

**RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES**

INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

**RUSSIA
AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2021 – 3 (313)**

SCIENCE-INFORMATION BULLETIN

**Moscow
2021**

Federal State Budgetary Institution of Science
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences
of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN)

Centre for Global and Regional Studies

Division of Asia and Africa

Velihan Mirzehanov – Scientific Consultant
Elena Dmitrieva – Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Board:

Belinsky Andrey, Vasiliy Belozеров, Olga Bibikova (First Deputy Editor-in-Chief), *Igor Dobayev, Alexander Gordon, Shamil Kashaf, Alexei Malashenko, Dina Malysheva, Aziz Niyazi* (Deputy Editor-in-Chief), *Valentina Schensnovich* (Executive Secretary), *Natalia Ginesina* (Managing editor, Translator)

Russia and the Moslem World : Science Information Bulletin /
INION RAN, Centre for Global and Regional Studies. – Moscow, 2021. –
N 3 (313). – 125 p.
ISSN 1072-6403

Scientific materials on the current political, social and religious issues concerning the relations between Russia and the global Islamic Ummah as well as Muslim countries are represented in the form of articles, reviews and abstracts.

ISSN 1072-6403

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.00

Journal is indexed in the Russian Science Citation Index

© ФГБУН Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам РАН, 2021

CONTENT

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

- Igor Dobayev. On the 20th Anniversary of the Terrorist
Attacks on Facilities in the United States: the Ideological
Justification of the Takfiri Jihadists // *Article was written
for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."* 5
- Oleg Cherevkov. The Problem of Countering the Religious
and Political Ideology of Islamism in the Context
of Ensuring the National Security of Russia // *Article was
written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."* 19

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

- Yusuf Djabrailov. Present Religious Situation
in the Republic of Daghestan in the Context
of National (CIVIC) Identity // *Article was written
for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."* 35
- Asiyat Botasheva. Problems of the Elite Conflict
in Karachayevo-Circassia // *Article was written
for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."* 46
- 2021.03.001. Ksenia Atamali. Terrorism as a Threat
to Regional Security in Central Asia // *Condensed abstract.* ... 56

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2021.03.002. Valentina Schensnovich. Historical and Religious Heritage of Iran and Social Policy of the Country at the Present Time // <i>Condensed abstract</i>	67
Kamil Azimov, Olga Bibikova. Shiites in the Socio-Political Space of Modern Lebanon (The first part was published in № 1, 2021) // <i>Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	71
Dmitry Efremenko. Bosnian and Albanian Questions Three Decades after the Breakup of Yugoslavia* // <i>Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	93
Valeria Kuznetsova. Historical Analysis of the Role of Migration Relations between Algeria and France in the War of Independence of Algeria // <i>Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."</i>	113

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2021.03.003. Elena Dmitrieva. Islamic World in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic // <i>Condensed abstract</i>	119
---	-----

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR DOBAYEV. ON THE 20th ANNIVERSARY OF THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: THE IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE TAKFIRI JIHADISTS // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: jihad, ideology, Islamism, radicalism, Salafism, takfir, terrorism, "pure" Islam.

Igor Dobayev,
DSc(Philosophy), Professor,
Expert of Russian Academy of Sciences,
Director of Center of Regional Studies,
Institute of Sociology and Religion, Southern Federal University,
Rostov-on-Don

Citation: Dobayev I. The 20th Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks on Facilities in the United States: the Ideological Justification of the Takfiri Jihadists // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, № 3 (313), P. 5–18. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.01

Abstract. Twenty years ago, a number of significant objects in the United States underwent terrorist attacks. As a result, several thousand people were killed, and members of the radical Islamist group Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden were declared terrorists, although there are other opinions about the organizers and customers of these terrorist

attacks. In this article, the author examines the ideological prerequisites that have been accumulated for centuries in some trends in Islam, which could become the driving motive for committing acts of terrorism by adherents of radical Islamism.

September 11, 2021 marks twenty years since the day when terrorist attacks were carried out on a number of objects in the United States. Despite the fact that the organizers and customers of these crimes have not yet been reliably identified, the Americans immediately accused radical Islamists from al-Qaeda and their leader, Osama bin Laden. This development of events allowed the American leadership to unleash a war in Afghanistan, two years later - in Iraq, and already in 2010 to launch the process of the so-called Arab Spring, which seriously reformatted the geopolitical situation in the Middle East and North Africa. As you know, the Americans are well-known inspirators of all kinds of provocations. Nevertheless, without excluding the version of Islamist attacks, let's consider the ideological prerequisites that could prompt them.

As you know, Islamist terrorism is a complex and multidimensional socio-political phenomenon, which is based on the ideological doctrine of modern Takfiri jihadists. Its foundations were developed in the Middle Ages by Salafi authors, including Ibn Hanbal (780-855), Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), their students and followers, who consistently and steadily developed this teaching. The main thing in the attitudes of the Salafists was a return to the so-called "golden age" of Islam, the time when the Prophet Muhammad received divine revelations and the rule of the first four "righteous" caliphs - Abu Bakr, Omar, Osman and Ali (610-661). The Salafists strongly opposed the introduction of any innovations into Islam, demanded the purification of the religion from the innovations that followed the end of the "golden age". In the following centuries, such Salafists as Muhammad Abn abd al-Wahhab from the Arabian Nejd (1703-1799) up to the authoritative authors of modern Salafi

teaching, among whom we will single out al-Maududi (Pakistan), as well as Egyptians-Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Faraj, Ayman al-Zawahiri and some others became well-known ideologists of the “purification” of Islam. Let's take a closer look at the contribution of these individuals to the development of the ideological doctrine of modern Islamism.

The Baghdad theologian and jurist Ahmad Ibn Hanbal is known primarily as the founder of one of the four currently operating Sunni madhhabs (madhhabs – religious and legal schools in Islam – I. D.) – the Hanbali. Unlike other madhhabs in Sunni Islam (Sunni, Shafi'i, Malik), Hanbali originated as a religious and political movement and later took shape in a religious and legal school. This movement expressed the views of the most conservative supporters of traditionalism of that time (now this ideological trend in Islam is called fundamentalism or Salafism) and systematized the corresponding concept of the creed. The Hanbalites reject both literal and allegorical interpretation of the texts of the Quran and hadith, deny the possibility of any rationalistic interpretation of the dogmas of faith. Recognizing the unconditionality of divine predestination, however, they believe that iman (a person's faith) depends on the good deeds performed by him, which determines his social activity. They reject any innovations (bidaa) in the field of doctrine and law, which do not have a direct justification in the Quran and hadith, considering them “sinful”. At the same time, being distinguished by fanatical strictness in observing the ritual and legal norms of Sharia, they resolutely oppose any extremes both in the creed and in the life of the community. Those who assumed the role of carriers of the Orthodox Sunnis, during the Middle Ages repeatedly headed mass movements [1, p. 43-44]. Today, the Hanbali sense of Sunni Islam is accepted in a number of monarchies of the Persian Gulf, primarily in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

At the turn of the 13th-14th centuries in Damascus, the teachings of Ibn Hanbal were developed by the medieval

religious thinker Ahmad Taqi ad-Din Ibn Taymiyyah. A distinctive feature of his views was extreme radicalism, both in relation to representatives of other religions, and to those Moslems who did not share his views. The main ideological constructs of this theologian are: "pure Islam" (the demand for the purification of Islam, a return to the "golden age"), the accusation of disbelief (takfir) of some categories of Moslems, the conduct of armed jihad. The attitude to the state, in general, and to the judiciary, in particular, was borrowed by him from various Kharijite sects (Kharijism, along with Sunnism and Shiism, is one of the trends in Islam – I. D.). Of course, the appearance of such a person as Ibn Taymiyyah and the popularity of his ideas was due to the fall of the Arab caliphate and the Mongols' conquest of many states of the Near and Middle East, which gave rise to another deep crisis in Moslem societies of that period. However, the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah proved to be in demand in the following centuries, including in the formation of the latest ideological doctrines of modern Takfiris-jihadists.

The follower of the ideas of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah was the religious teacher Muhammad Ibn Ad-al-Wahhab from the Arabian Nejd. His teaching turned out to be in demand on the Arabian Peninsula in the middle of the century due to the need to consolidate the Arab tribes living there in order to build their own state. By that time, there was a clear departure from the fundamental principles of this religion in the homeland of Islam. In this regard, in an effort to restore Islam to its purity, al-Wahhab began to preach the strictest observance of the principle of monotheism (tawhid), the rejection of the worship of Sufi saints (wali) and holy places (mazars and ziyarats), the need to purify Islam from late layers and innovations (bidaa) and return to its original purity. The main written work of the teacher was the treatise "Kitab at-Tawhid" ("The Book of Monotheism") [9]. Tawhid is the central principle of the Wahhabi doctrine, the essence of which is the strictest monotheism. The Sheikh categorically opposed mediation between God and believers. He

was also an implacable opponent of innovations that go beyond the Quran and the Sunnah. Showing a certain tolerance towards the “people of the Scripture” – Christians and Jews – the Wahhabi view of takfir (accusation of unbelief) he reduced his views to tightening the requirements for Moslems themselves. In this regard, the teacher filled the concept of apostasy from Islam and hypocrisy with a new content. Another system-forming position in the ideology of the Wahhabis is the concept of jihad (war for faith). Jihad is interpreted by al-Wahhab, first of all, as an armed struggle, which is the duty of every Moslem, and its object is not only kafirs (infidels), but also those Moslems who do not share the attitudes of adherents of “pure Islam” [4, p. 88].

Thus, it becomes obvious that since the first centuries of Islam, there has been a process of steady politicization of this religion. In the twentieth century, the concept of “political Islam” appeared, and after it – “radical Islam”, or “Islamism”, interpreted as extreme manifestations of “political Islam”. At the same time, two wings of “Islamism” are being comprehended – moderate and radical. The goal of all Islamists is the same – building an Islamic state and living according to Sharia, but the ways to achieve the desired are different. Moderates offer to go to the planned evolutionary, peaceful way, and their radical like-minded people are ready to achieve what they want by force. Of course, there were also authoritative ideologists of both directions of Islamism.

One of the most famous ideologists of the “moderates” is the founder and long-term leader of the Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Society) party, the Pakistani al-Maududi (1903–1979), a recognized theorist of Islamic fundamentalism, the author of the theory of the “Islamic state”, popular in the Islamic world. The theoretical legacy of al-Maududi, numbering more than 120 books and thousands of articles, touches on a wide range of problems: from issues of state structure to the status of women in Islamic society. The ideas put forward by him within the framework of Islamic fundamentalism had a significant impact

on the state-building in Pakistan, which took place after granting the independence to British India in 1947 and the division of this space on religious grounds into two parts – India and Pakistan. It should be emphasized that during the creation and subsequent development of Pakistan, al-Maududi's views underwent significant changes. If initially he was a supporter of a dictatorial form of government in the spirit of the caliphate, by the early 70s he and his party recognized the need for general elections on a party basis, demanded the convocation of an elected assembly with limited lawmaking rights, and even began to allow non-Moslems and women to participate in the work of parliament. At the same time, Maududi consistently and resolutely opposed the construction of an Islamic state by force [3, p. 63–66]. Al-Maududi's associates include the Albanian Nasir al-Din al-Albani, the Syrian Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti, and others.

Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), who founded the Moslem Brotherhood (BM) organization in Egypt in 1929 with his like-minded people can also be attributed to the “moderate”. In the first years of its existence, the ideological doctrine of the “brothers” was eclectic in nature, and the use of force to spread Islam, in their opinion, was permissible only when other means of persuasion did not achieve the goal [2, p. 19].

However, after the assassination of Hassan al-Banna in 1949 and the failure of hopes for cooperation with the government of “Free Officers” who came to power in Egypt in 1952, the “brothers” moved away from the positions of “moderates”, and Seyid Qutb, who developed the provisions of radical Islamism in his works in the 1950s and 1960s became their main ideologist.

In his books, S. Qutb reinterpreted traditional Islamic concepts in order to adapt them for use in political activities, the main purpose of which was to justify the violent seizure of power in the state. He considered Islam as a purely political movement, a political system, and therefore rejected the traditional point of view of the Moslem Orthodox, who pushed armed jihad into the

background, using it in exceptional cases. The belief about the duty of conducting jihad by every Moslem (fard ain), as well as the ideas of the so-called "jahiliyyah" (pre-Islamic ignorance - I. D.) he borrowed from the works of Ibn Taymiyyah. This is evidenced, first of all, by his books "Maalim fi tariq" ("Milestones on the Way") [7], which was published in 1964, and "Fi zilal al-Quran" ("Under the shadow of the Quran") [8], in which the concepts of jihad and jahiliya are described in the most complete form from radical positions.

S. Qutb, following Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Maududi, developed the concept of absolute Monotheism (tawhid). Ibn Taymiyyah was convinced that the principle of Monotheism requires strict adherence to the laws of God, that is, compliance with Sharia. Therefore, the use of laws created by man is tantamount to obeying or worshipping someone other than God, and therefore apostasy. Al-Maududi, followed by S. Qutb, adopted this position and drew a sharp line between the "party of God" and the "party of Satan". The latter, in their opinion, included Moslems who adhered to the laws created by man. Qutb in his teaching combined al-Maududi's concept of "modern jahiliya" with Ibn Taymiyya's views that the unity of God requires Moslems to follow the divine law, creating a synthesis that would strengthen the sharp difference between the party of God and the party of Satan: all those who do not follow the Islamic legal system and do not obey the commands of God are part of modern jahiliya and have departed from Islam, that is, they are apostates.

In his book "Milestones on the Way", Qutb for the first time presented a clear definition of the enemy as a person belonging to the jahiliya system, and called for its destruction. The means to eliminate this system of power, in his opinion, is an armed, offensive jihad, which protects the Islamic faith. Therefore, these two points in his teaching are inextricably linked, since jihad is a tool for eliminating jahiliya. Jahiliya, in his opinion, means the domination (hakemiyya) of man over man, or rather, the

subordination of man to man, and not to Allah. It means rejecting the divinity of God and worshiping mortals. The concept of jahiliya, of course, is the basic one in his theoretical constructions. It should be noted that S. Qutb preached a radical break with the orders prevailing in the country and established in religion over the centuries, which attracted a certain part of young people, both educated and poor. S. Qutb sought to form a "new Quranic generation", whose main goal was to create a new Islamic community on the ruins of nationalism, just as the Prophet Muhammad and his companions built a state from a community of believers on the ruins of pagan teachings. S. Qutb advocated the creation of an Islamic state through armed jihad. At the same time, he opposed the established Islamic legal views that jihad is, first of all, a struggle for spiritual self-improvement (jihad al-nafs) or a defensive war to protect the Moslem community. He justified the armed, offensive jihad, including against the rulers of the Moslem world, who use non-Islamic legal codes, and therefore are part of modern jahiliya and, therefore, are not real Moslems. He believed that they should be fought as infidels and removed from power, because the main goal of Moslems is to establish the rule of God on earth (divine huqm). Such a jihad, according to S. Qutb is the most effective way to combat jahiliya, which acts as an obstacle to a fair and free society based on the principles of tawhid. Thus, following Ibn Taymiyyah, he denied the division of jihad into small (armed) and large. In addition, today adherents of radical interpretations of jihad, referring to the works of Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers – Ibn al-Qayyim, S. Qutb, etc., they consider it permissible to kill civilians during the Islamist jihad. Thus, Ibn Taymiyyah argued that when infidels kill peaceful Moslems, it becomes permissible to kill the enemy's civilian population. Modern jihadists have transformed Ibn Taymiyyah's argument in a favorable way and have adopted the principle that people who help the enemy army in battle, even if they are not military, are legitimate targets for destruction. Recall that initially such radical interpretations of the

methods of conducting jihad came from the teachings of various Kharijite sects. However, throughout Islamic history, there is a common understanding that civilians should not be targeted in war, but extremist groups have defined the term "civilian population" in such a way as to turn every person living in Western countries into a target for terrorist attacks.

We would like to emphasize that S. Qutb's radical development of the concepts of Jahiliya and jihad became a clear departure from the traditional point of view of Islamic theologians, and even from the position of the founders of the Moslem Brotherhood party. It is believed that he did not bring the development of these postulates to the final logical end only because in August 1966 he was hanged in a Cairo prison for his anti-state activities. However, his followers, especially the Egyptians A. Faraj and A. Zawahiri, further radicalized these concepts and directed them not only to change the government, but also to fight against the whole society. In their opinion, the entire Egyptian society is not Moslem. It seems that this position is a Kharijite point of view, and most Ulema have not adhered to it for centuries, since following it leads to discord within the Moslem community. It is precisely such concepts that have prepared the ground for the development of various forms of modern terrorism. Various interpretations of the teachings of S. Qutb have spread beyond the borders of Egypt. Today, many scientists reasonably claim that S. Qutb is the main ideologist of modern Islamist terrorism.

The ideological heirs of S. Qutb were Egyptians - Muhammad Abdussalam Faraj (1954-1982) and his associates, who founded the Islamic Jihad group in 1979. It was the militants of this organization who killed President Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) during a parade in Cairo. As a result, Faraj and two of his accomplices were executed in Cairo Bab al-Khalq prison. Some researchers consider A. Faraj one of the leading Islamist theorists, while others question the level of his religious education, pointing out that he did not receive a humanitarian education,

studied as an electrical engineer and worked in his specialty at Cairo University. This gave him an additional opportunity to recruit supporters among young people. But, one way or another, it was he who, following S. Qutb, made a significant contribution to increasing the role of armed jihad in the activities of radical organizations in the late 1970s – early 1980s, preaching his ideas in the mosques of Egypt and actively recruiting supporters.

The main tactic of “Jihad Islami” was the conduct of armed attacks against high-ranking government officials, most often with the help of car bombs, as well as terrorist actions against the Coptic population. It is believed that it was A. Faraj who translated the concept of “jihad” from the theoretical to the practical plane in the twentieth century. A. Faraj outlined his vision of the concept of jihad in the brochure “Jihad – a forgotten duty” [11], where he reminded his followers of the need to conduct jihad, which he proclaimed the sixth pillar of faith. This work is considered one of the most consistent manifestos of modern jihadist ideology. It is mainly based on the interpretation of the work of Ibn Taymiyyah “Kitab al-Jihad” (“The Book of Jihad”). Following the position of Ibn Taymiyyah, Faraj attributed jihad to the category of “fard-ain” and considered it an individual duty of every Moslem. If Ibn Taymiyyah considered jihad possible in the event of an enemy attack on Moslem lands, then Faraj considered it mandatory in principle. At the same time, like S. Qutb, he rejected the concept of “big jihad” as a struggle with ones passions. It should be noted that in this book, A. Faraj constantly reproaches Islamic theologians for neglecting and even denying the obligation of jihad. He is followed in this issue by other Islamic ideologists of jihadism, who believe that the conduct of jihad today remains mandatory for every Moslem, until the last piece of land that was in the hands of Moslems, but was occupied by infidels, is liberated.

A. Faraj believed that it is impossible to build a truly Islamic society in a peaceful way, and this is real only with the help of jihad. He was sure that jihad would allow Moslems to

rule the world and restore the caliphate. At the beginning of the 21st century, Faraj's ideas could be implemented by Al-Baghdadi, who founded a new group on the basis of Al-Qaeda in Iraq: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS)).

Following Ibn Taymiyyah, his follower Faraj took a rather radical position on the issue of punishing "apostates" (in Egypt, by apostates he meant, first of all, representatives of state authorities – I. D.), and, referring to the works of Ibn Taymiyyah, argued that they deserve more severe punishment than representatives of other religions. In his work, A. Faraj, in particular, writes that according to the Sunnah, it was established that an apostate from the Moslem faith should be punished much more seriously than a representative of another religion. According to one of the types of punishment, the apostate must be killed: the *jizya* (poll tax – Etc.) is not accepted from him, as from the people of the Scripture, and it is forbidden to conclude any contracts with him. It is believed that an apostate should be killed, even if he is not able to defend himself, unlike representatives of other religions who do not fight with Moslems.

Following Ibn Taymiyyah, he referred to apostates the Moslems who, for some reason, do not observe all the laws of Sharia, and even if they recite Islamic testimonies. In this regard, he believed that Moslems who do not observe any norms of the Sharia are in a worse position than those who have never been Moslems at all. As a result, he considered it necessary to fight with every group of Moslems who committed the smallest deviation from the norms of Sharia. Here we can clearly see the borrowing of this postulate by Ibn Taymiyyah and Faraj from the views of various Kharijite sects. Also, since the time of the Kharijites, it has been believed among various extremist groups that the exercise of power is the prerogative of God, not people.

Faraj was particularly irreconcilable with the leadership of Egypt and other Moslem countries, considering them apostates. Following S. Qutb, he called the rulers of Islamic countries "near enemies", and not Islamic countries – "distant enemies".

It should also be noted that A. Faraj, unlike representatives of other radical groups, did not approve of the activities of Islamic charitable organizations, since their activities are under the control of the state. He said that their work does not contribute to the creation of an Islamic state, which he considered the meaning of his whole life.

The ideas contained in the brochure "Jihad-a forgotten duty" became a banner for Egyptian Islamist groups throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It is known that the current leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was his friend and closest associate, and used his ideological legacy in relation to the Al-Qaeda and ISIS groups.

For many centuries, Moslem scholars have been debating about the attitude of Moslems to those people who are not Moslems. As a result, a concept called "Friendship and non-involvement in Islam" appeared. Its provisions are reflected in a small brochure with the same name, written by Saleh bin Fauzan al-Fauzan [10]. In it, the author demands that Moslems reject friendship with "infidels", and the manifestations of this "friendship", as al-Fauzan emphasizes, are: likening them in clothes, words, and so on; living in the countries of the infidels and refusing to move to any of the countries of Islam for the sake of preserving their religion; making trips to the countries of the infidels for entertainment and pleasure; providing them with help and assistance against the Moslems, as well as praising and protecting them; appealing to them for help, giving them confidence, appointing them to those posts where staying will allow them to learn the secrets of the Moslems, and electing them as henchmen and advisers; using their chronology, especially if it is about their rituals and holidays, like Christmas; participation in the celebration of their holidays, helping them in their organization and congratulating them on this; praising them for the achievements of their culture and civilization and expressing admiration for their morals and skills, without taking into account the depravity of their views and the falsity of their

religion; using their names; asking for forgiveness for them and turning to Allah with prayers for sending them mercy.

The further development of the ideological doctrine of the Takfiri jihadists is associated with Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was the main theorist of Al-Qaeda, and after the destruction of Osama bin Laden by the Americans, he became the leader of Al-Qaeda. On the basis of works of his predecessors and like-minded people, he adapted their doctrines and concepts, including "Friendship and non-participation in Islam", to the state and goals of the radical Islamist movement. The radical pseudoscientific concept of "Likes and dislikes" developed by him (Al-walaa wa-l-baraa) [6, p. 14] divides all people on the planet into three groups:

1. those who should only be loved without feeling any hostility towards them;
2. those who should only be hated. Without feeling any love or friendly feelings for them;
3. those who, on the one hand, deserve love, and hatred on the other.

Naturally, like-minded people fall into the first group, and all non-Moslems fall into the second one. As for the third group, we are talking about those Moslems who did not take the path of radical Islamism. Such people must be convinced by carrying out the so-called "Islamic call", up to inclusion in their ranks. If these measures do not lead to the desired result, then the "disobedient" should be accused of "unbelief", "polytheism", "apostasy" or "hypocrisy", with all the consequences that follow from this.

The doctrine developed by Ayman al-Zawahiri is by far the most radical. Although this does not mean that there will not be a new theorist who will further "improve" the achievements of his predecessors.

Based on the analysis of the content of ideological doctrines from Ibn Hanbal to Ayman al-Zawahiri, it can be concluded that their doctrinal interpretations are based on the demand for the purification of Islam, up to the achievement of the state of "pure

Islam" [5, pp. 202–216], through the definition of the so-called "enemies of Islam" (infidels, polytheists, apostates, hypocrites) and waging an armed jihad against them. Regardless of the fact, whether these "enemies" are military or civilian. The concept of "distant enemies" and "close enemies", the emphasis in the last two decades has been made on "distant enemies" allows, in principle, to talk about the possibility of terrorist attacks by radical Islamists on objects in the United States (9/11). Doubts about this still remain.

