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AND
THE MOSLEM WORLD
2 (320) – 2023

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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR DOBAEV. GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES IN THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA

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Abstract. The article describes the process of the emergence and development of geopolitics as a science and a method of multifactor analysis: from traditional to civilizational, from global to regional and

even local. The author considers the main postulates of the founding fathers of the Anglo-Saxon, German, Russian and French geopolitical schools. Special attention is paid to the origin and development of Russian geopolitics, its current state. Among a number of directions, the Eurasian and the neo-Eurasian ones, their general and special features are distinguished. The milestones of the development of geopolitical thought in the South of Russia are spelled out, while it is noted that the geopolitical method, which has absorbed the achievements of "weak" French geopolitics, is effective, productive and is a good help in the political, sociological and strategic analysis of not only global problems of our time, but also important issues of national, regional and even local levels.

Geopolitics as a science grew out of political geography at the end of the 19th century, but attempts to comprehend the connection between the political organization of society in the person of the state and the surrounding space took place in the works of philosophers, historians and politicians already in ancient times.

The scientific and theoretical development of classical (traditional) geopolitics originates from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The term "geopolitics" was introduced into scientific circulation in 1916 by the Swedish geographer R. Chellen, who defined it as the science of the state, personifying a "geographical organism in space". The provisions of geopolitics were developed in the works of the founding fathers of its classical schools – the German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel, the American Admiral Alfred Mahan, the Englishman Halford Mackinder, the French geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache, later the German General Karl Haushofer and the German lawyer Karl Schmitt. They were the creators of the national schools of geopolitics – American, English, German, French. They understood geopolitics as a system of knowledge about the control of space.

The development of the geopolitical discipline from its founders to the present time has followed several parallel trajectories. In accordance with the fundamental concepts of geopolitics, the most important schools of this science were divided into three branches – maritime, land and coastal. The maritime and the land are considered strong geopolitical schools operating in global categories. It was their founders who derived the main law of classical geopolitics - geopolitical dualism, which consists in the eternal global confrontation of the states of sea and land civilizations (Sea and Continent, thalassocracy and tellurocracy). As for French (coastal) geopolitics, it is considered weak. On its basis, regional and local geopolitical directions appeared in the second half of the twentieth century.

Maritime geopolitics has become widespread in the British and American elites, and since the 1970s has become one of the most popular methodologies for political and military-strategic analysis of world politics and international relations in the United States.

The land (continental) school was formed in the 1920s in Germany and in the most general approximation (in hints and essays, rather than in a systematic presentation) among Russian Eurasians.

The "coastal line" in this discipline was being developed in France, at the Vidal de la Blache school, which was revived in the 1970s, together with the geopolitical magazine "Herodotus" by the modern geopolitician Yves Lacoste.

The foundations of the Russian school of geopolitics were laid by the famous Slavophiles – the Kireevsky brothers and the Aksakov brothers, A.S. Khomyakov and, in particular, the "last Slavophile" and the "forerunner of Eurasianism" – K.N. Leontiev. However, it was put as a science on a solid ideological basis and methodological basis by two great men of the 19th century, who worked in close scientific and scientific-political cooperation – the most prominent statesman of the Empire, Count D.A. Milyutin

and the famous scientist N.Y. Danilevsky. Through their efforts, geopolitics became a practical guide for the state activities of the Russian Empire.

Subsequently, in Russia, geopolitical views were formed in such directions as civilizational, socio-political and natural-scientific. This was due, firstly, to the establishment of the Eurasian status of Russia, its stable position within the borders of the Eurasian Empire, secondly, to economic growth, expansion of international relations, and thirdly, to the development of natural science, which began during the reforms of Peter the Great. Among the researchers of this time, one can name such scientists as K.M. Behr, V.I. Lamansky, L.I. Mechnikov, D.I. Mendeleev, etc.

Further evolutionary shifts in Russia's geopolitical views are observed in the works of E.A. Vandam (Edrikhin), A. Rado, V.P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, A.E. Snesarev and others.

However, after 1917, the attitude of the Soviet government to geopolitics became cool, and gradually geopolitics and geopolitics were ousted from the sphere of politics proper, sketches of geopolitical approaches are found only in the emigrant current of Eurasianism and in the teaching of military geography and operational country studies in closed military institutions. During this period, abroad, in the emigrant environment, Russian geopolitics received a new development, became the basis and fruit of the work of such an interesting scientific phenomenon as Eurasianism. The classics of middle–generation geopolitics were the pillars of Eurasianism – N.S. Trubetskoy, P.N. Savitsky, G.V. Vernadsky and others, and in Russia – "the last Eurasian" L.N. Gumilev. The Eurasians viewed Russia as a special civilization, different from the Western and Eastern ones.

In addition to the traditional (classical) version, there is also a *new* (economic) geopolitics (geo-economics) and the *newest* (civilizational) geopolitics. In other words, despite the youth of geopolitics as a science, there has been a transformation of geopolitical thinking: from traditional geopolitics (military

power) to new geopolitics, or geo-economics (economic power), and, finally, to the latest, or civilizational geopolitics. This trend has affected the fundamental foundations of the world order, the symbols of which are "big spaces", capital (gold) and information, including tradition as communication in time. The main category of geopolitics are *spaces*: physical (land, water, air, underwater sphere, space, etc.) and metaphysical (political, economic, environmental, demographic, military, etc.). At the same time, without denying the importance of a multitude of physical and metaphysical spaces, modern traditionalist geopolitics claim that they represent only a kind of background on which the struggle of strategic opponents - the states of land and sea civilizations – unfolds, and the main law of geopolitics (the law of fundamental dualism) determines the essence of the global and regional processes taking place.

Geopolitics experienced a new rise on a global scale in the 1990s, when there was a need to explain the main events of world politics in new coordinate systems. And it turned out that geopolitics fully meets these requirements. In addition, the rejection of ideological rhetoric revealed the fact that most American strategic planning centers continue to develop the tradition of British and American geopolitics of the Atlanticist school (Mackinder, Speakman, later Zb. Brzezinski, G. Kissinger, F. Fukuyama, S. Huntington, R. Pearl, etc.).

As for the modern development of the Russian geopolitical approach, it is certainly connected with the increase in research activities of several major competing geopolitical directions.

The most famous geopolitical school in modern Russia is the Neo-Eurasian one, the leader of which is the authoritative Russian thinker, author of a large number of monographs and textbooks on geopolitics A.G. Dugin, as well as his students, among whom are G.B. Gavrish[1], V.M. Korovin[2], L.S. Savin[3], etc. From the point of view of Neo-Eurasians, Russia's special mission is to put together the Eurasian continental space. They see Russia as a "bridge of civilizations" designed to bring

together the countries of Europe and Asia. At the same time, according to E.G. Solovyov, "in contrast to classical Eurasianism, A. Dugin and his followers actively borrow certain elements of European continental projects, expanding the horizons of Eurasianism to the whole of Europe and even Eurasia. The thesis of the need to create a "national ideocracy of imperial continental scale" is the key in the Dugin version of neo-Eurasianism. Teleology and the universal significance of Russian history, Russia's special mission are categorically derived from its continental, "tellukratic" vocation"[4].

Other Russian authors, including K.S. Gadzhiev, A.S. Panarin, K. Pleshakov, K.E. Sorokin, R.F. Turovsky, V. Tsymbursky, etc., have followed and are following the geopolitical problems. Nevertheless, in the modern Russian scientific environment, geopolitical research has not yet received an independent status. Some authors consider geopolitics as an offshoot of the history of international relations. Others consider it a field of political science or political geography. Finally, still others, as noted above, defend the problems of the fundamental dualism of political communities.

