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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

DMITRY YEFREMENKO. "DEOLIGARCHISATION" IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: RETROSPECTIVE VIEW // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: financial oligarchy, neo-patrimonial capitalism, Russia, the "YUKOS case," economic reforms, privatization, ownership structure.

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Abstract. The article considers the prerequisites and consequences of the struggle against the so-called oligarchs during the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin. The interrelation of the anti-oligarchic campaign with the processes of strengthening the "vertical of power" and the formation of a specific Russian model of neo-patrimonial capitalism is shown.

The history of Russia of the past two decades was marked by several significant turns, and the way of meeting them, and the vector of further movement have considerably influenced the transformation of the political regime and the role of Russia in the system of international relations. Among these turns was a struggle against the attempts to political domination of several

oligarchic groups, which unfolded in the period of Vladimir Putin's first presidential term (2000–2004).

The term “oligarchy” in the Russian historical context is associated with the 1990s. But the sources of this phenomenon go down to Gorbachev's perestroika, when a new social group of entrepreneurs almost without experience of organizing production and business in the conditions of open market competition came to the fore. Their road was different, they were able to achieve success not contrary, but thanks to the disintegration of the Soviet economic system, and their method of doing business included, among other things, the ability “to solve problems” at different levels – from local criminal groupings to the federal government. Due to such interactions it was possible to ensure reproduction in the qualitatively new conditions of the “power / property” tie, freeing it from the political and ideological restrictions of the Soviet epoch.

During the 1990s a specific version of neopatrimonial capitalism emerged in Russia. Max Weber characterized relations between power and property in Russia in the 16th – 19th centuries as a specific version of patrimonialism – czarist patrimonialism [Weber 1976: 621–623]. In the latter half of the 20th century Richard Pipes made a considerable contribution to the elaboration of the concept of patrimonialism in Russia, regarding the absence or vagueness of the dividing line between property and political sovereignty as a factor determining specific features of Russian history during the prerevolutionary period [Pipes 1993]. Shmuel Eisenstadt, adapting Weber's concept to the problem of modernization used the term neopatrimonialism [Eisenstadt 1973]. Neopatrimonialism can be regarded as a combination of two types of political domination – rational bureaucratic and patrimonial. The functioning of power in the conditions of neopatrimonialism is subordinated to formally legal standards only outwardly, whereas the real practice is informal and is determined by patronage and clientelism. Neopatrimonialism is characterized by the authoritarian organization of socio-political relations and the rent-seeking model of economic behavior [see: Erdmann, Engel

2006]. In the specific circumstances of Russia in the mid-1990s the main agents of political transformation staked more willingly on informal institutions, right up to actual transfer to “outsourcing” of the economic groups of interests of a number of functions of state governance. Such order of doing business compensated the weakness of the state and at the same time created additional insuring mechanisms for the political actors who were not sure of their political longevity, relying only on formal institutions. The culmination of neopatrimonial socio-political transformation was the presidential elections of 1996, the period of “seven-bankers-rule,” “loans for shares” auctions, and finally the Default on August 17, 1998.

Evidently, the economic reforms of the 1990s were either non-oriented to overcoming the patrimonial system, or at the very first contacts of the reformers with the Russian reality, a tacit substitution of the aims of transformation. There is no need to talk at length about facts of real corruption or specific ways of life of certain members of Gaidar’s team, for whom their stay in the government was only a transit point on the way from academic institutions to the Russian “Forbes list.” Realizing the inevitability of the reemergence of the “power-property” model in the new conditions the reformers of the 1990s tried to make it serve them and their customers. In this sense reforms may be regarded as a kind of “social engineering.”

In Russia of the mid-1990s, the political power formed a new stratum of big owners, who, taking advantage of the weakness of the state proclaimed their privileges in establishing control over the power which has created them. Informal institutions were substituted for formal ones and, as a consequence, political power was privatized by economic groups of interests after the Default of 1998, which concentrated about one-third of the Russian GDP under their control [see: Rutland 2008]. However the very essence of the economic crisis, which started on August 17, 1998 with the announcement of technical default and ended with the transfer of presidential powers from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin on

December 31, 1999, boiled down to the recreation of an ultimate patrimonial model of state power more acceptable to the majority of political and economic actors as well as mass social groups, with state power playing the main role.

Even for a considerable part of influential interest groups, each of which represented a powerful network unit, the need for the function of state arbitration was quite evident. But more important was the fact that the state as the supreme arbiter had to ensure the preservation of a new structure of large property which did not have enough legitimacy in the eyes of a big part of the Russian population. For most Russian citizens privatization became an inalienable part of individual and collective painful experience, a symbol of crying social injustice and monstrous corruption. No wonder that about one-third of respondents even at the beginning of the 2000s spoke in favor of the renationalization of big companies, and behind the «stable and widespread negative attitude toward the results of privatization one could feel and see irritation and revengeful expectation of “game change.” Paradoxically, this was combined with almost complete absence of any hopes for the restoration of “social justice”» [Zorkaya 2005: 94]. Insufficient legitimacy of the structure of big property remains a time bomb to this day, which can explode at the moment of destabilization of the social system, which is conditioned by a combination of external and internal pressure.

Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winner for economics, writing about economic privatization in Russia pointed out that the emerging private-ownership interests in that country led to the weakening of the state and destroyed public order by corruption and the appropriation of property by representatives of governmental bodies [Stiglitz 1999: 14].

At the beginning of the 21st century the demand for “return of the state” was a mass phenomenon and it was largely connected with the further expansion of informal institutions and relations, which could turn into a source of new social risks. On the contrary, the ability of a political leader heading the hierarchy of power to

control ambiguity and risks, even if this control was effected on the basis of the combination of using formal and informal institutions, proved highly in demand. In this sense the desire for “return of the state” meant that public expectations began to merge on one point, just as the interests of a considerable part of political actors, as well as apprehensions of influential interest groups. In essence, it was a demand for systemic stabilization, establishment of understandable and acceptable “rules of the game” in a compromise variant, excluding the repartition of property and “privatization” of the state by interest groups. Solution of this task became one of the key directions of Putin’s policy during his first presidential term. It is precisely in this context that Putin’s struggle with such figures as Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky should be viewed.

Putin-proclaimed “equidistance” of oligarchs meant that in the “power / property” combination it was power that played the dominant role. Putin’s resolute actions aimed at curbing the influence of big business and its certain representatives on power bodies were at first carried on with the use of less political resources. The first of “equidistant” oligarchs was Vladimir Gusinsky who made the erroneous stake on the success of the Luzhkov-Primakov tandem at the parliamentary elections of 1999, and Boris Berezovsky who repeatedly hinted on his own resolute contribution to Putin’s electoral success. Both of them were the living symbols of an epoch rapidly receding to the past. Their banishment from Russia should have vividly demonstrated the oncoming of a new epoch. The main result of the first round of the fight against the oligarchs was the return of the key media-assets under the control of the Kremlin; these media-assets were used by Berezovsky and Gusinsky as the most powerful instrument of strengthening their influence and expanding the business-empires controlled by them.

Although the forced change of the editorial policy of the NTV Channel and other mass media in Vladimir Gusinsky’s holding have evoked serious fears for the fate of freedom of speech

and freedom of the press in Russia, the departure of the country's new leader from the influence of oligarchic groupings was completely in line with public aspirations. Meanwhile, the authorities did not demonstrate any intentions to revise the results of privatization, moreover, in case of adoption by business of new rules of the game the powers that be became the main guarantor of the preservation of that form of property which was formed by the end of the 1990s. After the departure of Boris Berezovsky from Russia this silent pact was adopted by almost all business-structures. The only exception was the YUKOS Company of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Khodorkovsky's challenge was of a systemic character and therefore it was regarded by Putin and his inner circle as a much more serious threat than Berezovsky's and Gusinsky's claims to political influence. The scope and direction of the challenge to fundamental political and economic changes were not disputed or denied by convinced supporters of Mikhail Khodorkovsky:

"The efforts of the YUKOS shareholders at the beginning of 2003 could be joined in a certain general picture: they turn against corruption, take the biggest oil company from state control, finance the opposition, breed a new generation of freedom-loving citizens, develop humanities, moreover they have a certain business-plan for Russia. In a little time Russia will be able to extricate itself from the personal control of President Putin and will become a full-fledged western country. In a sense, it was a sort of a virtual plot aimed at changing the social order. It was foolish to think that the persons in the Kremlin did not notice that plot" [Panyushkin 2006: 21].

Apparently, the decisive motive of the authorities' decision to dismantle Khodorkovsky's business-empire was the fact that following the deal of a merger of YUKOS with Roman Abramovich's giant SIBNEFT (April 2003) negotiations began on the sale of the blocking equity participation of the joined company with ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil. The successful negotiations meant the transfer of Khodorkovsky's business-empire to the high

league of transnational corporations, and its owner himself, having entered the Areopagus of the global entrepreneur elite could become practically invulnerable and untouchable for the Russian authorities. The loss of political and legal control of the Kremlin over the crucially important asset of the Russian oil industry could bring about not only a sharp growth of the alternative center of influence on the country's economy and policy, but also a revision of the very formula of neopatrimonial capitalism. The success of Khodorkovsky's project should have opened the gates to convert property into political power, and the latter – into new property. There is not enough grounds to believe that this spectacular deal was planned by Khodorkovsky in order to do away once and for all with patrimonial relations, corruption and the specific instruments of Russian business in the 1990s.

By the fall of 2003, when the confrontation between the Kremlin and YUKOS ended with the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, it was found out that the authorities had exhausted all sound legal instruments to complete this struggle. The YUKOS Company has been able to put up serious resistance to the Russian government pressure, which is shown by the multi-billion claims presented to Russia by its shareholders. The obvious political background of the sentence on Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev explained the attitude to it of Russian citizens depending on their political preferences. In many cases the criminal component of the "YUKOS case" turned out to be beyond the framework within which the supporters of some or other political positions were ready to regard the Putin-Khodorkovsky confrontation.

According to a widespread view, the "YUKOS case" was a major event in the first two terms of Putin's power. In many ways it could well be regarded the main dividing line. For one, the consequences of Khodorkovsky's arrest, YUKOS bankruptcy, and the use of the virtual "Baikalfinancegroup" for the redistribution of the basic YUKOS assets were of great importance for the relations of Russia and the West. Naturally, the main reason for the tension

that arose between Russia and the West was not the arrest of the leader who allegedly offered the Russian people a democratic alternative. Having crushed Khodorkovsky's business-empire Putin has clearly outlined the bounds of the penetration of transnational and American capital in the key sector of the Russian economy. The demonstration of the fact that the master of property in Russia is the Russian power also meant that in its foreign relations Moscow would resolutely claim equal partnership. Besides, the "YUKOS case" coincided with the first diplomatic opposition of Moscow to American invasion of Iraq. From that time on, a possibility of possible integration of Russia in the American system of global management, which was examined seriously enough during the first two years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist act [see, for example: Nikonov 2002] ceased to be considered by leading world actors as a real option.

The Khodorkovsky-Lebedev affair has become a serious political event for the Russian liberally-minded public. Back in 1999 the electoral bloc "Union of Right Forces" which took the baton of liberal ideology from the "Democratic Choice of Russia" undertook active and relatively successful efforts in order to join the future Putin's coalition of winners. Approving the resumption of military hostilities in Chechnya, the leaders of the Alliance hoped to see a new Pinochet in Putin, who would not only suppress separatism, but also break internal opposition to the neoliberal economic course.¹ As a result, the "Union of Right Forces" (URF) overcame the 5-percent barrier and formed its own faction at the State Duma (the lower house of Parliament). However, the presence of liberally-minded figures in the government, who were ready and willing to continue the course of the Gaidar' reforms were in no way connected with the electoral success of the URF. In the 2003 elections it was not enough to support the actions of the authorities, but it was also necessary to formulate one's own attitude to all major aspects of policy, including the campaign against the YUKOS Company. It was necessary to dissociate from Khodorkovsky and support Putin,

although with certain reservations, or, on the contrary, to make the overthrown oligarch their banner and resolutely break up with the existing ruling regime. The URF leadership was not bold enough to do either one or the other, although under the pressure of the opposition information mainstream it was forced to denounce the actions of the authorities against the YUKOS management.

The image of regime victim, the courageous behavior of Mikhail Khodorkovsky at the trial and in prison camp and his talent of a political analyst have largely contributed to the growing respect of this man on the part of liberal-minded people. However, these positive feelings proved rather controversial. Respect for Khodorkovsky as a courageous fighter against the ruling regime made it possible to put forward several different interpretations of the past activities of the disgraced oligarch. In one case, one could speak of the insight of the new management of the YUKOS Company, who decided to renounce once and for all the old methods of the accumulation of wealth and sacrifice their assets and freedom for the sake of establishing democratic institutions, rule of law and free market based on honest competition in Russia. In another case, it was necessary to present Khodorkovsky's business as a miraculous exception among business ventures of other oligarchs. Finally, the third strategy presupposed apologetics of the Russian financial oligarchy as one of the excesses of the historically inevitable stage of the primitive accumulation of capital. All these strategies were based on a whole number of reservations and defaults and thus they proved vulnerable to both the supporters of the existing authorities and to those who did not recognize legitimate the redistribution of property undertaken in the 1990s despite the sad plight of Khodorkovsky.

After his arrest, the so-called systemic liberals have found themselves in a rather delicate situation. Although this term emerged only at the end of the first decade of this century, the arrival of systemic liberals in the Russian political arena can be synchronized with the coming to power of Vladimir Putin.² Throughout the 1990s the neoliberal reformers had the

opportunity to exert considerable, if not decisive, influence on choosing strategic development direction for Russia. Under Putin, they continued to use this influence, however, it was already the influence of executors or supervisors within the framework of any system or subsystem controlled by other forces. Sometimes things were going as far as to their readiness to fulfill the role offered by the authorities, which could hardly have been tackled by any ideologically motivated state-oriented political figure. A case in point was the participation of one of the main organizers of “loans for shares” scheme Alfred Koch in establishing government control over the NTV television channel owned by Vladimir Gusinsky. For real democratic reformers with the perestroika spirit, like, say, Yuri Afanasyev, such “systemic liberalism” was tantamount to collaborationism [Afanasyev 2011]. Along with unfolding the YUKOS case, accusations levelled against systemic liberals of collaborationism from the radical enemies of the regime became ever more resolute. It was more difficult to find convincing arguments to approve the active participation of systemic liberals in the vertical of power.

The traditional self-defense of systemic liberals boiled down to the contention that participation in bodies of power or cooperation with them makes it possible to minimize damage from “a turn to authoritarianism,” preserve the basic gains of the 1990s, and prevent the total domination of representatives of law-enforcement agencies in the key sectors of the economy and the abolition of the autonomy of civil society. Along with this, appeal was preserved to the Pinochet model, allowing to make socio-economic transformations under the protection of the security and military services – something which the liberal forces were unable to achieve through free elections. Finally, the thesis was put forward from time to time that the very existence of systemic liberals would contribute to a softening and further on a change of the regime. The “YUKOS case,” as well as the forced resignation of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov in February 2004 gave enough grounds to speak of the degeneration of liberals themselves

continuing to stay in the ruling bodies. In essence, at the beginning of the second presidential term of Vladimir Putin the pact between the elites was revised and in accordance with the new version systemic liberals were not only given, on the outsourcing basis, some major spheres of economic, social and scientific and educational policies, but they were duty bound to be drawn in the system of relations between branches of power. At the same time, having stopped to occupy key positions in the high echelons of state power, they did not turn into a screen to cover the consolidation of the autocratic ruling regime. The systemic liberals rather play the role of some balance beams or cut-outs allowing the authorities to avoid the overstrengthening of other interest groups or keep their confrontation within an acceptable framework.

* * *

In 2018 the Putin's "deoligarchisation" turned fifteen-years-old. No doubt, without it, and the struggle accompanying it, the development trajectory of Russia would have been considerably different. The outcome of the struggle, above all, meant that the removal of a serious threat to the vertical of power and the latter remains on the present dominating position. In a way it can be regarded a return to the Russian "historical rut," or a system of relations formulated by Emperor Paul I in the latter half of the 18th century: "Il n'y a de grand chez moi celui je parle et pendant que je lui parle." (He spoke in French) ["There is no important person in Russia apart from one to whom I talk and while I talk to one."]. Anyway, at the beginning of the 21st century possession of a really big property in Russia is possible only on the actual permission of the political power and only until this permission is valid. A possibility of conversion of property into political influence, if not completely abolished, is reliably restricted. It can be said that these restrictions have been established quite in time: the first of the so-called color revolutions in the post-Soviet area – the "rose

revolution” in Georgia – broke out one month later after the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Meanwhile, one of the most important mechanisms of developing political crises called “color revolutions” is the readiness of some or other groups of the economic elite of a given country to render a sizable resource support to the forces striving to seize power. In the absence of this crucial factor outside pressure aimed at destabilization or change of the ruling regime proves ineffective. This is why the weakening of oligarchs’ influence should be a must for strengthening the sovereignty of Russia as one of the most important international actors.

Notes

- ¹ The shadow of Augusto Pinochet seemed to be following Russian reformers of the 1990s. Their hopes that the role of the Chilean dictator who provided the forces for the success of the actions of the invited team of neoliberal experts would be played by Boris Yeltsin (subsequently Vladimir Putin) laid an indelible imprint on the reforms. Their hopes concealed their well-based disbelief in the possibility to carry through such reforms along with the functioning democratic institutions [see Klein 2007]. In the apologetic interpretation of Yevgeni Yasin, this position is presented as follows: “The creation of a democratic Russia, if you wish, is the task, which was postponed in 1992 for the sake of radical economic reforms. But now, when the basic reforms have been implemented and we have a market economy, its further development is only possible under a democratic system” [Yasin 2010].
- ² Apparently, this view belongs to Lilia Shevtsova, a political analyst. She suggests the following interpretation of systemic liberalism: “The point is liberal rhetoric: words, phrases, slogans, etc. used by the authorities to camouflage their anti-liberal, anti-democratic policy. They also include the technocratic elements in Yeltsin’s government, and later in Putin’s government where they continue to rule the roost in the country’s economy. Serving autocracy, they discredit the ideas of democracy and liberalism. As long as there exists the phenomenon of “systemic liberalism”, and also the readiness of intellectuals to serve the ruling kleptocratic bodies, we will hardly make a step toward a real transformation” [Opyt I uroki ... 2010].

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IGOR DOBAYEV, NADEZHDA GONTARENKO. RADICALIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: CHALLENGES, RISKS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islam, the radicalization of Islamic movement, Middle East, national security, Russia, terrorism, Muslim brotherhood, Daesh, Arab spring, Syrian crisis.

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Abstract. This article analyzes complex processes going on in the Middle East, internal and external causes of the radicalization of Islamic movements, relationship between the various factors influencing the change of the situation in one of the key regions of the world and threatening the national security of the Russian Federation. The article also forecasts possible transformations which may take place in the region against the background of radicalization processes and their influence on the Russian Federation.

During recent decades a very rapid radicalization process of Muslim religion and political institutions connected with it can be observed throughout the world. This movement has drawn in such Arab countries as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Yemen, Jordan, the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies, as well as Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Radical Islamization is one of the main challenges to the national security of the Russian Federation.¹

The Middle East region of the late 20th – early 21st century has retained its geostrategic importance, moreover, it has acquired

the status of a “dangerously explosive knot” and a zone of military-political instability and frequent military conflicts. In recent years they exacerbate ever more often and include ethnic, tribal social and confessional clashes. Due to this quite a few states of the Middle East have found themselves in a very difficult situation. As a result of the revolutionary developments, which were later termed the “Arab spring,” certain ruling regimes have become weaker, were ultimately overthrown, and quite a few countries of the Islamic world fell into chaos, growing all the time.

The dramatic developments, which began in December 2010 with mass protests in Tunisia, and which were later called the “Arab spring,” became possible above all due to the accumulation of the critical mass of internal conflict-breeding factors in many states of North Africa and the Middle East.² Meanwhile, according to our view, the “Arab spring”, is a chain of “color revolutions,” prowestern and pro-American, in the interests of the West (the U.S.A.) with the use of the instruments of network wars. An important subject of “color revolutions” is a foreign player relying on the already formed western and prowestern non-governmental organizations in these countries. This “foreign player” exerted a strong influence on the developments taking place in these countries and organized a broad public and diplomatic support to newly-revolutionary elements. He, directly or indirectly, took part in the neutralization of power or support and organization of the actions of the opposition forces.³ The range of his activity was wide enough: from waging information wars to using economic levers and sanctions, and even to taking part in military actions. All these elements of “network wars” were used by the West in the course of the “restructuring” of the Arab East.⁴

Beginning from the 1970s the socio-political processes going on in the Middle East and North Africa have been keynoted with the growing influence of political Islam. The Islamists have demonstrated their firm organization and strength and pretend to have become the main force determining the future of the entire region.⁵ The abolition of the secular regime of Saddam Hussein in

Iraq, the creation of the Palestine Islamist quasi-state in the Gaza sector under the HAMAS domination, the growing popularity of the Shia "Hezbollah" organization in Lebanon, the abolition of the secular regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, the civil war in Syria have caused serious changes in the regional political process. The situation is exacerbated by the presence and influence of old problems, among which are conflicts between Palestine and Israel, North and South Sudan Kurd separatism, and tension in Afghanistan, which have become stronger after the creation of the "Islamic state," instability in Pakistan, etc.

