

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2020 – 2 (308)**

SCIENCE-INFORMATION BULLETIN

**Moscow
2020**

Federal State Budgetary Institution of Science
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN)

Centre for Global and Regional Studies

Division of Asia and Africa

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Russia and the Moslem World : Science Information Bulletin /
INION RAN, Centre for Global and Regional Studies. – Moscow, 2020. –
N 2 (308). – 125 p.
ISSN 1072-6403

Scientific materials on the current political, social and religious issues concerning the relations between Russia and the global Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim countries are represented in the form of articles, reviews and abstracts.

ISSN 1072-6403

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.00

Journal is indexed in the Russian Science Citation Index

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по общественным наукам РАН, 2020

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* Translation of the title is presented in author's version

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. DEMOGRAPHY AND
MIGRATION PROCESSES IN MODERN RUSSIA // *The review
was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: birth rate, crude birth
rate (CBR), aggregate birth rate (ABR), the
national project "Demography," maternal
(family) capital, government assistance
programs, social policy, poor families,
family benefits, forecasting demographic
processes, population migration in the
Russian Federation.*

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Citation: Schensnovich V. Demography and Migration Processes
in Modern Russia // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020,
No. 2 (308), P. 5–23. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.01

*Abstract. Demography and migration processes in Russia at the
present stage seem especially relevant, since in recent years a tendency
toward a decrease in the population has been clearly seen. The authors of
the articles consider certain aspects and the significance of the national
project "Demography," set out proposals for improving the state*

demographic policy. Particular attention is paid to migration processes in Russia and demographic forecasts for 2020–2030.

Introduction

The most important direction of modern social development of Russia is reflected in Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 204 of May 7, 2018, where, among national goals, ensuring sustainable natural population growth in Russia is put in first place. Natural population growth is determined by the ratio of birth and death rates. In this case, in terms of minimizing the threat of population aging, the key role belongs to birth rate. Birth rate is an important factor in the formation and maintenance of human capital necessary for the development of the economy, especially in terms of increasing the level of labor productivity. Analytical assessments of the relationship of demographic processes in general as a factor in the innovative development of the economy, and in particular the labor market, are given in modern economic periodicals. The works also analyze various aspects of birth rate itself as an important component of integral socio-economic development.

State Support for Birth Rate

Doctor of Economics, professor of the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM) of the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (Moscow) A. Shcherbakov [3] considers current aspects of state regulation of birth rate in Russia and characterizes its recent changes. The researcher evaluates the main directions and measures of the practiced state support for birth rate. Attaching particular importance to state support of motherhood, aimed at encouraging the birth of children, supporting families in which

the third child was born, the researcher sets out proposals for the development of demographic policy in this direction.

After 2015, the number of births in Russia, notes A. Shcherbakov, as well as the aggregate birth rate (ABR), is significantly decreasing annually. The deepest decline in the birth rate in the country for the entire period of statistical observation occurred in 1999, when the crude birth rate (CBR) dropped to 8.3% (the number of births amounted to 1214.7 thousand). In 2000, the problem of birth rate as the most important state priority in the modern history of Russia was posed in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. The main measures of state policy in the field of birth rate were also proposed by the President of the Russian Federation in his messages in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century (including the mechanism for the payment of maternal or family capital, patrimonial certificates, etc.), and were put into effect by the legislators of the country. After the proclamation of a demographic policy, including birth control as a priority of state social policy and the adoption of appropriate measures, the annual increase in the birth rate and the decrease in natural decline until 2015 became more stable. ABR in 2015 as a result of progressive growth in previous years reached the value of 1.781. However, to date, it has significantly decreased and now Russia is inferior in this indicator to such countries as, for example, Lithuania, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, etc.

According to the researcher, the statement of the problem of increasing private birth rates appears to be quite justified in the adopted National Project "Demography." This applies to birth rates among women aged 25–29 and 30–34 years, although the final values of these coefficients, i.e., indicators for 2024, could be higher. In recent years, the birth rate situation in the country has become very unfavorable, and this has led to a general deterioration in demographic dynamics. As for the geography of birth rate in Russia, large differences are revealed here. Today, some Siberian and Caucasian territories are characterized by high

birth rates, while situation in the central and north-western territories is just the opposite. In recent years, among the regions with the highest birth rates there were: the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Daghestan, Ingushetia, Tuva and Altai. The regions with the lowest birth rate in 2017 included the Leningrad Region (8.3%), the Republic of Mordovia (8.5%) and the Tambov Region (8.6%). ABR in 2017 was the lowest in the Leningrad region (1.22), the Republic of Mordovia (1.26), and in the Voronezh and Smolensk regions (1.37 each). It was the highest in the Chechen Republic (2.73), in the Altai Republic (2.36) and in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (2.08). The reasons for the current decline in the birth rate in the country depend on many factors, and government measures for demographic development should take this into account, emphasizes A. Shcherbakov.

In Russia there exists an extensive system of monetary support for birth rate and the family. However, from the point of view of the author of the article, it is insufficient. The childcare allowance for working citizens, which can be applied to both mother and father and paid for 1.5 years from the moment of the child's birth, is 40% of the parent's monthly earnings and has a maximum limit. In 2019, this is 26 152.33 rubles. In March of this year, for example, the average salary in the country amounted to 45,000 rubles. Consequently, the childcare allowance for working citizens was to be 18 thousand rubles (40%), and for women, as a rule, receiving even less (by 15–18%), about 15 thousand rubles. If we consider not the average, but the median, or the so-called modal wages, then this amount will decrease significantly (according to some sources, to 9.0–9.5 thousand rubles). Such income can put the child's parents in the position of officially registered poor people, and a significant part of the population will have to apply for child support in low-income families. Another example of a low level of payments related to birth rate is the allowance for the care of a child aged 1.5 to 3 years. The country's leadership intends to increase it for deprived families from 50 rubles per month to the subsistence level of the child in the region.

For 2001–2007 an increase in the crude birth rate (CBR) in Russia amounted to 130.0%, with the sharpest growth in 2007, when state measures to support birth rate were introduced; for 2008–2015 CBR increased to 117.7%. A number of scientists and experts expressed doubts when discussing in the media the feasibility of individual measures to increase the birth rate, in particular maternal capital. The proposal to cancel it could be perceived as the position of state bodies. This in a certain way affected the demographic behavior of the population, weakening the desire of families to have children. The attentive attitude of the population to the position and intentions of state bodies in this regard is also confirmed by expert studies. Surveys showed that, for example, in 2007–2012 at least about a third of men and women who implemented the decision to give birth to a second child made this decision taking into account the state measures to support families with children. Speaking about the demographic policy, according to the author, it should be taken into account that due to the inertia of the demographic behavior models, stability, sustainability and permanence of state demographic support and, if possible, its strengthening are necessary. Therefore, the social significance and the real cost content of maternal (family) capital (MC) as a form of state influence on birth rate should not have been reduced. However, as calculations show, in recent years, there has been observed a decrease of socio-cost value of MC.

It is also important, the researcher emphasizes, to streamline and make the whole system of measures of state support of birth rate in Russia more accessible and intelligible for the population. At the end of 2018, the national federal project “Demography” was approved. Among its key goals, the emphasis is rightly placed on increasing ABR, since the number of women of young, childbearing age in the country has declined today due to demographic trends of the last century. If, for example, in 1989 the country had 23.3 million women aged 20–39 years, then in 2018 their number amounted to 21.3 million

people. For the birth rate process, 2 million women make a significant difference, especially in conditions of low ABR.

The national project under consideration consists of the following federal projects: "Financial support for families at the birth of children"; "Promoting the employment of women – creating conditions for pre-school education for children under the age of three"; "Development and implementation of a program of systemic support and improving the quality of life of citizens of the older generation" ("Older Generation"); "Formation of a system of motivating citizens to a healthy lifestyle, including healthy eating and giving up bad habits" ("Strengthening public health"); "Creating conditions for all categories and population groups for engagement in sports, mass sports, increasing the level of provision of the population with sports facilities, as well as preparing a sports reserve" ("Sport is the norm of life").

The most expensive of these federal projects is "Financial support for families at the birth of children" (2688.4 billion rubles, or 86.6% of the total cost of this national project as a whole). It is aimed, in particular, to support deprived families at the birth of the first child, as well as all families at the birth of the third and subsequent children; issuing a certificate for family capital, providing mortgage loans at a rate of 6% to families with two or more children.

A. Scherbakov shows the possible directions of development of state assistance to the birth rate. According to the researcher, in general, the national project "Demography" is an expression of a multilateral, resource-based state approach to solving the urgent and important tasks of modern Russian society. At the same time, the author of the article believes, important directions of state influence on the birth rate growth are still not fully involved in it. First of all, this is a territorially differentiated aspect: the population in the territories with a birth rate below the average, according to the author, should receive more state support for birth rates than in other territories.

Strengthening federal – budgetary – and other support for birth rate should be exactly of such nature, and as for the measures to stimulate birth rate already existing, it is possible that they can gradually be diminished in regions with a relatively high average birth rate. It is also necessary, the researcher emphasizes, to ensure long-term and stable state support for birth rate calculated for at least 10–15 years. In addition, it is important to strengthen and increase the authority of the institution of a traditional family, including a multi-generational family: the development of family state policy, and not abstract demographic one. A key aspect of demographic policy is government support for a large family.

In the national project “Demography” for 2019–2024 monthly federal payments are planned for more than 415 thousand families for the third and subsequent children with a certain share of regional co-financing, until the child reaches the age of 3. In the context of the current demographic situation in the country, A. Shcherbakov believes, much more focused and targeted state support for the birth of the third child is needed. An emphasis on the weightiness of federal (and regional) support for the third child’s birth is important. It is advisable to assign such state support, the appropriate payments to the federal center to a greater extent. It is desirable that support for the birth and upbringing of the third child substantially exceeded similar measures for the first and second child. A full and timely indexation of maternal capital is required, adequate to the real value of inflation for the entire period of its operation, especially for 2016–2019.

The author thinks the following measures important and appropriate: the use of tax leverage to support the family, the change in the tax burden on the income of each of the spouses - parents or guardians when the third child appears and further on. However, A. Shcherbakov believes that it is advisable to apply such birth control stimulation not to all tax-paying parents, but only those whose incomes are not higher than the average

wage in the region. It is assumed that for recipients of large salaries such tax benefits are less significant. The appearance of children in the family should not turn into a factor of its financial disadvantage, the transition to low-income, needy categories of the population, the researcher emphasizes. Ultimately, the national project "Demography" and a number of measures for socio-economic development are called upon to become an essential prerequisite for providing the population with greater confidence in the future and, accordingly, optimizing the birth rate in the country.

State Policy in the Field of Demography, Migration Processes in Russia

The article by A. Tkachenko, ScD(Economics), Professor of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow) [2] analyzes the main problems in connection with the implementation of the May 2018 decree of the President of the Russian Federation. The main objectives of the decree include the goals of the demographic, social, migration policy of the Russian state, including reduction in the mortality rate of the working-age population, assistance to poor families with minor children, increase in the birth rate, fight against poverty, and a steady migration influx of population into Russia.

The national project "Demography," the content of which is wider than the name, consists of 5 parts. Each part is a federal project, which will most likely consist of several federal programs, some of which are closely interrelated.

The first federal project in the field of birth rate, entitled "Financial support for families at the birth of children," is numbered by the Government of the Russian Federation among the most important ones. The expenses for the programs of this project since 2007, when the law on maternal (family) capital was adopted, according to the author of the article, had a slight effect on the birth rate, and its real impact and effectiveness have no

unambiguous assessment. The same section provides tasks related to health and quality of life that increase life expectancy.

The second federal project in the field of employment consists of several programs, mainly related to the status of women, to family responsibilities in the economy. In this regard, the task of fully satisfying the needs of families in kindergartens continues to be under consideration. The project makes provision for the introduction of more than 250 thousand additional places by 2021 and, according to the developers, is fully provided with financing. Funds will be allocated for creation within the framework of the project in the years 2020–2024 of about 9 thousand groups of short-term stay of children and for vocational training of women with children up to three years during the period of parental leave. Employment support programs traditionally cover two components. The first is training women who are on maternity leave. This program was not previously supported by the federal budget, but was funded only by regional budgets and therefore had no significant effect. Now, in this program, which is being reintroduced into the national project, the regions will annually receive subsidies from the federal budget to create child care groups up to three years old.

The second component includes the development of the so-called care groups as small private organizations, which is due to the inability to open kindergartens in all settlements. Organizers-educators of the groups will receive grants in the framework of the state program, which is not generally accepted practice, and will receive training for working with children with the help of the state, which takes a time out for 2018–2019 to prepare all the regulatory conditions for a program that complements ordinary childcare facilities.

The third federal project of the national project “Demography” “The older generation” includes three areas, among which there is “Active longevity.” At the same time, A. Tkachenko believes, the developers of the project have not a clear idea of the content of this term, because they said that its

development is in connection with the task of increasing life expectancy. The project also includes a program to create a long-term care system. Such programs in world practice are aimed at helping people who cannot minister to themselves and require social and medical services. The author notes that there are no such studies in Russia yet, but they are necessary to create a long-term care system, which will be included in the Project "Demography" and will require not only significant, but every year increasing funding. The program of active longevity is associated with healthy life expectancy, which means disability-free life expectancy. In accordance with the position of scientists and practitioners in the field of health preservation, it is expected that an elderly persons will live without serious or moderate health problems, which they cope with themselves.

In 2015, indicators of the healthy life expectancy of older people were included in the Eurostat study "EU statistics on income and living conditions." In Russia, A. Tkachenko notes, such an indicator is not yet available. In addition, a minimum European health module (MEHM) consisting of three indicators: disability, chronic morbidity, and perceived (subjective) state of health was developed and put into practice. In Russia, pilot projects for the care of the elderly are already practiced in 6 constituent entities of the Federation (in the territory limited to 12 municipalities), and the project aims to eliminate queues in institutions for the elderly. It is proposed to introduce modern international principles for supporting senior citizens and prolonging their healthy lives. In this regard, the author of the article believes that it is necessary to refer more often to the results of research, as well as to the reports of international organizations, for example, the OECD or UNICEF.

The fourth federal project is related to a healthy lifestyle, the implementation of which, according to A. Tkachenko, does not look quite correct: it is supposed to be implemented at the corporate level, where employers and employees must implement healthy lifestyle programs. The project developers

hope to solve the problem of reducing the mortality rate of the working-age population through the fight against tobacco smoking, alcohol consumption, and also as a result of improved working conditions,. However, the other side of the problem is not taken into account: male mortality at the age from 16 to 60 years old is 3–3.5 times higher than female mortality rates. Therefore, the researcher notes, to use the same the problem of reducing mortality in working age needs different approaches and measures.

The fifth federal project will be devoted to the development of physical education, so it is difficult to attribute it to the national project “Demography” and, the author of the article believes, it would be worthwhile to regard it as a separate federal program. Indeed, with such a non-subordinated set of projects and programs, there is a high probability that both effective management of individual projects and the national project as a whole would be impossible.

According to the researcher, the national project “Demography” should also include the main goals from the Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for 2019–2025, or there should be made changes that modify the state migration policy. It should not be a change in market conditions, for example, associated with an increase in the retirement age, and, consequently, as a number of officials and experts believe, with a decrease in vacancies in the labor market and the consequent need to limit labor migration. Such a market approach, A. Tkachenko believes, has nothing to do with the goals of long-term development and cannot change state concepts, policies, and long-term programs.

The concept puts in the first place the main goal of state policy as a whole: to achieve stabilization in and even increase the country's population, and the labor force needs of the Russian economy are in the second place. This, to some extent, differs from the structure of the national project “Demography” proposed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the

Russian Federation. When developing the forecast of population migration in Russia, Rosstat uses the number of arrivals and departures as scenario variables, although, for example, the balance of migration by countries of arrival differs significantly from the balance of arrivals and departures by the same countries. And although the forecast scenarios are reviewed every two years, their spread is too large to be, according to the researcher, a real basis for planning migration flows and regulating them. According to the latest forecast by Rosstat, revised in February 2018, the spread between the extreme of the three migration options makes 2.2 times for 2018, 4.5 times for 2023 and almost 5 times starting from 2030 and until the end of the forecast period (2036), which from the point of view of scientific justification cannot be recognized as sound. A number of authors have proposed a migration forecast based on a model that takes into account both arrivals and net migration (net migration). Such studies can expand the horizons of choice for deciding on the possible volumes of migration. Calculations using this forecast model indicate a rather low net migration flow from the CIS countries to Russia: about 130 thousand people annually in 2018–2023.

The author of the article considers it necessary to pay attention to the US experience with regard to such an aspect of migration policy as social support for migrant families with children. The national project “Demography” is being developed and will be approved in a psychologically difficult period for society, when the government approved indexation of benefits for 2018 in the amount of only 2.5%, although the consumer price index for goods and services in 2017 was unprecedentedly low for all the years of the XXI century. Indexation of all family benefits, except for maternity capital, which is only planned to be indexed in 2020, will be calculated on February 1, 2019 according to the results of 2018. New monthly payments will be indexed to needy families up to 1.5 years of age when the first or second child is born, introduced from 01.01.2018 and their size will be

revised only in February 2019; regional child allowances will increase as benefits in regions with a surplus budget. Most domestic experts emphasize that the presence of minor children in the family significantly increases the risk of poverty, which indicates the insufficiency of public policy measures. If, in Russia, monetary benefits to low-income families are considered, judging by the statements of the top officials of the state, as measures of demographic policy, then they should be included in the national project under consideration, with the designation of their prospect at least in the medium term. At the same time, A. Tkachenko believes, it is necessary to use foreign experience in order not to associate unnecessary hopes with these benefits and not to set a goal that they are not able to achieve.

An analysis of the fundamental work on the impact of state aid and other sources of social protection for dysfunctional families in the United States suggests that low-income families are heavily dependent on a wide range of programs and that such programs together help these families rise above the poverty line. In this regard, the author of the article believes, such individual measures as assistance to Russian families, the upper threshold of which is defined as one and a half living wages, in the form of an allowance for the second child until the child reaches the age of 1.5 years in the amount of 6,284 rubles. 65 kopecks (from 1.02.2018) and the same amount for the third child already from the funds of maternal capital, most likely, they will not be able to radically change the income of these families so as not only to “raise” the family above the poverty line, but also become at least a small incentive for birth rate growth. Moreover, these measures will not be able to transfer the standard of living of these families to the average Russian standard, which social support systems in other countries try to achieve.

According to the researcher, the declared goals of the new national project in Russia may turn out to be ineffective due to the lack of analysis of the impact of previous innovations,

assessments of which have not yet been made. In addition, the decision to transfer the regions in Russia the right to identify needy families and pay them benefits should be accompanied by 50% co-financing from federal sources, and the regions should have their own budget sources for such programs. Apart from the need to help mothers who want to go to work after parental leave, it is necessary to pay attention to the level of benefits for the mothers who did not work before, which are provided in a minimum amount. So, from 1.02.2018, taking into account the indexation by 2.5%, such mothers receive 3,142.33 rubles for the first child and 6,284.65 rubles for the second and subsequent children. The author of the article emphasizes that paying benefits to even a non-working woman, which is 3.1 times (for the first-born) less than the subsistence level of the child and 1.53 times less for subsequent children is unacceptable in a welfare state.

In addition to targeted assistance to poor families under various programs, it is necessary to highlight such an aspect of the problem as accounting for the income of these families in the taxation system and the impact of tax preferences on their standard of living. In Russian practice, only payments under state benefits are exempted from taxes, but the salary of people with incomes below the subsistence level and mother's benefit in connection with a child's illness are not exempted. Based on the level of payment of sick leave, the mother of a family in which children are often sick, according to existing standards, has no guarantees to avoid poverty.

Prediction of Demographic Processes in the Russian Federation

Demographic forecasts, notes R. Azikhanov [1] (Penza State University), underlie any social forecasting and planning. The demographic forecast is a scientifically based prediction of the main parameters of the population movement and the future

demographic situation: population, age and gender and family structure, birth rate, mortality, migration. Demographic forecasts are the basis for building forecasts for the development of the region's economy, forecasts of labor resources, forecasts of the development and functioning of the service sector. At present, in Russia, demographic forecasts are regularly developed and published by the Federal State Statistics Service, as well as some scientific organizations. The conservative and innovative scenarios of the long-term forecast of the socio-economic development of the Russian Federation are based on the average scenario of the demographic forecast developed by Rosstat taking into account the results of the 2010 All-Russian Population Census.

The total birth rate for this scenario in 2030 will make 1.7. The following measures may affect birth rate growth: free provision of land for the construction of a house or cottage at the birth of the third (or subsequent) child; creating conditions for increasing the affordability of housing for families with children, as well as providing housing for young professionals in rural areas. Among the negative factors affecting the demographic situation there are structural changes due to a decrease in the number of women of reproductive age of 20–29 years old with a simultaneous increase in the number of women aged 30–39 years, as well as the tendency to delay the birth of the first child to a later period.