In modern conditions, however, in geopolitical studies the developments of the French school[5] are most often used. The French school is distinguished by the rejection of the "objective law" dualism of land and sea, typical of the Anglo-Saxon and German traditions. Moreover, for French geopolitics, the idea of gradual convergence, interpenetration of land and sea – these opposing, from the point of view of H. Mackinder and other British, American and German authors, geopolitical forces – is of greater importance. The French school representatives deny the decisive influence of material, natural, and geographical factors on political processes. The French school is characterized not by geographical determinism, but by the primacy of human will and initiative. Thus, Paul Vidal de la Blache sharply criticized F. Ratzel, for his geographical determinism and put forward the principle of "possibilism", which is fundamentally important for

modern French geopolitics, according to which a particular space only provides the state with opportunities for its geopolitical configuration, but the realization of these opportunities depends on the will of people. A characteristic feature of French geopolitics is the emphasis not on the spatial and geographical dimensions of states and their natural borders, but on such more important factors, from the point of view of its representatives, as the organization of the territory, its attitude to communications.

It was the French school of geopolitics that was one of the first to pay attention to the issues of social geography, which contributed to the development of "internal geopolitics" – the study of political rivalry observed within one nation (for example, in the electoral sphere). According to French geopoliticians, spatial and geographical factors do not exhaust the variety of reasons that influence the political behavior of the state and which therefore should be supplemented by factors of time, duration, history.

Finally, another feature of the French school of geopolitics is the tendency of its representatives to consider geopolitics as a method of research. It is characterized by an emphasis on social "ideas" about space and taking into account the combination of spatial (local, national, regional, global, network) and temporal (short-term, long-term and perspective) characteristics of the object under study.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the multidimensional structure of geopolitics in modern conditions is differentiated, including *global, regional* and *local*. Experts also distinguish between *external* and *internal* geopolitics.

In the context of globalization, the influence of geopolitical processes has increased not only at the macro-regional (interstate) level, but also in regional politics. Therefore, along with globalism, there is a formation of *regionalism* that takes into account the influence of not only internal but also external factors on regional development.

Thus, in recent decades, a shift in the emphasis of geopolitics has been increasingly recorded – from the global level to the regional one. The optimal unit of analysis is the geopolitical region as a kind of geopolitical, geo-economic and geocultural integrity, demonstrating a dynamic moment in geopolitical analysis (cross-border nature, variability of contours, change of dominant regional powers, cultural, ethnic and demographic transformations). From this point of view, attempts at regional geopolitical analysis of individual world regions or the post-Soviet space are not without some meaning.

In this regard, a clear line between foreign and domestic policy, between territorial levels of political governance is gradually being erased. There is a phenomenon of *glocalization* – direct mutual influences of global factors and subnational (regional and local) with the subordinate role of states. Under these conditions, a scientific term was needed that would synthesize the directions of analysis of the problem at the strategic and sub-state levels, as well as the participation of sub- and trans-state regions in politics. Such properties are possessed by the term "internal geopolitics" introduced into scientific circulation.

This concept, conceptualized in the French geopolitical school, the most reasoned analysis, apparently, found in a number of articles by M.V. Ilyin.[6] The subject of the study of "internal geopolitics" is the internal structure of polities ("the configuration of the articulation of geographical possibilities and principles of political organization"), as well as the internal policy of states in the context of geographical parameters and their social systems. M.V. Ilyin identifies two types of geographical factors. The first of them is material (geomorphology, natural zones, areas and settlement networks, linguistic and ethnocultural areas, economic and transport infrastructure, communication and organizational interactions). The second type of factors can be called spiritual and mental, since M.V. Ilyin refers to it

geopolitical codes, images, identity, "memory" about the ways of applying geopolitical factors.

Thus, *internal geopolitics* is a field of scientific knowledge that explores models of the structure of the political space of countries, identifies factors of the geopolitical situation and development of regions, and also suggests measures to manage the territorial development of the state.

The geopolitical approach, which is of universal interest and of undoubted value for Russian political science as a whole, is especially indispensable for studying the situation in the South of Russia. Based on this methodology, it is possible not only to study multidimensional and multifactorial processes, but also to actively cope with serious challenges to national security and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation emanating from this region, which is an important practical side of the issue.

In this regard, the geopolitical theme, since the 1990s, occupies a significant place in the works of South Russian researchers. In the south of Russia in the post-Soviet period, many conferences, seminars, and round tables devoted to geopolitical issues were held. The year 1998 was particularly significant in the life of the region's geopolitics. At the end of April, scientific readings "The Caucasus: Problems of geopolitics and national-state interests of Russia"[7] were held, which contributed to the emergence of an informal community of geopolitics of the South Russian macro-region.

At the end of 1999, the Center for Regional Studies was established on the basis of Rostov State University (since 2006 – the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University), within which a large number of conferences, round tables, and other scientific events were held, and collections of scientific articles, monographs and educational materials began to be published under the heading "South Russian Review". Over the years of publishing activity, the Center has published more than 100 collections of articles, about 15 of them on geopolitical issues[8].

Questions of geopolitics began to worry not only venerable and novice scientists, but also students. The course "Geopolitics", originally for political science students, began to be taught in a number of higher educational institutions in the southern Russian region. Later, textbooks on this subject appeared, among which we note "Politicheskay regionalistika (na materialah Yuzhnogo federalnogo okruga)", prepared by a team of authors from the North Caucasus Academy of Public Administration headed by Professor Ignatov V.G.[9], as well as a five-volume course of lectures "Political regionalism", proposed by Kuban scientists A.V. Baranov and A.A. Vartumyan[10]. In 2022, the Southern Federal University published a textbook on geopolitical processes in the Black Sea-Caspian region[11].

During the same period, the region's scientists begin to develop geopolitical studies of the subjects of the Near and Middle East, the Caucasian macroregion, and the south of Russia. Among them are Rostov residents A.G. Druzhinin, I.P. Dobaev, S.N. Epifantsev[12]; scientists from the Chechen State University V.H. Akaev and G.B. Vok[13]; researchers from Daghestan Z.S. Arukhov, E.M. Magaramov, Z.A. Makhulova, G.A. Murklinskaya[14]; author from the Karachayevo-Cherkessian Republic A.A. Ebzeev[15] and others. Nevertheless, it is still premature to say that geopolitics as a science has taken place in the South of Russia.

In modern Russia, geopolitics is largely considered not as an independent science, but in line with the provisions of the French geopolitical school, as a kind of geopolitical methodology that proposes to reduce the most significant processes to a single geographical matrix and explore it in relation to external and global factors. The multifactorial nature of the geopolitical methodology is reflected in the definition of geopolitics presented in the popular encyclopedia "Geopolitics"[16]: "*Geopolitics is the theory and practice of modern international relations and prospects for their development, taking into account the large-scale systemic influence of geographical, political, economic, military, demographic, environmental, scientific, technical and other factors.*" Approximately

the same opinion was held, for example, by the American classic of traditional and new geopolitics N. Spikeman, who considered geopolitics precisely as *an analytical method that allows to develop an effective international policy.*

Using a geopolitical approach, several dissertations for the degree of PhD(Politics) were prepared and defended in the South of Russia already at the beginning of the "zero", among them we note the studies of Z.A. Makhulova[17], E.M. Magaramov[18], A.T. Abakarov[19], M.V. Dzhevakov[20], etc.

So, geopolitics, as a method of multifactorial analysis in relation to a particular geographical matrix of different scales (planet, international region, state, intra-state region), is taking an increasingly serious position in the study of ongoing political processes. Especially its importance in our country increased after the end of the cold war and the ideological confrontation, when there was a conceptual vacuum in the analysis of the ongoing processes. Under the current conditions, the importance and effectiveness of the geopolitical method for analyzing the processes taking place in one or another part of the world has increased. At the same time, geopolitics, as a qualitatively new public knowledge, experienced its new rise in the 1990s, as it turned out that only it is able to fully meet new requirements, revealing the ambiguity of geopolitical processes, their characteristic paradoxes and contradictions.

