

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2019 – 3 (305)**

SCIENCE-INFORMATION BULLETIN

**Moscow
2019**

ББК 66.3; 66.4; 86.38
УДК 297

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УДК 297 **Russia and the Moslem World: Science**
Information Bulletin / INION RAS, Centre for
Global and Regional Studies. – Moscow, 2019. –
N 3 (305). – 128 p.
ISSN 1072-6403

The published scientific materials on the current political, social and religious issues concerning the relations between Russia and the global Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim countries are represented in the form of articles, reviews and abstracts.

ISSN 1072-6403

ББК 66.3; 66.4; 86.38
DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.00
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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2019.03.001. ILYA PECHKUROV. THE ONTOLOGY OF DEMONSTRATIVE CONSUMPTION IN MODERN RUSSIAN SOCIETY // *Izvestiya Vuzov. Severo-Kavkazskii Region. Social sciences, Rostov-on-Don 2018, № 1, P. 25–29.*

Keywords: demonstrative consumption, everyday life, consumerist society, social reality.

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The author of the article analyzes a phenomenon of conspicuous consumption in Russian modern society. The author notes that in modern Russia conspicuous consumption came out of the shadow and was legalized after the longstanding ban. However, in Russian conditions, in a situation of “excess consumption,” it differs in vulgar and demonstrative forms of appearance with explicit semi-criminal spin and lexicon.

According to the author in Russia it is being formed the society of social ill-being. Deformations of the social atmosphere and loss of sense of vital integrity by society and people lead to “washing out” of a concept of human worth.

Nowadays fundamental changes come into antagonism with established for centuries standardized culture, generating strife

and various contradictions. At the same time renewal of culture is implemented through the chaos serving as a pre-condition for formation of a new order and means of process synchronization in social and cultural spheres. The ontology of conspicuous consumption is embodied in society where formation of a certain way of life which can be conditionally called "consumerism" becomes the result of occurring transformation. Hence goods and services are capable to act as certain "knots" of social relation, as "keys" to penetration into elite strata of society which is actively stratified according to consumer scents.

The author notes that processes of transit of society from one socio-political organization to another are followed by violation of social relation and weakening of social control. Washing out or disorganization of social structures, loss of utility of norms or values by which members of this society were guided before in their living, – all this is a basis for distribution of non-normative forms of response to the facts of surrounding social reality. The social uncertainty acting as a special condition of a social object and a phenomenon becomes a condition of existence of similar one.

The phenomenon of sociocultural crisis is closely connected with a concept of social uncertainty, and the society going through it is qualified as a crisis society. It is distinguished by a combination of corresponding indicators and characteristics of sociocultural qualities affecting political, economic, production spheres and also such indicators as disintegration of social groups, institutes, loss of personal identification with former structures.

Conspicuous consumption in its modern form relies on the idea of consumerist society in which the high standard of life has to be guaranteed to each member of society. However, "the consumer roundabout" did not lead to anything positive. It only fueled consumer expectations and significantly enhanced manipulative role of marketing, advertising and fashion. As a result, the "prestigious" (symbolical) value of goods as a certain

index of a steady position of a person in the internal competition and life circumstances advanced to the forefront. The specifics of conspicuous consumption in such society are caused by existence of immature economy and immature consumers who got access to resources and only just satisfied their basic needs.

The author points at the lack of the areas of living in Russia, consumerism and certain life attitude and norms distinguishing extravagant lifestyle it is possible to demonstrate the status only by means of “external” indicators – clothes, car, accessories and expensive prestigious services.

The author comes to a conclusion that consumerism in modern Russian society as the cultural and ideological phenomenon which replaced former ideology more and more gains dominant value. The nascent stage of consumerism in culture is mainly distinguished by development of a new way of life, new cultural and social practices, realized in this context. Particular characteristics of the Russian consumerism is connected with the fact that consumption values “experience” a certain resistance from traditional values, and their “appeal” is often caused by novelty of phenomenon and new social and economic opportunities.

In the 90s conspicuous consumption became a component of developing and new social reality. The process of primitive accumulation which converted into state property redistribution gained strength. Those who got much money wanted honor and respect. At the same time conspicuous consumption was not limited to a small group of rich people. The main body of the people of moderate means also wished to look rich at least in appearance. So the mechanism of conspicuous consumption worked. At the core of psychological set of a “consumer” defined as hedonistically irresponsible there is inability to anticipate and consider consequences of their actions, to correlate them to “the principle of reality.” Opinion polls show that the modern Russian inhabitant is immeasurably distinguished by his existence in the world of illusions which are generated not only by its personal

imperfection, inability to understand correctly and reflect the world, but also the surrounding cultural environment imposing on a person a set of myths and stereotypes inherent in it.

The author presents interesting results of the opinion poll held by Yu. Zimmerman about features of conspicuous consumption of modern youth in Russia. Researches showed that during transition in Russia there was a devaluation of moral values. Only 47% of respondents consider that "the most important ornament is plaid conscience," 30% – claim that "the conscience voice does not always sound audibly," and 23% – believe that "the conscience needs to be had, but it is not obligatory to use." At the same time the sociologist shows that under the weight of various institutes, including advertising, fashion, mass media, there is an active expansion of consumer culture of hedonistic type.

Unlike the developed and socially stable societies, consumerist society in Russia is formed in crisis social space as separate loci. At the same time the great majority of the population is content with virtual consumerist society which it observes on their TV screens, in supermarkets and on the streets of megalopolises. Many researchers write that the content of modern social and economic development of Russia, creation of the corresponding attitudes and ways of thinking are in many respects predetermined by those business models which were created and functioned prior to market transformations. The past still affects. Owing to this fact in society to this day there is the Soviet hatred to "speculators and profiteers," to a habit to live "covertly," only now absolutely other forms of conspicuous consumption act as deficiency.

In conclusion the author comes to the point that at the moment Russian society is more and more disoriented in the world of senses, pulling away from its ontological origins. It leads to social ill-being in it. As a result, the ontology of conspicuous consumption materializes in society, differing by an abruptness of social relations, lack of distinct cultural values, standards, norms and the rules of conduct that allows to speak

about transitional state of the former Soviet Union territory. In these conditions it is being formed the consumerist way of life when the consumed goods and services as symbols of success, prestige and social ascent turn a "prestigious" way of life into a goal in itself.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

ELYOR IBRAGIMOV. MANIPULATIVE TECHNOLOGIES ON CHANGE CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOR OF YOUTH // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: geopolitical competition, manipulation, manipulating technologies, types of manipulative technologies, chain of manipulative technologies, elements of manipulative technology, purpose of manipulation, manipulation functions, manipulation methods, manipulation styles, principles of manipulation.

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Abstract. The article substantiates the thesis that geopolitical competition at the beginning of the new century led to the emergence of various manipulative technologies, which are often used to change the consciousness and behavior of young people. The author makes an attempt to determine the essence, content and main features, to classify the structural components of modern manipulative technologies based on various facts and logical arguments, the social threat of these technologies is revealed.

On the eve of the 21st century, called the "Age of Information," the relations in geopolitical arena have received their own unique characteristics. In particular, the competition between geopolitical forces has reached its peak. Young people in this process began to become the object of geopolitical influence. Political forces on the way to achieve their own goals influence the worldview of young people, amongst other things, to educate future leaders ready to serve their needs and interests. Unfortunately for us, this goal is achieved through manipulation of consciousness and behavior of the younger generation. In this regard the need to study the essence and content of modern manipulative technologies, identify their inherent features, structural components, and initiate mechanisms to confront them becomes one of the most pressing problems of social philosophy.

The word "manipulation" (manus – hand) is used in the sense of working on an object with a specific purpose. This implies the requirements of efficiency and skill. In this regard, the word "manipulation" in a figurative sense can mean such a thing as "entering into a relationship with people as an object." The "Modern Sociological Dictionary," published in 1969 in New York, interprets this as follows: "Without informing others, hiding the true goals, achieving superiority over others, to form the desired behavior."

As psychologists and sociologists emphasize, manipulation is considered one of the types of influence on the consciousness of an individual, its practical application by direct influence on the individual serves the purpose of achieving unilateral advantage. The word "Manipulation," taken from the Latin language, involves action of hands. However, manipulation means hand exercise, in particular, demonstration of magic tricks, based on the art of hands; achieving nefarious goals by fraud, deception, extortion; communication impact based on the activation of motivational situations (feelings, stereotypes).

Manipulation is not violence, it is the temptation of an individual to do something, it is a way to lead an individual astray.

The dangerous side of manipulation is leading to defeat of the inner harmony of an individual, its excessive exposure to external influences.

Usually most people confuse manipulation and deception. However, if the objective of a deception is achieved through conscious substitution of false information for truth, manipulation makes an individual after the treatment to mistake a wrong thing for the right one.

An American scientist R. Cialdini identifies several types of manipulation: a request for help; an impact of the seller; political propaganda; education of children, etc. In his opinion, fundraisers for various funds, street vendors, entrepreneurs, businessmen, sales agents, employees of advertising agencies widely use manipulation in their activities. Thus, manipulation is the formation of deliberately wrong people's consciousness at the expense of lightweight ideas, opinions and views and due to this redirection of the individual to the life in the interests of the manipulator. A person who performs this kind of action in practice is called a manipulator. One can identify the following types of manipulators:

- 1) Manipulator as one of highly professional specialists in his / her field, motivated by material interests, serves political forces pursuing unseemly goals;

- 2) Manipulator in order to manipulate a specific person or a particular group, or to withdraw them from the right path effectively uses various means, the potential of modern technology;

- 3) Manipulator in his / her activity strictly adheres to the rule of the account of interests, aspirations and desires of individuals, and in particular young people;

- 4) Manipulator distributes his / her ideas through "students" from among young people with weak will, low level of thinking, living for the moment, and uses them as instruments throughout the process.

Currently, the manipulative technology is carried out as follows, in keeping with the number of people and objects of influence:

1. **Individual technology** – in this case, one individual is chosen. Manipulators thoroughly study the character of the individual, his/her strengths and weaknesses and usually turn into potential objects of influence five categories of people:

a) Individuals who love a comfortable life, accustomed to think only within the framework of satisfying their own interests. Such people put their interests above everything else. To manipulate their minds, the emphasis is usually placed on their interests, in particular, they are provided with evidence that a given activity is in their interests.

b) Individuals under constant stress. The people of this category are commonly engaged in creative activities, they are dreamy, lose self-control easily. To manipulate their psyches impacts on their mental aspirations are mainly used.

c) Individuals drawing on logical opinion. They are used to believe in facts and arguments. Manipulation of their psyches is carried out by influencing their ideas of justice, conscience, morality.

d) Individuals who do not go beyond satisfaction of the most primitive animal instincts (food, sleep, sexual relations, etc.). Manipulation the psyche in this case is realized by creating conditions that meet their basic needs.

e) Individuals with mental disorders. This group of people suffers from various mental illnesses and has no sane opinion. Manipulation people of this kind is effected by intimidation and inflicting suffering on them.

2. **Public (group) technology** – the targets of this process are mainly political associations, social movements or certain categories or classes of society. On the one hand, technologies designed to manipulate young people, who are usually considered a strong strata of society, are used. They are designed to reduce the educational needs of young people, to strengthen the desire to

emigrate from the country or to destroy their patriotic feelings. On the other hand, the technologies designed to achieve victory in political struggle in the elections, to belittle the authority of certain political forces, to gain power and other similar goals are used.

3. **Mass technology** – in this case, the main task is to influence public opinion. An example of manipulation of this kind may be strengthening of consumers' interest in low-quality production due to intensive advertising. Also spread of various far-fetched rumors, in particular, information about the so-called "Last day" should also be regarded as a model for achieving certain interests. In the course of this process, general public, having believed in the end of life on Earth, contribute to the development of consumer society, which, in particular, manifests itself in the increased demand for sedatives and drugs. This, of course, in its turn, resulting in development of certain types of business, leads to satisfaction of material interests of certain people.


This practice, being an ideological way of influence of external forces over the aspirations, morals and preferences of an individual in order to introduce alien ideas into his / her consciousness, is a complex for achieving political goals to change the way of life and mentality of a society on the basis of material, spiritual, psychological impact.

At present time both successes and failures of humanity are of global nature. Unfortunately, the establishment of cultural hegemony is becoming a widespread technology for bringing foreign territories under someone's influence, management of human consciousness.

Manipulators use manipulative technologies to achieve their geopolitical goals. These technologies have their own specifics. Each technology has a corresponding cause-effect chain (hereinafter – the chain), this observation should be extended to manipulative technologies too. Within the frames of this work, it seems appropriate to identify and explore the chain of

manipulative technology aimed at changing the worldview of young people.

The chain of manipulative technology, in our opinion, consists of the following components:



Let us briefly analyze these principles.

1. The goal is to redirect the consciousness and behavior of young people to the target geopolitical road. To do this, the following tasks are set as the main tasks:

a) First of all, study of the real spiritual and psychological atmosphere of young people for introduction into young people's minds the system of values necessary for the manipulator;

b) Definition of opportunities that have an impact on the worldview of young people but have not yet been put into practice;

c) Identification of factors and means to change the worldview of young people;

d) Elaboration and implementation of the mechanism and the complex of actions that serve for changing the worldview of youth within a specific territory;

e) Transformation of the consciousness of the youth so that its forms and content served the goals of the manipulators;

2. Before applying any technology in practice, attention is paid to the development of a set of reliable methods. This requirement is explained by the fact that they (methods) are among the central elements of the technology. When choosing a method, special attention is paid to the following four aspects :

- Each method has its own content;
- Each method is used in specific circumstances;
- Each method has its own value;
- One should not forget that each method includes different approaches and principles.

Currently, about 100 methods of manipulation are used. Within the framework of this article it is not possible to dwell on each of them, so we will bring into light some of the most widely used ones.

One of the most widely used methods is slander. According to this method, a specific person in the civic circle is said a few slanderous words about. This means his / her shortcomings (albeit fictional), failings, etc. As a result, people's opinion about this person changes to negative. Even a person who has a positive opinion about this object of slander, loses confidence in him, begins to keep aloof from him / her.

The method of praise is the opposite of the above it is mainly used in various PR campaigns. Usually the advantages and merits of the person in question are shown in an exaggerated form. Hymns of praises sound in his / her honor in the streets, public places and at public events, in mass media. As a result, a positive image of the person chosen as the object of manipulation is formed.

Another method which is often used is the method of reference to an authoritative person. It is mostly used by the people who need to create a positive opinion in a certain circle of people. According to this method, quotes from the statements of famous people are given, they are approached to get and spread their opinions on a particular topical issue. As a result, people

begin to accept these people as highly spiritual and enlightened individuals.

The way of presenting oneself as a humble, modest person is widespread in the spheres of politics and art. Some politicians, artists in order to change the attitude to themselves from negative to positive try to create an image of a person who shares the views of the main part of the population. In most cases, this method makes it easy to achieve the goal.

3. In the process of changing the worldview of young people, various tools, equipment and materials are mandatory. In this case, you should pay attention to the following important aspects. These tools and equipment are of the most modern nature. Thus, the use of modern computers enables you to deliver information to the destination quickly, secretly and without distortion. Naturally, this kind of equipment is considered an effective mechanism of action. Similarly, smartphones, tablets and other media are widely used for the same purpose.

At present, the information system covers the whole world. The Internet, cellular communication, radio and television are widely spread in the world. International, regional, group and other links have also developed dynamically.

4. The consistency of advocacy activities also deserves close attention. On the whole, the method of ensuring such consistency was developed long ago. For example, qualified German specialists showed a sequence of activities that serve the study of social reality even in the 70th of last century.

As they emphasized, the study of social reality must consist of three stages. The first of them is preparing and organizing the study. Within this time interval main aims, ideas and the main stages of the study are identified, a set of analytical actions is developed. At the second stage, empirical research is implemented (in other words, materials are collected). At the third stage the collected empirical data are analyzed. On the assumption of these factors, the manipulators pay special attention to the sequence of the ongoing propaganda process.

5. The next element is monitoring. As it is known, monitoring is a set of data that includes dynamic observations, analytical estimates and forecasts aimed at studying the state of a system. Of course, taking into account the fact that at present geopolitical forces are developing long-term strategies, the process of impact of the ongoing manipulations is constantly being monitored. The focus of the ongoing process of changing the worldview of young people is development of new technologies, abandonment of obsolete technologies, regard to the share of the youth market, constant study of their needs and desires and other similar issues.

Manipulative technologies mainly consist of the above steps. Naturally, these technologies can be enriched by various elements, as well as improved in the course of their practical implementation.

All the above-mentioned underlines once again the need for large-scale opposition to manipulative technologies, which serve as a tool for changing the consciousness and behavior of modern youth.

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IGOR DOBAYEV. JIHAD: ESSENCE, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL PRACTICE* // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.01

Keywords: jihad, Islam, Islamism, Koran, radicalism, takfir.

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Abstract. The article is concerned with emergence and evolutionary development of the term "holy war" (jihad) in Islam. There is an intrinsic interpretation of this phenomenon in early Islam and also evolutionary changes in its understanding over the next centuries. There are offered some typologies of jihad. There are considered parameters of its understanding by representatives of orthodox Islam, and then ideologists of radical Islam (Islamism). It is proved that theorists of radical Islamism peculiar define traditional sources of Islam, perceiving Quranic verses at face value, excessively expanding a circle of so-called "enemies of Islam," applying to them takfir. Ideologists of radical Takfirism demand implementation of their unreasonable claims practically, implementation against "enemies" of offensive jihad.

* Article is executed within an internal grant of SFU № БУГр-07/2017-22 "Transconflict regions as a phenomenon of the geopolitical competition: social risks and resources of adaptation to humanitarian calls."

In this regard adherents of radical Islamism are quite often and fairly called takfirists-jihadi.

According to studies of Muslim theorists concerning some aspects of the theory of jihad, the whole world is divided into "the field of Islam" (Dar al-Islam) and "the area of war" (Dar al-Harb). The countries which are under the reign of Muslims refer to the first group, the second - "unorthodox" governors. "The field of Islam" theoretically always has to be in a state of open-ended war with "Dar al-Harb". In exceptional circumstances Islam allows a standstill truce for up to ten years. Except these categories of the countries some faqihs emphasize one more category of lands - "the area of the world" (Dar al-Sulh). These are such lands which do not belong to Muslims and are not governed by them, but their governors consider themselves vassals of Muslim states and render tribute for it.

During an initial period of Islam formation "jihad" first of all was thought of as fight in defense and for distribution of Islam as exerting intensive efforts on the way of Allah that meant cosmopolitan diffusion of faith in Allah, at the same time participation in "jihad" was considered as a direct way to paradise.

It should be noted, nevertheless, that even views of the Prophet Mohammed on the essence of jihad passed over notable time evolution: during the Meccan period which passed under the slogan "there is no coercion in religion" it was forbidden to enter confrontation with "kaafirs," and it was offered to incline them to proven faith with "wisdom and good exhorting." Heathen should have been inclined to proven faith by persuasion. However already during the Medina period when there were attacks on Muslims on behalf of the Meccan kaafirs, the war was authorized: it was originally authorized to wage defensive-minded war with enemies of Islam, then to charge at recreants, but so that military operations did not fall on sacred months, and finally - to attack them at any time and everywhere.

In other words, during the Meccan revelations “jihad” was considered rather as an effort at salvation, than fight for proselyting. Moreover, during that period of time there were no concurrent views concerning obligatory participation in “jihad” for members of Muslim community. In the Medina suras of the Koran war for faith was considered to be the responsibility of adherents of Islam as sacred, it is touted as accomplishment of divine mission supported by the authority of Allah. Confirmation of these facts are in ayats 76-78, 86.

It is obvious that religious preachers seeking to use Islam for political expediency make reference to those ayats of the Koran in which it is said that implementation of only religious sacral instructions is not enough to get to paradise. And whoever believes in Allah, performs Namaz, pays expiatory almsgiving, keeps the fast during Ramazan, carries out the Hajj, but refrains from war with pagans, is afraid of armed battle, is considered as the person, choosing rather mortal life over afterlife paradise. And such behavior is unworthy of a Muslim. Therefore, the Koran gives strong means of influence on consciousness of faithful. Those Muslims who do not want to take to fighting over faith, the Koran and Sunna threaten with the same painful punishments as pagans and infidels of Islam. Those who elude the fight the Scriptures are loomed up to be turned into non-Muslims (ayat 39).

If the first Muslims declared jihad against the Arab kaafirs, and then against infidels of Islam and “hypocrites,” then after Mohammed's death similar wars for faith were waged against neighboring countries and nations and in unique historical conditions gained paramount importance in the world of Islam as performance of a sacred “holy” mission by Muslims.