References

1. Dobaev I.P. Islamic radicalism in international politics. – Rostov-on-Don : Rostizdat, 2000.
2. Dobaev I.P. Political institutions of the Islamic world: ideology and practice. – Rostov-on-Don: Publishing house of the SCSC HSE, 2001.
3. Dobaev I.P. Islamic radicalism: genesis, evolution, practice. – Rostov-on-Don: Publishing house of the SCSC HSE, 2003.
4. Dobaev I.P., Dobaev A.I. Terrorism and anti-terrorist activity in the Russian Federation. – Rostov-on-Don: Publishing House of the Southern Federal University, 2011.
5. Dobaev I.P. On the issue of the religious purity of "true Islam" // Humanitarian of the South of Russia, 2020. No. 3.
6. Ignatenko A.A. Self-determination of the Islamic world // Islam and politics / Ed. V.Ya. Belokrinitsky and A.Z. Egorin. – Moscow: RISI Publishing House, 2001.
7. Qutb S. The future belongs to Islam. This religion. Milestones in the path of Allah. – Makhachkala: Publishing house "Badr", 1997.
8. Qutb S. Under the shadow of the Quran. – Moscow: Publishing house "IMMAN", 2003.
9. Muhammad Ibn Suleiman al-Tamimi (Ibn Abd al-Wahhab). The Book of Monotheism. – Moscow: "Badr", 2000.
10. Saleh bin Fauzan al-Fauzan. Friendship and non-involvement in Islam [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://cyberpedia.su/7x5ect7.html> (date of address: 11.01.2021).
11. Faraj M.A. Jihad-al-farida al-ghaiba ("Jihad is a forgotten duty", in Arabic). No date.

OLEG CHEREVKOV. THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERING THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF ISLAMISM IN THE CONTEXT OF ENSURING THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF RUSSIA // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: Wahhabism; Islam; Islamism; fundamentalism; extremism; terrorism; ideology.

Oleg Cherevko,

Master student,

Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies,

Southern Federal University

Citation: Cherevko O. The Problem of Countering the Religious and Political Ideology of Islamism in the Context of Ensuring the National Security of Russia // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, № 3 (313), P. 19–34. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.02

Abstract. From the beginning of the 1980s, the destructive religious and political ideology of Islamism began to penetrate actively the territory of Russia under external influence. Its adherents expanded and strengthened their influence, using from outside support and actively used extremist and terrorist methods to achieve power under the guise of adherence to the Muslim faith. At the same time, Islamism shows a high degree of adaptation to the counter-measures used against it. In this regard, it seems relevant to pay attention to those areas in which counteraction to Islamism in Russia has areas of improvement, and in what ways the implementation of them is possible.

Islamism is a religious-political ideological complex, the purpose of which is a fundamental, revolutionary change of social relations on the basis of particular provisions of the Islamic religion and under its lee. These transformations are mainly achieved through violence, both physical (murder, robbery, illegal business, terror, etc.) and psychological (propaganda, intimidation, recruiting new followers, etc.). This ideology, which

in its relatively modern form originated in the Middle East in the 1930s of the twentieth century, today is a real scourge of public security not only in predominantly Muslim countries, but also in those parts of the world where Muslims have never constituted an absolute majority – Northern America, Europe, Russia, East and Southeast Asia. The availability of modern means of communication, the openness of the information space and the availability of certain material and spiritual resources allow the adherents of Islamism to achieve their goals quickly and efficiently, adapt to local conditions, and find their target audience. Although, due to the mass media, it may seem to the average man that the world community is actively opposing radicals, in fact, there is an imbalance in the methods of this counteraction: force, counter-terrorism methods prevail, while anti-terrorist ones aimed at preventing extremism still leave a great deal to be desired, which determines the relevance of studying the problems of countering Islamism and the search for the most effective tools for implementing this counteraction.

Russia is one of the pillars of the struggle against the religious and political ideology of Islamism. For many years, it has been fighting this destructive phenomenon. One of the arenas of confrontation is the region of the South of Russia, which is due to a number of factors: geographic, cultural, civilizational, economic, etc. The search for the necessary tools to counter the ideology of Islamism is impossible without a deep understanding of the circumstances under which this set of views and judgments penetrated our country, the South of Russia, under what conditions it developed in it, how it adapted. Therefore, within the framework of this article, it makes sense to resort to the historical and political approach and consider the events of the recent past through its prism.

The penetration of the destructive religious and political ideology of Islamism, or, as it is still sometimes mentioned in Russian scientific literature and journalism, the “Wahhabi” ideology in our country falls at the late 1980s. The history of the

emergence of this ideological complex is directly related to the systemic crisis of the central government in the USSR and Russia, the weakening of ideological control, the emergence of an ideological vacuum in society, which especially seriously affected young people. The liberalization of leaving abroad has led to the fact that in the predominantly Muslim republics of southern Russia a fairly large stratum of young Ulama appeared, who received spiritual education in the countries of the Middle East and gained a certain prestige among supporters of radical transformations and separatists.

Exactly during this time period the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism began to spread among the believers of the Muslims of the Soviet Union. Supporters of the so-called pure Islam differentiated themselves from the Muslim Ummah of the USSR by their zero tolerance to atheism, perception of socialist society as a “godless” society as well as opposing themselves to the official Muslim Spiritual Directorates and a critical attitude towards the so-called popular Islam adopted among the Muslim population of the Union. Islamists of varying degrees of radicalism incrementally increased the intensity of their activities in the country's largest cities, and were also noticed in Tatarstan and Bashkiria. However, in the 1990s, it was the South of Russia that became the region where the conflict between supporters of the “pure one” and people who supported local “traditional” Islam with interspersing of highland customs became the most acute (Kudryavtsev, 2000). The growth in the number of “Wahhabis” coincided with Perestroika and a general increase in interest in religion in all stratum of Soviet society, including Islam.

Researcher Silantiev R.A. notes such a feature of adherents of Islamism, which immediately manifested itself at the very beginning of their existence in the South of Russia, not only as the inability, but also the unwillingness to tolerate representatives of other religious and philosophical school of thoughts, which is expressed in the manifestation of extreme aggression and

violence (Silantiev, 2007). Khalidov V. points out that the central place in the ideological platform of supporters of Islamism is the concept of non-recognition of any power extending away from the Sharia injunctions (Khalidov, 2012).

Daghestan and Chechnya became the spiritual and material centers of Islamism at that time. Sheikh Said Afandi Chirkeisky (Al-Chirkawi, 2003, p. 99), experts on Islamic studies Vagabov M.V. (Vagabov, 1999), Bobrovnikov V.O. (Bobrovnikov, 2001, p. 82) draw attention to the appearance of the heralds of a new ideology in their works. Akayev V.Kh. notes that as early as 1989, articles of an extremist nature appeared in the official print media, glorifying Islamism and criticizing the Muslim practices established in the South of Russia; records the high-quality training of Islamist preachers and the inability of local law enforcement and ideological control agencies to cope with the increasingly popular ideology (Akayev, 2003).

During this period of time, riding on the wave of intensification of the believers' political activity and religious cells in general, Muslim organizations became more active, aiming at the "purification" of Islam and the establishment of a new type of social relations based on the principles of Islam (Ermakov, 1994). These organizations, formed mainly by arrived preachers, "assistants" from the countries of the Middle East, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and many who later became famous, "home-grown" ideologues came out.

The weaker the Russian state became, the more powerful positions were occupied by the Islamists. Establishing control over most of the former Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the period from 1991 to 1993 allowed them to expand their social and economic base, form an alliance with ethno-nationalists, and bring over some religious leaders who previously belonged to the official structures of spiritual governance. For example, when federal troops were sent in the Chechen Republic in December 1994, Mufti Alsabekov Kh., a former naib imam of the Alma-Ata mosque and naib mufti of

Kazakhstan, who had been trained in Syria and Pakistan, declared a “holly war” to Moscow. He, as well as many like him, belonged to the younger generation of Ulama who were influenced by radical fundamentalists of Islam. Subsequently, separatists turned to Islamism even more, after 1996, when Chechnya gained de facto independence for some time. On its territory, under the slogan of “Sharia”, the Islamists destroyed representatives of the “old” clergy, teachers, former law enforcement officers and in general everyone who could be regarded by them as a dissident. The Islamists not only joined the “government”, they constituted an overwhelming majority in it, and wanted to expand their sphere of influence.

Meanwhile, in Dagestan, Kebedov B.M. was engaged in the spread of the religious and political ideology of Islamism, who created religious educational institutions in a number of settlements of Daghestan that were unauditably to the official bodies of the spiritual administration, in which the so-called pure Islam was studied. In one of these schools, located in Kizil-Yurt, young people from all Muslim regions of southern Russia studied, their number reached 700 (Khanbabaev, 2001, p. 105). In the spirit of their distant heralds, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, with charitable and educational activities, the Islamists in Daghestan quickly came over to organizational building, creating the necessary infrastructure, psychological and military training of followers. Poverty seriously helped them in it, unemployment and lack of confidence in the future, which worried the overwhelming majority of the population not only of the republic in those days, but of the entire country. The tendency to provoke a conflict with adherents of “traditional” Islam quickly became apparent, which manifested itself, for example, in the organization of unauthorized rallies and riots in Makhachkala, Buinaksk, Khasavyurt, the desecration of mosques, and the expulsion of “traditionalist” imams. To involve new adherents in their ranks, literature of religious fundamentalists was published on a mass scale. Books were not only imported

from abroad, but were also printed directly on the territory of Russia, and in large (up to 100 thousand copies) circulations (Khanbabaev, 2001, p. 105). Extremists paid attention to creating their cells and giving their activities a legitimate status, as Dobayev I.P. writes: "After the end of the Chechen events of 1994-1996, Kebedov B. actively organized Wahhabi cells - "Islamic societies" ("Jamaats") in the territory of Daghestan. On their basis, in mid-1997, the socio-political organization Islamic Society of Daghestan was created, officially registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Daghestan" (Dobayev, 2001).

Despite the fact that the regional authorities tried to put pressure on the followers of Islamism in Daghestan, their position continued to increase. One of the reasons for this is monstrous corruption. Leaders of various levels, officials of federal and regional departments privatized the most profitable sectors of the economy and social sphere. Explicit social injustice prevailed in society: ordinary citizens could not find work, rural and urban youth increasingly went into criminal structures. The deteriorating socio-economic situation contributed to cultural and ideological discord, and they, in turn, significantly helped to spread the ideology of Islamism in the Republic of Daghestan, including the strong assistance of foreign preachers and religious organizations.

The activities of Islamists in Daghestan and Chechnya very quickly became aggressive. Radical leaders did not hide their plans to unite all Muslim republics of the South of Russia under the banner of "pure Islam." The period 1998-1999 became the apotheosis of the expansionist plans of extremists and is associated with the formation of the so-called Kadar zone and the invasion of militants in Daghestan. Only due to some stabilization of the socio-political situation in the country, increased interaction between federal and regional authorities and law enforcement bodies it was possible to disrupt the Islamist attack. Later, during the hostilities in Chechnya, the federal authorities used the tactics of "chechenization" of the

conflict, in some sense gradually separating it in the public consciousness from conflicts in other parts of the world with the participation of radicals.

The more stable the economic situation of the population was, the more stable the power became, the fairer and tougher the process of law was ensured, the more the position of extremists weakened. This was expressed, for example, in the transition from full-scale hostilities to partisans (2005), changing the management structures of gang groups and removing the last ethno-nationalist elements from the local ideological complex of North Caucasian Islamism (2007), falling under the closer control of international Islamist organizations (2012–2015). The combination of effective counter-terrorism (forceful) measures, as well as the formation of a major hotbed of tension in Syria and the outflow of most of the Islamists from the South of Russia, allowed some politicians and the media to talk about the “defeat of the terrorist underworld in the North Caucasus” (Regnum, 2016). The problem of confronting Islamism lost some resonance and is no longer in the epicenter of the media, as it was a few years ago.

However, turning to data on the number of registered terrorist crimes in the Russian Federation, we will see that their number has increased significantly: in 2012, 637 such crimes were recorded, in 2013 – 661, in 2014 – already 1128, in 2015 – 1538, in 2016 – 2227, in 2017 – 1871, in 2018 – 1679, in 2019 – 1806. For the period from January to October 2020, 1990 terrorist crimes were registered (Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, 2020), which is much higher than the previous similar period. Only these data disconfirm the thesis that Islamism in our country is defeated and has lost its influence: on the contrary, it has not gone, and the activity of radicals has increased.

The problem of countering Islamist radicals is aggravated by the fact that, despite the fact that IS structures (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) were forced out to the peripheral regions of Syria and Iraq, the organization managed to maintain its financial, economic and organizational potential significantly.

According to *The Economist*, this terrorist organization has withdrawn a large amount of money from the above-mentioned states, amounting to about \$400 million. At the same time, the vast majority of these funds were placed in Turkey, Lebanon, European countries and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf (Archakov, 2016). The tactics and strategy of the actions of extremists have undergone significant changes: if earlier religious-political radicals sought to create an integrated space, the “caliphate,” which would stretch from the Iberian Peninsula to East Turkestan and the islands in the Pacific Ocean, now this is referred to the actions of deeply conspiratorial groups operating, for the most part, autonomously, using tactics of targeted attacks and sabotage. The so-called sleeping cells of Islamists operate in the territory of more than 60 states of the world, and Russia is no exception (Khoperskaya, 2018; TASS, 2018). In fact, there is a return to the follow-on concept of “rebellion,” formed back in the 1960s by the military theorist of the Russian foreign countries Messner E.E., who wrote in his work: “The fighting by rebels, saboteurs, terrorists, diversionists, propagandists will take on enormous dimensions in the future...” (Messner, 1960).

Radicals, probably not without the help of their curators, were able to maintain the senior leadership and organizational structure. The leaders of the autonomous “Jamaats” are based on people who have received tremendous experience in organizing underworld resistance in the Middle East, who return to their countries of origin – this is about 30 per cent of all those who took part in the fighting on the side of the Islamists (Kovalev, 2019). In addition, these are people who are deeply convinced of their rightness, the correctness of what they do, and who can ideologically and psychologically influence followers and sympathizers. Such an ideological influence is the cornerstone in the use of the tactic of “lonely terror,” the characteristics of which are low costs and, often, the formal non-belonging of the terrorist himself to the structures of the Jamaat. It should be noted here that the thesis about the use of this type of terror is not new:

Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of Al-Qaeda (a terrorist organization banned in Russia), called for it in due time. The essence of such a strategy is that persons who may not initially be affiliated with Islamist organizations, but who share religious and political extremist views, must independently and without significant support from Islamist organizations (with the exception of ideological) commit terrorist actions, and organizations, in turn, should take responsibility for their development in fact (Andriukhin, 2018).

There are already many examples of such actions as of 2020: February 2 – an attack using knives in London (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2020), October 16 – the high-profile murder of teacher Samuel Patie in Paris (Vesti, 2020), October 29 – the massacre in Nice in the Catholic Basilica of Notre Dame (Gazeta RU, 2020), November 2 – a terrorist act in Vienna (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2020).

An acute situation also arose in Russia: the Federal Security Service during the year announced the prevention of more than 20 terrorist acts, which cover Moscow, St. Petersburg, Bashkortostan, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Krasnoyarsk, Murmansk, Astrakhan, Rostov, Chuvashia, Tver region, Stavropol Territory, etc. (RIA, 2020). It is important to note that among the failed originators of terrorist attacks in Russia, two categories stand out: the first - immigrants from Central Asia, the second - from the Muslim republics of the South of Russia. They usually returned from the war zone in the Middle East and were located mainly in the large economic centers of the regions, which distinguishes the current type of Islamist underworld from the one that existed in the early 2010s (“forest Ummah”).

In the context of our article, special attention should be paid to the South of Russia, where, according to the old and bad tradition, the positions of Islamists are still strong. Daghestan again draws special attention to itself, where the “Wahhabis,” as in the 1990s, compete fiercely with representatives of official spiritual bodies for a worldview, primarily of youth. Despite loud

statements of some representatives of regional authorities, Daghestan remains a territory where extremist activities are systematic, not episodic. At the same time, Daghestan is becoming one of the centers for coordinating religious and political extremism throughout Russia. According to a number of experts, while the positions of the Wahhabis will be strong in the region, the threat – for the rest of the country will also remain high, since “a person who professes Wahhabi ideology is a potential recruit, he is a sleeping cell” (Nakanune, 2018).

Islamists managed to maintain their presence in the information field, where multilingual modern media still continue to operate – news agencies with trained specialists, television channels, a weblog, communities and information channels on social networks, especially Telegram, which regularly release materials of a fairly high quality of performance (Stavropol Pravda, 2018).

In view of the above, without denying the success of the Russian law enforcement forces in recent years, special attention should be paid to the imbalance between counter-terrorism (force aimed at eliminating already existing Islamist cells) and anti-terrorism (information and ideological, preventive, aimed at destroying the influence of destructive ideology) actions. The “Overall Plan for Countering the Ideology of Terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2019–2023” was adopted in the Russian Federation at the end of 2018, among the goals of which there were the following provisions: improving the effectiveness of preventive work with persons exposed to the ideology of terrorism, as well as those who fell under its influence; implementation of measures to create anti-terrorist consciousness among the population of the Russian Federation; improving information and propaganda measures and protecting the media landscape of the Russian Federation from the ideology of terrorism; development of organizational and other measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the activities of counter-terrorism actors (National Anti-Terrorism Committee, 2018).

In 2019, in terms of anti-terrorist activities, Russian services achieved the following results: financial assets of more than 2 thousand persons suspected in involvement in terrorist activities were blocked; more than 12 thousand targeted preventive measures were carried out with persons exposed to terrorist propaganda, about 14 thousand measures with persons serving sentences for committing crimes, about 35 thousand measures with migrant workers (Rambler, 2019). However, the threat of religious and political extremism does not go away, because there is no clear and simple system, a kind of “life plan” that could be opposed to such a powerful ideological complex as Islamism, which would hit the weakest points of this ideology: on the failure of the “purity” of Islam, which is preached by radicals (Dobayev, 2020); about the utter futility and retrograde system of social relations that Islamists want to build, etc. Not enough attention is paid to the ideological agenda, and if it is paid, then the target audience is not precisely determined.

To understand possible ways to combat the ideology of Islamism, it makes sense to study a certain foreign experience. A number of works of the famous scholar of Islam Dobayev I.P. (Dobayev, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2020, 2021) are devoted to the study of counteracting the ideology of radical Islam. Thus, it is noted that revelatory activity against Islamist leaders and organizations is a priority when developing methods of ideological opposition in the United States of America. Moreover, experts in this field, scientific centers and institutes are involved in this activity; joint expert events are regularly held with the participation of intelligence officers and individuals who have authority with the Muslim community.

It is important to note that American foreign policy is often aimed at supporting “moderate” Islamists who are ready to make a deal with the United States and its allies, thus implementing the principle of “divide and rule.” Emphasis is placed on the elimination of Islamism by the hands of followers of Islam (Cohen, 2001). Visits of Islamist-sympathetic religious and political figures

to the United States are funded and carefully organized, where they contact exclusively with representatives of traditional religions, at most with some moderate reformists. Americans consistently pursue policy to curb violence against a number of social and religious groups in Muslim countries, emphasizing that those who commit such acts rank with Islamist radicals; they actively support local and regional media that criticize religious and political extremism, describe the way of life in the West and the capitalist system in a positive way (Dobaev, 2015).

The realization of a qualitative ideological counteraction requires the use of a system of modern social and information and communication technologies. Thus, the Echelon electronic warfare system uniting the United States and a number of its allies (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) after the events of 2001 was largely focused on ensuring anti-terrorist activities. The system includes the best technical, software solutions designed for interception and analysis of information. The system can recognize any language that is in its base, and if keywords are found, then it can be assumed that this object will fall under the supervision of security services (Bocharnikov, 2013). According to researchers Bocharnikov I.V. and Goncharov S.S., a kind of analogue of such a system in Russia could be the "Yarovaya package," but the desire of the state to save money led to the fact that the technical input is implemented by mobile operators, who are subjects of economic relations for which ensuring state security is behind profit (Bocharnikov, 2019).

Another vector of American anti-terrorism strategy should be noted. Back in 2015, watching the "remigration" of Islamists from Syria and Iraq to their homeland, to the countries of Central Asia, the United States adopted a "Strategy to combat extremist ideas," the object of which was the population of the states of the region, and one of the main goals was the fight against the terrorist threat and ideology of Islamism. Then a new version of the strategy was adopted, which covers the period from 2019 to 2025. A U.S. Department of State report says the U.S. has directed

more than \$9 billion of direct assistance to countries, allocated more than \$50 billion through international organizations, and invested more than \$31 billion in Central Asian economies. American specialized media distribute information materials in the languages of the peoples of Central Asia, which are devoted to Islamist threat (U.S. Department of State, 2018). At the same time, perhaps, the consequence of such an active U.S. policy in the region is the outflow of Islamists to Russia. Therefore, it is important for the Russian state to implement programs that would be comparable with the American Strategy.

Not only large and rich countries such as the United States are able to counter effectively religious and political extremism. For example, Algeria has an experience of creation of single ideological and information center on counteraction to Islamism: by means of massive counter-propaganda, focusing on the provisions of the Quran and Sunnah rejecting violence and terror and the impartial facts from the history of "Wahhabism," religious figures loyal to the authorities made significant progress in correction of a situation and also discredited of the Islamic movement in the eyes of youth (Abdullina, 2017).

Our country has every indication that, with the help of specialists in the field of Islamic studies, authoritative religious figures, to conduct more active and successful counter-propaganda work aimed at risk groups – Muslim youth of Russia and labor migrants arriving in our country from Central Asia. It is necessary to carry out more active work on adaptation and socialization not only for those who came to our country, and in certain cases – directly and our citizens, which will remove them from the category of people "vulnerable" to Islamist influence.

It is important to implement actions aimed at discrediting the image of supposed "heroism" around Islamists, the heads of the "Jamaats" and figures of large Islamist organizations, including through cinema art. So, an excellent example of how to shoot high-quality counter-propaganda is the British mini-series "The State" (Kinpoisk, 2017), the Swedish series "Caliphate"

(Kinopoisk, 2020), the Middle East series "Black Crows" (Kinopoisk, 2017).

Thus, summing up, it can be said that the number of supporters of Islamism in the world in general and Russia in particular, the growing influence of this religious-political extremist ideology, the activation of its members, suggest that the problems of countering Islamism are becoming more urgent than ever. Despite the fact that the Russian Federation is at the forefront of forceful opposition to extremists, there are still areas for improving this policy, especially in the field of ideological opposition. In order to resist effectively Islamist ideology, it is necessary to carry out a number of qualitative and large-scale activities, the development and implementation of which should take into account international experience and understand the importance of using modern social and information and communication technologies.

References

1. Abdullina Y.B. Weakening of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria // 30 years of the Department of Religious Studies of the Ural Federal University. Collection of scientific articles. Ural Federal University named after the First President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, Institute of Sociological and Political Sciences, Department of Philosophy, Department of Religious Studies. – Yekaterinburg, 2017. P. 82–88.
2. Akayev V.H. Islam: sociocultural reality in the North Caucasus.//North Caucasian center of the higher school, Chechen State University. – Grozny, 2003. 264 p.
3. Al-Chirqawi, Said-Afandi. A treasury of godsent knowledge. M, 2003.
4. Andryukhin N.G., Smirnov A.A. Lonely terrorism as a modern form of terrorist activity // International life. – M., 2018. № 9. P. 91–109.
5. Archakov M.K. Material and technical support of Islamic extremist organizations //Readings in memory of Professor Sidorenko A.A. Blagoveshchensk, 2016. № 3. P. 12–20.
6. Bobrovnikov V.O. Islam in the post-Soviet North Caucasus (Daghestan): myth and reality // Islam in the post-Soviet space: a look from the inside out/eds. Malashenko A. and Alcott M.B.; Moscow Carnegie Center. – M., 2001.