The trend of demographic aging of the population will lead to an increase in the overall mortality rate up to 14 in 2030. At the same time, life expectancy will increase to 74 years by 2030. The main measures to reduce mortality will be aimed at improving the organization of medical care and increasing its accessibility, the prevention of socially significant diseases, and the prevention of mortality as a result of road traffic accidents and of cancer. The emphasis of the state demographic policy on the formation of a healthy lifestyle, on measures to reduce the abuse of alcohol and

tobacco products, on the prevention of alcoholism, tobacco smoking and drug addiction will also improve mortality rates.

Due to the entry into the active reproductive age of thin contingents born in the 1990s, the age composition of the population will significantly deteriorate. At the same time, the working-age population will decrease to 77.4 million people in 2030, and the population over working age will grow to 40.7 million people. As a result, the demographic burden on the working-age population will increase. In these conditions, the role of population migration in the formation of labor potential and its distribution across the country increases. The Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025 is aimed at regulating migration processes, in which goals, principles, tasks, main directions and mechanisms for implementing the state migration policy of the Russian Federation are defined. The implementation of the Concept's measures will allow improving migration legislation in terms of modernizing the mechanism for determining the needs of the Russian economy in foreign workers, simplifying the entry, exit and stay of qualified foreign specialists, entrepreneurs and investors, developing educational and academic migration, improving the mechanism for foreign citizens to work on the basis of patents owned by Russian individuals, promotion of territorial mobility of Russian citizens. The maximum effectiveness of the implementation of measures to improve the demographic situation is taken into account in the high scenario of the demographic forecast, on the basis of which a forced version (option 3) of the forecast of the long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation is formed. In this scenario, by 2030, the aggregate birth rate will increase to 1.96, the overall mortality rate will drop to 11.2, and life expectancy will increase to 78 years. According to the high scenario, the migration growth is supposed to be higher than in the average scenario, it will amount to 320-531 thousand people annually and will completely compensate for the natural population decline.

By 2030, the resident population will increase to 151.4 million. Thus, the author concludes, without a demographic forecast, the scientific planning of indicators of the country's socio-economic development and the prediction of geopolitical processes, the calculation of the necessary production of goods and services, the development of infrastructure, housing, education systems, health care and pension provision are impossible.

Conclusion

The national project “Demography” is unprecedented in the new Russian history in terms of costs and the desire to cover a huge field of problems and tasks requiring significant changes in modern economic policy. The authors of the articles note the need for mutually agreed managerial decisions in the project “Demography” with a number of other national projects in connection with their high interdependence. They prove the insufficiency of the already announced measures to achieve the intended goals. The possibility of using the experience of a number of countries that have solved similar problems earlier has been evaluated; the importance of adapting policies to specific needy groups of the population is shown, special attention is paid to the role of scientific research that has been successfully embodied in management practice in the form of programs, special surveys, and the expansion of statistical information as the basis for making adequate and effective decisions by national governments or the European Union. It is shown that the main obstacle in the implementation of a national project may be its internal inconsistency.

Researchers consider it important in the development of the national project “Demography” to separate the financing of family support and the financing of birth promotion, otherwise the project will not bring the expected effect in either family or demographic policy. Therefore, it is impossible to combine such tasks as increasing composition of families, growth of birth rates,

especially in regions with difficult demographic situations, supporting families who decided to give birth to a child, and families with children. Preliminary information on the emerging national project "Demography" leads to the conclusion that its developers, considering the problems of low-income families (households), do not mention two tasks: access to quality health care and providing greater educational opportunities for children from low-income families. Health and education programs as national projects are being developed separately, while it is necessary to combine these tasks and solve not just the problems of health or educational policies, but the problems of poor families, including their health, education, employment, social protection. An analysis of the experience of other countries shows that systematic efforts in these areas reduce poverty and difficulties in the short term and contribute to more positive results in the field of education, health and employment in the long term. These findings help to clarify a number of positions in the national project "Demography" for its greater effectiveness.

The demographic and migration forecasts of the long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation are of particular value. The practical significance of demographic forecasts consists in the fact that, based on scientific research, recommendations are made to the governing bodies about the need to take measures to stabilize or improve the existing demographic situation, take into account population reproduction trends when solving important national economic problems, and make adjustments in conducting demographic policies.

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IGOR DOBAYEV. THE MECHANISM OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN RADICAL ISLAM // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islam, ideology, Islamism, mobilization, political Islam, radical Islam.

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Citation: Dobayev I. The Mechanism of Social and Political Mobilization in Radical Islam // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 23–29. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.02

Abstract. The article defines the essence of radical Islam (Islamism), and examines in detail the key factors contributing to the mobilization of adherents of Islamism to an uncompromising struggle with the "enemies of Islam" (polytheists, apostates and hypocrites). It seems that these provisions can be used to block Islamism, as the ideological doctrine of radicals.

Radical Islam (Islamism), as an extreme form of political Islam, is a complex and multidimensional socio-political phenomenon. We consider Islamism as an independent phenomenon that cannot be identified with Islam itself or exclusively with any of its versions (Sunnism, Shiism, Harijism) or brands (madhhabs – religious and legal schools in Islam –

I.D.). In reality, it exists and manifests itself in two main forms: as an ideology and socio-political practice based on it.

In this case, speaking of ideology as a whole, we mean not only "certain systems of philosophical, artistic, moral, legal, political, economic, social knowledge ... about the world and the role of man in it, which organize, regulate, integrate and direct the activities of individuals in all spheres of society's life", but also the value layers underlying these systems. At the same time, ideological power commands and controls the practical activities of individuals, as well as coordinates and directs the functioning of the state, political, economic forms of power of society [1, p. 134-135].

Depending on the nature of society and the state, the level of their development, the circumstances of the place and time, the correlation of ideology and politics (political practice) can appear in three forms: ideology as a means of politics, politics as a means of ideology and ideology as an ideological and theoretical motivation and justification of practical politics. Of course, such a division is quite conventional, since all these functions can constantly change, move from one to another, combine, but, depending on the circumstances, more emphasis can be placed on one or the other function of ideology in its connection with socio-political practice. The latter, on the whole, shows that ideology and politics are constantly changing places as a cause and effect, as a goal and a means. Such a close interweaving of one and the other is especially characteristic where ideology takes the form of state ideology, as a result of which the line between politics in the person of the state and state ideology is blurred [2, p. 244].

A similar relationship and interdependence is also characteristic of radical Islamic ideology and the Islamists' practical activities based on it. However, radical ideological principles are brought to a specific individual not in the form of theoretical constructions that are difficult to understand, but in the form of slogans or appeals (archetypal ideologemes), which in

the case of Islamism (radical Islam) are proclaimed the norm or the establishment of Islam itself. At the same time, Islamic radicalism, as an ideological doctrine, acts as a way of socio-political mobilization of its supporters to solve those problems and achieve those goals that are put forward by the developers of Islamic ideologies. Such ideologies suggest the everyday existence of their adherents in the form of a mission of the struggle for "true faith," which ultimately means the establishment of a theocratic form of the political organization of society. In other words, by radical (social and political) mobilization in radical Islam we mean the way (including the social mechanisms of its practical application) by which people's behavior is organized and aimed at solving the problems and achieving the goals that Islamism as a political ideology sets itself.

Understanding the historical material associated with the institutionalization in Islam of the doctrinal directions of the radical sense, reveals the valid mechanisms of social mobilization in general and its political component in particular [3, p. 64]. The essence of the issue is that in Islam there is a rich tradition of using religious worldview constructs in socio-political practice, when doctrinal prescriptions are embedded in the context of the goals and objectives of current politics, that is, they are actually used as ideologemes. Factors due to which this state of affairs becomes possible can be classified into several types.

The first one is represented by the actual doctrinal specificity of Islam. We are talking about the fact that initially the basic world outlook postulates suggest the formation of a special attitude of believers to the world and their place in it. The basic philosophical postulates in this case are the provisions on the nature (causes, essence) of the world order and the existence of a certain order in society. This also includes such core provisions as the interrelation of God, the Islamic Ummah and man, as well as provisions explaining the nature of power in society and clarifying the purpose of a believer in the world, the meaning of

his existence. For example, there is a canonical assertion, especially characteristic of traditionalism and fundamentalism, about the impossibility of arbitrary intervention of an individual in the existing world order, and for believers to organize the life of society and accordingly establish power in it at their discretion, if there is no sacred, divine will. However, these provisions, which are especially characteristic of radicals, are combined with the postulates that such an intervention becomes not only possible, but also necessary, mandatory for a true believer in case of violation of the order established by God.

As a result, a rather simple semantic worldview is initially formed in the minds of adherents and operates at the archetype level: the world, including society, are perfect by the will of God, any imperfection of society (evil and injustice in it) is introduced by people (unbelievers, those who believe in a wrong way and those who believe insincerely). This leads to the conclusion that the fight against the “enemies of Islam” (polytheists, apostates and hypocrites) is the essence of the true faith. Thus, the initially presented semantic scheme of world perception contains a mobilization attitude [4, p. 56].

The second group of factors ensuring socio-political mobilization in Islam is related to the forms of collectivism practiced in it and the norms of community life. Continuing the development of the above-designated logic of world perception at the level of motivation for social activity (by the motivation of social activity in accordance with the existing tradition, we mean the motivation for action, by the motivational attitude – the corresponding stable non-reflective behavioral reactions, unified and ordered stereotypical patterns actions that are also normatively fixed in radical Islam) are as follows: a true believer cannot always independently correctly evaluate the correspondence of the surrounding phenomena of public life to divine plan and proper world order. Hence the need for an appeal to connoisseurs – ulama, fakikhs, ustases, carrying out a kind of “expert evaluation.” Their competent opinion on a

particular issue removes the personal, individual responsibility of the adherent. And then a specific member of the Moslem community in their actions becomes accountable only to religious authorities for the full and accurate implementation of their instructions. In other words, an ordinary believer, and in social terms an ordinary member of a Moslem society or even a community (in their radical understanding), does not bear personal worldview and legal responsibility before God, unlike, say, a Christian. He is responsible to the “mediator” between him and God.

Thus, the initial attitude of perception is formed, lowering the worldview and personal legal responsibility for committed acts. Such an attitude rests responsibility not on the acting individual, but on authority external for him, which, in particular, finds wide consolidation in the procedural and normative system of Moslem law – fiqh [5].

And finally, the third type from among the factors mentioned above refers exclusively to the political and legal experience of radicalism. The Ulema Council is never personified in decision-making; it speaks on behalf of the community as a whole to the members of the same community. Moreover, the very concept of the Ummah – a community of co-religionists – in addition to the actual rural community – the jamaat, is also interpreted in a metaphysical sense. The Ummah is a community of Moslems living in a given territory, in a given state, in a region, and even in the world as a whole.

On the basis on this understanding of the problem, an ordinary believer as a separate individual practically does not mean anything in the world of socio-political relations, he is only a member of different in scale, but united in religious affiliation (and in fact on the political and ideological platform) communities: from real, revealing itself in everyday existence, up to associative communities of the spiritual and ideological plane.

In turn, the condition for the individual to enter a community, the condition for the former to be recognized as a

full member is a demonstration of loyalty, solidarity. Such a demonstration requires fulfillment of the instructions of its religious authorities as a prerequisite. And since such authorities come up with demands and claims of a socio-political nature, socio-political mobilization is carried out through a kind of assimilation of the individual by the community and the community by its authorities [6, p. 71–72].

Thus, from the three indicated groups of factors, the mechanism of social and political mobilization of an adherent in Islamic radicalism is formed. The specificity of such a mobilization is a kind of dissolution of the individual principle in the community of fellow believers, the community as a real form of collectivism, and the community as a spiritual, political and ideological association. Moreover, it is precisely in radicalism that a peculiar “phenomenon of representation” reaches its peak, when the community itself is personified in its authorities, they represent it both in sacred and in political and practical terms. Proceeding from this, we can define the essence of Islamism as an ideological doctrine and socio-political practice based on it, which are characterized by normative-value consolidation of the ideological, political-worldview and even armed opposition of the world of “true Islam” to the world of “infidels” outside and the world of “untrue faith” within Islam and require absolute social control and mobilization (service to the idea) of their supporters [7, p. 32].

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THOMAS FLICHY DE LA NEUVILLE.¹ THE CORONAVIRUS: A PARASITE FOR GLOBALISATION, AN UNEXPECTED BOON FOR MEDICAL DATA COLLECTION // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World"*.

Keywords: CORONAVIRUS, Wuhan, epidemics, pandemics, developed countries, virus, incurable disease, mass gathering of medical data.

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Citation: Flichy de La Neuville T. The Coronavirus: a Parasite for Globalisation, an Unexpected Boon for Medical Data Collection // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 29–34. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.03

The respiratory syndrome that first appeared among fish market stall-holders in Huanan, Wuhan in January 2020 has since claimed several hundred lives. While the virus has spread rapidly, the epidemic bears no relation to the major pandemics that have continually struck the world's population throughout history. These include the Black Death which killed 30–50% of Europeans between 1347 and 1352, successive cholera epidemics in the modern era and a yellow fever outbreak that halved the population of Philadelphia in 1793. But unlike the pandemics that are currently crippling Africa, the coronavirus is now affecting

people in developed countries, despite the medical support available to them. As a result, the virus has awoken our previously dormant terror of dying of an incurable disease. As long as it does not become a pandemic, the coronavirus might temporarily boost America's global position. In any case, its development is already helping to accelerate the mass gathering of medical data.

The Coronavirus Taps into Our Dormant Fear of an Unavoidable Death

The immense fear currently being passed from person to the next is largely self-generating. No political or financial powers benefit from a definitive cooling of China's economic furnace, which would, in the short term, unleash a wide-scale financial crisis. Our fascination for the coronavirus is mostly psychological. As advocated by Italian and French schools of thought in the late 19th century, crowd psychology is fuelled by the endless repetition of a spectacular, unexplained image. In 1895, Gustave le Bon wrote in his work *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*:

"Everything that shapes the imagination of crowds presents as an arresting and very clear image unconnected from any supporting interpretation and unaccompanied by anything other than a few marvellous or mysterious facts, such as a great victory, miracle, crime or hope. Things must be presented as a monolith, with no explanation as to their genesis. Neither one hundred small crimes nor one hundred small events would affect the imagination of a crowd, yet a single large crime or event would mark it profoundly."

Once this image has been forged, it spreads from one individual to another through simple emotional contamination. Today, it is the memory of major Asian epidemics – such as the bubonic plague, which originated in China, or the cholera that travelled from India in the 19th century² – that has been

reactivated. The first consequence has been a collapse in holiday bookings for China, Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. The resulting disruption has also reduced demand for oil, copper and soya in China, but increased demand for gold and coal. Our terror is not totally unjustified though, in that Asia produces 80% of our medicines. The global pharmaceutical industry is highly dependent on Chinese drug production³. Medicine shortages were very rare a decade or so ago, but they are becoming increasingly common. In 2018, the French National Agency for Drug Security recorded 868 supply shortages or stockouts.

The Coronavirus Scares Us because It Threatens the Central Nervous System of Globalisation

Although our all-too-tangible fear currently outstrips the real threat posed by the virus, it could still generate three different reactions in geoeconomics. First, our fear of the virus might encourage certain Western powers to try to seal off China, the disease's epicentre and the world economy's most significant engine⁴. Easily swayed by even the slightest hint of trouble, financial centres are already displaying signs of anxiety. Second, the epidemic is made all the more frightening by the fact that it has piggybacked onto the existing ailments of globalisation. It is no coincidence that the coronavirus began in a market, as it thrives in global cities and transitional spaces. Wuhan is in central China, so the country has lost a key economic province. This has, in turn, led to major disruptions in the global supply chains of equipment and consumer goods. The virus is affecting significant exporter regions in Italy too, specifically Lombardy, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna. The consequences for the Italian peninsula's economy may be dire. History has recorded many instances of trade routes being paralysed by pandemics. For instance, the plague was able to spread out to all corners of the European continent because it found its way into the heart of the Christian world at the Papal Palace in Avignon. When it reached

Bordeaux harbour in 1348, it was then able to spread to other port cities via newly emerging coastal trade routes. By paralysing sea-bound capitalism, pandemics attack the central nervous system of globalisation but spare mountainous areas⁵, sparsely populated regions⁶ and the few towns⁷ that are willing to protect themselves with drastic exclusionary measures⁸. Lastly, the virus could also trigger a financial crisis on a far larger scale. If the coronavirus became a pandemic, it could entirely redefine the current geopolitical balance. Let us not forget that the Great Plague in the 14th century led to the fall of the Byzantine Empire, held up the Spanish Reconquista for a century and drastically reduced Venice's maritime and commercial power. As things stand, only minor disruptions are visible on the horizon. Hong Kong, for example, a global health leader and an expert in medical forecasting, is benefiting from a sudden period of respite. It is nonetheless worth noting that crisis managers have called on armies' medical and logistical skills from the earliest weeks of the crisis. In China, the new Huoshenshan hospital was built in ten days thanks to the crisis management expertise of the Chinese army. French citizens repatriated from Wuhan have been handled by the military's own health service. Given that the French army's medical experts have world-class knowledge of tropical diseases, the careless choice made by decision-makers to drastically cut staff numbers despite their vital medical crisis skills can only be condemned.

The Coronavirus Will Accelerate Personal Medical Data Collection

Historically, pandemics have aided in the practice of collecting medical data about individuals as public authorities try to ensure that the sick do not spread the disease to other areas. In 1501, the French town of Carpentras invented a 'health pass', which was handed over to travellers when they left an unaffected locality. Other towns would require them to show it when they

entered the city gates. Over the past two months, the spread of the coronavirus has given rise to similar measures aiming to ensure that individuals share their medical information with public authorities. This phenomenon goes hand-in-hand with one of the defining dynamics of our era: by enabling capital, goods and people to move ever-more frequently, globalisation is fomenting ontological instability. To combat this, states and multinational businesses are now obliged to monitor individuals increasingly closely:

“At every moment of our existence, we generate information about our health, our mental state, our plans and our actions. In short, we emit data. This data is now collected, processed and finally mapped out by computers with immense storage and calculation capacities. The whole point of big data is to relieve the world of its unpredictability in an attempt to reduce the impact of chance – nothing more, nothing less.”⁹

In the great AI war that is currently being waged between China and the United States, it is the former who has claimed victory for data thanks to the extensive homogeneity of its population. The US and its Western allies are now trying to seize the historic opportunity this epidemic represents to catch up with their Chinese rivals. If they succeed, the advantage they secure will be considerable, as Western nations have already stolen a march on China in their mastery of algorithms. The virus is also supercharging artificial intelligence in the medical field. On 31 December 2019, Canadian start-up BlueDot proudly announced that it was the first to predict this global epidemic using its automated data processors. Because the DNA of the virus has been sequenced by Chinese scientists, a team at the University of North Carolina directed by Professor Ralph Baric has successfully modelled SARS-CoV-2. This will enable us to better understand how the virus might mutate and, in consequence, how we can beat it. Another of this epidemic’s great paradoxes is that it has forced teams of competing scientists to cooperate.

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2. The cholera outbreak of 1832, for example, killed more than 500,000 people in England and 100,000 in France.
3. China produces 90% of the world's penicillin.
4. The development of the coronavirus in China will slow down agricultural imports over the coming months.
5. The Pyrenees and Alps were left unscathed by the Black Death.
6. 14th-century Russia
7. Milan was one such town in 1348.
8. The quarantine system currently in force in China was first developed in Ragusa in 1377.
9. Marc Dugain and Christophe Labbé, *L'Homme Nu*, Plon, 2016, p. 8.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

2020.02.001. SERGEI FILATOV. MUSLIM COMMUNITY OF ST. PETERSBURG: TRADITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN CHALLENGES // *Economic, Social, Political, Ethno-Confessional Problems of Afro-Asian Countries. Yearbook 2019. Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, Moscow, IOS RAS, 2019, P. 155–166.*

Keywords: Muslim community of St. Petersburg, mosque, imam, Salaphites, North Caucasus, Central Asia, migrants.

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Referring to the history of the issue, the author of the article notes that the majority of the Muslim population of St. Petersburg were Tatars since the very foundation of the city, enticed into the construction of the city by Peter I. Later, the Muslim population began to grow due to recruitment and to the 18th century the majority of Muslims of St. Petersburg were soldiers. A small group was merchants. Imam's functions were fulfilled by Tatars knowledgeable about Muslim religion. In the second half of the 19th century, there were more civilian Muslims than military ones. The predominant occupation of the Muslim population of St. Petersburg was small-scale trading and service.