Geopolitics is a rather complex, multidimensional and dynamically developing phenomenon, and it is increasingly penetrating the domestic (regional) level, contributing to a comprehensive understanding and analysis of ongoing processes.

In such circumstances, it is not so important, as A.G. Dugin emphasized in conversations with the author of this article, whether geopolitics is a full-fledged scientific discipline or not, it is indisputable that the geopolitical method is effective, productive and is an excellent help in the political, sociological and strategic analysis of most acute problems of our time. In this regard, according to A.G. Dugin, it is necessary to give academic

and scientific-practical character to geopolitical research with appropriate institutionalization of geopolitics as an independent field of political research[21].

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

ELENA DMITRIEVA. RELIGION IN RUSSIA IN THE ERA OF DIGITALIZATION (ON THE EXAMPLE OF ORTHODOXY AND ISLAM).

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Abstract. The article analyzes the impact of digital technologies on religious institutions in Russia. Digitalization currently covers all spheres of human life and activity and its penetration into the religious sphere is a natural and necessary process. The introduction of religion to the digital environment has both positive and negative sides. On the one hand, religious figures begin to enter in dialogue with believers through information technology, as a result of which the religious audience

increases, new followers are attracted, and on the other hand, online communication can lead to the fact that believers will stop visiting temples, mosques and minimize their participation in the life of the religious community, a separation of believers will occur. To assess the new religious digital reality, it is necessary to analyze the ongoing processes from the theological and moral points of view, as well as to determine the permissible limits of the introduction of digital technologies into the religious sphere of human life. The article also examines the attitude of Orthodoxy and Islam to IT technologies.

Introduction

Currently, information technology has become a reality and changed the traditional way of life of people. The processes of digitalization covered not only the socio-economic sphere of human life, but also such, at first glance, an area that is far from the processes of modernization – a spiritual one and, in particular, religion. Religion is forced to adapt to the changing living conditions of society and come into digitalization so as not to lose its followers.

The process of adapting religion to the digital environment began to gain momentum in the late 1990s – early 2000s, when such a concept as the digital environment appeared, social networks began to develop actively as a new way of information and communication exchange, a large segment of Internet sites with religious themes arose. Dialogue between clergy and believers began to take place not only through traditional real life communication in places of worship (temple, mosque, etc.), but also in the Internet space. Religion thus began to adapt to the new needs and pace of life of a modern person. This process has both positive (access to the richest heritage of religious thought, popularization of the works of theologians, educational activities among young people, etc.) and negative points (the drop in attendance of places of worship, the separation of believers, propaganda of pseudo-religious directions and radical religious movements in online format, etc.). There is also a question about

the permissible limits and appropriateness of the use of digital technologies in religious practices (virtual prayer, pilgrimage, etc.), since the specific character of the digital environment does not always meet the moral and value criteria of various religions.

The virtualization of religious space gives more freedom to believers in the religious life of the community and allows them to do without the participation of clergy in some cases. For a certain part of believers, online communication inspires confidence more than visiting a temple or mosque and personal interaction with representatives of the clergy. The role of site administrators, who have an important function of moderating and controlling site content, steps forward. Thus, they, whether or no, can have a negative impact on the community of believers, establish any rules and boundaries of communication that do not comply with religious moral and ethical standards. This situation with the administration of sites raises some concerns among representatives of the clergy, given the high pace and scale of digitalization of the religious sphere, but, nevertheless, they recognize the importance and need to use digital technologies in the life of the church. Nowadays, the issues of censorship and regulation of Internet sites by representatives of the clergy are becoming more and more relevant. The problem is that clergymen do not always have sufficient technical knowledge to perform the functions of moderators.

The pandemic that began in 2020 changed the idea of the role of IT technologies in religion and posed many questions to representatives of the clergy about expanding the boundaries of the religious digital environment. During pandemic, the population faced quarantine measures, and the problem of holding those rituals in the virtual space that were previously possible only in full-time format became acute. The situation changed dramatically and what was previously considered unacceptable became a reality during this period. Believers lost the opportunity to attend religious institutions and events, the opportunity to join the sacraments of worship disappeared, religious traditions were broken in the minds of people. All these factors were a powerful impetus for the forced

acceptance of a new virtual reality, into which many traditional religious practices were transferred. Thus, during the pandemic period, there was a reinterpreting and expansion of the virtual religious space, believers had the opportunity not only to receive information from the Internet, but also to participate in online rituals and acts of worship. Interestingly, in the period after the pandemic, digital rituals did not leave the virtual field and continue to exist along with worship in churches.

Today, the widespread introduction of digital technologies into the religious life of society causes less criticism and rejection both from clergy and believers than it was at the initial stages of this process and in the period before the pandemic.

IT technologies in Orthodoxy and Islam

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) recognizes the need and importance of using digital technologies in the implementation of religious activities and communication with believers, but at the same time is wary of conducting religious ceremonies online. The Russian Orthodox Church believes that virtual communication with God does not replace the true communication of believers in the church at the sacred service, and some religious actions cannot take place in digital reality. Digitalization should not go beyond technology and affect human behavior, change its essence. The Russian Orthodox Church notes the importance of fidelity to tradition and considers it as the main condition for self-preservation and development of the believer's personality.

The Russian Orthodox Church does not reject the very use of IT technologies in the field of religious education, missionary activities, organization of communication and discussions, although at the initial stage of digitalization the Orthodox Church was wary of this phenomenon (there were even warnings against using the Internet). But with the development of digital technologies and their active implementation into the life of society, there was a change in the church position, since it was

impossible to ignore the emergence of new technologies and their inclusion in various spheres of society.

To adapt to the new digital reality, rules were developed that regulated the church's relationship to IT - technologies that allow Orthodox religious ceremonies not only in churches, but also in the online environment. Some rites can be held online, for example, light a candle, order a prayer service, and talk with a priest. Such services are popular among believers and there are already many sites where this can be done when there is no possibility to visit the temple. Believers positively perceive such a practice of digitalization of rituals, especially the younger generation, for which digital reality is a usual practice already.

In modern conditions, it is impossible to turn a blind eye to achievements in the field of digital technologies, so the process of involving the Russian Orthodox Church in the digital environment is actively gaining momentum. A large number of Orthodox bloggers appeared, including many representatives of the clergy. The number of educational Orthodox sites is growing. Modern Orthodox youth took an active position on the Internet and has their own pages on social networks and blogs (Odnoklassniki, Vkontakte, LJ, etc.). The negative side of Internet communication was the appearance on the network of false priests, bloggers-fraudsters, with whom the Russian Orthodox Church has to fight actively (lists of sites of false priests, resources, blogs that are not related to official Orthodoxy are constantly monitored and published).

The introduction of new digital technologies in the life of Muslims in Russia also leads to the emergence of new forms of communication, products and services. The Council of Muftis of Russia advocates the widespread use of IT technologies and welcomes the use of social networks and other Internet platforms to promote the ideas of Islam, to discuss religious topics, to communicate between ethnic and religious communities, as well as to overturn a wrong impression of Islam. Digital technologies are seen in Islam as neutral in nature, man can use them either for good or for evil, and ignoring the digital environment will lead to

the isolation of the religious community from the world. It must be recognized that among the Muslims of Russia there are some believers who take a negative position towards digital technologies and call for the rejection of their use, explaining this by the desire to preserve traditions, but the paradox is that even they have to use the Internet space to broadcast their point of view.

One of the main sources of modernization of Islamic religious practice is the Internet. With its help today you can make a virtual hajj by going to the site to visit Mecca, listen to a religious sermon by videoconference, even a sheep sacrifice is available (buying and slaughtering an animal online). On the Internet for Muslims there are dating sites that operate strictly according to the norms of Islam, services for donating money for charity, specialized Islamic online stores with halal products, which have recently been appearing and functioning on the network.