It should be admitted that the processes caused by the "Arab spring" are constantly developing. Old power structures have collapsed and now political Islam comes to the forefront.⁶

In Tunisia – the cradle of the modern Arab revolution – as a result of the free parliamentary elections on October 23, 2011, after the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, the greatest number of seats (90 of 217) were gained by the Islamist "Nahda" ("Rebirth") party. Its leader – Rashid Al-Gannushi – a noted ideologist of political Islam, and general secretary – Hamadi Jebali, who took the post of Tunisia's Prime minister as a result of the "Nahda" election victory. At the same time Islamic fundamentalists (Salaphites) are bolstering up their positions, claiming political leadership, building an Islamic state, and introducing the Sharia law. Islamization causes a split in Tunisian society, part of which is dissatisfied with the Islamization of socio-political life and abolition of the results of the secular reforms introduced under previous regimes.

In Egypt, after the collapse of the regime of President Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brothers have become the most organized and influential political force. They position themselves as the moderate Islamists, whose political program proclaims general democratic goals. At the parliamentary elections in November 2011 the biggest number of seats (42 percent) were gained by the "Party of freedom and justice", which is a political wing of the Muslim Brothers; second place was won by the "An-Nur" party

representing the Salaphite movement (some time later the parliament was dissolved on the initiative of the military and by the Constitutional Court decision). The presidential elections in May-June 2012 were won by the Chairman of the "Party of Freedom and Justice" Muhammed Mursi, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brothers. He soon dismissed the heads of the Supreme Military Council and assumed all power, both executive and legislative prior to the election of a new parliament. However, the firm position and resolution of the high command of the Egyptian armed forces did not allow the Islamists to realize their far-fetched plans. M. Mursi was soon arrested and is still under investigation, and the Muslim Brothers, for the umpteenth time in their history have become outlawed. The secular regime in Egypt has withstood trials and tribulations with great difficulties.

In Libya, the protest demonstrations against the 42-year-long rule of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi have soon grown into an armed uprising inspired from abroad, supported by a naval blockade and air strikes by NATO. Special NATO units, along with those from certain Arab countries, took part in the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime. Among the Libyan rebels there were many mercenaries from Arab countries, as well as from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Muslim diaspora in Europe. Parliamentary elections took place in Lybia in July 2012, which were won by the "Alliance of National Forces" headed by Mahmoud Jibril, and Islamists from the "Party of Justice and Construction" – a political wing of the local "Muslim Brothers" movement came second. It should be emphasized that many of those rebels fighting against Qaddafi preach radical Islam, and they feel quite comfortable in Libya today. At the same time the new regime is unable to keep the situation in the country under control, inasmuch as real power there belongs to the leaders of clan and tribal groupings and their armed units. It is evident that the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime resulted in Libya's disintegration, growing influence of radical Islamism, and its spreading to neighboring regions, Mali, for example. On part of that country's territory inhabited by clan-tribal

groups of Tuaregs, who earlier supported the Qaddafi regime, an independent Islamic state based on the Sharia law was formed. It was supported by radical Islamic groupings, including Al Qaeda operating in Algeria.⁷

The situation connected with the Syrian crisis holds a special place in the Middle East. In the course of it the interests are clashing not only of the regional, but also world powers.

The turmoil which gripped North Africa and the Middle East from December 2010 was largely a reflection of the crisis which the Arab world was living throughout several decades in succession, and which resulted in a rapid population growth in the latter half of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century. In the early 1960s the population of the Arab countries reached 100 million. In 2011, during the “Arab spring” there were 400 million people living there, and by 2050 their number may reach 700 million. There are no resources to cope with such rapidly growing population.

The western world has welcomed the “Arab spring,” hoping that young people would be able to overcome the gap separating the Arab world from western countries and ensure economic prosperity and democratic order.

However, it soon became clear that the real “season of the year” was not the “Arab spring,” but the “Islamic winter.” In many Arab countries power was seized by the “Muslim Brothers” organization and its branches and affiliations, whose aim was to build so-called ‘Islamic states. In certain countries, for instance, in Egypt and Tunisia, the population has succeeded to avert complete chaos fraught with civil wars, but in other Arab countries state institutions have collapsed and societies have begun to disintegrate. As a result, Syria, Libya and Yemen have joined Iraq and Somalia. In the summer of 2014 the “Arab spring” and “Islamic winter” were replaced with Al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham – the Islamic states of Iraq and Levant, after the militants of these groupings have seized the north of Iraq and the east of Syria. The DAESH and similar movements have emerged due to the transfixions in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Iraq.⁸

The revolutionary developments in Arab countries have caused a sharp geopolitical and ideological polarization in the region. The geopolitical and ideological forces of the participants in the “Arab spring” can be grouped in five blocs: 1. Conservative Sunna bloc – Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which is closely connected with the United States and Israel. The military elite of Egypt (Sisi’s regime), certain elements in Libya, the regime of the overthrown president of Yemen Abdrabbuh Mansour Hali, as well as certain forces of the Syrian opposition are oriented to it; 2. The reformist Sunnite (moderately Islamic) bloc: Qatar, Turkey. It is connected with the United States and opposes Israel. The “Muslim Brothers” movement in Libya is oriented to it, the forces of the Syrian opposition, the Palestine “Hamas” movement; 3. The radical Sunnite Islamist jihadist block - the “Islamic state (‘Caliphate’)”. Initially, it had an extraterritorial character and was represented by movements positioning themselves as regional branches of “Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. The Jihadists were engaged in the fight against the Syrian government beginning from January 2012, and in December 2013 became the main force of the Sunnite revolt in Iraq; 4. The Shia bloc: Iran, part of Iraq, Syria. The Shia movements Hezbollah (Lebanon) and “Ansarullah” (Yemen), as well as the Iraqi “People’s volunteer corps” and the Palestine “Hamas” are oriented to it. This bloc maintains relations with Russia and China, as well as with the United States (Iraq). At the beginning of the “Arab spring” it came to the forefront with the concept of “Islamic awakening,” however, at the end the forces of the Sunna-Islamists proved hostile to the regimes allied to it in Syria and Iraq. Later on, Iran put the main emphasis on support of the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-Jihadist movement within the framework the “Axis of resistance”; 5. Secular “democratic” forces: Tunisia, Iraqi Kurdistan. Apart from that, they participate in the political process in Egypt and Libya on the side of the Sisi regime. The alignment of forces in the Middle East continues to be as complex as ever, and to understand it properly is not a simple task.

The year 1928 is the time of the emergence of the modern Islamist movement in the Middle East. About that time Sheikh Hasan Al Banna founded the “Moslem Brothers” organization in the Egyptian city of Ismailia.⁹ At first it was illegal and was a mixture of a religious sect and a political party. Its main aim was to unite Muslims on the territory of a genuinely Islamic state with the legal system based on the Sharia law, with the Koran as the main law. All means were considered permissible to achieve this aim, including those of terror.

A number of objective factors had contributed to increasing the positions of radical Islam in the Middle East countries, First, the principles of a general political character – the defeat of Arab countries in the war with Israel in 1967; crisis of official ideologies; Iranian revolution of 1979 and foreign-political activity of Tehran’s regime in the export of Islamic revolution; Afghan crisis; Arab crisis after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf war in 1989; growing role of the Middle East in international relations; activity of international Islamic institutions; expansion of Arab migration. Apart from that, the Palestine problem has exerted a negative influence for quite some time. Prior to the early 1990s, the war in Lebanon, where various Islamist extremist groupings were very active, also caused a certain deterioration of the situation. Secondly, the socio-economic situation in the countries of the Arab East was characterized by a whole number of specific features: agrarian overpopulation and a great number of workers in agriculture; too rapid urbanization; inability to provide enough jobs and, consequently, growing unemployment, and great property stratification in society. A special role in the growth of the Islamist factor has been played by general socio-economic dissatisfaction of the Arab people caused by failure of their hopes for a swift and successful economic progress after gaining independence. Nice slogans about prosperity spread by the leaders of Arab states in the 1960s proved abortive, as a result, trust in the leaders of Arab countries has been lost, which caused a crisis of the legitimacy of the ruling circles of the region.

As we have already noted, on March 15, 2011, the “Arab spring” reached Syria. Anti-government manifestations began all over the country, which turned into a virtual full-scale civil war. The groupings coming out against the government received support from the West.

The Syrian crisis is a complex, contradictory global political phenomenon. On the one hand, the Syrian government acts jointly with Iran and the “Hezbollah” movement against the Arab alliance headed by Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf monarchies at the regional level. On the other, at the international level the Syrian crisis is a natural continuation of the “Arab spring.” This is why the United States and European Union regard the Syrian government as an “evil force” as a result of which Syria has become the arena of a confrontation between different subjects of world politics. The United States and Europe have taken a harsh stand, having denounced Bashar al Asad’s regime for the alleged reprisals against his compatriots, and introduced sanctions against Syria. During that period the terrorist ISIL grouping managed to seize a big territory of Iraq and Syria, as a result of which the ISIL has become one of the main threats to international security as a whole, and the national security of the Russian Federation, in particular. Protecting its national interests Russia positioned itself as an ally of official Damascus.

Diplomatic relations between Russia and Syria were established practically from the moment of the foundation of the Syrian Arab Republic. In the post-Soviet period they continued. Beginning from 2005 the President of Syria has visited Russia several times, and in 2011 the President of Russia arrived in Damascus on an official visit for the first time. From the very beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011 Russia has supported the Syrian government. Moscow has not only supplied the Asad regime with arms, but also rendered diplomatic assistance. Syria is of a major strategic importance for Russia. In 1971 a Russian naval base was commissioned in the Syrian port of Tartus, which ensured it an outlet to the Mediterranean. The Tartus base is the

only military base outside the boundaries of the CIS. Besides, the Russian Federation and Syria have common economic interests. At the political level the Russian Federation adheres to non-interference policy in the Syrian internal conflict and supports the right of the Syrian people to decide their destiny themselves. Apart from that, Russia comes out as a mediator in resolving the conflict. Moscow has time and again called on the parties to the Syrian conflict to conduct a dialogue with a view to searching a peaceful way out from the crisis.¹⁰

The key priority of the national security of Russia in the region is the defense of its territory from radical Islamic terrorism.¹¹ As noted in the new Concept of foreign policy of Russia the global terrorist threat "has reached an unprecedented level after the emergence of the international terrorist organization ISIL and similar bodies, pretending to create their own state formation and increasing their influence on territories from the Atlantic Ocean to Pakistan."¹²

It should be kept in mind that the influence of radical Islamism on Russian territory is manifested most of all in the North Caucasus,¹³ where one of the most dangerous and numerous terrorist groupings – "Imarat Kavkaz" – operated.¹⁴ In the autumn of 2014 the amir of one of the units of this organization Suleiman Zainalabidov took an oath to the Islamic state. The "Imarat Kavkaz" became a branch of the Islamic state. Similar sections were opened in other republics in the North Caucasus.

These tendencies and processes present a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. It is no secret that part of the people from the North Caucasus fighting on the side of the ISIL will definitely return to Russia, along with new arms consignments, and there is no doubt that new acts of terror will follow.¹⁵ Russia cannot wait and see these developments indifferently, which is why the decision was taken to interfere in the military hostilities in Syria in compliance with the Syrian authorities' request.

On September 30, 2015, the operation of the Russian air force units began in Syria.¹⁶ The main aims set by Russia in these

operations included fight against terrorism “in distant places,” support of the present legitimate government of Syria, and the preservation of the territorial integrity of that country.¹⁷

Inasmuch as each side of the conflict pursued its own geopolitical interests, solution of the Syrian crisis has got into an impasse. The greatest profits from such situation were reaped by radical Islamists. And soon terrible acts of terror began to be perpetrated on the Eurasian continent.

There is no doubt that in 2018 the situation in the Middle East will remain no less complex than before. Apart from the Islamic factor, the “Kurdish problem” comes to the fore, which can also destabilize the situation in the region. All these factors are bolstered up by the active interference of certain subjects of international and regional politics, which will lead to greater turbulence of political processes in the Muslim world and elsewhere.

Notes

- ¹ For more details about ideology of radical Islamism see: works by I. Dobayev and I. Sedykh. Rostov-on-Don Socio-humanitarian Knowledge Publishers. 2017.
- ² P. Shlykov. Middle-Eastern Policy of Turkey in the Context of the “Arab Spring”. <http://perspektivy.info>.
- ³ I. Dobayev, A. Dobayev. Terrorism and Anti-terrorist Activity in the Russian Federation. Rostov-on-Don. 2011. P. 115.
- ⁴ See on the subject: I. Dobayev, A. Dugin. Geopolitical Transformation in Caucasian-Caspian Region // Central Asia and Caucasus. 2005. No 5 (4).
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2018.03.001. ALEXANDER KHOKHLOV. ISLAMIC FINANCE: A BOOST TO THE ECONOMY OR A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY? // *"Problemy Natsionalnoy Strategii,"* Moscow, 2016, № 4 (37), P. 238–248.

Keywords: Islamic financial institutions (IFIs), Islamic banking, Islamic insurance, ideology, legislation, national security, terrorism.

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As the author of the article notes, Islamic banking structures cannot enter the Russian market as the independent actors. They will have to work in conjunction with Russian financial institutions

and authorities. This is a serious problem, as the interested persons abroad expect to receive powerful lobbyists of their interests, far from business. Alexander Khokhlov examines the mechanisms of the functioning of Islamic financial institutions (IFI) in order to understand the true motives behind the actualization of the idea of the arrival of Islamic capital in the domestic market.

The Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) activities are based on a religious worldview, proceeding from Muslim doctrinal attitudes. Economic activity is an instrument for the implementation of worldview and, in particular, political attitudes. However, the author of the article points out, for today there is no single point of view among Muslim intellectuals on the criteria of the Islamic (in the true sense) economy. The reference Islamic economic model has not yet been built even in states where the sharia norms are the determining factors in the system of political, economic and social life (such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar), according to many theologians. The fact is that economic activity in these states, like in many others, is based on universal principles operating in the world today. Therefore, the essence of the issue in practice boils down not to their principled denial, but to a formal correspondence of Sharia law with the operations of the canons of capitalism.

One of the hallmarks of the Islamic economy in the Middle East is the dominance of the financial sector. But there is a serious problem here, since the loan interest (or “usury / riba” as a way of generating profit) in conditions of operating modern economic instruments is unacceptable from the point of view of the doctrinal attitudes of Islam. Profit in Islamic banks is achieved by two most common methods that allow to solve the problem in a speculative way: 1) The Islamic Bank formally acts as a co-founder of a business that is credited and receives a certain share of the income from this business on the basis of this. These operations are carried out on the basis of the mudaraba (and its modifications) and musharaka agreements; 2) Discount. A bond (sukuk) or a bill is sold cheaper than its nominal value, and is repaid at par. Thus, the

conditionally obtained interest is absent, and the profit is due to the recount of the discount. However, this type of operation is not considered by most Islamic lawyers as permissible, which rarely affects the practice, nevertheless. At the same time, the Islamic economy is not limited exclusively to banking and trading operations, although the latter play a key role in the tools of Islamic banks. There is another branch – Islamic insurance (takaful). Insurance companies invest in economic activities permitted by the Shariah (halal), and on this basis they make a profit.

The Volga region and North Caucasus republics are Leaders in financial transactions that comply with Sharia regulations in Russia.

A. Khokhlov refers to the experience of Tatarstan. The organization of the Islamic banking system and its accompanying structures in the territory of Tatarstan is regularly discussed in the republican state, independent and religious mass media. Today in Tatarstan a number of practical initiatives are already being implemented in this sphere. Thus, the Tatarstan Investment Development Agency is operating under the Government of the Republic since 2011.

In general, the infrastructure of Islamic finance in Tatarstan is quite extensive and includes the Islamic Business and Finance Development Fund, the Tatarstan International Investment Company, the Eurasian Leasing Company, “Ak Bars” Bank, the Financial House Amal, the insurance company “Alliance Life.” At the end of March 2015, the Tatarstan regional branch of the Association of Muslim Businessmen of Russia (APM RF) was opened in the republic. The Council for Interaction with International Financial Organizations under the President of the Republic of Tatarstan carries out its activities at the state level. The International Economic Summit of Russia and the countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation – KazanSummit is held in Kazan on a regular basis under the patronage of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan since 2009 and is a major project for

Tatarstan. In 2012 Kazan Summit was supported by the Federation Council of the Russian Federation and the Association of Regional Investment Agencies. The work of Tatarstan experts in the field of Islamic finance with federal legislative structures is one of its priorities. It can be assumed that the leadership of Tatarstan strives to build a dualistic financial system in the Republic, following the example of the one that exists in Malaysia today. Traditional and Islamic institutions within the framework of this model exist in a single legal field. At the same time, the activities of Islamic Financial Institutions are regulated by special legislation. The success of Tatarstan in the field of interaction with federal legislators would allow to remove fundamental disagreements in the Russian legal sphere.

In March 2015, the lower house of the Russian Parliament took up the problem. The State Duma Committee on the Financial Market has started drafting a bill on the establishment of Islamic banking in the Russian Federation. Since Tatarstan is not so rich in natural resources, as other developed Russian regions, the idea of Islamic capital along with active technological development is quite pragmatic and justified. The establishment of a hub for Islamic financial services in Tatarstan would be another argument in this regard. Therefore, it is quite understandable that the Republic of Tatarstan is actively working with the Islamic development Bank, promoting its interests in Central Asia and offering to apply the experience gained there in Tatarstan.

Today there is no need to change the legislation in Russia so that Islamic banking will work in the country. Some types of Islamic financial products have been on the Russian market for more than 10 years, and the operations carried out under the canons of the Shariah exist not only in theory but also in practice. Supporters of expanding the presence of Islamic financial institutions on the Russian market are promoting the idea of creating an independent legislative base. The state should create preferential conditions for the development of Islamic economical institutions, from their point of view, and ideally all treaties known

to classical and modern Muslim law should be reflected in the Civil Code. In other words, we are talking about the Islamization of the legal sphere in the implementation of this approach, about creating a parallel to the existing legislative sector in fact. This directly contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the secular nature of the state.

The amount of funds attracted by the IFIs in the Russian Federation does not exceed 1% of the volume of funds of the entire Russian credit system, which cannot contribute to the interpretation of their activities at this stage as a serious help for the Russian economy. Even Tatarstan has little potential for sustainable demand for Islamic financial services. The way out of this situation is proposed in the forced increase of the religiosity of the population, as well as by attracting non-Muslims, who are not prohibited from using Islamic financial services under certain conditions. For example, today Takaful companies are developing special programs to familiarize the population with Islamic insurance in order to attract non-Muslim clients in many non-Muslim countries.

Potential threats are related to the financing of terrorist and extremist activities through IFIs. Some Islamic banks will not be able to avoid financing terrorist groups in conditions of weakness of the Russian audit system in the sphere of finance, as well as a special ideological background.

Summing up, the researcher notes that Islamic finance in Russia cannot really be a significant help for the country's economy at the moment. Although they do not pose a threat to the national security of the country, under certain conditions such a possibility cannot be excluded.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2018.03.002. RAIS ISMAILOV. WAYS OF FORMATION OF COMPETITIVE RUSSIAN ISLAMIC EDUCATION // "XI Faizxanovskie chteniya. Islam v Ryazanskoj oblasti: proshloe, nastoyashhee i budushchee: Materialy Vserossijskoj nauchno-prakticheskoy konferencii. Ryazan, 14 aprelya 2015" // "XI Faizkhanov Readings. Islam in the Ryazan Region: Past, Present and Future: Materials of the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference, Ryazan, 14 April 2015," Moscow, 2016, P. 47–49.

Keywords: Russian Islamic education, Muslim ummah, ompetitiveness of Islamic education, traditional Islam, Islamic theology.

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One of the priorities of the Russian Ummah is the development of a competitive Islamic education that meets the challenges of modern society, the author writes. The creation of a possible alternative to foreign Islamic universities, as well as the restoration and development of the Russian Islamic theological school is understood as being competitive. The Muslim Ummah, state bodies, Russian society as a whole still do not have a clear idea of what traditional Islam should be like. There can be no question of any development of Islamic education until the Muslims of Russia decide on this key issue. There will be an

ideological vacuum that will be filled with foreign ideological attitudes about Islam.

An important component of the competitiveness of Islamic education is the level of professional training of future imams, which includes knowledge of the Arabic language. Obviously, it is very difficult to learn a foreign language without the possibility of communicating with native speakers. Therefore, the question arises of the teaching of the language by the Arabs with further training of students. However, it is not safe to send Russian students to study in the Arab countries. There are several possible ways to solve this problem. Kazakhstan can be an example. At the initiative of the state, al-Mubarak University was created – an analog of al-Azhar, where teachers from Egypt teach a considerable part of subjects in Arabic. Thus, graduates acquire the necessary language skills without going abroad. The establishment of Russian missions in countries where internships are held by students from Russia is another option. This approach is implemented by many Islamic countries sending their students for internships or for raising the level of education. For example, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia have such centers in Egypt.

