Khadi Maksudi "Akaid" (theology) and "Ibadati Islamiyah" (Islamic church service) on religious issue. These books were rewritten anew for using them in educational process by Khazrat Kurbangali and Magfura hanum Mustafa and were published in printing house of Ahmad effendi Wahhabi Karovi. Further there were published books "Tajvid" and "Islam history" and the book "Muallim ash-Sharia" (Teacher of Sharia) was copied in handwritten variant. Books of native language were handwritten and issued as lithography with assistance of intellectuals' brotherhood Harbina and were handed over to the school. Later after introduction of the subject of Tatar nation history with great difficulty it was found the book of Ubaidullah "Tatars history" with the support of a member of Muslim community Inoyatullah efendi Zainuddin was written by hand and published in lithography. There were no math books in Tatar for first and second forms, that is why it was taught since the third form in Russian. Due to lack of geography and natural sciences books in Tatar these subjects were also taught in Russian [1, 44-45].

At the same time literature in Russian was bought in Harbin and books in English, which then were used in educational process, in Tokyo. Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali wrote books on all subjects, besides above mentioned

religious disciplines, which were rewritten by hand and distributed among pupils.

Undoubtedly, such historical event in the short period of Islam existence in Japan played an important role in spiritual and cultural life of small Muslim community of Japan. «Parents, aksakals mahallas were incredibly glad that religious lessons, lessons of language, theology and divine service were held in their native language. It came cohesion, happiness and long hope religious and national spirit. «This religious and national spirit weakened hatred, animosity and diffidence among Muslim migrants. Now for benefit of the school not only pupils' parents but also members of Muslim community donated part of their revenues for school needs» [1, 43].

In conditions of such enthusiasm in October 1927 involving Muslims living in Japan it was established "Congress of Japan Muslims." There were took some decisions regarding social, cultural, spiritual-educating aspects of life of local Muslims. "Among these decisions there were such points: opening of primary schools for children living in Japan, teaching them national and religious attainments, use of common spelling rules, training of handicrafts, provision of financial and social assistance for children from needy families, to open publishing house aimed at edition of required books and literature for school's activity and stiffening religious education of local Muslims, to create burying-place for Muslims, paying maximum attention to marriages of Muslim young people, strengthening of friendship between Japanese and Muslims" [1, 42].

Not only migrants Muslims took part in this congress but members of local government, Japanese public figures. Among them ex-head publisher Mr. Inucoin, ex inspector of internal affairs Mr. Tokynomy, Mr. Tuvoemo, known as Grandfather of all Japanese nation, plenipotentiary of Japan in Hungary who came to the homeland for a journey, director of Turan association in Hungary, professor Mr. Parula and other famous public people. They all give their point of view concerning the congress.

One of the results of the congress 1927 was building of printing office and publishing of specialized religious literature that was extremely urgent for the faithful community and Tokyo Muslim school. With this view in one printing office in Turkey there were bought unused prints of Arab language for 100 yens and brought to Tokyo. Customs administration added export duty on these facilities equal to 100 yens, but interference of authoritative deputies of Japanese society could reduce the duty rate to 50 yens. In such a manner Tokyo Muslim community got Arab prints. Muhammed-Abdulkhay Kurbangali and his pupils got them right, a young man was studding the work of some printing houses in Japan for a month and coped with the way of printing. A number of Muslim community members brought financial assistance in the sum of 500 yens. This contributed to the start of printing first books about Islam in January 1930.

Before 1937 alongside with publication of required books there were edited: writing of Abdulla Tukay "Collection of Tula," diverse religious books as of "Haftiyak sharif", national stories, collection of verses and so on. A memorable moment in the history of the printing house and publisher occurred in 1934. That year for the first time for all history of Islam in the Far East it was edited the Holy Quran its colorfully decorated copies were sent to state and public figures of Egypt, Afghanistan and Iraq, scientists of the Egyptian university Al-Azkhar and also the Japanese emperor Hirohito. In response to these gifts there were recieved letters of thanks with compliments. Besides, in the same printing house it was issued monthly information magazine "Yaponsky Reportyor" about life of Muslims in the Far East and Japan. The local population expressed their positive relation to opening of Muslim school in Tokyo. Every day pupils of Tokyo Muslim school except Friday and holidays came to school wearing a special uniform with silver badges with stars and the moon. Seeing them Japanese understood that they were children of migrants. Pupils of the school used the privileges provided from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the railway in

the form of monthly and annual special rate tickets for trams and trains. Sometimes there were organized excursions to country parks, places of amusement and objects of interest for pupils. Also pupils of the Japanese schools invited pupils of Muslim school to their holidays where they came with congratulations. In this regard it is necessary to emphasize that not only children of the Turkic-Tatar nationality living in Tokyo but also children from the neighboring cities and also from Korea were pupils of this school.

