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CONTENTS

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2020.04.001. Valentina Schensnovich. Demographic and Migration Situation in Russia during the COVID-19 Pandemic // <i>Condensed Abstract</i>	5
Yulia Korobkova. On Practice of Spindoctoring in the Foreign Policy of Russia // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	11
2020.04.002. Elena Dmitrieva. Islamic Financial System in the Post-Soviet Space // <i>Condensed Abstract</i>	15

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

Zaid Abdulagatov. The Influence of Foreign Islamic Education on the Religious Consciousness of Moslems of Dagestan (Ending. Opening in № 3 (309), 2020) // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	26
2020.04.003. Valentina Schensnovich. Azerbaijan Foreign Policy. Condensed Abstract	43
Filipp Zakharov. Modern Strategy of "Soft Power" in Uzbekistan // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	54

2020.04.004. Elena Dmitrieva. The Key Role of the Energy-Related Factors in Current Russian-Turkmen Relations // <i>Condensed Abstract</i>	59
Gulsina Khoshimova. Spiritual and Moral Basis of Military Culture of the Army of Uzbekistan // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	70

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Olga Bibikova. Turkey's Interests in Idlib // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	75
Elena Dmitrieva. Administrative Corruption in Modern Iraq // <i>The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	86
Daria Panarina. Moro - a Destabilizing Factor in the Philippines: Attempts to Solve the Problem // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	95
Andrey Belinsky. Shadow of Ankara Spread over the Spree. Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Policy towards the Turkish Community in Germany // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	108

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

Kristina Yunitskaya. Specificity of Islamic Marketing // <i>The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	117
2020.04.005. Konstantin Simonov. Religious Backgrounds for Modern Sports	122
Contents of "Russia and the Moslem World" Bulletin for 2020 №№ 1 (307) - 4 (310)	125

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

2020.04.001. VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. DEMOGRAPHIC AND MIGRATION SITUATION IN RUSSIA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC // *Condensed Abstract.*

Keywords: Russia, population reproduction, mortality, preliminary assessment of the situation in 2020, pandemic, COVID-19, coronavirus, Central Asia, migration, labor migrants, educational migration, border regions.

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1. Alexey Kashepov. Epidemiological Transition Theory and the Demographic Situation in Russia in 2020 // *Modern Science*, 2020. № 7-1. P. 42–50.

2. Sergey Ryazantsev, Zafar Vazirov, Farzona Garibova. "Stranded on the Borders" between Russia and the Homeland: Migrants from Central Asia Countries During the COVID-19 pandemic* // *Scientific Review. Series 1. Economics and Law*, 2020, № 3. P. 45–58.

A.V. Kashepov [1] presents theories explaining the processes of population reproduction in Russia for the period 2000–2020. Special attention is paid to the problems of mortality

and the increase in life expectancy. The author provides a preliminary analysis of the 2020 crisis phenomena associated with the COVID-2019 pandemic, also provides statistical forecasts of epidemic mortality and calculations of its possible impact on the overall indicators for 2020.

The author notes mortality from biomedical causes (internal, natural causes) and socio-economic (external) causes in the structure of the causes of total mortality before the 2020 pandemic. Previously, it was assumed that the "internal" causes of death were stable, decreased slowly and were dependent on direct influence the economic and social situation in the country not to the same extent, and "external" reasons depended on the lifestyle and the state of medicine as well, but at the same time were under a stronger influence of state policy, economy, legislation.

The author takes several scientific paradigms as a basis. The paradigm of "demographic transition" developed by A.G. Vishnevsky in Russia is the most widespread in both world and domestic literature. Mortality and life expectancy are interpreted as a socio-biological process dependent on society, economy and government influence. The theory of "epidemiological transition" by A.R. Omran develops in parallel, according to which the primacy of endogenous and quasi-endogenous causes replaces the prevalence of exogenous causes of death (epidemics), i.e. there is a radical change in the structure of mortality. A. Kashepov believes that the 2020 pandemic may prove the premature of the conclusion about the withdrawal of such events from the global list of causes of death. Although, in his opinion, this theory can hardly be refuted by the events of 2020 if the "epidemiological transition" is considered in the context of the last few decades.

The author used the theory of the "demographic crisis" in his works to explain the sharply increased mortality over the significantly decreased birth rate in Russia in the 1990s. A. Kashepov suggests the following periodization of the

demographic situation in Russia: normal development (not without problems) along the trajectory of the “demographic transition” and “epidemiological transition” until 1991, the “demographic crisis” of the 1990s, and after “stabilization” and a gradual return to the trajectory of global development in 2000–2010. Although in Russia there were wave-like movements in the total population, natural growth, and birth rate during the period of stabilization before the pandemic, the researcher does not yet see any prerequisites for a return to the demographic catastrophe of the 1990s.

Mortality in Russia, which increased sharply during the demographic crisis of the 1990s, continuously decreased in the period 2002–2019, and the average life expectancy increased accordingly, amounting to 73.3 years in 2019. The researcher shows comparative data on mortality from various causes in Russia and some other countries. Cancer and cardiovascular diseases are the most common causes of death in developed countries. In developing countries, infectious diseases (in 2020, they suddenly overwhelmed the United States and other developed countries), as well as diseases of the digestive system and external causes usually play a large role. Over the past 20 years, mortality from infectious diseases in Russia has been higher than in the most developed countries, but the corresponding ratio was generally stable in comparison with a sharp decrease in mortality from accidents, poisoning and injuries.

The author considers the prospects for the overall mortality rate and the total population mortality and mortality from COVID-19 for 2020. The number of deaths is projected to increase in 2020. This can be called a pessimistic option, which comes from the economic recession as a factor only. A. Kashepov also gives an alternative estimate of mortality for 2020 based on the hypothesis that additional mortality from COVID-2019 will overlap with the basic trend of reducing mortality from all causes. At the same time, the estimated additional mortality of

people who are considered cured of COVID-2019, but will die from its consequences (from damage to the lungs, heart, etc.), as well as additional mortality of chronic patients will affect the demographic results of 2020. According to the author, it is necessary to reduce the overall mortality rate for the period after the pandemic, based on improving the standard of living and health promotion. It is necessary to radically increase health care costs as well. The author believes that in this way the tasks of "saving the people" and increasing the average life expectancy to the level of developed countries will be successfully solved in our society.

S.V. Ryazantsev, Z.K. Vazirov and F.M. Garibova [2] consider the problems of migrants in the border regions of Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as on the borders of Central Asian countries during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic, the authors note, has a negative impact on Central Asian labor migrants, who constitute the largest group of foreign labor in Russia. Most migrant workers face unemployment and lack of livelihood due to the coronavirus pandemic at this time. Migrants cannot return to their countries of origin due to restrictions and closure of state borders. At the same time, the economy of the host countries, especially the border regions of the Central Asian section of Russia's borders, suffers from a shortage of agricultural workers.

Migrants from Central Asian countries, the vast majority of whom are of working age, are in demand in the labor markets in Russia. Labour migration also brings direct financial benefits to both the host country and donor countries as a contribution to the gross domestic product. All newly independent republics in Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR experienced a significant outflow of labor force abroad. Emigration has led to a shortage of highly qualified specialists in these countries.

Many experts believe that migration is still spontaneous. The visa-free travel regulations, as well as the geographical proximity between the countries of the region, stimulate

temporary labor migration, which is often seasonal in nature. The authors note that the level of legal literacy among migrants from Central Asian countries is low. As a rule, they come legally, but often become “undocumented” migrants due to ignorance of local migration laws and unscrupulous employers. This leaves them without social protection and the state without tax revenues from their employment.

International migration in the post-Soviet space plays an important role in shaping the demographic and socio-economic development of Russia and the countries of Central Asia in modern conditions. The situation with the COVID-19 pandemic has brought about significant changes in the nature and trends of migration in the post-Soviet space, redefining the problems with the situation of migrants, especially in the border regions, where many find themselves in a “frozen” position due to the closure of borders. At present, Russia and Kazakhstan are “migration magnets” for migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The number of migrants from Central Asian countries, who entered Russia for various purposes in the first quarter of 2020 is 1,060,401 people. Most of them are labor migrants and they are located in all regions of Russia, although most of them are concentrated in large cities and in the border regions of Russia.

To reveal the scale of the impact of COVID-19 on the situation of labor migrants in Russia, the authors provide preliminary results of the ISPR FCTAS RAS sociological online survey (April 2020), which showed that more than half (65%) of labor migrants were actually left without work due to restrictions in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, 20% said they work in the same place, about 4% of respondents have found additional work. According to the survey, about a third of migrants (34%) wanted to go home, but were unable to do so due to the closure of borders. Kazakhstan closed borders and declared a state of emergency. The countries of Central Asia – donors of labor migrants – began to close their state borders. International

mobility has dropped sharply, and by the beginning of April has practically ceased as a result of travel restrictions. The borders were completely closed by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan accepts only evacuation flights with its citizens. As a result, the situation of migrants remains difficult, as people were left without means of livelihood, sources of income and cannot pay for housing and food. Experts say that "megapolis labor migrants" who lost their jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic have already begun to move to the southern regions of the Russian Federation, for example, to the Astrakhan region to look for work in order to survive this period. Russian President V.V. Putin canceled the payment of patents for migrant workers from March 15 to June 15, 2020 and employers were able to accept migrant workers without permits.

The COVID-19 pandemic, the researchers conclude, has transformed the migration situation and identified gaps in the migration policies of Central Asian countries and Russia. Travel restrictions and border closures have highlighted the vulnerability of stranded migrants to unsanitary conditions in crowded airports and checkpoints. The pandemic has affected global trends in international economic migration and the dynamics of remittances. When viewed through the lens of migration, the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 can be long, deep and widespread. An information vacuum must be overcome: information on the rules for hiring foreign labor should be intended not only for migrant workers, but also for potential employers.

YULIA KOROBKOVA. ON PRACTICE OF SPINDOCTORING
IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA // *The article was written
for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

*Keywords: spindoctoring; reputation
management; foreign policy; political
technologies; public opinion; interests.*

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Abstract. The article considers the necessity to apply spindoctoring as a modern political technology and possibility of its use as an instrument for protecting the interests of the state not only in the domestic political sphere, but also at the level of international politics as a whole. The Russian Federation may also resort to such technologies to work on topical courses of its foreign policy in order to improve its image abroad and to protect its interests.

Spindoctoring is a manipulative PR technology to change public opinion in this or other way necessary for the customer, using certain technologies and methods.

Among modern researchers, there is a belief that spindoctoring is used exclusively to protect only self-serving interests of politicians of various ranks and is a type of reputational management. Therefore, it often belongs to "dirty" technologies. Contemporary political realities, especially in the realm of world politics and international relations, allow us to consider spindoctoring as an effective technology for protecting interests and reputation of the state itself.

There are a number of issues in Russian foreign policy that need to be worked out by political consultants in order to protect

Russia from attacks by foreign politicians and the media and improve the image of Russia in the eyes of the world community. Today they are:

- Gas “wars” with Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus
- Formation of union state with Belarus
- Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
- Doping scandal in international sports
- Salisbury incident
- Russia’s participation in the Syrian war
- Construction of Nord Stream 2.

American PR specialist Harold Burson said, that first, customers told us: “Here is our message. Go, deliver it.” Then they began to ask: “What should our message be?” Now: “What should we do?”¹ The work of political consultants was transformed into something more than news management. Today, political public relations consultants work both ways: they tell the customer what he must do to appeal to the public, and the public what it should think about the customer. Therefore, it is permissible for political consultants to advise entire states not only how to get their message across to the people of another country, but also what should be done to achieve the desired result, because no political technology can radically change someone’s opinion to the opposite side.

Today, political public relations consultants work both ways: they tell the customer what he must do to appeal to the public, and the public what to think about the customer. Therefore, it is permissible for political advisers to advise entire states not only how to convey their message to the people of another country, but also what needs to be done to achieve the desired result, because no political technology can change someone’s opinion in a radically opposite direction.

One of the most important areas of foreign policy are Russia’s closest neighbors – Ukraine and Belarus. The unquestionable advantage of the situation is the commonality of the language, the common socio-cultural space, which simplifies

the work of political technologists. As for the audiences of more distant states, information is already transmitted to them indirectly, that is, not through information from acquaintances or collapses, but through the media with translation and commentary. A tangible downside to working with Ukraine and Belarus is the internal disunity of the audiences of these countries: the so-called “pro-Western” and “pro-Eastern” groups have polar views on the past and future of their country, on their place in the political arena and on Russia as their neighbor. Even the internal elites cannot unify these groups, so Russia has a difficult task – to find a common denominator in order to turn the opinion of the entire people of another country in its direction. In this case, it is necessary to strengthen influence on the media of both countries, work with political parties, leaders of public opinion. The holding of various cultural, entertainment and cultural and educational events is also a good initiative. The holding of the World Cup in 2018 changed the attitude of foreigners towards Russia, since they saw with their own eyes what was happening inside our country and how people live in it, and now for foreigners who visited Russia, hostile media will not be able to change this image in the opposite direction. Such large-scale, expensive events are important for increasing the positive public in different parts of the world.

Public relations specialists agree that not only the media influence public opinion, but also the public opinion has an impact on the information presented by the media. Obviously, the opinion of the Russian and foreign audiences varies on all the above listed conflict affairs. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the local specifics of the audience, as the public perceives everything that happens through the prism of their own culture. It is also obvious that stating of direct errors of the opposite side causes the perverse effect among the audience and desire to support and protect their side. Therefore, it is necessary to refrain from direct accusations towards the opponent. On the other hand, in case of accusations towards oneself, it is appropriate to

use spindoctoring technology. For example, Russia's argument about the Salisbury incident is based on the UK's accusation of the lack of evidence and information on the supposed perpetrators of the poisoning.² In this case, it is more appropriate to use the "spin-control" technology, when the press office often, but briefly and distantly, presents the newly discovered facts of the investigation, without adding comments, excuses and accusations. The foreign press will have to put this information on the front pages of newspapers, and the rest of the work will be done by another group of specialists who should draw attention to something "taking away attention," for example, another large-scale event.

The use of spindoctoring is also beneficial for the customer in that suppressing the situation generates rumors and various interpretations from the audience, and spindoctoring offers a made-up scenario and explanations, which helps to direct public opinion to the right way. Therefore, it is important to provide the public with a large amount of convenient information on a particular issue. These can be documentaries, investigative films, television programs, analytical articles, statements of politicians and comments of opinion leaders. For example, in conflict situations, president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko tries to interpret events in simple phrase, that is commented by the Russian side as a "manifestation of emotionality."³ In layman's terms, especially from the Belarusian side, the direct message of President Lukashenko is much more understandable than the covert message of the press secretary of Peskov. Simple statements of the top officials instantly spread through the media and clearly reach an average listener, so it is advisable for the Russian side to use the same "medicine." In the case of an English-speaking audience accustomed to "prime standards" of the media, it is appropriate to publish large analytical articles, detailed investigative films, high-quality and interesting news stories, as they will be popular with the audience.

Conclusions. Among the foreign policy interests of Russia, peaceful coexistence with other countries and the maintenance of friendly relations are the most important. However, to achieve this goal, it is necessary to assert yourself and your friendly intentions in understandable ways for various audiences. Current conditions create the necessity to use various methods and technologies to build a positive image in the eyes of a foreign public, otherwise this threatens misunderstanding of Russia as a nation, further hate campaign in the media and deterioration of relations with other countries, which contradicts the interests of the Russian Federation.

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3. "Peskov: the dialog with Belarus will be kept going, in spite of emotional replies of Lukashenko" / TACC // 17.02.2020 [Electronic recourse]. - Access mode: <https://tass.ru/politika/7777283>

2020.04.002. ELENA DMITRIEVA. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE. CONDENSED ABSTRACT.

Keywords: Islamic financial system, Islamic banking, post-Soviet space, alternative banking system.

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1. Sharipov Sh.S. Issues of Islamic Banking System Formation on the Example of the States of Post-Soviet States* // *Vestnik Universiteta*. 2018. № 9. P. 147–151.

2. Zabolotnikova V.D., Dodobaeva T.E. Implementation of the Instruments of Islamic Financing in the CIS Countries // *Novaya paradigma socialno-gumanitarnogo znaniya* (Collection of scientific papers based on the materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference. In 6 parts. Edited by E.P. Tkacheva.) 2018. P. 54–61.

Considering the processes of the Islamic banking system formation in the post-Soviet republics with a predominance of the population professing Islam, Sharipov Sh.S. [1] analyzes the functioning of the already existing elements of the Islamic banking system in individual republics, identifies the problems of its legal framework and assesses the prospects for the development of the Islamic financial system in the post-Soviet space.

The author writes that the geopolitical position, economic situation, the availability of free financial resources and the Moslem religion of a significant part of the population have created favorable conditions for the development of Islamic finance in a number of regions of the world as an alternative to the existing banking system. The viability of the Islamic banking system has today been confirmed in the world, including in the post-Soviet space, where the issue of its development is on the agenda today. For example, 95.3% of the population of Tajikistan are Moslems and it can be assumed that there are prerequisites in the republic for a high demand for banking services that comply with the norms of Islamic law. In countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Islamic banking is already enshrined at the legislative level.

The author pays special attention to the experience of Kazakhstan, where, after the financial crisis of 2008, the Islamic financial system began to be introduced at the legislative level, as a result of which a new source of income appeared, which made it possible to form a new pool of investors both inside and outside the country. In 2010, the first Islamic bank was opened –

JSC Islamic Bank AlHilal. The opening in 2018 of the international financial center "Astana" (hereinafter referred to as the IFC, one of the areas of work of which is the development of the sphere of Islamic finance and which has become a financial center for Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Western China, Mongolia and Europe) should be considered a significant event of recent times. In order to promote the AIFC as a regional center for Islamic finance, the International Expert Council on Islamic Finance at the AIFC was established.

As a result of the reform of the legal framework in Kyrgyzstan, the functioning of the Islamic banking system has already become possible, where CJSC EcoIslamicBank became the first in the provision of Islamic financial services, offering financial products that comply with Sharia law to legal entities, and since 2008 to individuals. A distinctive feature of the Kyrgyz Republic among other post-Soviet countries is significant experience in the operation of Islamic microfinance organizations operating in accordance with Islamic law (for example, LLC MCC Kompanion Invest). One should note the opening of the Islamic Financial Center, created at OJSC Bakai Bank which became the first of the traditional financial institutions in the country.

The problems of the development of Islamic banking in Azerbaijan are associated with the spread of the policy of secularism, which is manifested in additional restrictions for projects with a religious bias. Despite this, the author notes, the Islamic financial sector in Azerbaijan demonstrates sustainable development (International Bank of Azerbaijan, Kovsarbanks, Ansar Leasing and Joint Leasing).

The legislative bodies of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have currently outlined directions for improvement in relation to the legalization of Islamic banks.

In Russia, the scale of activity of Islamic financial institutions is extremely insignificant in comparison with foreign countries. This is partly due to the recent beginning of the development of this area, partly with the lack of significant

incentives for development until 2014. Discussion of the implementation and development of Islamic banking and finance as an alternative source of investment and financial instruments for the country's economy became relevant after the introduction of sanctions by the West. From that moment on, it became necessary to search for alternative financial markets, as a result of which the Federal Assembly, the Bank of Russia, Sberbank, Vnesheconombank formed working groups to study the possibilities of developing Islamic financial institutions. As an example, consider the issue of the possibility of functioning of "Islamic windows" in the largest bank in Russia - Sberbank. At the same time, despite significant advances in the legislation reform, the final deadline for resolving the current problems of banks operating under Islamic law remains uncertain. Currently, on the territory of the Russian Federation in regions with a predominantly Moslem population, the following institutions conduct activities that do not contradict the canons of Islam: the financial house Amal (Tatarstan), trust partnership LaRiba-Finance (Daghestan), trust partnership Masraf (Daghestan), Eurasian Leasing Company (Tatarstan) and others.

In Tajikistan, a policy of introducing alternative banking services is currently being actively pursued with the support of the National Bank of the country. Despite the positioning of the Republic of Tajikistan as a secular state, one should take into account the religious factor when analyzing ways of developing the banking sector. The government's position on this issue was clearly outlined back in 2014 and its practical expression can be considered the adoption of the law on Islamic banking, which regulates the requirements for opening Islamic banks, as well as the work of "Islamic windows" through which traditional banks were able to provide their clients of specialized Islamic banking products. However, the practical application of this law ran into a number of objective difficulties: low level of public awareness of the availability of Islamic banking operations; additional legal risks due to non-compliance with legislation and Sharia

principles; poor development of the relevant infrastructure; insufficient elaboration or complete absence of Islamic financial reporting standards; poor training of employees of financial institutions and Sharia experts in working with Islamic finance and an undeveloped legal framework in this area. The author notes that these difficulties are common for the countries of the post-Soviet space.

In conclusion, the author comes to the following conclusions:

1. The formation of an alternative banking system based on Islamic finance is relevant and can serve as an incentive to attract funds from Moslems – residents of the country, as well as the flow of investments from abroad from countries with a developed Islamic economic sector.
2. A sign of the possibility of successful formation of an alternative banking system within the framework of the concept of Islamic finance in the post-Soviet states may be the successful development of the banking system of Kazakhstan, which has a similar geopolitical, historical and religious environment.