With the growth of the Muslim community in the city, the question of mosque's construction came up in 1904, after a meeting with the Bukhar emir Seid Abdul-Ahad-Khan, Nikolai II allowed Muslims to get a plot of land in the capital for its construction. The mosque remained operating after the revolution until the summer of 1940. In the 1950s there were more than 40,000 Muslim believers in Leningrad and their numerous appeals led to the opening of a cathedral mosque for worship in 1956. In the second half of the 1980s, Leningrad had a small (compared to Moscow and other major cities in Russia) Muslim diaspora predominantly with Tatar population. Their high level of education was noted. The influx of migrants poured into this diaspora and adapted to urban life, as Tatars were more concerned with maintenance of their national rather than religious identity. Islam was treated as an element of national culture.

In the times of perestroika and after it, the city's Muslim community experienced violent turmoil. Imam Khatib Mahmudov, well known in the Soviet times, intensified his activities. He headed the al-Fatah community and created the city's first al-Fatah madrasah. Khatib Mahmudov cooperated with the Muslim Spiritual Authority of the Russian Federation. Since 2015, the community of the MSA of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg was headed by Damir Mukhetdin, imam mukhtasib of St. Petersburg and Leningrad region. Changes also took place in the Cathedral Mosque of St. Petersburg. In 1994, Jagofar Pancheev (since 1978 imam khatib of the Cathedral Mosque of the city) broke with the Central Muslim Spiritual Authority of Russia and declared himself mufti and chairman of the centralized religious organization Muslim Spiritual Authority of St. Petersburg and the North-West Region of Russia (MSA of St. Petersburg). Jagofar Pancheev, with the support of the authorities, managed to build the second mosque in the city on Moscow Avenue. Most believers, who like a traditional historical mosque, go to the MSA of St. Petersburg. In 2012, Jagofar

Pancheev died and Ravil Pancheev his eldest son became the new mufti.

The alternative mukhtasibat (administrative unit of the Muslim Spiritual Authority) was headed by Damir Mukhetdin and his deputy Damir Husainov. Damir Mukhetdin lives in Moscow and regularly comes to St. Petersburg for service. Husainov lives in St. Petersburg and constantly runs the community.

After receiving higher spiritual education in Russia or abroad, the imams of St. Petersburg receive higher secular education at the Moscow State University or St. Petersburg State University and become certified Orientalists, director of the Hermitage M.B. Piotrovskiy (Program "Special in-depth study of the history and culture of Islam") usually undertakes leadership of their education.

Among clergy and activists of Mukhtasibat there is a hermeneutic attitude towards sacred texts. Insight of the Prophet's statements requires careful study of the conditions in which the Prophet's statement emerged, to whom, and for what it was said. Such an approach leads Mukhtasibat intellectuals to deny the xenophobic and cruel interpretation of the Quran, to replace it with more humane understanding. Damir Husainov is sure that the hermeneutic approach better reveals the essence of Islam, he also notes the secular nature of the Tatarian-Bashkir culture in St. Petersburg. The imam for St. Petersburg Tatars remains not a spiritual leader, but one of the preservers of the Tatars national traditions. Now the obsession of Tatars with culture and secular higher education is growing, and with religious education – not. The community grows considerably due to the influx of people of new nationalities for the Ummah of St. Petersburg – Russians, citizens of the Caucasus, Tajiks and Uzbeks. So "Tatarian" it can be called only nominally and in the sense that it continues Tatarian traditions and it is led by Tatars.

Mukhetdin's followers are associated with the Coordination Council of Muslims of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region,

headed by an entrepreneur Shamil Mugattarov, who protects the interests of Muslim communities in courts and officials' offices.

The author notes that currently there are two officially recognized Islamic organizations in St. Petersburg - the Mukhtasibat of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region, which is a member of the Council of Muftis and headed by Damir Mukhetdin and the independent Spiritual Administration of Muslims of St. Petersburg and North-West Russia, headed by Ravil Pancheev. Both organizations are run by representatives of the Tatar community. D. Mukhetdin's organization is characterized by greater intelligence, solidarity, and a tendency towards critical view of the creedal tradition. Pancheev's organization attracts much more believers, because it owns a huge and beautiful historical mosque, and relations with believers are dominated by a formalist approach. Deadly enmity is firmly established between the leadership and activists of both organizations. Pancheev's followers accuse Mukhetdin's ones of extremism, Wahhabism, terrorism and associations with the crime. Mukhetdin's followers accuse Pancheev's ones of immoral behavior, theft, indifference to the fate of the Ummah and associations with the crime.

Relations between these two Muslim organizations and the authorities developed variously. During the period of the governorship of Valentina Matvienko, the authorities had the same relation to both movements, under governor Georgy Poltavchenko, the authorities focused more on Pancheev. The new governor, Alexander Beglov, didn't show any policy towards Muslims.

Ravil Pancheev protects his independence from other Islamic centers and does not consider it possible to submit his muftiyat to any centralized organization.

Mukhetdin and Husainov consider themselves direct adherers of the jadids of the early 20th century, and following them they return to the principium of Islam. The jadids' ideas

now are continued by adherents of EuroIslam, which is rapidly developing and has more followers.

For the past 30 years, St. Petersburg Muslim community has faced the phenomenon of migration, when many other nationalities side with the Muslim community of the city and change its face. There is no reliable data on the number of ethnic groups that profess Islam, but Muslim leaders themselves say about 1–1.5 million ethnic Muslims living in St. Petersburg.

Examining the ethnic composition of the modern Muslim community of St. Petersburg, the author notes that the first new ethnic group which declared itself in the St. Petersburg Ummah was Russians, not from the Caucasus or Central Asia. Their main influx accrued to perestroika and the 1990s. Most Russian Muslims are intellectual God-seekers. Some have joined the Mukhetdin community and are the most active part of the faithful. Imams say that the community of Russian Muslims can be expected to do anything, as they are constantly gone too far in their sacred search. Officially recognized imams seek to stay away from the Russian Muslim community. They fear that the Russians will be accused of extremism, then those who cooperated with them will be punished.

Azerbaijani is an influential group among other Muslim ethnic groups. However, in religious life, they are unnoted. The Azerbaijani community is consolidated but little religious. On several occasions, the Azerbaijani attempted to organize an official Shiite community with their imam and mosque building, but it failed due to their insufficient activity.

Among the North Caucasus peoples, earlier than others, the problems of establishing their community were completely solved by the relatively small Ingush. The Ingushetia government concerned about settling the legal status of the community and registered it in the Mufti Council, and Ingush munity of the Mufti Council, headed by Damir Mukhetdin, now rents premises from Inentrepreneurs bought a large building for sacred services and events on Vasilyevsky Island. The author notes the paradox of

the situation, as the first "Tatar" comgush. The imam of the Ingush community Magomed Hadziev, chairman of the organization "Zikr," has been in charge of the mosque since 2007. He has spiritual and two higher secular education - economic and oriental ones (did the masters with M.B. Piotrovsky). Magomed Hadziev is irreconcilable with Salafites.

The author writes that now in St. Petersburg only three ethnic groups - Tatars, Azerbaijani-Shiites and Ingush completely solved their religious-ethnic problems. Representatives of other peoples in the North Caucasus and Central Asia are trying to seek solutions to their religious problems. The huge majority of these people moved to the city recently, are engaged in physically demanding job, their life is not arranged, many do not know Russian well and are poorly educated.

According to the survey, conducted by the author of the article, 15-25% of people from the north Caucasus and 10-20% from Central Asia remain for permanent residence in St. Petersburg. The rest, having earned a certain amount of money, return to their homeland.

Most of them do not have an opportunity to choose a mosque, and they go to the nearest one. If not to the nearest, then - to the central, the largest, beautiful and ancient. In areas of compact migrant residence sometimes there emerge small Muslim communities which are headed by immigrants from the same production environment including those with very radical views. Information about the detection of Islamic extremists by law enforcement agencies periodically appears in the media. Consulates of Central Asian states, representative bodies of North Caucasus republics and communities of migrants seek to divert all suspicions from themselves in associations with radicals. Therefore, all these communities and representatives, except Ingush, recognize only Ravil Pancheev's muftiyat and cooperate with it. In order to impede the activities of radicals, it was decided to appoint representatives of their spiritual departments (mainly secular people), to cooperate closely with

communities. The greatest activity of this kind is shown by Daghestan, and they achieved the greatest successes.

The Daghestan muftiyat since 2006 has its official representative Isagaji Osmanov in St. Petersburg, who in return closely cooperates with the authorities of the Republic of Daghestan. I. Osmanov runs the Islamic organization of Daghestan "Ishan," which exists under the Daghestan cultural center of St. Petersburg and bends to the muftiyat headed by R. Pancheev. I. Osmanov was appointed Pancheev's assistant. Members of "Ishan" gather for prayer in the Daghestan Cultural Center. Since 2017 in this unofficial mosque has been serving imam Ramazan Daud-Gajiev (in St. Petersburg he – Avar – is the only imam from Daghestan, but there are also Daghestan-imams in Vyborg and Gatchina). R. Daud-Ghajiev graduated from the Daghestan Islamic University (DIU) named after Sheikh Muhammad-Arif in Makhachkala and wants to continue his education at the Faculty of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg University of M.B. Piotrovskiy. I. Osmanov and R. Daud- Ghajiev note the emerging obsession with to higher education of Daghestani and the beginning of the process of appearance of Daghestani intellectuals in St. Petersburg.

The largest and most active Islamic community from Central Asia is the Tajik community. The Tajiks are more conservative than the Tatars or Daghestani. They are fervently abiding to the appearance of believers, consider their imams better educated in theological disciplines and more pious. In the late 2010s, the Tajik community was allocated a warehouse on the Senna market, which was converted into a mosque. A Tajik imam Abdurahim served in it, who got education at home. He is the official assistant of R. Pancheev.

Believing Muslims of other Central Asian peoples do not have their permanent imams in the city. They are included in religious life organized by representatives of Tatars, Ingush, Daghestani, Tajiks.

In conclusion, the author concludes that there is a complex intertwining of religious movements and national interests in St. Petersburg Ummah. In St. Petersburg and other major cities of Russia, the Tatar-Bashkir Muslim subculture is joined not only by the North Caucasus subculture, but also by the Central Asian subculture as a result of migration. At the moment, an integral religious culture is being formed.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

2020.02.002. AYTEK KOICHUEV. ABOUT PREVENTIVE MEASURES OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN KARACHAYEVO-CIRCASSIA // *Islam i islamovedenie v sovremennoi Rossii (Book of Reports of Russian National Islamic Studies Forum "Islam and Islamic studies in Modern Russia," 27–28 September 2019). Makhachkala, 2019. P. 326–333.*

Keywords: extremism, current conditions, tendencies, risks.

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The author of the article notes that growth of radicalism and separatism in Post-Soviet Russia was a consequence of weakening of government institutions, and destabilization of economic and socio-political situation in the former Soviet republics and became the result of activity of foreign intelligence agencies which placed emphasis on religious and ethnic factors, with the purpose of uniting the potential of national separatism and religious radicalism. The author gives as an example difficult public and political processes which began in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation which then developed into a full-scale war in the territory of the Chechen republic. According to the author, the sources of this tragedy and also surge in religious extremism and

national separatism originate in revival of imperial aspirations of some countries of non-CIS states which historically show interest in the Caucasus, as Great Britain and Germany.

In his article, the author gives the results of the study conducted in 2017 by employees of the scientific laboratory of pedagogical and ethnocultural research in the field of education of Karachay-Cherkess State University named after U.D. Aliyev, about studying the risks of extremism and terrorism spreading in Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Finite population of the study was made up of practicing Muslims of the Republic.

The researches were interested in:

- Number and ethnic composition of residents of the KCHR participating in fighting on the side of ISIL (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), their educational background and social situation, presence of the residents of the Republic among ISIL fighters, people with higher Russian or foreign Islamic education, where and when it is got by them;

- The existence of extremist organizations in the republic, or branches of similar organizations from other regions, and which exactly, as well as their influence on young people, migrant workers and foreign nationals;

- Identification of known ideologists and experts of extremism in the KCHR (nationalists, religious extremists who are adherents of traditional religions or adherents of non-traditional religious teachings, sectarians, etc.);

- The attitude of the parents of the militants towards their children joining extremist and terrorist groups.

The information received produced the following results. The number of residents of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic who went to the countries of the Middle East to participate in the fighting on the side of ISIL is about two hundred people. Among them there are people of different nationalities (Karachays, Circassians, Abazines, Nogais, Russians).

The educational background and social status of militia participants varies. Most have higher education, good part of

them is from economically prosperous families with above-average income, had regular employ and stable earnings. Common to most young people who joined extremists and went abroad to conduct "jihad" is the lack of proper parental control and attention. Many parents knew about their children's ideological commitment only after they left for Syria.

None of the supporters of extremism who joined terrorists have a complete Islamic education. Only because of this circumstance they became "easy target" for the recruits.

On the basis of the study carried out, we drew up the following relative differentiation of members of extremist groups, which allows to distinguish and characterize their groups:

A) "Ideological" are convinced champions of the idea, positioning themselves alien to any kind of personal benefit.

B) "Romantics" is a group looking for glory and feats wishing to change the world for the better.

C) "Seekers" is a category of persons close to representatives of the second group, but less constant and strong in their beliefs and purposes.

D) "money-makers" - persons seeking power, influence and money. As a rule, by becoming members of extremist groups, members of this group purposefully climb up the hierarchical ladder of the group, using its material and human resources to the maximum extent possible for personal profit.

E) "Unconcealed criminals" - close to the previous group of persons category of anti-social elements.

The author, considering that one of the tasks of preventing extremism and terrorism is to take all possible measures to insure from moral degradation, physical destruction and to return to society those young people who can still be saved, proposes the following preventive measures:

1. To create the necessary conditions for individuals representing the "ideological" group to have the correct interpretation of ideology (religious, political) by which they consider themselves (for example, to give a correct

understanding of Islam 's teachings, its humanistic doctrine, which is most authoritative and accessible in the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam of 5 August 1990);

2. A group of “romantics” and “seekers” should be given the opportunity to “find themselves” in the process of implementing socially significant projects that bring real, notable benefits for society.

3. Preventive work with representatives of groups of “moneymakers” and “criminal elements” rarely and with great difficulty brings a positive result. Taking it into account, work with this category of persons should include close observation of each representative of these groups, allowing them to be quickly isolated from society if necessary.

Studying the possible motivational and ideological aspects of extremism and terrorism, a team of researchers concluded that the main factors that encouraged young people to join the ranks of extremists were: biased media coverage of events in one way or another affecting Islam and Muslims; discrimination, chauvinism and nationalism, hostility and baseless suspiciousness of Muslims in general; not always justified and adequate preventive measures; lack of appropriate initiative by a large number of senior spiritual advisors to find new ways and means of civic education and development for Muslim youth; widespread false stereotypes about Islam and Muslims. The latter factor provokes the escalation of “protest” actions, the spread of ideas of confessional and national separatism, forms reluctance to integrate into society.

The role of mass media in the formation of anti-extremist consciousness of the population, the development of inter-ethnic and interfaith mutual respect and cooperation in the Republic is declared by respondents central. According to the majority of respondents to the survey (82.9%), the media should be given the function of preventive activity. The most popular source of information is the Internet – the 98.3% of educators; 75.7% imams, 7.1% elders. Television is the second most popular 1.7%

for educators; 72.9% of elders; 24.3% of imams. Among the most demanded sources of information, according to elders, there are still print media, to which they “trust more” – 20%.

The role of national public associations of the KCHR in the formation of anti-extremist consciousness of youth and anti-terrorist values of the residents of the Republic is assessed by respondents today as insignificant, but important in general (having significant but not realized potential).

According to the results of the study, the state of inter-ethnic and interfaith relations in the territory of the KCHR is not alarming, the level of social tension in this aspect is low, and the level of tolerance is high enough. Residents of the republic of Muslim religion, not only tolerant (in terms of tolerance), but friendly to members of other religious and (or) national affiliation, make up an absolute majority – 93.5%. The proportion of respondents who appreciate the condition of inter-ethnic relations and positively perceive the efforts of the executive authorities in this direction is 76.8%.

The author considers that the danger of extremism and terrorist attacks in Karachayevo-Cherkessia is minimal nowadays. This conclusion is based on the fact that the “modern Islamic jihad” carried out under the flag of the establishment of the Islamic State, as well as terrorist attacks carried out by extremists within the country, are not supported or accepted by Muslims of the Republic in the way of expressing the interests of Islam and Muslims. The common view is: “The real Islamic jihad must solve the problems of restoring the unity of the Ummah and moral development of Muslims, bringing people the good and justice, calling for creation and prosperity.” A large part of the Muslims of the Republic is convinced that ISIL and terrorist attacks are in fact directed against Islam and Muslims.

The author concludes according to the results of the study that at present there are no organizations of so-called “Islamic’ radicals in the territory of the KCHR.

At the same time, as some respondents rightly point out, it would be a mistake to underestimate the conflict potential of other non-religious factors that could also pose a terrorist threat. It should be kept in mind that extremism and terrorism, as their extreme form, can arise on the basis of political, economic, social, inter-ethnic contradictions, as well as conflicts of interest of criminal clans going into power.

Author of the abstract – Elena Dmitrieva

OLGA BIBIKOVA. POLYGAMY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Polygamy, demographic imbalance, Islam, Sharia, migration.

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Citation: Bibikova O. Polygamy in the Post-Soviet Space // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 47–66.
DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.04

Abstract. After the collapse of the USSR, the Moslem regions of the CIS and the Russian Federation returned to ancient traditions. Among them is polygamy, which in different countries exists due to various social reasons.

Following the declaration of independence by Central Asian countries, secular legislation was revised. In some countries, an article prohibiting polygamy has disappeared from the Constitution. The fact is that in the countries where the majority of the population is Moslem, Sharia law is still respected. Polygamy in the East has deep roots.¹ And not only in the East. Numerous historical

documents, and especially the Bible, indicate that polygamy has always existed. Peoples fought, men perished, and to replenish the population, it was necessary to give birth to as many children as possible. Especially boys, who, having matured, would become warriors. By the way, even in antiquity, the principle of infanticide developed: killing of frail infants (sometimes they were sacrificed to the gods). Girls were killed the most.²

Naturally, noble people could afford to feed several women. There was a practice of choosing the most beautiful captives, which were intended for leaders or for sale. Later, representatives of the less affluent classes began to acquire a second and a third wife. And, if for the rich polygamy was a symbol of prestige, for the poor each wife was regarded as a new member of the labor cell.

It should be noted that Islam, rejecting hypocrisy and prejudice, gently refers to sexual needs of men. In the Shiite branch of Islam, a man who is separated from his family can arrange a temporary marriage (*siga* or *muta*).³ In fact, many male migrant workers from the Central Asian republics, having gone for work abroad, acquire temporary wives, most of whom also come from Central Asia. Their behavior is dictated by the tradition formed by Islam many centuries ago.

The Quran testifies that polygamy (*Ta'addud az-zavjat*) existed among the Arabs at an early stage in the development of Islam. (Ayat 3, sura An Nisa – “Women”) says that a man can marry other women that he likes: two, three, four. The reasons why a man can have more than one wife are listed by the Islamologist A. Karimov, explaining that if the wife does not protect her husband’s chastity or is seriously ill, infertile, and so on, and the husband wants a child, then it’s advisable (*mustahabb*) to marry another one. If a man wants to marry another woman unnecessarily or to raise his prestige in society, then polygamy is undesirable for him (*makruh*). If a man is poor, weak or confident that he cannot show justice between wives, then polygamy is a sinful deed for him.⁴

The ethics of marital relations in Islam is different from similar relationships among other nations. The Syrian theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350) in his works “The Way of Two Migrations and the Gate of Two Blessings” and “The Garden of Lovers and the Rest of the Passionate” noted that intimate communication is designed to preserve health, bring joy and pleasure to the body, preserve the human resource. Russian orientalist L. Syukiyaynen notes that in Islam the rigor of morals is combined with the tradition of openly discussing the details of intimate relationships.⁵ It is characteristic that this tradition originated in the Middle Ages. This is evidenced by the work of the Tunisian sheikh Sidi Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Nafzavi, “The Fragrant Garden” or “Garden of the Delight of Souls,” created between 1394 and 1433. In this collection of love affairs of Arab rulers, the author demonstrated knowledge of the eroticism of the East. Acquaintance with these works indicates that people in the Moslem East knew how to enjoy themselves in many various ways, feeling free and avoiding any hypocrisy.⁶ It can also be noted that the French writer Guy de Maupassant made this book known Europe, translating it into French.