In the territory of the school residence hall for those who live out of Tokyo was organized. Such pupils stayed at school to the termination of academic year and the beginning of summer vacation (May), and from the beginning of new academic year came back to the residence hall.

On Tokyo streets local population, seeing pupils in a special uniform of Muslim school, began to photograph them. Using these photos reporters spread information in a number of newspapers and magazines. Pupils from different cities, even from Hokkaido and Sakhalin wrote letters to pupils of Islamic school, expressing desire to get acquainted closer with them and learn about Islamic religion.

Authoritative state and public figures of Japan and also representatives of scientific community participated in a number of celebrations and parties organized at school, they congratulated the staff of the school on a festivity, expressed wishes of progress in school's activity. For example, among them there was the inspector of education Houyomo Ichiru, a head of the department of control of religion at education office Nichiomo, the head of the department of general education Siyomo Muro. In the album Tokyo Muslim School Album (1927-1937) telling about friendly relations between Japanese and pupils of Muslim school it is given the following: "Visit by highly respected guests of Muslim school is expression of the Japanese etiquette, hospitality, politeness and also courtesy and fine qualities of the Japanese of high society. Japanese with great

respect treat Islamic religion. They are glad that Muslims of Japan study their religion and language. Members of government, leaders of the nation demonstrated this joy and even religious representatives of Japan also openly did it and came to meetings, delivered congratulatory speeches in such a manner they showed respect for Islam" [1, 44].

It is remarkable the fact that when the Muslim school was opened in Tokyo, in parliament of the Land of the Rising Sun the issue of religious education of the Japanese children from initial classes and the organization for this purpose of special Sunday religious lessons were discussed. Opening of Muslim school was welcomed with open arms by Japanese. Local government newspapers started to publish articles about studying of experience of Muslims in the organization of religious education.

With opening of Muslim school in Tokyo there was a tradition of carrying out various holidays in the schoolhouse with participation of pupils and representatives of the Muslim community, organization of holiday feasts. According to the Muslim calendar (Hijra) New year was one of such holidays. This day discussions about rebirth of the prophet Mahomed (Allah will bless him and welcome), virtuous acts of associates, competitions in proverbs, verses, music and the riddles prepared by pupils were organized. Also special attention was paid to organization of events on the Birthday of rasul Allah Mahomed (peace be upon him) - month of Rabi-ul-avval on Hijra. At such events pupils read small fragments from the Koran and told about life of the Prophet and history of Islam, together read the ode (kasid) "Mavlud of An-naby" and glorified birthday. In a Ramazan month class hours were reduced from six to four hours per day. Pupils of school visited a tarovekh-Mohammedan prayer. Days of the holiday "Iyd Al-Fitr" (Ramazan-hait) and "Iyd al-Adkha" (Kurban-hait) from side of the Muslim community of the school there was organized a special holiday table and various gifts were distributed.

Summing up the results it is possible to say that though Islam history in Japan covers very short period, it is very eventful according to contents. In sources it is specified that contacts between the people of Japan and representatives of the Muslim world began since the 11 century, and from the 18 century to the present days develop consistently. In the 20 century the history of the relations of the Japanese society and the Muslim community is enriched with many significant events. Opening of Muslim school in Tokyo promoted transformation and enrichment of spiritual and cultural life of Muslims of Japan.

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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2018.01.015. PLATON POLOMOSHNOV, ANDREI POLOMOSHNOV.
ISLAMIC AND CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY AS
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comparative analysis, religious anthropology,
monotheism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity.*

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One of the aims of a comparative analysis of Islamic and Christian anthropology is the specification of their individual socio-cultural singularity. Researchers reveal the key structural elements of these theories as specific points of comparative analysis.