3. Practically in all the republics of the post-Soviet space, with a predominance of the Moslem population, active work is currently underway to form a legal framework for the creation of an Islamic banking system.

The article of researchers from Kazakhstan [2] discusses the implementation of the Islamic finance model in the practice of the financial market of the CIS countries. The authors note that the world market of Islamic financial services over the past decade has grown almost 6 times – from 150 billion to 822 billion dollars and, according to some experts, has sevenfold development potential – up to 4 trillion dollars. Today Islamic financing is developing in more than 50 countries of the world, and in 16 countries amendments were made to legislation in order to create optimal conditions for its development. The countries of post-Soviet Central Asia are still poorly represented in the sphere of global Islamic financial flows. The authors believe that Islamic

investment in most countries in the region has grown only marginally.

Speaking about the development of Islamic finance in Kazakhstan, the authors note the fact that today Kazakhstan has acted as a “pioneer” among the CIS and Central Asian countries in introducing a legal framework for the development of Islamic finance. This approach was determined at one time by the intention to organize the full functioning of the Islamic financial system and to establish a mechanism for attracting investments for the implementation of infrastructure projects aimed at the development of the country. In the coming decades, Kazakhstan intends to attract investments from Islamic countries of at least \$ 8 billion. Kazakhstan has taken a model characterized by the following features as the basis for the development of Islamic finance:

- 1) the state provides political support to Islamic financial institutions;
- 2) traditional and Islamic financial sectors exist in parallel;
- 3) the activities of Islamic financial institutions are regulated by a special law, but it does not prevent them from operating in the same legal field with traditional financial institutions;
- 4) traditional banks and insurance companies offer clients Islamic financial products, open “Islamic windows”.

In 2009, the Law “Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts on the Organization and Activities of Islamic Banks and Organization of Islamic Finance” was adopted and amendments were made to a special part of the Civil Code, establishing the possibility of exceptions to the general rules of sale and trust. In addition, it is stipulated that under the bank loan agreement, under which the lender is an Islamic bank, the loan is carried out on terms of urgency and repayment and without charging a fee for using the money. According to the law, the following types of operations of an Islamic bank are provided:

- acceptance of interest-free deposits on demand from individuals and legal entities, opening and maintaining bank accounts of individuals and legal entities;
- investment activity under the terms of leasing or rent;
- agency activity during performance of banking operations of an Islamic bank;
- acceptance of investment deposits from individuals and legal entities;
- bank lending operations: the provision of loans by an Islamic bank in cash on terms of urgency, repayment and free of charge;
- financing of entrepreneurial activity in the form of financing of trade activities as a trade intermediary with the provision of a commercial loan and financing of production and trading activities through participation in the authorized capital of legal entities and (or) on a partnership basis.

A course was taken on the formation of Alma-Ata as a regional center for Islamic finance and entering the top ten leading financial centers in Asia. To implement the set tasks, the following is necessary: development of Islamic banking; creation of Islamic non-banking and microfinance institutions; introduction of Islamic insurance; development of the Islamic capital market; development of Islamic financial infrastructure; marketing work to attract investors, issuers and market participants. Achieving of these objectives should result in the annual growth of the Islamic finance market at the level of 10-15%. Since the period of joining the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), Kazakhstan has attracted more than \$ 3 billion in investments for the implementation of various socio-economic projects. So, in order to implement the joint project "Western Europe - Western China", the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) allocated more than \$ 188 million for the reconstruction and modernization of the international transit corridor connecting Europe and China, where the length of the road passing through the territory of Kazakhstan is

2,787 thousand km. Back in 2012, within the framework of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Islamic Development Bank, a Partnership Strategy was adopted between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the IDB Group, the main goal of which was to assist Kazakhstan in using available economic opportunities and resources to address key development problems that limit growth and competitiveness in medium and long term. As part of the Strategy implementation, the IDB group mobilizes resources for financing through various "non-sovereign" windows, including public-private partnership (PPP), short-term trade finance (ITFC), financing lines (IDB / ICD) and other sources of financed instruments. The effective development of Islamic finance and banking in Kazakhstan presupposes the development of Islamic insurance, which not only acts as an alternative to traditional insurance. For the introduction of Islamic insurance in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to create an appropriate legislative framework, which will define the general conditions and requirements for the activities of professional participants in the Islamic insurance market.

Today, Al Hilal Islamic Bank JSC, the first Islamic bank in Kazakhstan and the CIS, established in 2010 by an agreement between the Governments of Kazakhstan and the UAE, is a subsidiary bank of Al Hilal Bank PJSC, one of the fastest growing Islamic banks in UAE with 100% participation of the Government of Abu Dhabi. Also, after obtaining a license, another player, Zaman-Bank JSC, appeared on the Islamic financial market of Kazakhstan. Mutual insurance society Halal Insurance Takaful is the first and only company in Kazakhstan to provide Islamic Insurance services in accordance with the rules and principles of Sharia. In 2011, a new Islamic financial instrument was launched – the Zakiat Foundation of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Kazakhstan, which is a distribution center for collecting zakiat and charitable funds.

The Kyrgyz Republic also became one of the first in the region to join the Islamic Development Bank. In 2006, President

Bakiev K.S. signed a decree "Implementation of a pilot project for the introduction of Islamic principles of financing in the Kyrgyz Republic", which allowed the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic to formulate and introduce new rules for Islamic financial institutions and issue licenses to open Islamic financial institutions. It also adopted a regulation on the introduction of Islamic securities (sukuk) and Islamic insurance (takaful). It was in Kyrgyzstan that a meeting of the Shariah Council was held for the first time in the history of the CIS countries. Its initiator and organizer was the first Islamic bank in the state - CJSC "EcoIslamicBank". This financial institution, which initiated the development of the Islamic financial system in Kyrgyzstan, has a long and interesting history. The bank has been operating in the financial and credit market for more than 17 years: it was created on the basis of the Rossiyskiy Kredit bank, which was transformed into JSC EcoBank in 1998 (this name was retained until 2010). In January 1998 the bank was re-registered under the new name EcoBank and received a license from the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic. From this moment the history of the bank begins. The modern history of EcoIslamicBank is inextricably linked with the beginning of the introduction of Islamic principles of financing and banking in Kyrgyzstan. It was JSC EcoIslamicBank that began the implementation of Islamic principles of financing (IPF) in Kyrgyzstan. The bank offers a full range of financial services of a modern Islamic bank: cash and settlement services, bank cards, financing the fixed and working capital of a business (murabaha, ijara, salam), housing and auto financing (murabaha, ijara), servicing foreign economic activities, investment deposits and trust management (mudaraba) and others.

Serious studies of the problems of the development of Islamic finance have appeared in Russia as well. Research estimates suggest that up to 0.8 million people across the country are ready to use Islamic financial products. The total amount of foreign investment in Russian Islamic financial products could

reach \$ 70 billion in the long term. Potential clients of Islamic banking in Russia are almost 25 million Russian Moslems. The authors cite the opinion of IMF experts that Islamic banks are more resilient to the financial crisis than traditional ones. The entry of Russian financial companies to the markets of Europe and the United States is limited, and the calculation can be made on Islamic finance - both with import substitution and with the development of the investment climate. "Halal" banking services are offered by the Tatarstan joint-stock company Bars, the financial house Amal in Kazan, a branch of Tatagroprombank, bank LaRiba in Makhachkala. Vnesheconombank also plans to cooperate with the IDB. Islamic financial services will help attract money to the system of those people who, for religious reasons, cannot use traditional banking products. In addition, it is believed that the availability of Islamic financial products and the regulation of this market will enable Russia to attract money from Middle Eastern investors who are ready to invest in "halal" projects.

In conclusion, the authors, assessing new trends in the development of Islamic banking, come to the conclusion that the positions of Islamic financial products in the market segments of social groups with middle and low incomes, both Moslems and non-Moslems, are strengthening. Among the priority geographic niches are Indonesia, China, Moslem countries of Africa and Central Asia, as well as Russia. Moving out of the niche of corporate financing and lending to the rich layers of the Moslem society into designated markets will allow Islamic banking to expand its client base and expand its scale in the global economy. At the same time, there are a number of factors that hinder development: lack of qualified personnel; low competitiveness in traditional markets, where Islamic banks are not assigned a special status; excess liquidity associated with the lack of efficient interbank foreign exchange markets; underdeveloped system of supervision and regulation of the activities of Islamic banks; "Specific" risks of Sharia compliance; a high degree of regional fragmentation in the sector.

In this regard, it is possible to predict the strengthening of two trends in the development of the Islamic finance sector:

- 1) a gradual transition from the quantitative growth of Islamic banking products to their simplification and standardization;
- 2) consolidation in the industry and the formation of large diversified Islamic banks focused on interregional expansion.

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

ZAID ABDULAGATOV. THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN ISLAMIC EDUCATION ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS OF MOSLEMS OF DAGHESTAN (Ending. Opening in № 3 (309), 2020) // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: foreign Islamic education, ideology, resistance, salafism.

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Abstract. Author based on historical facts showed that foreign Islamic education Caucasians was a problem for the Russian government in the early XX century. According to historical data, assessments and data of a small opinion poll in the article concluded that the current foreign Islamic education contributes to changes in the religious identity of Moslems of Daghestan in the direction of their consciousness salafisation. Thus, the foreign Islamic education enhances sectarian tensions in the country.

Indicators of the influence of foreign Islamic education on manifestations of extremism and terrorism in the Republic of Daghestan. According to statistics of recent years, in the age structure of detainees, convicts, killed in the course of anti-terrorist operations, Daghestan youth (from 15 to 30 years old) is designated in the range from 65 to 75 per cent. The radical change in this power confrontation has not yet happened.

At the same time, it is the youth that is the main age group that actively raises their Moslem educational level, including in foreign Islamic educational institutions. The average age of the respondents making up the sample was within 30 years.

According to official data, more than 400 Daghestanis were trained in Al-Azhar (Egypt). About 40 of them were destroyed during counter-terrorism operations by law enforcement agencies.¹ Obviously, there is no guarantee that the remaining 90% of Al-Azhar's Daghestani graduates are law-abiding citizens of the republic.

The well-known leaders of the North Caucasian radical Islam Anzor Astemirov and Magomedali Vagabov, who were cadis of the Caucasus Emirate², studied in foreign Islamic educational institutions³ after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are many other figures of Islamic radicalism who studied in foreign educational institutions, who have been and are conducting active extremist and terrorist activities in the North Caucasus. They were also preachers of the ideas of active participation of Daghestanis in the activities of ISIS (an organization banned in Russia). Thus, Kamil Sultanakhmedov, who received his Islamic education abroad, for many years conducted preaching work in Izberbash and in the large Kayakent district of the Republic of Daghestan. A video of his oath to ISIS appeared on the Internet on June 2, 2015.⁴

It is worth noting once again that, according to various estimates, from 2 to 5 thousand Daghestanis participated in the activities of ISIS. As the head of the RD R.G. Abdulatipov (2013-2018) stated to media, 47 Daghestanis from the Untsukul region

of the republic alone were fighting in the ranks of ISIS against the government forces of Syria. A representative of the Untsukul district leadership,

It is worth noting once again that, according to various estimates, from 2 to 5 thousand Daghestanis participated in the activities of ISIS. As the head of the RD R.G. Abdulatipov (2013-2018) stated to media, 47 Daghestanis from the Untsukul region of the republic alone were fighting in the ranks of ISIS against the government forces of Syria.⁵ A representative of the Untsukul district leadership, when asked to assist in conducting a sociological survey among students of foreign Islamic educational institutions, answered: "Yes, we have a lot of them, but the survey is impossible, everyone is in the forest!".

With the beginning of the perestroika processes, the road was opened for foreign preachers of the values of Islamic education in Russia. In particular, teachers from Arab countries actively worked in the Islamic educational process in Daghestan. They had a strong influence on the formation of the youth wing of the radical Salafi movement in Daghestani Islam. Information about how it was held at the Islamic Institute named after Imam Shafii in Makhachkala, was given to the author by a former student of this institute, now the head of the Department of Oriental Manuscripts of the Institute of the IAE DSC RAS, Sh.Sh. Shikhaliev:

"... As a rule, there was no curriculum, no link to any textbook or program... Students taught by Arabs had broad views on general issues of Islamic civilization (Islamic culture, history, Aqida). ... The education exercised by Arab teachers gave knowledge about Ibn Taymiyyah, different trends in Islam, about hadiths. Knowledge was given about D. Afghani and other Islamic reformers (M. Abdo, R. Rida). They are designated in the Daghestani Sufi discourse as "spreaders of evil", "lost", "heretics". ... Daghestani teachers also have good knowledge of hadiths, but they are strongly attached to Muamalat, and the Arab ones - directly to the Islamic call, Aqida.

... Many who studied with Arab teachers adopted Salafi (Wahhabist) ideas. One of the Arab teachers was Muhammad Hani, a graduate of Al-Azhar, a Hafiz (he knew the Quran by heart). In addition to the Islamic Institute named after Imam Shafi'i, he also worked at DSU, taught Arabic. He was assigned to graduate school (in history) published a brochure about the imam Shamil... Was caught recruiting Daghestani students. He often went to pioneer camps, conducted classes. The rest were citizens of Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, Egypt, KSA. Abuzagir Mantaev, Yasin (Makhach) Rasulov, well-known leaders of the youth wing of the Daghestani radical Salafis, studied at the Islamic Institute named after Imam Shafi'i, moreover, they studied in groups of Arab teachers ...

A public organization (1992) for the implementation of the Islamic appeal was organized by Arab teachers".⁶ A similar thing happened in many regions of Russia with the Moslem population. Since the beginning of the 90s of the XX century the State Islamic Institute functioned in Grozny, where 420 students studied at the same time, and 12 immigrants from Sudan, Jordan, Syria and other Arab countries worked as teachers [7, p. 69-70]. Such madrasahs appeared in the Volga region, for example, Almetyevsk madrasah in Tatarstan.⁷ As a rule, the graduates of these IEI formed radically Salafist views that were not characteristic of regional traditions. Researchers often note the undoubtedly positive aspects of foreign influence on the Islamic educational process in Russia, but they forget to give a complete picture of this phenomenon. According to V.O. Bobrovnikov, despite the high statistical indicators of the growth of modern Islamic educational institutions in Russia, the general level of education fell. "The education was organized better in the Wahhabi madrasah, opened with Saudi money, the largest of which, al-Hikma (more than 750 students), worked intermittently in 1991-1999 in Kizilyurt".⁸ At the same time, it is well known that it was the Kizilyurt District of the Republic of Daghestan that was one of the centers for the propaganda of radical Salafi ideas

and Salafi terrorist activities in Daghestan in the 90s of the XX century. The problem for traditional Islam, society, as it turned out, and for the state, was different: how the foundation of the Moslem doctrine – aqidah, one of the many disciplines of Islamic education – is taught. One of the main provisions of aqida is Tawhid (monotheism), the attitude to which is one of the main criteria separating Salafis and Sufis. It was this circumstance that caused and is causing particular concern among representatives of the local clergy. Such a danger in the educational system was seen not only by the North Caucasian clergy, but also by the clergy of the Volga region. The ideas of Wahhabism through the legitimate system of Islamic education in Russia, in their opinion, spread “not only in the North Caucasus, but also in the Penza, Ulyanovsk, Orenburg, Sverdlovsk regions and in Tatarstan”.⁹

Foreign Islamic education: pro et contra. It would not be fair, following certain facts of the survey data, to give unequivocally negative assessments of the influence of foreign Islamic education on the social, civic behavior of a Moslem. Undoubtedly, education in this system is much richer, more diverse in its influence on a person. The above facts are important only to the extent that they indicate weak, vulnerable spots in this system from the point of view of universal, including secular, and not locally confessional interests of the Daghestanis, which in the long term and ideally should develop in line with the common interests of Russian society and the state.

In the Russian society there is an opinion that foreign education contributes to the radicalization of the Islamic consciousness of Moslems. This assessment is mainly held by supporters of Sufi Islam, who have historically been irreconcilable opponents of various manifestations of Salafism. At present, it is Sufi Islam that is the “official” Islam in the Republic of Daghestan. At the same time, the question of the negative impact of all foreign education on inter-confessional, confessional-state relations is not so obvious. In this regard, one of the tasks of the sociological study was to identify the impact of

foreign Islamic education of Moslems of Daghestan on their social (religious) behavior.

The arguments put forward by supporters of foreign Islamic education in its defense are different and basically boil down to the following.

1. Extremism is manifested by those young people who studied abroad, but did not complete the education, did not receive a diploma.

2. Islamic education abroad cannot form radical Salafism for the reason that the ruling regimes in these countries themselves are “terribly afraid” of extremism.

3. Foreign Islamic universities are good in teaching theological disciplines, such as fiqh (Moslem law), the Quran, Hadith and others, but they do not teach the specifics of educational work in the countries to which the students will return, that is, Russia, England, the USA, Kazakhstan, etc. And this is another education that has no direct relation to Moslem education.

4. There is no radicalism in Islam itself. Radicalism occurs in situations where there is a bias between the understanding of the values of secular life and the netherworld. When people treat this world (dunya) as a mistake of God and look for ways out of it, striving for the next world, a motive for radicalization appears. It is a mistake to believe that knowledge of the culture of Islam is equivalent to understanding the specifics of the problems that generate radicalism.

5. The ban on foreign education, including Islamic education, is not legal. You can become extremists without leaving Russia.

6. There is a prejudiced attitude towards graduates of foreign Islamic universities in Daghestan, since they often destroy stereotypes created by ancestors, based not on Sharia, but on customs. It is very difficult to give up what the ancestors relied on, but after all, they could be mistaken. That is, the point is not in foreign education, but in relation to it.

7. In the conditions of Daghestan, there is an opinion that the Islamic educational system is exemplary and of high quality, superior to foreign systems of this kind. The same is true for other republics of the North Caucasus.¹⁰ In fact, most of the teachers of the IEI in Daghestan, and throughout Russia, are, at best, graduates of the same Daghestan, Russian universities and madrasas. Or, they received their education, studying clandestinely or independently during the years of Soviet power.¹¹ "By the level of teaching, the branches of Islamic universities in Daghestan" (52 branches, about 3000 students) can be compared with the average madrasahs" [8, p. 4]. In this position, ethnographer A.A. Yarlykapov, who claims that "Islamic universities that appeared in the 1990s practically remain at the level of madrasahs and even mektebs."¹² Foreign education fills this gap.

8. Graduates of foreign IEI, in particular from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Mecca, Medina), practically cannot be teachers of Daghestan IEI. Firstly, they are afraid of accusations of extremism, Wahhabism (KSA is the birthplace of Wahhabism), and secondly, they are simply not allowed to engage in this kind of activity. That is, Islamic education in Daghestan and in Russia as a whole initially has a religious and political content, which strengthens the existing interfaith confrontation.

Islamic education abroad as a problem for the state and society.
This problem can be indicated in the following form:

- In different muftiats, in the positions of the Islamic leaders of Russia, the attitude to foreign education is different, which makes it difficult to have a single content of the educational process in terms of program definition, uniform regulatory requirements for the list of foreign IEIs acceptable for Russians.

- There is no certainty in this matter among secular experts. In the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, there are both supporters and opponents of foreign Islamic education among them.

- The authorities still have not been able to solve the problem of controlling the departure of young Moslems to foreign IEIs. To a greater extent, this concerns the private trips of young people to foreign countries.

- The mechanism for sending Russian students to Islamic educational institutions abroad has not been formed.

- The effectiveness of cooperation with foreign IEIs in the preparation of appropriate training programs is low.

- There is no mechanism for mutual recognition of Islamic educational institutions in the Russian Federation and abroad, which is an obstacle to the accreditation and licensing of the IEIs of the Russian Federation.

- Some muftiats have "their own" Islamic universities abroad. The contradictions between the muftis are intensified by foreign Islamic education.

- Graduates of foreign educational institutions have more problems with employment than their peers who received their education in Russia.

- Graduates of foreign Islamic educational institutions in Russia form a different Islamic culture that contradicts the traditional one. The emergence of this culture is developing in terms of conflict, with violations of the law, manifestations of extremism and terrorism.

- "... Even in the well-known Islamic universities" Al-Azhar "(Cairo)," Abu-Nur "(Damascus)," Az-Zaytun "(Tunisia), a Daghestani student may" face the fact that he does not comply with Islamic norms. ... More than 70% of students who return to Russia after studying abroad are unable to perceive the true knowledge of Islam. ... It is important for Russia to start training its own specialists".¹³

The results of sociological surveys. An analysis of scientific and journalistic literature on the problem under discussion shows that researchers have not yet carried out sociological work to identify the reasons for the outflow of young people to foreign

Islamic educational centers, the influence of these centers on the social (religious) behavior of Moslems in Russia.