L. Sukiyaynen notes, that from the point of view of Islam, polygamy is humane and moral, since it helps to solve the problems of female loneliness, fatherlessness and prostitution.⁷ Islamic theologians believe that polygamy protects men from adultery, the possibility of getting sexually transmitted diseases, and gives women status, protection and motherhood. In addition, polygamy contributes to an increase in offspring, which in Islam is regarded as divine grace.

Indeed, in the current situation polygamy solves a number of social problems. Daghestan imam Magomedrasul Saaduev believes that men who consciously take such a step can be considered patriots, since they take two and, sometimes three or four families under guardianship, and should be provided with privileges.⁸

UZBEKISTAN

Polygamy in Uzbekistan has always existed, despite attempts of the authorities to ban it. According to surveys conducted in Uzbekistan, the republic's public, despite the legislative prohibition of polygamy, considers this form of marriage possible, because it allows solving the problem of single women. Participants in the discussion on Tashkent's Azatyk radio noted that the long stay of labor migrants in Russia and creation of second families there put Uzbek women in a difficult position. In Uzbekistan, now, as in times of war, whole mahallas have been left without men. Men have gone to work to Russia, South Korea and Czechia. Men who should be near their children are abroad. Many women who could not get married are left on the shelf.⁹ Only in Russia, as of February 1, 2017, there stayed 1,5 million citizens of Uzbekistan.¹⁰ Over the three quarters of 2018, 3.55 million people left for Russia. Most of them are men of fertile age, some of whom left their families at home. However, even before the start of mass migrations, polygamy was popular, especially in rural areas. In the summer of 2017, President Mirziyoyev blamed the mullahs who performed "nikah," which contributed to the spread of polygamy in the republic. The president promised to punish the mullahs who performed this rite.

Polygamy is prohibited in Uzbekistan; there is an article on this subject in the country's criminal code. Article 126 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan reads as follows: "Polygamy, that is, cohabitation with two or more women on the basis of common household, is punishable by a fine of fifty to one hundred minimum wages or by correctional labor for up to three years, or imprisonment for up to three years." However, the growing labor migration of men leads to the fact that outside the homeland, Uzbeks are acquiring new families. According to the Russian media, the number of citizens of Uzbekistan in the Russian Federation is about 1.5 million people. (as of February 1, 2017).

Sociologists explain the spread of such marriages among migrant workers as an element of adaptation to the conditions of migration and a return to the historical practice characteristic of Moslem society.

TAJIKISTAN

In the fall of 2013, at the initiative of women's organizations, a letter was sent to the government in which Tajik women asked their husbands who had left to work to Russia to return to their homeland. There were even wishes to demand from Russia to deport them. By the way, a few years earlier, women of Azerbaijan addressed their president with a similar request.

In the spring of 2015, under the influence of an economic crisis and as a result of the adoption of new migration rules in Russia, Tajik men began to return, but the situation did not stabilize. In 2018, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the number of Tajik citizens who came to Russia and were registered with the migration register amounted to 482,897 people only in the first quarter of 2018.

According to economists, the remittances of labor migrants to their homeland amount to more than \$ 3 billion a year, which corresponds to 40% of Tajikistan's GDP. For many Tajik families, transfers from Russia are the only means of subsistence. Moreover, Dushanbe is interested in Russia conducting a migration amnesty for 200,000 Tajik migrant workers who are waiting for a visa to re-enter Russia.¹¹ The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan connects this issue with the agreement on the presence of a Russian military base in Tajikistan.¹²

The absence of a significant number of Tajik men at home negatively affects the marital and family situation in the republic. As in other republics, the Tajik Criminal Code prohibits polygamy (Article 170). In case of violation of the law, a fine in the form of a fine of 2000 minimum wages, or in the form of

correctional labor for a term of up to 2 years is imposed. In some cases, a restriction of liberty of up to 5 years is provided.

However, more and more members of the public speak in favor of legalizing polygamy in the republic, which fact, in their opinion, will improve the demographic situation and overcome the gender imbalance that arose as a result of the civil war (1992–1997). Proponents of the legalization of polygamy argue their position by comparing illegal polygamy in the republic with the practice of “civil” marriages in European countries.

Thus, the informal recognition of parallel marriages that have arisen in the country of employment is gradually emerging. Naturally, the Tajik society condemns temporary cohabitation. However, in the history of the peoples of Central Asia polygamy has not been completely eliminated anywhere. This circumstance contributes to the formation of a different social and marriage ethics. In the event a man has entered into a marriage according to Islamic rules in his homeland, he can contract a civil marriage in the country of employment, for example, in Russia, since his passport does not contain an entry confirming registration marriage. Some of them send home an SMS with the text: “talok, talok, talok,” which means “divorce.” S. Olimova, a sociologist, head of the ShARK research center in Tajikistan, notes that about 90% of the migrants surveyed were married, but only 5% took their wives to Russia.¹³

Over time, the laws for Tajik migrant workers have become tougher. As a result, the volume of remittances decreased by three times. However, illegal immigrants are still there and they are waiting for the promised amnesty. The FMS is preparing a new law, which should reduce the level of crime among immigrants, increase labor safety, increase employer responsibility and create a system of a more transparent presence of foreign workers in Russia. In addition, the new law is aimed at combating corruption and reducing the number of illegal immigrants. It is assumed that Tajik migrants will have worker status and, therefore, will have social security and other rights.¹⁴

Analyzing the current situation, as a result of which the family in the homeland of the migrant is destroyed, the researchers note that this situation had some sad consequences, and among them – female suicide, a phenomenon not characteristic of Moslem culture. The Tajik public organization “Perspective Plus” noted the growth of such cases. An expert at the Center for Social and Economic Research “Strategy” F. Saidov believes that today in Tajikistan there live from 50 to 80 thousand women, whose husbands have gone for labor migration and broke off relations with their families,¹⁵ some of them have been left without the financial support of the breadwinner. Similar cases were recorded to a greater extent in rural areas, where the marriage was not officially registered with the registry office, but only a religious ceremony was held. In such cases, it is extremely difficult for women to prove their rights, confirm paternity, and divorce makes it difficult to divide property and receive alimony. Even with a court decision, it is very difficult to enforce it, because the husband is physically absent from the country.

KYRGYZSTAN

The Republic's criminal code prohibits polygamous marriages. In July 2008, Minister of Justice of the Republic Marat Kayipov proposed to legalize polygamy. According to the minister, the ban on polygamy violates the rights of children born in nikah from second and third wives. We are talking about the fact that in such cases the marriage is contracted in a mosque, and there are no documents defining the rights of children from such a marriage. His proposal had no consequences, since at the household level the public understands the inevitability of polygamy in the current economic conditions.

In 2010, the provision that Kyrgyzstan was a “secular state” was removed from the new edition of the Constitution.¹⁶ According to representatives of women's organizations, in this way the authorities were going to legalize polygamy purposefully.¹⁷

A paradoxical situation is developing in the republic: for example, the head of the Women Leaders movement, G. Nurmatova, finds the phenomenon of polygamy normal provided that all the requirements of the Sharia are met, but at the same time opposes the legalization of polygamy. In her opinion, those who demand that punishment for polygamy be excluded from the legislation do not fully understand the essence of the issue. To her opinion Kyrgyz society is not Moslem, and even many people who consider themselves Moslems do not always understand the essence of certain Sharia norms. G. Nurmatova believes that under such conditions, when society is not ready to understand and fulfill the requirements of Islam, the resolution of polygamy is fraught with negative consequences."¹⁸

Human rights activist A. Abdurasulova believes that this problem should be reviewed in a broader perspective. Indeed, among the reasons that encourage men to take a second wife may be the state of health or infertility of the first wife, lack of hope for the birth of a boy. However, there is a danger that the opportunity to take a new wife will become the realization of the whims of wealthy men, while the need, social insecurity, and the lack of prospects to find a suitable life partner and create a family for love make a woman agree to such a marriage.

In practice, the facts of polygamy take place even at the highest level. And this is characteristic of almost all Central Asian states. We have already noted that men who have gone to work abroad often stop sending money to their remaining families, forcing their wives to seek livelihoods on their own. For some of them, the status of a second wife is a way out of the circumstances. Naturally, if there is no divorce mark in the passport, the registry office will not register a new marriage. In this case, the marriage is concluded in a mosque, but it does not have legal protection (rights to alimony and inheritance).

On the issue of polygamy, the public of Kyrgyzstan has almost split in two. Some consider polygamy not only possible, but also forced, especially since cases of polygamy are known

almost throughout the country. Others strongly oppose: Sh. Khabibullina, the head of the department of the organization Women Can All (Osh city), believes that the punishment for polygamy cannot be excluded from the legislation of the country, since such marriages are concluded without ensuring the rights of women and children who suffer from these marriages in the first place.¹⁹

The population of the republic (estimated as of January 1, 2010) is 6,389 thousand people.²⁰ There is an evident disproportion, since there are significantly more women than men in the population category after 35 years of age.

Almost every fourth citizen of Kyrgyzstan has don off to Russia in search of leaving. The Migration Service under the Government of Kyrgyzstan reports that 640 thousand Kyrgyzstanis were registered in Russia in 2018 with migration registration. According to unofficial data, over 1 million Kyrgyz citizens work in the Russian Federation. It is not known how many of them have created a second family, being outside the homeland, however, in Russia the number of orphans born by migrant women is growing.

Due to the simplified entry to Russia for the residents of Kyrgyzstan²¹ many women of the republic are seeking here. Many give birth to children here. The Kyrgyzstan Ayaldary (Women of Kyrgyzstan) human rights foundation, founded by B. Tarabekova, a Kyrgyz woman who has been living in Russia for 30 years, helps migrant women with small children who are left without support from a man, as well as without housing and work. According to the Russian law "On Citizenship," a child born to foreign citizens on the territory of the Russian Federation, and the state of his parents does not grant the child citizenship, becomes a citizen of the Russian Federation." For a young mother, this is a chance to stay in Russia forever, but getting all rights is extremely difficult. It's good if the mother is legally on the territory of the Russian Federation. In fact, the number of children abandoned only by Kyrgyz women and only in Moscow

is measured in dozens every year,²² and the number of those sent home – still by units.

According to the World Bank, Kyrgyzstan ranks first in the world in terms of remittances from migrants to their homeland. For 11 months of 2018, the inflow of remittances to the republic amounted to \$ 2.48 billion. Of this money, \$ 2.44 billion was transferred from Russia.²³

TURKMENISTAN

In June 2018, an article prohibiting polygamy was introduced into the family code of the republic. The new version of the regulatory document in article 7 contains the phrase “Polygamy is not allowed in Turkmenistan.” The Criminal Code of the Republic (adopted in 1997) contains article 163, according to which a fine of up to 30 average monthly wages or two years of corrective labor is stipulated for “cohabitation with two or more women in a common household.”

There are thousands of examples of polygamy in Turkmenistan, although back in 1928 polygamy was attributed to “domestic crimes.” A special decree was adopted, according to which polygamy and the payment of kalym were attributed to “remnants.” It is believed that in the years 1930–1940 polygamy was eliminated, although polygamous families survived in remote areas.

Today, in independent Turkmenistan, Islamic traditions are being revived, according to some experts, thanks to European values that have penetrated the country, which made it possible to experiment more boldly with models of family life.²⁴ In fact, the lack of men, including those dying of drugs, was the reason for the preservation of polygamous marriage. The second reason is the desire of parents to arrange the future of their daughters, or divorced women and widows who want to find a breadwinner.

Public polls indicate that many divorced women agree to the role of a second wife, because in this way they gain status and

protection. But in this case, they can only rely on religious marriage (nikah). A Turkmen journalist Esen Aman writes that despite the prohibitions and negative perceptions on the part of society, polygamy exists and is becoming quite common, and therefore, it may be prudent to legalize or, more precisely, legitimize the existing situation. To his opinion this may be an insignificant and not the only step necessary to save the gene pool of the Turkmen nation, but this is the path indicated by nature and there is no sense in abandoning it.²⁵ It has become a tradition to publicly condemn any Turkmen official to mention that he has more than one wife. At the same time, the number of divorces is growing in the republic. In recent years, one of the causes of divorces initiated by women has been the drug addiction among men.

KAZAKHSTAN

A somewhat different situation with polygamy has developed in Kazakhstan: here, the proportion is 8 women for one single man (!).²⁶ Women of the republic are more emancipated compared to residents of neighboring countries, therefore, when discussing the problems of marriage and family, the issue of divorce is highlighted. The increase in their number is due precisely to the fact that the Kazakh women are more independent in nature. In the parliament of the republic, the problem of divorces and polygamy was discussed repeatedly, but the legislators did not come to a consensus. It was noted that the resolution of polygamous marriages would significantly reduce the number of divorces, contribute to a reduction in the number of unmarried women, an increase in the birth rate, and a decrease in the number of abandoned children and abortions, since the creation of such a family usually takes place more deliberately. However, if a law allowing polygamy is passed, it is obvious that international legal organizations will condemn this decision and

the image of Kazakhstan will fall in the eyes of our foreign partners, especially Europe.²⁷

However, in 1998 the criminal liability for polygamy was abolished. In 2001, 2007, 2008 the parliament of the country again raised the issue of legalization of polygamy. In fact, polygamy is present even in the highest echelons of power.²⁸ All attempts by individual deputies to legitimize the presence of Tokal (younger wives) are faced with resistance from the female part of the population, and are blocked at the parliament level.

In April 2019, the human rights coalition of Kazakhstan made a call to legitimize polygamy. As noted by a number of Kazakhstani experts, the demographic situation in the country also speaks in favor of polygamy. As of January 1, 2019, the population of the amounts to 18,396 thousand people. The number of women exceeds the number of men by almost 600 thousand.²⁹

The information and analytical portal Quorum.kz conducted a survey that showed that the majority of Kazakhstanis (41%) agree with the proposal to legalize the institution of polygamy in Kazakhstan, as this would reduce the number of single women in the country. 11% of respondents do not see the point of this, because such a practice exists de facto. 26% of voters voted against, and 22% had no definite opinion.³⁰

AZERBAIJAN

The legislation of Azerbaijan does not prohibit polygamy. However, on 1.09.2000, the punishment for polygamy was abolished. Media regularly report cases of clandestine polygamy. Here, as in other republics with Moslem population, Kebin Kesmek – another marriage – takes place in a mosque. According to the law, religious marriages do not have legal force and do not create either a property or hereditary obligation between the parties, which in turn is the basis for depriving a woman of her rights in case of divorce. Thus and so, divorced women whose

marriages were not registered with state bodies cannot count on material support from their ex-husband.

The discussion around polygamy revealed different points of view.

The head of the pro-Iranian Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA) G. Nuriev is a supporter of the legitimization of polygamy. Azerbaijani MP Ramiz Ahmadov disagrees with him; in his opinion, the ancient Moslem custom of polygamy is unacceptable today. The same opinion is shared by T. Hasanova, a consultant for the women's crisis center, who believes that legitimizing polygamy will destroy the foundations of the Azerbaijani family. She is sure if a man is allowed to take several wives, this will infringe on the rights of women who already suffer from the pronounced patriarchy of Azerbaijani society.³¹

Mostly polygamy is practiced in the southern regions bordering Iran. Hasanova notes that if before society had a very negative attitude to such cases, now in the regions where young guys emigrate to Russia, Turkey and other countries in search of work, the number of potential "spinsters" is growing. Therefore, women are ready for all humiliation, so as not to lose the family and the breadwinner. Both neighbors and relatives of such people, knowing the general situation, try to "treat them with understanding" and no longer mind. Naturally, under the influence of Iran, religious figures in the south of the country back up such marriages.³² Oddly enough, a survey of the population revealed that men support polygamy, women, in their majority, oppose it.³³

Today Azerbaijan is a self-sufficient state based on national roots, at the same time a secular, multinational, multi-confessional one. The country is developing dynamically. On its territory there are more than 70 different nationalities, preserving their traditions and customs. However, as noted by representatives of the public, some customs should be abandoned, because they do not meet modern challenges.

If earlier the main problem of the family and marriage sphere was early marriage, today we are talking about polygamous marriages. Measures are required to ensure that the rights of children from second and third wives were not infringed. In the past 10 years, the number of children born to unregistered wives has increased 4 times. In rural areas, the level of education has decreased and religious propaganda has intensified, and the worldview of people has changed. If you leave everything as it is and do not pay attention to polygamous marriages, then their number may increase.

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According to Art. 14 of the Russian Family Code, only one woman and only one man can be married at a time. Similar legislative norms are present in the laws of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

Unofficial polygamous unions are not uncommon among Moslems living in the Slavic republics, as well as in the republics of the North Caucasus, where the majority of the population professes Islam. In 1999, the then president of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev, tried to legalize this practice by allowing men to enter into up to four marriages, but the Ingushetian Supreme Court repealed this law as unconstitutional. Later, in 2006, the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov raised this issue, referring to the traditions of the Chechen people and the situation of gender imbalance that arose as a result of two wars. Today, polygamy in the republic is unofficially encouraged by the authorities.

Since the middle of the last century in Russia there has been a violation of the marriage pool, i.e. matching the number of grooms and brides, as well as an increase in the number of single women with and without children. Therefore, in a number of regions of Russia, where the number of Moslems is large, an appeal to the sociocultural norms that are characteristic of Moslem society, i.e. to the polygamous family takes place. This is

also facilitated by the fact that in a Moslem environment, an unmarried woman is not a full member of society until she marries and gives birth to a child.

In the mid-1990s Ruslan Aushev, President of Ingushetia, allowed polygamy (then we were speaking about a second wife). But then this decision was cancelled by President B. Yeltsin. In May 2015, the Moscow mufti Ildar Alyautdinov also raised this issue. He noted that the number of Moslem marriage ceremonies in the capital has increased. Religious leaders noted that they cannot condemn such marriages, since the possibility of having 4 wives for a Moslem believer is recorded in the Quran.

The discussion on the legalization of polygamy took place in Tatarstan. Since 2015, the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Tatarstan has introduced a rule to issue a certificate of religious marriage, as well as record the fact of its occurrence in an electronic database. It is characteristic that a survey of visitors to the kazan.aif website revealed that 85% of respondents were negative about polygamy, 15% said that "it depends on the situation in life." None of the respondents supported the proposal to allow polygamy.³⁴ During a meeting with foreign journalists, Rustam Minnikhanov, the president of the Republic of Tatarstan, when asked about polygamy in Tatarstan admitted that in fact some cases occurred underhandedly.³⁵ This statement indicates a rather tolerant attitude towards polygamous marriages. An understanding of the situation is also demonstrated by the statement of E. Murzin, deputy of the state assembly of Bashkiria who noted that the number of men in the republic is far less than of women and due to this fact the birth rate is low: few women dare to raise a child without a husband.³⁶ Indeed, the attitude of the authorities towards polygamy is directly related to the birth rate in the Russian Federation.

Thus, the population of Tatarstan – 3894284 (2018) compared with 1959 increased by 1 million,³⁷ the birth rate is 2.7 per 1000 people. But the consequences of the low birth rate characteristic of the 1990s begin to have a significant impact on

modern demographic processes.³⁸ A similar situation exists in other regions of the Russian Federation.

The German independent non-governmental organization Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Foundation conducted a survey in the North Caucasus, which revealed the largest number of monogamous marriages in Ingushetia (95%), Daghestan (94%), and Kabardino-Balkaria (91%), in Chechnya (84%). The survey revealed that the largest percentage of polygamous marriages is present in the age group of women from 17 to 30 years (36%). Typically, these women have a low level of education.³⁹ Researchers have noted the importance of adat (customary law) in Chechnya. By these standards, children belong to the husband's family. If the husband dies or divorces the mother of his children, the children remain in the husband's family. Therefore, many women do not insist on divorce and do not object to the second / third marriage of their spouse, provided that she remains in the family with her children.

One gets the impression that in order to eliminate the "demographic hole," the authorities are turning a blind eye to the numerous facts of polygamy in Moslem regions, in the hope that the birth rate will increase, including through polygamous marriages.

* * *

Considering the prerequisites for the spread of polygamy, it should be noted that today it is, above all, the numerical superiority of women over men.

Despite the fact that in most states polygamy is prohibited, such marriages are recognized in fifty countries. In a number of cases – as a rule in multiethnic and multiconfessional societies – this issue is referred to the jurisdiction of provincial authorities.

There are also about a dozen countries in the world where polygamous marriages are not allowed to be registered, however, the marriages already concluded are recognized and not

prosecuted. In addition, sometimes polygamy is in the position of a legally permissible, but undesirable phenomenon.⁴⁰

In almost all European countries, a paradoxical situation has arisen: with the prohibition of polygamous marriages, their number grows, primarily due to an increase in the number of immigrants who come with wives who have been married in other countries.

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KAMOLIDDIN MIRZAAKHMEDOV. CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEMOCRATIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: democratic transit, legitimacy, social system, state power, reform, public organizations, public control.