The initial point of any religious anthropology is the understanding of God. Proceeding from this, it is possible to determine the understanding of man and his relations with God. Monotheism is common for Islam and Orthodox Christianity. Then follow principal differences. In Islam God is One and Single, and in Orthodox Christianity He is triune, there is Trinity: God

Father, God Son and God Holy Spirit. In Islam God is not anthropomorphous, He is not like man. By explanations of Islamic theologians, certain attributes of Allah, coinciding in name with human features principally differ from the latter. In Orthodox Christianity the key role is played by the dogma of Godlikeness of man, that is, actually "humanlikeness" of God. Another difference in the understanding of God in Islam and Christianity is connected with the knowledge and understanding of God. In Islam, inasmuch as God is not like man, He is principally incognizable and unimaginable in any imaginative form. On the contrary, in Orthodox Christianity God is not only human, but also cognizable for man. Cognition of God, direct mystical contact with Him is one of the principal tasks of a true Christian.

Difference in understanding God in Orthodox Christianity and Islam determines difference in understanding Nature, that is, the essence and origin of man. The only common thesis for both religions is that of the creation of man by God. The main premise of Christianity in understanding the nature of man is that man was created by the image of God. Man's divine likeness in Christianity makes the latter the religion of personification. This is why there is no abstract man in general, but each man is a person, rooted in God.

In Orthodox Christian theology the thesis of the personal nature of God and hence the personal nature of man plays the key role. In Islam the problem of the nature of man is interpreted on the basis of opposite principles. Being a creation of Allah man is not like Him and has no qualities inherent in Him. Man is alien to the nature of God. The nature of man has no divine ontological basis. The highest individuality is inherent only in Allah. The individuality of each man, on the one hand, is created by Allah, inasmuch as the existence of not only man, but the entire living world is the act of Allah's will, and on the other hand, is made by the efforts of man himself aimed at conforming to the standards of behavior and the mission given man by God. It is not accidental that the description of the image of perfect man

(Muslim) plays a special role in the anthropology of Islam. In modern Islamic theology one can see and feel increased attention to the problem of individuality, which shows that the traditional concept of man is being slightly modernized in the direction of certain personification of the interpretation of the nature of man. Many contemporary Islamic theologians deal with such aspects of the nature of man which condition his formation as a personality: the freedom of choice, ability to control his emotions, desires and will with the help of reason and thereby to create himself. However, such interpretations are essentially at variance with traditional orthodox Islam.

The status of man is determined in his attitude to God and in his relation to the world created by God. Both in the two religions are predestined by God. However, the essence of relations between God and man in Islam and Orthodox Christianity essentially differ. The status of man in Islam is determined by the following key principles: man is the slave of Allah, man is Allah's governor on earth. The notion "slave" in Arab culture has a different connotation than in European culture. Here "slave" is not a creature deprived of free will and freedom, but a person with an active position of worshiping God, but not of passive submission and humility.

The status of man as a slave of Allah is complemented and specified by the notion of man as a "vicar" of Allah in this world of ours described by the Koran. This status determines a certain selectness of man among all other living creatures. This selectness is expressed in special qualities which Allah bestowed on man in contrast to other creatures – reason and free will. The status of Allah's vicar on Earth also presupposes man's power over the material world within the limits given by Allah. This status does not eliminate two principal weaknesses of man – moral and physical. The latter is in his physical nature and the former lies in his inclination to abandon true faith and commit sin. Man's physical weakness is insurmountable inasmuch as he is a living creature, but as he is also a moral creature he stands above all

other physical creatures. The status of Allah's vicar presupposes man's ability to overcome his moral weakness. This ability is his merit. The status of Allah's vicar on Earth means man's potential to prove his ability to conquer his moral weakness. Each man worshipping God, serving Him and fulfilling His precepts is Allah's vicar. Relations between God and man in Islam are based on worship and submission on the part of man, and on constant guidance and mercy on the part of Allah. Allah's mercy is bestowed only on the righteous submitting to His will and Muslims. Apostates and sinners will be severely punished. This is why an important place in man's attitude to Allah is taken by fear of punishment. Characteristically, in Islam relations between God and men are not interpreted in terms of "love" as is the case of Christianity. This is due to the principal absence of anthropomorphous nature of Allah.