In the sample structure, young people are represented more than the older generation: 54.8% versus 45.2%. On the whole, this corresponds to the active participation of young people, both in the general processes of the Islamic revival, and their share of participating in the activities of illegal armed groups. These data of the sample correspond to the level of declared religiosity of ethnic Moslems of the republic: youth - 95%; general in Daghestan - 90% (Older generation - about 85%).

Forms (types) of foreign Islamic education in which Daghestanis are involved. The importance of raising such a question is due to the fact that foreign education can be obtained both in a public and private educational institution, and even from a private person. The negative impact of foreign education on social (religious) behavior is rightly associated with the fact that Daghestanis often receive education outside the state system, where there are educational standards determined by the state. And a private organization, especially an individual, as a rule, cannot provide the student with the necessary knowledge, not only in various secular sciences, but also in theological. According to the poll, 48.9% of the respondents received Islamic knowledge in the private sector. Men use this form of education more than women (men - 50.0%; women - 44.4%). At the same time, 36.8% of men studied in a private educational institution, and 13.2% - from a private teacher. None of the women received an education from a private teacher. In general, about half of those leaving for foreign education (51.1%) go to state educational institutions.

How do Moslems of the Republic of Daghestan get to foreign educational centers. The question of how Moslems get into the foreign educational process remains relevant for Russia as a whole in terms of countering extremism and terrorism. Academician E.M. Primakov believed that for the most part they leave abroad at the invitation of fellow countrymen who are

already studying there, and, as a rule, "easily fall under the influence of radicals."¹⁴

According to the poll, less than one third - 28.5% of Daghestanis were sent to education abroad by the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of Daghestan (SAMD) or some other Russian religious organization. Among men, these were 22.5% (women - 53.5%). Quite a significant number of people - 22.4% - received education at the invitation and funding of a foreign educational institution. The highest rates were for the item "it was a private trip" - 38.8%. Men - 42.5%, women - 22.2%. In general, 65% of men leave for other countries in order to obtain Islamic knowledge without the knowledge of any Russian Moslem organization. Only 7.5% of Daghestani men are sent for this kind of training by the SAMD. At the same time, it is the social group of men that is most susceptible to the influence of radical Islamic views.

*Educational level of Daghestanis leaving for foreign Islamic education.*¹⁵ The structure of the sample by education was as follows:

Secular education: Primary education (4th grade) - 6.0%; Secondary education (grades 9-11) - 42.0%; Secondary vocational education - 4.0%; Incomplete higher education (after 3 courses) - 10.0%; Higher education - 38%; Without education - 4%.

Religious education: Reading the Quran - 25.5%; Graduated from maktab - 21.3%; Graduated from madrasah - 14.9%; Graduated from Islamic University - 21.3%; Without education - 17.0%.

It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that groups with 4% without any secular education, and 6% with primary education, falling into private hands, may forever remain people with low secular education. On average in Russia, 0.1% of the population¹⁶ is considered to have no secular education, and this is considered a high indicator for normal adaptation to modern life.

At the same time, it should be noted that in the Islamic educational institutions of the Republic of Daghestan the share of

students with higher secular education is significantly less than among those involved in foreign Islamic education: 8.7% versus 38.0%. In addition, the Daghestanis who go to other countries for Islamic education are much older than those who receive such education in the republic. This suggests that the bulk of students abroad have made a serious independent life choice.

Islamic religious leaders often, in order to warn those heading for a foreign education from extremist ideology, offer to pre-teach them the basics of traditional Islam at home. It is equally important that the traveler be prepared in secular education, which the religious leaders do not like to talk about.

The structure of the religious education of those traveling abroad is no less flawed. "Reading the Quran" (25.5%) and complete absence of Islamic education (17%) make up 42.5%. At best, both of these groups risk years of studying in preparatory courses with the hope of entering a college. At worst, they will take lessons from private individuals, although initially they will need to somehow master the Arabic language. In any case, it is difficult to hope that these 42.5% will be able to receive a high Moslem education in a few years. According to experts, obtaining such an education will require at least 9 years of painstaking work from those who do not know the Arabic language and the foundations of the Islamic religion. And this is long-term socialization in a different socio-cultural environment.

A group of those who graduated from madrasah will also face many problems in terms of entering an Islamic university immediately (14.9%). At the madrasah level, students learn namaz, reading the Arabic text of the Quran, master the basics of the grammar of the Arabic language (sarif), the rules for reading the Quran (tajid), and the basics of the religion. There is no need to talk about any deep knowledge in Daghestan madrasahs. The overwhelming majority of madrasah teachers do not have appropriate methodological training [10, p. 110–111; 11, p. 5].

Reasons for interest in foreign Islamic education: opinions of the respondents. One of the main reasons for the

attractiveness of foreign Islamic education for Daghestanis is “faster and better mastering of the Arabic language.” This is indicated by almost 60% of the respondents' answers. This position is ahead of another – “the lack of highly qualified personnel” in the Daghestan IEI: 49.2%. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to consider the mastery of the Arabic language as the only determining reason for the departure of Daghestanis to study abroad. Arabic is needed not for the sake of mastering desacralized values, but precisely for the sake of Islamic, sacred ones. In this sense, in the total sample, quite large percentages were received not only by the problem of language, the lack of local personnel, but also the reasons for the narrowness of Islamic educational programs in Daghestan, which is that they are concentrated exclusively on mastering knowledge about the Shafi'i maskhab (30.6%), on questions of fiqh (23.5%). That is, interest in foreign education is caused by a number of reasons, the main of which can be ranked in terms of importance in the following order: Arabic, teaching (educational) personnel, educational programs.

One of the proposed answers to the question about the attractiveness of foreign education was its characterization as giving “true knowledge” about Islam. This position was noted by 27.1% of the respondents. According to another survey conducted in Islamic educational institutions of Daghestan in 2016, this figure was 1.6%. This suggests that a Daghestani goes to distant countries for Islamic knowledge, not only, but maybe not so much because there are no conditions in the republic to obtain sufficient knowledge, for example, on Sufism, Shafi'i madhhab. They are interested in other knowledge that, in principle, cannot be obtained in Daghestan, even if the Islamic education system is at a high level in the republic. It has a narrowly confessional content, while a large group of Moslems have a need to go beyond a separate Sunni madhhab, a movement.

In Islamic interfaith discourse, the concept of “true Islam” has a complex and conflicting nature. Salafis and tariqatists have

different interpretations of its content. The question of "true" Islam is one of the most debatable in Islamic interfaith discourse. It is central to the conflict between Salafism and Sufism in modern Islam. The accusation of disbelief (takfir) in Sunni Islam is carried out by the denial of Sunni madhhabs by Salafis and Salafism by Sufis. Wahhabism is one of the manifestations of Salafism, which arose on the basis of the Hanbali madhhab. The answer to the question of which of the respondents focuses on "true" Islam as the reason for the attractiveness of foreign education is associated with their answers to confessional identity.

Confessional identities of Daghestanis who received Islamic education abroad. The confessional composition of the sociological survey sample turned out to be somewhat biased towards Salafism in comparison with the confessional structure of the carriers of Islamic consciousness in Daghestan. In the Islamic confessional structure of Daghestan, given the presence in the republic of Hanafis from among the Nogai and part of the northern Kumyks, there should be about 89% of Shafiites. According to a sociological survey in 2016, 97.6% of the respondents identified themselves as Shafiites in the Islamic educational centers of Daghestan. Among those who studied abroad, 60.8% of the respondents named themselves Shafiites, as can be seen from the data in Table 1.

Table 1
**Distribution of answers to the question:
 "What madhhab do you profess in Islam?"
 Studied in foreign Islamic educational institutions. (at %)**

Madhhabs	Hanafism	Malikism	Shafiism	Hanbalism	Faithy without madhhab	Another madhhab	Cannot say
The proportion of those who got into a random sample from the given madhhab (%)	5,9	2,0	60,8	15,7	15,7	7,8	

According to the table, the Salafism of the sample is determined by the fact that one part of the respondents identifies themselves with the Hanbalites, a Salafi madhhab, the right wing of which is Wahhabism, and the other completely denies any of their madhhab affiliation. According to the point of view of successive Salafis, the Islamic religion should be as it was before the madhhabs, i.e. it should be the religion of righteous ancestors (as-salaf as salihun) who did not divide Islam into madhhabs. Thus, 31.4% of the answers to this question can be considered as having Salafi content. As it turned out, it was these two groups that determined the main composition of those respondents who went to foreign Islamic educational centers in search of knowledge about "true" Islam.

Salafism of these two groups of the survey was revealed in their attitude towards Sufis. 57.1% of the madhhabless think that Sufis are "lost." In the general sample, only 21.7% think so. At the same time, 57.1% of the madhhabless and 85.7% of the Hanbalis in Daghestan consider the moderate Salafis the true Moslems, while only 13.3% of the Shafii are of this opinion.

The high Salafi potential of foreign Islamic education is also manifested in the respondents' answers to the question: "Tell me, please, how do you feel about radical Salafis, or, as they are called in Daghestan, 'Wahhabis' "? The attitude of the respondents to the "Wahhabis" turned out to be more strict, in terms of their recognition as Moslems, than to the "moderate" Salafis. Nevertheless, more than a quarter of the "fundamentalists" show a "good attitude" towards them. There were 22.4% of them in the general sample. In the context of many years of active anti-Wahhabi activity of the state, the Republic of Daghestan still has the Law on the Prohibition of Wahhabi and Other Extremist Activities in the Republic of Daghestan (1999), a powerful anti-Salafi activity of the Tariqa Islam dominating in the republic, this is a high indicator of Salafist sentiments of those studying abroad. If we proceed from the number of 3000 Daghestanis who have studied abroad in recent years, then we would have, with a

representative sample, about 700 such supporters of radical Salafism, who under certain conditions may find themselves in the ranks of the “forest brothers”, ISIS. And in this case, Salafism, through the attitude towards the “Wahhabis”, was to a greater extent manifested by those who consider themselves Hanbalists or madhhabless. “Good attitude” to “Wahhabism” as to the true religion of Moslems was expressed by 57.1% of the Hanbalis and the same number of the madhhabless. Among those who identified themselves as Shafiites, only 10.0% think so.

Among those who called themselves Shafiites, the opportunity to gain knowledge about “true” Islam as the reason for the attractiveness of foreign education was noted by 13.3%. Among the Hanbalis and the madhhabless, this figure is 28.6%.

Only 10.2% of the respondents believe that “a Moslem must follow the laws of the state, even if they contradict Sharia.” Foreign Salafi influence at this point becomes obvious if we pay attention to the active work of foreign scientists in Russia. The World Council of Moslem Scientists (WCMS) in Daghestan headed by its Secretary General, Sheikh, Dr. Muhaddin Ali al-Karadagi in 2013–2014 held two theological conferences in Daghestan. In the materials of the conference, the section “Position of Islam in relation to cooperation with a secular state” Moslems are instructed: “Observance of the laws of the state is mandatory if there is a clear understanding that they do not contradict Sharia ... positive integration and observance of laws that do not contradict the principles of Islamic Sharia, service to the Motherland so that such patriotism does not contradict religious devotion in the framework of achieving the good.”¹⁷ In a republic where there is an “anti-Wahhabi” law, Muhaddin al Qaradagi, at a meeting with young Moslems in Daghestan, says that Muhammad Abdel Wahhab’s main book *Tawhid* “is not extremist or contrary to Islam and does not call for murder.”¹⁸

Main conclusions

1. The denial by some religious and secular leaders of the importance of Islamic education abroad for Russian Moslems does not correspond to the high level of this education, which attracts Russian Moslems. A Russian Moslem travels to distant countries not only for high, but also for other knowledge, which is not taught in Moslem educational institutions of Russia.

2. The content of the foreign education of Moslems includes such components that do not fit into the schemes of traditional Islamic culture of Russian Moslems, and, as a result, contributes to conflicts. First of all, this concerns Salafi and radically Salafi ideas promoted by a number of foreign Islamic educational centers, as evidenced by both the social (religious) behavior of the Daghestanis studying abroad and the results of a sociological survey among them.

3. A negative attitude towards foreign Islamic education is also formed due to the tough inter-confessional competition between official Islam, which is represented by the Sufi Islamic tradition in Daghestan, and the Salafis. The Muftiate of the Republic of Daghestan, for all its efforts, fails to take control of the organization of foreign Islamic education for Daghestanis.

4. Russia needs democratic control over those leaving for Moslem education abroad. The challenge is how to organize it.

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2020.04.003. VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. AZERBAIJAN FOREIGN POLICY // *Condensed Abstract*.

Keywords: foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ayaz Mutalibov, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), Abulfaz Elchibey, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Turanism, Heydar Aliyev, multifaceted policy, «balance policy», study of international relations, Baku State University, ADA University, Center of Strategic Studies.

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In the article of Nasibova A. [1] it is considered the formation of foreign policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan (AR) after getting its independence in 1991. The author analyzes the foreign policy course of the first presidents of the state. Particular attention is paid to the domestic factors that determined the international situation of the country.

The historical events of the late 20th century led to transformation of the existing system of international relations. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact Organization changed the system of international relations that existed for almost half a century. Azerbaijan, the author notes, could quickly build a foreign policy and integrate in the system of international relations. With the adoption in August 1991 of the Declaration on Restoration of State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and in October 1991 of the Constitutional Act, the country embarked on the course of development a foreign policy course based on its national interests - principles of democracy and sovereignty.

Within current system of international relations, the official Baku was supposed to establish a mutually beneficial dialogue, where the national interests of Azerbaijan should not encounter the interests of the states of the world. This was a difficult task for the country's diplomacy, given its vulnerable situation in the region and in the world on the whole. The Republic of Azerbaijan began its way to independence with serious economic and political problems caused by the war with Armenia for Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, in the early periods of independence, Azerbaijan did not actively participate in international affairs. The main task of the new leadership of the country since the end of 1991 was to prevent separatism, nationalism, ensure the territorial integrity and security of the state, strengthen its international positions, and eliminate the socio-economic consequences of the war.

The first president of the RA Ayaz Mutalibov (1991-1992) paid great attention to the country's international activities. During the short period of his presidency, Azerbaijan became a member of a number of regional and international organizations. In December 1991, the state was admitted to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Membership in the OIC helped Azerbaijan strengthen relations with the countries of the Middle East. Adhering to

the principle of multilateral diplomacy, A. Mutalibov was eager to establish mutually beneficial partnership at other political poles. On January 20, 1992, Azerbaijan was admitted to the CSCE, which laid the foundation for the country's European policy. The accession of the RA to the CSCE brought the Nagorno-Karabakh problem to a new international level. At meetings of the organization, they increasingly began to discuss ways to resolve the conflict and stabilize political situation in the South Caucasus. In February 1992, the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center was tasked to take steps to establish a dialogue between the parties of the conflict and civilians of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Thus, the ground was laid for creation of the Minsk Group, which is a mediator in resolving the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict until now.

Following the acceptance of the Declaration of Independence on October 29, 1991, the RA government made an application to the UN requesting the country to join the UN. On March 2, 1992, Azerbaijan was admitted to the UN. Diplomacy pursued specific goals: to strengthen international situation of the RA, consolidate its regional significance, bring the Karabakh issue to the international legal level, restore the territorial integrity of the country and profitably use its geostrategic position. However, all this would not have been possible without establishment of bilateral relations.

Azerbaijan established its first diplomatic contacts with the Republic of Turkey. The factors of interstate rapprochement were ethnic, cultural and historical contacts that have connected countries for centuries. Ankara recognized the sovereignty of Azerbaijan on November 9, 1991. The establishment of diplomatic relations revealed considerable prospects in bilateral relations. In January 1992, Azerbaijani President A. Mutalibov made an official visit to Turkey, during which the countries defined the course for further cooperation and collaboration in various fields. Azerbaijan first received guarantees of military assistance from outside. A country that entered a difficult path of building independence under

conditions of war and economic crisis needed support of its closest stronger neighbor. For Turkey, cooperation with Azerbaijan was also necessary: the country would be able to solve the urgent energy problem, strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, become an intermediary in the dialogue of the West and Azerbaijan and take part in solving problems of ensuring security of the Caucasus.

Having come to power, A. Mutalibov got a young state, which was absorbed by economic and military problems. Since 1989, the Karabakh problem was acute in the country, which was the result of difficult interethnic relations in the region. Against this background, the oppositional Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) pushed for resignation of the country's president. After the tragic events in Khojaly on January 26, 1992 and a series of failures of the Azerbaijani army in Nagorno-Karabakh, A. Mutalibov resigned under the pressure from the APF.

The new president of Azerbaijan was one of the leaders of the APF, Abulfaz Elchibey (1992–1993). He became the first popularly and democratically elected president of the country. The foreign policy course of the new president was radically different from the policy of his predecessor. An ardent nationalist according to his political beliefs, a Turkist and Turanist, he held a course for the building of friendly relations with Western countries and Turkey. Calling them strategic partners, Elchibey declared an unspoken struggle against communism, all remnants of the Soviet past and Iran, which became considered the most dangerous neighbor for Azerbaijan. Elchibey did not conceal his pro-Turkish course in foreign policy.

Pan-Turkism in Azerbaijan's foreign policy created the most favored nation regime for Turkey. In November 1992, a number of agreements were signed between the two countries concerning trade and economic, credit, investment, industrial and technical cooperation. Turkish President T. Ozal spoke more often about Azerbaijan's support in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. In 1992, Ankara first broke off economic relations with Armenia, and in

1993 closed the Turkish-Armenian border. And to date, bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia are almost reduced to nothing.

Under the presidency of A. Elchibey, relations with Iran plunged into crisis. A. Elchibey openly pursued anti-Iranian policy, declaring Iran “an enemy of the entire Muslim and Turkic world.” The reason for such sharp criticism was the impairment of rights and freedoms and cultural discrimination of the population of so-called South Azerbaijan (the northwestern part of modern Iran which borders Azerbaijan), where mainly Turkic peoples live, mostly Azerbaijanis. Instead of diplomatic methods for resolving disagreements with Iran, A. Elchibey called on reunification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan and supported the far-right nationalist party of Iran “Bozkurt” (“Gray Wolves” in Turkish), advocating the separation of South Azerbaijan from Iran.

During the presidency of A. Elchibey, serious damage was caused to the international image of the country. The President's harsh and sometimes contradictory appeals to his neighbors (Armenia, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian region) had led Azerbaijan to diplomatic isolation, and an anti-Azerbaijani coalition of states had formed around the country. All this was accompanied by ethnic separatism, the Karabakh war, attempted military coup and an overdue civil war. As a result, by 1993, Azerbaijani statehood faced a deep crisis and spelling destruction. In summer of 1993, Milli Mejlis brought up a question of trusting the president in a popular referendum. In August, 97.5% of the country's citizens voted to change power and oust A. Elchibey from power.

With the arrival of the new President G. Aliyev (1993–2003), Azerbaijan's foreign policy experienced significant changes. The country embarked on a multifaceted policy and peace-building and stability around state borders. The “balance policy”, which G. Aliyev introduced into political life, established complex goals for Azerbaijan – to eliminate the mistakes made by previous

presidents, to build a new foreign policy course that reflects the strategic interests of the state. The first priority was to resolve the Karabakh problem. During the active diplomatic position of G. Aliyev, through the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group and the CIS Interstate Parliamentary Assembly on May 4, 1994, the Bishkek Protocol on a Ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh Zone was signed. On May 12, 1994, the Ceasefire Agreement between Armenia, the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan, came into force. However, to date, the conflicting parties cannot find consensus on this issue, and regular violations of the ceasefire aggravate the political situation in the South Caucasus.

G. Aliyev strengthened trade and economic relations with Russia. The trend founded by Aliyev the senior was inherited by his son I. Aliyev, who maintains partnership relations with Russia. Another merit of G. Aliyev was that in September 1994 he adopted the "oil strategy" of the country's development, as a result of which a contract was signed with a consortium of foreign companies for the development of oil fields. Thus, Azerbaijan switched over to the course of building mutually beneficial relations with the West. It strengthened the country's authority, contributed to the infusion of foreign investment into the state treasury and improvement of the economic situation on the whole.

The "balance policy" of G. Aliyev covered not only the West. The president understood the need for rapprochement with the Muslim world. In such a situation, the first priority was to stabilize relations with neighboring Iran. The principle of democracy, multi-vector and restraint in the politics of G. Aliyev stabilized the growing conflict between the countries. In 2002, G. Aliyev made an official visit to Tehran. Following the results, 10 documents on bilateral cooperation in the field of customs control, transport, road construction, communications and culture were signed.

Repeated visits of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Turkey are an indicator of the fact that G. Aliyev devoted strategic importance to Ankara in his foreign policy. His statements about brotherhood, national unity, affinity of languages, culture and religion demonstrated that Turkey became not only a political partner in foreign policy for Azerbaijan, but also an integral part of the country's social life.

Foreign policy of Azerbaijan in the first years of independence was built on a religious-ethnic principle. However, such a system, according to the researcher, could not stand up against the test of time, as by the beginning of the 1990s the already formed system of civilized relations required states to build foreign policy on the balance of international actors' interests. From 1993, the country's leadership has been building a foreign policy based on the current realities and national interests of the country. Since that time, Azerbaijan has become a state with a multifaceted foreign policy, which occupies a rightful place in international and regional integration.