A huge number of various applications for smartphones have been developed for Muslims to follow the religious practices of Islam, and a large number of electronic devices have hit the market (watches with intervals for prayers, electronic rosary in the form of a sensor on the hand's finger, an electronic prayer mat). Electronic devices that are not related to gambling, drug use, alcohol and tobacco smoking are considered halal.

It should be noted that the digital religious platform in Russia is not fully filled yet and therefore its Orthodox and Islamic segments have good prospects for growth.

Conclusion

As information technologies develop in Russia, the process of modernizing the religious sphere continues. Religion was able to overcome the difficulties associated with the need to preserve traditional spiritual and moral values and adapted to the new digital reality. Omission of the digital environment in the religious life of society would mean the loss of a huge proportion of its followers and actual isolation from the world.

The Internet, as an important source of religious knowledge, has priority among believing youth. It should also be noted that with the common preference of traditional religious practices, their digital counterparts are gradually increasing the number of their adherents from the total number of believers. This is due to the increased penetration of modern information technologies into the daily life of people, a change in the rhythm of life, an increase in comfort, as well as compliance with the security regime in certain conditions. It should be noted that the processes of digitalization, unfortunately, both in religious and in other spheres of human life lead to the isolation and separation of people, to the transition from personal communication to impersonal contacts in virtual space, which cannot but affect the psychological and mental state of a person.

The weak point in the religious digital environment is still cybersecurity issues. There is still no complete protection against the actions of cybercriminals on the network (hacking sites and dissemination of deliberately false information, replacing site content, illegal use of users' personal data, etc.).

For a long time, religion has remained a fairly conservative institution, but with the development of digital technologies, what previously seemed impossible to implement religious practices has become a reality today.

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KANYBEK KUDAYAROV. KYRGYZ-TURKISH COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY SPHERE

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Abstract. The article is devoted to the review of the development of Kyrgyz-Turkish relations in the military sphere. Attention is paid to the nature of bilateral cooperation, mainly represented in the form of logistical and educational assistance from Turkey to the Kyrgyz Republic.

Diplomatic relations between the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) and Turkey were established on December 24, 1991. The Turkish Republic was one of the first states in the world to recognize the independence of Kyrgyzstan. Since then, political, economic, cultural and educational contacts between the two countries have been developing quite actively.

Despite periods of some turbulence in Kyrgyz-Turkish relations (2016-2017), the bilateral partnership over the past three decades has been characterized as progressive and beneficial for both states. At the same time, the Turkish side acts not only as a partner close in culture and language, but also as a major donor to Kyrgyzstan in the educational sphere, as well as in the field of military-technical cooperation.

Speaking about the military assistance provided by Turkey to Kyrgyzstan, it should be said that since at least the 2000s, its annual volume has been estimated at $1 million on average.

Unlike the educational sphere, for projects in which (Manas University, Maarif Schools, etc.) Ankara annually allocates tens of millions of US dollars, military assistance does not look so significant. Nevertheless, cooperation in the military sphere also constitutes one of the important aspects of bilateral cooperation, which continues to develop today.

The fundamental documents defining cooperation between Bishkek and Ankara are: the Treaty "On Eternal Friendship and Cooperation between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Turkey" (1998)[1], the Joint Statement "Kyrgyzstan – Turkey: Together in the 21st Century" (1999) and the Joint Statement "On the creation of a high-level Strategic Cooperation Council between the Republic of Turkey and the Kyrgyz Republic" (2011).

At the moment, for a total more than 120 agreements, contracts and protocols have been signed[2, 3].

Kyrgyz-Turkish cooperation in the military sphere began in 1993 with the signing of an agreement on military education[4], and afteryears - international legal acts involving regular material and technical assistance[5], training of members[6] of the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan, as well as cooperation in other areas related to military affairs[7]. In general, military relations include military training, joint exercises, the supply of military equipment and materials, as well as some military vehicles and weapons from Turkey to Kyrgyzstan.

The intensification of bilateral relations has been observing only since the 2000s. A certain role in building more effective and dynamic cooperation was played by the "Batken events" (1999–2001), when a large group of terrorists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) invaded Kyrgyz territory and didn't meet serious opposition from the military formations of the republic. It was then that all the weakness of the Kyrgyz army was revealed in the face of external aggression. After the IMU terrorists were squeezed out of Kyrgyzstan (thanks to military assistance from Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkey), the local authorities decided to reform seriously the armed forces of the republic.

Since Kyrgyzstan experienced an acute shortage of budget funds to support its armed forces, the republic almost never refused any type of military assistance offered by regional and global actors (Russia, the US, China, Turkey, etc.).

The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, followed by the global fight against terrorism, also played an important role in the development of Kyrgyz-Turkish military cooperation. Since this period, the number of trainings and exercises conducted both bilaterally and within NATO programs has significantly increased. For two decades of gratuitous material and technical assistance provided to Kyrgyzstan by Turkey, the list of transferred property includes vehicles, heavy-duty refrigerators, manual fixed automobile central radio installations, switch units, generators and batteries, power plants,

loudspeakers, digital repeaters, night vision devices, laser sights, hand binoculars, signal pistols, metal detectors, utensils, camp kitchens, bunk beds and shoes.

Since 2005, cooperation has begun to develop in a completely new direction that did not previously exist in bilateral contacts - military medicine. The Turkish party began to provide all possible assistance in the training of medical specialists, the purchase of medical and technical equipment, medicines. Funds from the Turkish government are regularly allocated to support military medicine, purchase equipment for the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard of Kyrgyzstan[8].

Unilateral military material and technical assistance in recent years has begun to alternate with the purchase of Turkish military products by the Kyrgyz authorities. Such changes are associated with tensions on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, where armed clashes have been taking place between representatives of the law enforcement agencies of the two countries for several years. In particular, in 2021, the republic acquired several Bayraktar TB2 UAVs[9], which were deployed at the Jalal-Abad airport[10]. Later, Bayraktar Akıncı and Aksungur UAVs were purchased[11]. In order to operate unmanned aerial vehicles in Kyrgyzstan, a remotely piloted vehicle base was opened. In addition to UAVs, the Kyrgyz Republic purchased 40 armored vehicles and other equipment from Turkey to protect the state border with Tajikistan and repel possible aggression from the Tajik side, which took place several times in 2021 and 2022. The military budget of Kyrgyzstan is replenished with articles concerning the purchase of weapons, which was not observed in the republic in previous years.

After three decades of cooperation, the Kyrgyz and Turkish parties expressed a desire to expand and deepen bilateral contacts in the field of military education, defense industry and security by creating the necessary legal framework and promoting a common understanding of military training and security between the relevant institutions of the two countries[12]. Perhaps bilateral relations will enter a new stage of cooperation in the military sphere.

One of the examples of the implementation of the above mentioned interaction in the current decade is the participation of the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan in the international military exercises in Turkey "Ephesus-2022", in which servicemen from 37 states were involved. For 45 days, the military contingent of the Kyrgyz Republic worked out training issues using computer modeling and practically carried out activities as part of a multinational group of forces[13].

Holding joint exercises is nothing new in bilateral Kyrgyz-Turkish relations. Exercises with the participation of the armed forces of two or more states were held periodically, also through NATO, since Turkey oversees the relationship of this organization with the Kyrgyz Republic. This contributes greatly to some Turkish military circles that have close ties with their colleagues from Central Asia[14]. It is also noteworthy that the military representative of Kyrgyzstan in Turkey works at NATO headquarters in Izmir[15].

As for the interaction of the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan with NATO, as in the case of many states of the post-Soviet space, it is developing within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program (since 1994). This cooperation is realized in the form of joint military exercises, various conferences and seminars.

Over the past period, more than a thousand military personnel of the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan have taken part in events within the framework of this program, which includes training on topics such as peacekeeping, language training, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, the law of armed conflicts and much more[16].