Further over the course of elaboration on the concept of jihad the typology of this phenomenon in terms of object of armed attack began to include six versions: jihad against enemies of Allah (i.e. those who threaten existence of Islamic Ummah, those who pursue Muslims and also against heathen); jihad

against those who attempt inviolability of borders "Dar-al-Islam," jihad against recreants ("Munafiqun"); jihad against an oppressor ("al Bagi"); jihad against robbers; jihad against monotheists – non- Muslims refusing to pay "jizya."

However, until now owing to a certain disunity of the Islamic movement on various directions, ideological tendencies and comments (madhhab) of generally excepted classic doctrine of "jihad" it is not created, that just does not exist as there is no common orthodoxy for all Muslims. Everything is explained by the fact that Islam as an ideological system was historically formed and continues to function in fight of ideas and opinions, is in a state of search of a further way of development. In every country there are different groups which offer their way and are in favor of solution of evolving problems on the basis of the concepts offered by them. However, with reasonable certainty it is arguable that there is no single orthodoxy for all Islamic countries, all Muslims, as well as single Islamic way, nevertheless, it does not exist, and at the center of public attention there are various, quite often contradicting each other models. Told completely and utterly refers to the Islamic concept of "jihad": in Islam there is no such instance which could put the end to a dispute as to whether how it is necessary to treat and conduct holy war for faith.

Throughout all history of Islam, the concept of "jihad" exercised contradictory functions, was at the heart of domestic and foreign policy of various subjects of political process. The concept of "jihad" has various and often contradicting each other sense: it is fight for harvesting, fight against illiteracy, fight of new with old, "jihad" was considered and as class conflict.

The term "jihad" in Muslim "orthodoxy" (universally recognized Muslim "orthodoxy" really does not exist – *I. D.*) is understood as fight for faith which is conducted in the following main forms: "jihad of heart" – fight against own obliquities; "jihad of language" – "command of worthy approval and prohibition of worthy censure"; "jihad of a hand" – acceptance of

the appropriate punitive measures concerning criminals and violators of rules of morality; "jihad of a sword" – armed struggle with pagans, fallen in which it is prepared unending bliss in paradise.

According to the traditional point of view, "jihad with him / herself" is "big jihad," more difficult, than "small jihad" (the armed jihad). Besides, according to ideologists of moderate Islamism, "internal jihad," especially self-education, there is a required condition through which it is necessary to pass for achievement of "the highest degree" of religious consciousness.

However "in the European public conscience jihad ingrained first of all as "jihad of a sword" whereas, according to the Koran and Sunnah, this concept is multiple-valued." As confirmation of all that was said in particular that in orthodox Islam the institute of "jihad" does not number among five "pillars" of faith ("shahadah" – confession of faith; "salat" – a prayer; "sawm" – a fast; "zakat" – a tax in favor of the poor; "al-hajj" – a pilgrimage).

In various ideological branches of Islam (traditionalism, modernism, fundamentalism) a concept jihad is also understood differently.

In traditional Islam jihad is understood more as an effort over him-herself, but not violence against others, but "small jihad" ("jihad in the form of a sword") – as a defensive war directed against oppression of Muslims by neo-traditionalists (modern traditionalists – *I. D.*) concerning one of the main Islamic edicts – conducting jihad it is preached the principle: "There is no coercion in religion." In this regard, though conducting "holy war" (jihad) is recognized as the Muslim's duty, proceeding from ideas that the mankind is divided into religious and unjust Muslims – unorthodox who are subject to conversion in any ways and sometimes even violent, nevertheless, jihad in traditional Islam, unlike fundamentalism, is perceived as an effort over him-herself, but not violence against others, but "small jihad" ("jihad in the form of a sword") – as a defensive war directed against

oppression of Muslims. Though in conditions of serious upheavals, positions of traditionalists concerning jihad can rally with views of fundamentalists.

The modern Turkish traditionalist Haruna Yaha understands jihad as "true" sees "any kind of ideologic fight against antireligious, atheistic, unholy teachings." Along with the above mentioned interpretations of jihad he also understands this term as a real war which "according to commands of the Koran can be only defensive and be conducted with adherence to moral principles of Islam. Using of the concept "jihad" in relation to any forms of violence directed against innocent people that is for the description of terror, is the greatest injustice and perversion of the truth."

In contrast with traditionalists and especially fundamentalists, reformers (modernists) claim that Islam is the religion of universal humanity (insaniya) preaching universal brotherhood. Insaniya is opposed to nationalism by modernists as the ideology dividing mankind. Proceeding from such paradigm, reformers insist that religious tolerance is a fundamental principle of Islam. Hence, for example, "jihad" is interpreted or as exclusively defensive war, or as "fight" for economic prosperity, or as fight for spiritual renewal. So, for example, the modern Muslim reformer Fazlur Rahman even insists on the necessity of "intellectual jihad": "Holy war" of this type has to be directed to change rules of the past according to new circumstances (assuming that these changes do not break general traditional principles and values) and at the same time to change modern situation where it is required to bring it balance accord with these general principles and values."

Then, fundamentalists consider jihad, first of all, as armed struggle. This circumstance, we think, is explained by those purposes and objectives which are set itself by fundamentalism as an ideological tendency. If traditionalists support saving of that version of Islam which developed in the certain territory today, and modernists defend an evolutionary way of its development, then fundamentalist "revolutionaries" demand

return to the past, in so-called "Golden Age" (7th century) of Islam. It stands to reason that, the voluntary valuable and worldwide outcome of modern people in earlier Middle Ages is hardly possible therefore it is not dismissed use of violence in some form by moderate fundamentalists and their radical adherents.

Jihad is an indispensable attribute practically of all modern ideological doctrines of Islamic radicals (Islamists). As the authoritative Israeli researcher of radical Islam E. Sivan emphasizes, "the theory of jihad in interpretation of Islamic radicals is premised on the idea that the conflict is and will be the rule, at least, until the Messiah (Mahdi) does not come to the end of the world. Therefore Islamists consider that only holy war in its power perception can be the unique answer of the Muslim world to the present regimes in the countries of Islam distribution where western ideals dominate. Only after overthrow of these regimes and restoration of unity of all Muslims as it was during the gold era of Caliphates, peaceful relationship can be established in Ummah."

Islamic radicals actually consider "jihad" the sixth "pillar" of faith. Such understanding of "jihad," as well as broad interpretation of the term "takfir" (accusation of distrust) differs Islamists from orthodox Muslims.

At the same time moderate Islamists put emphasis on the defensive nature of jihad, and ultra-radicals - exclusively on offensive aspect of "holy war."

"In Sharia language, - the most authoritative theorist and practitioner in the Islamic world of a moderate and radical wing Pakistani al-Maududi writes, - the word "jihad" is used for war which is waged for the sake of Allah against those who are Islam's enemies.... if the Islamic State takes fire from non-Muslims, in that case everyone has to come down on the side of jihad. In case of overextension for resistance, the neighboring Muslim states have to help their religious duty consists in it. If they fail, then Muslims of the whole world have to fight against

common enemy. Jihad is the same duty of a Muslim, as well as a daily prayer and a fast. Those who back out it, is a sinner.” However, the same author always consistently opposed creation of the Islamic State by force. In one of his lectures, addressing youth audience, for achievement of the tasks which faces Islamic society, he did not recommend to carry out activities in the form of secret groups and urged to exclude use of violence and weapon to change the established order. Moreover, the violent method is characterized as hasty and unrealistic though he, it would seem, also means achievement of an objective in the shortest route. According to him, the most acceptable decision for the Muslim community and everyone who is engaged in distribution of Islamic appeal it is holding a peaceful and right revolution as its ultimate goal by means of open and broadest promotion turned to minds and hearts of people.

“Jihad in Islam, the Egyptian Islamic theorist of the moderate direction al-Ashmavi writes, is completely defined by Hadith of Prophet who addressed believers after fight close to Badra where they won: “We returned from Small jihad – to Great jihad.” And war against enemies in which life and property is exposed to the risk, it is smaller, small jihad from the point of view of correct (orthodox – *I. D.*) Islam. As for the real Great jihad, this resistance of soul to tests, overriding of the damnable temperamental attribute and behavior by a person, contributing to that the temper [human] towered, schooling of own spirit to generosity.”

This Hadith is at all ignored by ultra-radicals. They not only do not accept division of jihad into “big” and “small,” but also categorically deny its defensive character. The most authoritative theorist of this wing of radicals Egyptian Seyyid Kutub categorically didn’t favor the defensive nature of jihad: “... If we inevitably have to call the movement of Jihad in Islam a defensive movement, then we have to change a sense of the word “defense” and understand it as “protection of a person” ... Islam, heading for the world, does not mean that cheap world which

aim comes down only to securing the territory in which the population which conceived Islamic teaching lives. Islam wishes such world in the shadows of which all religion would completely belong to Allah, so that people, all people of this world would worship only Allah ...".

S. Kutub's conception divided society into two types: Islamic society in which only Allah's power is admitted and Sharia functions, and society of jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic heathenry) in which people create laws and break the main principle of monotheism – autocracy of Allah (hakimiyya). Relying on such conclusion, most modern societies is pagan, including those which consider themselves Islamic, but do not live according to Sharia. Denial of hakimiyya, in fact, means apostasy propelling into unbelief. Islam and jahiliyyah are absolutely incompatible systems between which any peaceful co-existence or gradual transformation of jahiliyyah in Islam is impossible. It is possible to restore Allah's power on the earth only after jahiliyyah is destroyed by force, and participation in this fight is a duty of each Muslim.

S. Kutub offered the following strategy for the Islamic movement.

First, as in jahiliyyah society in general there are no visions of Islam, it is useless to demand introduction of Sharia-based ruling or to try to commit coup d'état for that purpose. It is necessary to begin with an explanation of the principles of Islam, and especially – the ideas of autocracy of Allah.

Secondly, those who accepted this appeal as though accepted Islam again and, therefore, have to behave according to the principles of "true" Muslims. For this purpose, such believers need to leave jahiliyyah society, but not literally, and in the way of the "spiritual gap" which does not exclude contacts in vital and everyday issues.

Thirdly, after the community of "true Muslims" will reach necessary spiritual and moral level, it is necessary to start creation of the Islamic organization – the particular vanguard

aimed at overthrowing jahiliyyah and establishing Allah's power on the earth.

Fourthly, on initial stage of such activity it is necessary to avoid direct collision with the regime as it can lead to death - blow for even weak Islamic movement.

Fifthly, when the Islamic movement reaches required force and power, it is necessary to begin jihad in its power, offensive understanding, without any concessions and indulgence.

Ideas of Seyyid Kutub were developed by Muhammad abdal-Salam Faraj who in the late 1970s of the 20th century founded the ultraradical group "Al-Jihad" in Egypt, which especially actively operated in the last quarter of the last century and concerning murder of the president Anwar Sadat.

The novelty of views of A. Faraj unlike Hassan al-Banna and Seyyid Kutub's concepts consisted in utter Salafi character. He proved each statement by ayats of the Koran and dictas of the prophet Mohammed and also creative legacy of such Ulemas of the past as Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Kasir and Ibn al-Jawzi. Until the end of the 1980s the book of A. Faraj "Al-Fareeda of al-Gaiba" was almost the main ideological source of Al-Jihad.

A. Faraj as the main ideologist of the organization, analyzed all the experience of radical Islamism of the 60-70s, evidenced in the works of Seyyid Kutub, S alih Sariyya, Shukri Mustafa formulated classic basic principles of radical Islamism of Sunni sense. A. Faraj's ideas serve as the ideological platform of activity of most modern radical groups.

So, he considered that any Muslim ignoring Sharia - is "pagan, it is necessary to make war with him until he returns to Court of Allah and his envoy and will stop judging neither in big, nor in small other court".

Speaking about modern governors of Egypt, A. Faraj claims that they "have nothing from Islam, except Muslim names", and reckons them among secession (murtaddyn). A secessionist, he notes, is worse, than "unfaithful by birth" (i.e. the Christian, the Jew and so on) as they can not to know Islam, and a secessionist

consciously abjures a religion, knowing about its virtues. In reference to the opinion of founders-eponyms of Sunni madhhab, A. Faraj writes that Christians and Jews "unfaithful by birth" who are the patronized community cannot be killed. It is permitted to execute a secessionist, "he has no right to settle property on someone, his marriage loses legitimacy as he rejected basis of Islam, he is worse than a kaafir."

Having accused the Egyptian regime of infidelity, A. Faraj justified validity of the armed jihad with authorities from the religious point of view. In his work "The forgotten debt" he writes: "Today, despite all importance of jihad on which the future of Islam depends some Ulemas neglect this duty, knowing that it is the only way to ennoble Islam again... Without any doubts, today idolatry on the earth can be overthrown only by sword force."

According to A. Faraj while Ummah is under the reign of the incorrect regime, implementation of only five pillars of Islam becomes insufficient. In these conditions jihad as armed struggle automatically becomes the sixth pillar of Islam. Besides, jihad in A. Faraj's conception gets the offensive character. According to his opinion, "war in Islam is waged for the confirmation of a word of Allah on the earth both as the defensive, and offensive way ... Islam extended by a sword, however infidel imams conceal it ... Muslims are under the obligation to unsheathe their swords and to direct them to the regimes which cover the truth."

The general strategy of jihad according to A. Faraj is defined by ideas of "the near enemy" (Muslims who do not share ideological principles and actions of radicals), "the distant enemy" (non-Muslim opponents of radicals, first of all, representatives of the Western Christian civilization) and about jihad as an individual duty for each Muslim. According to A. Faraj, jihad becomes obligatory in three cases:

- If two armies met, then a Muslim mustn't leave his files;
- If pagans attacked the Muslim state;
- If the imam called his community for jihad.

In addition, A. Faraj mentions one more condition – the fourth. Relying on it if the governor of the Muslim state rejected the reign according to Sharia, then such governor must be overthrown, and jihad becomes an individual duty. For its maintaining special permission of Ulemas is not even necessary, jihad becomes the same individual duty as a fast and a prayer.

However, at the turn of 80–90s of the 20th century the new leader of Al-Jihad Abbud az-Zumr fulfilled the ideological doctrine of organization with new conceptions. Apart from him, Tarik az-Zumr was one more productive author of the movement. By the end of the 90s the new ideas were suggested by one of the leaders of foreign authorities of “Al-Jihad” Ayman al-Zawahiri who is nowadays considered as the main ideologist of Al-Qaeda and the “the World Front of Jihad” created by Osama bin Laden.

Their features of concept’s representation of jihad almost do not differ from A. Faraj’s ideas. So, according to Abbud az-Zumr, jihad is also *fard al-ayn* – an individual duty of each Muslim who has to participate in it to the best of his ability. Other theorist of Islamism Tarik az-Zumr considers that the highest demonstration of all forms of jihad is an armed struggle. He picks up sharply those leaders from among Islamic radicals who limit themselves to ideological fight. Moreover, jihad in that case has offensive character, and it is optionally that pagans were first who initiated attack, “it is enough that they only have some features of those people with who it is necessary to conduct war.”

Ideologists of the organization back up their conclusions with religious arguments, referring to a number of authoritative Ulemas of the Muslim past among whom there are Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Kasir, Al-Qurtubi, An-Nawawi, etc. As a result, it is concluded that jihad becomes a duty of each Muslim in the following cases:

- When the head of the state is *kaffir*, so it is necessary to fight for his overthrow

- Jihad is conducted with the community backing out of Shariah injunctions. They are security guards, police and prosecutor's office members;

- Jihad is necessary for establishment of power of the Muslim Caliph. Relying on Ibn-Taymiyyah's opinion, Tarik az-Zumr supposes that force is necessary for implementation of such Sharia injunctions as "command of good and prohibition of impious, establishment of justice, Hajj, Friday prayer, help dejected, enforcement of punishments."

It is worth noting here that Al-Jihad rejects tactics of gradual "Islamization from below." Such strategy is based on society's change by means of exercising of Islamic appeal. However, Al-Jihad considers that it is difficult to change society until it is under the reign of the regime of pagans, capable to apply and use various methods preventing peaceful Islamization. According to ideologists of organization, the strategy of "Islamization from below" shows its restraint in activity of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Jamaats. The first ones become isolated by frameworks of the intellectuals and pull away from masses, the second ones almost lost grip of reality. Moreover, any participation in parliamentary activity is unacceptable for Al-Jihad: it would mean the recognition that Allah is not a source of laws, and his creation.

At the same time, in the late 1990s the outstanding theorist and the leader of Al-Jihad Ayman al-Zawahiri put forward the idea of global jihad, first of all, with "the distant enemy" - alliance of global kufr. He means preeminently, the countries of the West, first the USA and Israel; now Russia was included in this list which, according to Islamists, adhered to this union. A. al-Zawahiri writes, "it is not necessary to consider that fight for creation of the Islamic State is a regional war. The alliance of crusaders and Zionists headed by the USA will not allow Muslim forces to come to power in any Muslim country. We need to prepare that this fight will not take place within one region, it will be conducted both against the internal enemy - recreants,

and against external one – alliance of crusaders and Zionists.” According to him, jihad with “the distant enemy” cannot be postponed as the alliance of Jews and crusaders does not give either time, or chances to produce defeat to “the internal enemy.” Therefore A. al-Zawahiri suggests moving this war beyond the Islamic world to the territory of the enemy. In particular, he supported bringing successful jihad for liberation of Muslims from Afghanistan and Chechnya and to transfer it from the outskirts of the Islamic world to its heart.

After terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001 and the beginning of anti-terrorist operation A. al-Zawahiri called destruction of two New York skyscrapers a blessed deal and the ultimate in fight between Muslim Ummah and forces of great pagan kufr. He blamed J. Bush for the fact that he openly announced a new crusade against Islam under the mask of fight against terrorism. A. al-Zawahiri in his new book “Al-Wala Wal Bara” emphasizes that nowadays each Muslim has to counter invaders using hands, language or at least thoughts. In his book he published a specific fatwah in which it is said that for a Muslim is forbidden to take up with kaffirs, it is necessary to keep any secrets of Muslims. It is forbidden to do any business with kaffirs. It is forbidden to perceive any theories and the ideas of infidels. It is forbidden to help kaffirs with their war with Muslims and somehow acquit crusaders. It was ruled to Muslims to conduct jihad with faithless aggressors, secession and hypocrites (the two latter are meant as the Arab regimes which provided their territory for an anti-terrorist campaign and also the Ulemas publishing false fatwahs bought by the authorities).

Al-Jihad was one of the first which also put forth an idea of creation of a united front of Islamic organizations. In April, 1991 Abbud az-Zumr started a project of creation of the Islamic front. According to him, the organization realized that today it is extremely necessary to unite various Islamic organizations as “extensiveness of the challenge is too big to cope with it using forces of any one group apart.” Besides, the modern political

situation leads to such measures, that is: rapprochement of Russia and USA and acceleration of European integration. At the same time apparent priority in such front is given to radical, "jihadist" groups.

In February, 1998 "a terrorist number one" of that time Osama bin Laden managed to unite a number of extremist Islamic groups around the organization of Afghan Arabs Al-Qaeda which was earlier created by him, having made the "World Islamic front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders" which achieved prominence as World Front of Jihad (WFJ). Besides it founding parties of the "front" were: the head of the Egyptian organization "Al-Jihad" doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri; chairman of the advisory board of the al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya Rifai Ahmed Taha Moussa (Egypt); secretary of the Pakistani Islamic organization "Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan" ("Association of Ulemas of Pakistan") sheikh Mir Hamza; leader of the Pakistani movement "Harakat Al-Ansar" Fazlur Rahman and leader of the movement Jihad from Bangladesh Muhammad abd-al-Salam. MFJ also included the Pakistani organization "Al-Hadis," Libyan "al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya," Jordanian "Bayat al Imam" ("Swear of the imam"), the Algerian "Armed Islamic group," the Yemen Jihad, Lebanese Asbat al-Ansar, Jamaa Islamiyya, etc.