The level of professional training of future imams is also associated with a high level of study of the primary sources of Islamic theology; the ability of a future specialist to adapt his knowledge to the conditions of Russian society; the formation of his own theological school; the presence of actual theological scientific works; the presence of the most famous classical and modern works on Islamic theology translated into Russian; the revival of spiritual inheritance in Islamic education (Sufism). These aspects can be developed by building a system of higher Islamic education, consisting of three levels: 1) basic Islamic education; 2) magistracy in secular educational institutions in the field of “Islamic Studies” on the basis of IAAS, Moscow State University. The purpose of the training is to master the scientific methods of studying Islam and the skills of professional translation, and 3) to upgrade the skills of imams.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.03.003. SHAMIL KASHAF. DISSEMINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION IN FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT OF RUSSIA, TURKEY AND CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES COOPERATION // *"Gosudarstvennoe y munitsipalnoe upravlenie. Uchenie zapiski CKAGC," Rostov-on-Don, 2017, № 1, P. 161 – 172.*

Keywords: public educational policy, Islam, Islamic education, Muslim religious organizations, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkey.

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History of interpenetration of religion and education in the countries of the former Soviet Union which chose the secular nature of state as a basis of constitutional system is given by so-called religious revival. Increase of religion's influence on world outlook points of broad segments of the population has become a reality as for Russia in which multimillion Muslim Ummah lives as minority in the non-Muslim country, and for the states of the Central Asian region which have gained independence where ethnic Muslims hold a dominant position by the number of citizens. At the same time interest to the Turkic-speaking Muslim countries and such regions of Russia as the Volga region, the North Caucasus and the Crimea, is observed from Turkey – the state which offered its "role model" for imitation from the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia which were again created in the former Soviet Union. In the last decade of the 20th century when Islam was actively presented on the public agenda of the Post-Soviet republics, the idea of revival of Islamic values as spiritual support and basis of the life organization and daily life of Muslims which don't contradict democratic transformations of secular state won over the growing number of Islam adherents. To some extent Turkey's experience on "connection of Islam with

democracy,” acquaintance to which for the Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek Muslims was more available after opening of external borders of the former USSR couldn't but contribute to the development of this discourse.

Along with growth of religiousness among Muslim part of the population of the Post-Soviet countries and increase in number of Islamic culture adherents who began to adhere to Sharia in their everyday life, certain forces tried to realize their own separatist projects on appeared interethnic contradictions in Muslim community. In several former countries of the Soviet Union there was observed a tendency of politicization of Islam, connection of Islamic factor with political radicalism and nationalism. The religious ideas which came after collapse of the Soviet ideological system and the atheistic principles to the territory of sovereign republics of Central Asia which could quickly fill emerging moral and spiritual vacuum were not often deprived of destructive maxims. In the early 1990s different missionaries joined in fight for influence on believers of Kazakhstan who were emissaries of extremist organizations. Benefiting from diplomatic relations established in 1992 between the republic and a number of Muslim states (Pakistan, Libya, Egypt), under the guise of pseudo-Islamic slogans they could build own “educational” activity, using for this purpose, including, restored mosques and madrasah on the territory of Kazakhstan. In the conditions of updating of a religious factor the government of the RK and authorities of Muslim religious organizations in accordance with the procedure established by law, including Muslim Spiritual Authority of Kazakhstan (MSAK), were forced to oppose solidary the activity of ideology's exponents of religious radicalism.

Particularities of religious identity of Kazakhstan citizens can't but be considered today at the institutional organization of Islamic education in the context of the state educational policy. Making agreement in 2001 between governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the RK which provided opening in Almaty of the Egyptian university of Islamic culture Nour-Mubarak

(in 2001 it was renamed as the Kazakh-Egyptian Islamic university "Nour") became one of important steps on regulation of affairs in this sphere. The university which obtained license and state accreditation of the Ministry of Education and Science of the RK provides training of qualified personnel of specialists in Islamic studies, scholars of the religion, teachers of Arabic, teachers for madrasah, staff of religious employees for mosques. Within the system of Islamic education of Kazakhstan at MSAK republican institute for training of imams (Astana) and also 9 madrasahs function. In 2016 the status of madrasah located in cities of Saryagash, Shymkent, Almaty, Aktyubinsk was enhanced to the level of "colleges," it was held modernization of curriculums and programs according to public standard. Adoption of the Development concept of religious (spiritual) education of Muslim Spiritual Authority of Kazakhstan till 2020 became the high-profile event defining a new stage in an institutionalization of Islamic education in the republic.

The new priorities arisen after the collapse of the USSR affected also educational policy of Kyrgyzstan. At the same time restructuring of educational system which was carried out since the beginning of the 1990th years in the RK allowed to join different types of educational activity as well some foreign centers which, acting as financial donors, weren't always ready to divide democratic values of the country where they were. In particular, in Bishkek and other settlements of Kyrgyzstan it became possible functioning of more than ten private schools opened at the expense of the Turkish educational association of Fethullah Güen. The development of modern Kyrgyzstan takes place, as in Kazakhstan, in accordance with the secular model of a democratic state with a predominantly Muslim population. According to the Kyrgyz leaders, it must be promoted by effective state regulation of religious sphere, stiffening the level of cooperation of public authorities and civil society, preeminently religious organizations and associations. Today in the republic they are mostly Islamic. From 2814 organizations registered in Kyrgyzstan there are

2422 religious ones, or 86% – are Muslim, 380 – Christian. In the RK there are registered about 70 Muslim centers, funds and associations practicing educational, public awareness, charity activity and construction of cult objects. Rapid growth of number of the last became possible owing to influence and financial support from Turkish, Pakistani, Arab, Iranian and other religious organizations and figures. This process led to emergence of new cult practices and to split of Muslim community in the country which can lead to uprising of contradictions and religious-based disputes in the future according to experts.

In the country it is implemented the Concept of state policy of the Kyrgyz Republic in religious sphere for 2014–2020. Special attention in it is paid to interaction of public authorities with Islamic organizations and associations and traditionally confessed by the people of Central Asia hanafite madhhab. The dissimilarity of the last from other madhhabs and currents of Islam is that owing to the toleration it doesn't oppose Islamic values to national traditions and customs. Another particularity of hanafite madhhab is called the ideological basis for development of partnership with the state. It allowed traditional Islam to coexist without obvious conflicts with the state during the Soviet period and today allows to develop effective relationship of secular Kyrgyzstan and religion for ensuring stability and development of democratic society.

In general, the state recognizes positive influence and contribution of religion to cultural, social and educational spheres, cooperates with religious institutes, at the same time building a system of severe restrictions directed against politicization of religion and destructive activity of religious movements. In this regard an important direction of prevention of religious radicalization, distribution of extremism in Kyrgyzstan and also counteractions to involvement of youth in ranks of banned terrorist organizations.

Observed tendencies in rapprochement of positions of the state, in the countries of Central Asia with the turco-Muslim population, in the spiritual and educational sphere with Islamic

religious organizations representing a Sunni branch of Islam traditional for this part of Eurasianism, it is coordinated with similar processes in Russia. Traditional religions of Russia for a long time have tried to obtain official inclusion of theology as cross-disciplinary area of knowledge in the system of not only actually religious, but also state education. The Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation approved federal state educational standards of higher education on theology, both bachelor degree and magistracy levels. In 2016 it was appointed the Expert council of State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles on theology among them there were experts in Islam. Heads of the highest Islamic educational institutions in the CIS countries can be guided by that their best graduates could pass PhD and doctoral defense on theological studies not only in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco subsequently, but also in Russia.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.03.004. ZALINA SULTANAHMEDOVA. SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM // *"Islamovedenie," Makhachkala, № 2, P. 37–54.*

Keywords: extremism, fundamentalism, radicalism, Islamic extremism, Wahhabism.

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Zalina Sultanahmedova considers Islamic extremism as a destructive form of social radicalism. One of the most essential characteristic of extremism is the extremist ideology. The author allocates types of ideologies: political, legal, moral, philosophical, religious, esthetic. The interests of social groups are reflected in them. Most brightly it is reflected in political ideology.

The extremist ideology belongs to radical kinds of political ideologies.

It is possible to allocate the following types of extremism on cultural and social localization: regional (separatist) within certain countries or regions of the planet, national (within certain states), civilizational (within separate types of civilizations) and transnational or international. There are two main types of extremism on social organization method: elemental, unorganized and not institutionalized and institutionalized, organized, taken the form of extremist organizations with systematic activity.

The main criterion of religious extremism is the specifics of religion as a basic ideology. The key moment in understanding of the nature of religious extremism is the question of principles of connection between religion and extremism. It is obvious that religion potentially contains a possibility of extremist transformation. Especially it concerns the developed religions. But social factors or conditions are necessary for realization of this opportunity. The complex of these conditions includes both the objective moments: a social and economic and political crisis in society, radical transformations of social system, and the subjective moments: crisis of social and cultural identity and national ideology, rivalry of alternative ideologies, overaction of opposition, antigovernmental political forces, etc.

Modern religious extremism can't be understood out of its relation with political extremism. Political extremism takes the form of religious Islamic extremism in conditions which promote this transformation: weak development of democratic political institutes, social and economic crisis, spiritual disorientation and problem of social and cultural identification of society.

Religious political extremism is a use of radicalized religious ideology in political goals. On the social essence religious extremism is extremism from below which is formed as ideology of oppressed masses put in position of fringe groups. Characterizing the essence of religious extremism it is important to draw a distinction between extremism, on the one hand, and

religionism, on the other one. Extremism belongs to the religious radicalism based on fundamentalist orientation. Modern religious extremism is inseparably linked with terrorism – work method of Islamic religious extremists.

Religious extremism is qualified by two main criteria: by a form of religious organization and religious confessionism. In the form of religious organization religious extremism is the closest to destructive totalitarian sects, however its organizational forms quite often go outside the framework of and reach the level of mass religious movements, theocratic political regimes, and transnational religious associations. By a religious confessionism extremism is distinguished by the main world religions. There can be three forms of religious extremism: Islamic, Christian and Buddhist.

Islamic extremism in the modern world is generally localized in the countries where Islam is traditional religion. However, Islamic extremism is actively advanced together with millions of migrants to regions where Islam isn't the leading traditional religion – countries of Western Europe and the U.S. And this process goes the more actively, the stronger there is a destructive influence of the West on the Arab Muslim countries of the Middle East.

Islamic extremism has particular qualities in Russia, in those regions where a large number of Muslims traditionally lives. The main reasons generating emergence and growth of Islamic extremism in Russia, especially in the North Caucasus can be divided into three groups: social and economic, political, sociocultural or spiritual and ideological. The social and economic reasons are basic. It is possible to refer the numerous social contradictions generated by Russian reforms to the political reasons: between the robbed population of the country and its ruling establishment consisting of a narrow number of oligarchs and officials; between various groups of ruling official-oligarchical elite in struggle for power and profit; between the former federal republics in fight for redistribution of joint property; between ethnic groups of the Russian multinational state.

Political factors influencing development of extremism in Russia are the imperfection of political system, low degree of its democratic character and quality of administrative elite, political ambitions of regional leaders using religion in struggle for power and privileges, activity of foreign religious and political centers and also Western intelligence agencies. Spiritual factors of development of Islamic extremism are crisis of the Soviet, international, socialist ideology and based on it sociocultural identity of people, disintegration of a single cultural space, degradation of spiritual culture, commercialization of media. Spiritual vacuum in regions of the North Caucasus with the population put in critical conditions of existence was filled with rapidly radicalizing Islamic ideology.

In its social essence Islamic extremism becomes sharp, but natural reaction of the Islamic countries to geopolitical domination and aggression of the West. In Russia Islamic extremism is also a regular reaction of resistance of the bourgeois and liberal transformation of traditional societies happening in complex and destructive forms. Islamic extremism, in fact, is a form of a social protest of Islamic regions against Western sociocultural expansion, against globalization on the Western models.

The social base of Islamic extremism isn't limited to layers of social fringe groups or categories of the needy population. All segments of society and social groups are represented in it to different extents. It does it especially stable and creates a big personnel scope for development of various extremist Islamic organizations.

Ideology of Islamic extremism is divergent, there is a variety of competing and quite often conflicting with each other versions. In each concrete Islamic sociocultural region it is formed the specific version of Islamic extremism considering and reflecting local features. According to two main movements of Islam it is possible to allocate two ideological directions in Islamic extremism: Shia and Sunni. These both directions aggressively deal not only with general enemies – people of different faiths, but also with each other.

In Russia in the North Caucasus the fundamentalist directions of Islam – Salafism and Wahhabism became ideology of Islamic extremism. The main demands of the Wahhabites programme is coming round to Islam “Golden Age,” a shariatization of public life and reconstruction of the theocratic state “Emirate of the Caucasus.” Ideology of Islamic extremism isn't a coherent fundamentalism. On the contrary, Islamic extremist ideologists quite in a reformatory way, but in the spirit of extremism interpret original Islam, actually giving with it that version of ideology which expresses their extreme views.

Despite differences between forms of extremist Islamic ideology, it is possible to allocate its general ideological core and characteristics. The author refers a complex of accented ideas to an ideological core of Islamic extremism: first this is aggressive intolerance to dissentients and people of different faiths who are considered as enemies of Islam. Secondly, actualization of the idea of jihad (which is interpreted in Islamic extremism as Muslim's duty) is the same as daily namaz. Thirdly, the exclusive place in ideology of Islamic extremism is taken by idealization of social and legal norms of early, original Islam.

Akin to organizational forms modern Islamic extremism is utterly various. Among organizational forms of Islamic extremism it is possible to see both small totalitarian sects, and numerous local Muslim communities got under control of extremist religious leaders, both training centers of Islamic extremists, and extremist terrorist organizations up to the Islamic State (ISIS). A new form of the Islamic extremist organizations using possibilities of the Internet and modern means of communication are network extremist structures both regional and national, and transnational.

The researcher comes to a conclusion that fight against Islamic extremism has to be directed to elimination of social and economic, political and spiritual reasons of Islam radicalization in Muslim regions of Russia.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.03.005. MUSLIMAT MAGOMEDOVA. MANIFESTATIONS OF RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN AND COUNTERMEASURES // "Vlast," Moscow, 2017, № 12, P. 171–177.

Keywords: religious and political extremism, the Republic of Daghestan, opposition, Islam, ideology.

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The author examines the causes of religious and political extremism in Daghestan, analyzes the factors of the growth of social tension that causes protest mood of the population.

The author notes that the manifestation of religious and political extremism is typical for the North Caucasus over the past two decades. The region is one of the most difficult in Russia, as there is a growing influence of the religious factor on ethnopolitical processes and the general growth of social tension.

The confessional factor has always played and is now playing a big role in public life of Daghestan, but extremism based on religion is more often associated with politics and nationalism. The danger of spreading religious and political extremism in the territory of Daghestan is that young people (making up 30,3% of the population) are most vulnerable to this trend.

The author, based on a survey of experts, dealing with the problems of ideological confrontation between extremism and terrorism, identifies the following problems among modern Daghestan societies: corruption; absence of social elevators; stratification of society in terms of material well-being; decrease in the level of education; violation of an individual's rights; religious fanaticism that engenders religious extremism and terrorism; the worsening of the social and economic situation; intra-confessional contradictions; the strengthening of the role of religion in public

life (clericalism); ineffective management; lack of social justice; organized crime; impunity of officials; lack of channels for the will of citizens; inefficient judicial system; religious extremism; low levels of education and health care.

A number of factors of social tension in the republic were also revealed: the problem of unemployment, its growth in recent years and outflow of citizens from the republic, including in search of work.

As for the level of the terrorist threat, the author of the article notes that there has been an increase in the activity of armed bandit formations in the south of Daghestan since the beginning of 2017. The regime of the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) is periodically introduced in various regions of the republic.

The author draws attention to the influence of the Islamic state on the North Caucasus in the framework of this study. The author cites statistical data for 2017 on the inhabitants of the North Caucasus, who are fighting for ISIS in Syria, and among which 1,2 thousand people come from Daghestan (the total number is 2 thousand people). There is a danger that these people can be a serious threat to the country's national security upon returning home.

Speaking about the reasons for the spread of religious and political extremism in the North Caucasus, the author calls such factors as the clan system of governing the republic, the criminalization of power, an ineffective judicial system, the recruitment of youth into extremist groups by means of information technologies, and intra-confessional conflicts. All this is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate information policies by the Spiritual Administration of Muslims and state bodies, a harmonious and consistent national policy closely linked with the strategy of national and spiritual development of the peoples of Daghestan; lack of confidence in the bodies of state power and law enforcement structures among citizens. Problems and gaps in the activities of the authorities are used by supporters of Salafism for their own purposes, for raising the protest mood among the population.

In addition to the internal causes of the spread of religious and political extremism, the author of the article points to external factors, namely: the actions of various emissaries, outside funding, the work of missionaries and compatriots who arrived in the Republic of Daghestan in the early 1990s, Internet resources, the influence of external destructive forces (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) The reasons for radicalization lie in the misinterpreted, simplified interpretation of Islam as well.

According to the results of the study on determining the effectiveness of countering extremism among law enforcement bodies of Daghestan, the most effective is the FSB bodies, then the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs for countering extremism in the Republic of Daghestan, and the bodies of the Federal Migration Service and the bodies of the Prosecutor Office are in the last places.

The author points out that the state is fighting terrorists, not the reasons for their appearance and the goals they pursue. The ideological counteraction to extremism is reduced to ineffective and formalized measures in the republic. Based on the study, the author claims that representatives of the clergy of the republic have an ambiguous role in ideological counteraction to extremism. On the one hand, religious figures hold medjlises with the participation of prominent religious scholars of the republic, as well as international conferences with the participation of famous world Islamic scholars; the "As-Salam" newspaper is being published, television programs on religious topics are being conducted. On the other hand, the contradictions within traditional Islam cause discontent in Daghestan society. Spiritual leaders of traditional Islam are inferior in public debate to representatives of the unconventional current.

Despite some successful campaigns and actions to counter the ideology and practice of extremism and terrorism, the regional system of such resistance has not developed in the republic.

The author suggests the following measures to overcome extremism and, as a result, terrorism in the republic: to carry out

reforms in the economic and political spheres; to overcome ugly forms of corruption; to work with young people in educational institutions, mosques, broadcast television programs of anti-terrorist orientation, improve legislation, explain more actively the insolvency, social harm and the criminal nature of ideologies, programs and actions that encompass hatred towards people of other races, nationalities, faiths and social groups.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.03.006. ZENFIRA RUSTAMOVA. AZERBAIJAN – IRAN: SOME IMPORTANT STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS // *“Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ehkonomicheskoy i kulturnoy oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya. 19 oktyabrya 2016,” Moscow, FSBEI of HE, MSLU, 2017, P. 110–116.*

Keywords: Azerbaijan, Iran, bilateral relations, Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, Vladimir Putin, Hasan Roukhani, political and economic cooperation, cooperation in the field of culture and tourism.

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On August 8, 2016, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said in his welcoming speech at the first historical meeting of the heads of the three States, Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran in Baku that our peoples living side by side for centuries were united by common history and geography, and close ties of friendship connected Azerbaijan with both Iran and Russia. These relations have reached the level of strategic partnership in recent years. Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan successfully cooperated in the framework of international organizations. Azerbaijan was against the

sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia. The trilateral format created good opportunities for raising economic cooperation to a higher level, as well as for ensuring peace, security and stability in the region. The Azerbaijani leader concluded that his country has always demonstrated an example of good neighborhood. Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran were united by their readiness to coordinate approaches to a wide range of regional and global issues, aspiration to build up multifaceted practical cooperation in the trade, economic and cultural spheres further. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expressed the opinion that no country alone could withstand threats from outside and develop its potential in modern conditions. Three neighboring states experienced common threats in the sphere of politics, economy, culture and ecology. H. Rohani stressed that there were all prerequisites for dynamic cooperation the measures taken by the three countries were not directed against other countries.