M. Agazade [2] examines the history of studying international relations in Azerbaijan. The author emphasizes the key role of universities in the study of international politics and international relations in the republic. The article reveals reasons why it has not yet been possible to create research centers in the RA that could compete with foreign ones on this issue.

After gaining independence in Azerbaijan, special attention began to be paid to the study of international relations as a separate area of humanitarian science. For that purpose, new faculties and departments, as well as research centers, were opened at universities. During the period when Azerbaijan was a part of the Soviet Union, there were no education institutions in the Azerbaijan SSR where disciplines related to international relations could be taught. Hence, there were few Azerbaijani diplomats in the Soviet times. In 1991, after regaining of state independence, there was a dire need for professionals in the

sphere of international relations and diplomats to ensure the participation of the republic in world politics. For this purpose, in 1991, the Faculty of International Relations and International Law was established at Baku State University (BSU), where the Department of International Relations began to function, which went down into history of Azerbaijani science as the first department studying international relations in Azerbaijan. Since 2011, the faculty became known as the Faculty of International Relations and Economics. Currently, the faculty has 6 departments: 1) international relations; 2) diplomacy and modern integration processes; 3) economics and management; 4) the world economy; 5) mathematical economics; 6) political science and sociology.

Despite the fact that there are 51 public and private universities in Azerbaijan, only a few of them teach international relations: ADA University (Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy), Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Baku Slavic University, Khazar University, Azerbaijan University of Languages, Azerbaijan State University of Economics, Nakhichevan State University, West Caspian University and Baku Engineering University.

Among these universities, ADA University is different because of the presence of external relations and experts in the field of international relations. The Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, founded at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 2006, was renamed ADA University in 2014 after merging with the University of Information Technologies of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The main task of the university, in which students and professors from 46 countries study, is to train politicians, diplomats and specialists in the field of foreign policy, public relations, business, information technology.

BSU is the first modern university not only in Azerbaijan, but also in the entire Muslim East. The university was founded in 1919. Education is conducted in three languages - Azerbaijani,

Russian and English. About 1000 foreign students study at the university.

Despite teaching of disciplines on international relations at universities, scientific schools with their leaders have not yet been formed on the basis of Azerbaijani universities. Only ADA University differs from others in its unique system of learning and teaching, the author emphasizes. The main advantages of ADA University are joint training programs with foreign universities and direct support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Besides universities, there are research centers that study international relations and politics. Among them, there is the Center for Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SAM), which had financial support from the authorities. The main goal of the Center, which functioned in 2007–2018, was to promote the development of various spheres of the country's life, including scientific research in the field of geopolitics, security, state building, regional development, as well as providing the highest bodies of state authorities with predictive and analytical information. In January 2019, by decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, SAM's activities were ceased.

To this date, among the main research centers dealing with various problems of international relations in Azerbaijan, there are:

1. Atlas Research Center. Created in 2005 by political scientist E. Shahinoglu. The Center studies regional security issues, including relations with Azerbaijan's closest neighbors and international organizations, monitors the negotiation process for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

2. Center for Caucasian Ethnosocial Studies (QESAM). This center, established in 2006, prepares reports that correspond to the strategic interests of the RA. The Center makes forecasts based on processes taking place in the region and in the world.

3. Global Research Center. The main goal of the centre, established in 2013, was to study the role and place of

Azerbaijan in the world economy and also to convey the RA's point of view on the territorial issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the international community.

4. Karabakh Research Center. The center was founded in 2013 by joint efforts of the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The purpose of the center is to train young specialists to study the problems of Karabakh, as well as to make efforts for peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict.

5. Caspian Energy Research Center. The main activity of the center established at the Khazar University is the study of energy resources of Azerbaijan, monitoring and research of the activities of international energy companies in Azerbaijan. The Center is also engaged in academic and educational activities and is recognized as one of the best independent expert institutes in Azerbaijan.

6. Caucasus Research Center (QAFAM). The center pays priority attention to the study of relations between the countries of the South Caucasus, the preparation of reports within the framework of the interests of the RA and the analysis of possible influence of other countries on the Caucasus region.

7. Caucasian Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies. The center, founded in 2006, is distinguished by the width of its scope of activities. The center attracted the best Azerbaijani specialists who were educated in American and European universities. The center studies not only the Caucasus region, but also Europe, Africa, America, the Middle East, the Far East and Central Asia. Within the framework of the activities of the center, a special place is occupied by the study and analysis of ethnic conflicts.

In general, the main focus of all these centers is the study of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and assistance to the authorities in the information confrontation with Armenia. It should be noted, however, that despite their

links with public authorities, they are not publicly financed, unlike universities, either sponsored by businessmen or self-financed. For this reason, some centers do not even have official websites.

The researcher notes that nowadays the study of international relations and international policy as a science in Azerbaijan significantly remains short of other humanitarian special fields. Nevertheless, thanks to ADA University, in recent years the number of specialists in this field has increased. Despite the fact that the study of international relations is observed in only one university, it gives hope that other higher educational institutions will follow the example of ADA.

Summing up the study of the problems of studying international relations in the RA, the author of the article notes that at present their level in Azerbaijan is in arrearages of the global one. There are several reasons for this. One is that international relations are not studied as science anywhere except universities. The lack of the necessary research and policy centres is therefore another reason for preventing the emergence of rigorous research on the topic. To overcome all these obstacles, new research and policy centres must be established to cooperate with universities, official government bodies, and universities must use global practices to train professionals. Special attention should be also paid to cooperation with foreign universities. Cooperation with Russian universities, which should develop, plays a valuable role in this. Inviting specialists from leading Russian universities to Azerbaijani universities and using their experience can give an impulse to the development of the study of international relations in Azerbaijan, the researcher concludes.

FILIPP ZAKHAROV. MODERN STRATEGY OF “SOFT POWER”
IN UZBEKISTAN // *The article was written for the bulletin “Russia
and the Moslem World.”*

*Keywords: soft power, Uzbekistan,
Sh. Mirziyoyev, I. Karimov, reforms,
integration, regional leader.*

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Abstract. The foreign policy of Uzbekistan has become more dynamic and the country has moved confidently along the path of its interests since Shavkat M. Mirziyoyev came to power. The new President of Uzbekistan has launched an ambitious course to get the Republic the status of a regional leader. Uzbekistan actively uses soft power as one of the tools of its foreign policy. The author analyzes and compares the activities of the previous and current leadership of Uzbekistan in implementing integration processes and extending its influence to other states of the Central Asian region. In the conclusion, the author notes the pronounced course of modern Uzbekistan in interaction not only with the countries of the region, but also with such powers as Russia, China and the United States.

Much has been written and said about the first years of Sh.M. Mirziyoyev as president, which have been identified as the Uzbek “thaw” or “spring”.¹ Sh.M. Mirziyoyev undoubtedly seeks to resolve or soften at least tensions in the region. Basically, these are the constant conflicts of Uzbekistan with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Border controls, strict visa regimes and higher rates on the background of stagnation in the governmental relations – all this has turned the region into a place of relatively weak intra-

regional trade. Moreover, the international prestige of the President of Uzbekistan grew after the organization of a major summit in Tashkent in March 2018, which focused on the development of a roadmap for peace in Afghanistan.²

In addition to striving for external openness, Sh.M. Mirziyoyev also made a lot of efforts for domestic changes: launching political reforms, releasing political prisoners, freedom of speech to journalists, the National Security Service restructuring, and fighting corruption and nepotism. He also took unprecedented steps to liberalize the Uzbek currency – the soum, after the failure of I.A. Karimov in this direction in the late 1990s and early 2000s.³

In addition to internal continuity, the key priorities of foreign policy remain basically the same as before: Sh.M. Mirziyoyev acknowledged his commitment to independence in Uzbekistan's foreign policy, multilateral integration, and rejection of military blocs.⁴

Despite the fact that Sh.M. Mirziyoyev developed broader regional cooperation, it is important to keep in mind that I.A. Karimov also took similar efforts. The first president of Uzbekistan supported the idea of "Turkestan is our common home" and also participated in regional forums designed to promote economic and political integration. I.A. Karimov also sponsored the idea of settling the conflict in Afghanistan, the so-called 6 + 2 initiative.⁵ Consequently, the recent regional conference on Afghanistan, organized by Sh.M. Mirziyoyev, is not a radical departure from the policies of the previous president in the 1990s. The same can be said about Sh.M. Mirziyoyev's attempt to develop regional cooperation.

The commitment of Sh.M. Mirziyoyev's soft power is undoubtedly his new direction,⁶ as some Uzbek analysts emphasize. According to Harvard University scholar D. Nye Jr., soft power makes others want the desired results, since it co-opts people rather than forcing them.⁷ It is about building trust, promoting openness, enhancing the country's authority in the

international arena, this concept has found a receptive audience outside the U.S. It is possible to talk about liberalization, about cooperation in the economic and political spheres within the framework of soft power. The Chinese Communist Party, led by Xi Jinping, remains the main arbiter of change. The executive branch of Uzbekistan continues to be the main catalyst for reform. Sh.M. Mirziyoyev gives priority to dialogue on the need to end confrontation in the region, interstate relations and openness to membership in the World Trade Organization.⁸

Today, Uzbek officials emphasize the need for cooperation with other Central Asian countries in a more friendly tone with all their regional counterparts. Using a soft power tool, they call for joint construction of regional power plants and fair distribution of electricity, thereby reducing the possibility of regional conflicts. Sh.M. Mirziyoyev personally visited many neighboring countries, signed important socio-economic agreements, including agreements on security. Many business leaders accompanied presidential delegations. Tashkent welcomed the participation of representatives of leading international institutions and also major foreign governments in the visits. Sh.M. Mirziyoyev also visited the Russian Federation, China and the United States in order to conclude trade agreements, obtain diplomatic support and maintain a security partnership. The administration's internal reforms are aimed at presenting the country as a more attractive partner for the West, while Uzbekistan continues to deepen economic ties with Russia and China.⁹

Expansion of interaction with foreign partners and international institutions contributes to the improvement of relations between Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors. Recent Uzbek initiatives have led to the creation of new transport infrastructure, economic deregulation to facilitate business, liberalization of control over the national currency, and other market reforms to achieve Uzbekistan's status as a regional transport and investment hub. The new tactics should help Uzbekistan make better use of its natural advantages, such as its

central geographic position in the region. In particular, Uzbekistan has the most profitable strategic position throughout Eurasia for receiving investments from China. The new foreign policy approach of the Uzbek government can also create socio-economic opportunities for its citizens, strengthen the regional capacity to prevent transnational threats, raise Uzbekistan's foreign economic authority outside Central Asia, and help preserve geographical pluralism in the heart of Eurasia, in addition to strengthening old and forming new economic ties.

On the other hand, if the global context changes again so that key international actors, such as the U.S. and the European Union, seek liberal political and economic reforms as harbingers of international participation, this could force Sh.M. Mirziyoyev to spend more material and non-material resources on illiberal executive power protection rather than identifying potential economic cooperation.¹⁰

Asserting the status of a great power in the region, whether it is China, the United States, or Russia, may also force Sh.M. Mirziyoyev to abandon openness. Moscow's attempt to achieve growing multilateral integration in the former Soviet region has raised skepticism in Uzbekistan. In contrast, China has been able to advance its major investment projects, as outlined in the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative, without necessarily contradicting the key concept of Uzbekistan's foreign policy. But even in this case Sh.M. Mirziyoyev will most likely refrain from dependence on one partner. Independence and strong commitment to sovereignty remain the cornerstone of Uzbekistan's foreign policy, and the president is unlikely to compromise on this issue, just like his predecessor.

It should be noted that other countries will also benefit from the processes taking place in the largest country of the Central Asian region. Unlike Afghanistan, which has suffered from the war, prosperous Uzbekistan will become a more reliable partner not only in ensuring regional security, but also as a

source of economic opportunities and greater openness in this closed region.

Thus, since Uzbekistan borders all four Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan), has the largest population, and the second-largest GDP, Since Uzbekistan borders all four republics of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan), has the largest population and the second largest GDP, the willingness to productively interact with neighbors can both move the region forward and deprive the potential of a leader. Uzbekistan's recent initiatives could be a trigger for the renewed role of Central Asia as an independent region.

Central Asia can be not only a geographical name, but also a center of trade, tourism and culture. The goals of President Sh.M. Mirziyoyev to increase GDP by 2 times can be realized if the Central Asian region attracts external investors and political partners, and also participates in such international organizations as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and also under the UN Sustainable Development Goals program. The expansion of Uzbekistan's bilateral relations with the countries of the region and with the major world powers is the result of the "soft power" policy implementation.

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2020.04.004. ELENA DMITRIEVA. THE KEY ROLE OF THE ENERGY-RELATED FACTORS IN CURRENT RUSSIAN-TURKMEN RELATIONS // *Condensed Abstract.*

Keywords: Russia, Turkmenistan, cooperation, regional security, hydrocarbons, energy export, arms import, humanitarian cooperation, cultural exchange.

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1. E. Garbuzarova. Russia in Turkmenistan: the Policy of Strengthening Cooperation* // "Post-Soviet Issues" 2020. Vol. 7. № 1. P. 63-72.

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3. K. Muratshina. Institutional Structure of Russia-Turkmenistan Humanitarian Cooperation* // "Vlast." Moscow. 2020, Vol. 28, № 4, P. 245–252.

E.G. Garbuzarova [1] notes recent revitalization of the Russian-Turkmen relations thanks to the return of the Russian Gazprom to the energy market of Turkmenistan in 2019. Until then, cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan was limited due to the neutral status of Turkmenistan in the international arena, as well as Russia's lack of action in the post-Soviet area throughout the 1990s, owing to its internal political problems. Having received the status of a neutral state in 1995, Turkmenistan sought to distance itself from Russia and avoided any forms of multilateral interaction.

Sustainable economic development of Turkmenistan directly depends on hydrocarbons exports and, therefore, Turkmenistan tries to diversify the routes for the transport of hydrocarbon resources. Since independence, Turkmen authorities have sought to slightly inflate figures for hydrocarbon resources in order to attract foreign capital inflows into the development of oil-gas fields. The country has fourth largest reserves of gas in the world after Russia, Iran and Qatar and actively implements projects proposed by the European Union, China and Iran. The author notes that Russia is one of the transit countries for Turkmen hydrocarbons. Russian-Turkmen relations are primarily governed by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 2002 in

Ashgabat. Also, an agreement was concluded between Russia and Turkmenistan in 2003 on gas supplies to Russia for 25 years.

While analysing the history of relations between the two countries, the author points out to their rather turbulent collaboration in the natural gas industry. The U.S. and the EU ambitions for the Caspian region inspired Russia to develop new projects for cooperation with Turkmenistan in the energy sector, which would strengthen Russia's position on the Caspian. The endeavours resulted in the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project. However, the Turkmen authorities revised their plans for this project and removed Gazprom from the draft, out fear of being heavily dependent on Russia. The 2009–2010 Russia's decision to cutback imports of Turkmen gas and the subsequent suspension of gas imports for over six months led to a decrease in gas production in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen authorities retaliated by actively promoting cooperation with China and Iran in the oil and gas sectors. In 2016, the Russian Gazprom opted to completely abandon gas imports from Turkmenistan, having gradually reduced Turkmen gas purchases over the previous years. The cooperation in the gas sector between the two countries ceased to exist because of disagreements over gas prices.

In 2017, official visit of the President of Russia to Turkmenistan opened up a new stage in cooperation of the two states. During the visit, the leaders discussed not only economic cooperation between the two countries, but also regional security issues associated with the tense situation in Afghanistan. According to the author, Ashgabat views Russia mainly as a driving force for its dynamic economic development and has no interest in developing military and political cooperation with Russia. So far, the authorities of Turkmenistan have handled the emerging tensions on the Turkmen-Afghan border without external support. Security in Central Asia is a priority for Moscow.

Turkmenistan's proposal to join the construction the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI) came

unexpected for Russia, given that Russia had repeatedly expressed its readiness to take part in the project earlier, but the project participants showed no support for the proposal. This is due to the geopolitical nature of the project, which is promoted by the United States in a bid to limit Russia's influence in Central Asia. Russia's joining the TAPI project would aid Russia in both strengthening its role in promoting regional security and increasing its influence in the region. However, there is another gas project that runs counter to Russia's interests in the Caspian region and Central Asia. The project known as the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TKGP) between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan has been in development for decades. Although the construction is protracted, there has been some progress in the implementation of the natural gas pipeline recently. The U.S. and the EU have geopolitical interests in the region and by lobbying this project they offer an anti-Russian project to the Caspian states. Western countries' increased activities in the Caspian region prompted Gazprom to resume the purchase of Turkmen gas.

While in the first years of independence Turkmenistan sought to diversify gas routes to the EU and China bypassing Russia, now Ashgabat is beginning to consider Russia as an alternative to above all China, which in fact has become the main exporter of Turkmen gas. To date, China, in turn, has not demonstrated much engagement in the construction the fourth line of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. It is interesting to note that the total capacity of the current Turkmenistan-China pipeline is designed to transport 55 billion cubic meters of gas per annum, but reaches only 36 billion cubic meters per annum.

According to the researcher, Gazprom's decision to resume Turkmen gas supplies to Russia stemmed from the need to ensure security in the region rather than interest in buying Turkmen gas. At the moment, the authorities of Turkmenistan are not eager to cooperate with Russia on strengthening regional security, relying on their own military force. However, the situation on the border with Afghanistan urges Russia to

strengthen its military and political influence in Central Asia. Both Russia and Turkmenistan are interested in a timely response to the destabilization of the situation on the Afghan-Turkmen border. While Russia has extensive experience in fighting radical extremists and terrorists in the Middle East, Turkmenistan doesn't have such experience. During the presidency of Saparmurat Niyazov it was possible to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Taliban and to make the situation on the Afghan-Turkmen border less tense, but such a scenario is not feasible today. At the point, the authorities of Turkmenistan still lean towards Uzbekistan and refuse to cooperate with Russia in the military sphere. Now, relations between the two states in this sphere are limited only to the purchase of military equipment. The author cites an expert opinion that Russia in fact has no need to purchase gas from Turkmenistan due to cost recovery issues. Also, Turkmen gas was previously supplied to Ukraine, but the supplies have been suspended in recent years. The author comes to the conclusion that Russia's decision to resume the import of Turkmen gas is of a political nature; it was made in order to obtain foreign economic and foreign policy advantages from Turkmenistan. Russia's foreign policy priority in Turkmenistan is to prevent the breakthrough of the Turkmen-Afghan border, where the situation is perpetually unstable. By resuming purchases of Turkmen gas, Russia is counting on the loyalty of the Turkmen leadership in security matters, which implies close coordination of the work of special services, law enforcement agencies and constant exchange of information. Gazprom's return to Turkmenistan may be an answer to two major challenges faced by Russian foreign policy in Central Asia. Firstly, third world countries lose a chance to strengthen their positions in the region and, therefore, the proposed construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline becomes uncertain. Secondly, Russia gets a chance to transport Turkmen gas via Turk Stream, which will reduce transportation costs and allow redirecting gas

from the Yamal Peninsula and Western Siberia fields to Nord Stream 2 and Baltic LNG projects.

The author notes that Turkmenistan continues to distance itself from all post-Soviet integration groupings, which includes Russia and only takes part in the CIS Interstate Council sessions, where Turkmenistan, at his own request, participates as an associate member.

A dual citizenship issue also has a negative impact on relations between Russia and Turkmenistan. The 2008 amendments to the constitution of Turkmenistan prohibit nationals from holding a second citizenship. Thus, dual citizenship of Russia and Turkmenistan is not recognized in the republic. This allows the authorities of Turkmenistan to put pressure on Russia in matters of possible recognition of Russian-speaking population with dual citizenship.

At the same time Turkmenistan is interested in establishing foreign economic ties with the subjects of Russia. Turkmenistan is focused on further cooperation with Tatarstan and the Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Astrakhan, Kostroma, Pskov and Saratov regions. Ashgabat is highly interested in new mining and processing technologies of oil and gas. To this effect, the current president of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow arrived in Tatarstan on a working visit in June 2019. The president got acquainted with state-of-the-art technologies for oil production and oil refining and their adaptation to the conditions of Turkmenistan. At present, Turkmenistan, as before, sticks to multi-vector policy and navigates between the world's centres of power. The existing level of trust between Russia and Turkmenistan hampers the realization of all the opportunities.

Researches E.A. Orlova and O.G. Koval [2] analyse possible competition between Russia and Turkmenistan for energy resources supplies to countries in Asia and especially China. The authors believe that oil and gas export capacity of Turkmenistan should not be underestimated. This is particularly relevant in

connection with the construction of Power of Siberia gas pipeline, aimed at growing gas exports to China.