7. Bocharnikov I.V. Information counteraction to terrorism in modern conditions // Security problems. M., 2013. № 3 (21). P. 2–3.
8. Bocharnikov I.V., Goncharov S.S. "Sleeping Cells" of the terrorist pseudo-caliphate "IS" in Russia: measures of prevention and counteraction // Science. Society. Defense. M., 2019, T. 7, № 4.
9. Vagabov M. Who is interested in the escalation of the war // NG-Religion. 1999. September 1.
10. Vesti (2020). An Islamist brutally killed a French teacher because of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. Access Mode: <https://www.vesti.ru/article/2473331>
11. Gazeta. RU (2020). Three dead people, a beheaded woman: a terrorist attack occurred in Nice. Access mode: <https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2020/10/29/13338271.shtml>
12. Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation (2020). Portal of legal statistics of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation. Access Mode: http://crimestat.ru/offenses_map
13. Dobaev I.P. To the question of the religious purity of "true Islam" // Humanist of the South of Russia. 2020. Vol. 9. № 3. P. 202–215.
14. Dobaev I.P. Wahhabism as a socio-political phenomenon in Saudi Arabia and the North Caucasus // Scientific thought of the Caucasus. – Rostov-on-Don, 2001. № 3. P. 56–67.
15. Dobayev I.P. Countering new terrorism in the ideological sphere: foreign experience // State and municipal administration. Scientific notes. Rostov-on-Don, 2015. № 3. P. 87–90.
16. Dobayev I.P. Radicalization of Islam in modern Russia. M. – Rostov-on-Don: Social and humanitarian knowledge. 2014. 332 p.
17. Dobayev I.P., Dobayev A.I. Terrorism and anti-terrorism activities in the Russian Federation. Rostov-on-Don.: Publishing House of SFU, 2011. 200 p.
18. Dobayev I.P. Dobayev A.I. Nemchina V.I. Geopolitics and terrorism of the post-modern era. Rostov-on-Don.: Publishing House of SFU, 2015. 370 p.
19. Ermakov I., Mikulsky D. Islam in Russia and Central Asia. M, 1994.
20. Film search (2017). Page of the mini-series "State." Access Mode: <https://www.kinopoisk.ru/series/1046886/>
21. Film search (2017). Page of the series "Black Crows." Access Mode: <https://www.kinopoisk.ru/series/1048714/>
22. Film search (2020). Page of the series "Caliphate." Access Mode: <https://www.kinopoisk.ru/series/1331193/>
23. Kovalev A.A. Current problems of national security of Russia: theoretical and practical aspects / Edited by Shamakhov V.A., St. Petersburg: Kononov A.M. Publishing House, 2019.
24. Kudryavtsev A.V. (2000). Wahhabism: problems of religious extremism in the Northern Caucasus. Access Mode: <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-09-2000/14.Kudriav.shtml>

25. Messner E.E. Rebellion – the name of the third world. Buenos Aires, 1960.
26. On the eve (2018). Orthodox churches were at risk. Access Mode: <https://www.nakanune.ru/articles/113711/>
27. National Anti-Terrorism Committee of Russia (2018). A comprehensive plan to counter the ideology of terrorism in the Russian Federation for 2019–2023 years. Access Mode: <http://nac.gov.ru/terrorizmu-net/kompleksnyy-plan-protivodeystviya-ideologii-terrorizma-v.html>
28. Rambler (2019). The head of the FSB summed up the results of anti-terrorism work in 2019. Access Mode: <https://news.rambler.ru/other/43337054-glava-fsb-podvel-itogi-antiterroristicheskoy-raboty-za-2019-god/>
29. Regnum (2017). The liquidation of Rustam Asilderov in Daghestan is a major success of the security forces. Access Mode: <https://regnum.ru/news/society/2213731.html>
30. RIA (2020). Cases of preventing terrorist attacks in Russia in 2020. Access Mode: <https://ria.ru/20201015/terakty-1579936608.html>
31. Rossiiskaya gazeta (2020). Another cold-weapons attack occurred in London. Режим доступа: <https://rg.ru/2020/02/02/v-londone-proizoshel-ocherednoj-terakt-s-primeneniem-holodnogo-oruzhiia.html>
32. Rossiiskaya gazeta (2020). In the center of Vienna near synagogue shootout took place. Access Mode: <https://rg.ru/2020/11/02/v-centre-veny-u-sinagogi-proizoshla-strelba.html>
33. Silantyev R.A. (2007). Russia is Wahhabi. Access Mode: <http://www.gazetanv.ru/article/?id=833>
34. Stavropol truth (2018). From N.P. Patrushev's speech, during a visiting conference in Cherkessk, 11.04.2018 Terrorists rush to the Caucasus. Access Mode: https://yandex.ru/turbo/stpravda.ru/s/20180413/terroristy_rvutsya_na_kavkaz_119517.html
35. TASS (2018). CIS APC: "sleeping cells" of terrorists exist in many countries. Reference date: 04.12.2020. Access Mode: <https://tass.ru/politika/5736238>
36. Khalidov V. (2012). Is dialogue with the "forest ummah" possible? Access Mode: http://islamio.ru/news/society/vozmozhen_li_dialog_s_lesnoy_ummoy_/
37. Khanbabaev K.M. Stages of the spread of Wahhabism in Daghestan // Alima and scientists against Wahhabism. Makhachkala, 2001.
38. Hoperskaya L.L. "Islamic State 2.0": a growing threat in Eurasian space // Causasian Science Bridge. 2018. 1(1). P. 51–64.
39. Cohen A. Hizbut-Taqhrir. An Emerging Treat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia // The Heritage Foundation. 2003. 30 May.
40. U.S. Department of State (2018). United States Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025: Advancing Sovereignty and Economic Prosperity (Overview). Available at: <https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-for-central-asia-2019-2025-advancing-sovereignty-and-economic-prosperity/>

PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASSUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

YUSUF DJABRAILOV. PRESENT RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF DAGHESTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL (CIVIC) IDENTITY // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: religious identity, civic identity, national identity, religiosity, Islam, Christianity; confession.

Yusuf Djabrailov,
PhD(Politics), Senior Research Associate,
Regional Center of Ethnopolitical Studies,
Daghestan Scientific Center, RAS

Citation: Djabrailov Yu. Present Religious Situation in the Republic of Daghestan in the Context of National (Civic) Identity // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, № 3 (313), P. 35–46.
DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.03

Abstract. Based on the results of a sociological survey carried out among Daghestani youth, the article establishes the relationship between the aspects of religious and national (civic) identity in the light of the respondents being citizens of Russia.

The author of the article notes that issues relating to religious and confessional identity remain high on the international agenda and has entered the public discourse of

Russia. Consequently, with Russia seeking to strengthen national unity, a better understanding of the issues regarding mutual influences of the social identities of its peoples is required. A thorough analysis of the transformation process of the religious identity of Daghestanis and identification of its current development trends within a multiethnic society require an in-depth sociological study. Historically, long-term interaction of ethnic and religious aspects results in religion taking root in the psychology of peoples and affecting almost all areas of public and personal life: culture, politics, habits, customs, etc.

At the 2013 meeting of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations, Vladimir Putin said the following: *"Our core objective is to enhance peace and harmony in the multiethnic Russian society, so that our people feel that they are citizens of a single country regardless of their ethnicity and religious beliefs. I see this as key to the sustainable and successful development of our nation. [1]"*

The author points to the fact that interest in religion, and in particular Islam, has grown considerably among the youth. Thus, the survey conducted among senior students of almost all large universities in the Republic of Daghestan is intended to determine possible religious discrimination and its impact on the shaping of national (civic) identity.

A total of 560 young people of 16 nationalities took part in the survey; 32 respondents (5%) did not report their nationality. All ethnic groups of Daghestan were represented among the respondents: Avars - 201 (36%); Dargins - 94 (17%); Lezgins - 78 (14%); Kumyks - 44 (8%); Laks - 37 (7%); Tabasarans - 20 (4%); Russians - 18 (3%); Azerbaijanis - 9 (2); Rutuls - 7 (1); Tsakhurs - 7 (1); Aghuls - 6 (1); others - 7 (1%). Two thirds of the respondents (378 - 67%) indicated that they lived in urban areas, while one third (182 - 33%) resided in rural areas; of the individuals surveyed 277 (49%) were men and 283 (51%) were women.

The method of the sociological research was a questionnaire based survey. The study confirmed that the population of Daghestan is extremely religious.

Table 1

Do you consider yourself a religious person?

Response options	<i>(Percentage of the total number of respondents)</i>
Yes, I do	84.7
No, I don't	5.9
I believe in a higher power, but I do not adhere to any religion	5.1
Not sure	4.3

Table № 1 indicates that a large majority of the respondents (84.7%) are religious; 5.9 per cent do not consider themselves religious; 5.1 per cent believe in a higher power, but do not adhere to any religion; and only 4.3 per cent find it difficult to answer.

Table 2

If you are a religious person, to which religion or religious movement do you belong?
(Percentage of the total number of respondents)

Response options	<i>(Percentage of the total number of respondents)</i>
Islam	88.1
Christianity	2.5
Agnosticism, atheism	1.5
Not sure	7.9

The vast majority (approx. 96%) of the population of the Republic of Dagestan is Muslim. Table № 2 provides the distribution of responses to the question “If you are a religious person, to which religion or religious movement do you belong?” Of those questioned, 88.1 per cent are Muslim, 2.5 per cent are Christian, 1.5 per cent are agnostic or atheist, and about 7.9 per cent found it difficult to answer.

Table 3

**If you are a religious person, do you follow all
the mandatory religious observances?
(Percentage of the total number of respondents)**

Response options	<i>(Percentage of the total number of respondents)</i>
Yes	40.7
Yes, partially	37.9
No	14.5
Not sure	6.9

The question “*If you are a religious person, do you follow all the mandatory religious observances?*” (Table № 3) is intended to measure religiosity of the respondents. According to the responses received, 40.7 per cent of the respondents practice all the religious observances (the author calls them devoutly religious); 37.9 per cent follow some of the observances (those are religious); 14.5 per cent do not practice religious observances (those respondents question their faith); and only 6.9 per cent found it difficult to answer.

The question “*What is religion for you personally?*” has multi select answer options. The results obtained are as follows: 72 per cent of the respondents say it is closeness to and communication with the Almighty; 45 per cent consider religion as moral and ethical compass; 38 per cent think that religion means observance of religious rites and practices; 15 per cent view religion as the basis of their national tradition and culture; only 5 per cent characterize it as a relic of the past or prejudice; and 9 per cent of the respondents found it difficult to answer the question.

Analysis of the results of the study identified the following pattern: the more religious the respondents are, the more they view religion as a reflection of a believer’s personal relationship with the Almighty and, conversely, the less religious they are, the higher proportion of the respondents consider it as the basis of the national tradition and culture.

Table 4

**In your opinion, is the principle of equality
of the traditional denominations being violated in Russia?
(Percentage of the total number of respondents)**

Response options	(Percentage of the total number of respondents)
Yes	30.9
No	31.8
Not sure	37.3

Table № 4 shows the distribution of responses to the question *“In your opinion, is the principle of equality of traditional denominations being violated in Russia?”* It indicates that 30.9 per cent of the respondents are of the opinion that the principle of equality of confessions in Russia is violated; also, almost one third of those interviewed for the sociological survey say that there is ethnic discrimination. Almost the same number of people (31.8%) holds the opinion that in Russia the legislative norms of equality of traditional confessions are fully respected. The majority of the respondents (37.3%) found it difficult to answer this question.

The study goes on to explore to what extent Daghestani young people accept their being part of Russia’s civil society, and sharing civil responsibilities and duties. And in this regard the respondents were asked about their sense of community with the citizens of Russia. In order to determine the place of civic identification in the hierarchy of social identities, the respondents were also asked about their feeling of community with other social groups (Table № 5).

Table 5

**How do you evaluate your sense
of community with the following social groups?
(Percentage of the total number of respondents)**

	Strong	Moderate	None	Not sure
Citizens of Russia	38.4	40.9	12.5	8.2
People of the same nationality as myself	60	28.6	5.5	5.9
Residents of my city or village	54.3	30.6	8	7.1
People who follow the same religion as myself	62.5	25	3.6	8.9
Residents of my republic	48.6	33.9	8	9.5
People who share my political views	23.9	38.9	20.7	16.5
People with the same level of income as myself	24.4	25.9	29.5	20.2
People in the same profession as myself	44.3	35	10.7	10
People who have the same outlook on life	55.6	27.5	8	8.9
People of my age	31.3	36.4	18	14.3

As shown in Table № 5, there is a clear dominance of ethnic and religious identities in the Republic of Daghestan. It also worth noting that young people display civic identity to a lesser extent than other group identities, such as: residents of my city or village; residents of my republic; people in the same profession as I; and people who have the same outlook on life.

It should be noted that the indicators of civic identification are slightly higher for non-religious respondents than for religious ones. Thus, 48 per cent of non-believers and 39 per cent of believers state that they have a strong feeling of community with the citizens of Russia. However, the indicators of civic identification of Christians

and Muslims differ significantly. According to the responses received, 79 per cent of Christian respondents have a strong sense of community with the citizens of Russia, while only 39 per cent of Muslim respondents feel that way.

The author points out that all Christian respondents are Russians. Consequently, it is not a purely religious factor, but more likely an ethnic and religious one. As the religion of constituent people, Orthodoxy has the capacity to address the right of its followers to spiritual, moral and ethnocultural development.

The author notes that the study does not aim to determine the areas of possible ethnic and religious discrimination, which requires further sociological research. Nevertheless, politicians and public and religious figures most frequently raise the issue of the ban on hijab and construction of mosques in cities when discussing religious discrimination. In this connection, a Duma deputy from the A Just Russia party said the following: *“Even given a strong desire and funds for construction, it is impossible to build a mosque in Moscow today, which provides grounds for justified outrage in the Muslim community. [2]”*

It should be noted that these issues do not lead to social differentiation in the traditionally Muslim regions of the North Caucasus (Daghestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia). Here in Daghestan, known as the cradle of all traditional religions of Russia, members of many ethnic groups and religions have centuries-long experience in mutually respectful coexistence. But outside the region, Muslims experience a certain “religious discomfort” that prompts them to draw a line between their territories and the territories of others. This is due to the federalist system, which implies that the development of a particular religion is determined by the national composition of the population of the federal subject.

With this approach, Orthodoxy as the religion of the constituent people has a broad range of opportunities throughout the country, while Islam is becoming a regional factor rather than a federal one. Thus, it is rightly noted that the current state of affairs results in the following pattern: parochialism -

conservatism – archaization and marginalization of religious consciousness [3]. Consequently, in order to “federalize” Islam it should be officially given federal status, simply by virtue of the fact that Islam has historically been a federal phenomenon.

Many centuries of development of world religions on the territory of Russia has created additional advantage over countries with a religious minority in developing a strategy to address problems of religious practices within a foreign cultural environment. It also gives a significant impetus for developing a conflict-free strategy to help the representatives of all religions adjust to the life in a secular state. The author optimistically predicts that the future of Russia is based on the pluralism of various social and cultural groups who share civic values. Any attempts to emphasize religious and ethnic exclusivity in the country are a serious disruptive factor in the formation of a single political nation and a supranational and non-denominational civic identity.

However, Muslims citizens of the North Caucasus are given no privilege in the religious sphere over migrants from Muslim countries. In a sense, a migrant temporarily living in a foreign country is better able to tolerate religious discrimination than a believer holding citizenship. In this case, being a citizen only makes a person feel inequality in the country more acutely.

The author notes that further study of civic identity among Muslims confirms that Islamic socialization of young people does not impede shaping of civic identity. Thus, 43 per cent of devoutly religious Muslim respondents, 34 per cent of religious respondents and 21.4 per cent of hesitant respondents state that they feel significant social connection with citizens of Russia. As we can see, the more religious Muslim respondents are, the higher their indicators of solidarity with citizens of Russia. 40 per cent of Muslim respondents evaluate their sense of community with Russian citizens as “moderate”, while 13 per cent of those questioned do not feel any social connection. Among Muslims with strong sense of community with people of their faith, 46.3 per cent of the respondents have high indicators of civic identity.

Muslims who do not feel social connection with fellow believers have significantly lower level of civic identification (30%). According to sociological studies conducted in other regions of Russia, respondents who feel no social connection with fellow believers have significantly lower key indicators of trust, which is vital for interethnic harmony, as compared with those who feel such a connection [4].

In our opinion, increasing sense of local identity in the minds of young people and lower indicators of civic identity stem from systemic social and political problems of the state which keeps individuals from enjoying their full citizenship. According to the 2019 nationwide monitoring of public opinion by the Levada Center, which covered a sample of 1600 people over the age of 18.58 per cent of the respondents do not believe they can influence events in the country; 11 per cent believe they can influence to a great extent; 27 per cent think their scope of influence is significant; and 4 per cent of the respondents found it difficult to answer [5].

The author identifies uneven representation of multiple identities in the social, political, economic and cultural structure of Russian society as the major obstacle to a common national identity. Consequently, the state, as the main regulator of the nation-building process, should address the interests of representatives of all confessions and ethnic groups and guard against any imbalances.

The study goes on to examine day-to-day interreligious relations. The respondents were invited to consider the Bogardus scale (Table № 6).

Table 6

Are you ready to accept a person of other religion as your ...

	Yes	No	Not sure
Boss	81.9	9.6	8.5
Colleague	89.4	4.6	6
Neighbour	91.8	2.9	5.3
Friend	77.8	10.3	11.9
Spouse	24.9	53.2	21.9

According to the answers received, Daghestani students have positive attitudes towards people of other faith in different areas of social interaction. The overwhelming majority of the respondents are ready to accept a person of other faith as their boss (81.9%), colleague (89.4%), neighbour (91.8%) and friend (77.8%).

At the same time, there is a certain social distance between representatives of different religions when it comes to spouses. Thus, 24.9 per cent of the respondents expressed their readiness to marry a person who adheres to a different religion. It is most likely because of their desire to preserve own religious traditions and values. According to the Shafi'i madhhab widespread in Daghestan, restrictions on marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man are imposed due to the fact that women are influenced by their husbands and their religion to a greater extent. A number of conditions must be met in order for a marriage between a Muslim man and a Christian woman to be considered permissible. According to the Hanafi madhhab, which has become less widespread in Daghestan, there are no conditions for such a marriage other than the Christian faith [6].

This explains that 33.9 per cent of Muslim women and 66.1 per cent of Muslim men are ready to marry people with other religious background. According to the degree of religiosity, 17.9 per cent of Muslims with deep religious faith, 18.3 per cent of believers and 54.3 per cent of those that remain hesitant are ready to marry people of other faith. As far as religious affiliation is concerned, 20.8 per cent of Muslims and 50 per cent of Christians are ready to have a person of other religion as a life partner.

Conclusion

The author concludes that at present, in the Republic of Daghestan, young people retain high levels of religious and ethnic identities. The study identified a relationship between a weak national (civic) identity amongst young people and their perception of being ethnically and religiously discriminated. At the

same time, it was found that neither strengthening nor weakening of religious identity would have any impact on the sense of community of young people with the “citizens of Russia” social group. However, the study found that devout Muslim respondents have a higher level of civic identity compared to those who partially follow religious observances or do not follow them at all. Also, Muslims with a robust sense of community with fellow believers have higher indicators of civic identity.

The vast majority of young people are ready to accept representatives of other religions and ethnic groups in the sphere of interpersonal relations, which confirms that interfaith relations in the region remain stable.

Nevertheless, the results of this study show a significant discrepancy in the indicators regarding ethnic and religious discrimination between Russians and non-Russians. This is partly due to a different understanding of the relationship between civic and ethnocultural identities on the Islamic-Orthodox borderline. Russian young people associate involvement in the historical development of the country and inclusion in a single cultural space with the Russian identity to a larger extent than representatives of other ethnic groups. For representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus and other ethnic groups, Russian citizenship and the sense of unity of many peoples under the wing of a single state seem more relevant [7].

Thus, the first step towards strengthening of civic identity amongst Daghestani youth is to ensure the important constitutional principle of equality of all citizens under the law, regardless of their gender, race, nationality, language, origin, property and professional status, place of residence and religious views.

References

1. Putin Vladimir V. Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations. [Electronic resource] // Website “Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia”. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17536> (date of access: 16.07.2021).

2. Deputat Gosdumy` podnyal pered zampredom pravitel'stva vopros nexvatki mechetey v Moskve. [Electronic resource] // Website "Islam News". URL: <https://islamnews.ru/news-deputat-gosdumy-podnyal-pered-zampredom-pravitelstva-vopros-nekhvatki-mechetey-v-moskve> (date of access: 16.07.2021).
3. Magomedov M. Mechet` kazhdomu gorodu // Nur-ul islam, 2020. – No. 7. – P. 2.
4. Ryzhova Svetlana V. Religiosity, Ethno-Confessional Identity and Problems of Interethnic Accord // Sociologicheskie issledovaniya, 2019. – No. 2. – P. 49–58.
5. Public opinion – 2019. Moskva: Levada Center, 2020. – P. 36.
6. Fetva otnositel'no dozvolennosti braka s zhenshchinami Pisaniya // Website "Islam v Daghestane". URL: <https://islamdag.ru/verouchenie/22593> (date of access: 07.09.2020).
7. Serikov A.V., Skudnova I.B. Specifics of Formation of Regional Identity of Youth of the South of Russia // Social'no-gumanitarny'e znaniya, 2013. – No. 7. – P. 299.

ASIYAT BOTASHEVA. PROBLEMS OF THE ELITE CONFLICT IN KARACHAYEVO-CIRCASSIA // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: political power, political elite, elite conflict, federal elite, regional elite, civil society, Karachayevo-Circassia.

Asiyat Botasheva,
PhD(Politics), Professor,
Institute of International Relations,
Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University

Citation: Botasheva A. Problems of the Elite Conflict in Karachayevo-Circassia // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, № 3 (313), P. 46–56. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.04

Abstract. Political elite is a social group that has risen to political "stardom" as claiming to exercise authority and control the masses. The elites are undoubtedly generated by social inequality rather than unequal amounts of talent or individual, spiritual other differences. Elite education, professional success, great ambitions, extensive expertise, standing in society, the right connections, assertiveness, etc. are of great importance.

When describing political elites V.A. Kruchkov, A.K. Skovikov and O.N. Titov state the following: “By combining numerous definitions of the elite, one can identify its most common characteristics, such as domination and exploitation (K. Marx), great competence (V. Pareto), superior organization skills (G. Mosca), authority and moral superiority (S. Keller, L. Boden), prestige (H. Lasswell) and creativity (A. Toynbee). Most authors, while noting the relativity of the concept of “elite”, agree that real power, ability to influence the course of events, access to resources and strong social standing are the main features of the elite. The elite is a minority that controls the majority” [9].

The author notes that peculiarities of the formation and development of the political elite in Russia are source of debate. Researchers from the South-Russian Institute of Management of Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (SRIM RANEPa), who study the Russian and regional political elite, register a diverse range of opinions on the maturity of the Russian elite. They report that “in 2016, about 80 per cent of experts used the term quasi-elite” and note that “the assessment was significantly more negative if compared with the results of the expert survey in 2013” [1]. Followers of the Rostov school suggest that “neither composition, nor management behaviour and legitimacy of modern elites are well-established. Moreover, on a number of indicators elites show signs of deviance” [5]. Some experts contend that in the face of new political and economic challenges posed by geopolitical rivals of Russia, traditional models of leadership can be considered outdated; therefore, the structure of power requires optimization, as well as there is a need in “new approaches, comprising not only traditional methods of bolstering management activities, but also strategies enabling to pave the best way to achieve the goal” [11]. Describing regional elites as a whole, the researchers rightly point out to “inefficiencies of the democratic mechanisms for selecting new members of the elite, fostering career advancement of the right people who primarily

pursue personal and group interests" [1]. The Yug expert and analytical centre, in cooperation with the Club Regionov federal expert network, has carried out a joint study on elite conflicts in the North Caucasian Federal District and the Southern Federal District. The study confirms the findings of the political scientists from the Rostov School. The research materials published in 2020 indicate that "conflicts among elites proved to be one of the most intense in the south of the country"; the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic ranked second in the rating of 15 regions with tense elite-related conflicts [8].

The author observes that post-Soviet Karachayevo-Circassia is characterized by strong trends towards elite conflicts. Researchers have always pointed to the complexity of interethnic relations, increasing crime rates, including youth crime, uncontrolled migration, growing threat of drug trafficking, increasing presence of radical religious groups, etc. At present, some of the above-mentioned problems have become less pressing than at the end of the last century. However, the Yug expert and analytical centre study entitled "Measuring elite conflicts in the southern regions of Russia" indicates that increasing conflict among elites in the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic has reached a critical level and is estimated at eight points out of ten. Moreover, opponents to the existing elites in the republic have stepped up their efforts a great deal. According to the experts, the head of the republic Rashid Temrezov is under too much pressure from the opposing parties in comparison with his colleagues from other regions of the North Caucasian Federal District. Consequently, Temrezov's primary objective is to extend the term of office of the head of the republic as much as possible, since as a political figure he seeks to ensure the appointment of a successor and avoid potential criminal prosecution, which is possible due to the imbalance between interests of opposing political elites in the republic; furthermore, experts conclude that the head of the republic is in an extremely precarious position [8].