The outcome of the summit was the signing of a declaration containing provisions on the further development of the economy, the unacceptability of the practice of using unlawful economic sanctions, the importance of new reliable transit corridors, the strengthening of regional stability and security, the connection of the electric power systems of Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran for the exchange of electricity and etc. It should be noted that the way to the summit was long and not easy, speaking about its importance and significance. Heydar Aliyev laid the foundation for the development of Azerbaijani-Iranian good-neighborly relations and raising them to the present level. In October 1993, immediately after Heydar Aliyev was elected the head of Azerbaijan, Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani paid a visit to Baku and expressed his full support. Heydar Aliyev's official visit to Iran took place on May 17-19, 2002. A conversation between Heydar Aliyev and Iranian President Muhammad Khatami was held before the meeting. At the extended meeting, where Iran was represented by its Ambassador to Azerbaijan Ahad Gazai, Heydar Aliyev touched

upon issues without which it would be impossible to expand and deepen the Azerbaijani-Iranian bilateral relations. The visit of Heydar Aliyev to Iran opened a new milestone in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. In April 2004, the Consulate General of the Azerbaijan Republic was opened in Tabriz. Azerbaijan and Iran signed the Non-Aggression Pact on May 16, 2005, which prohibits the deployment of military bases in countries that are hostile to the opposite side. April 16, 2011 the first meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran was held in the Iranian city of Urmia, a joint declaration was adopted on its results. The second meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran was held on March 7, 2012 in Nakhchivan (Azerbaijan). The Turkish Foreign Minister noted that the agreement was reached on holding similar meetings in the areas of trade, energy, tourism and transport, and expressed the hope that the South Caucasus region will become a region of peace. Following the meeting, the Nakhchivan Statement was adopted. Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Muhammadbaghir Bahrami said during a press conference in Baku that the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers was important from the standpoint of both regional and international relations. On April 5, 2016, the third tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran took place in the Iranian city of Ramsar. As a result, a joint declaration was adopted, which expressed confidence that the historical, religious and cultural roots of the three countries would create special conditions for strengthening the unity between them. The convergence of interests in the establishment of peace and stability in the region, as well as the norms of international law on respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and inviolability of borders and the obligation to resolve all disputes peacefully was emphasized in the Declaration. The signatories of the declaration stressed the need to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict as soon as possible.

Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran said that no country would allow its territory to be used for threats or actions against the other

two countries. The participants of the meeting expressed their intention to strengthen cooperation in the fight against terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, human trafficking and illegal migration.

In 2016, February, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev paid a visit to Iran, and in August, the President of Iran Hassan Rouhani – to Azerbaijan. More than 20 documents were signed within the framework of these visits, which was an indicator of the strategic importance of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran. The Week of Iranian cinema, organized by the Culture Center of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Azerbaijan, was opened in Baku on May 14, 2016. Chairman of the Organization of Islamic Culture and Relations of Iran, Abuzar Ibrahim, highly appreciated the Week of Iranian cinema in Baku and stressed that Iran is eagerly awaiting the Week of Azerbaijan Cinema. In September 2016, Iran's ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mohsin Pakayin, noted at the last press conference (due to the end of his work) that the bilateral relations between the two countries were at a high level. During his tenure as ambassador, the Iranian presidents visited Azerbaijan three times. The President of Azerbaijan visited Iran twice. About 50 documents were signed by the countries; economic ties continued to develop; the number of flights between Iran and Azerbaijan increased. The Nakhchivan-Mashhad train was to be launched soon, which would further develop the ties between the countries.

October 5, 2016 President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev received the credentials of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Azerbaijan Javad Jahangirzadeh. Issues related to the expansion of bilateral cooperation in such areas as security, transport, infrastructure projects, agriculture, and tourism were discussed.

The level of development of the railway network and its inclusion in the regional and international railway system is an essential indicator of the country's economic progress. One of the

most important railway routes for Azerbaijan is the transport corridor "North-South," starting in India and reaching Helsinki. This transport route will connect Northern Europe with India and the Persian Gulf countries in the coming years, linking the railways of Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia. There are both economic prerequisites and the political will of the leadership of the participating countries to implement such a large-scale project. August 7, 2016, in Baku, the signing ceremony of the Protocol of intentions on cooperation in the implementation of the international transport corridor "North-South" and a number of other important documents was held with the participation of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Hasan Roukhani. The Ministry of Communications and High Technologies of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technologies of Iran adopted a memorandum on cooperation in the field of electronic security.

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Azerbaijan and the Organization of Cultural Heritage, Crafts and Tourism of Iran adopted the Program of Implementation in the Sphere of Tourism Cooperation for 2016–2019. September 19, 2016 at the exhibition "Iran Project-2016," Baku, Deputy Economy Minister Sahil Babayev noted that Iranian companies invested \$2,6 billion in the economy of Azerbaijan; only \$145 million of this amount was invested in the non-oil sector. About 450 companies with Iranian capital operate in Azerbaijan. According to the Deputy Minister, the warm relations between the governments of Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as the historical, cultural and religious unity between the peoples gave their results in the sphere of economy: the trade turnover, both exports from Azerbaijan and imports from Iran, grew by 70% in seven months in 2016. Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran will develop in the field of culture, tourism and business, youth exchange, and the ties between regions and provinces will deepen. Sahil Babayev emphasized the fact that the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran have moved to a new stage. Especially they began to develop in recent years. In just over two

years, the heads of state met seven times, more than 80 meetings were held and more than 40 documents were signed. Two meetings of intergovernmental commissions took place.

Thus, the researcher concludes, prerequisites have been created for the further successful and mutually beneficial development of bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Iran.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.03.007. LYUDMILA MAKSAKOVA. DEMOGRAPHIC AND MIGRATION POTENTIAL OF UZBEKISTAN // "Narodonaselenie," Moscow, 2016, № 1, P. 82–89.

Keywords: reproduction of the population, independent development of the population, "reasonable fertility," reproductive level, age structure, labor potential, gross external migration, labor migration, national staff.

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Moderately expanded reproduction of the population is typical for modern Uzbekistan, which provides a new dynamics of growth in its number and age structure, the author notes. According to the State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the population of the republic increased by 10,4 million people (by 50,5%) for years of independent development, and amounted to 31,025 thousand people at the beginning of 2015. In recent years, the average annual growth rate was within 1,5–1,7% against 3,0–3,5% in the 1970s and 2,2–2,3% in the early 1990s, which indicates a slowdown in population growth.

Uzbekistan passed the stage of high birth rate. Reproductive processes occur according to universal laws, with a general movement from high to low fertility and mortality. At the same time, the number of births is 4,0–4,2 times more than the number

of deaths annually, which indicates a powerful demographic potential of the republic. There are positive changes in the birth rate. Fertility is increasingly regulated within the family. The state pursues a policy of strengthening family relations, improving the health of the mother and the younger generation with a focus on "reasonable fertility." Gradually, the reproductive attitudes of the population to the average family were formed. Based on the results of socio-demographic surveys, it can be assumed that the current reproductive level is approaching the optimal and desirable parameters for the population.

New trends in the reproduction of the population have a favorable qualitative impact on its age structure. This is especially noticeable in the dynamics of the ratio of the population of the main age groups. The share of able-bodied contingents in the total number of inhabitants increased (from 49,1% in 1991 to 61,7% in modern times), while the share of children and adolescents under 16 declined accordingly, from 43,1 to 30,2%. As the world experience shows, the decline in fertility is inevitably accompanied by demographic aging with the corresponding negative social and demographic consequences. Uzbekistan could not avoid it either. At the same time, aging processes are almost imperceptible in Uzbekistan. The proportion of the population 65 years and over barely exceeds 5%. The population of Uzbekistan is young by international classification for this indicator. The average age of residents is 25–26 years, although there has been some "aging from below" age pyramid. In general, the modern age structure of the population of Uzbekistan and its dynamics indicate potential opportunities for a favorable development of the demographic situation.

Changes in reproduction processes and in the age structure of the population have not only demographic but also economic consequences that directly affect the quality of life. First of all, they ensured an absolute and relative increase in labor potential, which is a prerequisite for accelerating economic growth. The economic development of the republic in the last decade is much faster than

population growth (8,5 and 1,6%, respectively). The improvement of the demographic situation directly affects the qualitative aspects of population development. There is a reduction in the demographic burden on the able-bodied population. According to calculations, it has decreased from 1,036 to 620 people per thousand people of working age, i.e. in 1,7 times for 1991–2013.

The existing regime of reproduction of the population testifies to a sufficiently high qualitative development of the country. Population growth rates were optimized. The expected life expectancy increased from 69,2 years in 1990 to 73,1 years in 2013, incl. 70,7 years for men and 75,5 years for women. The death rate and life expectancy in the world are one of the main criteria for demographic security. However, there are a number of problems in the country with undoubted positive changes. A part of the population lives in ecologically unfavorable conditions. First of all, this refers to the lower reaches of the Amu-Darya with a population of more than 3 million people, where external factors affect the state of health. It will take a lot of effort to improve the demographic situation.

There have been significant changes in the migration of the population of Uzbekistan in the process of creating an independent state and market reform of the economy, caused by socio-economic and political transformations. A complex interweaving of various factors led to quantitative and qualitative changes in the migration situation. The most significant trend is a reduction in the gross volume of external migration, both in immigration and in emigration flows. Moreover, the gap between them increases, mainly due to a decrease in the intensity of arrival. The number of people, who left for permanent residence from Uzbekistan for the post-Soviet period, decreased by 3 times and the number of those, who moved in – 10 times. The decrease in the migration outflow of the population is a positive trend for Uzbekistan. The republic loses a lot of its qualified personnel as a result of external migrations, as the proportion of educated, professionally trained population is 12–15 points higher among emigrants than immigrants.

Currently, the orbit of migration links of the population of Uzbekistan has expanded, including European and overseas countries. However, external migration links with far-abroad countries make up only about 2% of the total. Russia and Kazakhstan are the most preferred countries of destination. At the same time, Russia's role is declining, there is a reorientation of emigration to Kazakhstan, which accounts for about half of all those who left the republic in recent years. Basically, such dynamics are due to the territorial closeness and similarity of the mentality of peoples. The non-indigenous population is more involved in external migration processes. The share of the titular population is relatively small (about 10%), Uzbekistan loses some of its titular population in external migrations, as its emigration flows are slightly higher than immigration flows. Basically, these are young and well-educated people. Preferred countries of arrival are the United States, Germany, Belgium, England, the United Arab Emirates, as well as Russia. The current migration situation in Uzbekistan is relatively stable.

Labor migration is of great importance for both sending and receiving countries. It reduces demographic pressure on local labor markets and creates economic effects in the form of remittances in sending countries, including Uzbekistan. It provides labor force, creates a large part of the gross product in the recipient countries, contributing to economic capacity-building. According to various estimates by Russian specialists, labor migrants create from 5 to 8% of Russia's GDP. At present, labor migration is quite large in Uzbekistan, it is fueled by both demographic and economic factors. Most labor migrants carry out their labor activities within the CIS. The main migration partners are Russia and Kazakhstan. According to the survey data, migrants from Uzbekistan work mainly in transport, construction, agriculture, trade, industrial enterprises, carry out housing and communal services, and do business.

For a long time the majority of labor migrants in Uzbekistan had an unstable, mostly illegal status in Russia and other CIS

countries. In recent years both sending and receiving countries have taken steps to regulate migration processes. As a result, the share of legal labor migrants from Uzbekistan, officially authorized to work in host countries, has significantly increased. Measures have been taken to streamline the processes of labor migration in Uzbekistan. The policy of the republic in this sphere is aimed at curbing the growth of the scale of labor migration, strengthening the social protection of citizens working outside the republic, as well as ensuring state control over migration processes.

Modern trends create quite real prerequisites for the development of external migration links of the republic's population. Uzbekistan actively joins the international community, expanding its economic and business partnership with various states. In the future, the dynamics of migration processes, on the one hand, will be influenced by modern changes in the geopolitical situation, on the other – the formation of migration behavior and migration intentions of the titular population. Currently, there are factors in the country that promote the development of migration processes and expand the participation of the titular population. Uzbekistan joins the world economy, enters the world markets. National cadres are attracted to enterprises with complex production, to foreign firms located on the territory of the republic, with modern forms of professional development and professional training of personnel, are internships abroad through joint ventures. The number of young people who speak foreign languages is increasing.

The current migratory flows will determine the potential labor migration in the coming years. Traditionally, Russia will remain a priority. It is estimated that the number of labor migrants from Uzbekistan to Russia can be halved in the next 10–15 years, due to unskilled labor mainly. According to the researcher, Russia will be attractive for business sectors of Uzbekistan along with Western countries. As a result, we can expect a higher qualitative composition of labor migrants to Russia with a decrease in their

number, since the entrepreneurial stratum of labor migration is distinguished by a higher educational and qualification level.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

ELENA DMITRIEVA. WATER CONSUMPTION IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES IN POST-SOVIET PERIOD: CONFLICT OF INTERESTS // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: water resources, water consumption, conflict of interests, irrigation, Central Asian region, post-Soviet area.

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Abstract. This article is a review of certain problems of water consumption in Central Asia. Special attention is devoted to the problems of access to water resources of the region and their distribution between its countries in the post-Soviet period.

Central Asia is a region very rich in water due to its natural and geographical features. Despite this the water problem has not only remained unresolved after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., but, on the contrary, it has become exacerbated and touched all five countries of the region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

At present these Central Asian states are characterized by a high birth rate, high poverty level, and drastic need for resources to develop their economies. The water resources in Central Asia are mainly used for agricultural purposes, hydropower generation, and for industrial needs, and are the main factor influencing economic and political stability in the countries of the region.

One of the specific features of water consumption in the region is the fact that the formation of water resourced takes place

mainly in one region, namely, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and their consumption in neighboring regions – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. All Central Asian republics consume water from the two main sources – the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers. This is why the problems of the transborder use of water (access to it, right to use it, and balance and regime of its consumption, support and restoration of water ecosystems, etc.) are so important in interstate relations.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are situated in the upper reaches of the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers. These are mountainous districts where the drain of these rivers is formed. The glacier reserves of water are their main resource of the clean fresh water. Hydropower plants and water reservoirs are on the territory of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan which enable them to control the water flow to neighboring Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan which are situated in the lower reaches of these rivers. These three republics, due to their geographical position, are the main consumers of water for agricultural needs (irrigational land cultivation).

In Soviet times there was a well-tested system of water consumption and energy supply in operation. Water supplies from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan was compensated by their deliveries of oil, oil products and gas, as well as electric energy, especially in winter to the former two republics. There was a uniform energy system and economic connections which practically disintegrated with the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan began to sell energy resources to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan at market prices, and if they failed to pay on time, they stopped supplies, thus causing an energy shortage in winter. In reply, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan began to reduce the volume of water drain to the republics in the lower reaches of the rivers in summer, thus filling their own reservoirs in order to be able to generate more energy by their own forces.

The main problem of joint water consumption has been the fact that the energy requirements of the republics in the upper reaches of the rivers have entered into contradictions with the agricultural requirements of the republics in the lower reaches of the rivers.

In the post-Soviet period the water consumption system and the regime of electric energy supply were abolished, and new ones necessary for the functioning of a workable water and energy balance were not created due to the differing interests of independent neighboring countries and their rivalry for energy resources. Each of the five Central Asian republics constantly uses all and sundry levers of influence on one another, disregarding the fact that the entire region has been formed as a mutually connected and mutually dependent economic complex, where everything was mutually dependent (water and energy balances, division of labor, etc.).

Such policy of the newly-independent states in Central Asia has a negative effect on the use of the water resources of the region, because water consumption in each republic takes place without due agreements and account of interests of all countries of the region, which will result in a greater conflict between neighboring countries and will take a solution to urgent problems in an impasse. The countries situated in the lower reaches of the rivers will use greater volumes of water for irrigation in their agriculture, which will cause a shortage of water in the upper reaches of the rivers, and the countries situated there will increase the generation of electric energy, which will lead to a shortage of water in the lower basin. Thus, we face a conflict of interests of the regional countries.

The very regime of water consumption leads to a conflict situation in relation between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (the energy regime of water consumption), on the one hand, and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (the irrigation regime of water consumption), on the other. The essence of the conflict boils down to the fact that in the irrigation regimes water is

consumed maximally in summer, and in the energy regime – in winter. In summer the countries in the upper reaches should replenish their reservoirs for the generation of big energy volumes required in winter, thus depleting the drain, so necessary for the countries in the lower reaches for irrigation. In winter evacuation of big masses of water takes place accompanying the generation of great volumes of electric energy, which causes the flooding of part of territory in low-lying countries. In order to avoid this, the countries in the upper-reaches need oil-and-gas resources of the above-mentioned countries in the winter period to maintain energy balance. This is why a way out of the situation would be the efforts of all countries of the region to reach an agreement in their joint rational management of the water resources, taking into account the interests of all independent republics.

In real life no such decision has been reached during the past quarter of a century due to the inability of these countries to agree with one another, as well as to certain technical and economic factors (absence of a modern irrigation system making it possible to consume water more effectively, refusal to grow hydrophilous crops, high cost of electric energy, etc.). The countries of the region proved unable to work out a uniform distribution system of water resources with due consideration of the interests of all sides.

In this case it would be necessary to have the third force in the person of international organizations and neighboring states, which are interested in resolving the water problem in Central Asia. Due to controversial decisions in the sphere of the transborder water consumption all Central Asian republics suffer great economic losses running into billions of dollars annually.

Moreover, uncoordinated actions may cause technical and economic consequences (uncontrolled water evacuation, crevasses, salinization of soil, etc.), whose consequences may be unpredictable not only to the given region, but also to neighboring countries. In the future, if there is no proper management and regulation such situation may become a source of interstate conflicts. The formation of independent states in Central Asia has

placed on the agenda the question of the rights of ownership of water among the consumer-countries. The desire of each Central Asian country to use the water resources of the region with maximal results only in one's own interests has violated the water consumption balance, which existed at the time of the U.S.S.R., and exacerbated the conflict situation in the region. Taking into account the high population growth rates, the water problem has turned into a factor of destabilization of the region demanding an immediate solution.

Literature

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AZIZ NIYAZI. THE WORLD, CIS AND CENTRAL ASIA IN THE MEASUREMENTS OF HUNGER INDEX // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Global Hunger Index, food security, Central Asia, CIS countries, UN.

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Abstract: The article is devoted to the problem of hunger in the countries of Central Asia in comparison with the situation in other countries of the world. The author gives various statistical data and results of the study of the problem of hunger by international organizations. The analysis of the reasons leading to a problem of hunger among the population of the planet is given.

The next report of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) "The Global Hunger Index of 2017: hunger and inequality"¹ was published at the end of last year. Global Hunger Index reflects degree of chronic malnutrition in various regions and countries in the world, except for the most prosperous states with developed economy.² The last study covers 119 countries. The index is calculated on the basis of four indicators: shares of starving population which is (chronically undernourished), shares of children under five years having low weight owing to acute malnutrition, shares of children under five years having development delays because of chronic malnutrition and also an indicator of children mortality under five years. The countries are ranged on 100-ball scale where 0 is the best result, 100 – the worst. The last results of a research are dated generally 2016, some 2012–2014, 2015 and the beginning of 2017.

In the report it is noted that in general in the world in 2017 in comparison with 2000 the level of hunger decreased by 27 percent. Improvement for this period happened by all four indicators of GHI. There were about 27 percent of malnourished by 2017, by contrast with 18,2 percent in 2000. The number of children with low weight decreased from 9,9 to 9,5 percent, with stunted growth from 37,7 to 27,8 percent. Child mortality declined from 8,2 to 4,7 percent.³

Nevertheless serious problems with food of inhabitants of the planet remain, in many countries they are far from the decision, and in some ones have seriously become aggravated. First of all it is connected with wars and conflicts, ecological disasters, social inequality, policy failure of authorities. Quite often such factors are closely bound, mutually aggravate each other. So in 2016 the number of starving inhabitants of Earth increased to 815 million people: it is more, than it was in 2015 (777 million) though it is less, than in 2000 (about 900 million). More than 100 million people faced the critical level of food insecurity though the previous year there were less of them – 80 million. The situation in the sphere of food security has considerably worsened in a number of the countries of Africa to the south from the Sahara, Southeast and Western Asia. And the most serious deterioration of the situation took place in the zones affected by wars, violent conflicts and internal fight where furthermore their impact was aggravated with droughts, floods and others ecological catastrophes. At the beginning of 2017 the UN stated that over 20 million people are on the brink of starvation in four countries of the world: Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen. Flashes of hunger there reached extreme levels. Hunger was officially announced in a number of regions of South Sudan. At the same time deterioration of affairs in the area of food security was also noted in the countries with relative peace, first of all where recession of economy led to loss of currency returns and tax revenues that

negatively impacted as existence of import food, and increase in prices for it. The reduced prices of oil and mineral resources limited the potential of a number of governments in subsidizing of basic needs of citizens and support of poor households at the expense of programs of social protection. Both in peace and in military conditions access to food was narrowed first of all for poor social groups, villagers, refugees, women and girls.⁴

Apart from that, for the last ten years the number of conflicts in the countries in which severe forms of food insecurity were already observed has increased and where violence principally appears in rural areas that negatively affects production and availability of food. To the fullest extent a new flash of conflicts affected countries of Africa and the Middle East where, against the background of social and economic instability and low emergency response capacity, food crises burst. Often they have been caused by climatic shocks and as a result fight for water and land resources. Worst of all with food the situation is in the Central African Republic. In this state more than a half of the population starves – 50,9 percent of citizens, and improvements since 1992 there actually aren't observed years.

In general it is possible to characterize the situation in the Post-Soviet states as noncritical, except for Tajikistan. As is seen from the diagram almost all of them, achieved considerable progress in scaling back of malnutrition since 1992, also, as well as the countries of Eastern Europe.⁵

In Central Asia problems of hunger and malnutrition still demand serious efforts to solve them. The ratings of the countries of this region according to the Global Index of Hunger and also the ratings of other states for the comparative analysis are given below.