Since 2000, Turkey has been conducting 12-week courses annually within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program together with special units of the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan. In 2007, the Kyrgyz Republic joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP) program aimed at expanding further cooperation with NATO. Appropriate measures are being taken to bring the Kyrgyz armed forces into line with international standards. The program also provides for the involvement of certain

units of the power structures of the Kyrgyz Republic in peacekeeping operations. Funds are allocated for the participation of the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic in courses within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program and the Center for Improving Methods of Combating Terrorism, as well as for the cost of participating in other NATO Partnership for Peace events.

Every year, about 100 cadets from the Kyrgyz Republic receive education and military training in such military educational institutions of the Republic of Turkey as the Higher Military Academy, the Gulkhane Military Medical Academy, the Higher Military Academy, the Higher School of the Gendarmerie and the Military Lyceums[17].

Taking into account the opportunities for obtaining military education provided to Kyrgyzstan by the states of the post-Soviet space, then Russia offers the largest number of universities – 15. Among other CIS countries – Kazakhstan, – 2 universities are ready to provide, Azerbaijan – 1[18].

In addition to training army units, Turkey also trains the Kyrgyz police using methods of combating crime and conducting hostilities, with reference to the experience of the Turkish gendarmerie.

Also, 7-week courses are periodically organized to train military personnel of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Border Service of Kyrgyzstan. Every year, training in mountain, special and sniper training are carried out. This way, the Kyrgyz police and the army have significant opportunities to assimilate and use Turkish weapons and combat skills.

The development of bilateral contacts in the military sphere in the early years of Kyrgyzstan's independence was not very active. However, at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries, the situation begins to change towards strengthening and deepening cooperation, which was caused by the "Batken events" in Kyrgyzstan, which showed the complete failure of the state's defense capability and demanded immediate measures to reform the armed forces of the republic.

Another equally significant event that coincided with the first was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the war on terrorism declared around the world, which intensified military cooperation with Turkey both bilaterally and through NATO.

The dynamics of Kyrgyz-Turkish relations in the military sphere has undergone some changes in recent years. First, the need for Kyrgyzstan to strengthen the defense capability of its southern borders, caused by repeated military aggression by Tajikistan, led to the purchase of Turkish military equipment, including UAVs. Thus, the traditional gratuitous assistance of Turkey to Kyrgyzstan began to be combined with military commercial transactions, which, definitely, contributes to strengthening of their cooperation. Secondly, despite the plans outlined at the beginning of the current decade to deepen military cooperation between the two states, they have not received proper development yet. Nevertheless, the implementation of these intentions may include the Ephesus-22 military exercises held on Turkish territory with the participation of NATO countries and other states, in which the Kyrgyz military also took active part.

At the moment, it is premature to talk about the development of a new stage of military cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, announced in 2020 in Ankara. Time will show the way bilateral contacts will develop.

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AZIZ NIYAZI. VORUKH – THE TERRITORY OF THE TAJIK-KYRGYZ DISCORD. ON THE ISSUE OF THE INITIAL DEMARCATION OF THE SOVIET PERIOD IN 1928–1941. (Part 2)

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Citation: Niyazi A. Vorukh – the Territory of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Discord. On the Issue of the Initial Demarcation of the Soviet

Abstract. Vorukh is a Tajik enclave in Kyrgyzstan and a point of a serious interstate conflict with unpredictable consequences. Apart from Vorukh itself, the conflict affects the nearby territories along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The growing tension is partly due to the incomplete demarcation of the borders of the disputed areas. Their history goes back to the Soviet past, on which opponents base their territorial claims. Tajik experts mainly relies on documentary sources of the initial period of national and territorial demarcation in Soviet Central Asia (1924–1928), while their Kyrgyz colleagues – on post-war agreements and maps that fixed the actual border lines, dating mainly from the second half of the 1950s. Based on their sources, Tajik experts conclude that Vorukh was not originally an enclave; moreover, in recent years, they have been trying to prove that it is not an enclave even now. Their Kyrgyz counterparts, on the other hand, unreasonably insist that since modern Vorukh has all the classic attributes of an enclave, it has always been one. The article discusses historical events and documents related to the processes of border formation in the Fergana Valley during the pre-war decade. Experts usually refer to them in passing, mentioning only those maps and fragmentary facts that are in line with their beliefs. The history of resolving border issues during this period is becoming more and more relevant as mutual territorial claims of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan extend. [1] After studying expert assessments and available documents, it has been concluded that Vorukh in the pre-war period, just like before that, was connected to the "mother territory" by a strip of land and therefore was not a Tajik enclave on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.

In September 2022, there were unprecedented clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Regular troops, as well as units of various law enforcement agencies and local militia, took part in the confrontation on both sides. During the most intense fighting

between September 14 and 19, hundreds of people were killed or wounded and thousands were evacuated. Serious damage was done to villages and economic infrastructures. This happened for the first time in modern Central Asia. The main battles took place in the vicinity of the Tajik enclave of Vorukh [2] in Kyrgyzstan and in the cross-border areas. The conflict in the Fergana Valley has protracted for decades. Economic disputes (usually over water, land and roads) often escalated into clashes between local Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Sometimes there were exchanges of gunfire, mostly with the use of hunting rifles; people were wounded and killed, houses and outbuildings burned. In the post-Soviet period, border guards of both independent states began to take part in skirmishes more often. In recent years, both states has pulled military equipment to the border and erected echeloned fortifications. Local conflicts involving the locals and military were growing more frequent and becoming more violent. At the same time, the authorities of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan did their best to avoid voicing their interstate confrontation, insisting that the tensions were purely technical in nature and related to the demarcation process. However, the circumstances were such that a serious armed conflict broke out between the two neighbouring states, which can hardly be considered an accident. There were explosive destabilizing factors of natural and artificial origins aplenty. All it took was setting fire to the fuse, either intentionally or unwittingly.

Serious tensions continue, in part, due to the unsettled issues of establishing the boundaries in some lowland and foothill areas between the two states. As of early 2023, out of 972 km of the shared border between the countries, 682 km were set and agreed upon, while 290 km remain disputed. [3] It is impossible to draw demarcation lines in about 70 areas, for the most part in the nearby territories of the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and the Sughd region of Tajikistan. Technically, it is extremely complicated to set the borders due to the fact that there are frequent strips of Kyrgyz and Tajik settlements and agricultural

plots in these densely populated areas. Borders often run along streets, sometimes even weaving between buildings in a checkerboard pattern. They can cross roads, fields, pastures, rivers and streams several times over.

Moreover, the situation is complicated by the fact that when defining the borders, both sides refer to all sorts of documents and historical events that exclusively support their claims. Tajik experts mainly rely on documentary sources of the initial period of the national and territorial delimitation of Soviet Central Asia, while their Kyrgyz colleagues turn to agreements, decrees and maps that set the actual border lines during the post-war period, starting from the second half of the 1950s. Furthermore, they often appeal to the conflicting rules and international law cases on establishing the boundaries. These references allow for each party to define the status of Vorukh as they will, making it a sticking point of the Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict. Recently, the positions of the parties have been drastically diverged. Some say that it is and has always been an enclave; others claim that it was never an enclave in the first place, since the lands that connected it with the "mother territory" were illegally seized.