The status of man in Orthodox Christianity is also determined by two principles: man is the supreme creation of God, and man is the son of God. The first thesis determined not only the physical nature of man, but also his place in the created world. God who created man by his image and semblance endowed him with Godlike qualities – reason and free will, and also made him the master of Nature. The thesis of man as the supreme creature of God brings Christianity closer to Islam, whereas the thesis of man as the son of God reveals the principal difference of Christianity from Islam. However, man being the Son of God is only his potential status, it was not initially given him by God. Thanks to Jesus Christ who gave the example of the Son of God, men are faced with a possibility of switching over from the status of God's slave to the status of the Son of God. In the "New Testament" the status of the slave is eliminated by the act of adoption, which man receives due to the peace-offering of the Son of God.

Thus, both in Islam and Christianity man is the most perfect creature of God and is called upon to fulfill His will or perform the mission of the "vicar" of Allah or the master of Nature, or a more important mission – to follow the divine enactments in his

behavior. In contrast to Islam, Christianity opens a possibility to raise the status of man to becoming the Son of God, and through his personal attitude to God to reach mutual divine love.

The interpretation of the status of man determines the essence of the purport of life of the believer or his divine mission, that is, his avocation established for him by God. There are both similar and different features in the interpretation of this mission in Islam and Christianity. The purport of life of the Muslim is to fulfill the mission predestined to man by Allah. The main condition for the realization of this mission is to submit to the will of Allah. But submission to His will is not passive action, but energetic struggle against one's own depravity, fulfillment of orders and behests of Allah, and striving to perfection.

Outwardly, the life mission of the Christian is much like that of the Muslim – obedience to God and fulfillment of the purport of life predetermined by Him. This mission also presupposes overcoming the depravity of one's own nature, nearness the Christian ideal of the divine man presented by Jesus Christ. Differences between Islam and Christianity are revealed, first, in the essence of the elements of the mission, and secondly in the emphases of the structure of life mission of the believer.

If we speak of the struggle with the sinful nature of man stemming from his imperfection as compared with God, as far as Islam is concerned, the meaning of this struggle boils down to rectifying wrong deeds by acts of will, and in Christianity it is perfecting the individual by the act of spirit. This is why in Islam fight against sin is always a single-step act of victory over concrete sin. As for Christianity, fight against sin is radical eradication of sin in one's own soul, which forms the foundation of righteous life and fortitude against temptations. Striving for a perfect way of life in Islam presupposes principal inability to reach an ideal image, whereas in Christianity such possibility is open to every believer.

In tackling the task of religious perfection of man Islam proceeds from deeds to the good qualities of soul to deeds, and

Christianity – from the good qualities of soul to deeds. Islam makes an emphasis on the quality of deeds, and Christianity – on soul and moral perfection. Hence, the essential difference in the nature of religious morality of Muslims and Christians.

Analyzing the key aspects of Islamic and Christian anthropologies, experts make the following conclusions:

Differences between these religious anthropologies reflect differences between Christian and Muslim civilizations, whereas affinity contributes to a constructive dialogue of these civilizations. The humane character of these anthropologies differs, but they are the forms of specific religious humanism. Modern Islamic extremism, just as the various forms of Christian extremism and sectarianism are based on distortion of Islamic and Christian anthropologies. Russia is a polyconfessional country on a single civilizational, socio-political and economic basis. It is necessary not only to preserve inter-religious peace, but also to realize inter-religious cooperation aimed at adapting the human nature of traditional religions to modern reality.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.01.016. AIDAR IUZEEV. FORMATION OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: CONFESSIONAL AND REGIONAL ASPECTS // *"Islam v sovremennom mire,"* Moscow, 2016, Vol. 12, № 4, P. 193–196.

Keywords: theology, Islam, regional component.

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Theology as a scientific secular discipline having a direct relation to religion ("teaching about God") should be based on objective truth, which may not always correspond to the

interpretations of religious canons of the past days and our time. A researcher should strive to come to the truth as close as possible, for this determines the significance of the research work of a theologian. Adherence to one or another religion should not be of importance along this road. As to the methodology of research, A. Yuzeyev holds the view that philosophy is the closest of humanitarian sciences to theology. This is why in writing and defending theses on theology philosophy and its methodology are the most convenient instruments.