**The ratings according to the calculations of
the Global Index of Hunger from 119 countries of the world.⁶**

Rating	Country	Years			
		1992	2000	2008	2017
		Points			
*	Belarus	–	<5	<5	<5
*	Cuba	10,5	5,3	<5	<5
*	Ukraine	–	13,7	<5	<5
21	Kazakhstan	–	11,3	10,9	5,8
22	Russian Federation	–	10,5	6,8	6,2
29	China	25,9	15,8	11,2	7,5
30	Iran	17,5	13,6	8,7	7,6
40	Republic of Kyrgyzstan	–	19,7	13,4	9,3
52	Turkmenistan	–	21,9	16,5	12,2
54	Uzbekistan	–	23,8	16,1	13,1
96	Tajikistan	–	41,8	32,6	28,7
100	India	46,2	38,2	35,6	31,4
107	Afghanistan	50,2	52,7	37,9	33,3

* – the countries are included into the leading group of 14 states united by the highest common rating. See the reference 6.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan got into the group of 2017 on-scale index under 10 points (43 countries) meaning a low level of hunger. The situation both with economy and food in Kazakhstan always remained at a higher level in comparison with other Central Asian republics. As a heritage from the Soviet Union the country got the most powerful industrial base and quite good agro-industrial resources of the region. Since the end of the 90th till 2017 Kazakhstan showed level decrease of chronic malnutrition almost twofold. Generally improvement of the situation with food was observed from 2008 to 2017. To a large extent it was connected with economic growth, agricultural and food policy of the authorities. According to the rating of the Global Hunger Index of 2017 it managed to outrun Russia and took 21st place. Russia came to the 22nd one though in 2000 according to the rating of GHI it was above Kazakhstan.

The Kyrgyz Republic has quite good rate of quantity reduction of the citizens suffering from chronic malnutrition. Improvement in this direction happened against the background of a slow insignificant economic recovery after a deep economic recession caused by radical neoliberal reforms of the 90s. The serious damage on social and economic development was inflicted by mass violent conflicts and periods of political instability. On the classification of the World Bank the KR falls under the countries with low income and food shortages.⁷ Nevertheless Kyrgyzstan managed to achieve progress in overcoming hunger – the 40th place according to the rating of GHI. In many respects it is connected with efforts of the state in this direction and international aid.

State spending on social needs in the republic is slightly higher than in Russia, exceed them in Kazakhstan approximately twofold.⁸ Such systems of the UN as Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN women, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lend assistance to the republic. With support of these and other international organizations special projects are also carried out aimed not only at provision of food aid, but in the first turn at the revival of agriculture, increase in enhancement of immunity of the agrarian sector and food system to external influences, settling and prevention of conflicts owing to fight for water and land resources. In particular, in Kyrgyzstan the program of the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UNPF) is carried out as a part of the project of the World Food Programme (WFP) on providing food aid in exchange for creation of productive assets, development of agricultural potential in regions of high conflictogenity because of anthropogenic influence on cross-border water and land resources.⁹ In areas where there were sometimes bloody clashes of Tajiks and Kyrgyz, now they collectively restore and use irrigation canals, resolve issues of joint administration of pastures and fertile territories.

It should be noted that membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan plays very significant role in promotion of food security and lowering of malnutrition levels in these countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan use privileges when purchasing and transporting food from the states of the union. Common border with Russia gives many benefits for the Republic of Kazakhstan, simplified rules of stay of labor migrants in Russia and their earnings (which they send home and which are on average estimated at 30 percent of GDP of the country) are also very important for the Kyrgyz Republic.

Almost at the same level according to the rating of the Global Hunger Index there are located Turkmenistan – the 52nd place and Uzbekistan – the 54th place. Their rating of GHI was calculated by indicators of 2014–2016. It is necessary to take into account that Uzbekistan in 2016–2017 demonstrated an accelerated growth of social and economic development of which a long stable period of strengthening of key branches of industry and agriculture and also reduction of a share of starving and undernourished people took priority. In 1999–2001 the starving (chronically undernourished) represented 16,4 percent of all the population of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in 2007–09 – 10,2 percent, in 2014–16 – 6,3 percent. In Turkmenistan, on the contrary, the situation with reduction of a share of the starving was unstable: in 1999–2001 they were 8,2 percent of total population, in 2007–09 – 4,5 percent, and in 2014–16 – 5,5 percent.¹⁰ Though in percentage correlation from 1999 to 2016 in Turkmenistan a number of the starving was less, sometimes much more, than in Uzbekistan, the last managed to reduce considerably their share in recent years while it increased in Turkmenistan. The food crisis caused by feverish demand for basic products of the first decade of 2018 in this republic was a consequence of the authorities' sluggishness on its prevention. Bad harvest of 2017 aggravated the problem of food security. Partly such situation is connected with raw export-oriented focus of national economy, insufficient attention to agro-industrial complex in favour of gas industry development, prices surge, reduction of

social support, difficult climatic conditions. Nevertheless Turkmenistan has great opportunities to cope with difficulties in the range of citizens' feeding, in view of that the population of the republic isn't so big as in Uzbekistan.

The situation in Tajikistan is much more difficult, which occupied the 96th place in GHI rating. According to the Hunger Index it is between Mali and Tanzania. It is estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) that 30,1 percent of the population in the republic – 2,6 million people suffer from malnutrition.¹¹ The civil war of 1992–1997 undermined significantly national economy, but for the twenty-year period of the post-war restoration which was followed by powerful international aid, Tajikistan didn't manage to reach any essential achievements in industry, agriculture and social sector. The number of chronically undernourishing citizens is being reduced slowly and slightly. In 1999–2001 they were 42,4 percent of total population of Turkmenistan, in 2007–09 – 38,6 percent, in 2014–16 – 30,1 percent.¹² The reasons of such situation first of all come from incompetent economic policy, deficiency of qualified business executives, high level of corruption. The ethno-regional control system of the state which outgrew in family and clan was in Tajikistan inefficient though sometimes in a number of countries of the East it led to social and economic and cultural progress. Also reduction of money transfers from labor migrants in connection with new rules of their stay in Russia has its effect. As Tajikistan isn't a member of EEU they are more difficult and more expensive for its citizens, than for workers from the countries which form part of the economic union. In the region of Europe and Central Asia (EAR) Tajikistan takes the latest place by a share of undernourishing people and by results of overcoming undernutrition. In general in the region of EAR in 2014–2016 14,3 million people, about 5,6 million of them from Central Asia, suffered from severe forms of lack of adequate nutrition. At the same time as it is noted in the report of FAO after the impressive progress made in previous years lately it is observed stagnation in the region.

Indicators of prevalence of malnutrition in the countries of Central Asia stay almost without changes, also, as well as in the Caucasus. More important obstacle in a way of ensuring food security in the region is poverty.¹³

Russia has achieved considerable results in recent years by indicators of a share of the starving and rates of their reduction. In 1999–2001 there were chronically undereating 5,1 percent of total population of the Russian Federation, in 2007–09 – 1,4 percent, in 2014–16 – 0,9 percent. Though it gave way to Kazakhstan in the rating of Hunger Index, its general indicators were better. Considering success of the Russian Federation achieved in agriculture and food import substitution in 2016–2017 it is possible to predict further stability of its food security.

Following the results of studies of 2014–2016 the best indicators according to the Global Hunger Index among the CIS got Belarus and as it isn't surprising Ukraine. They entered the most successful category of the least starving countries from 119 countries. Apparently, Ukraine was highly evaluated having the solid margin of safety in production of products and trade with Russia accumulated during previous years. But it ran out quickly in 2017. According to the specialists of FAO and World food programme country is in the category of the states with shortages of food.¹⁴ Food security threat sharply increased in 2017 in connection with the continuing armed conflict, inefficiency of control, food impoverishment, prices surge, high level of corruption and notable decrease in social support of citizens.

In general armed conflicts and violence in the world are the main reason of suffering from hunger. From the above-stated table it is obvious, the difficulty of the situation in distressful Afghanistan. In some areas there are about 70 percent of chronically undereating people. The best indicators of famine relief as a rule show the countries with effective institutes of power, economic distribution and planning, a low corruption component, and developed social sphere. An example of that in the CIS, as we see, is Belarus. China for the last decades achieved impressive

reduction of poverty and subsequently starving citizens. At the same time the state can be poor and feel economic pressure from external forces that Cuba perfectly demonstrates. Iran which experienced long-term war with Iraq and being under sanctions managed to keep its social system of assistance of the poor and needy, stability in reduction of number of starving. At the same time as the example of India, accelerated economic growth not necessarily entails successful reduction of poverty and number of starving.

Notes

- ¹ The report is prepared by IFPRI in cooperation with charitable organizations Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide. Form recommended by editors to reference: K. von Grebmer, J. Bernstein, N. Hossain, T. Brown, N. Prasai, Y. Yohannes, F. Patterson, A. Sonntag, S.-M. Zimmermann, O. Towey, C. Foley. 2017. 2017 Global Hunger Index: The Inequalities of Hunger. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute; Bonn: Welthungerhilfe; and Dublin: Concern Worldwide.
- ² Term "hunger" is used by international organizations as a synonym of the term "chronical malnutrition." "Malnutrition" – condition continuing not less than a year, characterized by inability to get a sufficiency of food for relevance in energy, maintaining of normal, active, healthy life.
- ³ 2017 Global Hunger Index. P. 5, 11. Universal improvement for 27 percent is calculated by four indicators integrated by GHI for 2012–2016.
- ⁴ A situation in the sphere of food security and food in the world – 2017. Stability enhancement to external effects for providing peace and food security. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. Rome, 2017. Page of vi, vii, 4, 5, 30. The report is prepared by joint efforts of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP) и World Health Organization (WHO).
- ⁵ Diagram made by: <http://vavilon.ru/statistika-golodayushhih/> (Access data: 28.02.2018.) Source: Country Trends for the 1992, 2000, 2008, and 2017 Global Hunger Index Scores / Appendix E / EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES. 2017 Global Hunger Index. P. 40.
- ⁶ The table made on the basis of: 2017 Global Hunger Index. Table 2.1 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES BY RANK, 1992 GHI, 2000 GHI, 2008 GHI, AND 2017 GHI. P. 13. – means lack of representative data in the report

of 1992. They aren't represented in the Post-Soviet countries during their presence in the USSR, i.e. for 1991. <5 means less than 5 points that says about low level of hunger. According to the report of 2017 14 countries occupy such top category – Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Estonia, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine and Uruguay. These states are united by joint elements and in the rating countries are located alphabetically without exact indication of the place – all countries are equal and are on 1–14 places. Due to the lack of data these states aren't included in the report: Bahrain, Bhutan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Qatar, Comoro Islands, Libya, Papua New Guinea, Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, South Sudan.

- ⁷ <https://data.worldbank.org/country/kyrgyz-republic> (Access data: 15.03.2017.) Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were included in the same group.
- ⁸ The State of Food Security and Nutrition in Europe and Central Asia 2017. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Budapest, 2017. FIGURE 10. Public spending on social assistance programmes, % of GDP. P. 20. The data in the report is taken from: World Bank. 2017b. ASPIRE database. Доступен на: <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/> Washington, D.C. Kyrgyzstan carried out significant progress in restoration of social care in comparison with the 90s when social expenses were suddenly cut down.
- ⁹ WFP. 2016. UN PBSO/PBF cross-border cooperation for sustainable peace and development mid-term progress report (Dec 2015 – Oct 2016). WFP Country Office in the Kyrgyz Republic.
- ¹⁰ 2017 Global Hunger Index. DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 1992, 2000, 2008, AND 2017 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES. Proportion of undernourished in the population (%) '91-'93 '99-'01 '07-'09 '14-'16. P. 34–35.
- ¹¹ The State of Food Security and Nutrition in Europe and Central Asia 2017. P. 5.
- ¹² 2017 Global Hunger Index. P. 35.
- ¹³ The State of Food Security and Nutrition in Europe and Central Asia 2017. P. 5.
- ¹⁴ <https://regnum.ru/news/2373553.html>. 29.01.2018. (Access data: 17.02.2018.)

2018.03.008. ELENA ALEKSEENKOVA. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF "5+1" FORMATS, CREATED IN CENTRAL ASIA (WITH THE U.S., KOREA, JAPAN AND THE EU PARTICIPATION // *"Mezhdunarodnaya Analitika," IMI MGIMO University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2017, № 1 (19), P. 29–41.*

Keywords: Central Asia, multilateral cooperation, "5 + 1" format, regional development, the U.S., Japan, South Korea , the EU, EAEU, conjugation, SREB.

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The publication is an analysis of the experience of interaction between the countries of the Central Asian region, as with the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, South Korea, Japan, and with other states over a 25-year time period after the collapse of the USSR. The author of the article notes that a number of the above states are trying to develop multilateral formats of cooperation in Central Asia, designated by the formula "5 + 1," in addition to developing bilateral relations with each of the countries of the region. The author notes that the formats differ according to the declared goals, content, mechanisms of cooperation, and allow realization of the various interests of the participating countries. The author analyzes these formats in order to identify the key interests of the participants and determine the vectors for the future development of the relations of the above-mentioned states with the countries of the region, considering this necessary for the most effective planning of building relations between Russia and the states of Central Asia.

The author notes that the Central Asian region with its large reserves of natural resources, a serious demographic potential, and transit opportunities in the center of Eurasia is extremely attractive for external actors, seeking additional opportunities for the

development of their economies. The attractiveness is combined with the weakness of political institutions, high conflict potential, poorly diversified and high-risk economy, as well as a serious set of external and internal security challenges, such as proximity to the sources of instability in Afghanistan and the Middle East with extremely low security of borders, problems of socio-economic stability, threats of growth of religious extremism, ethnic conflicts.

The author tried to characterize the formats of cooperation with the countries of the region, such as "5 + 1," to highlight their common and distinctive features, to outline their perspectives and limitations in the framework of this work.

The first meeting between the U.S. and 5 states of the Central Asian region in the "5 + 1" format was held in 2015 during the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State. The adopted documents underscored the commitment of the parties to the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and declared the desire to develop cooperation in many areas: in regional trade, transport, development of transit potential, energy, improving the business climate and stimulating investment, creating a sustainable environment, combating change climate, development of energy-efficient technologies. The author notes that cooperation in such important areas as: overcoming terrorism, traffic in weapons and drugs, supporting the development of Afghanistan and its recognition as a factor affecting stability in the region, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and humanitarian cooperation were at the bottom of the list.

The author of the article writes that although there are no direct economic interests for the U.S. in Central Asia, falling into the status of an outsider clearly contradicts the constant desire of the U.S. to "diversify" the relations of the states of the region with the outside world and prevent the growing role of China and Russia in the region. The creation of the "5 + 1" format is intended to show the five states that not only Russia and China can help in solving their regional problems, but the U.S. can also, without

pursuing any specific interests at this stage, except to promote the development of the region.

The absence of any concrete initiatives and programs in the field of regional security by the U.S. confirmed that Washington was not ready to invest significantly in solving the problems of the region. The new administration of Donald Trump has not yet formulated a specific agenda for the Central Asian region. Involvement in the affairs of Central Asia does not fit into the concept of "Make America great again" and looks like the dispersion of resources in the face of the need to address much more important internal and external tasks according to the logic of the current discourse of the U.S. administration.

The author notes the absence of an emphasis on the problems of observing human rights and the essence of the political regimes of the Central Asian states in the speeches of Donald Trump and the representatives of the American administration. Simultaneously, the administration of Donald Trump is quite serious about the fight against terrorism and maintains an active position on these issues in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.

The author believes that the new US administration will further develop the "5 + 1" format. Two main opportunities will be used: building economic contacts with the countries of the region and thus exercising influence on the political situation within them, as well as developing cooperation in the fight against radicalism and extremism. It is also necessary to take into account the donor activity of the U.S. in the region and significant influence of USAID on civil society and the social environment in some countries of the region. The author believes that this U.S. activity in the region will be supported regardless of the development of the "5 + 1" format.

Referring to the Directorate General for External Policies report, the author writes that the EU is the actor with the least influence in Central Asia for today. The region is not among the geopolitical priorities of the EU. So, the EU prefers to focus on

long-term strategies, rather than short-term strategies and results. The EU recognizes that it cannot and should not compete with Russia and China in the region, and calls for a focus on specific economic projects and cooperation in the security field where it can achieve concrete results. The EU should focus on education, continue to insist on improving the human rights situation and strengthen political and financial support for civil society.

The author notes that the region is becoming increasingly unstable, and the previously projected reorientation of the resources of the region (primarily gas) has not yet been carried out. Regional leaders believe trade with European states threatens their well-being, as well as democratic tendencies,. Corruption hampers economic development and "dilutes" a significant part of international economic assistance to the region, the human rights situation is not changing for the better.

The security problem could not become the basis for the EU cooperation with the countries of the region, although it is one of the most acute for the region and the EU is seriously concerned about the problem of terrorism and participation of citizens of the Central Asian states in military operations on the side of ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

In general, in recent years, the EU has intended to build relations with the states of the region rather on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis. Therefore, there is no need to talk about the existence of the "5 + 1" format in relation to the EU and Central Asia in fact.

At present, there is a significant transformation of the European approach. Despite the fact that the EU is currently more focused on domestic challenges, Brussels is gradually developing its own strategy for the Eurasian region.

The author believes that the EU and other key powers of the continent should seriously consider creating a common security zone for Europe and Asia, and ensuring this security is possible only through the development of the states of the region and the

formation of a common economic “connectivity” of the Eurasian space.

The emergence of the Chinese “One Belt – One Way” initiative in this space, which involves the integrated development of the transport and infrastructural connectivity of the Eurasian region, does not reduce the European concern for the future of the region. Central Asia and South Asia found themselves at the center of the Chinese project for understandable geographical reasons.

The EU insists on the need for multilateral formats to discuss the initiative “Economic Belt of the Silk Road,” on transparency and publicity, the need for the project to meet the goals of sustainable development of the United Nations, on the prospects for interaction of all stakeholders on the platforms of the OSCE, the SCO, CICA, and the need for multilateral coordination of all key regional donors and financial structures.

Specific proposals in the field of education, professional development and vocational training have not yet been announced by the Chinese side. It is possible that China is building infrastructure through Chinese labor and Chinese money, the local government benefits from using this infrastructure, but nothing changes for the local population. There is a danger of forming strong economic dependence for the states of the region from China, which can result in excessive debts for the Central Asian economies, and will entail a political orientation toward China.

The author notes that there is an understanding in the EU that it is impossible to resist the implementation of China's initiatives, and the EU is facing the task of “embedding” in the current situation in order to try to influence its development from within. The EU will try to create the most institutionalized and multilateral format for the implementation of the SREB initiative in order to reduce potential risks and maximize the benefits for enhancing the EU engagement with the Central Asian countries, which are the key link of transport projects on the way from China to the EU. The author believes that the joint work of European funds, expert structures and international organizations with the

expert community of Central Asian countries will be one of the formats of the interaction, and it is also possible to create bilateral and multilateral platforms for discussing China's initiative and projects.

Cooperation with the countries of the region to prevent the spread of radicalism and extremism can become another basis for the future EU Eurasian strategy. The EU is already quite seriously involved in the study of risks of radicalization in Central Asia. It is very likely that the EU – just like Russia – can face the most serious challenges to its own security in the near future, coming not only from the Middle East, but also from the Central Asian region.

The author believes that the dialogue with Japan is in the most elaborate and active phase among all the “5 + 1” formats operating in Central Asia. Japan provides official development assistance to countries in the region; The work is also carried out with international structures on specific areas of cooperation, such as UNDP and UNODC.

Japan (together with the EU) participates in the Meeting on Border Management, regularly participates in the Central Asian Initiative Group on Border Security (CABSI) Conferences, and conducts internships at the UNAFEI Institute for Asia and the Far East on crime prevention and combating offenders. Japan supports the Program for Applying Demand Reduction Measures for Central Asian Countries (FAST program), etc.

The main course of practical cooperation was identified for the next 10 years of the Dialogue development – assistance to the development of the agricultural sector of the economies of the countries of Central Asia based on the application of Japan's technologies and experience in the agricultural sphere. In addition, the fight against drug trafficking and control of the state borders of the region in the aspect of sustainable development – prevention of natural disasters, as well as the status of women – were especially noted.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five states expressed their gratitude to Japan for providing the frontier authorities with

inspection equipment and the implementation of the project on the creation of border cooperation offices. Five Japanese corporations have agreed with Turkmengaz to participate in the construction of the Galkynysh gas field, from where the TAPI gas pipeline will begin (in this project, Japan will invest \$10 billion). Japan also invests in infrastructure – the modernization of Tashkent CHP, Manas airport, the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, and in production – Mitsubishi plans to build a plant for the production of ammonia and urea in Navoi, and Toyota's assembly production will be in Kazakhstan. As for Tajikistan, Japan is mainly involved in humanitarian projects so far. Japan's main interest is in the oil and gas sector, due to turbulence in the Middle East. Japan, like Korea, is also interested in uranium. Experts say that Japan is ready to participate not only in social and economic projects in the region, but also to export technologies and develop the financial sector.