Tajik experts rely on archival documents of 1924–1929 and some later ones, contending that Vorukh was not an enclave during the formation of Soviet rule. At first part of the Uzbek SSR, this territory was wedged into the lands of Kyrgyzstan [4] and connected to the main part of Uzbekistan by a continuous strip of land. Subsequently, in 1929, the Tajik SSR emerged from the Uzbek SSR. Vorukh became part of the newly established republic and was directly connected to the "mother territory". It should be noted that the vast majority of state documents of the initial Soviet period – treaties and resolutions regarding the demarcation of the borders – were actually legislations, ratified by the republics and the Union Centre. It is important to remember that it was at that time that the key decisions on the structure of the Central Asian republics were made; major

present borders are still the same. In the first part of the article, an attempt to study the most significant decisions on the demarcation is made; the article also discusses modern estimates of these decisions. It concludes that Vorukh was not an enclave during the initial delimitation of the state borders of the Soviet republics of Central Asia. [5]

For the most part, borders between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and then between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were fixed between 1924 and 1929. It was a turbulent time of unprecedented revolutionary achievements in spite of the resistance of strong traditional ideas and practices. Now the Soviet authorities are usually blamed for the unfair demarcation of the Central Asian borders, although an objective assessment of these processes has yet to be given. How to draw fair boundaries across a mosaic of territories inhabited by an ethnically diverse (or sometimes ethnically indefinite) population remains an open question. [6]

The period of active redrawing of borders that was mainly associated with the emerging of ethnocentric formations was over by the start of the first five-year plan (1928–1932). In 1927, the Kremlin strongly recommended that the Central Asian comrades should cease bringing mutual claims over disputed territories that were based solely on ethno-national principle. [7] The focus was on economic expediency. [8] It was time of epoch-making social and economic achievements. The Soviet Union had to promptly boost its military and economic power. During tense pre-war, war and post-war years, shifting of borders in the region due to ethno-national unity was considered irrelevant. Rare exceptions were made for purely economic reasons. Thus, in 1927, at the request of the Kyrgyz side – and possibly at the initiative of the State Planning Committee – the coal mines of Sulukta along with the village and adjacent lands were transferred from the Uzbek SSR to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic. In 1928, the Sulukta District was formed within the Isfana and Batken-Bujum volosts. Carts loaded with

Sulukta coal were brought to the regional centre of Proletarsk in Tajikistan, reloaded into wagons, and then distributed throughout the Soviet Union. All necessary equipment for the miners was delivered back to Sulukta. [9] In the same year, the neighbouring settlements of Samarkandek and Üch-Korgon were transferred from the Uzbek SSR to the Kyrgyz ASSR, while the village of Jigdalik was transferred to Uzbekistan. At the same time, the Karkara *yaylak*, a vast pasture near Issyk-Kul, was transferred from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan.

With the beginning of the first five-year plan, the mass collectivization was launched in the countryside. In Kyrgyzstan, it also meant transition of nomadic and semi-nomadic households to settled way of life. Within a short period of time, tens of thousands people had to switch to a new type of management. [10] Settled nomads needed fertile lands with irrigation systems, which were in short supply. [11] Naturally, the unresolved ethno-territorial disputes were brought to the forth.

Despite some shifting of the borders in 1927–1928, the Kyrgyz side still felt slighted. After a three-year moratorium on filing territorial claims ended, the leadership of Kyrgyzstan reminded the Centre about unresolved territorial issues. In 1931, Abdukadyr Urazbekov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Kyrgyz ASSR, prepared a memo on the borders between the Kyrgyz ASSR and neighbouring republics; it was addressed to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Asian Economic Council. [12] It contained a detailed and rather extensive list of the territories and settlements in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to which Kyrgyzstan laid claim; the case for revising the borders was built on interconnected facts of an ethnic, national, economic, and geographical nature. At the same time, the document drew attention to territorial concessions, made by Kyrgyzstan in favour of neighbouring republics during the national and territorial delimitation. In essence, with this memo, Kyrgyzstan appealed to

the central authorities of the Soviet Union for resolving the land disputes that had accumulated over six years in its favour.

The document emphasized that hundreds of square kilometres of Uzbek lands were wedged into the regions of Kyrgyz ASSR, in particular:

– "The narrow strip of land of several hundred square kilometres that belongs to Uzbek SSR and is located near the upper and middle reaches of the Isfara River, wedges into the territory of the Sulukta District of Kyrgyz ASSR and divides it into two parts – eastern and western – thereby complicating communication within the district and services for the population." (Author's note: Most likely, this is a reference to Vorukh, which from 1929 belonged to the Tajik SSR.) [13]

– Similar territory of Uzbek SSR is wedged into Kyrgyz ASSR between the Sulukta and Kyzyl-Kyya regions. (Author's note: Apparently, it is Sokh and, possibly, Shohimardon.) [13]

– The villages of the Tajik SSR – Khtai, Andersai, Ak-Tube, Kotur, etc. – and the adjacent lands cut into Kyrgyz ASSR in the Sulukta region. [13]

Moscow reacted to the appeal of the CEC of the Kyrgyz ASSR with restrain. There were no significant boundary changes of Kyrgyzstan with neighbouring republics. However, the Centre took note of the remarks on the Sulukta region, and in 1932 the territories of Zamburuch village near Sulukta, a vast but sparsely populated area, was transferred from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan. It is possible that joining of this territory was due to the production needs to expand the industrial infrastructure of the Sulukta District and attract extra labour. [14]

That was the last significant change concerning borders of the Central Asian republics done by the central leadership of the USSR. During the subsequent pre-war years, there were mainly local boundary changes between neighbouring collective farms *(kolkhoz)* and districts, which could be settled at the level of heads of districts, rural councils *(selsoviet)* and collective farms. The lands were usually exchanged or leased. For instance, in 1937,

rainfed and irrigated mixed-use lands of the collective farms in the Batken District of the Kyrgyz SSR were exchanged for those of the Vorukh rural council in the Isfara District (the Kekh tract) of the Tajik SSR. The document was drawn up in the form of an act on the clarification of the borders in this area and provided a description of the lines of delimitation "in order to eliminate shortcomings of land use, such as strip farming and wedging." The size and location of the exchanged territories were decided upon by land surveyors, chairmen of rural councils and collective farms on both sides; they also approved the agreement with their signatures. Land use within new boundaries became legal after Regional Committees of the republics authorized the act. [15] In roughly similar manner, land was transferred between neighbouring collective farms and regions of the Kyrgyz and Uzbek republics at the level of local conciliation commissions. [16]

From time to time, the Kyrgyz authorities attempted to change the borders of the republic "in order to eliminate wedging and strip farming" with the backing of the Centre. In particular, this is evidenced by Extract from the Minutes of the session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR on establishing the border between the Kyrgyz SSR and the Uzbek SSR along the Chanach-Sai River (1938). In the document, the Kyrgyz side urges "the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to form a government commission that will be tasked to finally resolve land disputes between the Kyrgyz SSR and the Uzbek SSR." [17] However, there was a lack of understanding from Moscow.

Apparently, the leadership of Kyrgyzstan assumed that by its inaction, the Kremlin was giving the republics leave to make independent decisions on changing disputed border sections. In January 1940, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR Asanaly Tolubaev [18] ratified Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR on the project of the border between Kyrgyz and Uzbek, Tajik SSR. [19] The document expresses the agreement of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Kyrgyz SSR with "the project of changing

borders between Kyrgyz and Uzbek, Tajik SSR". Also, in order to "eliminate strip farming and wedging of the territories of one republic into those of another", the authorities considered it necessary **to transfer the villages of Surkh, Vorukh, Charka Matcha from Tajik SSR to the Kyrgyz SSR** (highlighted by the author). In return, it was proposed to transfer he villages of Karabak (collective farm Karabak) and Ravat-Kaut (collective farm named after Ordzhonikidze) in the Batken region to Tajik SSR. Also, the Kyrgyz side expressed its readiness to transfer three collective farms in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions to Uzbek SSR in exchange for two dozen rural councils and collective farms along with their vast lands, located mainly around Sokh, Shohimardon, Ravon, Tul, Vodil and Xonobod. [20]

In August 1940, there was another document, not nearly as assertive as the previous ones. It concerned solely the issues of straightening the borders with Uzbek SSR and once again expressed the necessity for exchanging the same rural councils and collective farms. It should be noted that this time the initiative did not come directly from the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic, but rather from the administrative and territorial Commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR that in turn, referred to the appeal of the "executive committees of regional and district *Soviets* of People's Deputies." [21]

However, there was no straightening of the Kyrgyz-Tajik and Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders in the subsequent war and the post-war years. Vorukh remained part of the Tajik SSR and was connected to it by a strip of land. In this period, there were no major changes in the boundaries of the Uzbek wedgings and enclaves. [22]

In conclusion, judging by the changing reasons for moving the borders in the documents under consideration, there was a shift from ethnic and national justifications to economic ones. Before the war, the focus was on administrative and territorial issues, coupled with economic ones. It was time of active

delineation, consolidation and disaggregation of internal administrative and territorial units. Naturally, another redrawing of inter-republican borders did nothing to facilitate establishing proper management. Continued national and territorial demarcation was no longer in line with the general course and was most likely considered precarious. It should be mentioned that in the 1930s Soviet rule was increasingly threatened by pan-Turkism, which was also reflected on the way border issues were being handled.