The main aspect in the work of a respondent is professionalism of a researcher, which should not depend on any factors. He/she should be distracted from reality and actively plunge into sources and the texts under investigation. If he/she uses sources in Arabic, as is the case of Islam, it would be better to cite them not only in Russian translation, but also in the original, because quite often a Russian translation does not adequately enough reflect the source. A respondent quite often distorts the original text he/she works on due to an insufficient knowledge of the language of the original.

A theologian working on a degree in Russia should know not only a narrow specialty (for instance, a specialist on Islam should know the foundations of other religions in Russia, above all Christianity and Judaism, but also he/she should have a thorough idea about the Bible and the Koran, dogmatics, missionaries, historical development stages of religions, etc).

Another problem is knowledge of regional component. In our troubled time, when religious radicalism is becoming ever more popular among uneducated masses, this knowledge becomes very important. A person writing a thesis on Islam in the Volga area, for example, should know not only works by Arab Muslim theologians, but also local material, for instance, that by the Tatar theologian of the 19th century Sh. Marjani (1818-1889). This also concerns Christian philosophy of the Volga area at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th century – for

instance works by the Russian philosopher and theologian V. Nesmelov (1883–1937).

It is necessary to publish works by religious philosophers of the 18th – 20th centuries in the language of the original and in translations. Among them are the Tatar thinkers Sh. Marjani, Kh. Faizkhan, R. Fahraddin and M. Bagiyev.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.01.017. OLGA NOVIKOVA. WOMEN IN ISLAMIC STATE // *“Problemy evropeiskoi bezopasnosti” / RAS INION. Moscow, 2017, Issue 2, P. 103–124.*

Keywords: gender, women, Islamic State, terrorism, suicide-terrorists.

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O. Novikova examines the problem of women's participation in terrorist organizations on the example of their activity in the “Islamic state.” These problems have been studied but very little. Meanwhile, the gender aspect should not be neglected. The gender character of terrorism calls for the study of motivations and role of women supporting extremist organizations.

The ISIS was a little-studied terrorist organization in 2006 – 2012 and had an insignificant number of women-terrorists in its ranks. However, the state of affairs has changed after the proclamation of the “Caliphate” by Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi on June 29, 2014 and his successes in Syria and Iraq. For instance, in 2015 among three thousand Europeans in the Islamic state there were 550 women (not counting citizens of Russia, CIS countries and Turkey). According to certain information, women comprise from ten to fifteen percent of all foreigners in the Islamic state.

Most of them are girls and young women from 16 to 24. As a rule, they come from families of Muslim-migrants of the second or third generation. Quite a few of them have good prospects to get a decent education and further independent and successful life in the West. Moreover, they come from well-to-do families with moderate views. A good part of girls have a complete secondary education, and quite a few of them were well-educated university students.

Muslim women are very attached to their large families whose members, as a rule, are against their young women going to Syria or Iraq. Quite often, the head of a family hides away the passports of girls and refuse to give them money. The Islamic state, on the contrary, actively helps organize such trips. For instance, if any problems arise at border crossings, girls-travelers are helped by lawyers specially sent from the Islamic state. The idea of natural relationship is actively used for recruiting. Kinship unions as a result of marriage make it possible to create and maintain a chain of loyal connections and whole networks of closely-knit groups in the East.

Western experts often regard the main reason inducing a young woman to leave for the Islamic state her desire for revenge caused by the loss of the father, son, husband or brother. It is often the case of a family remaining without the means of subsistence after it loses the breadwinner. This motive cannot be excluded, inasmuch as this terrorist organization, having established an original patriarchal system on its territory has created a mechanism of ensuring security, protects and supports all those loyal to the Islamic state. On the territories controlled by the Islamic state unmarried women live in hostels, and do not pay for board and lodging. Each month they receive a food ration and money for petty expenses.

Inasmuch as the Islamists have succeeded to create in the mass media an image of a full-fledged state with a prospect of further strengthening, many young women from Islamic countries have decided that they could marry a "hero-mujahideen" and

create a family. For its part, the Islamic state declares that a woman should marry if she wants to join the grouping. A marriage ceremony is arranged soon after a woman arrives to a territory controlled by the Islamic state, or even immediately. If her husband is killed or dies, the second marriage is welcome right away and the new marriage procedure becomes simpler.