It should be noted that there is traditionally no unified vision of the republic's political and economic course in the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic and therefore trend towards the imbalance of the political elites is on the rise. Nevertheless, Rashid Temrezov has been the head of the republic consistently since 2011. This means that the young politician enjoys the support of both the influential clans of the republic and the federal government; moreover, without much political experience he managed to achieve a balance in the demanding context of constant elite-related conflict in the republic. Nevertheless, one can reasonably predict that the end of his term of office in September 2021 will trigger a new round of conflict between political elites in the republic.

The author notes that political confrontation between the elites in the republic is especially intense for a number of objective and subjective reasons. The key determinants are: historically rooted resentment; extremely high stratification of society; dwindling incomes of average citizens of the republic; and strategic geographical position of the republic, bordering Stavropol Krai in the north, Krasnodar Krai in the west, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic in the east and Georgia and Abkhazia in the south. Also, the parties opposing the existing government make use of "ethnization of the conflict and speculation on existing or contrived ethno-religious, ethno-linguistic and other contradictions" [12], contributing to the escalation of the situation in the multinational republic of Karachayevo-Circassia. Thus, in November, 2018, the Cherkess and Abazin groups signed a mass petition to the President, requesting the permission to break away from the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic. They based the petition on ethnic oppression and violation of tacit national equality (distribution of significant posts in the republic between representatives of five ethnic groups). These claims were earlier voiced in a letter to the President, which contained a petition for a representative of the

Abazin diaspora to retain the post of head of the Federal Tax Service for the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic [10].

The author points to the fact that the fight against corruption in the republic plays an important role in escalating the elite rivalry and, at the same time, contributes to a new balance of power. The clampdown on large criminal groups that began in 2019 affected the interests of powerful political figures in the region; in particular criminal cases were opened against Raul Arashukov and his son Rauf Arashukov (advisor to the general director of Gazprom Mezhhregiongaz and senator of the Russian Federation, respectively). According to media sources, the Arashukovs organized a criminal group and exploited connections not only in the officialdom, but also in law enforcement agencies; there was “a law enforcement bloc of 10–12 people in high positions that covered up for the Arashukovs” [6].

Similarly, in 2020, the region’s law enforcement bloc was purged following the reopening of criminal cases related to A. Kaitov, who had been convicted of murder of seven people. The media reports that “there is an ongoing investigation into embezzlement of approx. 1 billion roubles from the energy sector of the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, which until recently was controlled by Kaitov. A dozen cases of embezzlement from Avtodor (road building enterprise) are being investigated. This enterprise used to be fully controlled by Kaitov, with his relatives and friends in the leadership. Also, police are investigating cases of embezzlement of funds from Vodokanal (water supply enterprise), which passed into the ownership of the Kaitov family in a mysterious way. And now they are reopening the investigation into several unsolved killings in the republic...” [2].

In 2020, there was an open confrontation between the elites in connection with the Cherkessk mayoral election. Supporters of the late S. Derev, former mayor of Cherkessk, Avtodor CEO A. Kaitov, acting mayor E. Belanova and others were involved in the conflict.

The author notes that all significant political developments in the republic have been accompanied by increased activity of the opposition to the head of the republic. As political scientist E. Shcherbina has said, “ahead of the end of the governor’s term in 2021, politicking is heating up”, propelling new information attacks and fake news [3].

Thus, a constant conflict of elites in the republic is attributed to a number of factors that determine the outbursts of political scandals, formation of cliques and backing different leaders. According to A. Ebzeev and U. Adzhiev, “in the multiethnic subjects (regions) of Russia, a change in the style of management resulted in a bifurcation of the functions of regional elites: in addition to their direct functions in the governmental structure, they also had latent but dominant ones.” They believe that there are functions enshrined in the constitutions of the constituent elements of the Federation, which therefore should be considered by the political elites, and there are also parallel directives of the federal government. The very change in the formation of the political elite in post-Soviet Russia entailed the rotation of the Soviet era political elite – the former Communist “nomenklatura”. The establishment of a fundamentally new system of relations between the federal and regional governments caused a certain imbalance in the functioning of the newly formed political elite both in the centre and in the regions [14].

The 21st century is without doubt a unique century, since the development of technological capacities, science and new technologies – such as robotics, nanotechnology, the digital world, etc. – has leaped forward. As for systems of governance, they remain the same: unitary state, federation and confederation. Without calling for a change in centuries-old state structures, we nevertheless note that most leading countries are federal states or gravitate to federalism. Thus, European countries are divided into separate administrative and territorial entities that have full legal and political independence, but retain subordination to a central government. The U.S. has purposefully

opted for federalism and seeks to democratically decentralize State authority. And the main advantage of this system of governance is that it eliminates the possibility of usurpation of power and blocks takeover by an authoritarian ruler.

Russian scholars are rather pessimistic about Russian federalism ("Russian Federalism at the Modern Stage: Stagnation or Simulation?" [4]) and define it as "unitary federalism" [13]. The researchers also take into account the fact that in Russia relations between the federal government and federal subjects (regions) are traditionally rigid, which is reflected in legislation. In the view of S. Turusin, the unitarization of Russia is evidenced by the following trends and provisions:

- 1) the federal government independently implements "comprehensive legislative regulation on all issues under shared jurisdiction";

- 2) the delimitation of competence between the Federation and its subjects is reduced;

- 3) the heads of the federal districts can apply supervisory powers over the regional authorities;

- 4) the office of the plenipotentiary representative of the president has been granted control over key regional authorities, etc.

It may be concluded from the above that firstly, there is a possibility of forming similar executive bodies in federal districts, and secondly, a certain intermediate level of governance between the federal and regional levels is emerging in Russia. S. Turusin rightly concludes that such a level of control of power is not provided for by the Constitution and as a result, the federal government has no mechanisms to control the activities of plenipotentiaries, which means no "control over controllers" [13].

Without political and economic independence, the governors find themselves under pressure from both the central government and local elites. As a result, the elite conflict that is supposed to ensure checks and balances and build a certain consensus in the society, turns into a "war" of compromising evidence, loud political slogans and pursuit of private economic

interests under the pretext of fighting political competitors. There is also an increase in clan centralization (since it is possible to withstand political turmoil as a group, not necessarily a group of relatives) and continuing politicization of non-political factors such as economic, environmental and other civic initiatives.

In the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, there is an increased emergence of new political elites due to the following factors:

- bid to have the same preferences as other political forces at the pinnacle of power;
- desire to preserve businesses and shield them from encroachments of the current clique in power;
- wish to gain riches and benefits from the governor's office;
- aspiration to have preferences from allocation of budgetary resources and perquisites of high offices;
- desire to invest in political power;
- lack of ability to influence legislative initiatives in the region;
- lobbying the interests of certain influential clans;
- high decile coefficient of income differentiation in the republic;
- increase of the Gini index in the country, including the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic, etc.

As a result, in the small republic there are a strong tendency to rally around plenty of political figures and rather high pluralism of opinions.

The author notes that S. Starovoitov, the CEO of the Club Regionov federal expert network and the head of the expert council for the Yug analytical centre, rightly points out that in the current atmosphere of political competition possible opponents to the governors are: [12]

- from among federal actors: certain representatives of the Presidential administration, members of the Federation Council, State Duma deputies, officials from the envoy's offices, as well as influential businessmen and officials from state corporations;

- from among regional actors: leaders of parliamentary parties and local political elites, influential regional entrepreneurs and congressmen;
- governors of other regions if they compete for the federal funding and large-scale infrastructure projects, have a territorial dispute or personal conflict;
- leaders of public opinion, aspiring for key positions at the federal and regional levels;
- influential social activists who advocate for the “green” agenda, among other things.

The author expands this list by adding leaders of public opinion, leaders of political opposition, television and show business stars, heads of financial and industrial groups and other famous people who support the protest rhetoric against the existing government.

Analysts opine that the elite conflict in the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic is a stark reflection of the same process at the federal level – at the level of the “struggle of the Kremlin towers” [12].

Researchers suggest that there is a need for continuous monitoring of the conflict potential in the republic and further expert analysis of the elite conflict in the regions; the escalation of the conflict between political elites and “the loss of control over this conflict can seriously undermine the political system of the state or region, even damage the legitimacy of the authorities and paralyze their functioning” [12].

The author concludes that the republic, as well as Russia as a whole, can develop through either evolution or involution. Further reforms, domestic and foreign policies, a balance between different courses of development and welfare of the people depend greatly on the competence of the federal and regional political elites of Russia. United political elites and a consensus between differently vectored political interests would facilitate strengthening of the society of Russia, which is vital due to increased globalist pressure on Russia.

The national interests of Russia set new rules for the elite: be mindful of their responsibility to the people, be ready to implement reforms and introduce improvements that reflect the aspirations of the enlightened and educated elite, not of those who care about enrichment while imitating the frenzied activities for the benefit of society. A. Kankia maintains that “if the current Russian ruling elite continues to disgracefully imitate development, there may be a social explosion similar to social disruptions in Tunisia, Kyrgyzstan and Egypt” [7]. This means eliminating corrupt officials and incompetent leaders from the Russian elite and drawing the attention of the elite to the moral, cultural and educational machinery. The elites must act in accordance with the principles aimed at solving national problems and addressing universal needs. Also matters ‘human dimension’ of activities, whose primary objective is a public good.

References

1. Batanina I.A., Vorontsov S.A., Ponedelkov A.V. On the Status and Mechanisms of Recruiting the Modern Russian Political Elite // *Izvestiya Tula State University. Humanitarian sciences*, 2017. – No. 3. – P. 3–15.
2. V Karachayevo-Circassia polnym hodom idet zachistka regiona ot odnogo iz samykh kriminal'nykh klanov respubliki, kotoryj vozglavlyayet Ali Kaitov, ranee otsidevshij srok za ubijstvo semi chelovek // Website “Infopressa”. URL: <http://infopressa.com/2020/10/06/russica2-v-karachaev-cherkessii-polnym-hodom-idet-zachistka-regiona-ot-odnogo-iz-samyh-kriminalnyh-klanov-respybliki-kotoryi-vozglavliaet-ali-kaitov-ranee-otsidevshii-srok-za-ybiistvo-semi-chelov/> (date of access: 16.01.2021).
3. V KCHR obsuzhdayut intrigi s vyborami mera CHERkesska i vokrug Temrezova. // Website “The Caucasus Post”. URL: <https://capost.media/news/politika/kcr-discuss-with-intrigi-vyborami-of-the-mayor-of-cherkessk-and-around-glwy-kcr/> (date of access: 16.01.2021).
4. Zametina Tamara V. Russian Federalism at the Modern Stage: Stagnation or Simulation? // *Vestnik Saratov State Law Academy*, 2018. – No. 6(125). – P. 22–33.
5. Zmiyak S.S., Artyuhin O.A. Regional'nye elitologicheskie issledovaniya. (Rostovskaya nauchnaya shkola). // *Gosudarstvennoe i municipal'noe upravlenie. Uchenye zapiski SKAGS*, 2008. – No. 4. – P. 149–159.
6. Kak sem'ya Arashukovykh vorovala milliony, prevrashchaya pensionerov v dolzhnikov: rassledovanie Ul'yany Skojbedy // Website “Komsomolskaya Pravda”. URL: <https://www.stav.kp.ru/daily/26947/3998976/> (date of access: 16.01.2021).

7. Kankia Alik G. The Influence of the Political Elite to Form the Foreign Policy of the Government. [Electronic resource] // Humanities scientific researches, 2015. – No. 3. URL: <http://human.snauka.ru/2015/03/10138> (date of access: 16.01.2021).
8. Konflikty elit v KCHR okazalis' samymi napryazhennymi v SKFO // Website "Politika09". URL: <https://politika09.com/politika/konflikty-elit-v-kchr-okazalis-samymi-napryazhennymi-v-skfo/> (date of access: 16.01.2021).
9. Kruchkov V.A., Skovikov A.K., Titova O.N. The Political Elite: A Theoretical Aspect // Fundamental Researches, 2013. – Vol. 8 (No. 11). – P. 1736–1740.
10. Mezhnacional'nyj konflikt v Karachaevo-Cherkessii: cherkesy i abaziny prosyat Putina vyvesti ih iz sostava respubliki // Website "Stolica-S". URL: <https://stolica-s.su/archives/166992> (date of access: 16.01.2021).
11. Ponedelkov A.V., Vorontsov S.A. The Leadership-Elite Component of the Modern Russian Political Control at the Regional Level // Gosudarstvennoe i municipal'noe upravlenie. Uchenye zapiski SKAGS, 2015. – No. 1. – P. 134–138.
12. Rejting konfliktnosti elit v regionah YUga Rossii // Website "Club Regionov". URL: <http://club-rf.ru/theme/531> (date of access 27.01.2021).
13. Turusin S.V. Unitary Federalism: Essence and Historical Forms // Vestnik Samarskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: ekonomika i upravlenie, 2013. – No. 7(108). – P. 74–79.
14. Ebzeev A.A., Adzhiev U.M. Geostrategiya etnicheskikh elit regiona (na primere Severo-Kavkazskogo regiona) // Social'no-gumanitarnye znaniya, 2011. – No. 8. – P. 62–74.

2021.03.001. KSENIA ATAMALI. TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA // *Condensed abstract.*

Keywords: Central Asia, CIS, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, radical Islam, international terrorism, geopolitics, regional security, CSTO, SCO.

Ksenia ATAMALI,

Editor, Department of Asia and Africa,
INION RAN

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.05

1. Nurdinova K.Kh. Radicalization of Islam as a Threat to Security of Central Asia // *Vestnik Oshskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, 2020, № 1–3. P. 334–339.

2. Trusova A.A., Cherniaev M.S. Terrorism Threats to Central Asia: Background, Areas, Regional Security Problems // *Postsovetskie issledovaniya*, 2020, Vol. 3, № 6. P. 470–478.

K.Kh. Nurdinova [1] examines threats and security challenges that the states of Central Asia are facing. One of the main challenges is religious and political extremism, since radical international and regional extremist organizations are spreading radical Islam ideologies and undermining social and political structures of states. Some experts believe that the socio-economic crisis and corruption contribute to the development of radical Islamic organizations. The problem of regional security and stability is further aggravated by the following factors:

- lack of full-fledged democratic institutions, which may result in a coup d'état;
- power rivalry in the region and mutual personal hostility of certain officials;
- political changes in a single country can threaten stability in neighbouring states.

In both Middle East and Africa, radical Islam in Central Asia is regarded as a major threat. Radical ideas have been spreading over the Soviet period, and in the years of “perestroika” they began to replace the socialist ideals. Moreover, it is the international border with Afghanistan that makes the influence of radical Islam in Central Asia especially strong, destabilizing the situation in all five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since the traditions of Islam and opposition to secularism have a long history here, the influence of radical Islamism in the region has proved to be quite strong. For instance, radical Islam was greatly affecting policy of Tajikistan after the civil war in the 1990s, which in fact was a reflection of the struggle between the secular and theocratic forces. In addition, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT)

was officially allowed in Tajikistan for a long time and its members were represented in the government structure.

The underground religious organizations made use of multiple internal problems of the Central Asian countries to discredit and undermine the secular regimes. Interethnic tensions, low standards of living, high unemployment and corruption rates, weak governance and the spread of drug addiction and radical religious and nationalist ideas are also hazards. The most significant events associated with radical Islam are the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992–1997, the Batken Conflict in Kyrgyzstan in 1999–2000 and the Andijan unrest in Uzbekistan in May 2005.

The author notes that the Islamists in Afghanistan are going through a kind of consolidation period, having managed to overcome internal discord following the death of the Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and to occupy the territories bordering Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Radical Islamism in Central Asia is spread to a greater extent in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Such an uneven spread may be due to the ethnic factor that brings Uzbekistan and Tajikistan closer to Afghanistan. Tajiks and Uzbeks are the second and third largest ethnic groups in Afghanistan, respectively. After appearing in early 1990s, Islamist parties and organizations have become part – an illegal one, with few exceptions – of the political landscape in the states of Central Asia. The main organizations are: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation; HT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and the Islamic State (IS). The Muslim Brotherhood also operates in the region; it is a network of autonomous cells that use various names, such as “Social Reforms Society”, “Islamic Call Committee”, etc. The already complex social and economic situation in the region is aggravated by social and political problems, with radical Islam at the top of the regional agenda.

The Islamic State, which has considerably strengthened after the seizure of vast territories in Syria and Iraq, is the major threat. The members of the movement work to create a world caliphate governed by Sharia law and headed by the caliph, the agent of God on earth. Many researchers both in the Western countries and Russia link negative trends in Central Asia to the activities of IS. Nevertheless, some Russian scientists are of different opinion. For example, A. Grozin, the head of the Central Asia Department of the Institute of CIS Countries, believes that the media has made IS a “brand name” that is now used by people who are in no way related to the movement.

It should be noted that the activities of Islamist groups (mostly of the Wahhabi wing) is virtually the only means for social protest against the impoverishment of the population, social and economic inequality, authoritarianism of the authorities and corruption. The author identifies the following reasons for expanding influence of radical Islam:

- since justice is one of the most important values in Islam, its widespread violation gave the Islamists the opportunity to justify their actions by the demand to observe religious norms;

- after the collapse of the USSR, the newly established national governments fell short of expectations of the population, and Islam filled an ideological vacuum, created by the crisis in the public consciousness;

- having received regular support from abroad, Islamists found themselves under influence of the actions of Islamic radicals in the Middle East and North Africa; moreover, the Taliban victory in Afghanistan created a favourable environment for increasing Islamist radicalization in Central Asia;

- the ideology of proletarian internationalism and relevant Soviet national policies was replaced by Islamic ideology, becoming a consolidating force in the Muslim republics of Central Asia;

- there is a certain influence of historical and geographical factor: during the demarcation of national boundaries, the areas

inhabited by the settled population and nomads became part of different republics, for instance, the Fergana Valley spreads across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; the territories along these administrative and territorial borders were marked by the most rapid Islamic revival;

- there is also a generation gap due to the fact that young people from extremist groups protest against the old clergy and senior officials of the Sufi tariqas, who will not allow a new generation into the elite;

- national governments proved to be unable to have a constructive dialogue with Islamic political organizations and movements.

The author notes that the official clergy is the only structured Islamic authority in all five states of the region, and recently the line between the official and “unofficial clergy” has started to blur. The reason for this is that many new mosques obtain official registration and that both structures are being unified into one; this is also partly because of the existing diversity of views and beliefs and the complex nature of the relations with the authorities. There are also structured Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas) that are particularly influential in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. They are very little involved in public and political activities, although their representatives are part of some political Islamic groups and organizations. Underground Islamist groups have a flexible pyramid-shaped hierarchy; an organization can consist of a single pyramid or many separate pyramids (groups). The groups are noted for high discipline because members are recruited from the military, including participants in the war in Afghanistan. The leader (emir) takes advice from the council (shura), but has the right to make independent decisions. The council members (and even Emir himself) have groups of personally loyal followers, and an ordinary member of such a group, in turn, can be emir for the next tier of the pyramid. Although there are some differences between the groups, they all seek to take power by force; do not

recognize the official authorities; demand the introduction of Sharia law; and use terrorist attacks as a means of pressure on independent states.

According to Russian experts, there is a new generation of radical Islamic organizations in Central Asia that use Internet for Islamic agitation; recruit officials of the republics of the region; focus their activities on traditional structures (mahalla) by creating local cells (khalq); and promote the idea social equality ("Islamic socialism").

The author concludes that Islamist organizations are acknowledged as a threat to national and regional security throughout Central Asia. In addition, there is a risk of another "Arab Spring", since there are many similarities between the states of Central Asia and the countries where the Arab Spring protests had spread. With the support of the official clergy, the leadership of the Central Asian republics are stepping up their fight against radical Islamists who can cause the systemic crisis in the region. At the same time, most countries in the region come to an understanding that there is a need for social and economic reforms, not only the crackdown against radical Islamists. There is a complex of objective and subjective reasons that contributed to radicalization of political Islam in Central Asia in the post-Soviet period: poverty, corruption, overpopulation, ideological vacuum, generation gap, as well as the hard-line stance of the authorities and leaders of Islamic movements. The above-mentioned complex of problems must be systematically and comprehensively addressed and requires exhaustive strategic efforts.

Researchers A.A. Trusova and M.S. Cherniaev [2] examine the threat of international terrorism and mechanisms for countering it; identify preconditions and further development of terrorist activities; and also analyze the impact of these factors on regional security in Central Asia. International terrorism is a global phenomenon and its study requires comprehensive analysis of economics, politics, history, psychology, culture, etc. Terrorist acts are considered as one of the most dangerous crimes

against humanity, society and the state, and with the expansion of globalization and development of modern technologies, the problem of countering terrorism becomes cross-cutting and global. At the same time, there is still no single definition for “international terrorism”. Thus, Russian Federal Law “On Countering Terrorism” defines terrorism as an ideology of violence and a tool for influencing governments, but does not specify the term “international terrorism”. Nevertheless, the Federal Act on international terrorism was adopted in 2016, and a number of Russian researchers also introduced this concept in their works. The authors cite some of them. A.P. Kuznetsov and N.N. Marshakova define international terrorism as a socially dangerous act committed for international legal purposes that encroach on public relations, intergovernmental affairs and international rule of law by causing (or threatening to cause) harm to the essential interests of the global community. According to A.A. Popovich, international terrorism is an infringement on the global order through the use (or the threat of use) of organized violence for internationally illicit objectives by intimidating those who are not direct targets of the attack. I.M. Ilyinsky argues that international terrorism is a motivated illegal retaliatory act of violence committed by citizens of one or several countries against another or other countries that is intended to provoke state of terror in particular individuals, groups of people or the entire population in order to gain ideological, religious, national, economic, political or social advantages.

The issue of international terrorism is also being widely discussed outside of Russia. For example, the FBI defines international terrorism as criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are associated with foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored). According to the Oxford Dictionary, international terrorism is the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims. The authors conclude that although

there is no single definition of this phenomenon, the issue of international terrorism is becoming more and more pressing and acquiring new dimensions and features.

Geopolitically, Central Asia is important due to large deposits of energy resources that the republics export around the world. Therefore, the interests of Russia, China and the United States clash in the region. Thus, China views the countries of Central Asia as an important transport hub for the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) project, which Xi Jinping announced in Kazakhstan in 2013. In addition, the Central Asian region directly borders unstable Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China, a hotbed of separatist sentiments and an area of activities of the East Turkestan terrorist group.

The authors note that due to the fact that the countries of Central Asia gained independence only after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, this is a relatively new region, where the formation of an institutional structure and the search for cultural and historical identity are still ongoing. Moreover, the region is located between two great political forces – Russia and China – and cooperation with these forces requires a constant search for a balance of interests. Thus, in addition to regional challenges and threats, the situation is complicated by the competition of external actors and the lack of cooperation between the countries of the region.

The authors subdivide terrorist threats to the countries of Central Asia into those internal and external. Internal threats are posed by the difficult social and economic situation in the countries of the region, because poverty, unemployment and the marginalization of certain groups of population often give rise to extremist opposition movements. External threats are posed by hot spots around Central Asia, forming the “Islamic arc” of instability: the Xinjiang of China, the Caucasus, Kashmir and Afghanistan. As a result, the Islamic groups Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) now operate in the territories of

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The IMU sought to create the Fergana Valley a separate state, thereby separating it from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Fergana Valley is a densely populated region with high unemployment, which contributes to the rise of radical organizations and facilitates recruitment. The IMU troops fought for the opposition in the Tajik civil war, joined with the Taliban in the war against coalition forces in Afghanistan and collaborated with al-Qaeda. The IMU joined ISIS in August 2015. The activity of the IRPT peaked during the armed confrontation in the country, making it a legitimate opposition party. Initially, the party opted for constructive dialogue; however, the authorities accused the leader of the IRPT M. Kabiri of financing the coup d'état in September 2015, attempted by Abduhalim Nazarzoda, the Deputy Minister of Defense of Tajikistan. As a result, the IRPT was banned and designated as a terrorist and extremist organization in Tajikistan. After the pan-Islamist political organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953, it quickly expanded its influence to Central Asia. The brutal persecution of its members can lead to further radicalization of the organization, now consisting of 15–20 thousand people. According to the representatives of the party, they do not recognize violence as a tool for political struggle, and carry out their activities peacefully. However, party literature ideologically justifies violence, and the party acknowledges its involvement in a number of attempted coups in the Middle East and has connections with other extremist groups.