According to the data of experts, China has been increasingly expanding its military-technical cooperation with Russia's traditional partners in this area, and, above all, with the countries of Central Asia. As for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the import of weapons in these countries is relatively low, and they pay with products considered unimportant for Russia. Turkmenistan, which pays for the weapons with gas, is a different matter. The authors provide statistical data on the foreign trade of Turkmenistan. For example, today, Russia accounts for 20 per cent of the total import of arms in Turkmenistan but is ranked only 3rd after Turkey (36 per cent) and China (27 per cent). Arms purchases from China are carried out mainly with the use of proceeds from gas contracts with Beijing, which is the main importer of Turkmen gas. According to Ashgabat's plans, such cooperation with Beijing includes a significant increase in gas production and export (by 2030, up to 250 billion cubic meters per annum and up to 180 billion cubic meters per annum, respectively). Nevertheless, despite the fact that now about 90 per cent of Turkmen gas is supplied to China, in 2017 the volume of supplied gas barely exceeded 30 billion cubic meters. In 2018, Turkmenistan was ranked 1st biggest gas supplier to China (33.8 billion cubic meters), followed by Australia (23.6 billion cubic meters) and Qatar (10.3 billion cubic meters).

The authors point out, that in the spectrum of Turkmenistan's export commodities in 2018, 80 per cent of exports are products of fuel and energy complex, and gas in particular. It is unlikely that other industries can significantly change the structure of the economy, although tourism in the country is growing steadily.

As for Russia's fuel and energy exports, oil exports stood at 267.5 million tons in 2019. Oil was mainly supplied to China (69.6 million tons making up 26 per cent), Turkey (8.2 million

tons) and Netherlands. Exports of petroleum products to Turkey reached 8 million tons and 7.9 million tons were transported to China. In 2019, the export of natural gas through pipelines amounted to 219.9 billion cubic meters (Turkey purchased 15.1 cubic meters of natural gas). During that period there were no natural gas supplies through pipelines to China, although China did receive small volumes of liquefied gas (1.79 million tons). By 2024, Power of Siberia gas pipeline is expected to transport up to 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China per year. Thus, China will become the second largest consumer of Russian gas in the world after Germany, where Russia exported 58.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russia in 2018. Turkey (24 billion cubic meters) and Italy (22.8 billion cubic meters) are currently ranked second and third largest consumers, respectively.

As can be seen from the above, despite proclaimed diversification policy, Russia plans to boost energy resources exports, both oil and gas. Therefore, the authors of the article suggest analysing whether this scenario is feasible and whether it might cause a conflict with Turkmenistan. After all, Turkmenistan also plans to ramp up the production and export of gas, primarily to China. On matters of transportation, Turkmenistan counts on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) with the capacity of 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Also, there are prospects for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, designed to transit Turkmen energy resources to the EU countries through the Caspian Sea and Transcaucasia. However, Russia and Iran are boycotting the pipelines construction along the Caspian Sea bed. Speaking of bilateral cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan, K.A. Muratshina [3] identifies institutions involved in the interaction between the two countries in the humanitarian sphere. The author shows the importance of humanitarian cooperation, which comprises international

partnerships in such areas as culture, science, education, youth work, sports, tourism, information and mass communications.

The author believes that research on the development of cooperation is closely connected with the understanding of the institutional structure, which can display symmetry (or asymmetry) in relations between states and sustainable cooperation, facilitate analytical work and predict the further prospects of international relations.

Turkmenistan, in a way, is a closed country, and the humanitarian sphere is the least explored field of relations between Russia and Turkmenistan. State institutions of bilateral humanitarian diplomacy include primarily formal contacts at the highest level. Every year, the presidents and government delegations of the two countries hold meetings in bilateral contacts or during CIS summits. Thus, the ministries of culture build ties between specialized organizations within the framework of their subordinate institutions. In a similar way an interaction in the fields of science and education is carried out. For example, cooperation between a number of leading universities of the two countries has been established, namely Moscow State University (MSU) and Turkmen State University, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, the National University of Oil and Gas (Gubkin University) and International Oil and Gas University in Turkmenistan, etc. In addition to higher education institutions, there are ties between secondary education institutions.

Russia is highly interested in developing tourism in the Caspian region; therefore, negotiations on this issue have been particularly intensive in recent years. Tourism is fully under the State's control: there is a list of Russian companies approved for providing tourist services and tourist escort, and routes for tourist groups are also fixed. According to the Federal Tourism Agency, the approval of the Turkmen side was received only in 2019, and

only after that the agreements became concrete. Moreover, diplomatic missions in the two states, namely the Russian embassy in Ashgabat and the consular post in Turkmenbashi, as well as the Turkmen embassy and consular department in Moscow and consulates in Astrakhan and Kazan, regularly organize international activities in humanitarian sphere.

At the same time, Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian country where there is no network of Russian cultural centres. In 2012, then-head of the Russian Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo K. Kosachev said, that the Turkmen authorities do not allow the agency into the country. In 2018 the new head of the department E. Mitrofanova noted, that the agency had to invent a “special format for cultural and information activities” due to the position of Turkmenistan. The reason for this is the sweeping “Turkmenization” policy conducted by Ashgabat, which force ethnic minorities to adopt Turkmen culture. The Turkmen authorities allow very little spread of foreign cultures, despite the fact that Russia is its closest neighbour. Turkmenistan deems Rossotrudnichestvo as a “soft power” instrument, although its purpose is not to impose, but to promote cross-cultural exchange between two neighbouring friendly countries. However, so far only individual projects of Rossotrudnichestvo have been approved.

The author also notes the importance of non-state institutions of cooperation, and the most important one is the diaspora. There is no information in the media or scientific literature on the activities of organized Russian community in Turkmenistan. Most likely, this is due to the State’s full control over society and the “Turkmenization” policy. There is evidence that Turkmenistan actually prohibits the establishment of such public organizations and also tries to gain full control over the Turkmen diaspora in Russia. There is no data on the exact size of the Russian community in Turkmenistan, but it has decreased dramatically following entry restrictions for individuals with dual citizenship. Those Russians who continue to live there represent and promote Russian culture in Turkmenistan.

A survey of several dozen migrants and students from Turkmenistan conducted by the author included question as follows: "In Turkmenistan, have you ever encountered Russian culture somehow?" Two persons questioned replied that they saw Russians celebrate Orthodox holidays. According to the survey, Turkmen learn about Russian culture mainly in Russian language and literature classes at school.

The Turkmen diaspora has structured public organizations in Russian regions; also, in those cities with Turkmen diaspora, multiple festivities and events that celebrate Turkmen culture take place every year. The author identifies international public organizations as another important institution. Under the auspices of the Russian Association for International Cooperation, the Russian-Turkmen Society for Friendship, Cultural and Business Relations and the non-profit partnership "Russian-Turkmen House" operate.

The author concludes that, in general, the humanitarian sphere of Russian-Turkmen relations is rather institutionalized and the majority of the institutions are state-owned. The scope of the opportunities for direct contacts between the communities of the two countries is still small, due to the closed nature of Turkmen society. There is a symmetry at the state level (interaction between the ministries, their subordinate institutions and regional authorities), whereas there is a total asymmetry at the non-state level as a result of Turkmen policy, which bans Russian public structures from actively operating on its territory. The Russian side fully complies with the principles of bilateral relations, which prescribe to ensure "free and equal development of the culture of the Russian minority living on the territory of Turkmenistan and the culture of the Turkmen minority living on the territory of the Russian Federation." The structure of cooperation between the two countries lacks a number of state and non-state institutions typical of Russia's partnerships with other Central Asian countries: in Turkmenistan, Rossotrudnichestvo is not allowed to operate and there are no direct ties between youth associations and continued

interactions between media organizations. The author considers that Russia should preserve and expand bilateral ties that have evolved over decades.

GULSINA KHOSHIMOVA. SPIRITUAL AND MORAL BASIS OF MILITARY CULTURE OF THE ARMY OF UZBEKISTAN // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: military art, spirituality, Islam, national army, military tradition, humanism.

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Citation: Khoshimova G. Spiritual and Moral Basis of Military Culture of the Army of Uzbekistan // Russia and the Moslem World, 2020, № 4 (310), P. 70-74. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2020.04.04

Abstract. This article describes the history of military culture as the spiritual and moral basis of the modern army of Uzbekistan. The role of military culture and traditions in education of military personnel in the spirit of patriotism is revealed.

The providing of effective moral education of military personnel at all historical stages has been and still is an important factor in ensuring national security of the country. The tasks of spiritual and moral education of army soldiers were solved in many ways and means in line with the course of the state personnel policy towards the armed forces.

According to the historical experience of Uzbekistan at the critical stages of development of the Uzbek state, military personnel, as the category of the most professionally trained

service men, were distinguished by patriotism, the state level of thinking, morality, strong will and sense of purpose in solving tasks to strengthen the state's national defense capabilities. The military culture of the national army of Uzbekistan has the same spiritual and moral foundations as the entire national culture of Uzbekistan - this is the original culture of the Uzbek and other peoples living in Uzbekistan. The national idea of independence and unifying around the ideals of our people, drive for internal spiritual self-improvement are the foundations on which Turan, Maverannahr, Uzbekistan and their army grew up. As a result of more than 14 centuries of the influence of Islam, our people have formed high moral principles of selfless service and self-sacrifice in the name of Faith and Homeland, and today a sense of military duty to the Motherland has been preserved.

Prominent Uzbek statesmen and military leaders such as Amir Timur, Sultan Jalalidin Manguberdi, Zahritdin Mohammed Babur perfectly understood the importance of spiritual and moral education of military personnel based on the foundation of Islamic teaching. An analysis of historical, archival and documentary sources indicates that Islam was the fundamental basis for the spiritual and moral education of soldiers in the army of Amir Timur during all periods of its development. Since the religious basis covered all aspects of troops' life, fighting and moral qualities necessary for the warrior were brought up with the help of religion. Being a ruler, Timur, relying on Islam, used the authority of the Muslim clergy to strengthen his autocratic power. It should be noted that Amir Timur attached great importance to the quality of training of military leaders, he demanded in the process of training of young soldiers to explain to them the meaning of the "Quaran," the meaning of the thoughts set out in it, to explain to the students the laws of the state and sharia, and to achieve the perfection of a man in the matter of morality. In addition, Amir Timur sent scientists and teachers to each city for religious education of Muslims, also paying great attention to other sciences (as

academician I. Muminov wrote - mathematics, geometry, engineering sciences, architecture, astronomy, literature, history and music, Amir Timur was a supporter of teaching of geography and he paid special attention to awareness of those countries where he had not been yet) [1].

In consolidating state power, Tamerlan (Amir Timur) attached great importance to improving the army. His military doctrine was clear. Special attention was paid to the selection, arrangement and education of military leaders, the composition and number of military units, their armament. Strict order and severe discipline were everywhere. The first place among many tasks solved by the military clergy was the desire to educate and develop spiritual and moral strength in a warrior, to make him a harmoniously developed person raised on true Islamic values. According to Timur's order, interrogations, revisions and inspections were carried out from time to time. The identified improprieties were severely punished. Sharafuddin Ali Yezdi in the work "Zafarnoma" reports that Timur punished even people closest to him, for example, the son of Miranshah and the grandson of Amirzad Pirmukhammed. When it came to honor, dignity, the interests of the state, Amir Timur, according to Yezdi, did not spare himself, his sons, grandchildren, or relatives. In his state affairs, he remained firm [2].

At the present stage of the development of the national army, spiritual and educational work in the system of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan is organized on the basis of the conceptual idea "Homeland is sacred, its protection is the honorary duty!", defense of independence and territorial integrity of the country is established as the most important task. The basic essence and content of this idea are aimed at the formation of honest, loyal and selfless patriots who do not spare their lives in the fight against the enemy. Enhancement of combat readiness and fighting potential of the troops, strengthening of active life position, development of intellectual potential, cultivation of responsibility for the fate of the Motherland, as well

as strengthening of ideological immunity against ideological and information threats, fulfillment of civil duty and constitutional obligations, forming of a harmoniously developed soldier - this is the main content of the Concept of military-patriotic education of youth [3], designed to ensure the unity of the army and people. Advance of the culture of military service of the national army should be realized on the basis of traditions. In the direction of ideological work, there are organized events that influence consciousness and thinking of military personnel using modern information and propaganda technologies. Measures of educational focus are information activities aimed at increasing the knowledge of military personnel and young people about the national idea and ideology, about ancient and rich culture of Uzbekistan, its history and centuries-old values, strengthening of their scientific, socio-political, spiritual and educational, legal knowledge and intellectual abilities, worldview.

Improvement of military service's culture should be carried out through the formation of consciousness of military personnel and in accordance with the goals and tasks that the Armed Forces currently solve, and on the basis of traditions. We define a number of qualities to increase the level of the officer's military culture, which he needs to work at: the military specialist executive should be distinguished by endurance, professionalism, initiative, awareness of his role in modern war, and the ability to predict events. Talent of an officer is manifested in the leadership, control and management of people, where such qualities as humanity, hard-working nature, tenderness, kindness, patriotism, etc. will be the common basis. [4] According to Yu.A. Panasenko, military administration in the army is a part of military art - as a multifaceted and multi factor phenomenon. A study of the practice of military personnel and officers of the Armed Forces suggests that an increase in the level of military service culture can be achieved in the following ways: analysis of the level of total and professional culture; the formation of positive motivation for the development of a culture of military service;

showing the significance of the culture of military service for the successful realization of military-professional potential; study and promotion of military traditions, which contribute to the formation of military honor, responsibility, a sense of duty, a sustainable interest in their professional activities among officers; encouraging officers to work to improve professional knowledge and skills. An important condition is the presence of character-building bodies with personnel.

Military interaction is currently taking place in different forms. First of all, the combat experience of the wars waged by certain countries is being studied. The military science of highly developed states, the organizational structure of their armed forces, charters are being studied. The best practices are incorporated [4]. The purpose of studying military culture, as well as culture in general, is to acquaint the younger generation with the spiritual heritage concentrated in the works of thinkers, the scientific data, traditions, lifestyle of the people based on the study and teaching of the history of military culture.

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

OLGA BIBIKOVA. TURKEY'S INTERESTS IN IDLIB //
The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."

Keywords: Idlib, jihadists, Hatay, Erdogan, neo-Ottomanism.

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Abstract. The enclave of Idlib has become a battleground for terrorists supported by Ankara, although Erdogan does not stop talking about his peacefulness. In fact, we are talking about an attempt to annex part of the territory of a neighboring state.

The name Idlib dominates the international agenda. Today it is one of the hottest spots on our planet. The end of hostilities in Syria, which has been going on for 10 years, as well as the fate of Syria itself as a state, depends on how soon the situation in Idlib is resolved.

Idlib, the administrative center of the governorate in northwestern Syria, is located in close proximity to the Turkish border. This is not the most economically developed area, there is soap and glass production, olives and many other agricultural

crops are grown. But Idlib is the last major enclave in Syrian territory still under the rule of the armed opposition.

In March 2017, Iran, Turkey and Russia agreed in Astana (Kazakhstan) that Idlib would become a de-escalation zone and set up military observation posts to monitor the observance of the ceasefire by the warring parties. However, from January 2018, fighting resumed.

The current population of Idlib consists of a part of the indigenous Syrians (many of them fled), as well as the various radical groups gathered there, which, while fighting against Assad's troops, are simultaneously sorting out relations among themselves. Having driven out local residents from their homes, the jihadists settled their families there. Since 2011, more than 700,000 people have moved there, fearing reprisals from the regime for the participation of their family members in the anti-government rebellion. By the way, it was Damascus that provided transport for their transportation within the framework of the evacuation agreements concluded between the Syrian government and armed opposition groups. Others sought refuge there, having lost their homes as a result of the fighting in the territories closest to Idlib. Thus, the population of Idlib has reached 2.5 million people, including a large number of displaced persons from other parts of the country living in camps and dependent on aid from terrorist sponsors.

Turkey, fearing a new flow of refugees, closed its border along Idlib back in July 2017. It was then that the armed opposition group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) seized the province, what resulted in a temporary suspension of humanitarian aid. In the northern part of Idlib, close to the border, several camps have been set up, where the largest number of displaced persons were concentrated. In many camps, access to food and water is limited, and it is cold in winter. Many schools have closed due to lack of funds, leaving children without education. There were also problems with

medical services: some doctors working in Khan Sheikhun hospitals were kidnapped.

Western media, which traditionally blame the Syrian tragedy on its President B. Assad and Russia, nevertheless report that refugee camps have witnessed raids and arrests organized by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which thus forced Syrian men to enter their ranks.

Two more or less numerically equal groups are concentrated in Idlib: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian wing of the former Al-Qaeda, and the National Liberation Front (NLF), a coalition created by Turkey to unite all opponents of HTS, ranging from remnants of the Free Syrian Army and ending with the Nuraddin al-Zinga Brigade¹ and Ahrar al-Sham², supported by Turkey. These formations were reinforced by thousands of other militants expelled from Aleppo,

Guta, Daraa and Rastan, where the rebels were defeated by government forces.

There are also Uighurs - Moslems, immigrants from China³, who believed the ISIS propaganda and by roundabout ways - through neighboring countries - moved with their families (!) To Syria, under the wing of jihadists. Having moved "to the land of the caliphate," they have established themselves as brave warriors, but due to their loyalty to ISIS, they are poorly integrated into the new situation in Idlib. Later, the ranks of Idlib militants were replenished with militants of the Ansar al-Tawhid group, associated with al-Qaeda⁴ banned in Russia.

In total, about ten groups are concentrated here, which are internally divided into dozens of more or less independent brigades. In the fall of 2017, clashes broke out between the HTU and the pro-Turkish rebels.

By the spring of 2018, HTS secured the north of the Idlib enclave, the provincial capital and territory along the Turkish-Syrian border. The jihadists assumed that from there they would be able to control the northwestern part of Syria and the strategic M5 road connecting Damascus and Aleppo, the industrial capital

of Syria. In addition, “leaning” against the Turkish border, they believed that in this way they can always find refuge in this country.

Turkey, supporting the National Liberation Front, seeks to weaken HTS, but does not want to enter into direct confrontation.⁵ According to French political scientists, Ankara tried in vain to get HTS to break with jihadist ideology and return to the National Liberation Front: in this way, it could have exerted long-term pressure on Damascus, making the Idlib region a Turkish protectorate north of Aleppo. In this case most of Idlib could have entered the projected buffer zone on the Syrian-Turkish border. However, the exclusive presence of HTS north of Idlib calls into question the existence of this buffer zone.⁶

However, they did not take into account that it is extremely important for Syria to protect the port city of Latakia (which Turkey had sights on at the dawn of the 20th century, during the formation of the Syrian-Turkish border), as well as the Russian bases of Khmeimim and Tartus. Therefore, after the victory of the troops loyal to the Syrian government in the area on Dera'a, the Idlib area became one of the last areas in Syria still controlled by the rebels.

In December 2019, 4 days before the outbreak of hostilities, government forces managed to liberate up to 40 settlements in Idlib, previously controlled by militants of the Jabhat al-Nusra terrorist group banned in Russia. The advance of the Syrian army towards Maarat An-Numan has caused undisguised alarm in Ankara. A high-ranking delegation was sent to Moscow, and Erdogan, speaking in Istanbul on December 22, said that: “Turkey is making every possible effort to end the attacks on Idlib ...”.⁷

Finally, at the end of January 2020, with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, it was possible to liberate the strategically important city of Maarat An-Numan in the southeast of Idlib province. Maarat An-Numan is an ancient Syrian city, which was mentioned back in the 9th century. In 2011, it was

seized by the rebels and changed hands during 2011–2012. In particular, after the Free Syrian Army militants formed a coalition with Islamic extremist groups from Al-Qaeda (former Al-Qaeda in Iraq) and the Islamic State, they were able to take this city. The “13th Division” settled there, later it was defeated by terrorists of the HTS coalition, who became the real rulers of the city. And the remnants of the Division became part of the pro-Turkish coalition Syrian National Army. It is characteristic that when the city finally came under the control of government forces, many weapons, including those of Western origin, fell into the hands of the Syrians.⁸ This indicated that a massive offensive was being prepared from which the territories neighboring Idlib, including the cities of Aleppo and Hama, could suffer.

Syria insists on the unconditional withdrawal of Turkish troops from the territory of Idlib. In turn, Ankara, referring to alleged obligations to fulfill the “Sochi agreements”, is trying in every possible way to prevent the offensive actions of the Syrian army, caused by reasons of self-defense, although in Astana it was recognized that the Syrian government troops have the right and even the obligation to liberate their national territory from terrorists. An analysis of the actions of the Turkish side shows that “the Turkish leaders simply did not make any efforts and do not intend to comply with the provisions of the Sochi memorandum and seeks to take all measures in order to maintain control over this territory.”⁹

The question arises: why Erdogan latch on the Idlib enclave so eagerly? Let us consider first the momentary reasons. Firstly, a large number of militants really concentrated here, which can still be used against the hated by Turkish leader B. Assad, although at negotiations with Putin Erdogan always speaks out in defense of the civilian population, etc. But in this case these militants must be fed, equipped, as well as reconciled among themselves, etc.