Active shifting of some local borders between the Isfara and Batken regions started with the end of the Stalin era of building socialism, at the turn of the fifth five-year plan (1951–1955) and the sixth (1956–1960). However, this is another era and the history of Vorukh becoming an enclave will be recounted in Part 3 of this article.

References

1. The most detailed position of the Tajik side on the issue of Vorukh and adjacent territories has been presented by the leading Tajik political expert Abdullo Rakhnamo. Source: Tajik-Kyrgyz border conflicts. Who is the real aggressor? 23.11.2022 [Electronic source] // Website "Asia-Plus". URL: https://asiaplustj.info/ru/news/tajikistan/security/20221123/tadzhiksko-kirgizskie-pogranichnie-konflikti-kto-na-samom-dele-agressor (accessed: 12.03.2023); *Rakhnamo A.* Мавќеи Точикистон ё чаро Чумхурии Точикистон кишвари тачовузгар нест [in Tajik] (On the position of Tajikistan, or why the Republic of Tajikistan is not an aggressor?) // Omuzgor, № 49, 8 dekabri soli 2022. P. 4–5.

2. Vorukh is a large Tajik settlement and an area of the same name that is located along the spurs of the Turkestan Range in Kyrgyzstan. Being part of the Isfara District in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, *Jamoat* (rural community) Vorukh is surrounded on all sides by the administrative territories of the Kyrgyz Republic. Overall, it consists of three villages, Tidon, Maidon and Vorukh, which is the administrative centre. Villages are divided into *mahallah* (communities/neighbourhoods); in total, there are up to 20 of them. According to various estimates, the area of the enclave is approximately 100 square kilometres, since it is impossible to accurately determine its size due to uncertainty of boundaries. *Jamoat* has total population of approximately 33–35 thousand people. At least 95 percent of

the population of Vorukh are Tajiks, mostly from the mountain areas of Karotegin (Rasht Valley) and Mastchoh. The settlement has over 5500 households and about 2700 individual *dehkan* farms (peasant plots). Religious feelings and national traditions are strong among the population. The inhabitants of Vorukh are mostly involved in agriculture, although people also leave to seek work abroad, especially in Russia. Source: URL: https://untj.org/jambi-project/index.php/maps-statistics/demography

(accessed: 02.03.2023); Асрори баҳсҳои марзӣ. Ворух: 47 соли ҳаводис аз "А" то "Я" [in Tajik] (Reasons behind border disputes. Vorukh: a comprehensive review of events over 47 years) 10.06.2021 [Electronic source] // Website "ASIA Plus". URL: https://sputnik-tj.com/20210610/asrori-bahshoi-marzi-voruh-47-soli-havodis-az-a-to-ya-1040116710.html (accessed: 12.02.2023); Aziz Niyazi. Vorukh – the Territory of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Discord. On the Issue of the Initial Demarcation of the Soviet Period. Part 1. // Russia and the Moslem World, 2023. № 1 (319). P. 60–61. There is a typo on page 61: instead of "…all the peasant plots in Vorukh occupy a little less than 100 thousand square kilometers" read "…100 square kilometers".

3. Data has been presented in the media of Kyrgyzstan citing information published by the State Committee of the Republic of Tajikistan on land management and geodesy as of mid-February 2023. It should be noted that activities of the intergovernmental commission and the topographic workgroups of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on border issues are not open to public. The mutual agreement on non-disclosure of information until the completion of delimitation process of territories is due to fears of discontent among the opposition and the local population. Information on the length of the common border and the disputed territories can differ dramatically in the media of the republics, as well as official information. Source: *Daria Podolskaya*. Tajikistan announces progress on border issue with Kyrgyzstan. 16.02.2023 [Electronic source] // Website "24 KG". URL: https://24.kg/vlast/258682_tadjikistan_zayavil_oprodvijenii_voprosa_ogranitse_skyirgyizstanom/ (accessed: 17.01.2023); *Azamat Shokirov*. War or peace: what should Tajikistan expect from the chairmanship of Bishkek in the CIS. 16.01.2023. [Electronic source] // Website "SPUTNIK News". URL: https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20230116/voyna-ili-mir-kyrgyzstan-1054252388.html (accessed: 19.01.2023); How many kilometers of the Tajik-Kyrgyz border has been demarcated? 25.09.2022 [Electronic source] // Website "SPUTNIK News". URL: https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20220925/tajikistan-kyrgyzstan-graniza-km-1051658284.html (accessed: 12.02.2023); Rahmon and Japarov discussed the border issue: details. 14.01.2023 [Electronic source] // Website "SPUTNIK News". URL: https://tj.sputniknews.ru/20230114/tajikistan-kyrgyzstan-granitsa-konflikt-podrobnosti-1054197140.html (accessed: 25.01.2023).

4. Kyrgyzstan means the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR.
5. Aziz Niyazi. Vorukh – the Territory of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Discord. On the Issue of the Initial Demarcation of the Soviet Period. Part 1 // Russia and the Moslem World, 2023. № 1 (319). P. 52–63.
6. It is well known that before the formation of the national republics many people from Central Asia were identified or self-identified by either their religion or place of residence (Fergana Valley, Namangan Region, etc.). Ethnogenesis of the Sarts is unclear. Source: *R. Bobokhonov* National and territorial delimitation and establishing of union republics in Central Asia (1924–1936). Part 2. [Electronic source] // Website "News Ivest". URL: https://news.ivest.kz/89137166-nacionalno-territorialnoe-razmezhevanie-i-sozdanie-soyuznyh-respublik-v-centralnoy-azii-1924-1936-gg-ch-2---r-bobohonov (accessed: 25.03.2023).
7. Apparently, by that time Moscow had understood that the flow of claims of the Central Asian comrades could be endless. It is possible that officials of the central apparatus were confused by their numerous proposals and complaints and had difficulty understanding the specifics of the region. One way or another, some territories were transferred back and forth between the republics multiple times. Within a few days, and even a day, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR could make diametrically opposite decisions, for example about Sokh and Isfara volosts. Source: Aziz Niyazi. Vorukh – the Territory of the Tajik-Kyrgyz Discord. On the Issue of the Initial Demarcation of the Soviet Period. Part 1 // Russia and the Moslem World, 2023. № 1 (319). P. 52–63.
8. Moscow most likely insisted on strict adherence to this principle even before that. As evidenced by a 1925 document, claims of a purely national character were supported by an economic reason. Thus, the demand of the Kyrgyz side that the Baksa-Sibirgen, Isfana and Chapkuluk volosts of the Khujand District of the Uzbek SSR should be transferred to the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region was justified, since 75.07 percent of the total population of these volosts were Kyrgyz. It was also noted that these areas, coupled with the Kyrgyz "Leylek and Naigutkipchak volosts, would make create an economically isolated region." Source: Minutes of the meeting of the Subcommittee on clarifying the boundaries of the Commission for zoning of the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region on the inclusion of the Baksa-Sibirgen, Isfana and Chankuluk volosts of the Khujand District into the Tashkent region, April 10, 1925 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 18–20. P.S. In 1926, the Chapkuluk and Baksa-Isfana volosts were transferred to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Region within the RSFSR.