Women in the Islamic state are in great demand, especially girls and young women speaking Russian. Fighters from the North Caucasus who feel isolated in the midst of Arab-speaking colleagues need brides from the CIS countries because the heads of families in Syria do not allow their daughters to marry foreign militants. Widows of the fighters – members of armed gangs who have died in Chechnya and Daghestan, and those Muslim militants killed in other countries, also come to the Islamic state in order to marry jihadists.

The fact that among the women going to the Islamic state there are many French Muslims can be explained by strict bans on wearing Muslim garments introduced by the French authorities. Muslim girls expelled from schools for wearing them live and study in isolation from the French public mainstream. They are dissatisfied with such state of affairs, and the Islamic state uses this pretext and grants them an opportunity to leave the state where they have to renounce one of the requirements of Islamic religion.

Another part of women coming to the Islamic state is those who turned Muslims after marrying Muslim men. Perhaps, some of them had no intention or wish to take part in armed struggle, but after coming there they began to adhere to radical ideas. Sometimes their radicalism goes as far as to make them join the groups of women-suicide killers. Most women turned into Islam are of Canadian, American, French, German, British, Belgian and Italian origin.

Contrary to most western experts, the main reason for women leaving for the Islamic state is ideological and religious. Women taking part in the armed conflict in Syria on the side of the Islamic state are convinced of Muslims being downtrodden

and persecuted all over the world. International conflicts are interpreted by Muslim women as part of a large-scale war waged by the infidels against Islam. Women going to the Islamic state not only reject western culture and denounce the foreign policy of the western countries, but they also want to take part in the construction of a society of a new type on the basis of the Sharia principle. These women regard participation in the building of the “Caliphate” as their duty and a guarantee that after death they will find themselves in paradise. In this their motivation is similar to that of men.

It is necessary to make a distinction between women-extremists and women-terrorists. Only a very few women are ready to take part in violent actions. Women-extremists are drawn in the actions of the militants of the Islamic state as medical nurses, they look after their life, but do not take part in military operations. But they can inspire men to active struggle, draw other women to go to the Islamic state, and call for committing terrorist acts in the territory of western countries. Women-terrorists take direct part in military operations and are suicide -bombers. Almost half of all terrorist explosions in Russia were made by women-suicide killers from Chechnya (“black widows”) in 2000–2005. It is a generally recognized fact that almost all terrorist organizations do not have any moral or other bounds for perpetrating terrorist acts with the help of women-terrorists.

Until recently women-suicide terrorists were a rare phenomenon in the Muslim world and some Islamist organizations, for example HAMAS and “Islamic Jihad” did not use them as fighters, to say nothing as suicide-bombers. Actions of women-terrorists are not too expensive, but they have wide repercussions in the mass media and are an effective means of a psychological war. As to the women-terrorists, suicide is not an act of self-destruction, but sacred martyrdom in defense of faith, and continuation of jihad.

Although women take an active part in wars and conflicts, they are, as previously, regarded victims to violence on the part

of men; it is emphasized that they become widows and are deprived of hearth and home. The gender approach rejects the possibility of women to take independent responsible decisions and thereby it does not recognize political, ideological and religious motives of their actions.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.01.018. LEONID SUKIYAINEN. ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF CALIPHATE: ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION // *"Islam v sovremennom mire,"* Moscow, 2016, Vol. 12, № 3, P. 139–154.

Keywords: caliphate, Sharia, Islamic state, fiqh, jurisprudence of Islam.

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The Islamic Sunni conception of power (state) generally formed in the 9–14th centuries. As distinct from Shia Muslim authors who relegate questions of power to religious dogmatics, the Sunni thought always considered the public power to be a subject of jurisprudence of Islam (fiqh). Sharia in the true sense knows a few laws of the Koran and Sunna of the Prophet regularizing the vertical relations of power. These sources don't contain any concrete instructions regulating activity of power or determining its content and essence.

Islamic thought lays emphasis on that the Prophet left the most general bases of the caliphate not accidentally which don't put Muslims together by rigid framework and allow them to choose the necessary form of government at their own discretion, corresponding to various historical circumstances. A hundred years from the prophet Mohammed Sunni faqihs could develop the beginnings of the organization and functioning of power on

the basis of broaden interpretation of few provisions of the Koran and Sunna concerning the caliphate (imamat) through a prism of their comparison with practice of implementation by the Prophet and “just” caliphs of the Supreme leadership of the community.