Secondly, the events in Syria were not useless for Ankara. The whole world knows how the Turks pumped oil from the Syrian fields Khuryet-Ist, Yuzevie and South Kishma,¹⁰ exported

equipment from the factories and factories of Aleppo, the industrial capital of Syria. Under the pretext of helping the "unfortunate Syrian refugees," Turkey sent over a million migrants of various ethnic origins to Europe. As it turned out, there were less than a quarter of the Syrians, and the bulk of the Syrians were transported already at the end of this refugee stream, as if to justify the name "Syrian refugees." Witnesses reported that the day before, people appeared in refugee camps in Turkey urging the Syrians to "go to Europe." In fact, Ankara did not really care about the fate of those who lived in these camps. However, young women and girls were taken from there to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, where they joined the local harems. And the brothel industry has in Turkey has grown in fact. Until now, little is known about how organs were removed from refugee camps, but that did take place...

Thirdly, Turkey is tolerant towards the terrorist rabble gathered in Idlib. It is not going to expel the Mujahideen. Some of them have already been sent to Libya, where, as it turned out, Erdogan also has interests. As reported by the London-based Human Rights Observatory, "... at the end of January, Turkey sent 1,750 people to Libya. Another 1,500 militants are being trained in Turkish camps. Mercenaries were recruited in Afrin and other settlements occupied by the Turkish army during Euphrates Shield operation.¹¹ There is another place where militants can be useful - Turkish Kurdistan. By resettling them there, you can dilute the local population disloyal to Ankara. As for the locals living in Idlib, the militants use them as a shield in combat operations or recruit new fighters among them.

But there are also geostrategic tasks that Ankara wants to implement through Idlib. Sultan Erdogan hides his goals behind lofty words about humanism. These goals were outlined by former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (2014-2016) in his book "Strategic Depth. Turkey's international position".¹² A. Davutoglu is considered one of the most educated and intelligent statesmen in Turkey, which hardly appealed to

Erdogan, who dismissed him, although the policy that Erdogan is pursuing today is largely motivated by the provisions of A. Davutoglu's book. And although the author himself rejects the term "neo-Ottomanism", the book outlines a strategy for turning Turkey into a world power by restoring relations with the countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire as provinces.

As noted by the Belarusian researcher G.N. Mikhalkovich, "According to A. Davutoglu," strategic depth "means that Turkish diplomacy should proceed from the fact that modern interstate borders in foreign policy are of much less importance than the deep historical and cultural roots of Turkey. Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia. Such an approach presupposes the establishment of dialogue and mutual understanding with formerly warring countries (the principle of "zero problems with neighbors"), strengthening of economic interdependence, and the establishment of regular multi-level intercultural communications. It should be borne in mind that Turkey itself combines many regional identities. There are more Azerbaijanis in the country than in Azerbaijan, there are more citizens of Albanian origin than in Albania, there are more Bosnians than in Bosnia, and there are more Kurds than in Iraqi Kurdistan. This reality, according to A. Davutoglu, means that violence and instability in the immediate vicinity of Turkey threaten to spread in Turkey itself, regional external conflicts can destroy the country from within."¹³

Thus, the author explains the need to change foreign policy priorities (by abandoning the focus on Europe), and the prospects for Turkey's becoming a world power. This is what constitutes the basis of Turkey's new foreign policy pursued by its President Erdogan.

Syria, which from 1517 to 1918 (i.e. 400 years!) was a part of the Ottoman Empire, is the closest state to Turkey. The events that have shaken this country for 10 years are, from the point of

view of Ankara, a convenient excuse to return Syria to its zone of influence.

Let me also remind you that at the dawn of Syrian independence, Turkey managed to "bite off" a tidbit from the territory of Syria - Iskanderun / Alexandretta vilayet, located near the sea (Iskanderun Bay).¹⁴ This happened after the given territory, according to the decisions of the conference in San Remo (1920), came under French control. A year later, the Alexandretta sanjak was separated into a special autonomous administrative unit within the French Mandate. The population living there was mixed: Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Turks. Due to the strategic position of this territory, Turkey refused to recognize the Alexandretta sanjak as part of the French mandated territory of Syria. But the French mandate was limited and had to end in 1935. By that date, the Turkish government headed by Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) had developed a whole program of measures that were supposed to contribute to the unification of Iskanderun with Turkey. The Armenian population was massively intimidated, and, remembering the atrocities of the genocide period, began to leave the area. From 1925 Iskanderun became an autonomous sanjak within Syria. In the middle of 1938, elections to the Legislative Assembly of Hatay sanjak (in Turkey since 1936 it has been called Hatay) were organized, according to which 22 out of 40 seats were won by Turks, 9 by Arabs-Alawites, 5 by Armenians, 2 by Sunni Arabs and 2 by Orthodox Arabs.¹⁵ Such figures were obtained due to the fact that shortly before the elections, a census was carried out in the sanjak, as a result of which the Turkish population was in the majority. Later, it became known that the census was falsified: the names of residents of neighboring Turkish cities were included in the lists.¹⁶ Following the behests of the recently deceased President Kemal Ataturk, Iskanderun sanjak was annexed by Turkey (06/29/1939). For the world community, this event passed almost unnoticed. Europe was preparing for war, and Syria was too weak to be heard in the League of Nations.

So, in addition to a huge territory – 5678 km², the area of which is twice the territory of Luxembourg, Turkey received a convenient port, because the sanjak occupied a strategic position on the coast of the Iskanderun Bay of the Mediterranean Sea. There are also ferrous metallurgy enterprises there.

Turkey also received the ancient city of Antioch, founded in the 4th century BC by Seleucus I Nicator, one of the generals of Alexander the Great, who received Syria under his control when dividing the heritage of the great commander. Since 64 AD e. the city became the seat of the governor of the Roman province of Syria. Antioch was the fourth largest city in the Roman Empire after Rome, Ephesus and Alexandria, and the second largest city in the Eastern Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire after Constantinople. Later, Antioch was called the cradle of Christian theology. Today it is the provincial town of Antakya, famous for its beaches. Naturally, Ataturk did not fight for Christian shrines...

Analyzing Ankara's behavior in the light of the Sochi agreements, it seems that Erdogan sees in them only the points which may correspond to his plans for the future of Idlib. As A. Areshev notes, "Ankara's interpretation of the above-mentioned agreements was initially radically different from what it was imagined in Moscow. If not control over this entire country, which for centuries has been part of the Ottoman Empire, then the occupation of at least its northern regions is directly conditioned by the Turkish strategic culture and centuries-old political practice."¹⁷

The former intelligence chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ismail Hakkı Pekin, spoke about the same in the article published on April 9, 2020 in the newspaper "Eny Akit". He said with a high degree of confidence that the rule of Bashar al-Assad will end in June, and Syria will either be divided or become a federation or confederation. "It is very important that the region west of the Euphrates, including Idlib and Aleppo, called the Republic of Aleppo, is ruled by Turkish-controlled

forces.”¹⁸ By the way, the newspaper in which he published his “message to the world” adheres to the right-wing views, focusing on the Justice and Development Party. At one time, it published a condolence to the family of Osama bin Laden, as well as several articles against Kemalism, although a law was passed in Turkey that does not allow questioning the ideas of the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.

It is easy to be convinced that the ideas of neo-Ottomanism are quite popular today among the power structures in Turkey. Dan Bielefsky, in his article “Disappointed in the West, Turks Dream of Past Greatness,” writes: “Longing for the days of past glory – and this is felt by both Moslems and secularists – partly reflects Turks’ vexation at the European Union, which, apparently, does not want to accept them into its ranks.

He quotes Ilber Ortayli, a Turkish historian and former director of the Top-Kapı Museum: “Turks are attracted by the heroism and glory of the Ottoman past because it belongs to them.”¹⁹

It is clear that Ankara’s actions in Syria are part of a long-term expansionist “neo-Ottoman” strategy. Erdogan’s appetites today are fueled by historically motivated revanchism.

However, Ankara will go beyond the capture of Idlib. Erdogan needs the coastal strip of Syria in connection with the discovery of an oil and gas field on the shelf. Turkey has already joined the struggle for energy resources in this region through the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, as well as by signing an agreement on the division of zones of the Eastern Mediterranean with Libya. That is why, declaring its commitment to peace, Turkey is flooding the region with its troops in support of the jihadists.

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ELENA DMITRIEVA. ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IN MODERN IRAQ // *The review was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Iraq, powers of the state, administrative corruption, fight against corruption, Anti-corruption court, developing countries.

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Abstract. The problem of administrative corruption, as an integral part of corruption in general, has become especially urgent in modern Iraq. In recent decades, the level of corruption in all spheres of Iraqi society has increased significantly. The authors of the articles consider certain aspects and overall situation with administrative corruption in Iraq, investigate the causes of its occurrence and propose measures to combat this phenomenon.

Introduction

From the legislative point of view, the concept of "administrative corruption" is considered as a fraudulent misrepresentation of the established process of implementing existing laws, in order to provide benefits to interested parties. Administrative corruption, as an integral part of corruption in general, is a global phenomenon that poses a threat to the socio-economic life of society and administrative activities of any state. This negative phenomenon, which firmly came into vital problems of many countries of the world, is a cause for concern and requires development of appropriate effective measures to counter it at the legislative and executive levels.

The growing level of administrative corruption in Iraq is one of the most pressing problems today, as it poses a real threat to the socio-economic and political situation in the country, destroys the economic and financial fundamentals of the Iraqi state and negatively affects its business reputation in the world community. Despite the fact that the origins of corruption in Iraq recede into the past, over the past decade its level has increased markedly, it has penetrated into all spheres of public life and politics of the country (administrative bodies, political parties, the army, etc.). If the authorities do not take any measures to combat this negative phenomenon, then Iraq will not be able to regain its authority and position in the Middle East in the future.

Causes and characteristics of administrative corruption in Iraq

Corruption in Iraq has a long history and references to it can be found in the sources of Sumerian civilization. Already in those days, there was phenomenon of the use of power and public office to receive bribes and there were indicated penalties for such acts, from fines to death penalty. Omar Huskhiyar Mohammed Ali in the article "The content of the phenomenon of

administrative corruption in the law of the Republic of Iraq" [1], examining the historical, political, socio-economic conditions of corruption in Iraq, notes that in the history of the country this phenomenon was especially widespread during the period of Ottoman and British occupation. During the period of monarchist rule in Iraq, the authorities' policy led to establishment of the principles of nepotism, to religious discrimination against people, which contributed to the growth of corruption among high-ranking government officials.

The author of the article draws particular attention to the fact that in the last decade of the twentieth century, the corruption network entangled all Iraqi state institutions. Due to the decline in income, the devaluation of the Iraqi dinar, the inhabitants of the country were forced to use all the savings to satisfy their vital requirements. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore other reasons that brought forward the aggravation of corruption - this is an implementation of projects that were not socially useful and did not have economic benefits by the authorities. Such projects include construction of palaces, river delimitation projects, creation of lakes, etc., which led only to Iraqi debts growth, a decline in public incomes, general social unrest, crisis phenomena in society and a simultaneous increase in corruption practices among civil service workers.

As for Iraq's reputation in terms of administrative corruption, the author assesses it as not the best and makes disappointing conclusions: administrative corruption persists and covers a network of judicial authorities, security ministries, and service sector.

Speaking about consequences of corruption, the author notes that corruption can give impetus to revolutions and uprisings that have recently been gaining strength: a wave of protests and riots in the Arab world (the so-called "Arab Spring") was held under the slogan of the fight against corruption. A number of researchers, based on an analysis of recent events, concluded that the main causes of administrative corruption in

the sphere of Islamic law are in the existing political system, chaos and instability in countries, as well as in ineffectiveness of control systems peculiar to totalitarian regimes. Such control dominated all aspects of citizens' lives, but did not protect against corruption.

A detailed analysis of the causes of administrative corruption in Iraq is dedicated to an article by Omar Huskhiyar Mohammed Ali "The causes and conditions for the existence of administrative corruption in the Republic of Iraq" [2]. The author shows that the causes of administrative corruption vary from one society to another, depending on existing cultures and values. A study of the phenomenon of corruption shows that it is related to the degree of economic and social development of society and is more actively spreading in developing countries and countries that are shifting from one political and economic system to another. Weak resources of the country, putting of major assets for sale, low wages lead to corruption, especially among high-ranking officials, since officials in this process usually have large powers, which creates conditions for corruption and illegal earnings.

According to the author, the main causes of administrative corruption can be presented in the form of the following blocks.

1. The reasons of political nature are general deviations related to the rules of government in the state, including a lack of freedoms and democratic system, as well as an information vacuum, insufficient control and not well-established relations between the administration and the public. Political reasons are based on the absence of a stable and effective political system. Weakness of the highest political authority is the reason for weakness of the competent regulating agencies (police, prosecution offices, courts) in detecting corruption and ineffectiveness of these activities.

2. Legal reasons are perversion of laws and regulations due to ambiguity or inconsistency, which leads to deviation from the implementation of the law by law enforcement officers seeking to obtain financial benefits illegally. These causes create a legal

vacuum. Legal grounds are also the result of contradiction of legislation at the level of the center and regions.

3. Economic reasons are impromptu economic policy and poor distribution of wealth, resources and income, or the burden of government without proper control by the authorities, that leads to a violation of equitable distribution of wealth among people, wherefore the funds are concentrated in a small group of people.

4. Social reasons are a set of consequences and circumstances that surround the actor and force him to show antisocial behavior. They are: effects of war and related nihilistic behavior in society; spread of poverty, lack of culture, morality and moral guides; gap between national values and rules adopted in the state's administrative bodies, which are often borrowed from foreign systems, and are different from national values.

5. Administrative reasons are lack of publicity, "transparency" in administrative work in decision-making by the authorities, redundancy of administrative functions; low efficiency of internal and external control over the activities of management bodies and their officials; imperfection of direct communication and feedback mechanisms between citizens and authorities.

Summarizing the above information, there is no doubt that administrative corruption is a dangerous phenomenon that threatens the national security of any state. Identification, prevention and suppression of administrative corruption require joint efforts of executive, legislative and judicial bodies, especially law enforcement agencies, which, in their work, should ensure blocking an elimination of the above reasons and factors which generate administrative corruption.

The author of the article believes that in order to determine measures to counter administrative corruption, it is important to clearly frame a term of this phenomenon, and a clear scientific terminology definition is necessary. Thus, in social terms, corruption means a violation of social norms from the point of view of public interest, or from an economic point of view.

Psychologists defined corruption as an imbalance in the system of personality and society, leading to a deviation of behavior in a corresponding system. According to the World Bank, corruption is the use of a public function to achieve special benefits or to misappropriate a public office, that is, an official, for personal advantage. Corruption is also defined as investment in public services, forcing auditors to pay part of the money or gifts in kind to an employee to execute their operations. Another trend is that corruption is not limited to abuse of public powers in public sector, but is widespread in private sector and in civil society institutions. Administrative corruption can also be defined as deviation from the legal duties laid on a public official and following personal interests rather than public ones.

The author considers all the above definitions of administrative corruption insufficiently complete and proposes his version of such a definition as a set of illegal actions committed by a public servant for the purpose of benefiting himself or others, which cause damage to public and private interests [1].

Implementation of anti-corruption strategies in Iraq created for developing countries.

In today's world, there are theories that describe corruption processes in developing countries. They can be useful in understanding the mechanisms for the emergence and spread of corruption in Iraq. This topic is devoted to the article by I.G. Davydenko and S.F.R. Rida "Adaptation of anti-corruption practices of developing countries to the environment of the Republic of Iraq" [3]. The authors systematized various anti-corruption strategies (applied in countries such as Singapore, Chile), which have high adaptational potential for application to socio-economic and political conditions in Iraq.

On the basis of the analysis, the authors distinguish the following theories:

- "Ethical" theory considers corruption only as moral and ethical standards and points at the need to train such qualities in order to eradicate corruption;

- Functional structural theory sees the cause of corruption in excessive bureaucratic procedures;

- The theory of functional modernization considers corruption as a developmental disease that takes place during the transition of a country from the category of developing countries to industrial ones;

- The theory of dependence is based on the fact that the global capitalist system baulks progress in developing countries by imposing corruptive practices that allow to realize its interests and exercise political and economic control through a national-political ruling elite, designed to prevent the crystallization of the views of the broad masses on the existing economic and social reality.

Examining the experience of developing countries in combating corruption practices, the authors emphasize five institutional strategies that, if applied comprehensively, have proven their effectiveness in Singapore and Chile.

1. Raising salaries of public servants and improving the system of payment in the public sector.

2. Publicly available information on government spending. Possibility for citizens to study the financial activities of the government.

3. Reducing the bureaucratic component. Simplification of obtaining different permissions and registrations.

4. Improving the international legal framework to deter corruption in the context of globalization.

5. Applying information and digital technologies in relations between officials and citizens. Using the Internet has proved effective in reduction of corruption.

At the same time, the authors note that the reviewed mechanisms implemented in developing countries are not subject to accurate copying and distribution for the purpose of forming

an anti-corruption model in Iraq. The described experience allows us to distinguish two public-political aspects in Iraq: preventing and combating corruption. Education and social security policies are also relevant to Iraq as anti-corruption measures nowadays. In Iraq, they admit as an effective measure the need of advance of wages of government officials by implementing social programs to ensure a high standard of living for civil servants, which is a deterrent measure for corruption. Taking into account the experience of a number of developing countries, Iraq is implementing the practice of simplifying administrative procedures, limiting the number of documents necessary for obtaining public services, and digitalization of the public sector is a deterrent, in particular, the introduction of electronic payment systems as an alternative to the direct receiving of fines and fees. Procedures and results of administrative contracts are published on the Internet in the electronic business center. Iraq it is provided criminal liability for corruption related offences.

Conclusion

Summarizing the above, it's to be noted that administrative corruption is a dangerous phenomenon that threatens the national security of any state. The identification, prevention and suppression of administrative corruption requires joint efforts of the executive, legislative and judicial bodies and, above all, law enforcement agencies, which must promptly block the causes of administrative corruption.

There is a necessity to eliminate conflicts of function, that is, situations where state and municipal bodies simultaneously supervise, control and provide services.

It is important to regulate clearly the procedures of state regulation and deprive officials of the opportunity to arbitrarily interpret laws and make decisions, to depersonalize the interaction of public officers with citizens and organizations.

In the latter, only the development of digitalization of all spheres of Iraqi society will help defeat administrative corruption as a phenomenon. The study of the experience of the public services sector through distant information technologies let the Iraqi authorities use digitalization as an effective tool to reduce economic corruption.

Foreign anti-corruption experience deserves careful study in order to borrow and transfer anti-corruption strategies to local conditions, which have shown high effectiveness, but it is necessary to take into account the real situation and traditions of Iraq in order to get support and approval of the residents of the country. As a result of the analysis of anti-corruption strategies applied in developing countries of the world, it can be said that for the Republic of Iraq social (public sector payment system), state-administrative (system of permissive and prohibitive procedures in business sector) and state-legal (system of criminal sanctions for corruption crimes) factors of anti-corruption policy formation are relevant.

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DARIA PANARINA. MORO – A DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE PHILIPPINES: ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the problem of the Moro – Moslem minority in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. The author provides a brief historical overview of the internal conflict between the Philippine government and Moslem separatists and analyzes the latest attempt by the state to resolve this conflict through the formation of the Bangsamoro autonomy (BAARM).

Islam is the youngest world religion, and partly because of this factor, and partly because of its specificity, it has a great influence and is actively spreading in different parts of the world. The ideas and role of Islam in the internal situation and politics of countries where a sufficient number of Moslems live cannot be ignored. And if in some countries Islam is just gaining strength, in others it is part of the historically formed social picture, since Moslems settled in these countries in the Middle Ages.

A prime example in this regard are the Philippines, an island nation in the Southeast Asia region, a country spread over 7000 islands (2000 inhabited). The largest island, called Mindanao, in the southern part of the archipelago, became the habitat of Moslems in pre-colonial times.

Moro in the Philippines – political and social aspects

The peoples who inhabited the southern part of the Philippine archipelago adopted Islam from Malaysia and Indonesia even before the arrival of the Spaniards, around the 13th century. In the 15th century on the Sulu archipelago there arose the first sultanate, in the first quarter of the 16th century sultanates appeared in Mindanao. The sultanates exercised control over the southern part of Mindanao until the colonial conquest of the Philippines by the Spaniards, from which the local Islamic population received the name "Moro" (Moors).¹ It should be noted, that throughout the history of the Philippine state, the Moros were a separate community, which was to some extent a threat. It is indicative that the Moro themselves have never recognized and still do not recognize the Philippines as their country, hence the very symbolic name Moro, which Filipino Moslems themselves use in everyday life, identifying themselves as a separate people, but not as Filipinos.

Despite the fact that resistance to the existing Moro government in the Philippines was shown throughout the history of the country, their protests took a particularly active and threatening form starting in the 1920s, at the time when the Philippines was still actually a U.S. colony. It is important to note that one of the factors that triggered the process of a more active (initially peaceful, but eventually turned into an armed phase) struggle was the policy of the United States, which, in an attempt to assimilate the Moslem population of Mindanao and "include" it into the society of the rest of the country, incorporate it into "Western world" with its values and norms that are different from Moslem ones, encouraged the active settlement of Mindanao by Filipinos in every possible way. This process implied the seizure of "primordially" Moslem lands from the local population in favor of new settlers, which certainly could not but cause discontent on the part of the Moro. Let's say a few words about the demographic picture in Mindanao before the

start of the massive population of the island by the Filipinos and today.