A. al-Zawahiri considers important for the strategy of the jihadist movement two moments. First, it has to grow constantly, change and be updated. Secondly, it is necessary to cultivate inflexibility, patience and firmness in mujahads. The main priority of the strategy of movement he sees military underground activity. In particular, he points that fighting groups of the jihadist movement have to use any weapon which is available or is not available and even forbidden. All known forms and ways of conducting effective war have to become a part of modern strategy. A. al-Zawahiri suggests to begin with the simplest and "easy" things: "Kill Americans with bullets, knives, packed mix of explosive, beat them with iron rods and throw Molotov cocktails." He suggests to focus on the following

tasks. First, it is necessary to concentrate on carrying out large-scale actions with a large number of victims, huge human losses are important. Such actions impress the western society, and give people pause for thought. It is the only language which the West understands today. Secondly, when conducting combat operations, it is necessary to found on actions of shahids (kamikaze). Such operations do not demand big losses from Muslims, but inflict heavy losses for the opponent. Thirdly, actions should be carefully prepared, it is necessary to carry out an authentic analysis of enemy's opportunities, his capabilities and between wind and water. Fourthly, elaboration of accurate strategy and ideology of fight is essential. Today fight "for our holy places, our homeland, houses, riches – this is a war of each Muslim, young and old." Each Muslim takes responsibility for protection of Islam and its relics. We have to give the society strong and expert leaders, to show the obvious enemy and to burst fear fetters.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2019.03.002. GALINA DENISOVA, ANATOLY LUBSKY, VALERIA VOYTENKO. INTER-ETHNIC INTERACTION IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA AS A SUBJECT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH // *"Gumanitarniy Yuga Rossii," Rostov-on-Don, 2018, Vol. 7, № 6, P. 41–56.*

Keywords: South Russia, inter-ethnic interaction, scientific research, national policy, regional multi-ethnic communities, ethnic politics, regional conflictogenity, nationalism, xenophobia, terrorist threat, migration policy, ethnic and political monitoring.

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Currently, the authors note, there has been actualization of cognitive interest in the problems associated with inter-ethnic

interactions in the regions of the Russian Federation. This interest is due to the fact that in the context of the challenges faced by modern Russia, it is necessary to solve the problems aimed at strengthening the unity of the multinational people of the Russian Federation on the basis of harmonization of inter-ethnic relations in Russian society.

The scientific literature considered various aspects of implementation of the national policy aimed at regulating inter-ethnic relations in Russia. Some authors, positively assessing the targets of national policy, believe that there has not been adequately worked out the mechanism for ensuring relationship of the processes related to strengthening of the unified Russian civil consciousness and preservation of ethnic and cultural diversity of the Russian society. This is largely due to the fact that certain doctrinal foundations of national policy at the stage of its formation were not the result of an equitable dialogue between the state and the society, as well as Federal and regional authorities. Multi-ethnic regional communities in the South of Russia, the authors emphasize, are among the most sensitive to the issues of Federal structure and implementation of national policy at the regional level.

A number of issues related to inter-ethnic relations in Southern Russia in the early XXI century have already been set in the scientific literature. Describing the current ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus Federal District, the authors considered positive and negative scenarios of its development, analyzing the constructive and destructive factors affecting its dynamics. Among the constructive factors of the positive scenario for the development of the district the researchers named, on the one hand, strengthening of the Federal government, law and order; effective functioning of the North Caucasian Federal District aimed at reduction regional conflictogenity, security ensuring, fight against crime and corruption; elimination of the terrorist threat; neutralization of nationalism and xenophobia. On the other hand, they singled out as a constructive factor such

form of macro-regional ethno-cultural loyalty existing in the North Caucasus, which manifests itself in the combination of ethnic, regional and all-Russian civil identities. In this case the authors stressed that the strategy of strengthening the all-Russian civil identity is exigent for prevention and resolution of ethno-political conflicts.

The system analysis of the current situation in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations in the North Caucasus and the Southern Federal districts allowing to identify the factors of inter-ethnic conflictogenity in regional communities, as well as the role of authorities and civil society institutions in the management of inter-ethnic relations is also of scientific interest. Considering the reasons of ethno-social inefficiency of administrative decisions in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations in the regions, the researchers note first of all insufficient attention of public authorities to national and cultural needs and civil rights, underestimation of conflictogenic potential among young people, low control of internal migration. In this regard, in the multi-ethnic regions in the South of Russia, it is necessary to establish a system of ethno-political monitoring of inter-ethnic relations in order to de-escalate the inter-ethnic tension, as well as intensify dialogue and interaction of the regional authorities, ethnic and civil organizations.

Considering the dynamics of the ethno-political situation in the North Caucasus, the authors generally conclude that tension is expected to increase there in the near future. The negative consequences caused by the global crisis and economic sanctions, as well as the unpredictability and complexity of international foreign policy relations will inevitably lead to ethno-political instability and strengthening of crisis processes in the North Caucasus.

Recently, a number of scientific articles prepared on the basis of expert surveys on inter-ethnic tension and ethnosocial processes in the South of Russia have been published. Experts ambiguously assess the level of inter-ethnic tension in the South

of Russia, determined by the objectives, value and ideological orientations and needs of ethnic groups. Most experts believe that economic, political and ethno-cultural mechanisms only do not suffice to prevent inter-ethnic tension in the South of Russia. In this regard, experts consider it appropriate to expand the political, legal and scientific tools based on sociological and socio-psychological methods of studying the inter-ethnic tension, in order to reduce the conflictogenic potential of inter-ethnic interactions in regional communities. Economic, migration and ethno-confessional factors have a great influence on ethnic tensions in the regions.

Scientific literature pays special attention to formal and informal institutional practices related to regulation of inter-ethnic interactions and resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts, prevention of nationalism and xenophobia, as well as development of dialogue forms of inter-ethnic interaction in multi-ethnic communities. The researchers rightly point out that no institutional practices of harmonization of inter-ethnic relations will have a positive effect without a conflictological examination of the challenges, threats and risks in the ethno-political sphere.

Institutional practices related to prevention and resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts in the South of Russia are a traditional subject of scientific literature of a conflictological nature. Informal peacemaking practices are of particular importance in settlement of ethnic conflicts in regional communities in the North Caucasus. The activities of national cultural organizations and ethnic diasporas in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations in the South of Russia also attract the attention of researchers. The main objectives of the activities of diasporas within the ethno-cultural movement are preservation and development of ethnic language and ethnic traditions; creation of cultural centers, funds and institutions of culture and education; promotion of citizens' participation in educational and charitable activities; organization of ethno-cultural events and festivals. Within the framework of

the ethno-cultural movement, the main tasks of diasporas are protection of civil rights and freedoms; fight against nationalism and racism; development of cooperation with other national associations; protection of the interests of autonomy members in governing institutions. Recently, the attention of researchers has been drawn to the issues related to the activities of ethnic diasporas in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations: social reproduction and integration of diasporas, diasporas as a factor of formation and preservation of ethnic identity, the role of diasporas in the integration of migrants into host communities.

In connection with the growth of migration flows in the South of Russia, the researchers turned to study of the impact of these flows on inter-ethnic relations in regional communities. Their attention was primarily focused on such issues as implementation of national policies and management practices in the field of regulation of migration flows in the context of inter-ethnic relations, the role of civil society institutions in the management of migration processes, labor migration and peculiarities of labor adaptation of ethnic migrants, peculiarities of criminal models of migrants' economic behavior. In addition, sociological works highlighted a number of issues related to the study of the conflictogenic potential of ethnic migrants and their relations with the host communities in the South of Russia.

The authors of the article emphasize that the majority of studies of inter-ethnic interactions in the South of Russia are characterized by disciplinary fragmentation of the obtained scientific knowledge and paradigm limitation of research practices. The challenge posed to social sciences by the complexity of inter-ethnic interactions in regional communities in the South of Russia involves the study of these interactions within the framework of conceptual thinking as a holistic ethno-social reality. Research practices in the study of inter-ethnic interactions in the South-Russian regions need to develop multidimensional methodological constructs in the framework of

interdisciplinary social and humanitarian research, this is the conclusion the authors came to.

Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich

2019.03.003. LIUDMILA BARAKHOEVA, MARINA ARSELGOVA. PROBLEMS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPUBLIC OF INGUSHETIA // "Vestnik Volzhskogo universiteta imeni V.N. Tatishcheva", Tolyatti, 2018, № 3, Vol. 2, P. 232–235.

Keywords: region, regional economy, the Republic of Ingushetia, demography, socioeconomic development of the region, social and economic indicators, gross regional product, agriculture, investment, standard of living, quality of life.

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At the present stage of development of the national and regional economies in the context of the economic crisis and structural transformations, the task of socio-economic development of the region is especially urgent. For successful development of the region and improvement of living conditions of the population, a detailed analysis of the socio-economic situation is necessary and the results of it should determine the goals and directions, elaboration of programs and measures for further development.

The Republic of Ingushetia is a constituent entity of the Russian Federation and a part of the North Caucasus Federal District, it was formed on June 4, 1992 and is located in the central part of the northern slopes of the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range. Its area is only 3.6 thousand km². This is the smallest constituent entity of the Russian Federation (0.02% of the country's territory). The republic counts 45 municipalities, including 4 municipal districts, 4 urban districts, 1 urban settlement and 36 rural settlements.

The geological potential of the territory of the republic reveals itself in the availability of deposits of oil, gas, marble, dolomites, thermal healing and mineral waters, pure mountain spring water.

At the beginning of 2017, the population numbered 480.5 thousand people, of which 41.8% are urban. As of 01.01.2017, the republic ranked 5th among the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in terms of population density (132.4 people per 1 km²), next to the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sevastopol and the Moscow region. The republic is mono-ethnic: the Ingush dominate in the national composition (94.1% according to the 2010 census).

The Republic of Ingushetia is one of the regions with a favorable demographic situation. In general, the dynamics shows positive changes in mortality and birth rates. The peak of the birth rate was registered in 2010 and 2011, in subsequent years, there has been a decline, nevertheless in terms of this indicator the region is numbered among the leaders. In 2016, the natural population growth amounted to 13 people per 1000 people population (3rd place in the Russian Federation).

The mortality rate in the dynamics for 2000–2016 has a positive trend. Thus, in 2016, the total mortality rate in the Republic of Ingushetia was 3.3. This is the lowest rate in the country. In 2016, compared with 2000, there was a decrease in mortality for all classes of causes of death. Due to the decrease in mortality, the indicator of life expectancy at birth in 2016 was

77.35 years for men and 83.62 years for women. According to this indicator, the Republic of Ingushetia ranks 1st in the Russian Federation (however, low mortality rates can be explained by the underestimation of deaths due to religious traditions, as well as in connection with the practice of traveling outside the region in search of qualified medical care).

The composition of the population of the Republic of Ingushetia is characterized by gender imbalance. As of January 1, 2017, the share of men in the total population was 45.33%. In 2016, there were 1,206 women per 1,000 men. The numerical excess of women over men in the population has been observed for already 5 years and is increasing with age. This is partially explained by both the inattentive attitude of men to their own health and migration from the region in search of work. The growing gender imbalance in the existing religious and socio-cultural traditions in the region can lead to deterioration in the physical, mental and social well-being of women, as well as to a number of other negative consequences.

According to UN criteria, a population is considered old if the proportion of people aged 65 and over in the entire population exceeds 7%. In 2016, 5.77% of the population of the Republic of Ingushetia was at the age of 65 years or more (14.21% for the Russian Federation). The demographic burden indicator in 2016 was 704 people per 1000 people of working age (740 for the Russian Federation). The proportion of the population over working age for the period from 2000 to 2016 was on a growth trend (from 8.1% in 2000 to 12% in 2016); the proportion of the population younger than working age decreased by 5.1 percentage points. The working-age population in 2016 increased by 1.2 percentage points as compared with 2000. The age structure over the past 3 years suggests that, in the long term, changes in the age composition of the population will be favorable.

The following economic conditions are characteristic of the republic: favorable conditions for the development of agriculture,

tourism, and the spa sector; peripheral position; insufficient qualification of labor resources in the context of excess of working resource; poorly developed infrastructure; ethno-cultural specificity.

The main features of the modern structure of the economy of the Republic of Ingushetia are: a high share of the sector "state administration and military security, social insurance"; a relatively small share of the agriculture sector. The main specialization of agriculture in the Republic of Ingushetia is cultivation of fruits and vegetables, grain crops, fine fleece sheep breeding and cattle breeding.

The level and quality of life reflect the degree of satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of people and are manifested in the quantity and quality of goods and services consumed by a person. To analyze the level and quality of life, the following indicators were analyzed: consumption of basic foodstuffs per capita, real incomes of the population, per capita incomes of the population, real accrued wages, real size of accrued pensions, Gini coefficient, ratio of funds and the share of the population with incomes below the cost of living in the total population.

In general, we can conclude that the diet is not balanced enough as for the products most important and necessary for life and health. The main problem in the region is associated with insufficient consumption of meat, fish, and fruit. The main obstacle to have a full and balanced diet for the population of both the region and the Russian Federation as a whole is income restriction. One of the main factors characterizing consumption is the per capita income of the population. For 2000–2016 per capita incomes were tending to grow. However, real cash income, characterizing the change in the income of the population, taking into account the consumer price index, has a negative trend in dynamics. Dynamics in Ingushetia for 2000–2016 demonstrates an increase in population inequality in terms of incomes.

On the basis of the results of the analysis of individual indicators of the socio-economic situation of the Republic of Ingushetia for the period from 2000 to 2016 we can distinguish the following groups of problems requiring implementation within the framework of the region's development strategy: social, economic, and infrastructural.

The main economic problems are: subsidized budget, low self-sufficiency of the region for certain types of food, a high degree of depreciation of fixed assets, an increase in the size of the informal sector, etc. To solve economic problems, it is necessary to strengthen innovative activity in industry and agriculture, expand the market capacity due to export growth, increase labor productivity, etc.

The infrastructure problems: instability in the supply of electricity, gas and water in certain settlements of the region; the need to expand and repair a number of roads, etc.

The main social problems that exacerbate economic problems and have a direct impact on the political situation in the region are: high unemployment and rising income inequality.

One of the main directions of development of the region should include the following: development of social policies aimed at increasing the welfare of the population, ensuring a high level and quality of life, creating conditions for the adequate functioning of the institution of the family, social support for citizens, and increasing the quality of social services. Political stability and civil accord in the region directly depend on the success of social policy.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. TURKMENISTAN:
YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW. ANALYTICAL REVIEW // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.02

Keywords: Turkmenistan (RT), perestroika, S. Niyazov, authoritarian regime, G. Berdymuhamedov, innovative international policy of cultural unification, state neutrality, foreign economic activity, Russia, Central Asia, South Asia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, U.S.A., transit of energy carriers, gas pipelines, security.

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Abstract. This review examines inner processes in Turkmenistan in the years of perestroika. It also analyzes changes in the elite structures in the late 1980s – early 1990s and characterizes the authoritarian regime of S. Niyazov. Talking about the present development stage of Turkmenistan, the review discloses the basic aspects of the new comprehensive innovative policy of cultural unification pursued by the President of Turkmenistan G. Berdymuhamedov. Special attention is devoted to the economic problems of the republic, specifically to the priority branch today – the gas industry.

Introduction

Looking through recent publications on Turkmenistan it should be noted, first of all, that political and economic observers, above all, turn to one of the most discussed subject today, namely, authoritarian power in the country. The powerful structures of the republic were not interested in the openness of society and political culture, and were striving to consolidate the

positions they had gained. The more open and liberal strata of society wishing to change the positions of the state authorities had no levers to bring pressure to bear on the powers that be. From the point of view of today and with account of the centralization and personification of power, as well as the character of the leader, the chance for an alternative and more open development of the political system and political culture was hardly possible. Researchers show the basic aspects of the new complex innovative international policy of cultural unification proclaimed by the President of Turkmenistan G. Berdymuhamedov. In its foreign economic policy of the country the priority was taken by the diversification of gas transportation routes to foreign markets.

Turkmenistan during Perestroika Years (1990–1991)

A researcher from the Czech Republic (Prague University) asserts that in the late years of the existence of the Soviet Union Turkmenistan revealed quite clearly a trend to the authoritarian development of the state system, which became fully pronounced after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. He examined the problems which brought the country to an authoritarian regime. The personal characteristic features of the first person of the state proved to be the essential factors. It was these features that prevented alternative possibilities to develop. The researcher supposes that the events of 1989–1991 determine to this day the present development trend of the republic and its political culture, moreover, the country's development for several decades ahead.

An analysis of the intra-elite struggle in Turkmenistan by the end of the Soviet period shows that in the period of Brezhnev's stagnation stability was one of the decisive factors of the entire Soviet and the Central Asian areas. For this purpose persons close to Brezhnev have been elected, just as in the case of Sh. Rashidov in Uzbekistan or persons who had to balance

various elite groupings. The latter factor was behind the appointment of M. Gapurov, First Secretary of the CC CP of Turkmenistan. He was a representative of a definite elite grouping, opposing the central Akhal-Tekin clan. Realizing the striving of the central clans for power he subjected the brightest representatives of them to reprisals, especially those from the cultural elite.

The career of the future First Secretary of the CC CP of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov, too, shaped in this medium. The future President of the country worked at the time at the CC CP of Turkmenistan, and in 1980 became the First Secretary of the Ashkhabad Regional Committee as a representative of the clan of the capital city. In 1984 he became the First person of the republic, despite the fact that he originated from the noble Akhal-Tekin family. In order to strengthen his loyalty to the Center S. Niyazov stayed for a probation term in Moscow for a year. Thus, the central authorities received a quite loyal figure to preserve calm in the far-off republic. S. Niyazov well understood his role and up to the end of the Soviet Union played it well enough. He remained more loyal to Moscow bosses than to the representatives of his own local clan. He was not a typical perestroika leader, and from the very beginning stemmed any attempts to promote an alternative development in the country. He had practically no people reliable enough in Turkmenistan whom he could trust one hundred percent, therefore, not wishing to lose power, he had to control unilaterally all major political, personnel and ideological processes in the republic.

To the above-mentioned factors we should add certain character traits of S. Niyazov himself, who was rather harsh and strict to his subordinates, on the one hand, and on the other, quite loyal toward higher persons and institutions.

On the basis of a psychological analysis of S. Niyazov's person, one can safely say that the latter aspect played the key role in the establishment of political culture of independent Turkmenistan. The personal factor, historical experience and

political culture in the country have become the reasons for suppressing any trend potentially threatening S. Niyazov's position in his republic, and subsequently the establishment of his personal power in the already independent state, the Czech researcher asserts.

He shows that in 1989–1991 there were certain trends in the country alternative to power, especially among Turkmen intellectuals, and attempts were made to participate more actively in the perestroika processes in the republic. Groups were formed alternative to the existing power, which were suppressed. One of them was “Agzybirlik” (“Unity”). They were engaged in reviving Turkmen culture, developing the Turkmen language, and discussing Turkmen history, especially that of the 19th and 20th century. In 1989 the Party of democratic development of Turkmenistan was founded, which had time to hold three congresses in three years (1989–1991). The party was headed by the teacher at the Polytechnical Institute D. Khojamammedov, a well-known opposition leader. The Turkmen Writers' Union has become another center of alternative views and direct opposition to Niyazov. Members of the Turkmen Writers' Union and other unions of creative professions were connected with “Agzybirlik” and other opposition trends. Some writers openly expressed displeasure with S. Niyazov's regime, and the newspaper *Edebiyat ve Sungat* has become a platform for manifestation of these sentiments. Among the alternative movements of opposition was also a non-official discussion club *Paikhas* created at the Republican Academy of Sciences in 1991, which was chaired by the well-known historian and demographer Sh. Kadyrov. This relatively small group proved able to popularize its ideas in the Turkmen mass media, which were not yet suppressed by the Niyazov censorship. But some time later all these groups were suppressed, and Kadyrov himself was forced to emigrate in 1992.

The Czech author notes an attempt to work out a joint platform uniting all opposition forces. In August 1990 a meeting

of representatives of all opposition groups took place. However, the weakness of the opposition and its very limited influence on the situation in the country and the absence of unity among its leaders were clearly demonstrated. On the other hand, Niyazov felt more confident of his position with a well-consolidated entourage, and, what is more important, with a quite strong repressive apparatus. Using the inability of the opposition forces and their disunity Niyazov was able to legitimize his leadership at the presidential elections in October 1990.

After the proclamation of Turkmenistan's sovereignty in 1990, the gap between the supporters of the conservative order and the alternative movement began to be seen and felt much clearer. The opposition was suppressed by various means: one of them was a ban on the publication of articles and other material by potentially influential authors in republican newspapers and magazines, let alone appear on TV.

From 1990-1993 onward arrests began under all and sundry pretexts of the most popular representatives of "Agzybirlik," including Khojamammedov himself. The Democratic Development party actually stopped its legal activity in the spring of 1992 in connection with the general onslaught against all opposition structures in the country.

Niyazov succeeded to use the state coercive mechanism in order to stem or limit the influence of the alternative centers of thinking. The intellectual groups were now able to use partly the central Soviet press to express their views and ideas, however, they had no levers of influence to change the situation in the republic. A certain role was played by disunity and atomism of the groups opposing Niazov. Besides, they had no support from most regions of the republic.