Unlike the U.S., Japan does not link its projects and programs in the region to any political conditions, but at the same time it has great financial resources, which makes it a more attractive partner for the countries of the region, especially in the face of a severe economic crisis. In addition, Japan can hardly be suspected that geopolitical considerations are the basis of its policy in Central Asia. It is expected that Japan's economic influence will only increase in the region in the coming years.

“Republic of Korea – Central Asia” the cooperation forum has existed since 2007. The conditions were created within the framework of this format for multilateral and bilateral discussion of cooperation in various fields of political, socio-economic and cultural interaction: in the field of energy and natural resources, infrastructure, IT, agriculture, science and technology, medicine and health, finance, light industry, education, etc.

South Korea can become a worthy example for the Central Asian states as a kind of “model of development.”

South Korea is one of the key economic partners of the countries of Central Asia investing in strategic sectors, such as

uranium mining, oil, gas and other raw materials production, transport and infrastructure. The main economic interest that is behind the Korean interest in Central Asia is access to resources and the weakening of dependence on their supplies from the Middle East.

Korea is dependent on energy imports by 97%. The growing dependence on nuclear energy makes Korea dependent on uranium supplies, which explains the great interest in the industry and its investment in uranium mining. The Central Asian states, in turn, are interested in these investments and technological development, which can be facilitated by cooperation with Korea.

In general, the cooperation of Korea and the states of Central Asia is developing in several formats. However, basically this cooperation concentrates around mutual economic interests and is fueled by the presence of historical and cultural ties.

The author notes that rich natural resources, great transit potential, the presence of serious security challenges, multi-vector foreign policy make the Central Asian region an object of interest for many external actors. The existing formats of "5 + 1" cooperation differ from each other both in the form of the institutional organization and in their content, as well as in the degree of efficiency and satisfaction of the participants with the results. Nevertheless, all external actors outlined above intend to continue and develop their presence in the region.

Russia and China are not trying to create such formats of interactions as "5 + 1," unlike all the external actors outlined above. Instead, Russia and some of the states of the region (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) are integrated into the Eurasian Economic Union. China prefers to build relations with the countries of the region at the bilateral level, offering large-scale investments, large infrastructure and transport projects to the Central Asian states that can enable the region to realize its transit potential and participate in international trade routes.

Obviously, cooperation within the framework of interface with the countries of the region will develop both at the

multilateral and bilateral levels. The main problem of cooperation in the triangle Russia – Central Asia – China (or EAEU-SREB) is still a low degree of integration and cooperation at the level of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as at the level of civil society.

Not all Central Asian countries are members of EAEU and can participate in projects of the People's Republic of China under the auspices of EAEU. Russia should formulate its own strategic vision of relations with the states of the region in these conditions, filling it with a positive agenda of practical cooperation at the level of small and medium-sized businesses, as well as civil society.

The author believes that the lack of competencies and the insufficient quality of human capital for the implementation of economic leap are the key problems of the Central Asian states at the present time. The competitiveness of the goods and labor of the Central Asian countries in the single EAEU market, as well as the opportunity to provide employment and benefit in the future from the infrastructure, built by China, depend on the ability of the states of the region to train qualified personnel with the required level of competence.

Obviously, in the foreseeable future, China will become the main economic partner of the region, and Russia will be the predominant guarantor of regional security, using the multilateral mechanisms of the OSCE and the SCO. Other external actors will be forced to take this reality into account, building their relations with the countries of the region. However, it is important for Russia to realize that most countries in the region pursue a multi-vector foreign policy and will not miss the opportunity to develop relations with those states that can provide additional development opportunities for the economies of the region.

Author of the abstract – Natalia Ginesina

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2018.03.009. ROMAN SILANTIEV. COOPERATION OF RUSSIA AND IRAN ON THE ISSUE OF COMBATING RELIGIOUS-MOTIVATED EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM – PROMISING DIRECTIONS // *“Sotrudnichestvo Rossii i Irana v politicheskoy, ehkonomicheskoy i kulturnoy oblasti kak faktor ukrepleniya mira i bezopasnosti v Evrazii: Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsii. 19 oktyabrya 2016,” Moscow, FGBOU VO MGLU, 2017, P. 43–48.*

Keywords: Russia, Iran, cooperation, extremism, terrorism, Wahhabism, anti-Shiite moods.

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The second decade of the 21st century is marked by the unprecedented growth of the influence of terrorist organizations in world history, whose adherents are tens of millions of people, the scientist writes. Terrorists came out of the underground, established control over vast territories, acquired the latest weapons and the possibility of conducting combat operations at the level of armored divisions. Supporters of ISIS, Al-Nusra and the Taliban have created their quasi-states with the management apparatus, powerful propaganda units and special services. They were so strengthened in some cases, that they moved from terrorism to terror, arranging the genocide of entire peoples and ethno-confessional groups. Modern religiously-motivated terrorism with all its diversity has a single foundation – the “Wahhabi sect of

the Hanbalt madhhab of Sunnism.” All the most dangerous terrorist organizations of our time are either classical Wahhabi Salafis or their offshoots, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb ut-Tahrir. In general, it can be asserted with full confidence that terrorist organizations will be constantly reproduced and developed if there are countries spreading the Wahhabi ideology. The Islamic Republic of Iran occupies a special place in the current situation.

The ideology of its official religion, Shiism, is incompatible with the destructive ideology of the Wahhabis, and demonstrates another face of the Islamic religion to the world, which causes particular hatred among the Wahhabis. The victory of Wahhabism is impossible in the Islamic world without the destruction of Shiism and the country that is the main defender of this Islamic trend. Wahhabi terrorists call themselves the Sunni strike group in the “holy war” against “Rafidite” Shiites, they increasingly deny the latter’s right to be called Muslims. Anti-Shiite propaganda intensified after the escalation of Saudi-Iranian relations especially, when the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to suspend the participation of their citizens in the Hajj after another mass death of Iranian pilgrims. Saudi theologians openly call Iranians not Muslims, but hidden Zoroastrian dualists. At the same time, Shiite theologians began to be executed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Unfortunately, the growth of anti-Shiite sentiment is also taking place in Russia. Some problems in Sunni-Shiite relations in Russia have been noted for a long time, but became public and acute in 2016. It all began when members of the Moscow Shiite community “Ahli-Beit” ceased to be allowed to namaz in the renovated complex of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque. The leadership of the mosque was afraid of provocations from anti-Shiite-minded parishioners and forbade them to perform prayers until relations improve. The Shiites historically considered themselves parishioners of this mosque, because it was the only one operating in Moscow 30 years ago and housed Muslims of

different currents. After the first scandal in March 2016, connected with the Shiites' denial of access to the mosque, the situation was repeated in early October, when members of the "Ahli-Beit" began to hold religious events preceding the day of Ashura (Shahsei-Vakhseya).

On 4 October 2016, the Shiites were attacked in the mosque building, where they were allowed to pray in the basement after long negotiations. The OMON soldiers (Special Purpose Police Unit) had to be brought in to resolve the conflict, after the main Imam of the mosque Ildar Alyautdinov made a statement that the leadership of the Cathedral mosque always met the Shiite community, providing the opportunity to freely visit temporary prayer rooms on the territory of the complex during the construction of the new building. An agreement was reached with representatives of the Shiite community that rituals demonstrating the peculiarities of their cult practices would not be held in the new building of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, in order to avoid further conflicts. However, on Monday, when the month of Muharram came, in the early days of which the Shiites accepted mourning, there was a conflict because the worship was performed too loudly, which caused discontent from other parishioners.

In turn, the society "Ahli-Beit" appealed to the chairman of the Russian Spiritual Service of the Russian Federation Ravil Gaynutdin, for permission to hold mourning events on the day of Ashura in the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, and also to conduct their activities on Fridays, as before. In response, Ildar Alyautdinov refused them and said that the only solution to the problem could be the allocation of a separate room or area for the construction of the Shiite mosque in Moscow. Mufti Ravil Gaynutdin appealed to the government of Moscow to allocate a room for rituals for the community of "Ahli-Beit." He noted that the government reacted with understanding.

In 1999, mufti Ravil Gainutdin protested the construction of the mosque in Otradnoye, stating that the mosques had always

been centers of unity of believers regardless of the division of Muslims into Shiites and Sunnis, and therefore the construction of the “Shiite” mosque in Otradnoye next to the already existing mosque could become a hotbed of tension and intra-religious confrontation in the future. The Shiites wrote a letter to Vladimir Putin, in which they expressed indignation that they were advised to seek help for a new place in the Iranian embassy. Thus, there is an acute Sunni-Shiite conflict, in which the leadership of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque took the side of the parishioners who were dissatisfied with the Shiite rites, sacrificing good relations with Azerbaijanis at the same time and provoking the bewilderment of the authorities. The Shiites prayed for decades in this mosque, without disturbing anyone, but now the composition of its Sunni parishioners has changed not for the better, apparently. Radical anti-Shiites are Wahhabis who threaten in this mosque not only the Shiites, but also the anti-ISIS Sunni preacher Abdullah Hayirdin.

The author concludes that successful Russian-Iranian cooperation in Syria can be observed at the moment, where our specialists destroy terrorists by joint efforts. But this is not enough. Struggling against specific terrorist structures, we cut out “metastases of a cancerous tumor,” which name is Wahhabism. But while this “tumor” is intact, new “metastases” will arise and a new terrorist super-organization will replace ISIS, which will be even more dangerous. A full-fledged fight against terrorism and extremism generated by religion is possible only through the denial of Wahhabism ideology and the destruction of all its derivatives. Thus, the main goal of Russian-Iranian cooperation in this field is identified by the researcher as fighting against Wahhabi ideology. He formulates the priorities for achieving this goal:

- Support and promotion of traditional Islamic movements. Optimization of educational programs;
- Ideological opposition to Wahhabi ideology. Creation of new multilingual media, primarily network. The de-romanticization

of Wahhabi terrorists is considered especially effective; – Direct joint military operations against Wahhabi terrorists.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.03.010. RUSLAN SHANGARAEV. IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY // *“Obozrevatel-Observer,” Moscow, 2017, № 11, P. 73-82.*

Keywords: “soft power,” pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, kemalism, Turkey, Russia, CIS.

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In the article the author considers issues related to the ideological component of Turkey's foreign policy, which is largely determined by its history, culture and geographical location. The countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus entered the sphere of influence of Turkey after the collapse of the USSR, it was the first to establish diplomatic relations with them.

Turkey tried to emphasize a similar ethnic and cultural component towards the peoples of the Caucasus, but this approach did not always work because of frozen conflicts and historically disagreements (for example, in relations between Turkey and Armenia).

Turkey has reached a certain socio-political and economic balance in domestic politics, which resulted in the spread of its influence on the surrounding areas through the establishment of institutions of “soft power.” These non-governmental organizations have become channels for Turkish public diplomacy, strategic communication and expanding Turkey's influence in the region, receiving state support.

Modern Turkey has taken a course to strengthen its influence on the entire Islamic world, positioning itself almost as the only defender of the interests of the entire Muslim Ummah. The author singles out the following organizations among all these institutions: the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSIAD), the Yunus Emre Foundation, the International Turkic Culture Organization (TURKSOY), the Turkish Council for Scientific and Technical Research TUBITAK.

Analyzing the ideological component of Turkey's foreign policy, the author notes that Turkey's awareness of the "soft power" was a consequence of the transformation that took place in Turkish foreign and domestic policy.

A number of fundamental shifts in Turkey's approach to the issue of values as an expression of its sociopolitical self-awareness is beginning precisely in the sphere of ideology, which resulted in a fundamental revision of the vector of its internal and external political development.

The key ideological levers that were actively used by Turkey in its foreign policy in the twentieth century were the ideas of pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism, which were supposed to meet the tasks facing the state. The idea of pan-Islamism was formulated in the second half of the 19th century and ultimately involves a return to classical Islam, in which priority is given to the confessional community over the ethnic.

The idea was picked up by the government of N. Erbakan in the 1990s, which became the first pro-Islamic prime minister of the country. Rapprochement with states where the majority of the population professed Islam was proclaimed the main goal.

A new ideology was defined after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of the republic by the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was called "Kemalism" and was oriented towards the transition of the Republic of Turkey from the country with an eastern, Islamic character to the Western secular way of social and political life.

The ideology of Kemalism was a key one in the country's domestic and foreign policy for a long time. However, with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (2002), there has been a gradual shift in the perception of the methods of forming and implementing the domestic and foreign policies of the Republic of Turkey.

This kind of orientation has developed and strengthened since the accession of Ahmet Davutoglu to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. A. Davutoglu, who is a follower of the school of liberalism, not only formed a foreign policy concept that includes a wide range of issues and directions in Turkey's sphere of influence, but also theoretically substantiated Ankara's interest in a number of regions - from Europe to Africa and from China to the Balkans. A. Davutoglu formulated the idea that the geopolitical changes of the late 20th - early 21st centuries, as well as the processes of globalization, raise the issue of identity on the agenda, which did not attract due attention during the Cold War.

According to A. Davutoglu, Turkey, established in the early 20th century as a nation-state, should recall its Ottoman past, defining a special "strategic depth" of Turkish foreign policy, imposing on the country a number of geopolitical obligations.

Within the framework of A. Davutoglu's ideas, it was possible to consider the elements of pan-Turkism, perceived in the context of a broader concept of pan-turanism, which consists in the creation of the Great Turan, stretching from the Balkans to Eastern Siberia, the ancestral home of the Turkic peoples.

Involving countries in the zone of their influence in the regions of the Near and Middle East, the Balkans, as well as an ambitious foreign-political advancement to Africa, Asia and Latin America requires awareness of the impossibility of applying the classical model of "carrot and stick" to these regions from Turkey. In accordance with these considerations, the idea of a common historical destiny and mutual development of cultures is laid in the basis of Turkish foreign policy.

All of the above projects, implemented with the direct or indirect assistance of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, clearly demonstrate the importance that the country attaches to the consolidation of influence in the region and the post-Soviet space in order to become one of the strongest states in the world. Claiming for the role of the modernizer of Eurasia, Turkey seeks to expand the geographic boundaries of its geopolitical influence.

The attitude towards the Ottoman past as a common space-time continuum for many peoples allows Turkey to present its experience as a potential common denominator for resolving crises and problems, creating a new regional dynamics within the Euro-Asian continent with the inclusion in this process not only ethnically and linguistically close, but also distinct peoples. In other words, Turkey's foreign policy, often referred to as "neo-Ottomanism," aims to extend its influence to a number of regions and peoples, using the rhetoric of the common past.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.03.011. KONSTANTIN DUDAREV. WINDS OF CHANGES OVER SAUDI ARABIA // *"Asia and Africa,"* Moscow, 2017, № 11, *"Asiya i Afrika segodnya,"* P. 39–44.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia, "Vision of 2030," reforms, Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Konstantin Dudarev,
Orientalist; Journalist

In this article the author analyzes the radical socio-economic reforms in Saudi Arabia aimed at reducing the raw material dependence of the country's economy and its diversifying. Speaking about the first visit to Russia of the Saudi monarch Abdel Aziz Al Saud in early October 2017, the author notes its importance and the serious nature of Saudi Arabia's intentions,

which was shown by the composition and size of the country's delegation: it numbered more than one thousand important persons among whom were ministers, heads of state corporations, big banks and private firms. The two countries have agreed to develop and strengthen bilateral relations, as well as those at the regional and international levels.

The author makes a conclusion that the visit was connected with the domestic situation in the kingdom, which has embarked on the path of radical transformations. The main document, which determined the new path of socio-political and cultural and moral development is the program of "Vision 2030," or "Strategy 2030 of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia" initiated by the Saudi Monarch Salman ben Abdel Aziz. In essence, it is a continuation of the path of reforms initiated by him after his enthronement in January 2015. Among them the change of the rules of the heir apparent, which resulted in bringing to power of the grandchildren of King Abdel Aziz, the founder of the dynasty, the reduction of state subsidies, introduction of the added value tax for the first time in history, tobacco tax. etc., as well as reduction of government spending, limitation of growth rates of wages and various bonus payments.

These steps showed a deviation from the economic model which existed for several decades and was based on the paternalist principles of state subsidizing the low prices of petrol, water and electric energy. Due to this the budget losses amounted to dozens of billions of dollars

Among the reasons for the reforms the author names the low prices of oil in recent years, which brought about considerable budget losses of the country. Its leadership has come to the conclusion that oil incomes can no longer serve as a reliable basis of stable economic development. And so, King Salman ordered the State Council on economy and development to work out a draft project of reforms.

The authors see the earnest of the success of the strategy in the international prestige of Saudi Arabia, which they regard "the heart of the Arab and Islamic world due to Mecca and Medina

situated on its territory. Among other factors of success are its “colossal investment potential,” as well as the resolution and desire of the country’s leadership to turn it into a “global trade hub and the gates to the world.” The main emphasis is made on the diversification of the economy, increase of the production potential and a greater share of the private sector in the economic life.

A new developing field is the mining and processing of natural riches, which are in abundance, such as bauxites, phosphates, gold, copper, uranium (about six percent of world deposits), etc.

Along with this, the government intends to support other promising branches of the economy and make everything possible to increase the share of the country’s producers, carrying on the policy of import-substitution.

In contrast to preceding decades, when the Kingdom was a pure importer of machines and equipment, a decision was taken to include in import contracts articles on development of defense production on the country’s territory. The task was set to double the mining of gas and create a national network for its delivery to various districts of the country.

Another factor contributing to the entry of Saudi Arabia into a new phase of industrialization is the country’s transit potential connected with its strategic position on the crossroads of major trade routes between Asia, Europe and Africa in conjunction with the abundance of energy resources and developed logistics.

Stake is made on regional integration, but the crisis that has broken up between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, on one hand, and Qatar, on other, can considerably retard integration processes.

Much depends on how smoothly reforms will be going on in the country and what the general situation in the Middle East and the entire world will be. The document specially notes the need for loyalty to the Islamic principle. The Kingdom will continue to exert every effort to receive Muslims from all over the world on its land, thus strengthening still more its positions as the spiritual leader of

the Muslim world and the center of Islamic civilization, and considerably increase financial flows to the budget of the country.

The social sphere is also an important factor. Despite a sufficiently high standard of living in Saudi Arabia, there are quite a few complex social problems in the country, the most acute of them being unemployment among young people, especially taking into account the fact that people under thirty account for about 70 percent of the population. An important aspect is to draw Saudi women to work, most of whom stay at home at present. It is not possible to carry out reforms without changing the social consciousness of citizens, their psychology and mentality, life pattern and even attitude to time. The country's population should not only accept reforms, but also take an active part in their implementation.

An important place is given over to foreign policy. All the more so since the Saudi government intends to develop the country's economy on the basis of the most advanced technologies, above all American ones.

As to the reaction of Saudi society and expert community to the new strategy, it should be said that the program gave people hopes for more active life full of positive changes, and young men and women for work and decent earnings. The International Monetary Fund and most analysts believe that the reforms will make the Saudi economy more dynamic.

At the same time certain experts express doubts whether a conservatively-minded Saudi society would wish to change its comfortable, calm and quiet life into the high-strung daily competitive struggle for various benefits.

Certain western critics of Saudi reforms predict their inevitable collapse, comparing the transformations in Saudi Arabia with the economic reforms of the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, which ended in his overthrow.

The attempt of the Saudi authorities to induce the population to renounce their high living standards ensured by oil incomes and make it earn its living by hard labor is really connected with a

serious risk to cause discontent in society. It will touch, first and foremost, 70 percent of the able-bodied male population working at the public sector, whose number will greatly be reduced, which may bring about a violation of the functioning of the established economic model.

Besides, it is necessary to take into account the stand of the influential Muslim clergy of Saudi Arabia, which usually adheres to conservative positions and do not support innovations. The clergy will hardly approve the idea of the authorities to draw women to working activities, or to open an opera theater in Riyadh, for it is generally recognized that all western entertainments are a vice.

The author notes that there is still no answer as to whether the growing tension would violate the age-old alliance between the ruling dynasty and the Muslim clergy due to which the country has succeeded to preserve unity even at the mostly difficult times. The transformation in the Saudi Kingdom are of international importance, as the country's modernization means a restriction of the influence of the Muslim clergy on people's minds, decrease of spreading religious extremism, radical views and xenophobia. A result of this course will be secularization of foreign policy and, consequently, lower terrorist activity in the Middle East and outside its boundaries.

Speaking of the first results of the transformations in the country, the author comes to a conclusion that the very fact that the reforms have been going on for over a year already speak of their success. Public opinion polls in Saudi Arabia also instill optimism. An important factor is that the transformations are carried out under the supervision of Prince Mohammed bin Salman who is part and embodiment of the new generation of the 30-year-old men forming the foundation of the Saudi society.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2018.03.012. VLADIMIR KARYAKIN. DEGRADATION OF SECULAR STATE INSTITUTIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES ACCOMPANIED BY ACTIVE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM // *"Nations and Nationalism in Muslim East," Moscow, 2015, P. 219–228.*

Keywords: institutalization, Arab world countries, Islamic fundamentalism, "Arab Spring," confessional identity, North Africa, Middle East.

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The "Arab Spring" of 2011 confirmed connections between the institutalization of state systems of North Africa and the Middle East and the dynamic of their social entropy. The author writes that the concept of "state institution" requires revision in connection with the growing role and influence of social individuals acting through social networks and the Internet on socio-political processes.