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Citation: Mirzaakhmedov K. Conceptual Approach to Democratization of Public Administration // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 66–76.

Abstract. In this article, the author revealed the structural and institutional factors of democratic governance through a comparative analysis of the fundamentals of democratization system of the public administration.

The movement towards the democratic state is proven to become the case in various states and in different forms. Ethical and semantic analysis of democracy indicates that it has a variety of social areas such as "political democracy," "economic democracy," "democratic values," "democratic state," "democratic society," "democratic governance," and "democratic development" areas of activity are used.

Thus, the democratic features of the modernization of a particular country do not include the emergence of political systems similar to the ones in the developed western countries. Indeed, democracy in each country has its own image. Because the decision of the democratic values in the minds of the people is carried out in essence, taking into account the nature of the thinking, which has been going on for hundreds of years. The decisive factor in the success of this process is that reform is a long-term conceptual strategy. The priorities set forth in the Order No. PF-5185 in 8 September 2017 of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Sh. Mirziyoev, "On Approval of the Concept of Administrative Reforms in the Republic of Uzbekistan" should serve one purpose: "Public institutions have to serve the people, not the people's public institutions" [1] the idea of implementing a life-style idea in practice has just begun a new phase of democratic development in the country. Today's world practice shows that there are internal mechanisms that ensure the dynamic development of a democratic society. At the current stage of modernization and processes in our country, reforms aimed at building a solid foundation for civil society are widely being developed, with the emphasis on the development of institutional and socio-economic bases of democracy based on the most recent conceptual approaches. Implementation of these tasks, in turn, serves as a basis for realizing the fundamental reform of human rights, including its expansion of its rights and freedoms, democratic renewal, strengthening the social structure of liberalization processes.

One of the most important subjects of the democratic political system, the introduction of new tasks in reforming its governance system, is an important basis of the reform of evolutionary democratization of society, primarily by the strengthening of the diversity and role of political institutions and non-governmental organizations, as well as increasing the political activeness of the population.

Almost all modern academic schools and centers dealing with public administration processes state that government can only be practiced within a democratic society. For example,

supporters of "strong administration" (M. Weber, A. Gaudner et al.) believed that the government's democratic form would provide reasonable bureaucratic mechanisms. Representatives of the "Leadership Approach" (A. Osborne and A. Gebler) argue that public administration should be horizontal, not vertical. Thus, the consideration of the elements of influence of civil society institutions in political decision-making in the field of horizontal governance is a sign of the existence of a democratic society [2, c. 31].

We believe that democracy in the field of horizontal governance will promote the rapid development of civil society institutions in society. The most important prerequisite for the success of democratization is the political stability aimed at reforming the society within the framework of the law, while maintaining the ability of state institutions to control the country.

From the 80's of the 20th century, social science has emerged as a "modern transitology," a new direction of research, both regional and then secular. If we approach this concept from the etymological point of view, modern transitology includes the analysis of the socio-political transitions of the transitional nature associated with the formation of a new quality of the system of social relations. However, in practice, the term "transitology" has a narrower meaning, and the subject of research in this area is the transition from autocratic forms of power to democracy. Transitology is a matter of democratization as a relatively independent procedure in the system of social sciences [3, c. 150]. In a general sense, the process of political, economic, and socio-cultural transformations aimed at the democratization of the democratic system.

According to the Russian scientist A. Melville, "the history of the formation of democratic norms is connected with the process of development, expansion and renewal of democratic ideas and principles, institutions and procedures." In his opinion, "democracy is a process of democratization in a constant movement" [4, c. 48].

A natural question arises. How is transition to democratic governance? Experts today do not have a clear answer to this question. This is because the issue is not about unambiguous research, but in many countries around the world, the democratization strategies are linked to various reform processes.

For example, the Doctor of Philosophy subjects Sh.O. Mamadaliev searches for Oriental characters of democracy in the Institute of National Authority. For this purpose, he addresses the Indo-Buddhism, Confucian, Darwinist, and Islamic socio-religious concepts that are deeply rooted in the consciousness, lifestyle and mentality of the Oriental people.

According to the scientist, democracy in the East has an elitist and ethical nature, that is, the righteous king, the state is the institution that promotes prosperity, spiritual and cultural development. Therefore, the Oriental thinkers "have put forward various ideas and concepts about the justice, the noble ruler and the society of kindness, relying on the Eastern lifestyle and thinking. If the theocratic approach prevails in these views, then in the nineteenth century approaches to the management of the state are reflected in secular knowledge and modern approaches appears the world, especially the European experience" [5, c. 47].

In our view, depending on the democratization strategy chosen by the authorities and political institutions in a particular country, it is possible to differentiate the transit of democracy. It is also possible to define democratization processes based on criteria of particular subject matter and object. There is no doubt that, for example, the democratization process in Germany or Poland differs from the democratization processes in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Naturally, the processes of democratization of the government may have been formed under the influence of civil or violent, revolutionary or evolutionary, internally or externally displaced. There is also a need for any democratic reformer to focus on a number of important and urgent issues: democratic consolidation of the political system, the development of the constitutional foundations of the state and society, the

establishment of civil society, the development of democratic functions of the state, Transition, as well as forming strong foreign policy directions that fully meet the country's interests in the transition period of the political system.

An important aspect of the conceptual approach analysis is to examine the model of "democracy transit". In the 60s of the 20th century, American political scientists G. Almond and S. Verber within the concept of modernization developed the theory of political culture. According to them, the political culture and activity of citizens is a general indicator and criterion of a democratic state. G. Almond and S. Verber used components such as "cognitive orientation," "affective orientation" and "assessment approach." Unlikely, the theory of economics, the process of democratization of the state and society is not a process of economic development, but a process related to political norms, attitudes and behaviors. The founders of this theory have developed the concepts of civil culture, first of all, oriented to the formation and effective functioning of democratic institutions. Civic culture was thus characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, as well as a compromise on mutual interests and relationships, tolerance principles [6, c. 58].

In our opinion, democracy is a reality related to governance, which is recognized by many researchers. Democracy is linked to the political system; the political system ensures that the political rights and the democratic rights of the person are met, and the official constitutional and legal norms correspond to political reality. At the same time, the political system is not only a comprehensive and diverse political process; it also represents the interests of the state, the political system and political groups on the one hand, and the socio-political reality, reality, mass movements, democratic development.

Hence, democratization processes are not the actions of self-denying groups, but rather the actions of those who follow the principles of social development and integrate those laws into

their own work. Socio-historical development indicates that the subject of this activity is primarily the state and its political order.

However, not all political regimes, the state are based on democracy, collective control, but there are elements and forces that aspire to social progress. When these elements are supported by the conceptual models of social development that the powers are concerned, a real opportunity for democratic development is created.

Nowadays, two approaches to the study of processes of democratization of state governance are highlighted separately - structural and organizational.

The first approach focuses on the structural elements that shape the socio-economic, cultural and cultural values of the state and nation in the process of democratization.

Structural Approach Representatives S. Lipset, G. Almond, S. Verba, D. Rostou explain the structural foundations of democratic regimes as a factor of socioeconomic and cultural change by identifying the basic linkages between them. It explains democratic processes in terms of objective structures rather than subjective goals of participants. The representatives of this approach also point out three main types of democratization:

1. Achieving national unity;
2. Achieving a high level of socio-economic development;
3. Democratic principles trust in democratic institutions and citizenship, recognition of national cultural values and values.

Representatives of the organizational approach of democratization (G. O'Donnel, F. Shmitter, A. Pshevorsky), the mutual agreement of the political elite of democratization processes, the conscious choice at the process of achievement of the agreement, the various forms and institutions of the new social structure, the right of every citizen to participate in governance (the universal participation principle), the equal number of votes (the principle of political equality), the will of the majority (majority principle or majority rule of law) [7, c. 128].

Likewise, Russian political scientist L.V. Smorgunov enriched science-specific approaches and proposed two theoretical paradigms, such as liberal-democratization and radical-democratization [8, c. 59]. In his opinion, it is possible to define certain limits of the concept of "state-society-citizen" through elements of these democratization. In the liberal-democratization process, arbitrariness and disobedience of citizens are observed in the radical-democratization process, based on the principle of national supremacy aimed at ensuring the political participation of the society, not the freedom of one person.

The criterion for democratizing society has grown in shape and content throughout history. This process continues even today. Indeed, democratization of society has not attained a high level, ideal level in the most developed countries. Every nation and society will always have the originality in understanding, interpreting and practicing democracy. This peculiarity is determined by a number of factors, such as the historical history of the nation, the national mentality, the traditions, the acting social relations. There are general criteria that define the character of democratization of the state and society. The observance of the general principles of democracy is related to the existence and functioning of democratic institutions. Democratization of the society is essentially a factor that ensures the harmonious development of the individual and society.

The high level of democracy and the development of its bases for Uzbekistan is a unique phenomenon, and the model of the presidency has been presented here as the most acceptable form of democracy and power. "Gordienko Svetlana, the prominent Russian political scientist, highlights the need for a strong presidential and strategic leadership, not just the modernization of the president, but also the ultimate guarantee of democratic rights and freedoms, the elimination of the destructive processes in society, should be able to" [9, c. 4].

In this sense, the position of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan has been shaped by the combination of national

traditions, values and developed democratic nation's experience. The Presidential Administration is a legal system that is an essential part of the rule of law, which is an important symbol of the rule of law. As a result of the establishment of the post of President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the mechanism of mutual conciliation of legislative, executive and judicial branches, and first of all legislative and executive bodies has been created.

However, when referring to the form of the presidential administration, it should be borne in mind that in the states where the presidency is governed, the President is the head of state and executive power, has extensive powers and is central to the system of state bodies. In this way, the principle of division of power networks is applied both functionally, institutional and personal, in real life. In our view, it is worth mentioning the following features of the presidential form of government: the President is the head of state and government, so the absence of a separate Prime Minister; Presidential powers directly taken by the people due to the introduction of the post of Vice-President in the country; The President must form the government independently of the parliament, and the government must be responsible only to the President, to resign his powers to the newly elected President; The president has no right to dissolve parliament.

Therefore, in the world of mixed-forming states, depending on the prevailing role of the President or the parliament, they are subdivided into presidential-parliamentary, parliamentary-presidential-style mixed forms. According to the dissertator, the authority of the President in the Constitution and the legislation and the role of practical life indicate that the presidential-parliamentary-type mixed form of government has been established in Uzbekistan.

As we analyze the complexity of the relationship between democracy and the government, it is important to note that democracy cannot survive without the power of strong power, and it should be noted that the existence of only powerful state institutions could not guarantee democracy. Indeed, they can lead to

the democrats and the society in the transformation of the state and their violation. The weakness of state power, on the other hand, leads to the ineffectiveness of an objective democratic democrat system.

The level of harmonization between management structure and society is primarily evident in the process of transparency, the development of independent mass media, the analysis and evaluation of the problem of access to information resources. Democratization of the society, its pluralization, along with the development of various political parties and movements, ideologies and movements, various views and political ideas. The development of new principles of public administration is largely based on these processes, and these are the basis for its formation and strengthening in the new qualities. In a progressive democratic state, strong power, based on the rule of law and justice, is based on public opinion in its immediate functioning.

Considering the processes of democratization of state governance, one can conclude that the most important element of effective administrative-public governance is the process of democratization and consolidation. Indeed, Strategies for action for further development of the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2017–2021, adopted by the Order No. PF-4947 in 7 February 2017 of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Sh.Mirziyoev, states that in the present-day world, is a genuinely national democratic strategy that is focused on deepening democratic reforms in the field of construction, in five priority areas of judicial, economic, social and security spheres [10].

Conceptual analysis of democracy in the process of state reforms indicates that these processes are interconnected and we cannot define the precise boundaries of these processes during the analysis of these processes. Considering the role of public administration in the process of democratization, we can come to the following conclusions:

1. It is impossible to create a universal, conceptual model that will allow defining the conditions of democratization. This is

because every society has created a variety of conditions for this process;

2. The phenomenon of democratization, based on the influence of a complex of factors;

3. The implementation of democratic processes requires a systematic approach because the current elite strives to democratize the society, but lack of such a desire from the society does not produce effective results;

4. Democratization processes should be based on a synthesized approach to the structural and organizational model of democratization, since in practice we can not process this process on any model basis;

5. The process of democratization is an important factor, and the process of democratization, if not integration processes in the society, does not produce the desired results;

6. The process of democratization is directly related to public administration, as it is an effective management capable of meeting the basic requirements of democracy transit.

It should be noted that the existence of effective public administration, in our opinion, is a key element of the process of democratization of the society, as it has been mentioned above, an indispensable link between the state and society. Therefore, it is recommended that the main democratic principles of state governance in Uzbekistan be interpreted as follows:

- Ensuring social cohesion;
- Gradual decentralization of public administration;
- Introducing effective forms of public administration from bureaucracy and prevention of corruption;
- Increasing the effectiveness and transparency of the decision-making system;
- Creation of effective mechanisms for ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens;
- Putting into practice the concept of "the public must serve the people, not the people's public institutions."

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2020.02.003. ANZHELA NOVOSELTSEVA. MEDIATIZATION OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT IN THE NEWSPAPERS "THE WASHINGTON POST" AND "THE WASHINGTON TIMES" // *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, Moscow, 2019, № 2. P. 116–128.

Keywords: Syrian conflict, American press, communicative strategies, manipulative technologies.

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According to the author of the article, mediatization of international armed conflicts has now become an integral part of geopolitics. Leading publications convey their vision of events on the world stage, using various communicative strategies of interaction with the readership. A high-profile event was the Syrian armed conflict – a local civil confrontation complicated by the involvement of international organizations, world powers, military-political and extremist groups.

The situation in Syria since 2011 is characterized by conflict of interest both within and outside the country (Sunni, Shiite, ethnic Kurdish, opposition and Syrian government). External participants of the Syrian conflict include Islamist terrorist groups (ISIS, al-Nusra Front, etc.) and anti-terrorist coalitions led by the United States and Russia. Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became part of the American coalition. Russian allies included the governments of Syria, Iran and Iraq,

later Turkey joined them. The motives of participation of each party in the Syrian conflict are based on economic, political, geopolitical, ideological, religious, social and other reasons. A high-profile conflict of interest affects the objectivity of press coverage. Among the reasons there are contradictory information coming from journalistic sources, the aspiration of the press to simplify various political phenomena. The biased media coverage of such significant international events as the Syrian conflict, Anzhela Novoseltseva emphasizes, deforms the world views in the consciousness of the audience. The author of the article identifies the communicative strategies of the newspapers "The Washington Post" and "The Washington Times," used in the press coverage of the Syrian conflict, ways of their implementation, and also draws conclusions about the information policy of the publications. The author analyzes the materials published by "The Washington Post" and "The Washington Times" from November 24 to December 15, 2017. The announcement of the defeat of ISIS in Syria, the official reactions of the leaders of the world powers – that is why, the author emphasizes, this time segment is interesting for the study.

"The Washington Post": In three weeks, 1,245 material appeared on The Washington Post's website, 48 of which focused on the Syrian conflict. Anzhela Novoseltseva notes the diversity of genres. The 18 informative notes are UN reports on the humanitarian situation in Syrian regions and the number of dead residents. A digest of world events with urgent information from Syria regularly appears on the newspaper's website. 12 of such correspondence were found. This testifies to the informative communicative strategy of the publication, during which journalists form an "agenda" for the reader. The strategy is implemented through communication tactics of informing and focus.

In the formation of the information picture, there are used framing technologies – journalists select certain facts that correspond to the position of the publication. Among the most

covered events there are the announcement of the defeat of ISIL, the attack on Sinai, peace talks on Syria in Geneva, Vladimir Putin's trip to Khmeimim Air Base, distress of the population in the Damascus suburbs of Eastern Ghouta. Within the framework of framing technology, there is repetition of the same theses in the materials. The US is losing its dominant role in Syria. Russia gains influence in the Middle East after a successful campaign in Syria: getting closer to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt. ISIS is defeated, but not terrorism. Syria's civil war is not over, Bashar Assad is a bloody dictator. The existence of 14 analytical articles indicates a desire to highlight the Syrian conflict by involving experts, politicians and ordinary citizens. The characters of four articles with elements of interviews were a Syrian journalist, the wife of an ISIS fighter, a refugee cook and a former prisoner "from Assad's prisons." The idea of inhumanity of Bashar Asad's regime is affirmed through the stories of people from different sectors of Syrian society who suffered from political repression. The presence of a manipulative communicative strategy is confirmed by the techniques of creation of a stable myth about the bloody regime of Bashar Asad.

At the same time, Anzhela Novoseltseva notes that various opinions are published on the pages of the publication. An analysis of the valuation level of information in "The Washington Post" media texts gave the following results. There is a harsh criticism of Washington in the materials. President Donald Trump's decision to end military support for Kurdish self-defence groups is condemned. In the materials it is also said that more than 800 civilians were killed in airstrikes by the American anti-terrorist coalition. Journalists also write about how American weapons fell into the hands of terrorists.

Moscow's actions "The Washington Post" are considered ambiguous by journalists. On the one hand, they talk about successful termination of the Syrian campaign, strengthening of Russia's position in the international arena, and powerful army. A lot is written about strengthening the authority of the country

at the Middle East. On the other hand, it is argued that defeating terrorists is not the only Kremlin's goal. Among the motives there are commercial interests: Russia needs B.Asad, which will not allow Qatar to lay a gas pipeline through Syria, the ultimate aim of which is Southern and Central Europe.

The purpose of most "The Washington Post" publications is to remind of the inhumanity of the Bashar Assad regime. To inculcate this thought much attention is paid to civilian casualties and the humanitarian situation in Syria. At the same time manipulative techniques of catastrophizing and repetition are used. For example, in ten materials it is described the situation of people in Eastern Ghouta, to whom the Government declared a provision blockade. One of the articles includes a manipulative approach of simplification: the author says that in a situation of civil war people so much want reforms in the country so that they do not care who will carry them out – terrorists or someone else. The assertion is counterintuitive – a complicated political process is thus driven into a binary scheme in which terrorist ideology is less evil than the Bashar Assad regime.

Thus, Anzhela Novoseltseva notes, The Washington Post, while covering the Syrian conflict, used various communicative strategies depending on the genre of the text and idea. The dominant strategy of the publication is conventional: there is pluralism of opinions, the overreaching-goal is to establish a dialogue. The pages of the publication present various opinions on the policy of Washington, Moscow and Damascus – from encouraging to critical ones. The existence of serious criticism of the US government proves general liberal orientation of the publication. At the same time, there are signs of manipulative strategy: journalists used manipulative techniques in forming an unambiguously negative attitude towards the Bashar Assad regime. "The Washington Post's" information policy on the Syrian conflict is characterized by the researcher as discontent with the Pentagon's ineffective actions in Syria. The general idea

is that the United States needs to get rid of Bashar Assad and win back from Russia the authority it gained in the Middle East.

“The Washington Times”: During three weeks, “The Washington Times” website published 701 articles and only 11 directly or indirectly concerned the Syrian conflict. This figure is four times less than the number of materials published by “The Washington Post.” In terms of the proportion of material devoted to Syria, it is about 4% in “The Washington Post,” while 1.6% of the total number of publications is in “The Washington Times.”

Journalists focused on the following events: the statement of the Turkish Prime Minister on the need to make Bashar Assad leave his office, the investigation of the American fighter of ISIL, the statement of Russia on the defeat of terrorists in Syria, the spread of the ISIL group to the north of Afghanistan, the conflict of the Syrian government and the opposition. The main points of the publication: Bashar Assad must leave, his regime is inhumane. Russia is gaining influence in the Middle East, while the US is losing it. The main reason for destabilization of the situation in the Middle East is the “Arab Spring” and poor foreign policy of Barack Obama. Military cooperation between the United States and Russia in Afghanistan is a positive scenario.

Genre analysis demonstrated that two information notes and five information reports were published during this period. The presence of relating to news texts suggests an informative communicative strategy for the publication. This strategy is implemented through communication tactics of informing and emphasis. According to the researcher, it is possible to talk about the technology of media framing in the formation of the insufficiently complete Syrian “agenda” of “The Washington Times.” Journalists select and repeat certain facts, concentrate on specific topics, ignoring others. It is necessary to note the neutral position of the publication against Donald Trump – in general, fierce criticism of it does not sound, that is peculiar to other materials of the publication.

The Kremlin's actions in Syria are mentioned in three materials at least. The texts hardly mention the merits of the anti-terrorist coalition, even the defeat of ISIL is presented as epiphenomenon. Although it is noted increased importance of Moscow in the Middle East region, it is sometimes asserted the superiority of anti-terrorist coalition in the region led the U.S. One of the journalists' goals is to show that the statement about the defeat of ISIL in Syria is not the end of the war.