The authors point to the fact that the instability in Afghanistan and the emergence of ISIS have made Central Asia an area of increased terrorist threat. Being driven out of the territories of Iraq and Syria, the organization's fighters relocated to Afghanistan, posing a threat to the countries of Central Asia and the CIS. A few years before the withdrawal of the anti-terrorist coalition troops from Afghanistan began, the terrorist threat in the countries of Central Asia considerably increased,

although it was more closely related to drug trafficking, not ISIS. The Central Asian region is one of the main suppliers of fighters (almost 20 per cent of all foreign fighters) for Salafist jihadist terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. There have been a number of terrorist attacks in Central Asia, including the following:

- *Tajikistan*: explosions in Kamarob and Khujand in 2010, armed attacks in Khorugh in 2014 and Dushanbe in 2015;
- *Kazakhstan*: explosions in Aktobe, Astana (Nur-Sultan) and Atyrau in 2011, armed attacks in Aktobe and Almaty in 2011 and 2016, massacres in Almaty in 2012;
- *Kyrgyzstan*: explosions in Bishkek in 2015 and 2016;
- *Uzbekistan*: explosion in Andijan in 2009.

Thus, a thorough analysis of the terrorist threat in the region indicates a high level of instability in Central Asia. The combat against terrorism and extremism is a primary objective of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The CSTO consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the SCO includes Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, among others. Coordination and consolidation of efforts of the member states in countering international terrorism, extremism and separatism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration and other transnational criminal activities are enshrined in the charters of both organizations. The Collective Rapid Reaction forces (CRRF) formed in 2009 are designated to respond quickly to threats to regional security. Nevertheless, both the CSTO and the SCO (which is in the process of establishing legal and regulatory framework) carry out military training, but have not been involved in military operations to date. Counter-terrorist operations are still the responsibility of the national armed forces of each Central Asian republic.

The authors conclude that terrorist and extremist organizations in the region have similar objectives and tactics, but the increasing autonomy of terrorist cells and solid networks pose new challenges in combating terrorism. The geopolitical importance of Central Asia, combined with its social and

economic problems and the religious factor, attract more and more terrorist groups to the countries of the region. Existing organizations that train fighters in the region are noted for closely connected terrorist networks. Moreover, there is no unified practical cooperation between the countries in countering terrorism in the region, and despite the existence of the CSTO CRRF, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan combat terrorism at the domestic level. The authors predict an increase in the activity of terrorist, extremist and separatist groups in the region; further politicization of Islam and the expansion of the influence of radical groups; consolidation of activities of terrorist groups while retaining their autonomy; and an increase in the number of terrorist attacks. The Central Asian republics, Russia and China should pool their efforts in combating the threat of the spread of terrorism in the region.

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

2021.03.002. VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS HERITAGE OF IRAN AND SOCIAL POLICY OF THE COUNTRY AT THE PRESENT TIME // *Condensed abstract.*

Keywords: historical and religious heritage of Iran, Zoroastrianism, Islamic world, Sunnis and Shiites, Nawruz, Judaism, Christianity, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, modern social policy of the country, Islamic government, Islamic foundations, waqfs.

Valentina Schensnovich,
Research Associate,
INION RAN

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.06

1. Maslakova-Clauberg Natalia I. Iran Opening up to the World: Historical and Religious Heritage // *Vestnik Diplomaticheskoy akademii MID Rossii. Rossiya i mir*, 2019. – № 2 (20). – P. 171–187.

2. Mamedova Nina M. The Role of Social Policy in a Culturally Complex Society Management (the Case Study of Iran) // *Vestnik Instituta vostokovedeniya RAN*, 2020. – № 1 (11). – P. 255–271.

The article by N.I. Maslakova-Clauberg “Iran Opening to the World: Historical and Religious Heritage” [1] examines the history of the emergence and formation of various world religions on the territory of modern Iran in the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. The main attention is paid to Zoroastrianism

as the first monotheistic religion and national-state religion – Shiite Islam.

In modern Iran, along with the state religion – Shia Islam, other world religions and confessions are represented: Sunni Islam, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity. Most Iranians identify themselves as Shiite Muslims (85), Sunni Muslims make up about 9 per cent of the population, Christians – 4, and 2 per cent include Jews, Zoroastrians, as well as other religious minorities – Bahais, Mandeans, Hindus, Yezidis. Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism are officially recognized in Iran and protected by the country's Constitution.

The first monotheistic religion on the territory of Ancient Persia was Zoroastrianism, which emerged in the East Iranian tribes. This religion was named after its founder – the prophet and priest Zoroaster (or Zarathushtra). In the period from the 6 century BC to the 7 century AD Zoroastrianism was the national-state religion of the Persian Empire. In the 1930s, during the reign of the Shahs of the Pahlavi dynasty, the religious symbols of Zoroastrianism began to decorate governmental agencies, Zoroastrian schools appeared, adherents of this religion were given the opportunity to occupy senior positions, that was previously not allowed. In the late 1930s, Iranian clergy announced in a special fatwa that the Zoroastrians were under the protection of Islam.

Currently, Zoroastrian communities have survived in Iran and in India, there are small communities in the United States and Western Europe. By various estimates, there are 100–200 thousand adherents of Zoroastrianism in the world from 25 to 50 thousand of them live in Iran. In modern Iran, Zoroastrians have the same rights as other religious minorities do.

During the reign of the Sassanid dynasty in 637 AD the Arabs captured the capital of the empire – Ctesiphon, and Persia came under the rule of the Arab Caliphate. The Zoroastrian community became a religious minority. As a result of the Arab conquest in the 7 century AD and the incorporation of the

country into the Umayyad Caliphate, Islam became the dominant religion of Persia.

The Islamization of Persia influenced the cultural and religious component of the state, while preserving the ancient civilizational heritage. Islam emerged as the youngest world religion, and before the first century of its existence split into three main directions - Sunnism, Shiism and Kharijism. The impetus for the religious split was the disagreement over the character and nature of the supreme power in the Islamic state.

Shiism (from the Arabic "shi'a" - "party", "the political group of Imam Ali") is a major religious trend in Islam. By 1698, Shiism had become the country's state religion for the majority of the Persian population. Since then, Iran has been a Shiite Islamic state.

There are a number of differences in religious rules and traditions between Shiites and Sunnis. Both directions honour the prophet Muhammad as the last prophet and messenger of Allah. Shiites venerate imams as intermediaries between Allah and believers. For Shiites, the imam is the spiritual leader and the chosen of the prophet, his representative on earth. Sunnis see Imam Ali as only the last of the four guided califs.

Shiite Islam in Iran was created as a form of national religion and became part of the national identity, this gave it a religious identity in the Muslim world. Along with the fact that Iran remains a Shiite Islamic state, the country retains the status of a multinational state with a rich historical and religious heritage, the researcher concludes.

Mamedova N.M. in her article "The Role of Social Policy in a Culturally Complex Society Management (the Case Study of Iran)" [2] notes that social policy for the country is of particular relevance due to the uniqueness of the power structure of the Islamic regime and the historically established cultural and ethno-confessional heterogeneity of Iranian society. The existing system of power is only four decades old and the social policy pursued by it as a factor of governance of the society is formed

and evolves under the influence of both Islamic principles and the changing needs of the country's population.

Since the Islamic regime proclaimed the achievement of social justice as one of its main goals, the author analyzes the socio-economic differentiation of the Iranian population, the dynamics of poverty and inequality indicators.

The Iranian revolution of 1979, which changed the course of the historical development of Iran as the world's oldest monarchical regime, was civilizational by nature. It replaced the secular nature of the shah's regime with a religious one and brought the clergy to power. The Iranian revolution set goals: social justice, freedom, democracy and independence from the influence of great powers. These goals were supported by the majority of the Iranian population, regardless of ethnic and religious affiliation. The main thing that attracted the country's population was the achievement of social justice and raising the living standards of the poorest segments of the population. The Islamic principle of justice explained the need to nationalize large property after the revolution in favor of the entire Ummah.

The Islamic regime retained its pre-revolutionary social security system, but made significant adjustments to it. Currently, the entire population of Iran is covered by the social insurance system. The pension scheme provides living standard above the poverty line. To strengthen the authority of the power and stability, social assistance is also provided through Islamic organizations. These are, first of all, Islamic foundations created after the revolution, waqfs and public charitable organizations. The preservation of public confidence in the Islamic form of government largely depends on the effectiveness of social policy, the researcher emphasizes.

KAMIL AZIMOV, OLGA BIBIKOVA. SHIITES IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SPACE OF MODERN LEBANON (The first part was published in № 1, 2021) // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."*

Keywords: South Lebanon, Shiites, Maronites, Amal, Hizbullah, Palestinians.

Kamil Azimov,

PhD(History), Senior Lecturer,

Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies

Olga Bibikova,

PhD(History), Senior Research Associate,

Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS

Citation: Azimov K., Bibikova O. Shiites in the socio-political space of modern Lebanon // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, No. 3 (313), P. 71–92. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.07

Abstract. The permanent conflict between Palestinians and Israelis in the southern regions of Lebanon forced local Shiites to create their own organization to protect the interests of the residents of the region. Today, the Shiite organization Hizbullah has become an important factor in the socio-political landscape of Lebanon.

Article № 2

In 1943, after the end of the French mandate, Lebanon gained independence. Religious communities (there are 18 of them in Lebanon) – Christians (Catholics and Orthodox), Moslems (Sunnis and Shiites), etc. signed the National Pact, according to which a representative of the Maronite community was elected president of the country, a Sunni received the post of prime minister, a Shiite took the chair of the speaker of parliament, etc. This agreement fixed the political priority of the Maronite Christians. The argument in their favor was the alleged numerical superiority of

the Christian population, although the population census was conducted long before the signing of the National Pact – in 1932.¹ At that time, Christians, being the most educated part of the country's population, were extremely active as compared to the Moslem population of the country. Traditionally, on the eve of the elections, Maronite candidates visited countries where a Lebanese diaspora existed (today it numbers from 8 to 14 million people), and there they received votes and financial support from their co-religionists, which allowed the Maronite community to secure victory in the elections.² The population census among Moslems was deliberately inaccurate due to the low degree of literacy of this group of the population.³ The current situation led to a system that put the Moslem community in a deliberately unequal position.

Over time, it became obvious that the demographic situation in Lebanon has changed. In particular, the emigration from Lebanon affected Christians to a greater extent than Moslems. And the birth rate of Christians was noticeably lower than that of Moslems. So, in 2012, according to the Pew Research Center, the number of Moslems in the country was 4,461,910 people (61.3%), while the number of Christians was 2,780,505 people (38.2%).⁴

Socio-economic situation of the Shiites of Lebanon (late 20th century)

The Shiite community in Lebanon has long been the poorest. The areas inhabited by Shiites⁵ were striking with their unsanitary conditions. Nevertheless, there were and exist now rich clans among the Shiites (for example, al-Asaad, al-Usairan, al-Khalil), but until recently the majority of Shiites were illiterate. The activities of Musa Sadr, as well as the progressive parties of Lebanon, changed the situation: young Shiites began to receive education (including on the basis of scholarships provided by the USSR). Thus, the increase in the level of education within the community has made Shiites a significant strata of society. Sadr,

with the support of Iran, created a whole network of humanitarian and charitable organizations, which led to noticeable changes that contributed to the penetration of new ideas and the emergence of new aspirations. Moreover, M. Sadr managed to achieve the creation of a Shiite (separate from Sunnis) representative office⁶ in the Lebanese Parliament, which significantly increased the status of Shiites in Lebanese society. Not the least role was played by the activities of progressive Lebanese parties, including the Communist Party of Lebanon, which, needing mass support, involved the Moslems of southern Lebanon, primarily Shiites, in the social movement⁷.

Naturally, over time, the self-consciousness of the Shiite population of Southern Lebanon has significantly strengthened. This was also facilitated by the political situation in the country, which developed against the background of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. By the early 1980s the community, realizing its importance, demanded the right to participate in the management of the state. The Islamic Revolution in Iran (1978–79) played an important role in this evolution. And if Tehran failed to implement the idea of establishing Shiite rule in Lebanon, then its anti-Israeli views of Tehran were supported by the Shiites of Southern Lebanon.

The community has long suffered from the indifference of state structures to its economic situation and socio-political status. Not the least role was played by the neighborhood with Israel, against which the Palestinians who were in the Lebanon territory constantly organized armed attacks. Israel responded to them with bombings and raids, which caused significant damage to the economy of Southern Lebanon.

Musa Sadr had a negative attitude towards the Palestinian presence in Southern Lebanon. Speaking at a rally of thousands in the Bekaa Valley in 1974, Sadr said: "The PLO is a factor of anarchy in the south. Shiites must overcome their inferiority complex in relation to Palestinian organizations. We say: enough is enough!"⁸

The Palestinian detachments were interested in maintaining their presence in Southern Lebanon, and the weak Lebanese army could not protect the border with Israel. When the Government of R. Karami⁹ decided to take control of this area in April 1969, the Lebanese army detachments faced Palestinian resistance. Further attempts to solve the problem did not lead to its resolution due to contradictions between the leaders of confessional communities, which concealed deeper differences associated with the traditional confrontation between various political groups.

Consequences of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon

In the autumn of 1970, the number of Palestinians in the country increased dramatically due to the transfer of detachments that were expelled from Jordan (September 1970)¹⁰. The different attitude towards the Palestinian presence on the part of the heads of confessional communities did not contribute to the development of a unified position on the situation in Southern Lebanon. It should also be noted that at that time, the Arab countries were still dominated by the point of view about the need to destroy Israel. The leaders of Egypt and Syria, who experienced the bitterness of defeat during the war with Israel, as well as the so-called "Arab street" supported the Palestine Liberation Organization morally and financially. Under these conditions, the weak Lebanese Government failed to repel the impending threat of civil war. In the summer of 1975, during the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, 30 thousand Moslems were killed. About half of them were Shiites.

Since that time, the training of Shiite armed detachments began in the Bekaa Valley (with the participation of Iranian instructors). Initially, they were formed as an armed wing of the Amal organization. Recall that in translation from Arabic, the word "amal" means "hope". At the same time, it is an

abbreviation of the full name of the organization “Afwaj al-mukawwama al-lubnaniya” (Lebanese Resistance Battalions)¹¹.

Before the disappearance of Musa Sadr, the Amal organization he created, adhering to the principles of tolerance, focusing on charitable activities, sought to defend the interests of the Shiite community inside Lebanon. Now, in the conditions of the aggravated situation, the Shiites were forced to form up self-defense detachments.

On June 6, 1982, Israel launched the operation Shlom a-Galil (Peace to the Galilee). This operation was a response to the terrorist attacks of radical Palestinian organizations that created a training base in southern Lebanon, turning this area into a springboard for periodic provocations against Israel, which made the residents of this area hostages of this situation. The PLO militants terrorized the population of south Lebanese villages for almost 12 years – from 1970 to 1982. A number of researchers note that the arrival of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Southern Lebanon was perceived by residents as a liberation from the terror of the Palestinians.

The Government tried to limit the anti-Israeli actions of Palestinians from the territory of Lebanon. However, unlike Jordan, where King Hussein showed his will and managed to expel the Palestinian militants from the country, the Lebanese government failed to take control of their activities. The current situation stimulated the exodus of some Shiites to the central regions of Lebanon¹². A number of researchers who have studied the causes of the civil war that began in Lebanon in 1975 consider the Palestinian presence in the country to be the most important prerequisite for a long confrontation between Christians and Moslems, their political organizations and local militias.

It should also be noted that the PLO militants fought not only with Christian formations, but also with Shiite Moslems. At the same time, the Palestinians suffered heavy losses from the Shiite militia, which aligned itself with the units of the Lebanese army.

At the end of September 1982, a multinational force consisting of army units of the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain was introduced into Beirut. Under the pressure from the Western allies, the Government managed to expel a significant part of the Palestinians from the country. However, soon after, the newly elected, but not yet assumed the office, President of Lebanon Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. Israel took advantage of this circumstance by introducing its troops into the territory of West Beirut¹³. Having launched a military operation in 1982, Israel quickly seized a significant part of the country's territory. This was facilitated by the fact that by the autumn the Palestinians had left West Beirut, and the Syrian units that had been in the country since April 1976 also left the capital. Israeli troops entered the capital unhindered. The siege of Beirut lasted from the end of June 1982 until mid-August 1982. Finally, with the mediation of the American diplomat Philip Habib, an agreement was signed (18.08.1982), according to which the PLO forces were to finally leave Lebanon. The main detachments of the Israeli army left the city quarters of Beirut by September 27, 1982. Later, the areas of the international airport and the seaport area were liberated¹⁴. Taking advantage of the situation, the military wing of the Maronite Kataib party staged a bashing in Sabra and Shatila – two refugee camps¹⁵ where mainly Palestinians lived.

From 1985 to 1988, the Amal Shiite militia units besieged the remaining Palestinian camps several times. It is characteristic that their ally at that time was the President of Syria H. Assad, who actively helped to expel Arafat's detachments from Lebanon. In addition, Amal (together with volunteers from the Communist Party and detachments of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon) managed to defeat the only militia of Lebanese Sunnis, Al-Murabitun, which took part in the civil war on the side of the Palestinians against the Christian right forces.

Creation of the Hizbullah Organization

As we have already noted, part of Iran's project to activate the Lebanese Shiites was the creation of the Amal organization, and later the military-political structure of Hizbullah¹⁶. Assessing the results of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a number of researchers come to the conclusion that by getting rid of the presence of PLO detachments on the territory of a neighboring state, Israel thus contributed to the strengthening of Shiite organizations that have become a full part of the Lebanese political landscape.

In addition to external factors – the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the civil war and the expulsion of Palestinians from Lebanon – it was the split within Amal that contributed to the birth of the Hizbullah organization. The disagreements that arose were related to different views on the further development of the Shiite movement in the context of the civil war in Lebanon. Lebanese researcher M. Harb believes that after Nabih Berri¹⁷ became one of the members of the organization's leadership, "there emerged a rapprochement between Amal and the Lebanese government¹⁸." Radical members of the organization, disappointed with the choice of N. Berry began to unite with other Islamist militants and, with the support of Iran, created Hizbullah¹⁹. In our opinion, the weakening of Amal's authority in the conditions of the civil war that has begun is explained by the fact that the circumstances demanded more effective measures from the Shiite leaders. As you know, Amal was unable to protect the Shiite population of the South either in 1978 or in 1982, when Israel invaded the territory of Lebanon, or from the rampaging PLO detachments.

Funds for the creation of a new organization were provided by Tehran, the second sponsor was Syria. As you know, during the life of M. Sadr, training camps were established in the Bekaa Valley, where young Shiites were trained in military affairs under the guidance of Iranian instructors²⁰.

The organizers of the Hizbullah in Lebanon were Abbas al-Moussaoui and Subhi Tufaili from the Islamic Appeal Party, Hassan Nasrallah and Syed Ibrahim Amin al-Syed, Naim Qasim, Imad Mughniyah and Abu Hassan Khudr Salama from the Amal movement, Abdel Hadi Hmade from the Communist Party²¹. In fact, they were carrying out the instructions of Imam Khomeini.

The structure of the Hizbullah organization

The organization is headed by the Majlis al-Shura (advisory council), headed by the Secretary General of the organization. The Council consists of seven members and two advisers (from Iran). The Advisory Council controls several committees responsible for political, military, parliamentary and judicial activities. An important role is played by the Jihad Committee, whose functions include covert operations.

The Al-Arabiya newspaper (UAE) writes that Hizbullah receives \$ 600 million annually from Iran, which is directed to finance the organization's medical, social and military expenses. "This amount helps to cover not only the costs of military activities and payments to employees, but also to provide social assistance to the families of the deceased members of Hizbullah²²."

Back in 1982, the Al-Qard al-Hasan Association was established, which deals with finance, up to lending to the Shiite population²³. In recent years, Lebanon has been experiencing an economic crisis, the Lebanese banking system has become an object of monitoring (in order to prevent the financing of terrorism), so money began to flow to Lebanon from Iran in the form of private transfers. Thus, Iran is bypassing the official economy of Lebanon and its banking sector. Al Arabiya also accuses Hizbullah of duty-free transportation of goods to Lebanon through the port of Beirut and (probably due to the weakening of border controls) through illegal smuggling

checkpoints that appeared in the conditions of the economic crisis and chaos in the country. Hizbullah also carries out projects that bring it profit. These are companies engaged in the production of dairy products, synthetic rubber and car sales, consumer cooperatives, etc. For example, Al-Bunyan Engineering and Contracting Company is engaged in infrastructure projects²⁴.

The social and humanitarian network created by Hezbollah is focused on helping the poor and the families of the deceased. In particular, in 1982, on the initiative of Iran, the organization Al-Shaheed (martyr) was created, which provides financial support to the families of the victims. Medical centers (in the southern suburbs of Beirut and Southern Lebanon) and two hospitals were established. Another association, Jihad al-Binah (established in 1985 also on the initiative of Iran), restores houses destroyed during the Israeli bombings, builds schools, is engaged in water supply, construction of power plants. Hizbullah also provides assistance to farmers by distributing seeds, supplying fertilizers and insecticides.

As for the mass media, the Al-Nur radio station has been operating since 1988, in June 1991 Hizbullah created the Al-Manar TV channel, since 1994 the weekly newspaper al-Ahd has been published. Since 2000, educational programs about politics, sports, everyday, family and cultural life have been carried out on the satellite network of the TV channel²⁵.

Hizbullah has a military wing, which, according to experts, is comparable to an army. In 2017, the military information provider Jane's 360 estimated that there are more than 25,000 fighters in Hizbullah's detachments, there are also up to 30,000 reservists. It is believed that the operational budget of the military wing is about \$ 1 billion per year. According to the State Department report (2018), Hizbullah annually receives weapons from Iran, as well as from members of the Lebanese (Shiite) diaspora around the world for about \$ 700 million. In 2017, the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that

Hizbullah's huge military arsenal includes small arms, tanks, unmanned aerial vehicles and various long-range missiles²⁶.

A certain role in the development of the Hizbullah organization was played by the authoritative Shiite leader Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah,²⁷ who founded the Union of Moslem Students (Shiites), whose members were inspired by the ideas of the Iranian revolution. The creation of this union contributed to the fact that the Shiite youth, who had previously expressed their protest in the ranks of the Palestinian Fatah, found a spiritual mentor in the person of Sheikh Fadlallah.

Until recently, the Jihad Committee was headed by Imad Mughniyah,²⁸ and later Mustafa Badr-ud-din (1961-2016), a relative of Mughniyah (a cousin and at the same time a son-in-law) was appointed to this post. The Jihad Council is accused of many acts of sabotage, including the organization of the explosion of a truck that entered the territory of the headquarters of the American Marines on the territory of the seaport in Beirut (23.10.1983). The truck was loaded with more than 5 tons of TNT explosives. After breaking through the posts, the truck crashed at high speed into a building that collapsed completely. It is characteristic that a few minutes later the headquarters of the French peacekeepers were subjected to a similar attack. As a result of the explosions, 241 Americans and 58 Frenchmen were killed²⁹.

Although no reliable evidence was found about the involvement of Shiites in the diversions, political scientists believed that Iran and its brainchild, Hizbullah, were behind them. According to the CIA, in only 5 months of 1983, Hizbullah organized 24 such subversive acts³⁰.

A certain Shiite Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement (as it turned out, unknown to anyone) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Later (4.11.1983), another suicide bomber rammed the headquarters of the Israeli counterintelligence in Tyre, as a result, 30 Israelis were killed. In response, French aircraft dropped bombs on a training camp for Shiite militants in the Bekaa Valley. Political scientists believe that it was the Shiite attacks on the

multinational forces located in the country during this period that caused the governments of the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain to decide (February 1984) to withdraw their troops from Lebanon.

The ideology of Hizbullah

According to the French researcher Bernard Hourcade,³¹ "in the confusing context of the Lebanese war, it was in its attitude to Israel and the Palestinian issue that Iran found a pass for passage to the Arab world³²." The interpretation of this statement suggests that Iran, claiming to participate in solving such an important problem as the Arab-Israeli conflict, which the Arab-Sunni world could not solve, wanted to take the place of a leading power in the Moslem world through this confrontation.

At first, Tehran hoped that the activities of Musa Sadr would contribute to increasing the importance of Tehran's role in Lebanon, but Sadr, after studying local realities, came to the conclusion that the idea of creating a state in Lebanon headed by religious hierarchs (like Iran) has no prospects. The concept of *Wilayat al-Faqih*, i.e. the rule of a Shiite religious leader in the most emancipated and secular state of the Arab world could not be realized. Sadr, seeing how the population of southern Lebanon suffers from the presence of Palestinian militants there, organizing endless attacks against Israel, focused his efforts on making the living conditions of his co-religionists easier.