In the conditions of the absence of support from Moscow after the abortive attempt at the coup in August 1991, the repressive and authoritarian method of ruling the country became the only possible way to keep power in his hands. His positions in Turkmenistan itself have strengthened so much that

neither the opposition nor any other clan structure was able to undertake any steps to prevent the switch-over to authoritarianism. The events of the autumn of 1991 have finally determined the development road of Turkmenistan to a centralized personal power, the Czech researcher concludes.

Turkmenistan at Present. Policy of Cultural Unity

The authors of the article "Turkmenistan and the Globalizing World: Innovative Policy of Cultural Unity" by K. Losev, DSc(Econ.) and V. Mikhailov, DSc(Hist.), at St. Petersburg State University of Aero-cosmic Instrument-making, term the policy of cultural unification pursued by the leaders of Turkmenistan's government a systemic range of pattern-forming aspects in politics, which can also be determined as the elements of a new comprehensive innovative international policy of cultural unification, declared by the President of Turkmenistan G. Berdymuhamedov. The proclamation of permanent neutrality on December 12, 1995, at the UN General Assembly was the first step toward shaping international and regional policy of a new type.

In the conditions of the transformation of international systems and transfer from the bipolar world to other forms of world leadership, neutrality is an effective means to preserve cultural and national values, guarantor of the primacy of humanitarian and general human aims in politics. The policy of state neutrality, the researcher emphasizes, has enabled Turkmenistan to reform domestic policy and economics necessary at the first stage of independent development of a state and create conditions for a further innovative policy of national and pan-Turkic cultural unification. Turkmenistan has actively participated in the elaboration and adoption and implementation of international and regional projects to develop innovations, such as, for instance "Strategy of CIS economic development up to 2020, which determined the main principles of innovative

economics – the principle of orientation to all-round basic innovations which are the foundation of the modern technological system – combination of state regulation of innovative activity with effective functioning of competitive market mechanism. Further on the innovative development of the Technological Center of the Academy of Sciences has been opened, international forums on innovative technologies have been held regularly.

The authors of the article note a harmonious correlation of the mining, processing and manufacturing industries, as well as the regional transit economic policy of the country. The implementation of the innovative economic policy is impossible without the correct distribution of the spheres of the real economy. Turkmenistan's economy is developing in accordance with the interests of the entire country.

The gas industry – an example of foreign economic activity of Turkmenistan

In the article entitled “Turkmenistan: Search for New Gas Export Routes” E. Ionova, PhD(Hist.) notes that after gaining independence the export of gas has become the main product of the country's economy, and from the mid-1990s the diversification of its supplies to foreign markets have become a priority in the country's foreign economic policy. In those years the plans of building gas pipelines to South Asia emerged, as well as the Trans-Caspian pipeline for the transportation of Turkmen raw materials to Europe.

After laying out a gas pipeline to China the latter has become practically the only purchaser of this raw material. In 2017 the PRC accounted for over 90 percent of the entire volume of Turkmen gas (33.6 bln cubic meters) which was by 13 percent more than in 2016. In the first six months of 2018 gas supplies from Turkmenistan to China were bigger by 18.8 percent than in the similar period of 2017. E. Ionova writes that the profitableness

of gas export to China is limited, inasmuch as a considerable part of profit from its sales goes to repay Chinese credits received by Turkmenistan for the development of oil-and-gas deposits, and also the construction of gas pipelines. As a result, Turkmenistan, which financed in its time the construction of the Turkmen-Chinese gas pipeline with a view to avoiding its dependence on Russia, has acquired a less profitable partner as compared with Russia. At present Turkmenistan tries to weaken its dependence on China and examines alternative native routes of gas export, including those to Russia. The resumption of the export of Turkmen gas to Russia may contribute to the strengthening of cooperation between the two countries.

The author of the article examines the project of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to South Asia. Its total length should comprise 1,814 kilometers, of which 774 kilometers should pass through the territory of Afghanistan. The commissioning of the gas pipeline is planned for 2019–2020. The construction of this gas supply route caused doubts due to a very shaky security situation in Afghanistan where terrorist acts and military hostilities do not stop, which naturally scare away potential investors. True, in recent years Turkmenistan has succeeded to draw support from a number of international financial organizations, which expressed readiness to take part in financing the project. In May, 2018, Saudi Arabia expressed its desire to earmark big means for the project.

The author notes that the project was not only economically important for Turkmenistan and Afghanistan lobbied by the United States it was also meant to create transport gas flows from Central Asian countries alternative to the Russian direction, which was supposed to contribute to drawing Central Asian countries away from Russia.

There is another international project, namely, a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India which is now revived by Tehran, and evokes much interest among potential investors. Among the advantages of this project is the fact that it

presupposes gas transportation not through the territory of turbulent Afghanistan, but directly to Pakistan, however, due to differences between participating countries, its implementation has not yet started. True, Iran has extended a pipe to the border with Pakistan. Another barrier to the project was Washington's opposition due to its position on Iran, particularly, the anti-Iranian sanctions. Thus the exacerbation of geopolitical contradictions in South Asia is closely connected with the gas supplies to several countries in the region. According to observers, the intention of Iran in this respect has induced Saudi Arabia to participate in financing the alternative project involving Russia. In their view, the Saudi offer was put forward on the U.S. initiative, for it was interested in thwarting the Iranian project. E. Ionova notes that Iran becomes a direct rival of Turkmenistan on other gas export routes, too.

Among the risks connected with certain projects, singled out by experts, are strained relations between countries participating in these projects, which can considerably complicate the course of their realization, or become a cause for the disruption of its work. They think that Pakistan can use the gas pipeline as an instrument of intimidation of India, and the latter may at any moment leave the project. However, in the center of attention remain the risks connected with reassuring security of the gas pipeline. And real threats may come not so much from the Afghan Taliban, who even supported the project, as from the ISIS militants ousted from Iraq and Syria. Thus, the researcher believes, if not for the risks connected with the project, it could have brought considerable benefits to the participating countries. Thanks to it Afghanistan could receive 14 million cubic meters of gas a day, and Pakistan and India – 38 million. Apart from that, the gas pipeline could have improved internal economic situation in these countries, by lowering the unemployment level. It is expected, for example, that the implementation of the project will be able to provide jobs for more than 12,000 Afghani citizens.

The researcher also turns to the Convention of the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and the problem of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The signing on August 12, 2018, of the Convention by the presidents of the five Caspian states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran – was the completion of a more than 20-year-long history of difficult negotiations on the division of the water area and the bottom of the Caspian Sea, and also on security in the Caspian region. The document legitimized access of the mentioned five countries to the Caspian resources – oil, gas and fish. A greater part of the water area and bio resources of the Caspian Sea remains in common use. Borders between territorial waters of the neighboring states are set on the basis of bilateral agreements. The problem of laying out pipelines has similarly been resolved. The right of the Caspian states to lay out pipelines on the sea bottom without getting approval of all the five states has been recognized; the pipeline will be laid only on the basis of agreements with the countries through whose sector the pipe will be laid. Thus, the document has a compromise character, and quite a few questions remain to be resolved. Nevertheless, for Turkmenistan the Convention opens up prospects for creating the non-regulated Trans-Caspian gas pipeline which has always been considered the main obstacle for the project

Conclusion

In 1989 Turkmenistan put forward a possibility of a reform of the rule, but the subsequent annihilation of all alternatives of the Turkmenian Republic in 1989–1991 has reduced this possibility and determined the authoritarian character of the country. Turkmenistan has lost the chance to become a more open society, political analysts emphasize today. Examining the present development stage of the country the authors of the articles on the subject have shown the basic aspects of a new comprehensive innovative policy of cultural unification declared

by Turkmenistan's President G. Berdymukhamedov. The five slogans of this policy have been revealed: policy of state neutrality, development of an innovative type of the economy, harmonious correlation of the mining, manufacturing and regional transit economic policy, policy of "cultural neutrality" in regional dimension, harmony of politics and economy in culture and education, innovative policy in the field of international relations.

The successes of the economic and political development of Turkmenistan have resulted in an intensive cultural and political cooperation of the country not only with the neighboring countries, but also at the level of international organizations. Today Turkmenistan is a recognized international negotiation platform on quite a few world problems, including those on cultural and economic cooperation, ecology, international affairs and security. Researchers point to the continuous growth of international prestige of the principles of positive neutrality, which is one of the indisputable and important factors of Turkmenistan's achievements in the international arena.

Turning to foreign economic activity of Turkmenistan, it should be noted the priority importance of its gas industry.

In the center of attention are the risks connected with the security of gas pipelines. To implement Turkmenistan's gas-exporting strategy the ensuring of the country's security is of decisive importance (for instance, of great significance is its ability to rebuff outside aggression, say, from Afghanistan). Turkmenistan has declared its readiness to cooperate with Russia in the sphere of security. This will facilitate a search for compromises in solving disputed questions connected with the projects under study of new gas routes for export. In a broader sense Russia's support bolsters up Turkmenistan's positions in the face of outside threats.

Turkmenistan's policy aimed at long-term development prospects is also advantageous for Russia, which receives an income from transit of trade in Turkmen energy carriers and their

transit, and Turkmenistan itself is also in profit of its connections with the largest world markets of energy carriers. Turkmenistan holds the most crucial geopolitical and geo-economic position from the point of view of the interests of the world's most advanced countries, as well as on the crossroads of the interests of the major Eurasian trade-economic routes, which largely determine the modern foreign policy of Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan gained sovereignty only at the end of the 20th century, that is, during the twenty-five years of independent development it managed not only to preserve political stability and economic independence, but also to become one of the stable influential global and regional countries. Modern Turkmenistan, researchers maintain, has been able to preserve political stability and economic independence, but also become one of the influential global and regional countries. Modern Turkmenistan has all possibilities to make its experience of state formation and development, and its experience of humanitarian-oriented international policy, free from conflicts, to receive due assessment of experts and become an effective example in the implementation of new standards of practical interstate relations.

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ANVAR OBIDOV. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Uzbekistan; foreign policy; sovereignty; development strategy.

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Abstract. The article analyzes the foreign policy of Uzbekistan at the beginning of the 21 century.

Since the time of getting independence, Uzbekistan has become able to conduct its own foreign policy. The first foreign policy concept of the Republic of Uzbekistan was developed by Islam Karimov and approved in 2012. Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Uzbekistan defines the following provisions:

1. The Republic of Uzbekistan shall reserve the right to enter into unions, communities and other inter-state units, as well as to leave them, guided by higher interests of the state, the people, its welfare and security, priority directions of modernization of the country, the national legislation in force and the undertaken international commitments;

2. Uzbekistan pursues a peaceful policy and does not take part in the military-political blocs, reserves the right to withdraw from any inter-state unit in the event of its transformation into a military-political bloc;

3. The Republic of Uzbekistan shall take political, economic and other measures to prevent involvement in armed conflicts and hotbeds of tension in the adjacent states, as well as shall not allow deployment of foreign military bases and facilities in its territory;

4. In accordance with the Constitution, the law "Defense", Military Doctrine the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan are formed up solely for protection of the state

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, peaceful life and security of its population and do not take part in peacekeeping operations abroad.

The foreign policy of Uzbekistan is based on the course toward achievement of peace, stability and cooperation and the following principles are adopted:

- Openness for cooperation, regardless of ideology, commitment to universal values, preservation of peace and security;

- Respect for the sovereignty of other states and recognition of the inviolability of borders;

- Non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;

- Peaceful settlement of disputes;

- Non-use of force or threat of force;

- Respect for human rights and freedoms;

- Advantage of generally recognized norms of international law over domestic laws and regulations;

- Equality and mutual interest in inter-state relations, supremacy of national interests of the state;

- Development of external relations on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

The goal of Uzbekistan's foreign policy is strengthening of independence and sovereignty of the country, promotion of national interests, maintenance of peace in the region, creation of favorable conditions in the world for development of Uzbekistan, increasing its authority among other countries. Foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan meets the generally recognized standards and principles of international law, including the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration on Principles of International Law and Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

After the presidential elections in 2017, President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev instructed the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies to submit the updated draft concept of Action Strategies for five priority lines of development

of the Republic of Uzbekistan until 2021, which is one of the main and priority tasks of foreign activity of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2017–2021, namely:

1. Improvement of the system of state and social construction;

2. Ensuring the rule of law and further reforming of judicial and legal system;

3. Development and liberalization of the economy;

4. Social sphere development;

5. Ensuring security, interethnic harmony and religious tolerance, as well as implementation of a balanced, mutually beneficial and constructive foreign policy.

To achieve this goal, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic has been assigned the following tasks:

Formation of the most favorable foreign policy conditions for effective implementation of democratic reforms and dynamic processes of modernization of society and economy in the country;

Preservation and strengthening of peace and stability in Central Asia, transformation of the region into a zone of security and sustainable development;

Formation of a balanced multi-faceted system of strategic partnership with the leading states of the world and international organizations;

Promotion of international initiatives of Uzbekistan in the most important areas of regional and international policy;

Assistance in increasing the volume of exports of domestic products and expanding its geographies;

Active promotion of foreign direct investments and advanced technologies in priority sectors of the national economy;

Assistance in attraction of foreign tourists and development of tourist infrastructure of the Republic;

Assistance in expanding and strengthening of cooperation in the field of transport and transit, development of international transport communications and logistics infrastructure;

Ensuring comprehensive protection of the rights and interests of citizens and legal entities of the Republic of Uzbekistan and outside the Republic;

Strengthening ties with the compatriots living abroad.

As mentioned above, the main priority of Uzbekistan's foreign policy is the region of Central Asia. Uzbekistan's policy is aimed at ensuring peace and stability in the region, resolving key issues of the regional security, including the promotion to settlement of the situation in Afghanistan.

Uzbekistan is ready to support all efforts contributing to stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan and return of this country to the normal course of development. A significant event in this line was the international conference "Peace process, security cooperation and regional cooperation". This conference is initiative of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The conference was attended by President of the Republic of Afghanistan Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, UN special representative in Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, heads of foreign services of Russia, USA, UK and other states, as well as representatives of 25 states and international organizations'. As President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev noted, in fact "fire of the war was imposed on the Afghan people from outside, it was s not their choice." According to the Chief of the Office for Cooperation with the Middle and the Near East countries of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan Otabek Akbarov "the main purpose of the conference is to express the consolidated position at the regional and global levels on the need for the earliest possible start of direct negotiations between the government of Afghanistan and the movement Taliban without any preconditions."

During the Tashkent conference on Afghanistan, the presidents of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan discussed further development of bilateral relations. President of Afghanistan Mohammad Ashraf Ghani sincerely thanked President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev for International forum on Afghanistan held in Tashkent, and underlined his readiness to deepen cooperation in the areas of mutual interest.

The conference resulted in adoption of the Tashkent Declaration on Afghanistan.

The Republic of Uzbekistan and China are close regional neighbors. Basic principles of relations with China are set out in the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Strategic Partnership of June 6, 2012 and Joint Declaration on Further Development and Strengthening Bilateral Relations of Strategic Partnership of September 9, 2013. On May 14 in Tashkent there was held the international conference "Uzbekistan and China: prospects of joint implementation of the "One Belt, One Road initiative."

According to Director of the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies at the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan V. Norov, Secretary of the Party Committee of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Yu Xinhua, the cooperation between Uzbekistan and China is consistently developing in all directions, the project "One Belt, One Road" plays an important role in the expansion of bilateral trade and economic relations.

Uzbekistan supports the project "One Belt, One Road," initiatives in the field of transport, trade, investments, energy and high technologies and is actively involved in the development of programs for opening of transport and logistics routes that will link Central Asia with the countries of South, Southwestern Asia and Europe through China and Russia.

As part of the event, the participants exchanged views on the priorities and prospects of Uzbek-Chinese cooperation in the spheres of transport communications, trade, economy, tourism, science and education. It was also mentioned about strengthening

bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and China, on the tasks of consistent implementation of agreements reached within the framework of the project "One Belt, One Road."

The project "One Belt, One Road" is perceived as a new model of international cooperation for it is based on the principles of effective use of opportunities of developed countries and assistance to countries with developing economies. The result of the forum was the elaboration of practical recommendations for further development of trade and economic, investment, transport and logistics, cultural and humanitarian, mutually beneficial partnerships within the frames of the project "One Belt, One Road."

As strategic partners and allies, Uzbekistan and Russia attach great significance to development of comprehensive mutually beneficial cooperation. According to the Strategic Partnership Agreement of June 16, 2004, the Allied Relations Agreement of June 14 November 2005, as well as the Declaration Further Consolidation of Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation of June 4, 2012 meet the interests of both countries and serve to strengthen stability and security in the region. The most important task in bilateral relations is to ensure practical and full implementation of the agreements reached during the state visit of President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to Russia on April 4-5, 2017.

Within the frameworks of the talks, much attention was paid to consolidation of Russian-Uzbek trade and economic cooperation. During the negotiations, the presidents of the two countries announced signing of agreements on joint investment projects worth \$ 12 billion approximately. Following the meeting, the heads of state signed a Joint Statement by President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin and President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev. A package of intergovernmental, interdepartmental and corporate documents, more than 50 agreements and contracts in the economic, energy, military-

technical, cultural, humanitarian and other spheres were also signed.

It should be noted that the year 2017 has become a very bright and significant year for Russian-Uzbek relations. The year was marked by significant intensification of cooperation between the subjects of the Russian Federation and administrative-territorial units of Uzbekistan, intensification of interregional relations through Russian-Uzbek and Uzbek-Russian business centers, as well as in other areas, among which the most important role is played by military cooperation (the parties ratified the agreement on the development of military cooperation). Another important point is the fact that Uzbekistan plans to expand the network of consular offices in Russia and continues to actively develop cooperation in the field of education and science. Thus, branches of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Plekhanov Russian University of Economics are working in Uzbekistan, the question of opening other Moscow universities in Uzbekistan is under consideration.

In general, Russia and Uzbekistan cooperate and will cooperate actively and fruitfully in all areas and, as mentioned above, are important strategic partners and allies. Summing up, it should be noted that the Republic of Uzbekistan is an important strategic state, which plays a key role in solving regional problems in Central Asia.

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ELENA DMITRIEVA. WATER RESOURCES OF CENTRAL ASIA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTION // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.03

Keywords: water shortage, Central Asia, transboundary rivers, water consumption, environmental problems, conflicts.

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Abstract. The author considers the situation with water use in the republics of Central Asia, which developed in the post-Soviet period. The ways and means of solving problems related to water supply in the region are analyzed.

The shortage of fresh water is one of the global problems at the present time, since water is the main natural resource without which human activity is impossible. Arising from the increase in water consumption as a result of population growth, it leads not only to a decrease in living standards, but also to a slowdown in the economic growth rates of countries experiencing a shortage of water resources. There is an opinion among experts that water may become an even more significant strategic resource than oil and gas in the future, as well as one of the main objects of confrontation. Even today, the situation with water use in some regions of the world leads to conflicts.

All of the above applies to the former Central Asian republics of the USSR, and now to independent states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Water supply problems, as well as the quality of fresh water, are so important today in the life of these countries that ignoring it can lead to a destabilization of the socio-economic and political situation in the region.

Control over water resources causes interstate conflicts, exacerbated by the fact that one of the parties has the ability to limit water supply. Limiting and stopping the supply of water or, conversely, dumping huge amounts of water from the reservoir, which will lead to humanitarian and natural disasters, is a way to put pressure on its opponent for one of the conflict's participants. Any means are used in the struggle for vital water resources, including radical religious and criminal groups, whose actions are aimed at undermining the situation in a certain country and thus gaining access to the "water tap." Therefore, the leadership of the countries of the region considers the issues of providing the population and the economy with fresh water as a component of the national security strategy in the conditions of water resources shortage.

Currently, there is a clear imbalance between water resources and human economic activity in the Central Asian region. Central Asia is one of the leaders in terms of losses and irrational use of water resources, as well as the degree of their pollution in the post-Soviet space. The water problem is characterized by extreme acuteness and specificity in the post-Soviet period for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The main sources of water are the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers, which are the main water arteries in terms of the catchment and spillway areas in the region. The peculiarity of the formation of water resources in the region is that the main sources of fresh water are formed in the mountainous part of the region - in the territories of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the flow is spent on the territories of the lowland states -

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan actually control the water resources and the schedule of water supply to the countries located in the lower reaches of the rivers. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are actively using hydropower due to lack of energy resources. Therefore, in winter time there is a discharge of water volumes more than is necessary for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (even flooding occurs there and the ecological situation worsens); in summer, water discharge decreases, although the need for water at this time increases.

In Soviet times, the power systems were unified for all and the Republic in the upper reaches of the rivers could export electricity to the Republic in the lower reaches of the rivers during the winter and import it from there during the summer, when the water was used for agricultural purposes. The republics of Central Asia took a course to build a market economy and pursue an independent policy on water use after the collapse of the USSR and the declaration of independence, guided solely by national interests and not thinking about their coordination with the interests of neighboring countries and how they affect the water situation in the region as a whole.