The caliphate serves as key category of the classical Sunni political theory which is considered in two interconnected aspects as the essence of Islamic power and as a specific form of government. Understanding of caliphate is based on the approach of high-profile Muslim political scientist al-Mavardi (974–1058) who used the terms “caliphate” and “imamate” as synonyms, though subsequently in a Sunni legal thought it became common to call a normative model of the Islamic State caliphate. Within the meaning of al-Mavardi the caliphate represents a certain function on implementation of the Supreme temporal (political) power and maintaining of faith at the level of Muslim community. In other words, the leading characteristic of the caliphate is orientation of the power to the solution of problems of religious and political character, but not rigid determinate structure of the state. The prominent place in the Islamic political concept is occupied by a solution of the problem of the caliphate origin. According to the Sunni thinkers who focus on the views of al-Mavardi confirmation of power of the caliphate is “urgent” and represents the duty laid both on the head of the Islamic State and all Muslims. It’s outlined the need of control from the caliph of execution by Muslims of religious duties and Sharia laws in general. Among rational arguments in favor of caliphate there is a need to avoid a disorder and anarchy in state and public affairs.

Sunni government peculiar resolves an issue of who possesses the Supreme power in the caliphate. According to the most widespread modern concept the Supreme carrier of sovereignty in the caliphate is Allah, and the Islamic State is organized entirely on the basis of mission entrusted by him on community. It is considered that on behalf of Allah the power on the earth is carried out by the community having the full

sovereignty representing neither more nor less than «reflection» of the Supreme sovereignty of Allah. Developing such approach, some modern writers emphasize that sovereignty in the Islamic State, in fact, is divided between Sharia representing Allah's will and community which will isn't absolute and is limited to Sharia.

The sovereign rights of community are shown first of all in the authority to elect its governor who manages all affairs from its name. At the same time the community doesn't concede the exclusive rights to the caliph, and only charges, trusts him to direct itself. As for a form of the Islamic power, its organizational bases, the Sunni jurisprudence doesn't refer these parameters to the caliphate to its constants and considers that they can be realized in practice in various options. The Sunni political theory doesn't know strictly determinate order of post replacement of the Islamic state head. On the prevailing concept, men become the caliph not as succession of the Supreme secular and religious power or appointment by the predecessor, but in virtue of owing to the special contract (*baya*) made between community and an applicant for the caliphate. The most corresponding to spirit of Islam it's regarded such form at which the community in the contract is presented by special group of Muslims – the mujtahids alloated with justice, wisdom and ability to resolve the issues which aren't settled by the Koran and Sunna.

The Caliph bears personal responsibility for exercise of power over community and has the right to take any measures for serving the interests of community under observance of Sharia. The contract of the caliphate isn't limited and works until the caliph strictly follows Sharia laws. If it is established that the head of state deviates from terms of the contract, then he should be displaced. Theoretically the community has the right to demand from the caliph of performance of his duties, possessing a right to control his actions. However ordinary Muslims can't interfere in state affairs and estimate policy of the caliph. These powers are accorded to mujtahids. The Islamic thought recognizes that only they represent community in the relations with caliph and protect

its rights. If Sharia was considered to be “law” for elite, then opinion of the last – “law” for ordinary Muslims.

The Sunni legal political theory places an emphasis that power of the head of state isn't absolute, he doesn't use any privileges or immunity, and as well as an ordinary Muslim, conforms Sharia laws and can be punished for any fault. Though he exercises the supreme religious power in the state, his powers are deprived of divine character. Being the head of state, the caliph doesn't use legislative power and can introduce new legal regulations only insofar as he is mujtahid.

The researcher emphasizes that such understanding of caliphate represents an ideal model of the state oriented towards the past. It reflects practice of an initial stage of the Islamic power formative years when after death of the prophet Mohammed so-called just caliphs headed Muslims (632–661). Until the middle of the XIII th century the caliphate of Omeyyadov and Abbasidov keeping some external attributes of an ideal Islamic State was a direct successor of the power of just caliphs. With the course of time the classical concept of the caliphate dispersed more and more considerably from really existing mechanism of power in the Muslim world though formally the caliphate remained. A mission to present it in the Middle Ages was taken by the Ottoman Empire.