A French researcher Didier Leroy writes in his book "The Lebanese Hizbullah from the Iranian Revolution to the Syrian War" that the rise of the Shiites and the birth of Hizbullah "should be considered in the context of the marginalization of the Shiites of Lebanon... in areas with high social and political poverty as a result of the confessional distribution of state functions after the national pact of 1943³³." And further, discussing the formation of Hizbullah's ideology, Leroy writes: "This is, first, a religious ideology based on the Shiite creed, the transformation of the idea

of the imamate and political leadership, and, finally, jihad, the central element of religious doctrine, where the sense of fighting injustice is the driving force³⁴."

In its political platform published in 2003, the leadership of the Hizbullah organization emphasized that the organization stands for the establishment of Islamic rule by peaceful democratic means. The movement also supports the slogan of the destruction of the State of Israel. This is evidenced by the organization's program document adopted in 1985: "We appeal to all Arabs and Moslems to tell them that the experience of Moslems in Islamic Iran has proved that people motivated by faith, with bare breasts, can, with the help of Allah, destroy the iron and oppression of tyrannical regimes... Only Islam can lead humanity to rebirth and make progress³⁵."

The American researcher R. Norton believes that of the two tasks – the creation of a state like Iran in Lebanon, i.e. the implementation of the idea of *Wilayat al-Faqih*, and the fight against Israel set by the new movement, the first goal gradually faded into the background. Recall that this idea was opposed by Musa Sadr. As for the fight against Israel, this task was not questioned.

Recall that in May 1985, Amal militants defeated the Palestinians in Southern Lebanon. During this period, Amal began to compete with Hizbullah and three years later, most of the Amal fighters joined Hizbullah. Later, Amal focused on humanitarian projects and political work³⁶.

In the mid-1980s, Hizbullah managed to mobilize about 7 thousand militants. As the American researcher J.P. Harik notes, membership in this organization for many Shiites meant getting a living, especially since the organization regularly received funding from Iran³⁷.

Gradually, the Hizbullah organization became an important not only military, but also political factor within Lebanese society. A number of circumstances contributed to this. In particular, in 1989, after the signing of the agreement in Taif

(Saudi Arabia) The Mufti of Lebanon, Sheikh Hassan Khaled, was killed. According to a number of observers, at this moment the Sunni community, having lost its leader, lost its dominant positions to the Shiites.

In 1991, Abbas al-Mousavi (1952–1992) was elected to the post of General Secretary of Hizbullah instead of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili (born in 1948). The removal of al-Tufaili was due to the fact that he believed that Iran was trying to subordinate Hizbullah, to direct its activities exclusively against Israel³⁸. There is another opinion: Subhi Tufail was guided by the ideas of Arab unity, which contradicted the requirement of unquestioning submission to the spiritual leader of Iran. Later, Tufaili pointed out the hypocrisy of Tehran, which justified the sending of Iranian volunteers to Syria³⁹ on the pretext of “protecting Shiite shrines”: “They could not openly say: “We are going to help Assad⁴⁰.”

Al-Mousavi, the new head of the organization, soon allowed himself several harsh statements against Israel, which was met with satisfaction in Tehran. Iran immediately increased its financial support for the Hizbullah organization. In turn, this caused concern in Israel, and already in early 1992, al-Mousavi was killed. After his death, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah (born in 1960)⁴¹ became the new leader of the organization, who focused his efforts on creating a powerful military group that was now operating not only in Southern Lebanon.

Activities of the Shiite faction in the Lebanese Parliament

It should be noted that the population of Lebanon appreciated the efforts of Hizbullah to restore order in the country. As noted by Harik (Harik J.P.) on the eve of the 1992 parliamentary elections, 62% of the Lebanese citizens surveyed said that they would vote for the Hizbullah candidate.⁴² This indicates the recognition of the role of the organization in the socio-political life of the country. Success in the parliamentary

elections at the same time meant a change in its character. The organization "clearly signaled that it had changed its radical course and was observing the rules of the pre-election game highlighted by time. Moreover, this game ... increased the legitimacy of the "Party of God" (the literal meaning of the word Hizbullah – auth.) as a mainstream party, which has a resistance wing, since as a result of its election victories, it formed the largest separate bloc in the new parliament – 12 of 128 members. This seems to have dealt a blow to the attempts of Israel and America to accuse the "Party of God" of irresponsible and unprincipled behavior, which in the West is usually associated – with mercenaries⁴³. "As Walid Sharara and Frederic Domont note," while other Arab Islamists have failed to create a solid social base, Hizbullah has established a close alliance with the Lebanese state and important segments of society⁴⁴."

In 2005, Hizbullah, having participated in the elections in the block with the Amal movement, won a majority in the electoral district No. 2 (South Lebanon), and was able to hold 23 representatives to the parliament (almost a fifth of the deputies out of 128) and was represented in the government, having received the portfolio of the Minister of Energy and Water Resources. It was Muhammad Fneish⁴⁵.

By this time, the Shiite society had changed significantly, the middle class had grown stronger and began to play an important role within its community. Among them there were people who began to reflect on the future of their community and its place in Lebanese society. There was an understanding that, despite the fact that they are related to the Palestinians by their rejection of Israel, the growing number of Palestinians among the country's citizens threatens to disrupt the confessional balance in Lebanon⁴⁶. In 2004, Hizbullah opposed the granting of Lebanese citizenship to Palestinians. This proposal was made by American congressmen who visited Lebanon. It should be noted that in this issue, the interests of the Shiites coincided with the interests of the Maronites and other communities, who feared that the almost half-million

Palestinian community in Lebanon, most of whom are Sunni Moslems, will become a significant political force that will make decisions to the detriment of the interests of other communities. Thus, the Shiites declared themselves as a community that protects the interests of Lebanon.

Activities of the military wing of Hizbullah

Since the beginning of the ISIL war against Syria (2011), Hizbullah fighters have been actively participating on the side of government forces. The detachments trained by Iranian instructors actively cooperate with the units of the Syrian army. In particular, in May 2013, when ISIL jihadists expelled 30 thousand Christians from the city of al-Qusayr (Homs province, Syria), Hizbullah detachments came to the aid of the Syrian army, which managed to liberate the city as a result of heavy fighting.

Hizbullah detachments provided invaluable assistance in the summer of 2017, when Jabha al-Nusra militants⁴⁷ tried to move the theater of military operations to the territory of Lebanon. To do this, they drove a significant number of refugees⁴⁸, mostly Sunnis, from Syria to northern Lebanon. So, in the city of Aarsal, where only 30 thousand Lebanese citizens lived at that time, there were already about 100 thousand refugees from Syria, including about 3,000 jihadists and their family members.

The mountainous region of Aarsal was considered the most tense place on the Lebanese - Syrian border. The jihadists used this remote area to smuggle weapons and drugs. The situation in northern Lebanon has been threatening for a long time. Lebanese Foreign Minister Gibran Basil, who visited Moscow at the end of 2015, even made a very significant statement: "Lebanon can turn to Russia for military assistance in the fight against terrorism⁴⁹."

In the summer of 2017, the Syrian government army invited the jihadists to leave the Lebanese territory and gave them the opportunity to safely retreat to Idlib. Having been refused, the Lebanese army, together with Hizbullah's detachments from the

south, tried to close the passage into the interior of the country. The Syrian government army was attacking the jihadists from the north. The offensive was conducted from two sides, and the first rocket attack on the places of concentration of terrorists was carried out by Hizbullah fighters. A significant number of jihadists were trapped in the town of al-Jibba, arranged by Syrian troops together with Hizbullah fighters. In turn, the Syrian military aviation did not allow the jihadists to continue their penetration into Lebanon. The operation against the jihadists was carried out on July 20, 2017 by all participants simultaneously⁵⁰, thanks to which the Lebanese army, Hizbullah units and the Syrian government troops managed in 6 days to liberate 90 square km of the Arsal district, as well as the neighboring mountainous region of Flita (Syrian territory). It proved also possible to take control of four more areas of the border area with Syria to the south of Arsal. The winners forced the jihadists and their family members (a total of 7.8 thousand people) to leave the area on 170 buses. Lebanese army soldiers entered the liberated areas⁵¹.

On August 8, 2017, a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council was held under the chairmanship of the President of Lebanon, General M. Aoun, at which it was decided to unite the Lebanese armed forces with the Syrian army and Hizbullah to repel the jihadists. The President stressed that the victory at Arsal was the result of cooperation between Lebanon, Syria and pro-Iranian forces (i.e., Hizbullah – auth.). Later, in an interview with the Egyptian channel SIS (12.12.2017), Lebanese President M. Aoun said: “Hizbullah’s weapons in no way weaken the state. They represent one of the most important pillars of the country’s defense strategy. We need resistance while our lands are occupied⁵².”

* * *

Analyzing the activities of the Shiite military-political structure of Hizbullah, originally created for the defense of the Shiite population of Southern Lebanon, it should be noted that this project went beyond its original plan not only due to the comprehensive support of Iran, but also the circumstances that arose at the turn of the XX and XXI centuries, first of all, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, which stimulated the outbreak of a civil war in this country, and then a more global conflict – the emergence of ISIL, the fight against which became a common task for the citizens of Syria and Lebanon.

Hizbullah, being the “brainchild of Iran”, and, in our opinion, a concrete manifestation of the “export of the Islamic revolution”, was able to become a full-fledged player in the Middle East political field. Naturally, this organization remains an instrument of Iran's influence on Lebanon and Syria, not only through the Shiite community, but also as an ally in the fight against ISIS and its heirs. As the Lebanese researcher Sami Raad⁵³ notes, analyzing the experience of Hizbullah's activities, “one can note the flexibility that it shows in order to temporarily adapt to a specific goal, waiting for a favorable moment to demand the implementation of its final goal...”⁵⁴ Sami Raad believes that Hizbullah “adjusted its strategy of creating an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, accepting Lebanese political life as it is, in accordance with the current constitution and international resolutions, including UN resolution 1701⁵⁵.” And further, Sami Raad himself expresses doubt that Hizbullah remained faithful to the idea of creating an Islamic republic in Lebanon. He writes: “there are no references to such goals in the current speeches. Is this only a strategic absence dictated by the tactical need to adapt one's speech, or a sign of a real political evolution? Today, nothing allows us to assert this⁵⁶.”

Obviously, the answer to this question remains open.

P.S. And yet... French researchers Anne-Lucie Shaen-Oudin, Yara-El-Khoury write in the article "The Lebanese Civil War" that Hizbullah "considers the creation of an Islamic Republic in the hypothetical future, when favorable conditions for its creation will be created."

References

1. According to the 1932 census, 793,396 people lived in Lebanon, of which 227,800 were Maronites, 178,100 were Sunnis, 155,035 were Shiites, 96,327 were Orthodox (of various churches), etc. Thus, Christians made up the majority of the population - 54%, (of which 29% were Maronites), and Moslems - 22% of the population (of which Sunnis - 22%, Shiites - 20%, the rest-Druze, Ismailis) // Demography of Lebanon. https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Demographics_of_Lebanon#Census_of_1932, (28.01.2020).
2. Many Christians retained dual citizenship, which allowed them to participate in the presidential elections in Lebanon. According to the law of January 1, 1926, there were no restrictions on multiple citizenship in Lebanon. The Law on Lebanese Citizenship // https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Lebanese_nationality_law; https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Multiple_citizenship (09.02.2021).
3. It is well known that among the uneducated part of the Moslem population, traditionally only men were recorded in the census.
4. The population of Lebanon. // <https://countrymeters.info/ru/Lebanon> (28.01.2021).
5. Shiites are settled in different regions of Lebanon: in the north in the area of Jbeil and Kisruwan, in the west of the Bekaa Valley, in the south of Lebanon, in Beirut itself and its southern suburbs // Lebanese Shia Moslems. https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Lebanese_Shia_Moslems (29.01.2021).
6. In 1969, M. Sadr became its chairman.
7. Lebanon Communist Party, established in 1924, has been active in this region from the very beginning In 1969, two more political organizations with a Marxist-Leninist trend were founded: in 1968, the Organization of Lebanese Socialists was founded, which in 1970 merged with the group Socialist Lebanon, forming the Organization of Communist Action headed by Mohsen Ibrahim. // Talal Jaber, "Chiites et pouvoir politique au Liban, 1967-1974 : contribution à une approche socio-religieuse", thèse de doctorat en sociologie, Université Paris-VII, 1980, p. 266.
8. Mackey S. Lebanon. A House divided. N.Y. Norton and Company, 2006. P. 200. (29.01.2021).

9. Rashid Karami – (1921–1987) served as Prime Minister of Lebanon 8 times. His last cabinet was active from 30.04.1984 to 1.06.1987. He played an important role in strengthening the Moslem community of the country.
10. The presence of Palestinians in the country was formalized by the 1969 agreement, which defined the principles of the presence of Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon. The agreement signed with the mediation of Nasser actually removed the Palestinians from the scope of Lebanese law. Thus, the Palestinians were able to carry out armed actions against Israel.
11. Mackey S. Lebanon. *A House divided*. N.Y. Norton and Company, 2006. P.200. (29.01.2021).
12. Mackey S. Lebanon. *A House divided*. N.Y. Norton and Company, 2006. P. 200. The Shiites settled in Nabaa, a northern suburb of Beirut, and in Dahiye, near the airport, in the southern suburbs of Beirut. These two suburbs, together with the Palestinian camps, formed a kind of poverty belt around the capital.
13. Western Beirut – during the outbreak of the civil war, the capital of Lebanon fell under the control of warring forces. Christian formations controlled the eastern part of the city, while Moslems, including Shiite formations, controlled the Western part. The “green line” between them passed in the area of the National Museum.
14. The New York Times. 27.09.1982.
15. The events in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps (September 16–17, 1982) followed on September 14 after the assassination of the President of Lebanon, B. Gemayel, who had not yet taken office, allegedly committed by members of the PLO. The International Red Cross estimated the number of people killed (including Syrians, Iraqis, etc.) at 1,500 people // Alestin F. Palestine is in the loop of Zionism. M., 1988. p. 66.
16. Hizbullah is a Shiite political structure that includes a number of socio-political organizations and a military wing. The name translates as “the party of God”. In Western literature, different spellings are accepted (Hezbollah, Hezbollah), based on dialectal pronunciation. The authors of this article use the spelling adopted in the modern Arabic literary language. The names of the sources cited retain the identical spelling. The phrase “The Party of Allah” is repeatedly mentioned in the Qur’an: Sura 61 (56) and Sura 22 (22) of the Qur’an. Krachkovsky I.Yu. 1956.
17. Nabih Berri – born in 1938, a native of an emigrant family of Lebanese Shiites, graduated from the Sorbonne. Having a law degree, he became a legal adviser to the Amal organization. Then, after the disappearance of M. Sadr, and the two-year rule of Hussein Husseini, he was elected its leader. He contributed to the activation of Amal’s ties with Syria. I have repeatedly met with H. By Assad. In February 1984, Amal fighters under the leadership of N. Berry expelled detachments of Lebanese forces from West Beirut, which increased Berry’s authority. Becoming a leading Shiite leader, he joined the Lebanese government, receiving the portfolio of Minister of Reconstruction of southern Lebanon, later-Minister of Justice, as well as electrical and hydraulic resources. In 1992, Berry became the Chairman of

- the Parliament – the Lebanese National Assembly: This is the highest post that a Shiite Moslem can occupy according to the country's constitution. N. Berry, who has been in the post of speaker since 1992, is known as the most consistent supporter of Syria.
18. Harb M., *Le Hezbollah à Beyrouth (1985-2005). De la banlieue à la ville*, Paris-Beyrouth, 2010 // <https://journals.openedition.org/geocarrefour/8196> (08.02.2021).
 19. Harb M., *Le Hezbollah à Beyrouth (1985-2005), de la banlieue à la ville*, Paris/Beyrouth, 2010 // <https://journals.openedition.org/geocarrefour/8196> (08.02.2021).
 20. Fadhil Abu al-Nasr: *Hezbollah, truth, and perspective*, first edition, al-bulb al - 'alamiyya Lil-Kitab, Beirut, 2003. *لبلل بزع: رصنللا وبأ ليلصف*, 2003، تلورل ب، بلالللل لللللللل علل ءللرلللل، للللال ءلللللل، ءلللللل ءاعللل
 21. Hezbollah. The birth of the party // http://www.chaskor.ru/article/hezbollah_rozhdenie_partii_1738 (06.02.2021).
 22. Fakhri J. The shadow economy of Hezbollah: billions at the expense of the state Al Arabiya, UAE. 07.12.2020 // <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20201207/248682617.html> (04.02.2021).
 23. In 2020, the financial system of Lebanon began to experience a deep crisis. Banks have stopped issuing money to their depositors in the amount of more than \$ 100. in a month, and then completely stopped issuing currency and limited one-time payments in Lebanese pounds, But Al-Card al Hasan in some of its branches allowed its customers to withdraw small amounts in dollars from their accounts.
 24. Fakhri J. The shadow economy of Hezbollah: billions at the expense of the state Al Arabiya, UAE. 07.12.2020 // <https://inosmi.ru/politic/20201207/248682617.html> (04.02.2021).
 25. Anne-Lucie Chaigne-Oudin. Hezbollah. 02.03.2018 // <https://www.lescledumoyenorient.com/Hezbollah.html> (16.02.2020).
 26. Hezbollah: histoire, organisation et idéologie. 29.08.2020 // <https://fr.peopleperproject.com/posts/27727-hezbollah-history-organization-and-ideology> (16.02.2020).
 27. Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935-2010), imam, associate of Musa Sadr, has been engaged in charity work in Lebanon since 1952, organizing schools, medical centers, orphanages, schools for the disabled and treatment centers for the blind and deaf. Later, he disagreed with the Iranian leadership and after the assassination attempt on him in 1985, he retired from business in Lebanon. Hussein Fadlallah: another choice. Hizbullah autobiography and modality. Beirut, 1994. (Arabic. Jaz) *لبلل بزع رلللل رلللللل: لبلل لللللل نلل*، 1994، تلورل ب، لللللل ءلللل راع، للللال ءلللللل، لللللللل ءلللللل ءلللللل
 28. Imad Fayeze Mughniyah (nicknamed Hyena; 1962–2008) is a Lebanese, Shiite, a native of Tyre. At the age of 13, he joined the PLO. Since 1983, he has been responsible for a series of terrorist acts, including the capture of 4 Russian hostages in 1985, one of whom was killed. After the Palestinians were ousted from Lebanon, he moved to Hizbullah. He was the first head of the secret service of this organization. He died as a result of a car explosion.

29. Levitt M. Hezbollah: The global footprint of Lebanon's : "Party of God". L., 2013. XVI, P. 23. Cit. on: The Middle East. Oil and politics. ref. Collection of INION. M., 2014, P. 119.
30. Levitt M. Hezbollah: The global footprint of Lebanon's : "Party of God". L., 2013. XVI, P. 23. Cit. on: The Middle East. Oil and politics. ref. Collection of INION. M., 2014, P. 119.
31. Bernard Hourcade (B. Hourcade) – CNRS, Paris, author of "the Geopolitics of Iran," Géopolitique de l'iran, Paris, A. Colin, 2010.
32. Hourcade In, Géopolitique de l'iran, Paris, A. Colin, 2010, p. 224.
33. Leroy D. Le Hezbollah libanais, de la révolution iranienne à la guerre syrienne, L'harmattan. R. // <https://clio-cr.clionautes.org/le-hezbollah-libanais.html> (31.1.2020).
34. Leroy D. Le Hezbollah libanais de la révolution iranienne à la guerre syrienne, L'Harmattan. P. // <https://clio-cr.clionautes.org/le-hezbollah-libanais.html> (31.1.2020).
35. Norton R. Hezbollah, movement of Islamic resistance in Lebanon // Princeton, 2007, P. 46 (29.01.2021).
36. "The two organizations have been competing with each other since the mid-1980s, and in 1988–1989 they fought with each other ... for political control over the southern suburbs of Beirut" // Middle East. Oil and Politics Ref. Collection of INION, M., 2014, P. 89 (31.01.2021).
37. Harik J.P. Hezbollah. The changing face of terrorism // L., N.Y. I.B. Tauris, 2004. – XIV, P. 40 (31.01.2021).
38. Subhi al-Tufaili – https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Subhi_al-Tufayli (23.01.2021).
39. The bitterness is about the participation of Iranian volunteers in the battles against ISIS.
40. Hezbollah. The birth of the party / / http://www.chaskor.ru/article/hezbollah_rozhdenie_partii_1738 (07.02.2020). Confusion in the Shiite camp // <https://golosislama.com/news.php?id=29256> (07.02.2021).
41. Hassan Nasrallah (born in 1960) is a native of the Lebanese village of al-Basuria, in which he represented Amal. Today he is called Seyid Hassan, which should mean that he is a descendant of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. He studied in an-Najaf (Iraq), where Shiite theologians traditionally study. Then he returned to Lebanon and later became a member of the Politburo of the Amal organization, and then, in 1982, a member of Hizbullah. Becoming the head of Hizbullah H. Nasrallah took care of the creation of the military wing of the organization. Other communities had similar military units in Lebanon. For example, the right-wing Christian Kataib party created its own power structures back in 1936. Iran's financial support allowed the organization to purchase long-range missiles that the Shiites used against Northern Israel. In 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak withdrew Israeli troops from Lebanon. His decision was made after the heavy losses of the Israeli army. Shiites consider the departure of the Israelis to be the result of the policy of H. Nasrallah, after which. Hizbullah immediately took control of areas of southern Lebanon.

42. Harik J.P. Hezbollah. The changing face of terrorism // L., N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 2004. – XIV, P. 50. Cit by: The Middle East. Oil and Politics Ref. Collection of INION, M., 2014, P. 89–90 (31.01.2021).
43. Harik J.P. Hezbollah. The changing face of terrorism // L., N.Y.: I.B. Tauris, 2004 – XIV, P. 52. Cit. on: The Middle East. Oil and Politics Ref. Collection of INION, M., 2014, P. 89–90 (31.01.2021).
44. Charara W, Domont F. Le Hezbollah, un mouvement islamo-nationaliste, Paris, Fayard, 2004, P. 24.
45. The Wall Street Journal, 31.07.2006.
46. According to the Lebanese Citizenship Law, a foreign spouse cannot obtain Lebanese citizenship through marriage with a Lebanese citizen. When discussing the Law, the deputies of the Parliament came to the conclusion that otherwise it would lead to an increase in the number of Palestinians who would certainly take advantage of this opportunity. The consequences of such a decision could disrupt the demographic situation in the country... In addition, the principle of *jus soli*, i.e. the automatic granting of Lebanese citizenship to those born in this country, does not apply in the country // Lebanese Citizenship Law – https://ru.qaz.wiki/wiki/Lebanese_nationality_law#By_marriage (05.03.2021).
47. The Jabha al-Nusra group was recognized as a terrorist organization by the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (dated 29.12.2014), its activities are prohibited on the territory of Russia.
48. Amarsal is located 12 km from the border with Syria and 134 km from the capital of Lebanon. The government media called Aarsal “the rear base of the gangs”.
49. Ishchenko S. Now Lebanon is in the Russian sights. 09.12.2015 // <https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/137808/>
50. La bataille du jurd d'Ersal a commencé. 22.07.2017 // <https://www.voltairenet.org/article197209.html> (20.03.2020).
51. Hizbullah cleared the Lebanese Aarsal district of terrorists // <https://eadaaily.com/ru/news/2017/08/03/hizballa-ochistila-ot-terroristov-livanskiy-rayon-ersal> (17.02.2021).
52. The statement of Lebanese President Aoun completely released Hizbullah from his obligations under UN Security Council resolution 1559 of September 2, 2004, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, as well as the disarmament of all Lebanese.
53. Samih Raad, a Lebanese scholar specializing in theology, professor at the seminary in Metz (France).
54. Samih Raad, «Une expérience politique islamique au Liban», Le Portique // 16.02.2021 // <http://journals.openedition.org/leportique/1408> (17.02.2021).
55. The resolution adopted unanimously by the members of the UN Security Council (11.08.2006) aimed at ending the conflict between Israel and Lebanon in 2006.
56. Samih Raad, “Une expérience politique islamique au Liban”, Le Portique // 16.02.2021 // <http://journals.openedition.org/leportique/1408> (17.02.2021).