As a result of this policy, conflicts have arisen over the distribution and use of water resources: if the hydropower plants of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan operate in the energy, not in the irrigation regime, the most intensive use of reservoirs occurs in winter, not in summer. The upstream republics receive an increase in the production of electricity, which they can use for export, and it turns out that the summer discharge of water for agricultural needs of neighboring republics located in the lower reaches of the rivers is not beneficial to them. Countries in the lower reaches of rivers, which use the resources of reservoirs especially intensively in summer, are beginning to experience water scarcity, which has a significant impact on the agricultural sector of their economy. They are in no hurry to compensate the water supply to the countries from which the water comes. Thus,

only their own plans for the use of water and energy resources come to the first place.

The legal status of using the waters of transboundary rivers has not yet been determined. There is no term "transboundary rivers" recognized in the international legal field in the texts of the internal laws of the Central Asian republics, as well as in bilateral and multilateral agreements, but such concepts as "water or water-energy resources" are used, which contradicts the provisions of international law and makes it impossible to refer on international law in resolving water disputes. As a result, unresolved issues of water use give rise to inter-state conflicts.

The situation with water use is currently aggravated for a number of reasons. The demographic load on water resources is increasing, as the Central Asian region is known for high population growth rates, and there is a constant shortage of food, so it is impossible to reduce agricultural production. Agriculture continues to develop not by an intensive, but by an extensive method of production in the lower reaches of the rivers, as a result of which water is spent much more on growing crops than is required when using modern technologies. Another reason for the aggravation of the situation is the climatic factor: dry years are increasingly observed in the region and as a result some areas are completely dehydrated. If climate warming predictions prove to be true further, then an increase in temperature and a decrease in precipitation are expected in Central Asia. Consequently, the resources of rivers will decrease significantly.

In addition to the above problems, a new factor related to water resources has emerged. This is the problem of pollution of water sources (underground and surface) as a result of human activity. This is the problem of pollution of water sources (underground and surface) as a result of human activity. The increase in the number and density of the population, the development of industry with simultaneous lagging behind the construction of treatment facilities, agricultural activities with the use of a large number of cheap and poor-quality fertilizers and

chemicals lead to severe environmental situations. There is an accumulation of excess amount of water contaminated with mineral salts, fertilizers and chemicals in irrigation facilities simultaneously with the processes of shallowing and pollution of the most important water sources - the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya. As a result of the deterioration of drainage systems, soil degradation is taking place, such as waterlogging and salinization. Biological sources of pollution, resulting from the increased demographic pressure on water resources and the lack of sufficient sewage and treatment facilities, are no less dangerous. Such sources of pollution can lead and periodically lead to outbreaks of epidemics of infectious diseases such as typhoid fever, cholera, and hepatitis.

What are the methods to solve the problem of using water resources in Central Asia?

The following solution is proposed - reducing the load on water resources, increasing freshwater resources, the transition to high-tech and hydro-conservation methods of water use. Many experts believe that the reason for water scarcity in the region is not the lack of water resources, but their inefficient and irrational use. According to various estimates, the loss of incoming water is from a quarter to half of its volume. But it is not only the loss of irrigation agriculture. In the upstream countries - Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan - the poor condition of reservoirs, wells, canals and water intake structures lead to the loss of significant amounts of water. Thus, it requires constant repair and maintenance of all hydraulic structures. And in the downstream countries, it is necessary to move to the use of advanced technologies in agriculture, based on accurate calculation of irrigation needs, thereby reducing water losses and reducing its consumption in industry and agriculture. Restructuring of industrial production to reduce the share of water-intensive processes is necessary.

Another way to solve the problem is to increase water resources through the use of underground freshwater resources, desalination of salt water, as well as territorial, including transboundary redistribution of water resources and attraction of

external water resources. As for the attraction of external water resources, we should mention the periodically revived idea of turning the rivers of Siberia, which can lead to an even greater environmental disaster in another region (significant climate change, waterlogging, flooding of the territory of Western Siberia) and therefore should not be considered as an option to solve the problem. The two largest cotton producers in the region are Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are currently the world's largest per capita consumers of water. Most of the water consumed by them goes literally into the sand and partly into branched irrigation systems, which are in poor condition, so half of the supplied water does not reach the fields. Artesian wells are another significant source of water replenishment. There are many small water-rich artesian basins in Central Asia, and their development could make a significant contribution to increasing the region's water resources.

It is necessary to bring order to the water use in the Central Asian region, effectively use the available considerable water resources to meet water needs. As a result, the prospect of resolving water conflicts depends on which way the Central Asian countries will choose to solve the water problem : extensive - within the framework of the current model of wasteful use of water resources or intensive - through the use of modern resource-saving technologies and improvement of water management methods.

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DMITRY YEFREMENKO. TRANSFORMATION OF THE MISSION OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND NEW POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN GREATER EURASIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.04

Keywords: Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Greater Eurasia, Afghan settlement, Central Asia, Indo-Pakistani relations, China, Russia.

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Abstract. The article examines the new tasks facing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after India and Pakistan

have joined it as full-fledged members. Prospects of peaceful settlement in Afghanistan are analyzed. Special attention is paid to relations within the Russia - India - China triangle, whose development becomes a crucial factor of the successful functioning of the SCO.

A new stage in the history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization began in 2018 connected with its enlargement due to India and Pakistan having joined its ranks. This reason alone is enough for examining a new balance of power within the SCO, a change of its tasks, and effectiveness of its functioning. No less important is the strengthening of cooperation between the Central Asian countries, which especially concerns the new leadership of Uzbekistan. Finally, new prospects for the transformation of the SCO activity are connected with developments around Afghanistan, including the possibility of the withdrawal of the military contingents of the U.S.A. and NATO.

At the initial stage of its existence and functioning, the SCO successfully coped with building an institutional framework for settlement border issues between China and the states, which became independent after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Geographically, the SCO activity was focused on Central Asia - a strategically important region full of threats to political stability, as well as the emergence of serious rivalry between Russia and China. Their joint work at the SCO has greatly contributed to the prevention of the conflict of interests of the two great powers. Further on, grounds emerged to talk of the division of labor and of mutually complementary functions: Russia makes the main contribution to maintenance of the security of the region, whereas China leads in the spheres of trade, investments and infrastructure development.

Having laid the main emphasis on its work on security problems in Central Asia the SCO after 2005 devoted much attention to new threats connected with the so-called color

revolutions. The technology of the outside support of mass protests aimed at overthrowing ruling regimes has repeatedly been used by the United States and other Western countries in the post-Soviet area. However, the use of this technology in Central Asia has not given geopolitical dividends to the West. Even Kyrgyzstan, which lived through political turmoil in 2005 and 2010, has ultimately decided to come to a closer rapprochement with its traditional partners – Russia and China. In Uzbekistan, an attempt of political destabilization in 2005 was thwarted, and following it the government of the country decided to discontinue U.S. presence on the airbase Khanabad. The adoption of the Astana declaration on July 5, 2005, calling on the United States to determine the deadline of the withdrawal of its bases from Central Asia was of principal importance. At that time the U.S. request to receive the observer's status at the SCO was turned down. In 2014 American military officials terminated their use of the Kyrgyz airbase Manas as a transit point (up to the year 2009 it was used as an airbase by the anti-terrorist coalition headed by the U.S.).

The SCO countries did not have the task to set up a military-political alliance and they have succeeded to achieve a substantial progress in ensuring security to the Central Asian region and curbing destabilizing outside interference. Thereby favorable prerequisites have been formed for the development of economic cooperation in the region, although the SCO itself has not become the very format within whose framework simpler conditions of mutual trade could be reached and investment activity stimulated.

During the 2010th major changes were taking place in the post-Soviet area, and also on the entire Eurasian continent. The newly-emerging structures and initiatives embedded the SCO countries in a new network of economic cooperation and mutual dependence. Among the major developments of that period were the transformation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan into the Eurasian Economic Union (with subsequently

joining Armenia and Kyrgyzstan to the EAEU), the proclamation of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative by China’s Chairman Xi Jinping, and the decision of China’s and Russia’s leaders to link this initiative and integration processes within the EAEU framework. These processes have been interpreted by Russian experts as a major geopolitical transformation, that is, the beginning of the formation of the macro region “Greater Eurasia” [Karaganov, 2016; Yefremenko, 2017]. In June 2016 President Putin of Russia spoke at the Petersburg Economic Forum on the prospect of forming a Greater Eurasian Partnership, which might become an outward integration contour toward the EAEU. According to President Putin, apart from the EAEU, among the participants in the Greater Eurasian Partnership can be the CIS countries, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and other countries concerned [Putin prizval..., 2016].

It can be seen that the geographical area of the Greater Eurasian Partnership practically coincides with the territory of the states which are full-fledged SCO members, or those with the observer status. In this context the SCO could be regarded as one of the most serious aspirant to the role of an international organization capable to regulate the formation of Greater Eurasia. Undoubtedly, the development prospects of the SCO are influenced by the general situation of international politics, including the growing confrontation between the leading world powers. In its Strategy of National Security endorsed by Donald Trump in December 2017 the United States proclaimed China and Russia the main leading world powers, throwing a challenge to American might, influence and interests [National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017]. Considering China and Russia as a threat and in its turn, threatening the crucial interests of these countries, the United States contributes to a further strengthening of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. This partnership in its scope and tasks can come ever closer to an informal alliance, whose conditions and stability are not regulated by a framework interstate agreement.

Evidently, China and Russia had strong leverage on other parties to use the SCO for a more active opposition to American pressure. However, the leaders of the SCO countries preferred another option, enabling to make the SCO a more multifaceted organization capable to take into account a broad range of interests and project stabilizing influence far beyond the boundaries of Central Asia. This choice seems rather clear-sighted, inasmuch as the SCO helps draw other countries and regions to a greater format of geopolitical transformations in which India and Pakistan are going to play a very important role, along with China, Russia and Central Asian countries. Russia and China have agreed that the SCO will not play the role of a direct opponent to the alliances led by the United States.

Stronger cooperation between Central Asian countries is of great importance for determining the future development of the SCO. The decisive role in these processes belongs to the new economic and political strategy of Uzbekistan. Due to the efforts of its President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, a considerable part of border problems with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have been settled. The Uzbek-Tajik relations, which were previously very strained, have gradually improved. Considerable progress has been reached in the most painful water and hydrotechnical problem for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Work has become more active in the construction of transport corridors in Central Asia and implementation of infrastructural and energy projects. Uzbekistan initiated the setting up of the Consultative Council of the heads of state of Central Asia.

The leaders of the SCO countries at their summit in Qingdao on June 9–10, 2018, expressed firm support to the efforts of the Central Asian countries to develop cooperation in political, economic cultural-humanitarian, and other spheres. A positive characteristic was given to the first consultative meeting of the heads of states of Central Asia (Astana, March 15, 2018). Thus the Qingdao Declaration elucidated the attitude of Russia and China to the new format of integration of Central Asian countries, in

which Turkmenistan also takes part, keeping its neutral status. Beijing and Moscow examine important novelties in the interstate relations of the Central Asian countries as compatible with the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, integration processes within the EAEU, and possibilities of cooperation with the SCO framework.

In view of the expansion of the SCO, the security of Central Asia does not lose its significance. But whereas previously Afghanistan could be viewed as an external factor for Central Asian security, now a settlement of the conflict in that country is of crucial importance for the further existence of the SCO. Except the U.S.A., all foreign participants in the Afghan settlement are either full-fledged SCO members or have the observer status (Iran). Of course, difference of interests between individual SCO member-countries may, and possibly will, be expressed regarding concrete political and military parameters of Afghan settlement, the role of the "Taliban" movement in this process, and also U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The influence of Indo-Pakistani contradictions on the Afghan conflict may also cause certain apprehension.

Further on, security in Central Asia and the establishment of peace in Afghanistan will be viewed more and more often by the SCO countries not as the two separate, but mutually connected processes, and as a single process. The effective solution of tasks involved in the struggle against the penetration in the region of international terrorist organizations and network structures, growing organized crime, narco-traffic, distribution of extremist ideas and distorted interpretations of Islam calls for a comprehensive approach.

Russia is making a considerable contribution to the search for Afghan settlement with the support of the SCO countries. Despite the official ban of "Taliban" in Russia, Russian diplomacy proceeds from a realistic assessment of the developments in Afghanistan, maintaining a dialogue with the basic groups exerting influence on the military-political situation in that country. The prospects of the development of the inter-

Afghan dialogue in the Moscow format, along with the course of President Donald Trump toward the cessation or radical curtailment of direct American participation in the conflicts in the Middle East have induced the United States to step-up its own diplomatic efforts. Under U.S. pressure the government of Ashraf Ghani thwarted the negotiation process in the multilateral Moscow format throughout 2018, despite the constant deterioration of the situation of security and increase of the part of Afghan territory uncontrolled by the Ghani government. As a result, it was American diplomats who entered into direct negotiation with the “Taliban” early in 2019, and President Ghani left aside [U.S., Taliban...] was forced to remind his fellow-countrymen of the deplorable plight of his predecessor Najibullah executed by Talibs in 1996.

Judging by available information, the main outlines of possible settlement may look as follows: the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Afghanistan in exchange of the Talibs’ guarantees not to protect terrorist groups in the country’s territory and not to cooperate with the IS. Although it is supposed that in order to reach an agreement within the framework of these negotiations on the political future of Afghanistan, the present Afghan government should participate in the procedure, in actual fact the subject of the matter is Washington’s readiness to reconcile with the dominating role of the “Taliban” in future Afghan policy.

It is evident that the situation in Afghanistan becomes a serious challenge to the SCO, too. The slowdown of the inter-Afghan dialogue in the Moscow format does not at all mean that Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and other SCO member-countries have no more opportunities to influence the situation in Afghanistan. Rather, it is possible to talk of a temporary pause, when the question on the withdrawal of the U.S. troops is agreed on directly between the U.S.A and the Talibs. But even at that stage, both the Talibs and the Afghan government will be interested in broadening a dialogue with the SCO (including Iran,

which has the status of observer-country at the SCO). When the withdrawal of U.S. troops begins, the security vacuum will increase in the country, and the authorities which will actually control a greater part of Afghan territory will inevitably step up their interaction with the SCO leading countries and, possibly, with the entire organization. Thus, the SCO will face the task of a broad assistance (except direct military interference) to further stabilization in Afghanistan and non-admission of the deployment of terrorist groupings (primarily those connected with the IS) on the territory of Central Asia.

Meanwhile, the Russian military-diplomatic and expert communities seriously fear the danger of a possible purposeful destabilization in Central Asia as a "concomitant result of the American withdrawal strategy." The main threat in this case may come not from the "Taliban", but from other extremist groupings, for which Afghanistan is a transit territory. Turkmenistan, which is not a member of the SCO and CSTO, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, whose state institutions remain inadequately consolidated. Nevertheless, the most realistic scenario of a complicated situation may be connected not with the transfer of "jihad" to Central Asia, but with a combination of extremism with narco-traffic, which is necessary to fight at the level of individual states and at the level of interstate coordination, particularly, greater coordination between the CSTO and SCO in the sphere of security and combat the "three evils forces." On the whole, the active role of the SCO and the coordination of positions of its member-countries become the key outside factors for the stabilization of Afghanistan itself, and the entire Central Eurasia along with it.

The expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after India and Pakistan have joined it meant a considerable increase in its political and economic weight, as well as additional interstate contradictions, which had previously a peripheral significance for the SCO. Indo-Pakistani rivalry is potentially the most serious problem, which may lead to a considerable

weakening of the SCO efficiency. However, the functioning of the organization in an enlarged composition in 2018 gives ground for cautious optimism. It is evident that in 2018 both Pakistan and India were striving to avoid the negative effect on the functioning of the SCO due to their contradictions. Perhaps, the leadership of these countries wished to show that their entry in the SCO was a serious political achievement for them, all the more so since the Indian opposition (namely, certain influential leaders of the Indian National Congress) criticized Narendra Modi for “the speedy” joining of India to the SCO as a full-fledged member. But one can also say that the new participants of the organization “have imbibed the Shanghai spirit well enough” to be able to work together along the lines drawing mutual benefit as much as possible. Of course, the hope that the Indo-Pakistani conflict lasting over seventy years may be settled in the SCO format is unrealistic. For one, India has a negative attitude to the attempts to bring about a settlement of the conflict beyond the framework of the bilateral relations. However, a simultaneous participation of both India and Pakistan in the SCO may enlarge the spheres and increase the experience of positive interaction of the two countries by creating a positive atmosphere for searching a settlement of fundamental difference between both these countries.

Russia is interested in the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations. Having no opportunity to exert a tangible influence on this process, Moscow is forced to balance between New Delhi and Islamabad, regarding India as a number one partner. However, in the relations with this partner Moscow has sometimes to look for non-standard arguments. For example, the Russian-Pakistani joint anti-terrorist exercises in September 2017 under the code-name “Druzhba - (Friendship) - 2017” in Kashmir controlled by Islamabad was taken by India as a clear sign of Moscow’s displeasure with the intention of the Indian authorities to diversify the sources of the supplies of military

planes. As a result, India has again increased purchases of Russian military equipment.

The new situation of full-fledged and simultaneous participation of India and Pakistan in the SCO allows Moscow to move more resolutely along the road of strengthening relations with Pakistan. A considerable drawing closer of their positions on Afghanistan and worsening of relations of Russia and Pakistan with the United States create possibilities for raising their bilateral interaction to the level of advanced partnership. The political elites of Russia and Pakistan increasingly recognize that their countries' strategic interests continue to draw closer and that their friendly relations with China play a major role in it. It is also important that Pakistan supports Russia's actions in Syria, even despite the fact that this support complicates its relations with such important partner as Saudi Arabia [Ramani, 2019].

Russia is interested in broadening the access to the market of Pakistan, even despite the sad plight of the economy of that country. Interest is growing in Russia in using the Chinese-Pakistani corridor and the port of Gwadar, although due to the geographical and logistical factors, the economic effectiveness of the development of this route by a large number of Russian consignors is not yet clearly evident.

Thus, Russia will strive to use new opportunities to cooperate within the SCO framework both in order to lower the tension in Indo-Pakistani relations, and also to strengthen Russia-Pakistan partnership. However, the balancing policy will be preserved, although it will be resorted to more choosy and, perhaps, in a broader geostrategic context. Thus, it can be surmised that broader military-technical cooperation with Islamabad will be used by Moscow to warn New-Delhi against a too excessive rapprochement with the United States within the format of the four-partite dialogue (Quad). At the same time, the enthusiasm of the Indian elite with the concept of the Indo-Pacific region, and especially the prospects of cooperation with the

United States, Japan and Australia is conditioned mainly by the range of problems of Chinese-Indian relations.

The Chinese-Indian relations are also a source of problems. Russia and Central Asian states are interested in smoothing and, if possible, overcoming the existing contradictions. As is known, the former Prime-minister of Russia Yevgeny Primakov put forward an idea of a tripartite dialogue of Russia-India-China in December 1998. Despite broad initial doubts as to its success, this idea began to be broadly discussed later by the expert community, and in 2006 the first meeting of these countries' leaders took place in St. Petersburg, which contributed to the formation of the BRIC group (BRICS at present). The tri-partite interaction of Russia, India and China continues to exist today, fulfilling the role of the supporting framework for the BRICS. Equally, the significance of this tri-partite format is growing for the SCO, too, where the role of coordination between the Central Asian states is increasing simultaneously.

One can talk of two scenarios of the interaction of Russia, India and China and its influence on the SCO. The first scenario presupposes that the most positive characteristics in this triangle will be given to Russian-Chinese and Russian-Indian relations, whereas relations between China and India will be more problematic, having ups and downs. In that case the role of Russia will be to help reach workable compromises on the current SCO and BRICS agenda. If all's good and well, these three countries will be able to formulate a common position on major international problems, or timely react to some or other crisis processes in the sphere of the economy or security. The second scenario presupposes a gradual and qualitative deepening and broadening of cooperation in the RIC format based on the common assessment of geopolitical transformations in Greater Eurasia. In this case one can suppose that the SCO will later become the foundation for the formation of Great Eurasian Partnership, and Russia, India and China will jointly come to

understanding their major role in forming the common destiny of mankind.

At present, the first variant looks more realistic. Declaring the multi-vector character of its foreign policy, India is striving for the consolidation of its positions as a big power with which all leading players in international politics will wish to develop friendly relations. A number of Indian experts recommend to preserve India's participation in various multilateral formats of cooperation, inasmuch as such participation confirms its growing prestige in the international arena, and secondly, reflects the requirement for the demonstration of its presence as an influential global actor [Unnikrishnan, Purushothaman, 2019].