Mindanao, as well as Sulu and Palawan, have historically served as home to more than 30 ethnic groups, 13 of which are the Moslems we know collectively as Moro. In modern realities, 3 main categories of the population of Mindanao can be distinguished, namely: 1) Moro (Moslems); 2) Filipinos (Catholic Christians); 3) the Lumad (non-Moslem and non-Catholic indigenous tribes). At the same time, the Moslem population in Mindanao numbers only about 20% and they do not live on the territory of the entire island, but in 5 provinces: Magindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tavi-Tavi, as well as in the municipalities of Katabato, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte and Davao del Sur. In addition, there is a fairly high concentration of Moslems in the Kudarat Sultanate, South Katabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Palawan. Another 5% of the island's population is lumad, while the remaining 75% are Filipinos, who mostly moved here from the island of Luzon and the Visayas.

It is interesting how each of the three categories of the population on the island sees the current conflict in Mindanao. It is significant that the Moro consider the Christian population the source of all their troubles, i.e. Filipinos - they both helped the Spaniards in the fight against local Moslems, and took their ancestral lands from them, and were constantly fighting the Moslems, and are still fighting. It is the Filipinos who, in the eyes of the Moro, are the main obstacle on their way to self-determination. Of course, this is not an objective and balanced opinion, taking into account all the accompanying factors, but rather a general idea that is very tenacious in the minds of the Moslem population of Mindanao. For their part, Filipinos, forced to live side by side with the Moro, in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, describe their Moslem "neighbors" as traitors, kidnappers, land invaders, terrorists, belligerent and troublesome people. There is a lack of any mutual understanding or attempts to achieve it on both sides, and, according to the author's humble

conviction, in this case, the attitude of the Filipinos can be considered a consequence of the Moro's initial hostility and their refusal to integrate into Filipino society at any levels. Finally, the Lumad hold the position that the Moro and the Filipinos are equally guilty of the conflict that has developed in Mindanao, and they consider themselves to be victims of both peoples, since both the Moro and the Filipinos seized "their"² lands and actually forced the Lumad to move to the mountains.

Considering all of the above, the Philippine government is facing a difficult task that still requires a solution: to achieve peace and prosperity on the island, which should become a full-fledged part of the Philippines and Philippine society and contribute to the development and modernization of the country (Mindanao has fertile land and many minerals, but the region itself is underdeveloped and is one of the poorest in the country in terms of living standards), as well as resolve the internal conflict between different representatives of the population of Mindanao. In addition, it should not be forgotten that achieving peace and security in this region of the country is indisputably important for maintaining balance and security in the Southeast Asia region as a whole, given the fact that the Filipino Moros are also part of the larger Moslem world.

Each Filipino president made attempts to smooth out and resolve the conflict in Mindanao by creating autonomy on the territory of the above-mentioned areas of the island, which would allow the Moro to preserve their values, way of life, and, finally, gain the opportunity for self-determination, and the Philippine government does not lose a certain part of its state territory³ and get the opportunity to fully develop an economically promising region without regard to the need for constant security.

If on the part of the Filipinos the government of the country acts as the agent of the peace process in this situation, then on the part of the Moro it is the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), created in the mid-1970s by two leaders – Nur Misuari

and Salamat Hashim. The manifesto of this organization, in particular, reads:

“We, the five million oppressed people of Bangsamoro, wanting to free ourselves from the terror, oppression and tyranny of Philippine colonialism, which has caused untold suffering and calamity for us by criminally usurping our lands, threatening Islam by completely desecrating its places of worship and its Holy Scriptures, and killing our innocent brothers , sisters and people in a genocidal campaign of appalling proportions ... Striving to have the sole prerogative to determine and establish our national destiny in accordance with our own free will, to secure our future and the future of our children ... we hereby declare the formation of the Republic of Bangsamoro.” (MNLF, Manifesto, April 28, 1974).⁴

The MNLF became the first official organization in the Philippines whose leaders were inclined towards radical separatism and were initially not ready to enter into negotiations with the Philippine government. However, their position changed over time, which, on the one hand, led to a process of discussion of autonomy and attempts to actually organize it, and on the other hand, provoked the stratification of the organization itself, from which former supporters began to split off. They formed into independent organizations of more radical separatists, and the main and largest such organization is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In 1977, the MILF formulated the following reasons for separating from the MNLF:

1. The leadership of the MNLF was manipulated, led away from the foundations of Islam, methodologies, goals, as a result, the MNLF rapidly evolved in the direction of Marxist-Maoist ideology.
2. The Central Committee has become a mysterious, closed, secretive and monolithic body, whose policies, plans and decisions - political, financial or strategic - become the exclusive prerogative of Chairman Nur Misuari.

3. The secretive, one-man and arrogant policies of the MNLF leadership group have led to confusion, suspicion and frustration among the members of the organization.

The division of the MNLF into two independent organizations with different goals also led to the fact that they "divided" the Bangsamoro territory among themselves too. For example, the MNLF under the leadership of Nur Misuari found support among the Tausug people in western Mindanao in the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan. Hashim Salamat, who became the leader of the MILF, has won over the Magindanao people of the provinces of Magindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga.⁵ Thus, in Mindanao there developed two strong organizations, from which smaller paramilitary groups subsequently split off, whose goals and methods were fully consistent with the concept of militant jihad, and whose actions in no way contributed to the successful resolution of the conflict. Omitting the description of numerous attempts to create autonomy, which have been repeatedly considered by other authors⁶, I would like to focus on the most recent "version" of autonomy in Mindanao, which is the result of the work of the current administration of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte.

After decades of war, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Moslem Mindanao (BARMM) is the latest attempt by Manila and the Moro rebels embodied in MILF to find a formula for self-determination for the region within the Philippine state. The new autonomy is the result of the 2014 peace agreement and is based on the Bangsamoro Organic Law, ratified by a referendum in early 2019.⁷ The new project seeks to correct the shortcomings of the previous project for the creation of an Autonomous Region in Moslem Mindanao (ARMM), which was deemed a "failed experiment." BAARM is currently governed by the Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA), which counts 79 members. The MILF leads the transitional government and holds the majority of the BTA seats.⁸

However, this does not mean that the MILF has full power in the BAARM, since there, as in the entire territory of the Philippines, clan influence are very strong. In the case of Bangsamoro, the provinces and municipalities are mainly ruled by clans. Thus, the political dynasties of Mindanao still remain an influential force in the local political arena. Until regional and municipal elections in May 2022, MILFs and local clans will share spheres of influence with varying degrees of success. The elections are intended to put an end to the peacekeeping process in Mindanao, so it is fundamentally important that the former separatists and local political clans⁹ can find a balance in the separation of forces, which would preserve the possibility of their peaceful coexistence within the government of the Bangsamoro autonomy.

Political clans in Mindanao are increasing their power and influence by maintaining order and security in the region with the help of private military police (each clan has its own police), gaining by this the favor of the population, as well as using the opportunity to push their candidates to government bodies as parliamentarians. They also use financial methods to strengthen their position, buying votes for themselves among the electorate or providing services and rewards to those who are ready to support them. Having reached a sufficient level of political influence, such clans draw from state resources and distribute the benefits obtained in the region in order to strengthen their position in politics, social sphere and business. Part of the responsibility for the difficult situation in the region lies with the clans, due to the fact that conflicts between them also constantly flare up, the so-called *ridos*, the reason for which may be a redistribution of influence, a struggle for power, revenge, insulted clan honor, etc. These conflicts are often resolved by the clans themselves with the use of their own “armies” (private police), including by violent methods, and are poorly regulated by the state. These phenomena also destabilize the already unstable and insecure situation in the region.¹⁰

The Bangsamoro Transitional Authority (BTA) serves as an interim parliament and exercises the legislative function in Bangsamoro until 2022. This body was formed in February 2019 and has 79 members - 41 appointed by the MILF and 38 by the Philippine government. They include representatives from all categories of the population of Mindanao, thus reflecting the interests of women, youth, Christians, indigenous peoples, former Moslem separatists, traditional politicians and clan leaders.

The main task of the BTA is to complete the creation of the legislative framework that will form the basis of future autonomy by 2022. In addition, the BTA must prepare a platform for elections in 2022. The following system is planned: the Bangsamoro parliament should consist of 80 members, of which half will be elected by party lists, 40% from constituencies and another 10% from demographic groups such as women, Christians, youth.¹¹ Such a system will help redistribute (directly during elections) the percentage of influence between political parties, candidates from which will be included in electoral lists and political clans that will nominate their people through constituencies.

At the same time, the MILF, which largely assumes the role of a "governing body" in the BAARM, faces a difficult task, on the one hand, to minimize the possibility of conflicts with political clans, which naturally requires the latter to retain a rather significant role, and on the other hand ensure "moral governance" on the territory of Bangsamoro, which implies improving life in the region (and, first of all, the development of the service sector) and will require the MILF to strengthen, centralize its power, and, consequently, limit the influence of clans. Finding a balance between these diametrically opposite poles means truly achieving a position in Bangsamoro that can be called a successful experience in creating autonomy and conclusion of the peace process.

Moro as a threat to the security of the region: a militarized society

Another important problem in the Mindanao region is the need to ensure and maintain security both on the island as a whole and in the BAARM in particular.

The Moro is a largely militant people, and therefore the presence of numerous scattered paramilitary groups among the Moslems of Bangsamoro is a typical phenomenon for the region. Against the background of the struggle for the right to self-determination and independence in opposition to the government of the country, such groups look "justified", and the delays of the Philippine official authorities in the course of the peace process, constant "rollbacks", lengthy discussions of all nuances, including in the Senate, only inflame jihadist sentiments among the already dissatisfied Moslem population, thus strengthening the position of armed groups not involved in the peacekeeping process. Several such groups have declared their loyalty to ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014 and 2015.

Local militant groups have always had a strong bond with separatists and Islamists outside the Philippines. Since the late 1980s the MNLF and later the MILF have provided support to Moslems of foreign origin, who took refuge in the Philippines in Bangsamoro, for one reason or another. However, loyalty to the Islamic State (an organization banned on the territory of the Russian Federation) and the support it provides to the Filipino Moslems (also accompanied by the implantation of the ideas of jihad) is a given fact of relatively recent times. According to a report by the Crisis Group, the existence of armed Islamist groups in the Philippines so far boils down to the following:

"Islamic State (Eastern Region), an alliance of groups associated with ISIS, which was formed at the end of 2015 with the aim of creating an ISIS wilaya (province) in Mindanao. It united militant groups dominated by three of the largest ethnolinguistic groups in Moslem Mindanao: the Abu Sayyaf

faction, consisting mainly of Tausugs and a number of Yakans; the Maute group in Lanao del Sur, represented mainly by the Maranaos people; and the Bangsamoro faction of Islamic freedom fighters dominated by Magindanaans.”¹² The leaders of all three groups swore oaths of loyalty to the leader of ISIS¹³, they formally support the idea of complete independence of the Moro from the Philippines and categorically reject the very possibility of a peacekeeping process and the need to negotiate with the country's government. In fact, they only recognize the military method of interacting with the official authorities, and, as the events of three years ago showed, they are militarily prepared and organized much better than Manila imagined.

We are talking about the siege of the city of Marawi, the capital of the province of Lanao del Sur, which began at the end of May 2017, a conflict that entailed extreme measures by the presidential administration - the introduction of martial law in Mindanao - and led to 5 months ¹⁴ of armed clashes in an attempt to liberate the city and at least temporarily stabilize the situation in the region.

Do not forget about the eagerness with which Moslem youth join the ranks of the armed formations in Mindanao for trivial reasons: this gives them the opportunity to “find their place”, to feel their importance and to partly provide relative welfare and help their families, to feel like heroes. This also complicates the situation as new militants, “fresh blood” appear all the time in the military groupings.

In this context, the so-called normalization and disarmament processes that are necessary to create and maintain peace in the region will be a challenge for MILF and will likely take a long time to be fully implemented. First of all, disarmament will affect the Islamic armed forces of Bangsamoro, that is, the military formations of the MILF itself. In addition, the normalization process presupposes socio-economic development, measures to ensure justice and dispute management systems

during the transition period, as well as building confidence in the entire process among the population.

The greatest difficulties, as expected, will be caused precisely by the disarmament process, and there are many reasons for this. In practice, the armed forces of the MILF should be disbanded, disarmed, and thus a significant number of men will find themselves "freewheeling", who will need to somehow arrange their lives, including looking for other ways to earn money and support their families. This process involves 4 stages. The first stage - the surrender of 75 weapons and the return to civilian life of 145 MILF militants took place in 2015. The second stage - the removal of 30% of militants from the armed formations - was to take place after the signing of the Organic Law of Bangsamoro. MILF submitted a list of 12,000 militants for consideration by the disarmament body in March this year. It is planned that by November the process of their disarmament and disbandment will be completed. The last two stages are expected to be completed by 2022 - to withdraw another 35% of the militants from their groups (third stage), and then the remaining number (fourth stage).

According to forecasts, the militants themselves are unlikely to accept this state of affairs without resistance, since their weapons are a guarantee of their own security in the territory of Mindanao, where armed clashes at the level of clans and smaller groups flourish. In addition, as mentioned above, having lost their place in the armed formations, former militants will have to look for sources of income in the civilian environment, and, as the practice of the first phase of disarmament shows, the measures taken by the government to support these people may not be sufficient.¹⁵ Thus, the first 145 demobilized militants and their entourage were dissatisfied with the socio-economic measures of the government.¹⁶ In this connection, the MILF now expects that the presidential administration will take the necessary steps to adjust the social package, including using the help of foreign partners, and that

the results will be felt by the next phase of disarmament. For their part, officials say that scholarships will be offered to fighters and their families for training in civilian occupations, and support payments of 100,000 pesos (\$ 1,925) in cash per person are planned for fighters.¹⁷

It seems doubtful that these measures were sufficient and had the desired effect, however, how exactly the situation will develop will show time. At this stage, BAARM seems to be the most successful option for autonomy, especially in comparison with all the previous attempts of the Philippine government to resolve this conflict.

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ANDREY BELINSKY. SHADOW OF ANKARA SPREAD OVER THE SPREE. RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN'S POLICY TOWARDS THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN GERMANY // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: R.T. Erdogan, Turkish community, FRG, AKP, DITIB.

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Abstract. The article examines the politics of R.T. Erdogan in relation to the Turkish community of Germany. It is noted that since his coming to power in 2003, Turkey has begun to intensify its activity in relation to compatriots living in the FRG. The main directions of the new policy are the preservation of Turkish identity, political control over the diaspora and suppression of dissidents.

The appearance of Turkish warships on the Greek sea shelf, the support of the Libyan Government of National Accord and military operations in Syria and Iraq once again confirmed the thesis repeatedly voiced by politicians and experts - since the coming to power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2003, the interests of the Turkish Republic have gone far beyond limits of Asia Minor. The three-million-strong Turkish community of the FRG, numerical, economic and political potential of which has acquired considerable importance for elaborating the external and internal political course of official Ankara, is in the zone of special attention of the country's new elite.

Its formation was initiated by an agreement concluded in 1961 between Germany and Turkey, which opened the floodgates

for labor migration from Central and Eastern Anatolia, literally suffocating from overpopulation. Initially viewed by both sides as a temporary, purely economic phenomenon, migration has since become a constant variable in relations between the two countries, and Turkish eateries and shops with small interspersing of mosque minarets have become an integral part of the landscape of West German cities.

It would not be entirely correct to say that in the 1960s-1980s the Turkish government did not pay due attention to compatriots living in the FRG. However, its main efforts were directed primarily at protecting the economic interests of its citizens and providing them with access to the social system. The political significance of the dynamically developing Turkish community was viewed mainly through the prism of the struggle against left-wing radical and Kurdish activists.

Since the mid-1980s, Ankara has become aware of the growing importance of the Turkish community living in Europe¹, as evidenced by a number of steps in this direction. "Firstly," notes Y. Aydin, an expert at the Berlin Science and Politics Foundation, "the Turkish government has ingrained the practice of coordinated protection of interests in relation to the respective resident countries, communes or local state institutions. Secondly, now it mobilized Turkish citizens abroad in situations that affected "national interests" and tried to use migrants in its struggle against Islamist, Kurdish-nationalist and left-wing radical groups ..." ².

However, a qualitative shift in the policy towards the Turkish diaspora of the FRG took place after the victory of the conservative Islamic Justice and Development Party (Turk. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) in the parliamentary elections in 2003 and the election of R.T. Erdogan for the post of Prime Minister. This shift was due to at least two factors. First, by this time the Turkish community of the FRG had become a significant factor, both from a political and economic point of view. So, according to the data of the same Y. Aydin for 2014, half of Turkish

entrepreneurs in Western Europe (70,000) lived in the Federal Republic of Germany. The fact that about 1.4 million Turks have the right to participate in the elections cannot be disregarded, which in itself is an important factor in the internal political struggle. Secondly, since the AKP came to power in the Turkish establishment, the concept of "neo-Ottomanism" has gradually become established, the core of which has become an active (and in some places quite aggressive) foreign policy in those regions that were once under the rule of the Sublime Port. If in the first years of Erdogan's tenure in power, the country's foreign policy was guided by the principle of "Zero problems with neighbors" put forward by Ahmet Davutoglu, and the question of joining the European Union was seriously discussed at the highest level, then the rapid economic growth, fueled by the ambitions of the Turkish leader, led to a change in the political course; from now on, Turkey must regain its former position in the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans.³ In these ambitious plans, the Turkish community of the FRG was assigned one of the key roles. So, what specific goals did the Turkish leadership pursue in relation to their compatriots?

The primary task of Ankara was to maintain by all available means the national and religious identity of the Turkish community of the FRG. The loss of culture or the complete assimilation of the Turks living in the FRG were not included in the plans of R.T. Erdogan and the AKP, not only for ideological reasons, but also because they would deprive them of an important instrument for achieving domestic and foreign policy goals. The importance of the top officials of Turkey attached to the preservation of the cultural and religious values of their compatriots can be judged from the speech of R.T. Erdogan, delivered in 2008 in front of 16,000 supporters in Cologne. In the speech of the Turkish leader, words were heard, the meaning of which should not cause any doubts among either the audience or an outside observer: "I well understand your sensitivity when it comes to assimilation. No one can expect you to accept

assimilation. No one can expect you to assimilate. Assimilation is a crime against humanity.”⁴ These words caused a storm of indignation among German politicians, complicating the already difficult relations between Berlin and Ankara.

The Turkish prime minister’s declaration was not just a figure of speech or an attempt to score political points in the future election race. Back in 1984, with the active participation of the authorities of the Turkish Republic, the “Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Institutions” (DITIB) was created, designed not only to satisfy the spiritual thirst of the Turks living far from their homeland, but also to strengthen the influence of the authorities on the Turkish community of the FRG. Thus, the candidacies of all imams of DITIB were approved by the Council for Religious Affairs under the Turkish government, and funding came directly from the state treasury. With the AKP coming to power, the number of mosques controlled by DITIB reached 900, and it gradually turned from an organization loyal to the Turkish authorities into “Erdogan’s long arm.” Providing a platform for the Turkish leader’s speeches, actually participating in the election campaign, or spreading conservative ideology among believers – all this actually turns DITIB into a German branch of the ruling AKP.

However, the Turkish government seeks to exert influence not only through DITIB, but also through other organizations. In particular, in 2007, with the direct support of Ankara, the Yunus Emre Institute (Turk. Yunus Emre Enstitüsü). Organized on the model of the Goethe Institute and the Confucius Institute, it was to become an effective instrument of “soft power” and a conductor of Turkish foreign policy abroad.⁵ Along with creating a positive image of the country, the Yunus Emre Institute supports language and culture through the organization of language courses, and also provides financial support to students in Turkey. But, as in the case of DITIB, the institute also performs a number of unofficial functions, that are entirely in the wake of Turkish foreign policy. “In the multi-lingual magazine “t.r.”,

published by the Institute, in the Turkish-English issue of January / February 2017 – notes the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung – there appears an article titled “Turks brought freedom to Europe”. [...]. Afyondzhu⁶ (author of the article – A. B.) describes how in the 16th century Protestants found refuge in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire.⁷ As we can see, the Yunus Emre Institute sometimes acts not only as a popularizer of the Turkish language and culture, but also as a propaganda mouthpiece for the ruling AKP.

In addition to such official institutions as DITIB and Yunus Emre Institute Ankara also actively works as representatives of civil society, as evidenced, for example, by close cooperation of the AKP and the biker club “Osmanen Germania BC”. According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, three club leaders, former club president Mehmet B., former vice-president S. Selcuk and head of the Stuttgart branch, Levent U, have been in contact with representatives of the Union of Turkish-German Democrats, the AKP’s foreign affiliate. The subject of the negotiations was probably the financial support of the club in exchange for performing a number of tasks for Ankara (political agitation, surveillance or intimidation of political opponents, etc.).⁸

The network of official and private organizations, religious institutions and interest clubs, which is widely spread over the Turkish diaspora of the FRG, gives the ruling circles of Turkey the opportunity to mobilize supporters to achieve their external and internal political goals. Preparations for a referendum on amendments to the Turkish Constitution, which were supposed to turn the country into a presidential republic, became a showcase of all pro-Erdogan forces in the FRG.