DMITRY EFREMENKO. BOSNIAN AND ALBANIAN QUESTIONS THREE DECADES AFTER THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA* // *Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."***

Keywords: Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albanians, breakup of Yugoslavia, ethnonationalism, interethnic conflicts, external interference, ethnichomogenization, irredentism.

Dmitry Efremenko,
DSc(Politics), Deputy Director,
INION RAS

Citation: Efremenko D. Bosnian and Albanian Questions Three Decades after the Breakup of Yugoslavia // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021, № 3 (313), P. 93–112. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.08

Abstract. The article examines the dynamics and prospects of the settlement of the main conflicts in the Western Balkans region. Three decades after the breakup of Yugoslavia, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains explosive, and the Albanian question has not yet been resolved. The most important factors influencing the conflict dynamics in the region are ethnic homogenization and external interference. The intervention of the West allowed to stop the military actions, but at the same time it actually consolidated the results of ethnic homogenization. The prospect of integration of various countries in the region into Western alliances does not eliminate the remaining conflict potential. Rather, Western alliances are following the path of internalizing these conflicts. In these circumstances, there is a high probability of further changes in the borders between the Western Balkan states.

* Translation of the title is presented in author's version.

** The research was conducted with financial support from the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, Project No. 19-011-00662.

The events of the late 20th century in the Western Balkans are often described in the literature as the war of the Yugoslav succession [15]. Although in this case we are talking about a metaphor, in our opinion, it is quite capacious, including a reference to the common source of the Western Balkan conflicts, as well as to the fact that extra-Balkan forces are deeply and, obviously, irrevocably involved in these conflicts.

The collapse of empires and large multi-ethnic State entities only in a minority of cases leads to the resolution of conflicts that have proved detrimental to the existence of these polities. Basically, it becomes possible to overcome conflicts when several small states appear in place of the "mother" state, which are relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion and do not dispute the territories of each other or third countries. Much more often, conflicts do not end, but evolve with the possibility of moving to the "hot stage". The impact of external state actors may contribute to reducing the severity of conflicts or fueling them (especially if the new states and / or the region as a whole remain the object of geopolitical rivalry), but it also has an impact on the processes associated with the consolidation of statehood and the transformation of macropolitical identity.

External interference, even disguised as peacemaking or arbitration, can lead to informal "assignment" of roles for states and communities - "victim" / "executioner", "winner" / "loser", etc. We are speaking, of course, about creating the image of states and communities by the mainstream of leading Western mass media and electronic mass communication media, which have a powerful influence on the formation of international public opinion. This is also reflected in the practice of inter-state interactions, when, for example, the inclusion of a State in military-political unions and supranational associations is conditioned by the fulfillment of not only general standard conditions, but also special conditions, such as full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former

Yugoslavia, the introduction of institutions and procedures for transitive justice, a certain orientation of the memory polices, etc.

In the case of the Balkan Peninsula, it is safe to say that the assignment of roles was due to a kind of path dependency, the presence of stereotypes already established in the West in relation to the Balkan peoples. As shown by M. Todorova, a characteristic feature of Western stereotypes of representation of these peoples is the focus on the role of primordial factors in the formation and even the current state of their identity [17]. One of the most striking examples of this vision is the well-known work of R. Kaplan, which makes a radical "extension" of the conflicts in the Balkans up to the era of the collapse of the Roman Empire [9]. J. Kennan, drawing parallels between the Balkan wars of 1912–13 and the bloody conflicts that accompanied the collapse of the SFRY, also made references to ancient times, pointing out that long before the arrival of the Ottomans, a non-European civilization with special customs, ideas about itself and the outside world [10] had entrenched in the eastern flank of Europe. In multiple variations, such views often led to conclusions about the "immaturity" of the Balkan identity, the need for external leadership for the period of completion of modernization, the full perception of liberal values and principles of civil society; in addition, if external arbitration was accepted (voluntarily or involuntarily), the arbitrators had the opportunity to announce the "progress" of Europeanization (Westernization) of some ethnic groups or polities and the "lag" of others.

External interference has led to the fact that in several post-Yugoslav countries, the current stage of nation-building takes place in conditions of long and stable frustration, when political elites are forced to demonstrate loyalty (using the terminology of A. Hirschman [8]) to the rules dictated from the outside, while a number of public groups (including mass groups) are focused on defending the right to vote in discussions about the past, present and future of their country, or on demonstrating readiness to exit the system of rules and assessments imposed on the elite. Despite

the informal nature of “prescribing” roles, they are usually very difficult to refuse. More often, one has to “get used” to them, try to match (imitate) or, on the contrary, convince external factors and your own population that the prescribed role does not correspond to the real actions and aspirations of a particular group within the community or the community as a whole.

If we try to assess the changes in the Western Balkans region over the three decades after the collapse of the SFRY, the triumph of ethno-nationalism will certainly come first, while the development of a market economy and institutions of pluralistic democracy looks mostly secondary, largely due to the need to demonstrate loyalty to the normative attitudes of the European Union and NATO. This does not mean that the political, economic and socio-cultural changes in the Western Balkans can be treated with disdain. No way. The region has changed, and some changes can be considered almost as an opportunity to get out of the rut of intraregional confrontation, which is most often meant when talking about the “Balkan fate” or “Balkanization”. The question, however, is the causes and conditions of the changes that have most profoundly transformed the face of the region.

In addition to the West, other major state actors have an impact on the region – Russia, China, Turkey, the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. For all these actors, the Balkans is the periphery, in whose affairs all of them (now even China) are seriously involved. At the same time the involvement of the European Union is of critical importance for the region itself, and for Brussels it is becoming both a matter of honor and a heavy burden that cannot be left on the sidelines. The Western Balkans are the region where the EU, almost first of all, must and can confirm its international subjectivity. At the same time, the United States is deeply involved in the affairs of the region, and Washington's activity in some significant aspects means a competitive challenge for the European Union, but still a common result of their efforts (largely through the mechanisms

of the Euro-Atlantic Pact) can be seen as the absolute dominance of the West in determining the fate of the Balkan peoples over the past thirty years. This does not mean that the West completely determines the entire course of events – despite all efforts, something is always going “wrong” in one or another part of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the West's intervention was justified by the need to stop the bloodshed and ethnic cleansing, and then to ensure the democratization and economic transformation of the region. At the same time, some of the most significant and irreversible changes have occurred as a result of military actions, the deaths of tens of thousands and the forced displacement of millions of people, and not as a result of “peacemaking” and transformational efforts of the EU and the West as a whole. The latter led mainly to a different composition of “winners” and “losers”, fundamentally different from what seemed most likely at the beginning of the armed conflicts in the post-Yugoslav space. Both the European Union and the United States continue to declare their commitment to the principle of multi-ethnic statehood, but in fact a higher level of stability has been achieved in the part of the post-Yugoslav space where ethnic homogenization took place at a terrible cost of blood, suffering and humiliation [14]. Conversely, those countries and territories that have managed to avoid these processes or where Western intervention prevents what can be called the final balance of ethnic division remain areas of increased risk of new outbreaks of violence and inter-communal hostility.

The permanent crisis of Bosnian statehood

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are among the countries that are very vulnerable to the stability of inter-community relations. The Dayton Peace of 1995 not only put an end to the bloodshed and launched the implementation of an extremely problematic model of consociational State structure in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but actually recorded ethnic homogenization

as a result of war, ethnic cleansing and the exodus of refugees. Table 1 shows the dynamics of ethnic homogenization in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 to 1997, i.e. from the breakup of Yugoslavia and the beginning of a series of military operations to the implementation of key provisions of the Dayton Agreement, and up to the last census of 2013.

Table 1

**Ethnic homogenization in Bosnia
and Herzegovina after 1991 [7]**

	Moslem-Croatian Federation			Republika Srpska		
	1991	1996	2013	1991	1996	2013
Moslems (Bosniaks)	52,30	72,61	70,40	28,08	2,19	13,99 (12,69)
Serbs	17,62	2,32	2,41	55,43	96,79	81,51
Croats	21,90	22,27	22,44	9,19	1,02	2,41

Thanks to Dayton, the boundaries of the entities are drawn, which are unlikely to become the object of new disputes between Bosnian Serbs and Croats precisely because of ethnic homogenization. The legacy of ethnic cleansing is such that the Serbs who left the territory of the Moslem-Croatian Federation, overwhelmingly do not consider it possible to return there. Almost as unattractive was the Republika Srpska for Croats. Moslem refugees are more willing to return to the Republika Srpska, but the number of those who returned did not exceed 50% of the number of Moslems living in these territories in 1991. We are not talking about a significant change in the post-war ethno-confessional balance in the entities of BiH, but the fundamental problem is the stability of the entire Dayton model of statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Constitution of BiH, for the implementation of which only one “directive of the international community” was enough [4, p. 139] without the procedures of democratic legitimization in the Serbian and Moslem-Croatian entities, was inspired by the ideas of consociational democracy by A. Lijphart [11], which assumes

the organization of governance in the territorial polity through the full-scale inclusion of ethno-cultural communities in this process. In fact, we are talking about ensuring the stability and internal security of such a polity on the basis of institutional transactions of actors representing competing ethno-cultural communities. However, the principal feature of the situation in BiH, which diverged from the ideal model of Lijphart, was the reluctance of the elites representing Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats to cooperate with each other. The interaction was and remains forced, carried out under external control and pressure. This is what makes the Bosnian version of consociational democracy extremely problematic.

To ensure its stability, there are not enough internal resources, and only external management (first by NATO, then by the European Union) allows to maintain relative stability, although at the expense of the effectiveness and functionality of state institutions. The factors that work more effectively in this structure function at the levels of the entities and cantons that make up the Moslem-Croatian Federation (there are no cantons in the Republika Srpska, which makes the management system less cumbersome). There is an obvious asymmetry between the two entities – the federal nature of the territorial-political structure of one of them and the centralization in the other.

At the top level of BiH state institutions, the adoption of significant political decisions is often blocked by a particular community, and the institution of the EU High Representative, who is endowed with a large amount of arbitration, administrative and restrictive powers in relation to entities, in fact turns out to be not so omnipotent when the efforts of specific political emissaries in this position, aimed at changing the status quo, increase the risk of a resumption of inter-communal conflict. Nevertheless, external governance remains the main anchor that prevents the collapse of a political structure that does not satisfy any of the communities, and this discomfort does not weaken over time.

Even more significantly, after Dayton, is the fact that there is not a convergence, but an increase in divergence at the level of identities, values, and historical narratives of the three ethno-confessional groups. Although the Treaty of Dayton significantly reduced the territory controlled by the Serbs, there is considerable scope within the current borders of the Republika Srpska to strengthen the Serbian identity, while common Bosnian values are often perceived as imposed from the outside. The political elites of the RS, who are by no means united in everything, strive to preserve to the maximum extent the powers granted by Dayton to the Serbian entity. Among the Serbs, discontent with Dayton is primarily due to the restriction of their rights to self-determination, as well as to their stigmatization as the main culprits of the 1992–1995 bloodshed, reaching the point that even the very existence of the Republika Srpska is interpreted as a direct consequence of the mass massacre of Moslems in Srebrenica [5]. Despite the fact that M. Dodik and a number of other RS politicians are increasingly strongly declaring their readiness for secession with the subsequent reunification with Serbia, it is the Serbian side that is a consistent defender of the “original Dayton”. Most likely, the Serbs will take practical steps towards secession only in the conditions of a sharp aggravation of the crisis in inter-communal relations.

Divergence also occurs within the Moslem-Croatian federation, since Islam in its various manifestations, including radical trends remains the basis for strengthening the identity of the Bosniaks. The appeal to Islam as a marker of identity has inevitably led to a religious revival, which has an increasingly strong impact on the everyday practices of the Bosniaks. Many representatives of the Croatian side, in turn, are growing dissatisfied with the forced attachment to the Moslem community, and there is a growing desire for the constitution of the third, Croatian entity of Herzeg-Bosna. The degradation of living standards in BiH, which has increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic, further highlights the disparity in the economic situation of Bosnian Croats compared to

those in EU-member Croatia. The political legitimacy of the Croatian representation at the top level of the BiH authorities is also very problematic. Thus, Ž. Komšić, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Croatian community, was elected to this position several times by Bosniak votes with little support from the Croatian population itself.

Thanks to this kind of electoral manipulation [3, p. 501], which undermines the principles of consociational democracy, the Bosniaks actually get a second vote in the triple leadership of BiH, while it is difficult for the Croats to count on representation in the Presidium that is not mediated by the influence of B. Izetbegović. Komsic's relationship with Zagreb is also very strained. In general, the situation in BiH in the areas of civil liberties and electoral democracy has been stagnating for a number of years, despite Sarajevo's desire to integrate into the EU.

If for the majority of Bosnian Croats the preferred option would be the creation of a third entity, i.e. the revision of the Washington and Dayton agreements, then most Bosniaks are focused on the centralist project, or the revision of Dayton with the opposite sign.

For the younger Izetbegović and other representatives of the Bosniak political elite, the ideal is the abolition of entities and the actual acquisition by the Moslem community on the scale of BiH of advantages similar to those they have within the framework of the Moslem-Croatian Federation.

However, the Bosniaks do not have sufficient resources of their own to achieve this goal. It can be achieved only if there is strong and long-term support from outside, which, even if it is provided, does not guarantee a peaceful revision of the Dayton model according to the centralist scenario.

The ongoing consideration of BiH's application to join the European Union and the possible launch of the country's accession to NATO are hypothetically capable of leading to a Unitarian revision of Dayton. However, integration into the EU and joining NATO in the Bosnian case may have fundamentally

different consequences for each of the ethnic communities. The European Union led by Germany prefers to avoid the disintegration of BiH, first, as an extremely dangerous precedent for the whole of Europe, and, secondly, as the prospect of the appearance on the ruins of BiH of a small Moslem state, open to the influence of Turkey, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and radical Islamist movements. The agreement on stabilization and association between the EU and BiH, which was signed in 2008, but came into force only in 2015, the conditions of Brussels accompanied the acceptance for review in 2016 of the application of Sarajevo to join the EU and the new strategy of the European Commission in relation to the Western Balkans (2018) [1] set high the bar to the requirements to quality and stability of political institutions, to overcoming inter-communal disunity and real shifts in the political sphere from ethno-nationalism to civic values. Although the prospect of BiH joining the EU enjoys support in all communities, attempts to use the demands of Brussels to dilute the powers of the entities, not to mention their abolition and transition to centralization, are met with strong resistance from the Republika Srpska. The efforts of the current EU High Representative V. Inzko, trying to use his broad powers to change the position of the Serbian side, give, rather, the opposite effect. This situation is not new, it can even be called the "High Representative's dilemma": having great opportunities to put pressure on the Serbs and other communities of BiH, the High Representative, as a rule, does not dare to use them to the maximum extent, for fear of provoking a new outbreak of inter-communal violence and being accused of purposefully destroying the entire Dayton structure. It will not be resolved, at least until it receives an unambiguous mandate for such action. But the EU in its current state is not ready to accept the risk of destabilizing Bosnia just for the sake of a sharp weakening of the position of the Serbs, and, accordingly, will not provide such a mandate. So far, the European Union prefers the lesser of evils – to state the insufficient progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina in

meeting the conditions for granting membership in the EU [6]. In fact, the admission of BiH to the EU has been shelved and will informally be linked in one way or another to the accession of Serbia to the EU, which, in turn, depends on the settlement of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

The situation with the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO, at first glance, is significantly different from the unpromising prospect of joining the EU. Both the US and other members of the North Atlantic Alliance adhere to the course of maximum absorption of the territories of the former Yugoslavia. However, the main obstacle to the accession of BiH to NATO is also inter-communal differences. From the point of view of the Serbs, joining NATO can lead to a very unfavorable change in the balance of forces for them, since BiH will find itself inside the security loop, outside of which Serbia will remain. Only the admission of Serbia itself in NATO could ease the concerns, though not completely, since the autonomy of the Alliance's members in matters of security and relations with each other is in any case limited not only by formal allied obligations, but above all by American dominance.

In fact, no one is satisfied with Dayton today, either inside or outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the differences regarding the ways of transforming the state structure of BiH are so great that the maintenance of the artificial structure of Dayton is so far considered by the majority of actors as the lesser of evils. This situation is unstable, and it can change kaleidoscopically due to unforeseen events, comparable in scale of consequences, if not with the terrorist attack of Gavrilo Princip, then with the shooting at a Serbian wedding in Bashcharshia on March 1, 1992. At the same time, it is also likely that the current semi-paralytic state of Bosnian statehood will be prolonged, after which some of the main external and internal actors will again begin to consider alternative strategies, provided that their implementation will permit to avoid serious outbreaks of violence.

The Albanian question

Western intervention has led to the emergence of a second Albanian state in the Western Balkans – Kosovo, which so far remains partially recognized. This alone poses numerous challenges to regional balance and security. Together with the problems of interaction of the Albanian ethnic minority with other ethnic groups in Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Southern Serbia (without Kosovo) and the north Greece, the Albanian issue is becoming a major factor of uncertainty, already localized on the territory of the North Atlantic Alliance too. The entry into the EU of any new country in the Western Balkans (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will mean the internalization of the Albanian issue by the European Union.

As a sponsor of Kosovo's independence, the West is also exacerbating the problems in the sense that, on its initiative and under its control, institutions that were previously virtually unknown on this ground are being transplanted in Kosovo. The situation for the West in the entire post-Yugoslav space looks very ambiguous: at first, under its pressure, they expand the possibilities of revision of borders and "exit" of actors, then these opportunities are practically closed, and the internal actors of the Western Balkan polities, deterred from the outside from new attempts to "exit", try to find a "voice" within the borders declared inviolable. In theory, the struggle of various actors for the right to "vote" should accelerate the processes of structuring the political space and functional specialization of power [2, p. 29]. In the Western Balkan and, in particular, Kosovo realities, the weakness or lack of institutional traditions leads to the fact that the introduction of formal institutions from the outside actually activates political structuring, but it occurs in such a way that the informal structures and relations that are familiar to the corresponding society are not displaced, but mimic and, ultimately, replace the content of formal institutions. In Kosovo, where the party and political structures develop largely on a clan

basis, this is particularly pronounced [13]. So the functioning of traditional Albanian law against the background of the introduction of pluralistic democratic institutions in Kosovo, regulating patron-client relations and protecting the special role of the tribal community [16], should not seem like something out of the ordinary.

The Serbian and other ethnic minorities are in fact marginalized in Kosovo, but where there is an opportunity to rely on external support (in the northern regions), they form alternative structures and institutions. Ethnic homogenization took place very intensively in Kosovo back in the days of socialist Yugoslavia; in the 1990s and especially after the military intervention of the NATO countries, the exodus of the non-Albanian population sharply sped up. As a result, the number of Albanians exceeds 9/10 of the total population. Their dominance in Kosovo cannot be challenged; the provision of legal guarantees and parliamentary representation to ethnic minorities does not pose a risk of changing the status quo, and the presence of small Serbian enclaves in southern Kosovo can rather be interpreted as a confirmation of Pristina's willingness to preserve the remnants of ethnic diversity. However, contrary to the 2013 Brussels Agreements between Serbia and Kosovo, the Association of Serbian Municipalities is still not functioning and, obviously, in any case, will not have executive powers. North Mitrovica and surrounding areas of Kosovo, with its predominantly Serb population, as well as a significant proportion of the Albanian population in the Serbian communities of Preševo and Bujanovac, remain potential arenas of inter-ethnic confrontation and escalation of the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. Ultimately, Western control is the main factor preventing such an escalation.

By providing military support for the so-called "humanitarian self-determination" of Kosovo [18, p. 86], NATO has dealt a final, decisive blow to the regime of S. Milošević and the project "Great Serbia". Does it follow from this that instead of the "Great Serbia" project, the United States, NATO and the West

as a whole chose the "Greater Albania" project? There is no doubt that, having received military support from NATO in 1999 in Kosovo and political and diplomatic support in 2001 in Northern Macedonia (the result of Western mediation was the Ohrid Agreement), the Albanians up to this day are distinguished by the maximum compliment in the Balkans in terms of relation to the North Atlantic Alliance. However, they have their own agenda, which is only to a certain extent compatible with the agendas of the US and the EU. Thus, for the United States the support of the Kosovo Albanians allowed to consolidate the unconditional dominance of NATO in the region and to create in Kosovo the most important stronghold – the base of Camp Bondsteel. However, this does not mean that Washington's main goal was or is to ensure the success of the Albanian irredenta. The creation of a Great Albania in one form or another or the conclusion of a union only between Albania and Kosovo will create an existential threat to several NATO members, will cause an acute crisis within the Alliance, the result of which may be its further loosening (up to now the main contribution to this process is made by Erdogan's Turkey with its own geopolitical ambitions). Rather, the United States is satisfied with the status quo, when the final goals of the Albanian irredenta are quite close, but not achieved, and the United States itself acts as the main armed guarantor of stability in conditions when the probability of sudden destabilization in the region still persists or even increases. The European Union is in an even more vulnerable position in the case of the Albanian irredenta. Most of the EU countries agreed to the recognition of independence of Kosovo, but they are not ready for the fact that this independence will only be an intermediate stop on the way to unification with Albania, and in the foreseeable future they will seek to prevent the emergence of this precedent by political means. As in the Bosnian case, for Brussels the prospect of recognition of the redrawing of borders on the results of violent ethnic homogenization is highly undesirable. Albanian irredentism,

along with criminal activity and the channels of Islamic radicalism passing through the Albanian-populated parts of the Balkans, can overturn the entire EU strategy towards the region.

Meanwhile, such a position of the West, which has already made important steps towards Albanian interests, may push Albanian actors (not only political elites, but also clan structures and criminal groups) to a series of new steps that transform the regional political reality. This is exactly what happened after the completion of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo and eventually ended with the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. In the face of increasing uncertainty about the prospects for full integration into the EU of the part of the Western Balkans, most of which was formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire, Albanian players may try again to actively use the previously successful tactics.

For both the US and the EU, the priority is a format for the settlement of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which will mean full recognition of the international subjectivity of Pristina and, if possible, will not lead to the collapse of the regime in Belgrade, which agreed to such recognition. On the one hand, such recognition is only a statement of existing and, obviously, irreversible realities. Hypothetical exchange of territories with a predominance of Serbian and Albanian populations between Belgrade and Pristina, could also eliminate new hotbeds of potential destabilization. On the other hand, the historical and symbolic significance of Kosovo and Metohija for the Serbs so far outweighs all the practical benefits of recognizing the political reality.

During the presidency of Donald Trump, there were certain shifts in the American approach to the Kosovo problem and to relations with Serbia. If previously Serbia was seen as a party that suffered both military and moral and political defeat, which must accept its consequences, then under Trump, the understanding of the importance of including Belgrade in the pool of regional actors, whose interests the United States is ready to support to a

certain extent, has clearly increased. In the materials of influential American think tanks devoted to the Western Balkans, there were calls for a “historical” rapprochement with Serbia and restoration of the reputation of the United States as an honest partner [12]. There is no doubt that Washington’s main motivation was related to the desire to establish NATO control over all countries in the region, as well as to weaken the positions of Russia and China in Serbia. At the same time, Trump has strengthened the motive of competition with the European Union.

The agreement on the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, signed in Washington in September 2020, involves a number of steps towards the interests of Belgrade, primarily in the economic sphere. At the same time, both Serbia and Kosovo are “integrated” into the American strategy not only in the Western Balkans, but also in the Middle East and in relations with China. At the same time, this agreement is supposed to create the conditions for even more significant changes in relations between Belgrade and Pristina. However, here the degree of consistency of the American approach becomes a factor of uncertainty, and it may again undergo changes under Joe Biden. At the moment, the demand for Serbia to recognize Kosovo's independence is stated as a priority of the policy of the 46th president of the United States in the Western Balkan region. Accordingly, the prospects for a new agreement between Serbia and Kosovo remain uncertain. Aleksandar Vučić is forced in his policy to constantly seek a balance between the almost sacred attitude of the majority of Serbs to Kosovo and Metohija as a hotbed of national statehood and culture and very unfavorable political realities. Restoration of Belgrade's de facto control over most of the territory of Kosovo (with the exception of the likely “exchange” of Northern Mitrovica and several adjacent Kosovar areas for territories in Preševo with a predominance of the Albanian population) is not possible; in the long term Kosovo is likely to form such a dense network of ties with Albania that recognition of their unity will be a matter of

time and political expediency for individual states and supranational associations. In essence, Serbia's stability will largely be determined by the extent to which the "Albanian question" is considered a matter of internal control and the extent to which it is considered a matter of international relations. Vučić's efforts, aimed at finding a *modus vivendi* with the Kosovo Albanians and Albania, at pragmatizing interaction with them, even if forced, are justified in the international context in which Serbia finds itself. This does not mean that all such efforts should automatically be supported by Moscow, but at least Russia needs to strive for a greater understanding of the real conditions and prospects that determine policy of Belgrade.