From the point of view of modern neo- institutionalism, the socio-political behavior of individuals is limited by the state institutions functioning in a country, which play a constructive role in stabilization of the social situation. In the Arab-Islamic world, strong traditional informal social institutions rival with formal political institutions. This can be explained by the fact that in most countries of the Middle East the latter are close, in their functions and structure, to Western political institutions, which make them illegitimate in the eyes of the Arab public, because they do not correspond to the Sharia laws. This causes conflicts, contradictions, and non-linear features in the socio-political development of states of the region at the internal state and regional levels.

One of the most crucial geopolitical factors in the Arab world is the institution of confessional identity, which often rivals with, and in some cases fully denies, the national identity of peoples.

If we turn to the monarchies of the Arab world, their population regards itself the single Arab nation living by the laws of Islam. As to the secular states of a republican type in North Africa and the Middle East, their people regard themselves, first and foremost, Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, Syrians, etc., and only then Arabs. National identification is still greatly expressed in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their population is not Arab, although in all these countries people believe in Islam. These factors make it possible to formulate the concept of regional national identity which is reflected in a sum total of informal social institutions and cultural-confessional forms, which are more important compared to formal political institutions created on Western pattern. The role of formal political institutions in the Arab world is low if it is compared with the influence of informal social institutions. This circumstance determines the conflict component of regional and internal state policy of countries in this region.

The interaction of the Middle East states can often be characterized by "the game with a zero sum" (the principle of which is "the winner gets everything") due to the decisive role of the military force used for tackling regional problems and the uncompromised protection of their interests by the opposing sides. Examples of this are provided by the events in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. This is the reason why the international organizations of the Arab world function ineffectively and do not create the foundation for a creative dialogue and cooperation. The external factors of international politics, using the absence of unity between Arab states tackle regional problems in their own interests using interstate contradictions and quite often applying military force to render assistance to one of the sides in the confrontation. An indicative example in this respect is a series of coups d'état in North Africa and the Middle East, when with the low prestige of regional international organizations and weak secular state institutions of the Arab world, this region has plunged into a chaos of confrontation between the government

forces and the armed opposition which used foreign military assistance for overthrowing the existing regimes.

Vladimir Karyakin notes that Western Europe can serve as a positive example of high institutionalization of states, for there is an organic combination of informal and formal political institutions which create a foundation for effective interaction and cooperation with “a positive sum,” which brings mutual benefits to all participants in the political process. Due to the factor the role of the elements of force of a state for solving intrastate and regional problems is negligent. In these conditions diplomatic methods of resolving outstanding problems come to the fore. This determines the effectiveness of the work of European international organizations. They do not interfere in the government policy of regional states, using exclusively diplomatic and economic levers for solving crisis problems.

A comparative analysis of the role of European political institutions and those of the Arab world shows that in the Middle East the level of institutionalization is minimal, which is responsible for a considerable degree of ambiguity in the development of the socio-political situation. As a result, social entropy and instability at the state and regional levels are growing and creating a host of challenges and threats to regional and global security. The Middle East states actually do not adhere in their foreign policy to the general standards and principles accepted in the world community. In this region there are no mechanisms of economic and forcible coercion to submit to international law, which creates more conditions for increasing chaos in international relations and turning the region into a large “grey zone” of socio-political bifurcation, which was clearly seen in the events in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011. This is why such rational strategies of big actors in this region are neutralized by the absence of information about the actions of the conflicting sides, which creates conditions for the use of military force in solving regional problems.

The leading Western powers positioning themselves as political institutions of a world level, assume the function of

ensuring regional stability and international security on the basis of the Western model of the world order with the use of the following principles: priority of the rights of the individual over public interests, that is, the extremely primitive principle of priority of "human rights"; presence of a political system with free elections and division of powers as the only legitimate form of political order – the principle of "democracy"; free distribution of resources on globalized market of commodities and services as the only effective form of economic management – principle of "market economy"; priority of international law over national legislation of states – principle of "limitation of national sovereignty." The last principle presupposes a trend of withering away of such political institution as the national state under the impact of the expanding global market and communication system.

The author of the article emphasizes that the above-mentioned principles proclaimed by the West as universal are not free from inner contradictions. This is also recognized by public representatives in the Arab Muslim world. For instance, democracy meaning domination of the majority over the minority contradicts Western human rights. The proclaimed equality of people contradicts the foundations of the market economy. The priority of the principle of international law over national legislation is implemented through various peacekeeping operations and "humanitarian interventions" using double standards in accordance with the political interests of the United States as the world hegemon.

The reasons for failure of Western attempts to change the Arab-Islamic world according to its civilized standards lie in the selfishness of the social individual of Western society, which contradicts the principles of clan-group loyalty to the principles of Islam. The free-market economy cannot enter into systems based on the clan-group relations and standards of the Sharia law. The priority of international law over national law engenders nationalism, anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism. The political elites of the Middle East states are well aware of the fact that the

globalization of the world leads to its division into the managerial center which is in the United States – the leading country of the Western world, and the periphery exploited by it. This gives rise to resistance to globalization processes in the Third World countries in the form of the rebirth of confessional and civilization identity of peoples. One of the consequences of this is return to traditional social systems as well-tested forms of the state order. The Arab-Islamic world's answer to globalization is a renaissance of the linguistic and cultural-confessional self-assertion, which takes the forms of an armed struggle and terrorist acts in some countries against the expansion of the ideology and "values" of the Western world.

In many Islamic countries, as well as in non-Islamic ones, a big part of whose population is Muslim, a crisis tendency of national statehood is observed. The social entropy of Arab-Islamic societies is growing. Central governments prove unable to ensure internal stability and public security. The efficiency of their actions goes down, and in some cases complete degradation of state institutions, chaos, anarchy and wars of everybody against everybody take place. In such countries as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Western Sahara, Palestine and Libya the authorities are unable to control the situation on their territories.

Looking into the history of the emergence of the national states of the Arab world, Vladimir Karyakin notes that after the termination of World War II the collapse of the colonial system occurred and many countries got into the zones of Western or Soviet influence. After receiving independence some states were headed by persons with Western or Soviet education, which determined their political orientation. Among the 48 countries of the Islamic world, 31 received independence in the course of the disintegration of the colonial system in the late 1940s to the late 1970s. That was an epoch of national romanticism when the ideas of renaissance and construction of national statehood stirred the people of the Arab world countries. However, by the end of the

20th century a crisis of the ideology of national-state construction began, which was explained by the widespread distribution of the ideas alien to Islam brought to these countries by foreign education and secular thinking of the national elites. The main reason for this was non-recognition of the legitimacy of the principles of a secular national state on the part of Islamic ideologists. As a result, a process of delegitimation and hidden destruction of state institutions of the Arab world began. This was expressed in the emergence of marginal public groups and anti-social behavior of their members, growing criminal activity, and social wars of the population against their own states.

Thus, the Islamic world gave an asymmetrical answer to challenges of Western globalization. But it was not a search for something new, but return to archaic mores and morals, to the sources of Islam, traditional values of the time of Prophet Mohammed and the rule of the four righteous califs. It can be stated that the rebirth of Islamic fundamentalism has also been manifested in the reaction of the Islamic ummah to globalization, that is, in its destructive attitude to secular statehood in Middle Eastern states. The opposition to the processes of globalization and westernization in these states can also be explained by the fact that Islam lends special socialization of personality in the social structure, which differs from the personal qualities of the Western social individual and demands to him in the Western state structures, which undermines the legitimacy of the principle of the secular construction of the state in the eyes of Arabs. For Muslims the Islamic concept of the state is based on religion. This is why the sentiments of the ummah correspond to the demand to destroy national state built on non-Islamic values.

In conclusion, Vladimir Karyakin notes that a characteristic feature of the socio-political processes in the Islamic world is the growing influence of radical political Islam against the background of the exacerbation of the struggle for power, resources and property between clans, tribes and armed groupings which manage to seize power for a short period of time and soon giving it

to radical movements, as the case has been in Somalia or Sudan. Political leaders who try to submit political Islam to the aims of building a national state and legitimation of their policy of the country's modernization commit a grave error. Islam is an ideological system, which cannot be adapted to solving particular political tasks.

It looks likely, Vladimir Karyakin says, that the failure of the idea of an Arab national state is of an irreversible character. The events in North Africa and the Middle East show that the West has received no dividends so far from the abolition of the regimes disliked by it. Instead of them come social chaos and on the wave of it – movements of radical political Islam.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.03.013. VASILY KUZNETSOV, IRINA ZVYAGELSKAYA.
PROBLEMS OF STATEHOOD IN THE MIDDLE EAST // *"Svobodnaya mysl," Moscow, 2015, P. 18–31.*

Keywords: Middle East, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Israel, nationalism, Islam, federalization, modernization.

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As a result of social, ethnic, tribal, confessional and ideological contradictions and differences many Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa have found themselves in a very

difficult situation recently. This is a conclusion made by scholars of the Orient Valery Kuznetsov and Irina Zvyagelskaya (Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences). A sharp deterioration of state management and growing chaos have become a byproduct of the "Arab spring" whose initiators and actors pursued their own aims, among which were the overthrow of the old elites and access to power and resources.

Speaking of the overall revision of the old state model, which took shape in the region in the process of the national-liberation struggle in the first half of the 20th century, the authors of this article examine this new model and whether it can be applied to the concept of national state.

States whose independence is connected with the cultural idea and internal cultural homogeneity can be regarded national. Ethnicity is politicized and gives birth to nationalism when ethnic community existing in certain boundaries believes that ethnic bounds should coincide with political ones, and the nationality of the ruling elite should be the same as that of the state's subjects. Nationalism does not emerge at the early stages of human history, it is an off-spring of industrial society. A developed industrial society is based on the innovative activity and new technologies. It needs educated people, and the education of a competitive member of society costs much, inasmuch as good education and qualification training are really expensive. New forms of self-realization emerge. Culture is influenced by the changes of the character of labor. The system of communications grades local differences and contributes to the distribution of homogeneous culture. To make society homogeneous through education (without it society will not be able to answer the requirements of modern production) is one of the tasks of state power. At the same time the emergence of independent states under the powerful impact of national-liberation movements puts into motion the mechanism of new nationalist movements in each of the states inhabited by national minorities striving to reach their own statehood.

In the Middle East the formation of modern states was taking place in the context of national-liberation movement and anti-colonial struggle. It developed under the strong influence of western nationalism within whose framework ever new national states emerged in Europe during the 19th – 20th centuries, in which common values and mutual liabilities came to the fore, along with identity with the state and community of culture accompanied with ethnic differences. At the same time Eastern nationalism developed also on the basis of anti-Western sentiments and pragmatic or emotional denial of western models. Despite the fact that both Western and Eastern nationalism were based on the idea of self-determination, there were serious differences between them. The borrowing of Western ideologies along with denial of Western types of social and state organization became one of the major specific features of building independent states in the Arab East,

Arab nationalism basing itself on the cultural community of the Arabs lost in the main aspect, namely, recognition of common rights, obligations and values. Even a successful construction of certain states was influenced by the dominating agrarian system, ethno-confessional and tribal loyalty and did not submit to Western rules of the creation of dominating civil identity.

The only formal exclusion in the Middle East was the state construction project of Israel influenced by Western nationalism and materialized within the framework of the British mandate, which soon became too narrow for it.

The main difference of Jewish nationalism from Arab nationalism was that the construction of a new state was made by people of European origin (including Russia). For them European models of state construction were organically natural and could not be rejected due to the fact that the emergence of the state was going on in the battle against British colonialism.

A definite manifestation of a revision of the model is a tendency to change the administrative-territorial system of states. In the case of Yemen, Syria and Libya the idea of federalization

conceals the attempts of the local authorities and Western experts to invent a model of preserving statehood in the situation of the weakening or disintegration of the institutions (or in the case of Libya the abolition of the system of personal power disguising the absence of institutions). The Iraqi experience has shown that such strategy has definite limits – unity of a federation depends on the presence of consensus between regional elites concerning the division of access to the country's resources and on the interests of third countries. In case of a violation of inter-regional balance or a change of the international situation the system becomes extremely vulnerable. However, in other countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and others) the crux of the matter lies not in federalization as such, but factual decentralization or other forms, including elements of federalism in the system of state management.

As to Lebanon, the point actually is hidden federalization aimed at balancing the interests of localized ethno-confessional groups. The Lebanese experience has largely been borrowed by Americans in organizing new Iraqi statehood. In Algeria, and especially in Morocco, it served as a means of maintaining autonomy of individual regions of the country controlled by Rabat – part of Western Sahara in Morocco, and Kabylia in Algeria. In both countries regionalization or federalization seems unfeasible (in Algeria this problem is viewed in the light of Berber separatism). In Tunisia the question of “disfavored” regions was put to the fore in 2011 in the context of granting the elites of these regions an access to power and the country's financial resources.

Another manifestation of revision is re-examination of the identity of state power and attempts to increase its religious aspect. The most active in this respect were the Islamist forces which ruled the roost in Tunisia and Egypt for the first couple of years after the revolutions in those countries.

In various states, irrespective of their domestic political situation, their governments began to pay more attention than; previously to the religious identity of the authorities. Such

tendencies are connected, evidently, with the actualization of the problem of cultural-historical and confessional identity of societies. This problem reveals prevailing ethno-confessional identity over national one. This is related to the countries, which are in the throes of civil wars and conflicts – Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya (in this case we do not mean ethno-confessional identity, but ethno-tribal one). But apart from them, we also have in mind Bahrain, where under the guise of democratic calls and slogans there is the Sunni-Shia confrontation between the authorities and the opposition.

The basic traits and the very possibility of another model of statehood (not the traditional Arab-Muslim) should be determined by the character of the modernization of regional societies. According to modern sociological research, modernization processes are taking place in a different manner in different societies.

The theory of multiple modernities gives an answer as to why modern societies in the East differ so much from Western societies. At a time when structural changes were taking place in post-colonial societies, structural changes of ordinary institutions, the emergence of new ones, and newly appearing social and ideological models were modern by their nature, but at the same time reflected the influence of dominating political culture. The emerging movements and parties putting forward anti-Western slogans could be aggressively nationalistic or fundamentalist, yet remain modern.

In the Muslim East secularism, *bon ton*, etc. have somewhat different character and are understood in another manner than in Europe, with due account of the specificities of Islam and its society. There can be talk of separating religion from politics, but never from the state, which has always retained complete control over the activity of religious institutions and turned to religion for legitimating the most important political decisions.

Turning to religion and its politicization becomes a characteristic feature of the modern epoch and a determining

factor in searching for a new model of statehood in the region. Such is the conclusion of most researchers of the problems of the Muslim world.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

2018.03.014. OLGA BIBIKOVA. ROLE OF SUNNI AND SHIA CONTROVERSIES OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST // *"Ekonomicheskie sotsialno-politicheskie i etnokonfessionalnye problem afro-aziatskih stran," Moscow, 2017, IOS RAS, P. 175–188.*

Keywords: Shiism, Sunnism, Imamah, religious differences, political rivalry.

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The author analyzes evolution of Sunni and Shia controversies the Middle East. Rivalry of Shias and Sunnis goes back to Islam roots, which began after the death of the prophet. The majority of Sunnis, i.e. adherents of the orthodox line, in the world is about 90%, Shias – 10% of Muslim population of the planet. Accurate data on the total number of Muslims in the world don't exist, but it is thought to be – 1.5 billion. According to data of 2002 24 million of residents of Iraq 60% of the population (Arabs and Kurds) profess Islam of Shia Muslim sense, 35% are Sunnites (Arabs and Kurds), 3% are Christians.

Birthplace of Shia Islam is Iraq. Shias pilgrims visit holy sites on the territory of this country – Nedzhef city where there is a tomb of Ali, the first imam of Shias, cousin and good- brother of the Prophet, and Karbala where in 680 the Prophet's grandson Hussein of Ben Ali was killed, and then Iranian Mashhad, where the 8th Shia Muslim imam Reza is buried. The fate of imam Ali al-Reza (the Persian name – Reza) demonstrates that at the end of the VIII century Sunnis and Shias were at enmity. According to the

legend, Reza was poisoned by the son of the Abbasid Caliph Haruna al-Rashid. Nedzhef is the center of Shia spiritual education in Iraq. After 1979 there is a residence of the head of Iraqi Shias here. However originally (at the end of the VII century) there were a few Shias in Iraq. Amplification of Shias happened later – during Safavids' rule and especially after their overthrow. The dynasty of Safavids which originated from dervishes made Shia Islam the state ideology of Persia. In 1722 the dynasty of Safavids was overthrown and in Iran the period of turmoil started which implicated emigration of a part of Shias to the neighboring Iraq. First of all, representatives of Shia Muslim clergy left who continued their activity in Iraq. As a result of propaganda activities of Shia Muslim dai the number of Shias increased in Iraq. During that period the Shia Islam was accepted generally by Bedouin tribes proceeding with settled way of life. Later Shia Islam found support among settled population while remaining portion of bedouins kept commitment to Sunni Islam.

After the proclamation of Shia Islam as a state ideology of Iran contradictions between Shias and Sunnis became intensified. Different approach to a question of who can be at the head of Ummah is the centerpiece of these contradictions. The problem of the power led the Muslim world to split. Efforts of Shia Muslim theologians on the basis of Hadith it was developed the doctrine about Imamah which "in virtue of sacred law" belongs to 'Ali blood.

Contradictions between Sunni and Shia Muslim brands of Islam became the permanent reason of disagreements both between Iran and Iraq, and in Iraq between representatives of Sunni and Shia Muslim brand. Political power in Iraq traditionally belonged to Sunni minority where dynasties of the Umayyads, Abbasids, Ottoman Turks, the Hashemite monarchy consistently ruled, and then the republican regime was proclaimed. Initially religious disagreements were fuelled by the conflict between Persians and Arabs which arose after conquest of Iran by Arabs (644). The conflict was based on rejection of Arab / Bedouin culture. By this time Iran was a developed state with long and rich history, culture and with

all administrative institutions. That circumstance that the Prophet didn't leave behind a male successor created in Arab society an opportunity for emergence of a new tradition – a selection of the leader, i.e. the Caliph (deputy). For bedouins inheritance (in the absence of a lineal heir) could go in the line of brothers. Persians also developed a doctrine about Imamah which proved the rights of Ali descendants on the supreme power.

For Sunnis the Shiite understanding of imam's function as go-between God and a person is unacceptable as Sunnis adhere to the concept of direct worshipping Allah, without intermediaries. In Shia Islam Ayatollah is Allah's deputy, is considered to be the representative of "a hidden imam" (Mahommed al-Mahdi) replacing him until he returns. In Sunni Islam imam is an ordinary religious figure, deserved authority by theological knowledge, the head of rituals of prayers, and their clergy institute is deprived of a mystical image. Sunnis worship the first for "righteous Caliphs," but disallow Ali's dynasty. Aggravation of disputes on this issue was reflected in comments of the last Umayyads period. And Shias had a practice of allegorical interpretation of the Quran to find arguments in favor of 'Ali.

The Quran was canonized at the Caliph Osman (644–651) and its samples for copying were sent out in all directions of the caliphate. All suras were provided with isnad supporting its authenticity – a list of people, generally associates of the Prophet and members of his family according to whom the most part of texts was written down. Besides, it was forbidden to use not canonized texts. Meanwhile in Iran there was a process of Islam adaptation to local conditions. The image 'Ali, the last of righteous Caliphs who was accepted by Iranians gained pattern of a national hero of Persian epic. By the example of "Sunnah" (collections of legends about the Prophet's life) it was created Akhbar – a collection of plots from Ali's life. Shias consider the text of the Quran accepted in Sunni Islam surreptitious. In certain cases, Shias in their way interpret meaning of some words which are graphically similar to

writing of name 'Ali. Most of Shias and Sunnis consider that the Quran is sacred and secured from any corruption.

From the beginning of Buwayhids rule in Baghdad in 945 who belonged to moderate Shias the aspiration of governors to manoeuvre between Shias and Sunnis inhabiting Iraq became observable. In the period of Ottoman board Shias in Iraq were in a majority, but in dependency. In XVIII – the beginning of the XIX century in the neighboring Iran immigration of rich Indian Shias who backed up the economic potential of Shias of Iraq that promoted status rise of the community. Proselytism activity of Shiite sheikhs who, unlike Sunni ulama, were protest carriers against power of Ottomans was the cause of fast distribution of Shia Islam. During Ottoman domination in Iraq the authorities tried throughout to annihilate Shias. Sultan Selim I in 1513 ordered to annihilate from 40 to 50 thousand subject Shias.

In the XX century when Iraq became a colony of Great Britain, London, being concerned about of its power strength, relied on representatives of Hashim family, the Prophet's descendants, and those tribes which supported them. Meanwhile princes of Hashim family, the Prophet's offspring, were held in Istanbul as high-ranking hostages. Princes were children of Hussein Ben Ali, the sherif of Mecca who in 1916 declared independence of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-1920s kingdom Hijaz was conquered by the governor of Nejd then the united Kingdom was created. In October, 1924 the sherif of Mecca Hussein was dethroned and expelled from the country by a reunion of nobles who swore to the conqueror Ibn Saud, the founder of the dynasty and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Abdel Aziz ibn Saud was proclaimed the king of Hijaz, the Emir of Nejd and joined territories. In Iraq till 1958 three generations of Hashemite governed until power was seized by military.