DITIB, the Union of Turkish-German Democrats and other organizations actively campaigned for their adoption. Such foreign policy steps of Turkey as the military operation in Syria against the Kurds were also accompanied by a noisy propaganda “chorus” conducted from the shores of the Bosphorus. “After the

entry of the Turkish army into Syria, the Office of Religious Affairs (Turk. Diyanet) called to pray in mosques for the victory of Turkey. Subsequently, in the mosques that are part of DITIB, videos were shown showing preschool children in military uniform⁹. Actions of this kind inevitably arouse criticism and alarm from the side of German politicians and the press.

Ankara connects certain hopes with the more active participation of the German Turks in the political life of the FRG. "Why shouldn't we have burgomasters in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and other European countries? Why shouldn't we have representatives or groups in political parties?"¹⁰ – asked the Turkish prime minister in Cologne. It is with the political activity of the Turkish community that Erdogan and the AKP link the improvement of Turkey's image and the strengthening of their negotiating positions. And although currently there are members of the German Bundestag with Turkish roots, not all of them support Erdogan's policy.

However, a much greater cause for concern in the eyes of Berlin is undoubtedly the activities of the Turkish special services on the territory of the FRG. As noted above, espionage on political opponents of the government (Kurdish activists, members of left-wing parties) also took place in the 1980s and 1990s, but after an unsuccessful attempt at a military coup in July 2016, the situation changed radically. The ensuing reprisal against the putschists began to rapidly ratchet up repressions, the victims of which were thousands of obvious and imaginary supporters of the opposition preacher F. Gulen, journalists, teachers and officials. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Turkish community of the FRG, among the members of which there were many critics of the regime, came under the scrutiny of the MIT (National Intelligence Organization of Turkey) intelligence service. As it was noted in the report by the German Federal Service for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany of 2019: "The presence of a large Turkish community and a large number of organizations, as well as diplomatic missions creates a

fertile ground for the activities of MIT."¹¹ For well-known reasons, in a public report, German counterintelligence officers did not indicate either the number of agents or their specific operations. However, intelligence expert E. Schmidt - Eenboom, citing his sources, believes that the number of MIT informants in the Turkish community can reach at least 6,000 people who work "... at tourist bureaus, Turkish Airlines, banks, mosques and other institutions."¹²

The following two facts are the most eloquent evidence of the recent intensification of the activity of the Turkish special services. So back in 2014, the prosecutor's office accused three MIT agents of monitoring Kurds and Yezidis. The fact that one of the defendants was Mohammed Taha Gergerlioglu, Erdogan's former adviser,¹³ made the situation especially piquant. Alinal Ozül, a young Turk, who was forced to move to Germany in 2016 because of his family's affiliation with the Gulen sect, was also caught in the crosshairs of the reconnaissance. Once in the small town of Wolfhagen, he visited a mosque where he hoped to receive support. However, the local imam, having learned about the political motives for the migration, began to threaten him and demanded that the young man immediately register at the embassy. He was subsequently attacked by several members of the local community¹⁴. Both of these cases clearly demonstrate how much the Turkish diaspora of the FRG is "shone through" by the special services and how strong the influence of Erdogan is¹⁵.

Based on control and close work with various organizations, espionage and threats, skilful propaganda and generous financial assistance, the policy of the Turkish authorities towards the diaspora has borne certain fruit. In parliamentary and presidential elections, the ruling AKP gained more votes among the Turks living in Germany than in Turkey itself. So in the June 2018 elections, the AKP received 42.56% in Turkey, while in Germany it managed to collect a truly rich harvest of 56.3%¹⁶.

It is obvious that the policy of the ruling elite in relation to the Turkish diaspora creates preconditions for numerous conflicts with the official authorities of the FRG. In November 2016, deputies of the Bundestag from the Left Party sent a request to the government regarding the activities of the Turkish special services on the territory of Germany. The document cited numerous facts of MIT surveillance of German citizens of Turkish origin. However, official Berlin prefers to keep diplomatic silence for the time being, preferring to once again exacerbate the already difficult relations with Turkey.

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- 15. In this case the activities of MIT may not be limited only to spying on the political opponents of the regime. The mysterious murder of three activists of the Kurdish Workers' Party in January 2013 in Paris and the kidnapping of Gülen supporters around the world by Turkish special services are direct confirmation of this.
- 16. This support of the domestic and foreign policy of R.T. Erdogan and the AKP on the part of a significant part of the diaspora is explained not only by the effective work of the Turkish authorities, but also by a number of other factors. First, the majority of those living in Germany are from Central and Eastern Anatolia. Conservative attitudes and high religiosity ultimately determine their sympathy for the AKP. Secondly, the lack of integration into German society and the feeling of national vulnerability among many German Turks create fertile ground for Erdogan's nationalist rhetoric, and in their eyes the Turkish president is turning into the "father of the nation", the defender of its interests. Thirdly, representatives of the diaspora do not directly face Turkey's internal problems (depreciation of the national currency, repression, etc.), which determines rather high sympathy for the Turkish president.

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

KRISTINA YUNITSKAYA. SPECIFICITY OF ISLAMIC MARKETING // *The article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Islam, marketing, Islamic marketing, Sharia, Islamic values, Islamic economy.

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Abstract. Islamic market is rapidly developing, has good prospects, but is not sufficiently explored. Its potential is connected to the growing demand for goods and services under Sharia laws, which is an impetus for emergence and development of Islamic marketing. Urgent character of the article lies in the need for scientific understanding of the marketing aspects of Islamic markets.

The very definition "marketing" comes from English and is translated as "market trade." Philip Kotler, the father of modern marketing, presents it as a type of human activity aimed at meeting needs and requirements through exchange.

To achieve good results in marketing, it is necessary to take into account such a factor as religion, because consumers' preferences and tastes are also based on religious characteristics.

The most numerous religion - Christianity does not impose any restrictions on the consumption of goods and services. But here is the second largest religion - Islam has some features and requires a certain type of marketing activity. Many believe that Islamic marketing does not exist in theory, since it is only being produced. However, it definitely exists in practice.

Recently, the Muslim world has been one of the main consumers. For 2019, there are more than 1.9 billion Muslims in the world, which is about 25% of the total population. Muslims are a huge audience of consumers who have their own specific requirements and requests for goods and services related to the norms and traditions of Islam.

Definitely, all Muslim countries cannot be considered as entire, because they are all at different levels of development. Each country has its own school of Muslim law and operates in accordance with its laws. There are 4 such schools (madhhab) in the world: Hanafi, Malikite, Shafiite, Hanbalite. They all differ in degree of liberality. This article provides examples that are typical of the first school - the most conservative and strict. Representatives of this school are intolerant of any innovations. The Hanbalite school is official in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as representatives of this school live in the United Arab Emirates, Oman and other Gulf countries.

Inclusion of Islamic countries in world trade makes them adapt ancient sharia norms to global standards and modern conditions.

Religion directly affects sales of products or service, as it is closely related to people's lives. In the Muslim world, religion has a primary influence on the behavior of buyers and business dealing in general. Therefore, a certain specificity of marketing in such regions has been developed.

All the norms that should be followed by every Muslim, including legal, ethical, material and religious, are enshrined in the Sharia. It is the Sharia that determines all human activity of Muslims, including trade.

The history of trade in Islam originates from the Prophet Muhammad, who was related to commerce and accompanied caravans from Mecca to neighboring countries. Sharia norms regulate banking, business, economics, politics, contracting and other vital function of people. All Muslims are obliged to follow these standards during business or marketing activities. In Sharia, trade is defined as an activity that can improve everyday lives of other Muslims. So, such an activity is not prohibited, but even welcomed and regarded as a virtuous act. Nevertheless, in order to conduct business, Muslims must abide by all the restrictions and prohibitions prescribed by religion.

According to Muslim traditions, advertising must comply with certain rules: advertising, including the logo that will be used in Islamic states, must be adapted to local cultural and religious values and traditions, translated into Arabic script. Moreover, companies planning to enter Islamic markets should translate their names into Arabic.

Islamic marketing prohibits trade in substances that may be harmful to health, especially, there is a ban on drugs, cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. Also, according to Islamic laws, dogs and pigs trading is prohibited, since these animals are recognized as unclean. In Islam, there is a ban on sale of musical instruments, as well as meat of animals killed not by the Sharia. In Islamic culture there are a number of unacceptable associations prohibited for use. This includes manifestations of supernatural power, which in Islam can be considered as equating with the Most High. For example, words such as "create" or "the greatest" have a special religious orientation and should refer only to the Most High. Thus, the use of these words in a different context is prohibited.

In Islamic marketing, it is considered unacceptable to show the body of a person and it is forbidden to use such a marketing tool in advertising, but it is allowed to show skin on the face, hands and feet.

The media in Islamic States were subject to strict censorship, and the covers of magazines and newspapers also fall under scrutiny and changes, if necessary. Participation of women in advertising is minimized, this applies to the use of photos or videos in advertising. Now some such prohibitions can be got around using pixelization - digital processing, which reduces the image resolution or part of it, or the use of sunglasses. All people who participate in films or advertisements should be dressed.

Trade also has its own rules and it is carried out in accordance with Sharia rules, that is, the principles of honesty must be used, and the consumer must openly provide information about goods or service.

In Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, there are fatwas - conclusions of an authoritative Muslim figure - prohibiting network marketing if it is a pyramid. Network marketing, as well as multi-level one, is the implementation of products or services based on the construction of a distribution network, which in turn is engaged in attracting partners to its network company. This prohibition is applied in respect of payment of bonuses and commission expenditures formed at the cost of lower-level contributions.

The reasons for ban on network marketing in Islam are the following.

Firstly, transactions in network marketing are regarded as uncertain, because the participant does not know in advance whether this event will be successful and will realize a profit, that means they are banned by Islam.

Secondly, transactions of this kind lead to the consumption of funds by other participants in this system, which may be unfair. And in the Quaran it is written that trade should be carried out only by mutual agreement.

Thus, the minimum requirements of Sharia will be satisfied by a network marketing company that meets the following requirements:

1. There is a real sale of a product or service. The product must be competitive and also meet the needs of a Muslim.
2. The paid fee should be transparent and clear.
3. There is a ban on using any pyramid scheme.

Today, there is a huge number of different marketing tools in the world. And Islamic marketing has also found its place and is the main way to promote products and services in the Muslim world. Marketing research, branding (the process of forming brand image) and merchandising (determines the method of sales in stores) are now increasingly popular. All these instruments contribute to the successful promotion of goods and services in the Muslim market, but their actions are limited by Sharia law. Companies operating in such markets and using Islamic marketing principles successfully meet the needs of their consumers and explore new market segments to expand their business activities. Islamic marketing has its own mentality, which harmonizes with the emotional, cultural and value guidelines and customs of Muslim countries. Such marketing is distinguished by a high degree of customer centricity.

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2020.04.005. KONSTANTIN SIMONOV. RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS FOR MODERN SPORTS // *Materials of the International scientific and practical conference "Innovative Processes in the National Economy and Socio-Humanitarian Sphere", January 31, 2018, edited by E. Tkacheva. Belgorod, 2018. P. 157–160.*

Keywords: religion, religious influence, Islam and physical culture, sport, ritual.

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The author examines the connection of religious doctrines of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism with physical culture and sports. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the usefulness and necessity of the physical training are not denied by any one of them. The desire to win the competition, to become the best, to improve ourselves does not contradict any religious postulates. The power of sports as well as the power of religion is to teach us respect for certain rules of order and responsibility, and thus creates an internal harmony that combines the beauty of body and spirit.

These days, watching various competitions, we are increasingly witnessing athletes turning to God, sincerely praying for victory, according to their religious beliefs to support their mental state. A solemn, sometimes even ritual, appeal to God before responsible starts has become almost a tradition and part of the competition scenario.

It should be emphasized that both the current and the past successes of Muslim athletes are not accidental. Firstly, physical training in no way contradicts the canons of Islam (even the Taliban, known for their commitment to traditional Islam, supported the development of sports such as wrestling, horse racing and cricket during their stay in Afghanistan in 1996–2001). Secondly, the Muslim prayer ceremony (namaz) contains elements of traditional

gymnastics. And thirdly – the availability of huge financial opportunities. Numerous sheikhs and rulers of the rich countries of the Arab region invest enormous sums in the development of sports in their (and not only in their own) countries.

Islam teaches that the faithful believers should take care of their body and strive to use its capabilities in a proper way. There are numerous examples of how Prophet Mohammed recommended to his devotees shoot at targets, practice horse racing and swimming to maintain their physical condition. The fact that a truly believing person has to be physically strong was not subject to and is not subject to any doubt from the point of view of adherents of Islamic teaching. Nowadays the welfare principles remain as important in a life of a Muslim, as it was many centuries ago.

The policy of the religious authorities is as follows: we have to do everything in our power to maintain an active physical condition. Nowadays every Muslim should devote time to this at least once a week. However, attending gyms and fitness-centers are strictly prohibited because the created environment is not suitable for a faithful Muslim. Physical training at home becomes the best solution (husband and wife can do exercises together). Physical training outside can be appropriate too, but all the religious requirements must be observed. Football, basketball, volleyball and bodybuilding are the perfect option in this regard. There are even special samples of modern sportswear for Muslims, men and women.

Speaking of Christianity, the author calls the Olympic Games the most important sporting event. However, it should be noted that the Christian attitude to sports was initially ambiguous. The Roman emperor Theodosius converted to Christianity in 391 AD and banned the Olympic Games that existed for 1170 years at that time. Pierre de Coubertin revived the Games many years later.

Worth mentioning is the Protestants especially. All churches in Western Europe and the United States have their own sports clubs and amateur teams in all sports.

The Reformation and the bourgeois revolutions were able to change the principles of life in the minds of Catholics and their attitude to sport. Thus, football and boxing appeared in England, bodybuilding in Germany, and in the Netherlands and Switzerland began the developing of winter sports.

The article also analyzes the concepts of Judaism. There was no talk of sport during the formation of Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. Sports movement became a means of national cohesion much later. The first sports clubs were created at the beginning of the 20th century. However, sport reached the Holy Land a bit later, because the representatives of local religious circles attached importance only to spiritual development. The task to strengthen the physical training of soldiers for military service appeared only with establishment of the state of Israel. Other religious organizations which paid attention not only to spiritual development, but also to physical development arose at the same time.

There are no equal to Buddhism among the religious denominations that have influenced the development of sports. This is where a huge number of martial art was created, such as karate, judo, taekwondo and many others. For the adherents of Buddhism, it was not just a sport, but a philosophy.

Analyzing the concepts of Hinduism and attitude to physical education, the author concludes that it is the adherents of Hinduism developed the technique of healing the human body – yoga, and gave the world chessboard. In the Hindu doctrine, there is an idea that the stronger the body, the better it perceives divine energy.

In conclusion, no religion denies the need for sports for people. The power of sport, as well as the power of religion, is that it teaches you to follow certain rules, forms a harmony in a person that combines the beauty of the body and spirit.

Author of the abstract – Kristina Yunitskaya

**CONTENTS OF "RUSSIA AND THE MOSLEM WORLD"
BULLETIN FOR 2020 №№ 1 (307) - 4 (310)**

№ 1 (307)

Konstantin Dolgov, Sergey Ryabkov. Threats to Peace and Security at the Present Stage (5-10); **Kamil Azimov.** Repatriation of Ex-jihadists: Possible Risks (10-22); **Igor Dobayev, Elena Schukina.** Islamophobia in Russia: the Origins and Current Status (22-37); **Valentina Schensnovich.** Migration Processes in the North Caucasus (Analytical Review) (38-56); **Snezhana Atanova.** Kazakhstan and its National Image: between the 'Soft Power' and the 'Brand Country' (57-61); **Svetlana Galiullina, Artur Suleymanov, Mikhail Bresler, Aleksey Chekryzhov, Bulat Murzagaliев.** Extremism Based on Religion as a Threat to the Political Stability of Kyrgyzstan (61-63); **Anna Serbina, Batyr Niyazliev.** Turkmenistan in the System of International Transport Corridors (64-73); **Tohir Kurbonov.** National Mentality of the Uzbeks: the Content and Structure (73-79); **Vladimir Kirichenko.** The Shia Community in Malaysia (80-91); **Ismet Konak.** The Turkish Policy During the Russian Civil War (1918-1922) (92-106); **Aigul Zinnatnurova, M. Zinnatnurov.** The Olympic Movement in Islamic Countries (106-108); **Bakhromjon Mamadiev.** Fatwas of Muslim Scholars on Early Marriage and Polygamy (109-120).

№ 2 (308)

Valentina Schensnovich. Demography and Migration Processes in Modern Russia (5-23); **Igor Dobayev.** The Mechanism of Social and Political Mobilization in Radical Islam (23-29); **Thomas Flichy de la Neuville.** The Coronavirus: a Parasite for Globalisation, an Unexpected Boon for Medical Data Collection (29-34); **Sergei Filatov.** Muslim Community of St. Petersburg: Traditions in the Context of Modern Challenges (35-42); **Aytek Koichuev.** About

Preventive Measures of Religious Extremism in Karachayev-Circassia (42–47); **Olga Bibikova.** Polygamy in the Post-Soviet Space (47–66); **Kamoliddin Mirzaakhmedov.** Conceptual Approach to Democratization of Public Administration (66–76); **Anzhela Novoseltseva.** Mediatization of the Syrian Conflict in the Newspapers “The Washington Post” and “The Washington Times” (77–83); **Kamil Azimov.** Shiite Factor in the Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran (83–101); **Arif Aliev.** In Search of the Nativity of the Prophet Muhammad (102–113); **Otabek Muhammadiev.** The Role of Alauddin al-Usmandi as-Samarkandi in the Development of Mawerannahr Maturidiyya Kalam School (114–124).

№ 3 (309)

Igor Dobayev. External Factors of Geopolitical Processes in the South of Russia in the Context of Globalization and Regionalization (5–22); **Thomas Flichy de la Neuville.** Digitalising the World: The Era of Invisible Power (23–36); **Aslanbek Adiyev.** Interethnic Relations and Religious Situation in the Republic of Daghestan in 2019 (A Case Study of Event Analysis) (37–56); **Zaid Abdulagatov.** The Influence of Foreign Islamic Education on the Religious Consciousness of Moslems of Daghestan (continued in N 4, 2020) (56–65); **Tohir Kurbonov.** Influence of Modern Civilization on the Uzbek National Mentality (65–70); **Odil Musaev, Sherzod Karshiev.** Problems of Religious Tolerance and Interethnic Relations in Uzbekistan (71–78); **Bakhrom Mamadiev.** Features of Centers for Publishing Fatwas in Saudi Arabia (79–93); **Dmitry Mosyakov, Unsiya Omarova.** The “New Islamization of Chams” Causes and Consequences for Cambodia (94–105); **Ekaterina Astafyeva.** Muslim / Malay Community in Singapore (105–116); **Andrey Dobayev, Igor Dobayev, Tatiana Ignatova.** Criminological Features of Financial Operations by the Havaiza System (117–136); **Elena Dmitrieva.** Ways of Development of the

Muslim Community in the Context of Globalization. Condensed Abstract (137–141).

№ 4 (310)

Valentina Schensnovich. Demographic and Migration Situation in Russia During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Condensed Abstract (5–10); **Yulia Korobkova.** On Practice of Spindoctoring in the Foreign Policy of Russia (11–15); **Elena Dmitrieva.** Islamic Financial System in the Post-Soviet Space. Condensed Abstract (15–25); **Zaid Abdulagatov.** The Influence of Foreign Islamic Education on the Religious Consciousness of Moslems of Daghestan (Ending. Opening in № 3 (309), 2020) (26–43); **Valentina Schensnovich.** Azerbaijan Foreign Policy. Condensed Abstract (43–55); **Filipp Zakharov.** Modern Strategy of “Soft Power” in Uzbekistan (54–59); **Elena Dmitrieva.** The Key Role of the Energy-Related Factors in Current Russian-Turkmen Relations. Condensed Abstract (59–70); **Gulsina Khoshimova.** Spiritual and Moral Basis of Military Culture of the Army of Uzbekistan (70–74); **Olga Bibikova.** Turkey’s Interests in Idlib (75–86); **Elena Dmitrieva.** Administrative Corruption in Modern Iraq (86–94); **Daria Panarina.** Moro – a Destabilizing Factor in the Philippines: Attempts to Solve the Problem (95–107); **Andrey Belinsky.** Shadow of Ankara Spread Over the Spree. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Policy Towards the Turkish Community in Germany (108–116); **Kristina Yunitskaya.** Specificity of Islamic Marketing (117–121); **Konstantin Simonov.** Religious Backgrounds for Modern Sports (122–124).

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