In general, Anzhela Novoseltseva emphasizes, the dominant communicative strategy of the publication is conventional, there are rather estimated evaluations of journalists, various opinions on Moscow and Washington. It is also stressed the importance of the U.S. anti-terrorist coalition in Syria, and it is not so much said about Russia's merits. At the same time, the publication expresses a completely definite outlook on the official Damascus. Here it is possible to see the presence of manipulative and regulatory communicative strategies. The main goal is to demonize the personality of Bashar Asad, distract its readers from the terrorist threat in Syria and remind of the civil war.

In conclusion, the researcher notes that the complicated multilevel conflict of interest in Syria is not adequately represented in both publications and does not reflect the external reality. The narrative is deformed primarily because of its fragmentation, biased selection of facts and events. Publications do not analyze the causes and consequences of the civil war in Syria, the reader is simply made to think that if Bashar Asad is eliminated, the Syrian people will instantly take the path of prosperity. This approach of journalists, according to Anzhela Novoseltseva, is absolutely unprofessional. Moreover, in both publications mentioning the name of the Syrian leader, manipulative communicative strategies are used.

"The Washington Post's" information policy on the Syrian conflict can be characterized as discontent with inconsistent actions of Pentagon and especially Donald Tramp. "The Washington

Times" does not allow itself sharp criticism of the White House, journalists prefer to blame all foreign policy failures of the former US president and his administration. There are also obvious differences in the presentation of materials. While "The Washington Post" is characterized by modal communicative strategy – an explicit display of editorial estimation of events, vivid and emotional criticism, "The Washington Times" is focused on neutral narration and considered evaluations.

Both publications use a conventional communicative strategy which overarching goal is to establish a dialogue between Russia and the United States. It is noteworthy, Anzhela Novoseltseva notes, that "The Washington Times" writes about the need to establish a dialogue with Moscow in terms of military cooperation in the countries with a terrorist threat, even despite variant readings about the fate of the Bashar Asad regime, interaction sets for dialogue. "The Washington Post," on the contrary, directs the reader toward confrontation, pursuing the idea that the United States needs to get rid of Bashar Asad and regain from Russia the authority it has gained in the Middle East.

Author of the abstract – Valentina Schensnovich

KAMIL AZIMOV. SHIITE FACTOR IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: the Shiite, the Sunni, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran, haj, discrimination.

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Citation: Azimov K. Shiite Factor in the Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 83–101. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.05

Abstract. Except for rivalry on the oil market, relations between the two countries are influenced by early enmity between Persians and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis. In current situation, these circumstances are used by the United States, which aims at dominance in the region.

About 10% of Saudi Arabia's population professes Shiism. However, there is no data on their exact number.¹ It is known that some 30,000 Shiites of different ethnic origins live in the capital of the Kingdom of Riyadh (Iranians, Pakistani, Yemeni and India born). The largest concentration of Shiite population is recorded in Eastern Province (Sharqia), where in a number of cities (Dammam², Zahran, Hufuf, Qatif) they make up almost half of the population. Approximately 250,000 Shiites live in the south-east and south of the region.

According to their religious views, Saudi Shiites differ: people from Iran belong to the main Shiite group – Imamism of the Jafarian type (Twelvers in the Russian Oriental tradition). The Ismailis are mostly members of the Banu Yam Arab tribe living in Najran Province, seized from Yemen in 1931.³ In the region of Yanbu (in the west of the kingdom) Shia Kaisanits⁴ are concentrated, and in the southern and western regions of the country – Zeidits.⁵

So far during the formation of the first Saudi state, conflicts and clashes between Sunnis and Shiites always took place. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, faulted the Shiites for rejecting the four guided caliphs.⁶ He gave them the nickname “Rafidah”⁷ (casting off), which his followers still use. However, this term is sometimes given a new meaning. Currently, Imamites are called Rafidah who did not legitimize the Omeyyad and Abbasid dynasty. The Shia

themselves give the word Rafidah a positive meaning, believing that the Rafidah are “believers who rejected the evil”.⁸

By the time of the spread of Wahhabism, representatives of different religions, including Christians and Jews, lived in the territory of the future Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Approximately till the 20th century in the Najran region, the Arab tribes of Arabia (Banu Taglib, Banu Tamim) professed Christianity, first they were taxed (jizya), but then they were forced to convert to Islam or resettle in Syria and Iraq by the authorities. But there are Christians among migrant workers (from Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Lebanon). Religious police (mutawwa'in) strictly monitor them, prohibiting public ceremonies.

Prior to the emergence of Islam, there were three tribes in Arabia that professed Judaism – Banu Nadir, Banu Kainuka and Banu Kurayz. Banu Nadir was hostile to Muslims, while the other two were tolerant of Muslims. As the years passed, Jews began to leave the region. Some have relocated to Yemen. Then in 1881 the exodus of Jews began also from Yemen. Before 1948, 15,430 people had legally emigrated. In 1949–50 Israel organized a special operation “Carpet,” as a result of which 44,000 followers of Judaism left Yemen. During this period, in view of the lack of clear boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula, Jews from neighbouring Arab countries have also moved for further emigration.⁹

In 1802 it was time of the Shiites, to whom the adherents of Wahhabism declared war. They invaded the town of Kerbela, Iraq, where they defeated Shiite holy places. As is known, the Wahhabis condemn veneration of the graves of saints and imams, but in this case, they were clearly guided by self-interests. The attackers looted the grave of Hussein (grandson of Prophet Muhammad)¹⁰, destroyed the dome of his turbe and took away gifts (carpets, precious vessels, fabrics, valuable copies of the Quran, gold and silver coins), donations of believers in honor of the imam in the mausoleum, and precious adornments were broken off the fence surrounding the burial place. The robbery

lasted 8 hours. According to Saudi chronicles, all trophies were sent to Mecca. The caravan with loot (including things taken from the city residents) consisted of 4,000 camels. At the same time, up to 5,000 residents of Kerbela were killed. At the same time, the Ottoman garrison, headquartered in Kerbela and didn't octroy the Shiites, fled the city. The proposed aid of the Persian ruler Fath-Ali Shah was rejected by the Turks. As A.M. Vasiliev notes, author of the book "History of Saudi Arabia," Feats of Wahhabis "were later described in the book of the Najd chronicler of the XIX century Osman ibn Abdallah Ibn Bishr "Symbol of Glory in the History of Nejd".¹¹

The story of the Arabian Peninsula is full of stories of banditry and robbery. Ibn Saud, expanding the territory of his demesnes, did not strain at any methods. Attacks on caravans and charges for almost every farsah¹² of the way became a source of livelihood for many Bedouin tribes who were robbing. Therefore, having subordinated any territory, Ibn Saud established strict orders that satisfied more the people living there and visiting merchants.

The region of Al-Khasa (in the province of Al-Sharqiyah - "Eastern" - Arabian), where the majority of Shiites live today, was seized by the Saudis in 1913. Immediately, a customs fee (8%) was established for the merchants, as well as the size of the zakat (2.5%) for the harvest of dates, the main source of income of the local residents of this land of plenty.¹³ As historians noted, already then, Ibn Saud doubled both the territory and the treasury's revenues under his control. The Turkish garrison of Al-Hasa surrendered, handing over all weapons to the winner, and the population, tired of the raids of Bedouin robbers, almost did not resist. After Ibn Saud expelled Turkish garrisons from Al-Hasa and Al-Katifi¹⁴ local Shiite mujtahids, Sheikhs Musa ibn Abdullah Abu Hamsin (1874-1932) and Ali ibn Hassan Ali al-Hunayzi (1868-1943) urged the local population not to resist the Saudis. The king even signed an agreement with Shiite religious leaders to "guarantee religious freedom" for the

inhabitants of the province in return for their submission to the new state. At first, the king upheld his promise: Shiites were allowed to have their mosques where they performed their religious rituals, and there was also a Shiite civil proceeding.¹⁵

However, Ikhwans¹⁶ – the religious military militia on which Saudi Arabia's first king Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud (1902–1969) relied, which played a key role in the unification of different regions of the Arabian Peninsula into a single state – as early as 1925 they demanded that the king prevented the Shiites of Al-Hasah and Al-Katyf from practicing their religious ceremonies in public. In accordance with Wahhabite morality, they also demanded to ban the glorification of the Prophet, to celebrate the birthdays and deaths of the Prophet and the fourth righteous caliph Ali, and to go pilgrimage to the holy Shia cities of Kerbela and Najaf in Iraq. However, the king ignored the demands of the Ikhwans at that time.¹⁷

In the beginning of 1927, King Abd al-Aziz engaged in the Committee of Higher Ulemas to consider the attitude towards Shiites and prepare a report on their place in the state. The Committee issued a fatwa demanding that the Shiites “reject the wrong Islam” and convert to Wahhabite Islam. It was also recommended that the places of worship of the Shiites should be eliminated, including the graves of associates and members of the prophet's family in Medina. In addition, it was forbidden to celebrate 10 muharram, the day of the death of Imam Hussein.

The subsequent abolition of Ikhwan units in 1930 reduced tensions between the Shiites and the authorities. Within the higher religious clergy, it was given an opinion that Shiites could be treated like Zimmi, adherents of a different faith under the protection of Muslims and paying a special tax. Subsequently, when oil was discovered in this region (1932), the importance of Al-Sharqiyah Province and Al-Khasa Region increased multiply. In particular, there is the Ghawar field, the world's largest oil and gas mined deposit.

The accrescency of power of Saudis in the region came with a campaign to eradicate non-Islamic and even non-Sunni beliefs. In particular, as a result of the campaign to eliminate "Shiite remnants" in and around Medina, all mausoleum in the ancient Jannat Al-Baki Cemetery, (including the mausoleum of several Shiite imams) were destroyed on Ibn Saud's orders. As we noted above, the attitude of the Wahhabis towards places associated with the names of outstanding Muslims was defined by Wahhabite ideology, which rejects worship of sacred sites. So far, a funeral in the desert is being practiced in Saudi Arabia without the designation of a grave.¹⁸

King Ibn Saud's actions to destroy the mausoleum at al-Baki Cemetery were criticized by the Muslim world public. Eventually, some graves were returned with some indications paved around the perimeter or a small stele, but in 1975 the grave of Shia Imam Jaafar Al-Sadiq (702-765) was destroyed.

Residents of Al-Sharqiya Province tried to protest, but their demonstrations were violently dispersed. In addition, the establishment of an oil industry in the region contributed to some spring tide of the prosperity of the local population, as jobs emerged.

It's natural that, formation of the working class in the oil industry, especially in the post-war years, was accompanied by the emergence of political movements. The eastern province was no exception, and the Shiites took part in them. At the same time, the inhabitants of the province were influenced by the events in the neighbouring countries: the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Being in close proximity to Iran, Shiites of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could receive Iranian radio and television broadcasts. Some Shia religious figures of KSA got education in Tehran, Meshed or Kum. Groups of Shia pilgrims went to Kerbela and Meshed. So, Ayatollah Khomeini's ideas were known to Saudi Shiites. In 1979, Iranian Shiites were able to hold mourning ceremonies in memory of Imam Hussein for the first time in many years. However, the low

level of education and lack of political activity prevented people from facing the realities of their situation.

During this period, Iraq unleashed war against Iran (1980–1988). In the Iraqi army, a significant percentage of the lower ranks were Shia (mostly foot troops). The leadership of the country, and first of all President Saddam Hussein, had to take steps to unite the population and iron out differences between Sunnis and Shiites. As the Russian researcher E. Tihonova noted, “Hussein actively began to emphasize the special role of Iraq as the center of world Shiism, declared all Iraqis descendants of Imam Ali and declared his own descending from the same Ali. There were made allocations for renovation of holy places in Najaf and Kerbela, and events of social and state character were opened by reading the Koran. S.Hussein was in active contact with the Shiite hierarches, and on the eve of making important decisions he visited the shrine of Imam Ali. Such a dramatic change of course was related to the Baathist regime's awareness of the possibility to use the religious feelings of Muslims¹⁹ in the war with Iran.

After the departure of the Shah of Iran (16.01.1979) and the return to Tehran of Ayatollah Khomeini (1.02.1979), the Shiite opposition in Iraq intensified. It advocated the overthrow of the Baas Party²⁰ regime and was eager to build an Islamic state on the Iranian model. It is natural that Tehran actively supported the Iraqi Shiite opposition, believing that it would be possible to implement Khomeini's ideas in such a manner. The slogan of “export of the Islamic Revolution” was aimed not only at the Shia Muslims of Iraq, but was also universal, i.e. it was addressed to all Islamic States. In Saudi Arabia, it was perceived as a call for a possible Shiite revolution, followed by the extension of Iranian expansion to other Persian Gulf countries²¹.

The ambitions of the Tehran leadership were extremely annoying Riyadh. Relations between countries turned into regional rivalries. In view of the Saudi kingdom's close

relationship with Washington, Khomeini called Saudi Wahhabism "American Islam."

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) negatively affected the countries of the region. Navigation in the Persian Gulf was particularly affected, where oil vessels were attacked by fire. This war is called the "First War in the Persian Gulf." Among the 300 vessels that transported oil through the Persian Gulf during this period and were attacked during the hostilities, the Saudi tanker *Safina al-Arab*, with a draught of 357,000 tons, was injured²².

The events in the Persian Gulf were not adequately covered in the kingdom's media, so Saudi Shiites did not express solidarity with Iran during this period. Nevertheless, the Saudi Shiites were gradually awakening. Unexpectedly during the haj (31.07.1987), Shiite pilgrims from Iran staged a demonstration in support of Khomeini. There were casualties as a result of clashes with Saudi security services²³. The official media reported that pilgrims from Iran staged an "illegal demonstration." During the investigation of the incident, the Kingdom authorities deprived a great number of bladed weapons (knives) of Shia pilgrims, as well as the same wrist watches with the inscription "lyabbaik ya Khomeini."²⁴ The Kingdom's authorities considered what had happened as a provocation aimed at sowing chaos in the country. It was noted that "pilgrims overdid the hospitality of the government of the Servant of the Two Holy Places and carried out an action incompatible with the holiness of haj rituals"²⁵. In response, Khomeini blamed the Saudi authorities for the deaths of pilgrims and appealed all Shiites to rebel²⁶.

Everything what happened got several explanations. One of them (Saudi one) says that supposedly 25,000 pilgrims from Iraq attempted to block the entrance to Mesjid al-Haram (a forbidden mosque)²⁷, where they met with Saudi soldiers protecting it. This version is still seen in Riyadh as a planned provocation, as a result of which the mosque was to be captured, and the Iranians were to proclaim Ayatollah Khomeini the head

of all Islamic ummah. In return, the Iranians accused the Saudis of trying to put obstacles in way of Shia pilgrims, right down to limiting their participation in Haj.

In 1988, several Saudi oil pipelines were blown up. This time, the Saudi government accused its own Shia citizens of what happened.

That same year, Saudi Arabia's government severed diplomatic relations with Iran, preventing Iranians from going the pilgrimage to Mecca.

On July 9, 1989, two bombs exploded during another haj, which killed one pilgrim and injured 16 others. The Saudi authorities at first as usual wanted to blame the Iranians, but as the Iranian government prohibited its citizens from the haj that year, the Saudi authorities accused and then executed 16 Shia pilgrims from Kuwait. Saudi theologians took part in the anti-Wahhabite campaign. In particular, the Supreme Mufti of the Kingdom Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh (1910–1999) issued a fatwa in which he put Shiites on the same footing as *murtads*²⁸.

Some thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia occurred after the end of the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), when Iraqi forces intruded into Kuwaiti territory. The operation Desert Storm, created to take control over Baghdad, was supported by Tehran. In this case, the interests of Riyadh and Tehran coincided, as it was Iraq that was seen as the main threat in the region during this period. Relations between States became normal during this period. In 1993, a total amnesty was declared in the Kingdom: Shiite prisoners gained freedom, emigrants returned to their homeland, and some Shiite intellectuals were given the opportunity to work in state institutions and the private sector. Moreover, there was an incident that epitomized that the leadership of the country refused to pursue anti-Shia policy: during the visit to KSA of Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–2017), the imam of the Prophet Mosque in Medina tried to say anti-Shiite *khutbah* at Friday prayer in the presence of the Iranian delegation, after which he was fired²⁹.

That same year, King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz (1921–2005) held a meeting with Shiite imams and the kingdom's "respected people," during which he promised not to practice religiously motivated discrimination against Shiites. However, according to Arab researchers, the King's promises "were not fulfilled due to his illness," which allegedly prevented the implementation of all projects related to the changing position of the Shiites and their integration into Saudi society. As a result, some opposition activists left the country again³⁰.

After the end of the war with Iraq, the controversy between Riyadh and Tehran almost ceased. In the 1990–2000's, economic relations even intensified, and Iranian Presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami visited Saudi Arabia, where they met with King Fahd³¹.

It cannot be said that nothing was done in the kingdom for Shiites, but these were individual cases. In 1993, three Shiites were incorporated into the Saudi Consultative Council³²; In 2005, some restrictions on carrying out events in connection with Shia commemorative dates were lifted; in the city of Al-Qatif, the Shia won 6 seats (out of 6) as a result of municipal elections, and in the city of Al-Ahsaa 5 out of 6³³. In the summer of 2006, the Shiites of the eastern provinces organized a celebration in honor of participation of the Shiite organization Hizbullah in the Second Israeli-Lebanese War.

However, this did not mean a complete change in attitude towards their Shia compatriots. According to the Russian researcher A. Fedorchenko, "there are cases when representatives of the law enforcement agencies of KSA without charge or trial arrested anyone who was directly or indirectly caught out sympathetic to the leader of the Hizbullah movement Hassan Nasrallah or his group."³⁴

Nevertheless, pressure from the world public and international human rights organizations made the Saudi authorities try to re-examine their attitude towards the Shiites of the kingdom. In 2003, National Dialogues were initiated

involving Shiites, Sufis and some liberal minded citizens. Thus, there was created a platform where Shiites could openly claim of discrimination. On April 30, 2003, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom was handed over the document "Partners in the Motherland," in which a group of Shiite political activists formulated principles of coexistence in the Kingdom. The document said that the citizens of KSA who profess Shiism are "an original, inseparable part of the loved Motherland, which is the only Homeland for them and to which they are infinitely committed." ³⁵

During this period, some Western media spread rumors of alleged plans to divide KSA and establish three independent states³⁶ on its territory, including a separate Shiite state in the east of the country (where intensive oil and gas production is realized), Hijaz state (with its sacred cities of Mecca and Medina) in the west, and Nejd state in the central part of the Arabian peninsula. Saudi religious extremists, considering the experience of American cooperation with Shiites in Iraq, saw it as desire of Washington to subordinate oil-bearing areas in the east of the country. They even claimed that the Shiites were co-sponsors of the draft.

Members of the kingdom's Shiite public who got the paper raised concern about the plans, which they perceived as an attempt to discredit Islam. They noted that the Palestinian tragedy, the occupation of Iraq by American forces, play into the Zionists hands. "The attacks go on the holy places of the ummah, its interests and even its very existence. The deadly danger threatens all Muslims, regardless of the doctrines and movements, which requires them to stick together in the face of this danger" ³⁷. The authors of the message noted that under these conditions all Muslims need to unite. They reminded that the opportunity to study and improve their educational level given to the Shia of the Kingdom gives them to be of benefit to their State, but there is still distrust towards the Shia, as a result service in the army, security forces and diplomacy are

inaccessible for them. The authors of the message proposed the establishment of a joint body (committee) with Shia, which powers would include issues related to the elimination of discrimination. To begin with, they also proposed an increase in the number of Shiites in the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), as well as an increase in their representation in the Council of Ministers, within a number of ministries, institutions and the army.

This message was favourably accepted by the Prime Minister. Later, Najib Hunaisi, one of the Shiite activists, commenting on the text of the message, noted that the statement quite conformed to the spirit of the reform programme that the Saudi government had launched just before.

In addition, the authors of the message demanded the extending of Shia rights, including the establishment of Shia courts based on Shia legal doctrine. However, these activities were harshly criticised by Wahhabite radicals³⁸, who issued a petition calling for a fight against Shiites, and once again demanded that Shiites step back from their "erroneous" beliefs voluntarily and "return to the true pass" of Islam. At the same time, they threatened that otherwise Shiites would be killed, expelled or forcibly experienced "the right religion"³⁹.