The functioning of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2018 gives grounds to certain optimism. The expansion of the SCO composition has not led to paralysis of the organization's work due to inner contradictions of its participants. Predictions of certain Russian observers that the organization will turn into a more pompous, but less useful organization [Gabuev, 2017], and an interest in its activity will disappear first in China and then in other Eurasian countries. During its chairmanship in the SCO China suggested a constructive agenda of work to the SCO, while continuing to implement its "One Belt, One Road initiative" and its harmonization with the integration processes within the EAEU framework. This meant for international politics a reliable continuation of work to form a polycentric world order, and for the world economy – the diversification of transport corridors and a further restructurization of the global value-added chains in favor of China and some other countries of the non-western world.

Perhaps, the efforts of the SCO countries to achieve Afghan settlement and the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO military contingents from Afghanistan connected with it were of the great importance. A sharp acceleration of these processes in the beginning of 2019 will, undoubtedly, be in the focus of attention of the further work of the SCO, just as the non-admission of a

breakthrough of the extremist and terrorist groups from northern Afghanistan to Central Asian countries. If these tasks are successfully tackled, the SCO will find itself at the forefront of important geopolitical and geo-economic transformations in Greater Eurasia.

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2019.03.004. REZA MALEKI. INTERRELATIONS OF IRANIAN AND RUSSIAN CULTURES: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS // *"Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ekonomicheskoy i kulturnoy oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii 19 oktyabrya 2016."* Moscow, FSBEI HE MSLU, 2017, P. 138–143.

Keywords: Russia, Iran, bilateral relations, dialogue of cultures.

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The dialogue of cultures of Russia and Iran is 500 years old, the author notes. Recently, relations have reached a new level, in particular since the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the collapse of the Soviet Union. They are supported by all sorts of documents and treaties. But, despite significant development, they are not being implemented properly at the present time, both at the level of relations between the two countries and at the regional and international levels: new problems and challenges have appeared.

While the most complicated problems of the two countries at all levels are connected with such phenomena as extremism, terrorism, nationalism, religious intolerance and cultural influence of the West, it should be noted that all these challenges are rooted in culture. All the attention of the governments of the

two countries is focused on political, economic and military relations, while cultural relations are forgotten, giving them a very insignificant place. Nevertheless, it would be worth starting work with the development of cultural cooperation, the author notes. The common threats and prospects of the two countries, as well as the need to optimize the scope of cooperation between Iran and Russia at this level, require a thorough review and restructuring of the cultural relations between the two countries.

Challenges, common interests and goals at the bilateral, regional and international levels

At different levels, the situation is as follows:

- At the level of bilateral relations – the absence of strategic relations, joint discourse, as well as mutual understanding between the peoples of Iran and Russia;

- At the regional level – the influence of extremist movements, Western culture and the threat of national, tribal and religious identity, as well as the inability of the countries of the region to come to a common understanding;

- At the international level - discord in the international system, the superiority of the United States and Western countries on the world stage, the lack of universal dialogue for the establishment of international order in the world community. Russia and Iran in bilateral relations, at the regional and international level, need to take the following steps:

Ways to achieve the goals.

At the level of bilateral relations

If Russia and Iran cooperate as strategic partners and bring their relations to a new level, this will lead to the emergence of common interests, goals and challenges at the bilateral, regional and international levels, the author notes. Countries will be able to counter joint challenges, as well as protect and develop common interests. The strategic cooperation between Iran and Russia can be called consolidated, stable, strong and effective,

taking into account the interests of the two countries. If we consider the relations between Iran and Russia as a pyramid, then at its top there will be a transition to strategic relations, which directly depends on the development of cooperation in the nuclear field. No matter how much cooperation and mutual understanding between Iran and Russia may be, an improved infrastructure should emerge between the two countries as a basis for strengthening ties and their institutionalization. This fact will be beneficial in building relations between Iran and Russia, and therefore cultural strategic relations between the two countries are the basis of strategic relations.

To create mutual understanding between the two countries, it will not be enough to apply traditional methods of cultural diplomacy, which alone cannot create an adequate image of Iran in Russian society and vice versa. Iran and Russia should carry out mutual assistance to solve the tasks. The author notes, that Russian media, which actively talk about the life of modern Iran, creating a reliable image of the country, can be cited as an example. Iranian media are also trying to more broadly talk about Russia and the events taking place in this country. To raise cultural relations between Iran and Russia to a strategic level, the following relevant steps can be effective:

- Creation of a joint Iranian-Russian committee on cultural cooperation;
- Signing agreements in the field of culture;
- Creation and active work of cultural centers in two countries;
- Creation of joint analytical centers in the field of humanitarian, cultural and social sciences.

At the regional level

Iran, Russia, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus have common problems that are also characteristic of the whole of Eurasia, including problems in the sphere of culture. Among

these problems are: the growth of extremism, the cultural influence of the U.S., national-religious disunity, the spread of divergence. Often they are brought into the region from the outside. The countries of the region are fighting them alone, focusing on non-cultural methods of action, and not having a common plan of resistance. However, the effective use of the cultural potential of all countries in the region can help to overcome these problems, the author notes.

It is necessary to formulate this policy as a “regional cultural mutual enrichment” in order to make the best use of the cultural potential of the countries of the region, as well as to raise relations and cultural cooperation to a higher level. Individual countries will contribute to the development of their own and common cultural potential thanks to the achieved increase in the level of culture in various fields, as well as the resultant force of cultural influence in the region. Iran and Russia, having the ability to transnational impact, in addition to bilateral cultural interaction, can play a constructive role in creating a regional dialogue that can rise to the level of multilateral cultural one. In order to achieve regional cultural mutual enrichment, as a first step, it is necessary to hold a meeting of culture ministers of Eurasian countries, form a joint commission on cultural cooperation in Eurasia, establish a common Eurasian analytical center, as well as create cultural maps of Eurasia, coalitions and joint multilateral cultural structures, establish or to intensify the cultural organizations of Eurasia.

At the international level

The most important thing in the world at the present stage is changes in the international system that is emerging in the transition period. This era of opportunities and threats to other countries, effective communities, and it will become a source of formation of the international system in the future. As a result of the First and Second World Wars, the main participating countries were divided into winners and losers. If now the main actors do not build their

future taking into account the peculiarities of that era, they may be among the losers. Knowledge of the features of this era and awareness of its position in it will help us influence the formation of the desired international system in the future. The most important factors in this formation are the preservation of world values and discourse. Iran and the Russian Federation play a large role in shaping the desired system of international order. In order to make the best use of the cultural potential of the countries of the region, as well as to bring relations and cultural cooperation to a higher level, it is necessary that this promotes the culture of the region. Thanks to the achieved increase in the level of culture in various areas, as well as the resultant force of its influence in the region, individual countries will contribute to the development of cultural potential.

In conclusion, the author notes that common threats, as well as the need to optimize cooperation, require a thorough review and restructuring of the cultural relations between the two countries.

Author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina

AZIZ NIYAZI. SYRIA: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL CHANGES THE DAY BEFORE WAR // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.05

Keywords: Syria, ecology, climate changes, migration, water-land resources, conflicts, industrialization, environmental contamination, agriculture.

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Abstract. In the article there is data on socio-eco-economic crisis escalation in Syria during its accelerated industrial

development. There are considered caused by it various levels and points of conflictogenity which aggravated during severe droughts of 2006–2008.

At the turn of the 20–21st centuries crescent interrelation between climate change, social and ecological shifts and violent conflicts began to be observed. In the 70–90s of the past century global climatic metamorphoses just gained strength and were not felt so obviously as in the 2000s. Nevertheless, many conflicts of that time were developing against the background of acceleration of social and ecological crises connected with the accelerated industrialization first of all of certain states of the East, including Syria. Its main natural resource is fertile ground. Only a third of the territory of the country is suitable for agriculture and stable harvests are reaped only from the irrigated areas. Cereals are seeded mainly on a boghara and their harvests in many respects depend on weather conditions, and therefore differ in instability. Mainly mountain, steppe, semidesertic or desert landscapes with limited water resources and deficiency of suitable watering lands are peculiar to Syria. During industrialization such easily vulnerable climatic conditions were often ignored.

During the period of active industrialization of the Syrian Arab Republic emphasis was put on development of the oil, oil-refining, chemical, electrical power, gas, textile and food industries. Extraction of phosphate mining with the increased concentration of chlorine, ironstone, asphalt, mineral salt, gravel, gypsum, marble increased. From the late 1960s large objects of heavy and light industry were under construction and commissioning. Such enterprises posed the greatest threat to fragile local ecosystems. Far from always it was considered their place in the system of future internal economic communications and increased risk to the territories relating to zones of low potential of self-clarification of arid soils, water sources and atmosphere. Planning of their placement were far from great, the principles of the scientific approach implicating consideration of not only economic, but also

ecological factors were often broken. At the same time the number of the medium-sized and small factory enterprises polluting emissions of which in total inflicted casualties to nature increased. The majority of large, average and small production objects used faulty technologies, deteriorated equipment, usually there were no waste treatment facilities or because of economy inefficient defensive expenditures systems were installed.

Noticeable accelerated rates of industrial production impact on the environment began to be noted in the mid 1970-80s with expending capacities of oil refinery enterprises, plants on production of cement, fertilizers, plastic, construction materials and a number of other products. Many of them used lagging technologies with a large number of waste without their recycling. Ecologists noted that "considering very low qualification of workers and ETW at many large and highly toxic enterprises of the Syrian industry and infrastructure, extreme runout of the installed equipment or its elements because of delays with their deliveries, violations in technological modes take form of chronic ones that reduces the effect of purification of production wastes by means of corresponding constructions. Besides, a considerable part of the enterprises which were under construction when pollution did not become a national problem yet was accepted for operation without cleansing systems"¹.

Placement of large industrial enterprises and infrastructure objects under the influence of spontaneous unjustified decisions led to their uneven concentration on the territory of the country. Many of them were built in the coastal fertile and densely populated western part of Syria, generally on the banks of rivers el-Asya (Oront) and Barada on random places. Oil refining, petrochemistry plants, plants of fertilizers and cement production in Homs, Baniyas and Tartus inflicted essential damage to the environment and health of local citizens. Pivot to energy-consuming technical industries aligned with construction of large power plants serving them. Work of powerful thermal power plants and cogeneration station was followed by air pollution

and withdrawal from circulation of considerable water resources. In the areas of placement of industrial complexes maximum permitted concentration of air pollution by toxic substances was repeatedly exceeded. Together with fast growing withdrawal of water for production and utility needs dumping of river and other waters increased, underground sources became soiled, deficiency of pure water started to be felt seriously². Construction of bunds, including a large dam et-Tabka on the main water-bearing artery of the country Euphrates did not help. Its reservoir was not filled according to the predicted calculations. Euphrates shallowed because of droughts, intensive development of the adjoining lands and the reduced runoff from the territory of Turkey owing to construction of a large bund and the increasing withdrawal of water for irrigating systems of Turkish agriculture there.

As a result of uncontrollable dumping of the crude industrial and household wastes especially great damage was inflicted to the rivers of Assi, Barad, Lakes Katin and Es-Cyn near which there was a set of industrial objects and a considerable part of the population of Syria concentrated. Chemical compounds, technical oils, colorants, organic elements, inorganic salts entered them from large and other production objects. Through sewerage systems organic and inorganic waste without cleaning were dumped wholesale into water. The contribution to pollution of reservoirs was made also by large farms. Animal manure got to water, high toxic harsh chemicals and fertilizers from fields were washed away. As a result, in certain rivers and lakes it was recorded high concentration of chlorine, phosphorus, chemically active alkali, nitrogen, magnesium and other toxic substances.

Water contamination inflicted extensive damage to residents of cities and towns. Sanitary regulations of drinking water consumption were broken, the threat of diseases was increasing. In some water sources water became undrinkable. Besides, in great numbers it was used for irrigation, but over time began to pose threat to agriculture. Watering with crude waters led to

accumulation of injurious substances in the soil, carriers of diseases and their transfer on plants. Vegetable food crops are especially sensitive to it. Their productivity considerably decreases in process of growth of the presence of organic impurity in water. Use of crude waters led also to agglomeration, hardening and salinization of soils.

Hence there were cases when peasants began to reduce consumption of river and lake water for irrigation of their farmlands grew or in general held back from it, preferring to drill boreholes for drawing of water from underground sources. However various contaminants got into them¹. More and more water from artesian boreholes was used by industrial enterprises and community services. As a result, underground water layers were quickly exhausted, especially in the Province of Damascus. Ground water was quickly reduced also in the zone of intensive land conversion in the northeast of the country where moreover Euphrates shallowed quickly. Improvement of land, adjoining the Euphratean dam lake, did not reach the target as soils were rich in plaster, were washed away and turned salty because of imperfection and deterioration of irrigational systems. Exhaustion of lands was aggravated with use of extremely harmful cheap toxic chemicals in order to boost productivity. Besides huge steppe territories turned into deserts because of extensive use of pastures. Impacts on them 3 times exceeded a limit above which the landscape degeneration is probable.

At the beginning of 2000s Syria seriously faced a problem of water scarcity, the fertility of soils began to be exhausted, and agriculture fell into decay. A half of occupied population of the country worked in agriculture, but conditions changed to the worst, peasants, and bankrupt farmers moved with their families to cities. Migration of farmers and cattle-farmers to the cities happened throughout all of time of diversification of the Syrian economy in the course of transformation of the country from agrarian in agrarian-industrial one. In 1991 in agriculture there were about 24% all occupied people whereas in 1963 this

indicator exceeded 60%. This resettlement was related first of all with the objective economic reasons (development of industry, services sector, emergence of new workspaces) but in the 2000s out migration of the population from villages to cities and large regional centers gained ecological character. Natural population increase in rural areas resulted in agrarian overpopulation. At the same time, as a rule, increase in number of family members was not followed by widening of an allotment therefore the labor productivity of occupied members in family economy decreased, the periods of forced unemployment were extended, the dependence on earnings for hire amplified and respectively income shrank. All this was aggravated with reduction of water and land resources. Ruralmout migration to the cities coincided with arrival in Syria in the period from 2003 to 2007 of about 1.5 million Iraqi refugees who settled mainly in Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Homs and also a number of cities of the southern region of the country. Unemployment rate in the country in 2005 reached 20% of able-bodied citizens, including about 30% among youth. There was a notable tension in labor and habitation markets, shortage of food, quality and availability of public services decreased.

The situation was challenging and critically became aggravated with severe droughts. Droughts of medium intensity were observed in Syria since 1998, but in 2006-2008 they were very intensive. The winter of 2007-2008 was especially droughty. Such phenomenon was never observed since meteorological observations in 1931 began. Large-scale death of crops and the cattle followed, 1.5 million villagers directed to cities in search for means of existence³. Collapse of an agricultural system of SAR led to the fact that in 2008 production of the most part of small-scale and average farms was decreased close to zero, in many cases completely, and cattle stock was almost lost. Social guarantees were not provided to such farmers and peasants, for the majority of them resettlement to cities became the only rescue. The share of the villagers moving with whole

communities and also Iraqi refugees in the population of these cities reached 20 percent, their houses did not meet elementary standards, unemployment grew quickly among them, many did not receive any aid from the state, or amount of this aid was minimum. The number of the poor quickly increased. As a result, there were frequent skirmishes between local population and newcomers, revolts broke out in a number of communities⁴. In the agricultural Province of Daraa suffered from a drought and the country which accepted thousands of immigrants from the East the conflict which developed into a large revolt broke out.

* * *

Certainly, there is a variety of reasons for war in Syria. It is necessary to consider geopolitical and internal political factors, long-term economic isolation of the country, huge military expenses, opposition of Syria and Israel. Internal tension was caused by price turmoil in the international food market in 2007–2008 and 2011, which provoked disorders called “The Arab spring.” The war in Iraq had an impact on Syrian economy. Suspense in supply of cheap Iraqi oil together with exhaustion of Syrian birthplace led to budget reduction.

However the time bomb was planted by own efforts. Explosive material was collected gradually. Undoubtedly, economic modernization of the country raised the standard of living of Syrians, but at the same time there were new difficulties in maintenance of adequate social-and-ecological balance. In the 1990s – the middle of 2000s load-bearing capacity of ecosystems of Syria was significantly exceeded. Under the influence of forced industrial modernization in the country deep socio-eco-economic crisis was brewing which began to undermine the basis of further growth. Economic growth rate went behind increase in population, social development chronically lagged behind the adopted standards. And demographic pressure was huge. If in 1975 7.5 million people lived in Syria, then in 2011 already 22.5 million did⁵.

Unstable social-and-ecological and economic system could remain for a long time. Perhaps the time bomb planted by illiterate managing could be defused over time. But conflictogenity level rose sharply as a result of extreme climatic jumps. The Syrian land use system was not capable to react to serious changes of ecological and climatic factors. On the eve of war fight for resources as strategic, and the most elementary, necessary for everyday life escalated. Life became difficult in not only material, but also in spiritual and psychological plan. Destructive processes in the nature and society caused higher level of social aggression. Against the background of deepened social-and-ecological degradation and numerous global, regional and local contradictions which led to a war synchronized and added up each other. The humanitarian loss from it is huge⁶.

The example of Syria shows that nowadays the ecology begins to intertwine in a single knot with policy issues, economic strategy, interethnic and sociocultural relations and this interaction if there is no common harmony, is capable to generate serious conflictogenic potential.

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- ² As a result of burning of local oil grades containing 4-5% of impurity of sulphur it was observed dangerous increased air pollution by sulphur oxide over the residential quarters and areas of agricultural crops located near thermal power plant (Baniyas, Mharde and Kattyna). During one day 200 tons of dioxide of sulphur about 10% of which, mixing up with moisture, formed sulfuric acid were dispersed to the atmosphere over Homs. Tons of volatile compounds got into air through pipes of enterprises, especially local plant of fertilizers which threw out a huge number of the waste, formed by production of urea, phosphates and nitrate of ammonium. At oil refinery plant of Homs 600-700 tons of phenol were annually burned in which up to 5% of its weight sulfur made. As a result about 24.5 thousand cu m of waste in the form of oxide of calcium, aluminum, iron were produced. The plants

on production of fertilizers -urea, nitrate of ammonium and threefold superphosphate emitted compounds of sal ammoniac and nitrogen. Situation was aggravated with intrusion into the atmosphere of large amounts of carbon monoxide during work of boiler houses, motor vehicle emission, mass of small workshops, etc. Besides the plant on production of phosphoric fertilizers in Homs delivered into a disposal area 900 thousand tons of a dry phosphite a year. This waste pour off near the city, poisoning water of el-Asya, lake Kattyna and underground sources. In the country there were used highly toxic insecticides which were transferred by air at an immense distances, infecting the territory and causing numerous diseases including cancer.

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RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. MAIN ACTORS IN THE FORMATION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE ARMY VS MFA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.06

Keywords: Turkey, army, Foreign Ministry, President, foreign policy.

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Abstract. the author examines the role and place of the army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in formation of Turkey's

foreign policy in the second half of XX – early XXI centuries. Special attention is paid to the period of rule of the Justice and Development Party, which came to power in 2002, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The article emphasizes that in the recent years, both the army and the Turkish Foreign Ministry were actually pushed into the background, and the administration of the President of the country came to the forefront in the matters of foreign policy of the Republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the army are traditionally considered to be the determining institutions in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy. In different periods of the history of the Republic of Turkey, the initiative passed from one side to the other.

During the Second World War and in the postwar period, especially after Turkey's admittance to NATO (1952), the dominant role was played by the army. "At that time the military stood guard over the achievements of the Republic and, paradoxically it may seem, ensured the democratic development of Turkey," said the Turkish retired general Yasar Buyukanit.

After the coup of 1960 and the growing influence of public opinion over the policy the dominant role passed over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: increased cooperation between Ankara and the countries of the West demanded involvement of civilians, diplomats, and public figures. "In the 1960–1970s, the army was mainly focused on internal security issues," the historian Gokhan Kocher emphasizes.

The second half of the 1970s was marked by escalation of social conflicts in the Republic, wave of political terror, leapfrog of offices in the government became the norm. "Many economic and social factors of the second half of the 1970s showed the urgent need for a radical revision of the national strategy," N.G. Kireev notes. And this revision, as 20 years ago, was undertaken by the military, who organized a military coup and formed the National Security Council (NSC) on September 12, 1980.

It is important to point out that, as many Turkish historians note, the army has never sought to oppose the Foreign Ministry or any other state institution. "The army as one of the pillars of the state from the first days of the Republic and as one of the most conservative institutions in the country has always only sought to protect the achievements of Kemalism, it <...> was meticulously performing its duty," – G. Kocher confirms.