During the 1930s, the researcher notes, in Arab countries the movement which purpose was the all-Arab unity was gaining momentum. In December, 1931 in Jerusalem the Muslim Congress in which Sunnis and Shias participated took place. General

Executive Committee headed by Emin Haji Hussein, the mufti of Palestine was elected at the congress. Besides, there were elaborated documents on the basis of which the international Muslim organizations were created. From a rostrum of the congress religious figures of both branches of Islam appealed Muslims for uniting to support Palestine which was under control of England. However practical steps were taken only in 1948 when the Iranian sheikh Muhammad Taghi Kummi created in Cairo the Organization for reconciliation of Islamic branches ("Dzhama'at at-takrib beyna al-mazakhib al-Islamiya"). The fatwah became the result of activity of this movement in which Mahmoud Shaltut, rector of Al-Azhar, declared recognition by the fifth madhhab of Islam Shia Islam of Ja'fari sense on an equal basis with four Sunni schools / madhhabs.

The Ba'ath party created in 1947 in Syria as one of its goals set consolidation of all Arabs. In Iraq the Ba'ath party was founded in July, 1968. Initially Iraqi branch of Ba'ath party consisted of approximately equal number of Sunnis, Shias and Christians. However soon the Ba'ath consisted half of Shias. Ba'ath Party members paid special attention to army. Political rule in Iraq, the author reports, where dynasties of the Umayyads, Abbasids, Ottoman Turks, the Hashim monarchy governed in succession, and then the republican regime was proclaimed, always belonged to Sunni minority.

At the beginning of the 20th century adherents of Shia Islam formed popular majority of southern and central regions of Iraq. The policy of the Ottoman Sunni authorities aimed at transformation of nomadic tribes into settled people, granting of the private rights for tenancy of land generated sense of unfairness and caused oppositional sentiments spiraling into deeds of protest in tribes. Tribes involved in the conflict with the authorities saw warrant in Shia Islam: Shia Islam attracted them with the idea of fight for justice. Under Saddam Hussein rule first of all Kurds, residents of oil regions, incurred repressions.

Their separatism threatened the state. The Shia religious elite wasn't touched, but kept under control, didn't allow creation of political organizations. The Shia organization "Da'va" (Appeal) operating in the underground was broken up, and its leader – the ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr was executed in 1980. After 1979 fear of transfer of Shia revolution to the territory of Iraq led to a war of Baghdad with Tehran in 1980–1988.

After invasion of American troops into Iraq in 2003 all former power structures in the country were annihilated. Because of the fact that there was no civil society and secular opposition in the country, Iraqis began to unite on the basis of religious communities. Kurds and Shias started taking an active part in the north principally in Nedzhef and Karbala. There emerged the Association of Muslim ulama (Sunnis) and more radical organizations sort of Al-Qaeda. Also the pro-Iranian Shia organizations ("Ad-Da'va") became more active. Americans brought Kurds and Shias to power in the country. For some of them the main goal was to expel Sunnis from power structures in the government and army. In the country discontent passing into risings which were put down throughout violence increased. The West intentionally realized a number of operations on implementation of the plan the Greater Middle East in which some new states headed by the regimes loyal to the USA and their allies were meant to be created.

In conclusion the researcher emphasizes: initiation of opposition between Sunnis and Shias, excess importance of this factor, creates an external cover of the events. Actually, Tehran rejected "export of Islamic revolution" long ago, but Arabian politicians aren't going to back away countermeasures to Iranian support of Shias in Arab countries because it is so convenient cause for confrontation continuing. Here it is observed coincidence of interests of the West and Arabian monarchies.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

SHAKHZOD ISLAMOV. RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA OF THE ISLAMIC STATE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: ISIL, religious propaganda, distortion of Islam, enlightened Islam, Koran, Islamic scholars, mass media, political technologies.

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Abstract: the article analyzes the activity of the Islamic State organization banned in the Russian Federation. It examines the methods of fighting this terrorist organization and its attempts to distort Islam.

The essence of the train of events going on in the Middle East, as well as the present socio-political and religious situation in Syria and Iraq are in the center of attention of the world community.

In the course of these events each analyst can clearly see the political technologies applied at present, which have never been observed earlier and were known only in theory.

The rapid spreading of the activity of the terrorist organization presenting itself as the "Islamic State of Iraq and Lebanon" ("ISIL") is undoubtedly a result of the well-thought-out propaganda in the mass media, especially the Internet. Today,

broad public, including Islamic scholars all over the world are engaged in the struggle against the negative influence and terrible consequences of the activity of this terrorist organization. To date, experts and scholars thoroughly study the methods used by the ISIL propagandists and ideologists, for one, their use of the Koran, sunnah, fatwas, etc . Researchers assert that the use of the Islamic sources is playing the central role in the activity of the ISIL and other terrorist organizations.

The supporters of the idea of jihad distort the premises of the Koran in trying to justify their criminal activities. Experts of a center in the United States, having analyzed 256 religious propaganda video materials published in the period from July 2014 to July 2016 have found that they distorted the meaning of quite a few Medina and Mecca acts. They propagandized the ideas of jihad; social services rendered by terrorist organizations of unlawfully occupied territories discredit ordinary Muslims in other countries. The meaning of the Koran is distorted for justifying domination of the seized territories and the local population.

In its religious propaganda the “ISIL” often compares itself with the Muslim community of the time of Prophet Mohammed, thus trying to encourage its followers and supporters. In one of its addresses to believers it was said they had been forced to leave their Motherland “just like you and succeeded to create an ideal society, just like we.” By claiming this, they wanted to present themselves in the image of the initial Muslim community.

Using religious texts as propaganda material by distorting the essence of the sacred sources of Islam, they wish, first and foremost, to prepare the religious foundations for creating a Caliphate. Secondly, the terrorist organization is trying to approve its military actions. By citing examples from religious texts the “ISIL” is striving to achieve spiritual discrediting and help physical annihilation of its political rivals.

Another reason for using religious sources in the “ISIL” media propaganda is its desire to justify the criminal actions of

foreign mercenaries serving in the ranks of terrorist units and forestall discontent and suspicions in their ranks.

Among the often used terms in religious propaganda materials of the "ISIL" are such as "qafir," "murtad," "jihad," "shahid," "dual Islam," "darul harb," "hijrat," and others. Terrorist organizations distort terms in order to undermine Muslim faith all over the world and prove that the true Muslims are only those who support the "ISIL."

It is indicative that the ideological leaders of terrorist organizations, in substantiating such ideas as "jihad," "shahid," "dar ul qufr," etc. do not give substantiation and do not divide them into degrees.

In its religious propaganda the "ISIS" often compares itself to the Muslim community of Prophet Mohammed's time, thus encouraging its followers. The "ISIS" positions itself as an initial and ideal Muslim community. Using religious texts as propaganda material and distorting the sacred sources of Islam, the "ISIS" heads try to create the religious foundations for forming a Caliphate. Secondly, this terrorist organization makes attempts to justify its military actions. Its main aim is to physically annihilate or spiritually discredit its political rivals.

Another reason to use religious sources in the media propaganda of the "ISIS" is its striving to justify the criminal activities of foreigners serving in the ranks of this terrorist organization and forestall their discontent and suspicions.

The terrorist organization often distorts religious terms in order to undermine the belief of the world Muslims and to prove that the only devout Muslims are those who support the "ISIL."

It is indicative that the ideological leaders of terrorist organizations avoid substantiations of such ideas as "jihad," "shahid," or "dar ul qufr" and do not divide them into degrees.

In experts' views, the bulk of those who join the "ISIL" ranks is young men without religious knowledge and proper understanding of the idea of jihad. Andrew Lebovich, expert on the Middle East, on the basis of information about 3,000 fighters

taking part in military hostilities notes their low religious literacy and superficial understanding of Islamic theory.

According to research, the "ISIL" in its propaganda pays main attention to the following subjects:

a) propaganda of military successes of the terrorist organization, annexation of new territories by the "ISIL," and operation of military camps training fighters;

b) management of and control over fulfillment of the established rules; the organization tends to centralized state and legal management; it should be noted that the "ISIL" tries to position itself as an organization guaranteeing the rights of Muslims.;

c) propaganda in the interests of the "ISIL." The terrorist organization distorts Islam in its interests and tries to show that the "ISIL" is the only representative of true Islam. The organization is engaged in spreading its pseudo-religious ideology among the broad masses of the population;

d) spreading false information about a Caliphate, which is claimed to be the only power of all Muslims. The order established on the unlawfully seized territories favorable for the local population with a view to drawing more people to the "ISIL" ranks;

e) damage inflicted on Muslims by their enemies; attempts to discredit the world community and fan up enmity toward it; the false idea is spread that the main aim of the enemies of the "ISIL" is a struggle against Islam.

According to most experts, the authoritative religious leaders are the only force who could help people influenced by the "ISIL" propaganda renounce harmful decisions.

Muslim scholars and priests have a great potential to denounce the ideas which run counter to pure faith and show the real face of terrorist organizations. They should be especially cautious and sincere in their ideological propaganda against terrorism.

It should be admitted that authoritative Islamic scholars denounce such terrorist organizations as the "ISIL." However, their statements and writings often do not reach young men, who can easily fall under the influence of harmful ideas.

Experts assert that the "ISIL" propaganda is well organized and quite effective and therefore it is necessary that counter-propaganda should be more attractive and trustworthy.

It is important not to overestimate the "ISIL" successes. The potential of the "ISIL" and its terrorist activity should be described truthfully and thoroughly in order to distance people's sympathies from it.

It's important to tell people true stories of those who have joined the ranks of terrorist organizations by mistake or by persuasion, and suffered a great deal as a result. True information about the "ISIL" and its criminal activities, and its distortions of the real essence and aims of Islam should be brought to the knowledge of the broad masses of Muslims. Views and calls of important scholars of the Islamic world should be made known to the broad masses of Muslims through the Internet and other mass media in order to turn them away from the "ISIL" and other terrorist and extremist elements.

It is important to prove that the terrorist organization of the "ISIL," which declares itself a defender of the Sunnah faith, in real fact is sowing the seeds of discord, enmity and hatred among Muslims.

All pages in the social networks connected with the "ISIL" should be closed. It is necessary to spread the ideas of enlightened Islam calling for peace and accord. We believe that scientifically substantiated and well-thought-out propaganda against the "ISIL" will help see and understand the difference between true and distorted Islam causing disturbances and discord.

2018.03.015. ZALMAN LEVIN. GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONALISM // *Trudy Instituta Vostokovedeniya RAN. Vyp. 4. Ekhnomichekieskie, socialno-politicheskie, ehnikonkonnessionalnyye problemy afro-aziatskikh stran*," Moscow, 2017, P. 167–174.

Keywords: Planetary society, nationalism, globalization, cosmopolitanism, public consciousness.

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The article analyzes a theoretical discourse on globalization, nations and nationalism and reveals contradictions arising in the course of the intrusion of globalization in the sphere of prerogatives of national states.

In the last quarter of the 20th century the epoch of globalization set in, the era of revolutions in information and telecommunication technologies. In Z. Levin's view, the world is now at the stage of structurization of planetary society. Mankind has entered a new development stage with the load of old notions and regulators of social life. Globalization is an objective historical process of the formation of the post-industrial world order. The character of the international division of labor is changing, just as the possibilities of international contacts along with the development of the communication means and information technologies. This has removed the borders dividing cultural areas.

In the epoch of Modern international relations were predominantly established on a bilateral basis, on exchanges of specific goods of national production under control of national institutions, whereas at present globalization divides the world into those who are connected with global structures and processes of globalization possessing high technologies, and those who are marginals. They are interdependent as parts of a systemic integrity of the modern world, and the development vector of mankind is

more and more determined by their interaction on the planetary scale.

The internationalization of consumption and requirements, technologies and cultural values has assumed a global character. State borders become ever more transparent for commodities, capital, technologies and ideas. The place and role of state in the world is changing. Its sovereignty is losing its absolute importance. Along with the formation of a world capitalist market a system of multilateral agreements and organizations was taking shape, which regulates relations between states. The activity of such organizations as the UN, International Monetary Fund and World Bank created for maintaining stability of the world financial system limits the sovereignty of a nation tied by multilateral dependence on decisions of international organizations.

The role of a sovereign state and nationalism in the world processes is also changing. In the epoch of Modern the structure of society was formed by social macro- and microgroups, whereas in the epoch of globalization the structural blocks of a hypothetical world order are formed by transnational corporations and political alliances. Although the state remains a necessary structure in the process of globalization, it comes out as a guarantor of stability of their activity on its territory.

The transformation of a conglomerate of national states into an integrated planetary community is often accompanied with the weakening of their civil, political and social integration. In contrast to the industrial epoch, when the social development vector in the world was mainly directed to political and economic consolidation within the bounds of a national state, globalization is accompanied with its economic and social disintegration. It split society into those who are directly connected with globalization, and those who are marginals. The latter were not well aware of the benefits of globalization, whereas its negative consequences are felt rather painfully. Quite often marginals identify globalization with globalism. Usually, they adhere to traditionalism, pragmatic conservatism, possess ethnic features and adhere to nationalist

ideas, even when they work in their native country for foreign corporations. Traditional cultural values and standards serve them as a foundation of their collective and personal self-identification.

Nationalism was the pillar of the epoch of Modern – ideology, politics and psychology based on the idea of the exclusiveness of nation as a civil, political and ethno-cultural community, whereas the ideological pillar of globalization is cosmopolitanism – ideology, politics and psychology of supra-national or extra-national sense.

These antagonists coexist and interact. In public consciousness of peoples the correlation of the national and the international has begun to change in favor of the latter. In the epoch of Modern civil and political identity emerged and developed, whereas globalization erodes it. The cultural gap between the West and East, the North and South becomes narrower. Differences between developed and backward countries are erased. Civic motivation in the mentality of a nation weakens and the idea of national and cultural affinity loses its exceptional importance. According to the author's observation, at the present stage of globalization the trend to absolutization of collective identities, such as patriotism, nationalism, socialism, which was characteristic of the epoch of Modern, is pushed to the background by the trend to atomization and individualization.

The integration potential of globalization and unification of the world's cultural space is confronted with the powerful potential of differentiation and disintegration. Along with the weakening of the inner socio-political integration of a national state, globalization has caused an explosive reaction of the opposition. Resistance to integration processes on the part of the anti-globalists and marginals in the globalizing world becomes stronger, as well as the activity of nationalists in the struggle against the globalism of American policy in the non-Western world, and protests against the threat to the Western cultural identity as a result of the mass migrations from Eastern countries to the West are also growing. Along with the intensification and

expanding contacts, disunity between individuals and nations grow, and ethno-national and separatist movements are on an increase. Civil nationalism has begun to dominate public consciousness.

State-sponsored nationalism has received second wind. Due to the change of the role of the state in world processes this century, the integrative potential at the state level objectively becomes an obstacle to globalization. The protest against “globalization expenses” is accompanied with idealization of national originality, mythology of national history, and politicization of ethnicity and religion. Differences in ideas and interpretations of the world order, justice and truth sometimes take a form of clash of civilizations.

Globalization, which predestined a special role to a state in the formation processes of a new world order, forces it to uphold its own interest in the new conditions under the banner of the protection of sovereignty. It is based on patriotism and loyalty to supreme power. In general, state ideology is formed by state power according to its understanding of the national interest. No matter how broad group interests might be, existence of people in a uniform socio-economic, legal, political and cultural space, as Zalman Levin notes, forms national conformism in a person, a feeling of belonging to the national state, adherence to certain common human values, ideals, institutions, and symbols. Differences are inevitable between society and the powers that be concerning the ideas of justice and public welfare, which makes it possible to use them in the interests of political antagonists. This explains the vitality of nationalism, which remains the ideological platform of struggle of a nation for its interests in the globalizing world. State-backed nationalism is a powerful weapon to manipulate public consciousness, Zalman Levin says in conclusion.

Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva

NIGORA YUSUPOVA. SPECIFIC FEATURES OF FAMILY RELATIONS IN ISLAMIC LAW // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islamic law, the Koran, Sharia, marriage, family code, Uzbekistan, moral and ethical norms.

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Abstract: The author of the article analyzes the concept of Islamic marriage, the Islamic family, the modern family code in Uzbekistan, as well as the attitude of Uzbek society to marriage through the prism of customs and traditions.

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, religion is separated from the state. But it is not separated from society. The role and place of religion in society are growing constantly, inasmuch as it should help it in its moral progress.

The norms of Islamic law determine the rules of human behavior in family and society and elaborate the religious, ethical and legal issues of society. According to Article 2 of the Family Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, family relations are regulated on the basis of the principle of the voluntary alliance of man and woman, equality of personal and property rights of the wedded pair, settlement of family problems by mutual consent, priority of family upbringing of children, care of their welfare and development, protection of the rights and interests of minors and non-working or disabled family members.

All citizens have equal rights in family relations. There should be no direct or indirect restriction of rights, establishment of direct or indirect advantages in marriage, interference in family relations depending on sex, race, nationality, language, religion, social origin, convictions, personal or social position, and other circumstances. Citizens' rights in family relations can only be limited on the basis of law and to a degree necessary for the

protection of morality, honor, dignity, health, rights and interests of other family members or other citizens protected by law.

Equality of men and women in marriage is also based on Article 46 of the Constitution which guarantees equality of men and women.

It should be noted that the legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan grants an opportunity to use local customs, habits and traditions in family life. Article 8 of the Family Code says that in the absence of corresponding norms in regulating family relations local habits, customs and traditions can be used, which do not contradict the legislative principles of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

Islamic law regards wedlock a sacred act, family is a must of joint life. Islamic law does not allow joint life of man and woman out of wedlock. This is a factor strengthening family relations.

Islamic law does not approve divorce, it is allowed only in case of impossibility to live together.

Mutual consent is the main condition for concluding marriage by Islamic religion, coercion in concluding marriage is banned. The Family Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan emphasizes the principle of voluntariness in concluding marriage. Woman's consent is especially important.

Islamic law demands participation of witnesses in the marriage ceremony: two men or one man and two women. Marriage concluded without the presence of witnesses is null and void.

According to Islamic law husband and wife should be equal and fit to each other in the following six positions: origin, religion, freedom, wealth, profession and belief. In our view these conditions are relative. Besides, they should refer mainly to the husband because they stem from the social stratification of society and are regulated by the community of people.

One of the specific aspects of Islamic law is the custom to make presents (mahr) to the wife. It serves as a guarantee from the speedy break-up of marriage either by husband or wife.

Mahr is a material value given to woman as a sign of recognition of her acceptance of man's proposal to conclude marriage.

In the family and marriage code of Islamic law there is detailed information about women who should not be married. The Koran also contains it. Article 16 of the Family Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan well describes reasons for which marriages should not be concluded.

Serene life after marriage depends on many conditions. Whoever wants to be happy in his family life and create a healthy and firm family should be very serious in choosing his life companion. This is specially emphasized in Islam. Prophet Mohammed said that wives should be chosen proceeding from four factors: wealth, beauty, social origin and religion and piety. Her religiousness determines her honesty, cleanliness, decency and humaneness.

Islam regards marriages as a union of two equal persons formed voluntarily and on the basis of the Sharia law. As a result of such marriage rights and duties of the newlyweds emerge, that is, property and non-property rights and duties of husband and wife.

It should be noted that far from all relations between husband and wife are regulated by legislation. Personal traits and qualities are also important.

Summing up what has been said one can conclude that Islam regards marriage as a union of two equal persons created freely, voluntarily, and on the basis of the Sharia law. As a result, the newlyweds are faced with new rights and duties, both property and non-property.

It should be noted that it is not all relations between husband and wife that are regulated by legislation. Their personal qualities also play a major role. Much is regulated on the basis of ethical standards and due to mutual love, respect and support.

Husband and wife have equal rights and duties in family, and they jointly decide problems of the upbringing and education of children, as well as other matters.

Breast-feeding is regarded very important by Islamic law, for mother's milk is the most nutritious food for the child. The Koran established that mothers should breast-feed their children for two years.

According to Islamic law, the following property rights exist and are used on the basis of the estate of matrimony: mahr (dowry, present), nafaka (pension, payment) and inheritance. Mahr and nafaka are within the jurisdiction of woman, and the right to inheritance belong to both husband and wife.

Nafaka is one of the property rights of woman. Islamic law means by this term providing the wife, children and parents with food products, clothes and place to live by man. Nafaka is the basis of life of husband and wife and guarantee of reliable and firm family life.

In Islam the basic and sacred condition of creating family is marriage approved by the Sharia law.

In Islam the family is based on the laws and principles ensuring natural biological and physiological requirements of human beings, their spiritual upbringing and material position. Islam calls for concluding marriage on the basis of the Sharia law. Such marriage ensures stability of mores and morals in society, social unity, accord and immutability, is a guarantee of a healthy society and entire humanity, it teaches people responsibility for themselves and preserves health of the present and future generations.

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