Subsequent events in the Middle East once again made the Saudi authorities fear a Shiite threat⁴⁰. As a result of the American occupation of Iraq (2003–2011), Iraqi Shiites became the dominant force in the country's administration, Iranian influence in Iraq increased notably, that contributed to the activization of Shiites in neighboring Arab countries and led to downfall of relations between Iran and KSA. In March and November 2011, Saudi Arabia's Shiites held rallies brutally broken up by the authorities. The next year, the influential Shiite preacher Nimr al-Nimr was put in jail. In January 2016, he was executed along with 46 Shiites on terrorism charges, that caused a new escalation of Iran-Saudi relations⁴⁰. On January 2, 2016, troops were sent in Al-Qatif, the

home town of the executed sheik, to suppress mass protests, and the authorities pacified the demonstrators with tear-gas⁴¹.

In response to the demonstrative execution of the respected sheik, mass rallies were also held in Iran. The demonstrators even tried to set fire to the Saudi Embassy, attacked the consulate in Meshed. Similar protests took place in Lebanon and Iraq.

The events called the Arab Spring were a new reason for disagreement between Riyadh and Tehran. Riyadh became a sponsor of the Syrian opposition, while Tehran backed the Syrian government headed by Bashar al-Assad.

The king of Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1935) who came to power in January, 2015 quickly enough delegated the government of the state to the son Mohammad ibn Salman Al-Saud (1985) who was appointed the successor of the throne (21.06.2017) by-passing other pretenders. Soon the Prince unveiled the program on modernization of the country "Vision-2030," which provides for decrease of dependence of KSA on oil exports. For these reasons, the Saudi authorities need to diversify the economy, modernize health care, education, infrastructure and tourism. The program was a cause for hopes for some "religious thawing" in the country.

However, in 2015, during another haj, a jostle in the Mina Valley killed pilgrims again. It is believed that more than 2,000 people were victims of the jostle on the Jamaat Bridge, although the data given by the Saudi media were clearly underreported. In connection with the death of its citizens (464 pilgrims from Iran), Tehran accused the Saudi authorities of poor organization of the haj and even called on Muslims of other countries to boycott it. Iranian President Ayatollah A. Khamenei even called for rethinking of the status of the Saudi monarch who is the custodian of the Two Holy Mosques⁴².

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Riyadh refused to apologize or provide financial assistance to the bereaved families. It is natural that, under these circumstances, competing accusations intensified. Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh, the supreme mufti of KSA, said in an interview for the Saudi newspaper "Mecca" that Iranians are not Muslims, they are "descendants of "magicians" and their hostility towards Muslims, especially Sunnis, is very ancient"⁴³. (Sheikh thought of Zoroastrians, the number of who in modern Iran is not large - 50,000 - ed.) In a number of countries where Shiites live, rallies in support of Iran took place. The following year, haj was peaceful, but the number of pilgrims went down significantly: only 2.4 million Muslims took part in it.

* * *

Analyzing the situation around the Saudi Shiites, it should be noted that ancient enmity between Arabs and Persians counts here. As it is known, in the middle of the 7th century the Arabs subordinated Persia, making an end of the Sasanian dynasty in 651. At the same time, the Persian power was more economically and culturally developed, that allowed many educated people to take a rightful place first in the Baghdad Caliphate (750-945) and then in the Abbasid Caliphate (1194-1258). Later on, negativity towards the Shia and Iran was raised by the Ottoman Empire.

In 1908, the Anglo-Persian Campaign discovered oil fields in Mashid-i-Suleiman (in the South-West of the country). From then on Iran got a resource for development. Almost the whole 20th century Iran was the largest oil producer in the world, exiting envy of its neighbors. Iran (1951 and 1979) drove Western

campaigns out of the country twice. They could return to Iran only in the late 1990s. In 2010 they again had to leave the country because of sanctions imposed on Iran by Western countries. Since the late 1940s, Saudi Arabia came the oil market, gradually competing with Iran, and unlike Iran, it was backed by the United States. According to the researchers, "both countries are the largest producers of energy resources and constantly challenge for trading area of their main export products – oil and gas" ⁴⁴.

Human Rights Watch produced a report in 2009 detailing the situation of Shiites in the kingdom. The report said Shiites living in Saudi Arabia were "ersons of systematic discrimination in religion, education, justice and employment... Education in the kingdom is based on religious Wahhabite materials... From an early age, students are taught that Shiites are not Muslims, and that Shiism is a Jewish conspiracy, and so Shiites are worthy of death... Sunnis should not eat their food, and marry them... They cannot be buried in Muslim cemeteries, etc" ⁴⁵. Even the number of names Shiites can call their children is limited. The authors of the report claim that during 50 years there were no Shiite employees at the Saudi Embassy in the United States. Moreover, in Fairfax University, Virginia, USA, an affiliate of Mohammed ibn Saud Saudi University, students are also told that Shiism is part of a "Jewish conspiracy against Muslims."

There is no formed opposition in the kingdom. The police heed carefully any demonstration of heterodoxy. As an example, is the fate of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was brutally killed in Turkey.

It is obvious that in the current situation, anti-Shiite sentiments in Saudi Arabia become aggravated by Riyadh's pro-American orientation and U.S. anti-Iranian policy. The kingdom's Shiites are seen as Iran's "5th column." Moreover, in recent years many Shiites from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen have been denied access to holy cities during the haj period. Thus, it can be

said that the political marginalization of Shiites in the Kingdom touches on religious apartheid.

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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

ARIF ALIEV. IN SEARCH OF THE NATIVITY OF THE
PROPHET MUHAMMAD* // *The article was written for the
bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: the PROPHET
MUHAMMAD, Qusayy ibn Kilab, the
Meccan temple of Kaaba, "year of the
elephant," al-Fijar war period, a unified
chronology, the Moslem calendar.*

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Citation: Aliev A. In Search of the Nativity of the Prophet
Muhammad. "Secrets of the Family of the Prophet
Muhammad" // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, No. 2 (308),
P. 102-113. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.02.06

From the time of the pre-Islamic "ignorance" (jahiliya) until
the introduction of the Moslem calendar, the inhabitants of the
Arabian Peninsula counted time from memorable days that
reflected various significant events. The representatives of the
Quraysh, the tribe that inhabited Mecca and its environs, to
which the prophet Muhammad belonged, were no exception.
During his lifetime, such events included, in particular:

* Written on "Prologue" to "Secrets of the Family of the Prophet
Muhammad." Moscow, 2020, p. 8-20.

- the year of death of the ancestor Qusayy ibn Kilab (the first historically reliable person in the Quraysh genealogy),
- "year of the elephant",
- al-Fijar war period,
- the year of the rebuilding of the Meccan temple of Kaaba.

Later dating, which takes the date of the migration (Hijra(h) of the first Moslems from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina) in 622 as the beginning of the counting of years, was probably carried out by lunar months (12 lunar months were 354 days) without correction inserts prohibited in the Quran. However, it is not known exactly how the years were counted in the time of jahiliya. This circumstance allows modern orientalist historians to assert that almost none of the events in the Arabian history can be accurately dated before the Hijra.

There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that the real date of the birth of Muhammad was not known even to his relatives and associates. This ignorance was most pronounced in the third year of the reign of the second righteous Caliph 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab (634-644), when he decided to introduce the Moslem calendar.

The impetus for this was the appeal he received in 637 from the commander, Governor of Basra Abu Musa al-Ashari, which stated that there were no dates in letters and documents. The Caliph realized that the lack of a unified chronology was confusing not only the management of troops in the midst of a war with Byzantium and Sasanian Iran, but was also an obstacle to the development of a young Moslem state. He gathered the companions of the Prophet and other knowledgeable people and asked their advice on this matter. Among them was a captured Shah Governor (Satrap) of the province of Khuzestan from the Sassanid family named Hurmuzan, Hurmuzan advised 'Umar about the order of chronology adopted by Byzantines and Persians.

Some of those present agreed with the suggestion of Khurmuzan not to invent anything and to keep track of the years

according to the chronology adopted either in Byzantium or in Sasanian Iran. In these countries, the date of the beginning of the reign of Seleucus I Nicator (the era of the Seleucids, or the era of Alexander) and the day of the accession of the next shahinshah (such as Yazdigerd III, crowned at the turn of 632 and 633) were taken as the point of chronological reference, respectively. However, 'Umar rejected these considerations, as he was inclined to introduce a "proper" Moslem calendar, different from that followed by the Gentiles, the Christian Byzantines, and the Zoroastrian Persians.

The Caliph rightly believed that the beginning date of the Moslem era would be more appropriate to coincide with some epochal event associated either with the life of the Prophet or with the birth of Islam. At the same time, Umar considered it unacceptable to keep track of the time since the death of Muhammad, although it was well known (only five years have passed since the death of the Prophet): it is not appropriate to make the day of mourning for the deceased Prophet of Islam a holiday. The fact that at this time Iran practiced the counting of years from the beginning of the reign of Yazdigerd III, which happened to coincide with the year of the death of the Prophet of Islam (632), also played a role.

There was no objection to the decision to start calculating the Moslem calendar from the day when the first Quranic revelation was sent to Muhammad. It was known that this event took place at night near Mecca in a cave on mount Hira. This night, called the "night of Predestination / Power," the Archangel Gabriel appeared to Muhammad for the first time and called him to preach a new religion.

The trouble was that the exact date of this event remained unknown. Later, when compiling the first biographies of the prophet Muhammad, most Moslem historiographers agreed that his first meeting with Gabriel took place on the 17th of Ramadan, 920 ad, i.e. in 610 ad, in the fortieth year of the Prophet's life. But

the Caliph 'Umar could not have known this, for he was no longer alive.

The ideal option was to start the Moslem era from the day or at least the year of the birth of the Prophet of Islam. But then there was a problem, which was summed up in the book "Monuments of past generations" by the famous encyclopedist from Khorezm Abu Raihan Muhammad al-Biruni (973-1048): '...About the time of [Muhammad's] birth and his speech as a Prophet," he wrote, "there is such a disagreement that does not allow us to put [these events] as the basis of the matter where contradictions should not exist" (2, p.41-42). What was known for certain was that the future Prophet of Islam was born during the long reign of the shahinshah of Sasanian Iran, Khosrow I Anushirvan (531-579), whose name was pronounced by the Arabs as Husri or Kisra.

And what should 'Umar do in this situation, even though centuries later, when numerous authoritative biographies of the prophet were written, there was still no complete clarity about the date of His birth? The Caliph's entourage included perhaps the only person who could attest to the Prophet's date of birth. Such was Hakim Ibn Khizam, the nephew of Khadija, the first wife of Muhammad, who died in 670 or 674 and lived, according to his own words, 120 years. However, by the end of the 630s, he was already a very old man and did not remember exactly when the significant event in the history of Islam occurred. As noted by the famous Russian orientalist O. G. Bolshakov, "... it is difficult to believe that the date of birth of one of the numerous, inconspicuous babies is remembered" (3, p. 64). Here we can add that in those years, the Arabs did not have a tradition to remember birthdays. And the person telling about his age could answer: "I was born after the elephant's March" or "during the reconstruction of Ka'by," etc.

As a result, Caliph 'Umar decided to start the Moslem reckoning with the Hijra – the day of the resettlement of Moslems from Mecca to Medina. "The clearest and most distant date,"

wrote al-Biruni, "was hijrah and [the Prophet's] arrival in Medina. This happened on Monday, when eight nights of the month of Rabi the first passed and the beginning of the year hit Thursday. 'Umar stopped on this era and began to count from it what he needed ..." (2, p. 41). It should be clarified here that Muhammad, according to such estimates, arrived in the vicinity of Yasrib on September 20, 622, the eighth of the third month of the rabbi 'I Rabi the first. Along with this, other dates were also called: the second and twelfth numbers of Rabbi 'I (2, p. 374; 5, p. 278; 10, p. 302; 16, p. 366; 17, p. 281). However, this was not so important, since the beginning of the first Moslem New Year Umar determined the first day of the month of muharram with which the Arabs began the countdown to the months (July 16, 622). The new chronology began to be applied since 658.

Some Moslem scholars, such as the historian Abu Jafar Muhammad al-Tabari (838 / 9-923) and the historian and translator Ahmad ibn Yahya ibn Djabir al-Baladhuri (circa 820-893), often dated the events of Arabian history according to the account of the years adopted in Sassanid Iran. With such synchronization, noted O.G. Bolshakov, it turned out that the birth of Muhammad was most likely "in the 40th or 42nd year of the reign of Khosrow I Anushirvan i.e. in 570-573 years." (3, p. 236). This message is confirmed by the information provided by al-Biruni, collecting contradictory data from the stories about the life of Muhammad: "The Prophet is reported to have been born on the night of Monday of the second, but they also say on the eighth and thirteenth of the month of Rabbi the first. Then they say that it was in the fortieth year of the reign of Khosrau I Anushirvan, but they also say: "in the forty-second," and some say in the forty-third. In accordance with this disagreement, there is a discrepancy regarding the life expectancy of the [Prophet]" (2, p. 42)

According to the opinion the great Central Asian scientist of the 9th century - mathematician, astronomer, geographer and historian Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi expressed in the

"Book of History," to which al-Biruni refers and stands in solidarity, Muhammad was born "on Monday night 17 Day-Maha in the forty-second year of the reign of Anushirvan or 20 Nisan of the year 882 of the era of Alexander ..." (2, p. 138). The famous medieval historian Ismail ibn Umar al-Busri better known as Ibn Kathir (1301-1373) believed that Muhammad, "most likely," was born on Monday the ninth of the month of Rabbi I (April 571) (4, p. 393).

His equally well-known predecessor, Abu-l-Hasan Ali ibn Muhammad, more commonly referred to as Ibn al-Athir (1160-1233), wrote in the work *Al-Kamil fi-t-tarikh* (The Complete book on the history) that Muhammad was born 7 years and 8 months before the death of Khosrov Anushirvan, i.e. in 571/72 (7, p. VI). However, all this data is most likely the result of simple countdowns from the date of the Prophet's death, and not a historical fact. For example, al-Khwarizmi believed that the Prophet died, having lived for 62 years, 9 months and 9 days (2, p. 141).

These data on the age of Muhammad were not the only ones. In particular, the famous collector and interpreter of hadiths (muhaddith) Abu Isa Muhammad ibn Isa al-Tirmidhi (824-883, 888 or 892) in his book "Book of the noble features of Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah," gave other opinions expressed by the Companions of the Prophet. So the secretary (katib) of Muhammad, Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan (between 594 and 605-680), who later became the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, believed that the Prophet was 63 years old at the time of his death. Muhammad's cousin, Abdallah ibn al-Abbas (619-686 / 87), said that the messenger of Allah died at the age of 63 or 65 years. The servant of Muhammad, Anas ibn Malik (circa 612-709 / 710 or 711 / 712), claimed that he passed away when he was 60, when "there were no more than twenty gray hairs on his head and beard" (15, p. 6, 240-242).

The inconsistency of Moslem historiography regarding the dates of the early history of Islam enabled Western Orientalists to

conclude that the entire history of Islam, including the biography of Muhammad, was composed (in detail) two to three centuries after the death of the Prophet. And at the same time, many of the Moslem authors arbitrarily interpreted the events of the late jahiliya and the first centuries of Islam and their chronology.

What all the experts agree on is that in the history of Arabia there was one event that turned out to be closely related to the time of the birth of Muhammad. We are talking about a failed attempt to capture Mecca, undertaken by an army equipped with war elephants led by the ruler of Khimyar (South Arabia) Abraha (Abraham) al-Ashram.

What caused the interest of historiographers, especially Moslem ones, in this event? Firstly, the ups and downs of the campaign of "people with an elephant" to Mecca made such a great impression on the Meccans that since this event - Am al-Fil - "the year of the elephant," they began to reckon time. Secondly, in Islamic literature, for a long time, starting from the eighth century, the provision according to which the birth of the Prophet Muhammad occurred during the campaign of Abraham to Mecca (which contradicts the method of counting down from the death of the Prophet in determining the date of his birth) has been canonized. And this significant event in many Moslem sources dates back to 570 according to the Gregorian calendar. Thirdly, the plot of the ill-starred Himyar ruler and his army was subsequently reflected in the Quran, in the chapter that is called "The Elephant" (105: 1-4).

Information about the campaign of Abraha is based on real events and has its own background. At the end of V century AD South Arabia was embroiled in a struggle for supremacy on trade routes from India and China, which unfolded between two great powers - Byzantium and Sassanid Iran. The pillar of Constantinople in the region was Christian Abyssinia (Ethiopia), on the territory of which there was a powerful Axumite state, and the ally of the Sasanian empire that from 115 BC The Himyar kingdom (Himyar) existed. It was located on the lands of

modern Yemen. One of the rulers of Himyara, Yusuf Ashar Dhu Nuwas (517–525), adopted Judaism under the name Joseph and launched the persecution of Christians, thereby causing the invasion of Yemeni Abyssinian troops. As a result, all of South Arabia for almost 50 years (525–572) came under the rule of immigrants from Ethiopia.

Around 533, the Ethiopian soldiers stationed in Yemen rebelled, overthrew the viceroy of the Aksumite king (negus), and enthroned one of their commanders, Abraha al-Ashram. Soon, the new ruler refused to pay tribute to the negus and, having defeated the large punitive army sent against him from Ethiopia, became the sovereign ruler of South Arabia. Unlike the inhabitants of Aksum, professing monophysite Christianity, Abrach is said to adhere to Orthodoxy (14, p. 427), which arose in 395 as a result of the division of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern. This could not but lead to the establishment of strong ties of Himyara with Byzantium. During the years of his reign (535 – no later than 570), he at the head of the troops, reinforced by specially trained fighting elephants, repeatedly made military campaigns in Central Arabia.

What goals did Abraha pursue with his campaigns to the north? First of all, he sought to conquer the settled and nomadic tribes of the peninsula, as well as subjugate the trading rivals of the Himyarites – representatives of the Kuraish tribe who inhabited Mecca and its environs. According to the Byzantine writer and historian Procopius Caesarensis is lat. (circa 500 – after 565), the intentions of Abraha were different: revenge for the desecration of the Christian church (13, p. 281).

Based on data from South Arabian sources, Professor N.V. Pigulevskaya (1894–1970) dated one of these campaigns “circa 545” (11, p. 343). And in the Himyarite inscription Ry 506 it is said that “the king Abraha ... carved these lines when he made the fourth raid ...” and these lines are dated 547 (Quoted from: 12, p. 32). Abu-l-Nadr Muhammad ibn Saib al-Kalbi (? – 763), a historian and scholar of Islamic doctrine, believed that the

prophet Muhammad was born 23 years after this date of the "elephant campaign," i.e. in 570. An opinion was also expressed that this campaign was preceded by the "elephant campaign," which took place around 563 (9, p. 82-84; ex. cm: 3, p. 234). Even at-Tabari indicated 563 as one of the versions of the year of birth of the Prophet. In the work "The History of Messengers and Kings," he noted that there is an opinion that Muhammad was born in the ninth year of the reign of Amr ibn al-Mundhir III (554-569), head of the kingdom of Lakhmid (12, p. 33).

The reports of later Moslem sources preserved relatively detailed information about the last trip of Abraha to Mecca, and the reason that caused it seemed quite prosaic. This is how it is presented in the work *Kitab Al-Asnam* (The Book of Idols) by a great connoisseur of the genealogies and traditions of the Arab tribes Abu-l-Mundhir Hisham ibn Muhammad Al-Kalbi. (737-819 / 20 or 821 / 22)

In the city of Sana'a, Abraha al-Ashram built in the city of Sana'a, a church of marble and gilded wood and wrote to the Negus of Axum: "I built a church for you, no one has ever built anything like it. And I will not leave the Arabs [in piece] until I turn their pilgrimage away from the sanctuary (Ka'ba Temple. - A.A.) ... "Having learned about this, one of the leaders of the Arabian tribe Kinana Kinana sent two of his relatives to Sana'a on an assignment to defile the church by defecating. They did so. When Abracha found out about this, he became angry and asked: "Who dared to do this?" He was answered: "One of the worshipers of Ka'ba." And he got angry and marched out with an elephant and Ethiopians (6, p. 32).

The subsequent course of events is not clear in detail and overgrown with legends. According to a later Moslem interpretation, Abraha was supposedly riding ahead of the troops on an elephant named Mahmoud. But when the elephant entered Mecca, the population of which prudently took refuge in the mountains surrounding the city, he did not want to go any further and, moreover, knelt before Ka'ba.

The prominent Meccans who remained in the city, led by Muhammad's grandfather Abd al-Muttalib ibn Hashim, were on the point of entering into negotiations with the enemy, but the Almighty intervened. He sent to the invaders a flock of Ababil birds and each of them carried in its beak a brick of burnt clay (Quran, 105: 3-4). And on each of them there was written the name of the warrior on whose head it was to be thrown. As a result, most of the troops died, and the survivors fled, but along the way almost all were killed by the Meccans. Abraha himself, seriously ill, barely reached Sana'a, where he soon died. So the legend says, but, according to more rational assumptions, it was the epidemic of smallpox that became the real reason for stopping the last campaign of Abraha (8, p. 653).