Apparently, the United States (at least under Donald Trump) has begun to make steps towards Belgrade, seeking a general and controlled rebalancing of forces in the region, the need for which increases in view of the prospects for the completion of the "Great Albania" project.

It is significant that the proven instruments of influence on the Western Balkan elites – the ICTY and its functional successor – the Hague division of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals – have begun to be used much more actively against influential Kosovar politicians. In addition, the possibility of external control over political processes in the Albanian-speaking area of the Western Balkans is associated with the use of inter-clan contradictions, the degree of determination in the fight against criminal activity, the presence of socio-cultural, economic and institutional differences between different parts of this space. However, neither the US nor the EU can be completely sure that they fully control the situation in the Albanian-speaking region.

The situation in Northern Macedonia is the most unpredictable, and with the general political destabilization in Montenegro increasing, it is likely that tensions will increase in the areas adjacent to Albania. The situation is far from ambiguous in those areas of Greece where a large number of Albanians live. Almost everywhere, the Albanian minority is characterized by a

high degree of cohesion and insufficient integration into the social structures of the respective countries [19].

The rapid expansion of NATO at the expense of the small Western Balkan countries – Albania, Montenegro and Northern Macedonia – meant, first, the interiorization by the North Atlantic Alliance of the smoldering conflicts related to the situation of the Albanian ethnic minority in the post-Yugoslav space. Secondly, unlike in the cases of Slovenia and Croatia, when membership in NATO preceded the crucial stage of European integration, in the current conditions, membership in the alliance can perform a compensatory function, when the final accession of other states of the Western Balkans to the European Union is postponed for many years.

North Macedonia's accession to NATO would hardly have taken place without the active support of the Albanian population and Albanian elites. Now, however, any destabilization of relations between the two main ethnic groups of Northern Macedonia can be seen as a blow to the reputation of the Alliance, which, in theory, should ensure internal stability and the security of its recruits. If, instead, events develop in the direction of the Kosovo scenario and the actual emergence of a state within a state, then NATO should block the activity of local Albanians or sign its impotence to prevent the slide of Northern Macedonia to a state of failure. By absorbing together with the Western Balkan states their contradictions, NATO, of course, does not risk to weaken significantly the allied unity (at least not for this reason), but it will be forced to divert additional resources to maintain regional stability. With its reputation as a provider of security, NATO, in the case of the Western Balkans, runs the risk of having to prove that reputation in practice.

* * *

The scenarios of the future of the Western Balkans, which are guided by the European Union and the United States, do not

lead to the elimination of the causes of the main conflicts in the post-Yugoslav space and, obviously, in significant points differ from the images of the desired future, which correspond to the aspirations of a significant part of the population of the countries of the region. The consequences of ethnic homogenization and ethno-nationalism is a harsh reality that forms the practical politics in and around the post-Yugoslav space. In the long term, two or three irredentist projects may be implemented in the region in one form or another. On the contrary, the chances that the Serbs, Croats, Albanians will completely abandon these aspirations, all together finding themselves within the common borders of the European Union, do not seem very high. Even if the EU's political elites decide to fully and unconditionally integrate all the territories of the Western Balkans, there is no guarantee that already inside the EU, taking advantage of a new status, regional actors will forever be satisfied with the narratives of harmonious coexistence within a multi-ethnic and multicultural space. If the efforts of external players to block the new rise of Serbian, Croatian or Albanian irredentism prove futile, such a development can be considered as the finalization of the military conflicts of the 1990s.

References

1. A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans. Strasbourg, February 6, 2021, accessed March 3, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-credible-enlargement-perspective-western-balkans_en.pdf
2. Bartolini, Stefano. *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
3. Berglund, Sten (ed.) *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013.
4. Bildt, Carl. *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998.
5. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna. "The Politics, Practice and Paradox of «Ethnic Security» in Bosnia-Herzegovina" // *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4 (2015), no. 1 : 1-18.

6. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2020 Report. Brussels, October 6, 2020, accessed March 7, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/bosnia_and_herzegovina_report_2020.pdf
7. Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013. Final Results. Sarajevo, June 2016, accessed March 1, 2021 <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/wphc/BIH/BIH-2016-06-30.pdf>
8. Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
9. Kaplan, Robert D. *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993.
10. Kennan, George F. *The Balkan Crisis: 1913 and 1993* // *The New York Review of Books*, July 15, 1993.
11. Lijphart, Arend. *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
12. Marusic D., Bedenbaugh S., Wilson D. "Balkans Forward: A New US Strategy for the Region", Atlantic Council: Official Website, November 2017, accessed March 7, 2021, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Balkans_Foward_web_1128.pdf
13. Montanaro, Lucia. *The Kosovo Statebuilding Conundrum: Addressing Fragility in a Contested State*. FRIDE working paper no. 91. Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2009.
14. Sletzinger Martin. "A Glimmer in the Balkans", *The Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 2011, accessed February 02, 2021, <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/winter-2011-the-seven-million/a-glimmer-in-the-balkans/>
15. Stokes, Gale, Lampe, John, Rusinow, Dennison, Mostov, Julie. "Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession". *Slavic Review*, 55 (Spring 1996), no. 1: 136-160.
16. Tarifa, Fatos. *Vengeance is Mine: Justice Albanian Style*. Chapel Hill, NC: Globic Press, 2008.
17. Todorova, Maria. *Imagining the Balkans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
18. Weller, Marc. *Negotiating the Final Status of Kosovo*. Chaillot Paper No. 114. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008.
19. Ypi, Lea L. *The Albanian Renaissance in Political Thought: Between the Enlightenment and Romanticism* // *East European Politics and Societies*, 21(2007), no. 4 : 661-680.

VALERIA KUZNETSOVA. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
ROLE OF MIGRATION RELATIONS BETWEEN ALGERIA AND
FRANCE IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE OF ALGERIA //
Article was written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."

*Keywords: Algeria, France; migration
processes, colonial system.*

Kuznetsova Valeria,
Bachelor, Political Science Department,
Institute of International Relations
and Socio-Political Studies MSLU

Citation: Kuznetsova V. Historical Analysis of the Role of
Migration Relations between Algeria and France in the War of
Independence of Algeria // *Russia and the Moslem World*, 2021,
№ 3 (313), P. 113–118. DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.09

*Abstract. From the end of the 19th century to 1962, Algerian
presence in France became part of more than a centenary history. The
early and significant migration flow of Algerian colonists to the
metropolis began in the second half of the 19th century. Until 1962,
Algerians were not called foreigners, but first "aborigines," then "French
subjects," and then "French Muslims of Algeria." Close relationship
between Algeria and France, the metropolis and the colony, oppressors
and oppressed, can be traced in the culture of both states and the
peculiarities of social structures throughout large-scale historical strata.
The peculiarities of this close unity, manifested in migration relations,
among other things, encourage the colony to fight for its independence.*

At the origins of Algerian immigration

Algerian emigration does not begin with the colonial
conquest of 1830. Algeria, on the contrary, becomes a colony and
immigration center, attracting hundreds of thousands Europeans
looking for a way to invest money (French, Spaniards, Italians,
Maltese). The establishment of a colonial system on this territory,

administered by French departments since 1848, significantly worsens the situation of the indigenous population. Worsening impoverishment in rural areas, very high population growth, land pressure, lootings, lack of resources led to the outflow of ethnic population from rural areas and emigration by the end of the 19th century.

The center of the outflow was the especially depressed region of Algeria - Kabilia. Local men provided an influx of labor force into the cities and to the farms of the Mediterranean coast of the metropolis, with the first stronghold in Marseille. They came into use as agricultural workers, diggers, traders or laborers.

Kabilia, especially the poor region, was the main place for those wishing to emigrate. The migration project was developed by family members or a special form of "council of elders" (djema'a). Single men in the metropolis often created families before leaving, and working in the metropolis allowed them to provide for the family when they returned to the village. Their wages allowed them to survive in the metropolis, and scarcely saved money was supposed to provide food for their families. Household heads left for a short time - usually only a few months due to the peculiarities of interstate regulation, so the frequency of movement of migrants between the metropolis and Algerian departments was high. On their return, other young people from their village go to their places, who are settled in their residences and receive their jobs. Migrant workers from Algeria subsequently formed very close diaspora communities in the metropolis. Men, on the basis of social contacts, family contacts, village solidarity or region of origin, joined together and created informal assistance communities, a kind of migration clans that facilitate access to housing, work, communication with the homeland and maintenance of cultural or religious traditions.

On the eve of the First World War, polls showed extensive settlement in the metropolis of the Algerian community. But due to the specific status, exact calculation was impossible. At the 1901 census, there were no statistics for the category of migrants;

Algerians were registered as French. However, for the first time there was a mention of “workers from Algeria”. According to a 1912 poll, there were about 4-5 thousand Algerians in the metropolis, more than a thousand of them were in the capital and on its outskirts. They were no longer only part of the agricultural community, but also belonged to the industrial and urban proletariat. They worked, for example, in refineries, in omnibus company and on building areas of metro in Paris, in the Michelin factories, in the mines of the Pas-de-Calais, in the Lyon industry, at the docks of the port of Marseilles. Chiefs appreciated the contribution of this dutiful and cheap labor force, and also resorted to it to disrupt strikes of local workers.

Thus, it was the First World War that initiated the centralized migration movement to France. In 1914-1918, about 100,000 front workers and 175,000 colonial soldiers were recruited in Algeria. After the war, all workers and soldiers returned to their native colonies, but few managed to stay in France.

Interwar period. The birth of Algerian nationalism and acceleration of immigration

In 1921 there were more than 35,000 Algerian citizens in France, in 1936 their number reached more than 85,000, and on the eve of World War II it dropped to 72,000. In the strict sense, this phenomenon cannot be called immigration, since Algerians had French citizenship and, therefore, were not foreigners, without using the rights of native French. The flows were strictly regulated. Arrival in the metropolis depended on the presentation of an employment contract, cash security, a health examination certificate, and a photo identification.

Immigration in the interwar period was available for the able-bodied male population for a fixed period, with numerous relocations and obligations to employers, which led to a constant increase in the outflow of those who had already worked and a low increase in the inflow of new labor (the migration balance

was even negative at the beginning of the economic crisis of the 1930s) ... On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, for the first time, the manifestation of close cultural ties and special attention to the Algerians from the state begin. Opening of the Grand Mosque in Paris (1926), and then the Franco-Muslim hospital (1935) and the Muslim cemetery (1937) in Bobigny, indicated the government's intention to help and protect its "Muslim subjects." However, these initiatives do not preclude their desire to control the immigrant community. As early as 1925, there was created the Service of North African Indigenous Affairs (le Service des affaires indigènes nord-africaines (SAINA)) with a North African brigade to carry out this task. Subsequently, nationalist and anti-colonialist ideas began to spread in the Algerian community.

Ahmed Messali Hajj, a supporter of communist ideas and Kemalism, founded the political movement "North African Star" in Paris in June 1926. Its activists propagated their political agenda in the Algerian community, relying on a chain of cafes, restaurants, furnished hotels and workers' houses. Nationalist party condemned the colonial system and claimed the independence of Algeria and all the countries of the Maghreb. Rallies, leaflets, demonstrations, party newspaper: nationalist activity gained momentum around Zaim (leadership) and his 3600 most active supporters. "North African Star" was dissolved on January 26, 1937 by a decree of the Popular Front. On March 11, it reappeared under the name of the Algerian People's Party, which in turn was clamped down on September 26, 1939.

1954-1962: Algerian immigrants in the War of Independence

World War II brought to a standstill of the flow of workers, while Algerian troops participated and suffered losses in the fight against Nazism and liberation of France. Flights to the metropolis resumed in 1946, which was contributed to the freedom of movement introduced by the law of September 20, 1947. The War

of Independence, with a slight interruption in the flow of new migrants, did not cause a major recession of Algerian migration. During the eight years of conflict, the number of Algerians living in the metropolitan area increased from 211,000 in 1954 to 350,000 in 1962.

This phenomenon may seem contradictory, as voluntary and massive emigration to the metropolis provokes repressions and conflict against participants in the independence movement. However, the pressure and colonial oppression which the Muslim population suffered from, intensified. In particular, this affected the policy of struggle against the Algerian associations. The French army identified prohibited areas, cleared of local residents who were in the camps under the protection of the military guards. More than two million Algerians ended up in such places.

Algerian immigration during the war continued to be economically driven, with men in the lowest paid jobs with high levels of dangerous and hard work (mainly in the construction industry and metallurgy). During this period, a sharp increase in migration begins in most regions. (Kabília still remains the main focus of migration, however, over time, the number of people leaving Oran, Constantine, Aures, Tlemcen...), and men increasingly begin to emigrate with their families (7,000 families in 1954, 30,000 in 1962).

The resettlement of this large Algerian community in the metropolis became the main issue for two rival nationalist political projects: the Party of the Algerian People, created by the last-mentioned Ahmed Messali Hajj and the National Liberation Front, a radical separatist movement involved in the "All Saints" uprising on November 1, 1954. Their confrontation develops into a bloody fratricidal strife, as a result of which the National Liberation Front roots itself in the immigration field of France. The organization is becoming an important pillar of the war of independence due to its financial backing (compulsory contributions), ideological significance and political pressure. At

this time, the authorities, in turn, express serious concern about the emergence in the center of the metropolis of a genuine Algerian counter-campaign of separatists. In this regard, the French authorities decided to create special social services that would provide well-aimed support to the Algerians, but unofficially they carried out an exploratory mission associated with subsequent repressive actions.

Conclusion

The colonial system built by the French metropolis over several centuries in Algeria, supported by the growth of social integration and consolidation of the Algerian diaspora in the French geographical, economic and cultural space, gave rise to a conflict which took the form of the struggle for the independence of Algeria and led to the emergence of political figures who initiated separatist processes. Migration processes and regulation of migrant flows by the metropolis influenced directly the creation of a nonequilibrium system of intracolony relations, expressed in the armed separatist conflict, and influenced the further close relationship between the two states.

References

1. Algerian National Movement https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_National_Movement
2. French conquest of Algeria https://ru.qwe.wiki/wiki/French_conquest_of_Algeria
3. L'immigration algérienne en France : histoire et actualité <https://www.cairn.info/revue-confluences-mediterranee-2011-2-page-219.htm#>
4. Peggy Derder. L'immigration algérienne en France <https://www.histoire-immigration.fr/dossiers-thematiques/caracteristiques-migratoires-selon-les-pays-d-origine/l-immigration-algerienne>

THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

2021.03.003. ELENA DMITRIEVA. ISLAMIC WORLD IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC //
Condensed abstract.

*Keywords: islam, fatwa, ramadan,
hajj, virtual hajj, coronavirus, pandemic.*

Elena Dmitrieva,
Senior Research Associate,
INION RAN

DOI: 10.31249/rmw/2021.03.10

1. Kafarov T.E. Islam v ekstremal'nykh usloviyakh pandemii // *Islam i islamovedenie v sovremennoy Rossii. Sbornik dokladov II Vserossijskogo islamovedcheskogo foruma. Pod obshchei redakciei M.YA. YAhyayeva. Mahachkala, 2021, P.89–96.*

2. Tsaregorodtseva I.A., Gukezhev I.A., Chepaykina D.I. The Fatwas of Coronavirus Era: the Reaction of Islamic Legal Institutions on Changing Realities. HSE University, Russian Federation, Moscow // *Vostok. Afro-Aziatskie obshchestva: istoriya i sovremennost. 2021. №2. P. 69–82.*

DSc Telman Kafarov (Professor, Head of the Department of Philosophy and History, DSMU) examines the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on Muslim religious life. The pandemic significantly changed the “technology” of most of the foundations of Islam - as a result, there was a temporary closure of mosques for the obligatory five-time prayer, including Friday;

the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca has become impossible or difficult; activities during the fasting month of Ramadan were minimized because it was recognized that extreme conditions associated with changes in daily routine and diet would increase the risk of infection; sharing an evening meal has become impossible due to the demands of social distancing.

The author notes that Muslims around the world are especially sensitive to the cancellation of the pilgrimage to the holy sites of Islam (Hajj). The experience of organizing the “Mecca 3D” project, which allows one to perform the Hajj in a virtual space, seems to be important in the current situation, although many authoritative organizations (for example, the Muslim Council of Great Britain) do not accept the virtual Hajj, believing that it should be associated with overcoming difficulties on the way to the sacred lands in real life. The Islamic world has been actively using modern communication tools for a long time, and why should this not concern the technology of pilgrimage, at least for a limited period of time?

The author notes that some representatives of the clergy show their “confessional vigilance” at the wrong time, defending the “purity” of Islam and arguing about the halal nature of medical antiviral drugs and vaccines. This issue is discussed in the media quite intensively, but it is not taken into account that the Quran and Sunnah unequivocally allow the use of non-halal products in extreme conditions that threaten the life and health of people. In fact, according to the Quran, a person, his physical and spiritual health is the highest value, and he is obliged to take care of preserving his life first of all. Telman Kafarov admits that these issues about the halal have a right to exist in normal conditions, but to raise them in the tense and uncertain conditions of a pandemic means to hinder the state policy of prevention and treatment of coronavirus.

The author raises another important topic about the cultural, regional and confessional specifics of the coronavirus pandemic. Nowadays, countries are already known that are

effectively confronting the pandemic – China, North Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam. The author asks why the regions with the highest population density, where the epidemic actually began, and without special spatial and geographical cordons that prevent the spread of the epidemic, are the most successful in combating the pandemic today. The author believes that the reasons are in the national mentality and the peculiarities of the social organization of the inhabitants of this region, to be more precise, in their discipline and law-abiding, which make it easier and with fewer losses to mobilize to achieve the set goals, as well as to restrict freedom during a pandemic.

There is almost no covid dissidence in these countries, which is quite common in European and other countries, whose supporters call for a boycott of government action in defense of the pandemic. Actions of covid dissidents are held all over the world on quite a regular basis. Only in January 2021, actions with thousands of participants demanding the rejection of anti-epidemic restrictions were held in many European cities. There are such dissident movements in Russia as well. It should be noted that Muslims are considerably less frequently getting involved in the covid-dissident movement, especially in relation to the strategy of self-isolation and distancing implemented by the state. But covid-dissidence among Muslims manifests itself in other forms, which were mentioned above in connection with the discussions about the halal nature of vaccines and antiviral drugs.

An important role in the successful address the pandemic is played by the phenomenon of social distancing, inherent in the inhabitants of Southeast Asia, where contact forms of communication, such as hugs and handshakes that exist in Islamic and Christian societies, are quite rare. Muslim etiquette is characterized by closer forms of communication where touching and hugging are a manifestation of respect.

Also, the author refers to the concept of “crowding”, i.e. an uncomfortable state of a person caused by a lack of personal space, when it seems to a person that there are too many people

around him. The author concludes that the epidemic situation will expand the boundaries of personal space in interpersonal and public communication of people of all faiths.

The team of authors led by PhD Irina Tsaregorodtseva (Associate Professor, HSE University) analyzes the relationship between religious, legal and government institutions in the Muslim world during the coronavirus pandemic. The coronavirus pandemic has become the next most important topic of discussion in the Muslim world after the end of the active phase of the “Arab Spring” with a wave of anti-government coups and discussion of their legality from the point of view of Islamic tradition.

In the spring of 2020, during the month of Ramadan, the largest number of coronavirus fatwas was issued. Believers wondered how the pandemic would affect traditional religious practices and rituals. The recommendations of the theologians of al-Azhar were actively disseminated, and first of all, through social networks, where rather detailed decrees were published, which contained the following prescriptions: believers were to observe fasting in the coming month of Ramadan, despite the pandemic; believers had to comply with all quarantine precautions, including attending and organizing mass gatherings, which also include Friday prayers in mosques; believers should not allow the spread of false information and unverified rumors about the coronavirus, and a ban was imposed to spread panic among the population; a ban was imposed on speculation in the prices of relevant goods and services during a pandemic; in everything related to the fight against the epidemic, the authorities and doctors had to be fully obeyed; it was recommended to accelerate the centralized collection of alms, obligatory according to the laws of Islam, in order to send the proceeds to help those in need and those affected during the coronavirus; it was allowed to use alcohol-containing agents for disinfection; it was allowed to bury several deceased in one grave if it was necessary during a pandemic. The above texts of fatwas

contained references to fragments from Scripture, prophetic traditions and historical chronicles of early Islam.

The recommendations of another Egyptian center, the House of Fatwas, generally coincided with the published instructions of the scholars of al-Azhar. A fatwa was also issued on the inadmissibility of organizing remote Friday prayers, since the true meaning of the face-to-face prayer action of believers led by the imam is lost. There were also very unusual decrees, which said that death from the coronavirus could serve as the basis for declaring a person a martyr.

The Fatwa Council of the United Arab Emirates on the official website also published the text of the fatwa on coronavirus-related issues. A feature of this document is the abundance of legal terms and references to the Holy Scriptures.

The content of the decisions of the European Council on Fatwas and Research in some moments had a specific shade for non-Muslim countries, although in the main part it coincided with those written by Arab institutions. The European muftis were concerned, in particular, about issues that were not particularly relevant for the Arab countries in the spring of 2020. First of all, it was about the cremation of the bodies of those who died from the coronavirus, and about the admissibility of such a procedure in relation to the deceased Muslims. Another new topic concerning fatwas of Arab institutions was the discussion of the question of one of the believers about the possibility for Muslims to take loans from European banks if the companies in which they worked were on the verge of bankruptcy due to the pandemic. The Muftis decided that such options were acceptable for European Muslims who were in a difficult situation.

A review of the available fragments of fatwas of the Council of Supreme Theologians of Saudi Arabia showed that their main topics are: justification of the need to suspend all types of pilgrimages to the sacred land of Muslims, compliance with all precautions that are recommended by doctors and prescribed by the authorities, as well as religious and psychological support of

believers during a period of violation their usual way of life. Also, Muslim scholars of Saudi Arabia quite often refer to the Quran and Sunnah when justifying the need for the prevention of coronavirus, insisting that the prevention of diseases is mentioned in the texts of revelation, and that Islam heals not only the soul, but also the body.

The French Council of the Muslim Faith has issued only one short resolution, which contains the simplest recommendations for hygiene in the conditions of the spread of the coronavirus.

The only resolution of the Muslim Council of Great Britain can hardly be called a fatwa; it resembles an appeal to believers and leaders of the Muslim community of the country in form – not to gather for mass events and limit social contacts.

The Council of Supreme Theologians of Saudi Arabia also recommended adherence to the prescriptions of the authorities and doctors; but the main focus of these decrees was on the annual pilgrimage to the Kaaba at the end of July, as well as fasting, which just fell on the spring time of the pandemic. According to the members of the Council, various types of pilgrimages to Muslim shrines should be suspended, but this is not a disaster, because the main thing is to prevent even greater harm.

The authors conclude that the coronavirus pandemic as a whole did not cause controversy in the positions of Islamic institutions both in the Arab world and in Western Europe.

**РОССИЯ
И
МУСУЛЬМАНСКИЙ МИР
2021 – 3 (313)**

Научно-информационный бюллетень

Содержит материалы по текущим политическим,
социальным и религиозным вопросам

Дизайн М.Б. Шнайдерман

Компьютерная верстка К.Л. Синякова

Гигиеническое заключение

№ 77.99.6.953.П.5008.8.99 от 23.08.1999 г.

Подписано к печати 18 / IX – 2021 г. Формат 60х84/16

Бум. офсетная № 1 Печать офсетная

Усл. печ. л. 8,0 Уч.-изд. л. 7,5

Тираж 300 экз. (1–100 экз. – 1-й завод) Заказ № 69

**Институт научной информации
по общественным наукам Российской академии наук РАН**
Нахимовский проспект, д. 51/21, Москва, 117418
<http://inion.ru>, https://instagram.com/books_inion

**Отдел маркетинга и распространения
информационных изданий**

Тел.: +7 (925) 517-36-91, +7 (499) 134-03-96

e-mail: shop@inion.ru

Отпечатано по гранкам ИНИОН РАН

ООО «Амирит»,

410004, Саратовская обл., г. Саратов,

ул. Чернышевского, д. 88, литера У