The Arab governors who have lost in rivalry with it had to resign claims over the caliphate therefore the Ottoman sultan got the caliph's title. As the institute having religious reasons and formally uniting all Muslims, the caliphate nominally remained prior to the XXth century. However after dissolution of the Ottoman Empire upon termination of the First World War it turned into abstract institute and in March 1924 was officially abolished. From then the caliphate ceased to exist as political reality.

The Islamic political and legal thought couldn't but react to elimination of the caliphate. Theory and religious arguments in favor of the caliphate revival were adduced by Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935). In continuation of the classical Sunni

theory of power Rashid Rida claimed that the elective caliph in the actions is bound by Sharia principles and laws. The Egyptian thinker carried out a thought of nonabsolute, limited nature of power of the Islamic State head who can make the most important political and legal decisions, having only consulted to community representatives.

According to Rashid Rida's concept, secular powers of the caliph in comparison with the classical theory narrow, limiting to the sphere of executive power. Concerning the religious rights of the Islamic State head, he claimed that appointment of the caliph consists in protection of faith and also implementation of Sharia laws.

Further, when there was obvious an illusiveness of hope for restoration of the caliphate, there was an opposite theory of the Islamic State according to which the caliphate has nothing in common with Islam at all. This view was espoused by the sheikh of the Egyptian Muslim university "Al-Azkhar" Ali Abd ar-Razik (1888–1966), expressed an idea that the Koran tells nothing about the caliphate as a state or form of government. Sunna as he believes, also doesn't offer indisputable hadis about the necessity of the caliphate, except for the general appeals to obedience, submission to imam (and not everywhere where it is told about the imam, means the head of state).

In fact Razik considers, the power of the caliph was always approved and supported by suppression and violence. Particularly the need of systematic suppression called into existence such form of government. Therefore, the caliphate is such a political order with which Muslims actually agreed while Sharia doesn't contain norms or principles on its obligation.

Rashid Rida and Ali Abdar-Razik's views considerably predetermine main tendencies of an Islamic political thought in the Muslim world up until now. However in the last decades discussion of problems of the power from positions of Islam entered a qualitatively new phase that it is connected with events

of “the Arab spring” and also with the emerging of the Islamic State (ISIL).

Remarkable activation of Islamic forces raised a question about the prospects for creation of the Islamic State as the specific practical project. The subject of caliphate, which seemed to remain in the past, again drew attention to itself. In Sunni Islamic tradition there was an opinion that establishment of power of imam (Islamic governor) is obligatory. In course of time in an Islamic political and legal thought there was created an understanding of the caliphate as governance of the Muslim community for part of a governor who provides a religion triumph, realizes requirements of Sunna of the prophet, does justice in relation to oppressed nationals and takes care of due enforcement of all rights. The absence of this authority plunges community into chaos when any right can't be protected, and nobody keeps people from malice. To avoid chaos it is needed an Islamic governor to whom all community of Muslims is obliged to submit.

Fundamentally, under Sharia, it is better when rulers of different regions act under supreme beginning of a single governor – the caliph. But if the caliphate is impossible in such understanding, then it doesn't deny need and legitimacy of power of governors of different real-life states. Heads of modern Islamic states also act as such paramount leaders. Muslim jurists established initial bases of the Islamic power in the form of caliphate and at the same time defined those borders which in principle shouldn't be broken. But if in practice there are power institutes which themselves aren't placed in an initial framework of Sharia, but are necessary for maintenance of Islamic values and realization of Sharia goals, then such power is considered to be Sharia owing to the actual existence and performing indicated functions. This order considers Sharia as initially unacceptable, but finds it admissible as a result of historical development of Islamic power. The modern Islamic thought, take into account historical evolution of Islamic nationhood, arrived at a key conclusion that Islamic power can be carried out not only in the

form of single caliphate of a sampler of just caliphs. In certain political conditions other models of power are quite admissible and sometimes are necessary if they are able to execute basic purpose of the caliphate – to protect religion and manage terrestrial affairs.

The Sunni legal thought proceeds from the premise that the main thing in Islamic power is not a form but content of activity. The understanding of the sense of Islamic power placing emphasis on realization of Sharia purposes prevails in a modern Sunni legal thought, the researcher stresses.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

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