The influence of the military slightly subsided with the beginning of liberal economic reforms of the late 1980s – early 1990s under the leadership of the Prime Minister (1983–1989), and then the President (1989–1993) of Turkey Turgut Ozal (1927–1993), who spoke, in particular, for a peaceful resolution of the escalated conflict between the Central authorities and the leaders of Turkish Kurdistan.

However, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan coming to power in 2002, the traditionally influential role of the generals began to fall even more rapidly.

First of all, the legal autonomy of the army, which had earlier been beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts, was abolished. Secondly, dismissal from service was burdened by numerous bureaucratic procedures and was removed from the competence of the army leadership. Besides, any dismissed person had an opportunity to appeal to court with the claim against the administration. Thus, the army lost the right to "self-cleaning."

Due to the reforms, the NSC, the main body of political influence of the military elite, became "more civilian" by its regulations. As a result of the administrative reform of January – July 2003, the mandatory requirement that the Secretary General of the National Security Council were an active General of the army was abolished: in October 2004, the first civilian Secretary General was appointed, and since then the National Security Council has been headed exclusively by civilians. Besides, the regularity of meetings of the NSC was changed: as from then they were held every two months, rather than monthly, as before,

which obviously complicated the use of the Council as a tool of pressure on decision-making by the civil government.

It was under the AKP that the military elite and the army as a whole became the object of public criticism. The image of the army, once highly respected and trusted in society, was gradually discredited. The media began to regularly publish materials about the outrage and irresponsible behavior of the army personnel. Plans to destabilize the country and to overthrow the government were also reported.

The Kemalist elite suffered the final defeat in confrontation with the AKP in 2016, when on July 15 a group of soldiers and officers of the armed forces of the Republic attempted a coup, which killed 250 people, not counting the coupists, and more than 2 thousand people were injured.

According to Pinar Tremblay, a Turkish political scientist, the events of July 2016 “allowed Erdogan to use the influence of clerics in his (as well as his party) confrontation with the Kemalist elite.” Numerous arrests of representatives of the military elite have led to the fact that today the Turkish army in many positions is even short of personnel.

And as a result of amendments to the Constitution, approved at the national referendum of April 16, 2017, the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces – once a very influential figure in the country – is now appointed by the President and is subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The State Oversight Committee, which is subordinate to the President of the country, now has the authority to inspect the army.

From now on, the decisions on participation or non-participation of the Turkish Armed Forces in certain operations abroad, as noted by a number of Turkish political scientists, are taken by the civil, political leadership, without actually relying on the opinion of the military elites, “turned into obedient executors of the will of Erdogan and his entourage.”

A distinctive feature of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in its turn, is its disengagement from the domestic political struggle.

"[The Foreign Ministry] has always stood aside from any political processes in the country, has not been subjected to pressure from certain influential groups," G. Kocher notes. To confirm this, it may be mentioned that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic have been in the position longer than any other Ministers of the country – an average of about 30 months.

Since the time of the Ottoman Empire, the Foreign Ministry, along with the army, played an important role in the foreign policy of the Turkish state. "The military has always felt close to diplomats and experienced the need for them in achieving their own goals (meaning coups d'état, after which a new government was established in the Republic, and it was necessary to establish contacts with the outside world – author's note), – said B. Oran. – The latter needed the former in times of difficult contacts with the outside world, especially with the West."

Diplomats played a special role from the first day of founding of the Republic of Turkey in the sense that Ankara, under the leadership of Atatürk, sought to integrate as quickly as possible into the Western world, which, in particular, contributed to diplomatic contacts. "A diplomat's word became decisive after long discussions between conservative Islamists and Republicans about the fate of Turkey and its relations with the West," Sh. Chalysh notes in this regard.

However, this balance was disturbed at the time of coups d'état in the Republic, perpetrated by the military elite, as mentioned above. The Foreign Ministry, like other ministries, was forced to obey the will of the generals, but directly in the process of negotiations with foreign partners, "it were diplomats who dictated their rules of the game to the military," historian Semih Günver points out.

With the AKP's coming to power, both the army and the Foreign Ministry begin to lose the former levers of influence over formation of Turkey's foreign policy – the center of gravity is gradually shifting towards the presidential administration.

The 45th article of the latest version of the Regulation on the Administration of the President of Turkey emphasizes that

one of its functions is “to coordinate the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies in determining the foreign policy of the Republic.”

In fact, as, the newspaper “Yeni Shafak” noted in July 2018, the administration of the President of Turkey “today plays not just a coordinating role in relation to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but has already become their curator, which quite recently has been the function of the head of the government and its staff.”

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OLGA BIBIKOVA . REORGANIZATION IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2019.03.07

Keywords: succession, rota system, modernization, the king Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, royal prince Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

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Abstract. There were changes in succession order in Saudi Arabia. In spite of existing tradition of transition of power by seniority from one brother to another one, the last king already appointed his son the royal prince.

The most conservative Muslim state – Saudi Arabia – came into time of change. The matter is that contrary to the established

tradition, today young and ambitious prince Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud rules the state. His father – the king Salman – remains a head of the state, however the prince guides reforms. However, the first reform was carried out by the king Salman (1935), the son of the late king Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, his 8th wife who came to power on 23.01.2015.

It must be noted that long ago there was felt the need for reforms in the kingdom. And abroad changes in the kingdom were also waited. Here what was written by the New York Times newspaper in 1964 in connection with arrival to the power of the king Faisal: “Financial stability, absolute lack of debts, constantly growing oil revenues will allow Saudi Arabia to carry out radical modernization ...”.

However, as the Russian researcher Kosach noted, “the termination in the first half of the 1980-s of oil prices increase finished an era of prosperity and unprecedented financial savings. At the end of the last decade of the expired century the World Bank defined Saudi Arabia as the state with the average level of income.”

In 1990 prominent representatives of the Saudi society (politicians, scientists, etc.) addressed the country leaders with the petition who had preoccupation with corruption and incompetence of officials. The condition of the Saudi army looked especially unattractively which opened after attack of Iraq on Kuwait. Al-Bassam B.A. from Rice University (Huston) writes: “It turned out that the Saudi army ... is not able to protect independently the country in case of necessity that forced Saudi to make a request of support to the USA and Great Britain.” The need for reforms began again to be felt with approach of “the Arab spring.”

The “Arab spring” which swept over a number of countries first of all involved youth into its folds. In Saudi Arabia 73% of the population did not reach 29 years, 45% – 14 years (as of 2009). By means of reforms kings of the dynasty of Al Saud more than once tried to defuse public conflicts because at rather high

unemployment rate among youth the situation is fraught with serious public shocks.

As G. Kosach notes, during the rule of the king Fahd (1982–2005) “the domestic and foreign policy of Saudi Arabia was finally formed. Its subject is continuation of economic modernization and social and political reforms within conservative and guarding policy.” “The new “educated class” which emerged during modernization” was enlisted in government during his rule... Generally, they are “the graduates of western university centers who gained experience of the previous work in public institutions or private companies, in the sphere of a public administration, higher education and business.”

At Fahd's successor, the king Abdalla, innovations began to penetrate with Saudi society. In the 1990-s it was adopted the Constitution, the first in the history of the country (actually it is the body of basic laws of the country); it was opened the stock exchange for foreign investors; the system of taxation and customs experienced reforming. In 2005 elections to country councils were held; the kingdom joined WTO; in 2007 there were adopted the laws against corruption which turned out to be, however, inefficient.

It's worth reminding that also that the king Abdalla cancelled traditional kissing of hands, replacing it with handshake. However, during some ceremonies, for example, funerals where there are only men, condoling, Saudis traditionally kiss relatives of a deceased on a shoulder. But the ban to the members of the reigning family to use treasury resources for their personal needs became more important. It was authorized to banks to reject petitions for a loan coming from the members of the reigning family if they have no positive credit history. On the order of the king to the Saudi young men wishing to get education abroad the government began to devote funds allowing them to study in prestigious universities of Europe and the USA. In the kingdom it was also organized the University of

science and technology named in honor of the king Abdalla where girls also studied. Moreover, the woman – the princess Nora bin Abdalla ibn Musaid Al-Faiz was appointed to the deputy minister's post on girls(!). Women were also allowed to take part in municipal elections. The king personally financed construction of subway in Riyadh. And in 2007 the king met in Vatican the Pope Benedict XVI that gave hope to Christians to construct at least one church in Saudi Arabia ...

On the date of a crowning of the new king Salman ibn Abdalla (23.01.2015) by tradition it was also announced the new royal prince. The brother of the king Abdalla prince Mukrin ibn Abdul-Aziz (1945), the educated person became the royal prince: he studied in college of the Air Force (Kornuel, Great Britain) and also in the USA. Besides, within 7 years he headed General Intelligence Presidency of the kingdom. Together with a rank of the royal prince he got an appointment of the 1st deputy prime minister, i.e. the king himself as under the law (since 1960) the prime minister is the king. However prince Mukrin was the last aspirant to the throne of the sons of the first king-founder of the Saudi state.

In three months (29.04.2015), according to the decree of the king, prince Mohammad ibn Naif (1959) was appointed to a post of the royal prince. Before it, being the Deputy Interior Minister, he was considered as the second successor of the throne (the deputy royal prince) after the consanguineous uncle the royal prince Mukrin. Observers noted that short period of being the prince Mukrin as the royal prince demonstrates that he initially was a temporary figure. The matter is that Mukrin, the younger son of the king Adbul Aziza Al-Saud and the concubine Baraka of al-Yamaniya, was the Yemen origin. He had no chances to become the king as he was not the representative of the influential clan in spite of the fact that he had influential service record.

As for prince Mohammad ibn Naif, his appointment as the royal prince was met with great satisfaction in the USA. The former director of the CIA M. Hayden called him one of five

“significant defenders of the world.” And nevertheless, on June 21, 2017 it was announced the new royal decree according to which prince Mohammad ibn Naif was removed from the office of the royal prince and interior minister of Saudi Arabia. In this regard the USA was even afraid that “bin Naif's resignation can negatively influence relationship of Washington and Riyadh in the sphere of security”. Interestingly that change of the successor happened in two weeks after the visit of the U.S. President Donald Trump with his family (including the son-in-law J. Kouchner) to Riyadh.

The rota system

Before proceeding to studying of the reasons of so significant resignations in the Saudi royal house, we will try to get onto the principles of inheritance, practiced (or practicing until recently) in the kingdom. The fact is that the royal dynasty of Saudi Arabia adheres to the patrimonial principle of inheritance – the rota system – according to which brothers of ruling family are, figuratively speaking “co-owners of the power.” At first successively, but not without any exception, the power is derived from one brother to another one (according by seniority), then nephews, etc. The similar system of succession took place and in other states – in Turkic and Khazar kaganat. In Russia similar practice existed till 14th century.

It was Prince Mukrin in the Al-As-Saud family, who was the last of the living brothers – the sons of the first Saudi king ibn Saud. Then there came the turn of his grandsons, that is nephews of the last king.

Today the Saudi royal family numbers from 15 to 22 thousand people in seven or eight generations of descendants of the king Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. However only 2000 of them are involved in power structures and have an opportunity to control the wealth of the country. Family members took upon themselves government of the state, they hold ministerial and gubernatorial

offices, head major campaigns, define the direction of the country and solve the arising problems in domestic and foreign policy, dispose of public sector of national economy. It only makes sense that for a variety of reasons not all can pretend to the throne, but some of them (about 60 people) could consider themselves as potential applicants.

Disadvantages of the rota system are obvious – elderly and sick people often come to power. At the beginning of the rule of the king Abdul Aziz (1880, time of reign 1932-1953) he was 52, Khalid (1913, – 1975-1982) – 62, Fahd (1921, – 1982-2005) – 61, Abdalla (1924, – 2005-2015) – 81. The present king Salman (1935) came to power at the age of 80. Two kings – Saud (1902, – 1953-1964) and Faysal (1906, – 1964-1975) were ousted from power. The first one – as a result upheaval of organized by his brother Faysal, being during that period the prime minister (the last prince in this position). The reasons of the upheaval were unknown long time because of closeness of Saudi Arabia. After more than 50 years researchers consider that his desire to transfer the throne to his son, but not to the brother was the reason of removal from power of the king Saud. The king Faysal who came to power after Saud was killed by the nephew revenging for death of his brother who was accidentally shot by a police officer in August, 1965 during protests against organization of telecasting in the country. Saud, on the date of enthronement, was 51 years old, and Faysal – 58.

Besides, according to the rota system, some of brothers in general cannot wait till their turn. The matter is that the Saudi kings traditionally married (and got divorced) repeatedly and had concubines that guaranteed them a large number of successors. The founder of the dynasty had 45 sons from 12 wives, and the displaced king Saud living his last years in Greece in all had 115 children. The late king Abdalla had 15 sons.

The current king Salman got throne only because two of his elder brothers – prince Sultan and prince Naif – died still being

royal princes. And the first one was already well into old age – he was 80 years old, and the second one – 73.

On June 21, 2017 inhabitants of the kingdom learned that henceforth, according to the decree of the king, instead of Mohammad ibn Naif, not the next nephew, but Mohammad bin Salman As - Saud, the son of the current king Salman who in the western media is called by MBS is appointed the royal prince. He is a grandson of the first king of the state Ibn Saud, that is the representative of the third line of inheritance. In case the former traditional system existed, prince Mohammad bin Salman should wait for his turn for a long time.

It is not the first conflict because of succession of the throne in Saudi Arabia. In the 1890s Saudis were pushed aside from power by the dynasty Al-Rashid. Eventually, Saudis managed to capture Riyadh, and in 1932 on the map of the Arabian Peninsula the Saudi kingdom appeared. To make himself safe against attempts of the competing clans to come to power, the king Abdul Aziz Al-Saud began to get married with women from major confederations of the Arabian tribes. A number of researchers considers that Saudis, thus, broke Sharia commandment according to which a Muslim can have only four wives at the same time (See the Koran, Surah An Nisa (The Women) Ayat 3).

The decision of the king Salman on appointment of his son as the successor was ambiguously met in the kingdom and abroad. Many observers consider that until now the dynasty was what united the population of four historic areas of the Arabian Peninsula. The dynasty where practically all tribes were presented at the expense of wives from different Arabian tribes and sons of Saudi monarchs, was the state core. According to some researchers, rejection of this principle can propel the country into the period of instability.

However, the king Salman procured that the population of the country was forgiving to his innovations. Literally in two days after enthronement it was declared the decree according to which all public servants, pensioners and students got as a gift

money reward in the sum of two monthly payments. 30 billion dollars were provided for these means. Debts of 500 thousand of Saudi citizens were waived in the amount of 133 thousand dollars. For foreign citizens who were in Saudi prisons, detention in a jail was replaced by deportation from the country with the ban on reenter. The king also allocated 20 billion dollars for construction of desalination and power plants which have to provide the population with drinking water. Financial support was obtained by registered literary clubs and also clubs of superleague of the championship of the kingdom on football. Thus, almost all citizens received allowance from the king.

Coming to power of Salman ibn Adbul As-Saud means major strengthening of the Sudairi clan. If after him the power passed to prince Mohammad bin Naif, then the Shammar clan could claim an approach to the throne. However, having appointed his son as the successor, the king Salman deprived the Shammar clan of prospect to strengthen its influence, and at the same time preserved a privileged position of the Sudairi clan. The Sudairi clan is considered the strongest in the country. Mother Sarah As-Sudairi of the king Abdul-Aziz and also his beloved wife Hassa bint Ahmed (being his first cousin at one remove) who gave birth to seven sons who became very significant people in the kingdom known as "the Sudairi seven": belonged to this clan.

Crown Prince MBS

Mohammad bin Salman As-Saud was born on August 31, 1985. He is the first child of Fahda bint Falah ibn Sultan al-Hithlayan, the third wife of the Saudi king. He has degree of bachelor of law. He is married to his relative princess Sarah bint Mashhur. They have four children – two boys and two girls. Since 2009 he held many important positions in government, in particular, was the governor of the province Riyadh. For several years he was his father's counsellor who was the crown prince during that period. When his father, prince Salman, became king,

29-year-old prince of MBS was appointed the Secretary of Defense (by that time he was the youngest Secretary of Defense in the world) and the Secretary General of the Royal Court.

The brilliant career of the young prince (he became the successor of the throne being 31, and his predecessor was 26 years older than he) drew attention of the international press to him. The attitude towards him within the dynasty is not well-defined. Appointing of MBS the crown prince means a distance from the throne for some prince s. In fact it was designated the refusal of the traditional principle of inheritance of power in the kingdom.

So fast eminence of the beloved son of the king can be explained by the fact that his father, the king of Saudi Arabia Salman was 82 years old, he had a stroke and difficult spinal surgery. It was rumoured that doctors found Alzheimer's disease and dementia.

In 2016, having become the head of the Economic and Development Council, MBS presented the new strategy of state development "Vision 2030." The key purpose of the strategy is – refusal of oil dependence that has to turn the kingdom into one of the most modern economies of the world. Thus, the prince suggested to rid the nation of an image of a medieval state. It is natural that attempts of reforming of the kingdom can arouse opposition of the clergy and the army. Just for this purpose, the prince concentrated the army and all key economic and financial leverages in his hands. In autumn 2017 the prince became the head of anti-corruption, where he was the initiator of its creation. The decision to create this committee appeared after the trip of the prince to the USA and the beginning of his friendship with Jared Kouchner, Trump's son-in-law.

MBS was in the USA in March, 2017. Within 2 weeks he visited 6 cities and several large enterprises. It was important for the prince to earn support from the USA in execution of modernization plans of the country's political system. Also, there were discussed joint actions against Iran's influence in the region

and also economic projects in which the USA can take part to the tune of 200 billion dollars. A year later, after MBS carried out a campaign against Saudi billionaires which aim was a whip-round for realization of his strategy "Vision 2030," he visited the USA again. Now his main goal was to convince the American investors that stern measures taken against the Saudi billionaires could not be undertaken against foreigners.

"Hashugdzhi case" short sell MBS

The ambitious prince did not get used to consult somebody's pleasure. Many consider the program of transformation of the kingdom dilettant. Experts pay attention that it doesn't have any expert basis. However, the prince shows unstinting conviction in its realization.

A series of events which took place in the kingdom recently – an execution of the Shiite religious authority Nimr an-Nimr, opposing confessional discrimination and oppressions of Shiites in Saudi Arabia (January, 2016), participation of Saudi Arabia military operations in Yemen and also murder of the oppositional journalist Gamal Hashugdzhi, the western media consider an initiative of the prince. The fact is that the journalist fell into disgrace after he moved to the USA in 2017 and, being an observer of The Washington Post, began to criticize the policy of Riyadh. It is natural that the prince didn't like it.

The incident reflected upon the dynasty. Later there was a version that in private correspondence the journalist called the prince "an animal which the more victims it eats, the more it wants." Moreover, in the letter to the Saudi oppositionist Omar Abdulaziz, Hashugdzhi supposedly said that he was going to publish data on use of chemical weapons in Yemen by the Saudi army.

Response of the countries of the Middle East to Hashugdzhi's murder was complex. Turkey was filled with indignation at that it was committed in its territory. The most hostile criticism sounded in media of Qatar which is in conflict

with the Saudi kingdom not the first year. The Al Jazeera TV channel reported that among the Saudi prince s there was a discontented group who want to demand from the king to give up power and to deprive prince Mohammad of the status of the crown prince. Information was confirmed by the Reuters agency on November 20, 2018.

Antagonism against Mohammad bin Salman by other prince s of the dynasty began to be formed even before Hashugdzhi's murder. The matter is that, having become almost actual governor at his aging father, the crown prince organized "an anti-corruption campaign" during which 11 princes and several dozens of the high-ranking officials were arrested and placed in the Ritz-Carlton hotel under the supervision of task force. Subsequently MBS himself told that thus he managed to return \$100 billion to treasury of the kingdom. In particular, one of the arrested prince s (the richest of them) Waleed ibn Talal was forced to give back 6 billion dollars for his release.

Implementation of the ambitious project "VISION 2030" needed money, author of which is MBS. As we noted above, the idea of refusal of oil as exclusive source of revenues of the state is the cornerstone of the project. The oil dependence is supposed to be liquidated by 2020, and earnings from not oil industries have to be increased by 6 times and reach 267 billion dollars. In the program there are 80 economic projects are specified to the tune of 23.7 billion dollars in the spheres which are not connected with oil development and oil processing.

Hashugdzhi's murder caused indignation around the world. Assumed involvement of the prince in the journalist's murder and also discontent with his actions concerning arrested princes and rich Saudis, pushes opposition (including in the dynasty) to a plot against the prince. According to the messages of Qatar channel "Al-Jazeera," there were rumors that it was necessary to persuade the king to resign. It was said that prince Ahmed, brother of the king who recently came back from abroad could take his place.