Concluding the review of stories related to the campaigns of Abraha, it can be stated that dating of the "campaign of the elephant," still causing heated debate among oriental historians, remains problematic. There is objective information based on independent written sources that allows us to assert that this campaign was undertaken either before 570 or was carried out by the son of Abraha, Yaksum Yaksum (See, e.g., 3, p. 56-57; 9, p. 61-86; 12, p. 28-35). As a result, it becomes clear that the linkage of the last of Abraha's campaigns to the time of the birth of Muhammad does not hold water, since it is known that this Himyar ruler died before 570. The fact that Abraha most likely used elephants in all of his military campaigns also contributes to the existing conflicting opinions.

Nevertheless, the attachment the date of birth of Muhammad' to the campaign against Mecca of the troops with the elephant, whoever led them, Abraha al-Ashram or his successors, is not much contrary to the truth. Perhaps, the Meccans who heard about the numerous raids of Abraha to the north also connected with his name the last campaign of the Himyarites. Historians can only follow the traditional dating of the birth of the future Prophet of Islam 570-572, since otherwise not only the system of chronology adopted in Moslem primary

sources, but also the chronology of all Moslem history will be violated. In fact, it's not inconvenient for anyone to know that the baby Jesus could not have been born in the year of his own Christmas, because, according to the Gospel of Matthew, "he was born in Bethlehem of Judea in the days of King Herod" (Matthew 2: 1) (1, p. 1012). And we know that King Herod I the Great ruled in Judea from 37 BC right up to his death in 4 BC. The accuracy of the evangelist is confirmed by the fact that the general census of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, which forced the carpenter Joseph and his pregnant wife Maria to go "register" from the Galilean Nazareth to the Jewish Bethlehem, was initiated by the emperor of Rome Augustus (27 BC - 14 BC) in the same 4 BC.

To date, the entire Moslem historiography of the events that occurred during the Prophet's life is based on the four most frequently mentioned reference points: the "year of the elephant" (\approx 570, the birth of Muhammad), the year of the restructuring of the Ka'ba (605), the beginning of the preaching of Islam (610) and hijrah (622).

In other words, taking into account the inevitable inaccuracies, all the data of Moslem authors are built in a single coordinate system: 570 - 605 - 610 - 622. O.G. Bolshakov noted that "...information about the early period of the life and work of Muhammad, is very unreliable. But not because it is falsified. The overwhelming majority of the data (excluding stories of miracles) are reliable to the extent that any eyewitness accounts are reliable" (3, p. 62). Therefore, the discrepancy in dates is actually a different view of the dating of an event.

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OTABEK MUHAMMADIEV. THE ROLE OF ALAUDDIN AL-USMANDI AS-SAMARKANDI IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAWERANNAHR MATURIDIYYA KALAM SCHOOL // *English version of the article was submitted by the author for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World," published in condensed form.*

Keywords: hadith, fikh (Islamic law), scholars, Samarkand and Bukhara Kalam School, Hanafi school, kalam, aqeeda.

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Citation: Muhammadiev O. The Role of Alauddin al-Usmandi as-Samarkandi in the Development of Mawerannahr Maturidiyya Kalam School // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2020, No. 2 (308), P. 114-124.

Abstract. This article deals with the life and scientific heritage of Alauddin al-Usmandi as-Samarkandi, as well as his role in the development of the Mawerannahr Kalam School. There is information about the works of the scientist, as well as copies of the manuscript that are currently stored in world funds. In addition, there is historical evidence that the scholar, who was buried at the "Usmat Ota" shrine in Bakhmal district today, is Alauddin al-Usmandi.

Introduction

Islamic culture came to Maverannahr in the 8th century and reached its highest scientific development by the 10th centuries. Islamic knowledge was raised to the highest scientific peaks by the scholars from Maverannahr, where over 8-12 centuries more than several thousand great scientists, thinkers, lawyers, scholars and specialists in the field of world sciences lived and worked.

The contribution of thinkers born and raised in our hometown to the development of world science has been recognized for many centuries and is undergoing deep study in our time.

Mawerannahr was the economic, social, cultural and educational center of Central Asia. Several madrassas were established in such centers as Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, Shash, Termez, and various branches of science were developed. The interest of the locals to learn Islam and the Arabic language has reached the peak of the development of Qur'anic sciences, jurisprudence, hadith, and the natural sciences. These reasons, in turn, came to the emergence of several scholars, scientists, thinkers, muhadiths in the Orient.

The scholars of Samarkand also played an important role in the development of the history, culture and spirituality of Mawerannahr. It should be noted that scientists, thinkers, muhadis, who made a worthy contribution to the development of world science, came not only from the center of Samarkand, but also from a number of neighboring villages.

The names of many scientists who lived and worked in the villages of Samarkand were identified. The study of their life and activities is essential to the study of the history, Islamic sciences and culture of Samarkand.

Acquaintance with their rich scientific and spiritual heritage serves a noble purpose – to convey to our hearts a sense of pride in our ancestors.

When we look back at our centuries-old historical and legal heritage after the introduction of Islam to Central Asia, we see that Central Asia has become a center for the development of Islamic jurisprudence, Kalam, Tafsir, hadith, and Arab scholars.

The study of the legacy of the scholars and thinkers and its play an important role in the spiritual heritage of the nations of Mawerannahr is of great scientific and practical importance in the spiritual awakening of our people today.

Materials and Methods

Each faqih of Central Asia left a significant contribution to the development of Islamic law depending on his scientific method and the way of his time, especially the Hanafi madhhab. One of the faqih is – *Muhammad ibn Abd al-Hamid al-Usmandi*

as-Samarkandi, a leading scholar and scientist of his time. He had been left a great scientific legacy that has not lost its relevance to these days. In particular, his works include "*Lubab al-kalam*," "*Tariqat al-Khilaf Bayn al-Aslaf*," "*Bazl al-Nazar al-Usul*," "*Hasr al-Masail*, and the *Qasr ad-dalail*," works are of particular importance.

The full name of the scholar is Abu Al-Fath Alauddin Muhammad ibn Abd al-Hamid bin 'Umar ibn al-Hasan ibn al-Hussain al-Usmandi al-Samarkandi, according to some sources said "was born in Samarkand in 408/1017 and died here in 502/1109" [1. 85], many sources say "He was born in Usmand, 488/1095, and died in 552/1157 at the age of 64 [2. 74].

In the works of Tabaqat (Bibliographic books), Abu l-Fath Muhammad ibn Abd al-Hamid ibn al-Husayn ibn al-Hasan ibn Hamza al-Usmandi, a native of Samarkand is known as the "column of the Universe" ("*Al-Ala al Alam*") [3. 156].

There is a great deal of controversy in the written sources regarding the place of birth of the scholar called "Asmand" [4] or "Usmand" [5].

Some scholars said that the place was called "Asmand" and that the scholars rated was Asmandi [6. 35], while others referred to the village as "Usmand" and some as "Samand." The scholar was born in the village of "Usmand" in Samarkand or was of his family was from that village.

The fact that the center of the Bakhmal district in the Jizzakh region (since 1994) is named after Usmat. The term "Usmand" eventually changed to "Usmat" as a result of sound changes. This is also confirmed by the presence of the "Usmat Ota" pilgrimage place located 70 km [7. 134] away from the Kurgantepa in the district center. Also, Sayid Azim is a writer of Bakhmal that relies on the views of historic scholars Olimjon Juraev and Jaloliddin Juraevs linking the grave of Usmat was a famous scholar with the name of Abu-l-Fath Muhammad ibn Abd al-Hamid al-Usmandi as-Samarkandi [8. 11].

There are also differences in the ratio of al-Asmandi or al-Usmandi to the birth of the scholar. As mentioned above, some

sources refer to it as al-Asmandi, while many sources say al-Usmandi (the first letter of the Arabic alphabet is read aloud with hamza and zamma) [2].

The father of the scholar – Abd al-Hamid ibn 'Umar al-Usmandi is one of the leading scholars of Samarkand and is well known for his eloquence and sophisticated preaching. His full name is Abu Muhammad Abd al-Hamid ibn 'Umar ibn al-Husayn ibn al-Hasan ibn Hamza bin Tahir al-Usmandi, whose sources mention only his name and hadith. There is not available information about his position or career, or even the year of his birth or death [1. 74].

In many sources, the name of the scholar's father was mentioned as Abd al-Hamid, sometimes or Abd al-Majid or Abd al-Rashid. We can say that some of the authors used the ar-Razi name instead of al-Usmandi and mentioned the sons like Abu Hamid and Abu Bakr.

For these reasons for the disorder in his father's identifying information about the name and birthplace, Kahhola mentions two separate individuals in his work, "Mujaam al -Muallifiyn" [9. 387, 409]. The fact that Alauddin's father was a strong scholar of hadith testifies and it was a scholar to the young Alauddin's emergence in a unique scientific environment and has laid a hard foundation for his future career as a leading scholar and debate scholar.

The life and scientific heritage of Alauddin Usmandi have been studied mainly by foreign scholars, including German scholar Karl Brockkelman [10. 111/1221], Turkish scholar Dr. Muhammad Said Uzervarli [11], Arab scholars Muhammad Zaki Abdalbarr [12], Sheikh Ahmad Farid al-Mazidi [13], Dr. Navzat Sodiqli Sulaiman [14], learned by Dr. Abdurrahman bin Mubarak al-Faraj [15], Sheikh Ali Muhammad Muawwaz and Sheikh Adil Ahmad Abdul Mawjud [16].

Scientists of our country have not done full research into the life and scientific heritage of the scientist. Some brief bibliographic informations are given in Scientific articles, books

and dissertations written by Prof. Ubaydulla Uvatov, Dr. Saidmuhtor Akilov [17] and Dr. Muslim Atayev [1].

The writings of such authors as Abd al-Karim al-Sam'ani, Ibn Abi-l-Wafo al-Qurashi, Abdul-Hai al-Lakhnawi, Khairuddin al-Zirikli, and al-Safadi, also include some information about the birth and death of Alauddin al-Usmadi, his origin. They say that he was powerful debater and scholar of his time.

Written sources give very little information about Alauddin's life. It is only recorded that he lived 64 years and died in 552 / 1157 y (in some sources in Bukhara) [18. 19].

The works of many historians also indicate that the scholar traveled to many countries in search of knowledge. Abu Sa'd Abd al-Karim al-Sam'ani says that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Shahristani met the scholar at Merv several times. In addition, it is mentioned that Usmany in one century with such figures of the Maturidia teching as Abu Hafs Najmuddin Umar al-Nasafi, Abu l-Mu'in al-Nashwani, Alauddin al-Samarkand and Nuruddin Ahmad ibn Mahmud as-Sabuni [18. 19].

The well-known Arab scholar Abul-Vafo al-Qurashi states in his book "Al-Jawahir al-Muziya fi Tabaqat al-Hanafiya" (The Bright Jewelry in the Autobiography of the Hanafi Scholars) that the scholar met Shams ibn Hisom ibn Burhan¹ in Baghdad in 552 / 1157 during his blessed pilgrimage [2. 114].

The biography of the scholar is mentioned in many works, including:

- Al-Safadi's "al-Wafi bi-l-wafayat" (V. 1 - P. 385);
- Al-Ansab by Abd al-Karim al-Sam'ani (V. 1 - P. 156);
- "Tabaqat al-Mufasssiriyn" by Jalaluddin al-Suyuti (V. 1 - P. 92);
- Shamsuddin al-Zahabi's "History of Islam" (V. 1 - P. 3859);

¹ His full name is Shamsuddin Abu Ja'far bin 'Umar ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Moza. The son of Umar bin Abdulaziz bin Moza Bukhari, better known by his mentor Burhan al-aimma (He wrote a book about his pilgrimage, published in 2013 in Iran. On a single copy, the manuscript is kept in Dushanbe).

- Al-Adirnawi's "Tabaqat al-Mufasssiriyn" (V. 1 - P. 186);
- Ibn Qutlubuga's "Taj at-Tarajim fi tabaqat al-Hanafiya" (V. 1 - P. 19);
- "Al-A'lam" of Khayruddin az-Zirlikli (V. 6 - P. 187);
- "Mu'jam al-Muallifiyn" by 'Umar Riza Kakhala (V. 10 - P. 130);
- "Al-Fawaid al-bahiyya" by Abdulhay al-Lakhnawi (P. 2).

Alauddin al-Usmadi has spent most of his interests in Samarkand and Bukhara and has traveled to many countries in the science of knowledge, as did many of his contemporaries of that time.

In some sources are given that he traveled to Hijaz countries including Mecca muakkrama and Medina to perform Hajj, and returned to Baghdad, Marw, and other scientific centers of the time to engage in scientific discussions with scholars on various issues.

In some sources are given that the scholar received his knowledge of jurisprudence from his teacher Ashraf bin Muhammad al-Alawi. And Imam Ashraf al-Alawi received his fiqh education from his father Abu al-Vazzaah Muhammad al-Alawi and he narrated it from his father Abu Shuja al-Alawi and narrated it. Al-Sam'ani says in the work of az-Zayl that it was narrated by Qadi Muhammad ibn Utba al-Sayigi, Judge of Merv [19. 177].

The father of Imam Ashraf al-Alawi was educated in the Qusam ibn Abbas Madrassah¹ in Samarkand. He was a pilgrim to Baghdad and returned to Samarkand to teach and spread knowledge throughout his life. He died at the age of 54 in

¹ According to a report, Hazrat Qusam was martyred in the Shirinket (Samarkand province) and buried his body in the Kuhak River and buried in the Banu Najiya cemetery. During the reign of Sultan Sanjar Mosi (1118-1157), there was a madrasah called "Qusamiya" in the same cemetery. It was on top of the Samarkand fortress of the Madrasa, near the Obi Mashhad canal, on the sunset. There is no sign of it now. Abu Tohirhoja Samarkand. Samaria. - T. Kamalak, 1991. - B. 30.

Shawwal, 491/1098, and was buried in the famous Chokardiza cemetery in Samarkand [20].

According to some sources, the great thinkers are buried in Chokardiza cemetery (also known as Choakardiza, Shakarjizza), where appeared in the 11th-11th centuries and is located in the southwest of Samarkand. According to the historian, K. Kattaev said there was once a military fortress there. That is why the name Chocardiza came from that

“Chokar” – means an army, and a “diza” – means a fortress. The Chokardiza ditch also passed through this area [21. 76].

According to the book of Ibn al-Shami Al-Radd al-Mukhtar, the cemetery is known as “Turbat al-Muhammadiyyin” for the buried of about 400 scholars in the name of Muhammad [22. 10].

The sources also indicate that the scholar listened to the hadith from Ali ibn Umar al-Harrat. Alauddin Usmandi learned his knowledge of hadith from Husamuddin Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz ibn Moza al-Bukhari¹ [23. 29] better known with the nickname of Sadr ash-Shahid.

The scholar's name is Shahid, and he took part in the Qatavon battle between Sultan Sanjar and Karakhan, 536/1141, where he defeated Sultan Sanjar at the hands of the enemy Gurhan [24. 534]. Therefore, he attains the rank of Shahid.

In this battle, a group of scholars was killed and many scholars were given martyrdom. These include Hisom ash-Shahid, Sadr ash-Shahid, and Saffor ash-Shahid [2. 375].

Alauddin al-Usmandi was a leading scholar in several Islamic disciplines, especially in the field of jurisprudence, hadith, and kalam, as well as a special field of study of differences between different sects. He was known for his deep knowledge, exceptional power, and extraordinary potential in the

¹ Hisomuddin Sadr ash-Shaheed Umar ibn 'Abd al-Aziz (1091-1142) was a Hanafi imam on the method and fu'r. He was one of the great scholars of his time of pleasure and goodwill and was a great scholar in the field of scholarship and sectarian issues. The great scholar Burkhoniddin Marghinoni was one of the great teachers. Sheikh A. Mansur. Hidoyat. 2013/1. – B. 29.

discussions and debates among scholars in these fields. That is why he is known among the scholars as "al-Ala al-alam" [3, 25] ("Pillar of the Universe"), "Al-Alaa" ("Pillar"), "Al-Ala as-Samarkandi" and "Alauddin" [26].

The descendants of Aluddin Muhammad al-Usmandi left a huge legacy, all his works are written in Arabic. The following is a brief overview of its rich scientific and spiritual heritage that has come down to us.

1. "Khasr al-Masail and Qasr al-Dalail" - "Specific Issues and Short Testimonies". This is the commentary on the book of Najmuddin Umar Nasafi "Al-Manzuma fi Ilm al-hilaf" [27. 1187]. Three of his manuscripts are in the Sulaimaniyah library in Istanbul.

There are many comments on this work of the scientist. Among them are the most famous comments of Imam al-Sugdi and Abu al-Mafahir Muhammad ibn Mahmoud al-Sudaysi [28. 4].

2. "Tariqat al-hilof fi al-fiqh bayn al-a'immat al-aslaf" - The book "Ways of Difference in Knowledge of Fiqh Among Past Scientists" illustrates ideological differences. The book was studied by Muhammad Abdalbarr and published in Cairo in 1990. The book was also studied by Sheikh Ali Muawwaz and Sheikh Adil Abdulomavjud in 1992 and published in Beirut.

3. "Bazl al-nazar fi al-usul" - ("A deep look at the basics of fiqh"). The book was researched by Zaki Abdalbarr and was published in 1992 in Cairo.

4. The book "At-Taaliqa fi al-fiqh" is devoted to the problems of fiqh "Islamic jurisprudence." It consists of several volumes.

5. "Al-Amoliy fi at-tafsir" [29] (Problems recorded in the science of tafsirs. (Exegetics of the Qur'an). According to written sources, this work of the scientist is a commentary on the Qur'an.

6. "Mukhtalaf ar-rivayah" [30. 1636] - (Various rivayats).

This book is about Islamic jurisprudence. Manuscript in the Egyptian library "Dor al-kutub," Department of Hanafi jurisprudence. Manuscript number 1815. A copy of the microfilm

No. 41789. The author of the book "Mukhtalaf al-rivayah" is Muhammad ibn Hassan. No first pages of the book. To the library of Mustafa Fazil, department of Hanafi jurisprudence. Manuscript numbered 119. Copy of microfilm No. 8356.

7. The book of the Hanafi madhab - "al-Mutariz wa al-mukhtalif" [31].

8. Commentary on the book "Uyun al-masoil" Abu Lays Nasr ibn Muxammad as Samarkandiy.

9. The book "Al-Favoid al-Aloiya."

10. Commentary on the book "Al-Hidaya min usul al-etiqod wa ilm al-kalam". Shaykh Nuruddin Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Sabuni al-hanafi [16. 31].

11. Kitab "Lubob al-kalam" ("The root of the science of Kalam").

12. Comments on the book of Nasafiy "Manzuma."

13. The book "Al-Miyzon fi Usul al-fiqh." (Measurement methods in Islamic jurisprudence.) The book was studied by Dr. Navzat Sulaymon and in 1992 published in the publication "Dor Dajla." Sources say that the scientist wrote about twenty works in various fields. Currently, their manuscripts and copies of microfilms are stored in manuscript collections in several libraries around the world, mainly in Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

The scientist's works, such as Lubab al-Qalam, Tarikat al-Khalifa Baynah al-Asaf, Mizan al-Usul fi al-fiqh, and Bazal al-Nazari fi al-fiqh, came to us and was studied and published by researchers in Oman.

In his work Lubab al-kalam, in his analysis of important issues related to the science of Kalam, he seems to have relied on the principles practiced by the teachings of Moturidiy. He must explain to our people and youth the true essence of our sacred religion in the era of the current ideological struggle, to express

the ideological direction of the science of Kalam, which deals with ideological immunity in them and is an important factor in the ideological attack on some of the extremist flows and groups that promote false statements.

In short, the author draws attention to the Qur'an and Hadith, expressing his ideas and thoughts in his works, and widely and effectively uses the works of our great ancestors, including our great countryman Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi.

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2020 – 2 (308)**

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Гигиеническое заключение
№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.
Подписано к печати 20 / VI – 2020 г. Формат 60х84/16
Бум. офсетная № 1 Печать офсетная
Усл. печ. л. 7,5 Уч.-изд. л. 7,0
Тираж 300 экз. (1–100 экз. – 1-й завод) Заказ № 126

**Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам РАН,
Нахимовский проспект, д. 51/21,
Москва, В-418, ГСП-7, 117997**

**Отдел маркетинга и распространения
информационных изданий
Тел. (925) 517-36-91
E-mail: inion@bk.ru**

Отпечатано по гранкам ИНИОН РАН
в ООО «Амирит»,
410004, Саратовская обл., г. Саратов,
ул. Чернышевского, 88, литера У
Тел.: 8-800-700-86-33; (845-2) 24-86-33