However, it is unlikely that opposition minded prince s will manage to oppose the present heir of the throne Mohammad bin Salman as practically all reins of government are concentrated in his hands. In any case it will not occur while his father king Salman bin Abdel Aziz As Saud is alive.

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TATIANA CHIZHIKOVA. HISTORY OF THE INITIATION OF MOSLEMS MIGRATION TO EUROPE SINCE THE 1960s // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: migration, Moslems, Europe, generations, labor force, international migrants, integration, migration exchange, emigration.

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Abstract. The article dwells on development of the migration situation in Europe, covering, in connection with historical events, the period since 1960. The situation in Europe and at the present stage is given for comparison.

The modern era is safe to be called the “era of migration,” thus emphasizing the special role of migration processes, as they among the key components of development of social life and economy globalization. But special attention should also be paid pay to the facts which triggered such an active relocation of people from one end of the world to the other.

If we compare the number of migrants in the 1960s and the present day, we will notice a grand difference: three times as much. If, for example, in 1970 the number of international migrants was 81 million people, today this figure reaches 258 million.

Formation of the world migration system began even in the colonial era. The countries of Western Europe played a major role in this process. As H. Rasmussen noted, “Europeans created a giant migration system that covered almost the entire world.”

In order to have an idea about the current situation in the field of international migration, one should resort to systematization of the multitude of migration links between countries. This way it is possible to reveal the existence of not one, but several both world and regional migration systems.

There are some groups of countries, linked by large-scale and sustainable migration communication set up since the past centuries. At a minimum, the migration system includes two countries with migrational exchange functioning between them. But due to the fact that, in reality, countries participate in various migration flows with a range of other states, smaller migration systems may be part of larger systems. So, the migration system, uniting France with the countries of North Africa, is one of the world’s migration systems with Europe as the center.

Europe has been very active in global migration flows for several centuries. Over time, its role has changed dramatically: Europe as a region, being a symbol of mass departure of migrants, has become a region of attraction of migrants from a variety of corners of the earth.

Back in the 1950s, many migrants in search of work went to Europe from Turkey, Central Asia and North Africa. They were

actively hired by governments for various kinds of works aimed at improving life in Europe. France and Belgium, for example, attracted mainly youth from Morocco and Algeria. Well-timed job growth continuously attracted migrants. However, most migrants arrived in Europe for several years, and then returned to their homeland.

Since the beginning of the 90s of the twentieth century the scale of the migration process has become incredible. It should be noted that the intensity of international migration is significantly lower than internal migration movements. According to the UN expert estimates, internal migration, since the 1980s, makes from 750 million to 1 billion people (almost every sixth resident of the planet).

I would like to single out the emigration from Algeria, which started in the middle of the last century. During the First World War, Algeria, being a colonial country, supplied labor force for the development of agriculture, industry, as well as for recruiting army in France. By 1924 in France there were about 100 thousand Algerians. But the largest displacements were registered after the Second World War. It was at the time that France needed manpower to rebuild its economy. Do not forget that by 1954, France has officially owned Algeria for 120 years. On the other hand, during this period, about a million ethnic French moved to Algeria due to the fact that the colonists were entitled to good land, higher-paid jobs compared to indigenous Arabs and Berbers.

Despite this, the situation in the country began to change gradually. In 1954, one of the most violent anti-colonial wars in history burst out. After eight years of war on March 19, 1962 France and the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria signed Evian agreements. They were supported by 91% of French citizens, but the fact that Algeria got independence entailed certain disastrous consequences: those who stood in the ranks of the FLN began to rob and kill ethnic French and the Algerians who had anything to do with the French.

The refugees were mostly the Algerians who collaborated with the French authorities and, therefore, feared persecution – these were, first of all, Europeanized Algerian intelligentsia and military personnel. The fact is that immediately after coming to power, the National Liberation Front started the policy of terror against the French population. It should be noted that on the very day of the proclamation of independence of Algeria, a bloody attack on Europeans, which claimed 153 victims took place in Oran. The slogan "Suitcase or coffin" thundered across the country. The result of such actions of the pogrom-mongers was that most Europeans who lived in Algeria were forced to flee the country. More than a million people became refugees, and it was a disaster for them, indeed, their ancestors lived in Algeria for generations.

During the period of Algeria's independence, millions of Algerians who supported the proclamation of national independence and their descendants moved to France, Spain and other European countries. By some estimates, the number of Algerian immigrants abroad reaches more than 7 million people, among them 4 million live in France. But these figures show only the number of officially registered migrants, and in fact there are much more of them, considering Algerian migrants who illegally crossed the borders of the country.

Algerian immigration in France is considered to be one of the oldest, and today the fourth generation of Algerian origin is growing up on the French soil.

The stability of migration ties is determined both by historical reasons (colonial relations or political unions) and by the mutual interest of countries, in particular, economic, in migration exchanges, which explains the upraise and preservation of the migration movement.

So, initially the migration flow from the colonies of Great Britain was initiated by the British to replenish labor force in the mines, in agriculture and construction. During World War II, ethnic minorities were recruited to serve in the Royal Air Force,

as well as to work at the factories where military equipment was manufactured. Immigrants from the former colonies of Great Britain undoubtedly made a great contribution to recovery and development of the economy. By the 1970s, the immigrant community in the UK numbered almost 1 million people. 80% of those who came to the UK in the 1980s were family members of previously arrived migrants. At the end of the century, the migration flow from the former British colonies was already more focused on the United States.

In the 1970s, Europe suffered an economic crisis that left most migrants out of work. From 1973 to 1975, many European countries pursued a strict migration policy aimed at stopping flows. Such a policy could not change the situation in Europe, it was not effective, and migrants continued to settle and, moreover, bring their families with them. Up until the 1980s, many immigrants were able to obtain citizenship in Europe, which explains the observed increase in the Muslim population.

So, we can conclude that from 1970 to 2019 the number of migrants has more than doubled. And their number grew faster than the population of the globe.

We have repeatedly mentioned the reason that makes migrants move so quickly to Europe. Besides, the events that took place in the fall of 2015 contributed to the acceleration of these processes. It was then that the European migration crisis manifested its origins.

In 2014-2015, European countries were swept by a wave of illegal migrants from the Middle East and Africa. In 2000-2010, 20-25 thousand people a year illegally arrived in Europe, but already in 2014, 900 thousand people arrived in Europe, in 2015, 1.048 million people. Syria and Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were the countries from which migrants fled to Europe. About 25% came from Africa (Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Cameroon, Tunisia, DR Congo, Algeria, Mali, Gabon).

In 2016, the indicator of the number of migrants and refugees arriving at the continent dropped to 390 thousand, in 2017 – to 186 thousand, at the beginning of 2018 – to 56 thousand, and at the beginning of 2019 – up to 8 thousand people.

The main reason for the increase in the migration flow to Europe was the “Arab Spring” in 2010–2011, which led to internal political destabilization in a number of countries in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East.

Another reason was the expansion of the network of criminal organizations smuggling people. In 2015, for example, more than 90% of illegal migrants who sought to get to Europe used the services of smugglers.

To combat the crisis, the governments of almost all European countries have decided to tighten migration standards. Thus, the length of stay of candidates for refugee status was reduced, the amount of benefits was reduced, and other measures were taken to reduce the arrival of migrants and refugees.

As we can see, the main reason of migration, both in the 1960s and starting from 2014, is the natural desire of refugees to live in better conditions, and, further, to restore their families. Only the movement methods and methods adopted by states to help migrants to acquire a new home or return to their homeland evolve.

Migrants should not be regarded just as a burden. Western Europe needs them. The demographic situation in Europe already forces the countries to take measures that would ensure the stability of the pension system in a few decades.

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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2019.03.005. VALERIYA ROZENBERG. SOCIO-CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES // "Vlast," Moscow, 2019, Vol. 27, № 2, P. 110–112.

Keywords: Middle East, international negotiations, cultural features.

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The author of the article analyzes the socio-cultural features of negotiations in the Arab countries. The author considers this problem relevant, due to the fact that in recent years the role of the Middle East in the foreign policy of not only the Russian Federation, but the whole world has increased. This is backed up by the importance of the Syrian conflict in the international arena and a series of multilateral international negotiations and foreign policy changes.

Analyzing the situation in the region, the author notes that the role of the Middle East in international relations has increased dramatically. The advantageous location of this region at the junction of three continents, its intensive economic growth and general political instability social contrasts and armed conflicts make the world community increasingly turn their eyes to the Middle East and take an active part in multilateral negotiations with representatives of the Arab world.

The author points to the special significance of the Middle East region on the basis of the fact that it currently appears as one of the centers of terrorism, which poses a huge threat not only to Russia, but also to the whole world. For this reason, much attention has recently been paid to the Syrian conflict: long-term multilateral negotiations lead to global changes in the relations of many countries in the international arena. The author gives an assessment of the Syrian conflict by some analysts who characterize it as a multi-layer cake, in which many conflicting and dissonant interests of both individual states and blocs, groups are mixed - these are the USA, NATO, Turkey, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Iran, and finally Russia. This tight interweaving of the Arab parties once again indicates the need to study and take into account in practice national specific communicative features for effective interaction with representatives of the Arab countries.

If we talk about the definition, the national style in the negotiations can be defined as adherence to certain cultural values, traditions and customs, orientation to specific decision-making mechanisms, and adherence to certain rules of conduct deeply rooted in national culture during the negotiation process.

Despite extensive research into national negotiating styles, the negotiating specialist must use knowledge of other cultures with great care: avoid stereotypical and false judgments and bear in mind that the identity of the negotiating partner is unique and cannot fully match the national portrait.

The author notes that the study of the basic rules of the Arab negotiation tradition should help to understand the system of thinking and the logic of behavior of the Eastern partners, which may ultimately influence the level of preparation of the negotiation processes, as well as their predictability and extent of conflict. In the Middle East, Islam has a great influence on the world of business and politics. Absolutely everything must be consistent with Moslem norms and rules. Some days and even months are completely excluded from the business life of a

faithful Moslem and therefore negotiations should not be held during the holy month of Ramadan, when all Moslems observe strict fasting and devote all their time to prayers. Friday is also a holy day when Moslems visit mosques for prayer, so receptions and meetings are also not accepted on this day.

State power in Islam is perceived as something sacred, therefore, in Arab culture, the attitude to law and authorities is respectful. The appearance of the negotiators, gifts, etiquette, the allocation of titles and positions of representatives is of great importance in negotiations with the Arab side. Arabs do not allow familiarity; therefore, in a dialogue with them, one should be extremely careful with gestures and expressions. Non-verbal communication is an extremely important part of the dialogue with Arab representatives. This feature can be seen even at the stage of the first contact in business relations: Arabs come very close to their partners, exchange business cards and soft handshakes. The gestures of the Arabs are different from those of the Europeans: for example, Arab partners should not demonstrate their feet and raise their thumbs up. Eastern partners can refuse by raising their chin and eyebrows up, making a clicking sound. Non-verbal communication as part of communication in general requires a separate careful study, because everyday gestures may seem insulting to representatives of other cultures.

Talking about the specifics of the Arab style of negotiations, one should note the subordinate position of women in Moslem culture. Experts do not recommend including women in the process of negotiations with the Arab side. In case this is still not possible for any reason, then women are advised to pay special attention to the requirements for their appearance. All parts of the body, except the face and hands, must be covered, clothing must look like really women's clothing, not men's, it must not be transparent or tight, a woman must not use perfume, her behavior must not be extravagant and defiant.

The Arabic negotiating style is a lengthy process. Hasty decisions look suspicious for the eastern representatives. It often occurs that your Arab partners may take some time to ponder the questions that have arisen - at this time it is better not to bother them, not to rush to break the silence and give the possibility to come quietly to a decision. Negotiations with Arab representatives are characterized by multi-stage strategies with positional bidding, which can take considerable time. Experts recommend developing a preliminary system of concessions in advance, but at the same time, as a rule, in the negotiation process the exchange of concessions should be equivalent, otherwise it will be problematic to reach an agreement.

Arab temperament is characterized by expansiveness and temper. In negotiations with the Arabs, you can notice their impetuosity, restraint, but soon the emotions subside. In such negotiations there are no half-tones and transitions - only direct intransigence. For this reason, in communicating with Arab partners, you can hear threats and direct attitudes: this side is our enemy, and this one is a friend. Negotiating professionals recommend that all agreements reached be made in writing, as otherwise the agreements may be violated (especially in the face of acute political conflicts).

Summing up, the author notes the fact that the Arab culture has pronounced national characteristics and is largely different from European negotiation standards, and therefore, thorough preparation for the negotiation processes involving the Arab side is necessary. Given the fact that today the fiercest clashes are taking place in the Middle East, not only at negotiating tables, but also in armed conflicts, you should pay attention to the analysis of the logic of behavior of the Arab partners.

In conclusion, the author emphasizes once again that the Russian side needs time, knowledge and patience to realize and strengthen its interests in this region in order to achieve peace and understanding in dealing with the East, which occupies a large place in Russia's foreign policy. According to the author,

understanding of the cultural characteristics and logic of the Arab participants in the negotiation processes can reduce the conflict of communication and help to draw up long-term negotiation strategies, which will help to achieve the necessary political agreements

Author of the abstract– Elena Dmitrieva

2019.03.006. TERRORISM IN THE MODERN WORLD: THE EXPERIENCE OF ISRAEL IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM // Condensed from *"The Fight against Terrorism: the Israeli Experience"* by V. Morozov and E. Litvinova. Vestnik BGU, 2018, No. 114, P. 117–123, and *"Restrictions on Property Rights in Order to Counter Terrorism (Demolition of Houses of Terrorist Family Members)"* by O. Romanovskaya and O. Bezrukova. Izvestiya vysshih uchebnyh zavedenij. Povolzhskij rajon. Obshchestvennyye nauki, 2017, № 4, P. 27–35.

Keywords: Israel, terrorism, the fight against terrorism, domestic policy, human rights, property rights.

V. Morozov and E. Litvinova, authors of the article *"Combating Terrorism: The Israeli Experience"* [1], note that the problem of terrorism has existed for more than one decade or even a hundred years. As early as the 1st century, in Judea there existed a sect of sikarii, who were radical nationalists opposing the Romans and the citizens who supported them. Sykarii preferred to act among a large crowd of people, which enabled them to slip away quietly and also had a greater effect.

In the modern world, terrorism has not only disappeared as a phenomenon, but is also acquiring ever more terrifying features and significantly more global dimensions. Although the number of terrorist attacks is reduced every year, their goal is no longer to intimidate the population and advance any demands, but to commit violent acts.

The author believes that the reasons for this situation can be the failure of the state policy to prevent terrorism through control over the lives of citizens, mistakes in the domestic and foreign policies of states, attempts to fight terrorism by the same means as with dissidents, opposition, etc.

More terrorist acts occur in the countries with unstable political and economic conditions. These countries include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Yemen, Libya, Pakistan, etc. However, recently cases of terrorist attacks also became frequent in prosperous countries such as France, Germany, Holland, New Zealand, which opened their borders to refugees from the countries in an unstable political situation, such as Syria, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, etc., but which had no well-defined laws and rules for reception and assimilation in society of such a large number of migrants. Migration policy of Europe contributed to the emergence of radical migrants in the host country and the creation of closed communities, living according to their laws and traditions, which were often in the conflict with the standard of conduct accepted in the adoptive country.

One of the countries that has learned to counter terrorism quite effectively is Israel. Since getting independence in 1948, the country has begun to attract groups from neighboring countries and during some 56 years, about 1,300 Israeli citizens died in the process of terrorist attacks. Such a situation required the state to take measures in order to avoid even greater losses in the future.

In its anti-terrorism policy, the government uses the principle of "making terrorism unprofitable."

In addition to the police Israel set up several organizations that were primarily aimed at countering terrorism. These were Mossad (1951) (agency for intelligence and special tasks), its objective and functions can be compared with those of Foreign Intelligence Service, Shabak (1948) (general security (and counterintelligence) service of Israel), which can be compared with the FSB and the IDF, the official army of the country.

Forming up of the first special forces of the Israeli army (Commando 101) is usually regarded as the starting point of the beginning of fight against terrorism. It was at that time that a platoon commander, Ariel Sharon (future Prime Minister) formulated some principles of the struggle, which remain governing up to this day:

1) The principle of "street fight", which can be understood as the need to deliver preventive strikes.

2) The principle of "inevitable retaliation": every terrorist will be tracked down and the punishment for his (her) actions will follow.

And one more principle is a theory developed by Ariel Sharon's deputy Shlomo Baum. It states that you can't just defend yourself against terrorism, you need to destroy the terrorists in their den and strike directly at countries sponsoring terrorism.

Currently, the anti-terrorist forces of the State of Israel are divided into 3 groups:

1) Capture units. These units perform hostage rescue operations and destroy terrorists.

2) Intervention units. They are responsible for cordoning and guarding the area of operations, gather intelligence and await for arrival of capture units. (Intervention units can directly carry out a counter-terrorist operation only if terrorists have begun to kill the hostages).

3) Support units. They assist the units of capture and intervention in the course of anti-terrorist operations and include units of mine clearance, electronic warfare, computer planning, dog service and several others.

However, despite such a powerful system of counterterrorism, in Israel there was for a long time no law regulating the issues of counteracting the propaganda and recruitment activities of terrorist organizations, and the international nature of such organizations was not distinguished, although most of the terrorist acts were carried out by people living outside of Israel. But the increased incidence of attacks on

Israelis in 2015 contributed to adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Act, which was approved on June 16, 2016 at a meeting of the Knesset. The purpose of the act was to assign special powers to “prevent the creation of terrorist organizations and carrying out terrorist activities, to bar and prevent terrorist acts carried out by terrorist organizations or individuals.”

O. Romanovskaya and O. Bezrukova, the authors of the article “Restriction of property rights in order to counter terrorism ...” [2], write that modern terrorism penetrates the life of every citizen more and more. The more large-scale the terrorist attack, the more attention it is paid in the news, the more often it is talked about it in the media. In this regard, there arises the question of the relationship between the media and the number of terrorist acts.

Due to the large number of suicide bombers in the ranks of terrorists, Israeli special services believe that it is easier to track down sponsors and other people from the suicide assassins’ immediate community to eliminate them. At the same time, this makes us think of non-standard methods of combating terrorism. However, everybody understands that the spread of terrorism will go on until its financial support ceases. That is why much attention is now being paid to the fight against financial terrorism.

One of the effective measures to combat terrorism is imposition of civil liability on criminals by setting fines, filing various lawsuits etc. The Israeli law provides for one more measure that is often resorted to, namely, the principle of collectivity, according to which not only terrorists, but also their families are punished (the Cabinet of Ministers adopted an array of laws under which terrorists’ families within 72 hours of an attempt or act of terrorism are deprived of all the property: their houses are destroyed, and their lands and savings are transferred to the state or the family of the deceased Israelite), and sometimes the economic punishment is applied to the entire “area” where the terrorist lives.

The author notes that the Israeli rules for the demolition of the houses of a terrorist's relatives have specifics stemming from the peculiarities of the Israeli legal system, which includes elements of traditionalism (Halacha is a set of religious rules, the main source of law) and judicial precedent (decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court are also a source of law, setting a precedent). In other words, demolition of houses and destruction of property of terrorists' families in Israel is perceived as a legal right to revenge.

Although Israel is often accused of the collective responsibility of terrorists' families, the decision on demolition is made on the basis of involvement of the families in the terrorist attack, since the families often learn about the participation of a family member in the terrorist attack, but they shelter them in every possible way.

Given the fact that every year an ever smaller number of terrorist acts are recorded in Israel, we can conclude that these principles are quite effective.

At the moment, the Israeli state has one of the best security systems. In addition to ongoing specials operations, reconnaissance missions, operations to eliminate the revealed terrorists, etc., a significant contribution to ensuring security is also made by ordinary citizens who are aware of the danger that terrorism poses and precisely thanks to the vigilance of the local population, about 80% of attacks can be prevented. Based on this, we can even say that security in Israel has become a kind of "cult" for the inhabitants of the country.

Similar methods and practices of fight against terrorism, used by the Israeli special services and state institutions, can be adopted by the countries of Europe to effectively counter terrorism.

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№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.

Подписано к печати 19/IX – 2019 г. Формат 60х84/16

Бум. офсетная № 1 Печать офсетная

Усл. печ. л. 8,00 Уч.-изд. л. 7,5

Тираж 300 экз. (1–100 экз. – 1-й завод) Заказ № 134

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информационных изданий
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Отпечатано по гранкам ИНИОН РАН
в ООО «Амирит»,
410004, Саратовская обл., г. Саратов,
ул. Чернышевского, 88, литера У
Тел.: 8-800-700-86-33; (845-2) 24-86-33