9. Administrative-territorial division of the USSR and a list of major settlements, along with a chronological list of resolutions on changing the boundaries of provinces, regions and republics. 8th Edition. Publishing House of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Moscow, 1929. P. 95; Tairov K.A., Sherov Sh.B. From the history of the city of Sulukta in the Kyrgyz Republic // Bulletin of the Universities of Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, No. 2, 2021. P. 207.

10. Dzhunushaliev J. Time of creation and tragedies. 20–30s of the XX century. Ilim Publishing House, Bishkek, 2003. 256 p.

11. The shortage of these vital resources was revealed during the land and water reform in the south of Kyrgyzstan during 1927–1928.

12. In 1937, Abdukadyr Urazbekov was arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary activities of a nationalist and pan-Turkist nature; executed in 1938, and rehabilitated in 1956. Starting in 1933, many leaders of the party and Soviet bodies of Kyrgyzstan were repressed on similar charges. Source: Abdrakhmanov Yu. 1916. Diaries. Letters to Stalin [Foreword by D. Dzhunushaliev, I.E. Semenov]. Institute of Party History under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (branch of Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU), Frunze, Kyrgyzstan, 1991. P. 6–94.

13. At the end of the document, political and economic necessity for further demarcation was emphasized. The state of the borders between the Kyrgyz ASSR with neighbouring republics hampered smooth collectivization and management of collective farms because there is strip system of *dehkan* farms between the farmers of the Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazakh ASSR. For the same reasons, there were great difficulties in fulfilling sowing plans in general, since management and irrigation construction and such was complicated. Such border issues between Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring republics called for a complete review and clarification by exchanging territories from one republic to another, destruction of strip farming and establishment of a border in accordance with natural geographical features. Hence, the Central Committee of the Kyrgyz ASSR considered it necessary to immediately start clarifying the existing borders…" Source: Memorandum of the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kyrgyz ASSR to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Asian Economic Council on the borders between the Kyrgyz ASSS and neighbouring republics. Frunze, May 29, 1931 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 120–123. (TsGA KR, fund 1642, op. 11, file 1791, pages 29–31, copy).

14. The decision to transfer the lands of the Zamburuch rural council was made by the Central Union government in 1926, while the area was still part of the former Isfana volost of Uzbekistan. Now it is Ak-Suu *ayyl aymagy* (rural community) of the Leylek District in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. About 6000 people live there, mostly Kyrgyz. Old *qishlaq* names of the villages that passed to Kyrgyzstan in the 1930s almost have not lasted to the present day. Source: Telegram from the CEC of Kyrgyzstan to that of Tajikistan with a request to promptly implement the decision of the Union Government to transfer the villages of Choʻyanchiy, Zamboruch, Jar-Jizgan of the Isfana volost to the Kyrgyz ASSR. . Frunze, October 28, 1931 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 18–20; Extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of the Tajik ASSR, sent to the CEC of the Kyrgyz ASSR, regarding the decision to transfer the villages of Zamboruch, Jar-Jizgan and Choʻyanchiy to Kyrgyzstan. Stalinabad, January 1, 1932 (TsGA KR. F. 1642. Op. 11. D. 1800. L. 30. Copy); Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic 2009. Book III (in tables). Regions of Kyrgyzstan. Batken region. National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek, 2010, p. 201.

15. The act, signed by representatives of the Batken region of the Kyrgyz SSR and the Isfara region of the Tajik SSR, regarding the clarification and establishment of the border in the tract Keh. The tract Keh. June 19, 1937 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 251; CGA KR. F. 1445. Op. 7. D. 150. L. 9, 9 rev. Certified copy.

16. For example: An act drawn up by a conciliation commission of representatives of the Kyrgyz SSR and the Uzbek SSR, based on the decision regarding a land dispute between the collective farms Kyzyl-Charvak in the Karavan region of the Kyrgyz SSR and Kyzyl Uzbekistan of the Uzbek SSR. Frunze, dated March 31, 1938 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 275–276. Ibid: An act drawn up by the Conciliation Commission based on decision regarding a land dispute between the collective farms of the Karavan region of the Kyrgyz SSR and the Yangiqoʻrgʻon District of the Uzbek SSR. 1938. p. 276–278. Conciliation commissions were established on the basis of the resolution of the Kyrgyz Central Executive Committee of November 2, 1937, No. 91 and the resolution of the Uzbek Central Executive Committee of November 28, 1937, No. 20/74.

17. CSA KR. F. 1445. Op. 7. D. 111. L. 51. Copy.

18. In 1943, A. Tolubaev was appointed chairman of the collective farm; was head of the rural council from 1947 to 1953. He died in 1962.

19. There is no information in the document as to which authority prepared the project. However, such work was usually done by the Administrative and Territorial Commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR.

20. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR "On the project of the republican border of Kyrgyzstan with the Uzbek, Tajik SSR." Frunze, January 19, 1940 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 317; CGA KR. F. 1445. Op. 6. D. 12. L. 4. Original.

21. As noted by the commission, "during the national delimitation of the republics of Central Asia, natural geographic boundaries were not established; as a result, there was a strip system farming by the Uzbek and Kyrgyz population. During collectivization, when assigning land to collective farms in accordance with state acts, the land use of the collective farms of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz SSR was merged. As a result, the collective farms of the Kyrgyz rural councils ended up on Uzbek territory and vice versa. The need for an exchange followed "in order to eliminate strip farming, wedging and interspersing, while at the same time establishing boundaries convenient for the best management of collective farms in terms of culture and economy and bringing the party and Soviet leadership closer to the population." The paper further describes the territories and entities of exchange in detail. Minutes of the meeting of the Administrative and Territorial Commission under the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR on partial changes regarding borders between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz SSR. Frunze, August 12, 1940 // Administrative and territorial division of Kyrgyzstan in documents of 1924–1945. Reference edition – Collection of papers. Ed. A. Bedelbaev. Bishkek. 2018. P. 322-324; CGA KR. F. 1445. Op. 6. D. 12. L. 1, 2. Copy.

22. It was only very recently that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan came to an agreement to partially change problematic sections of the border. Compromises on land exchanges are closely linked to the use of water resources. Source: *Oleg Kusov*. Kyrgyz-Uzbek dialogue: it took countries 32 years to draw the state border. 27.01.2023. [Electronic source] // Website "News.ru". URL: https://news.ru/cis/kirgizo-uzbekskij-dialog-na-provedenie-gosgranicy-u-stran-ushlo-32-goda/ (accessed: 20.03.2023).

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

UGUR BOZKURT. IMMIGRATION OF CAUCASIAN MOSLEMS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

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Abstract. Among the reasons that caused and made the migration the Caucasian Moslems to the territory of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century quite long (from the 1860s to the 1910s), one can name Russia's political activity in the Caucasus and Crimea. In turn, the Ottoman Empire encouraged the arrival of immigrants in order to increase the Moslem population and protect border security. Naturally, the relocation of such a significant mass of foreign-speaking people was accompanied by some problems. However, both the host country and the immigrants have benefited in many areas. Most of the immigrants assessed according to their qualifications were mainly involved in the

military sphere, in construction, as well as in ensuring the safety of railways. They made an important contribution to the development of Anatolian agriculture and animal husbandry. Some of the immigrants quickly adapted to the new situation, became part of the Ottoman society, and even got the opportunity to work in the palace. After the World War I, from which Turkey emerged as the losing side, some of the immigrants were on the side of the palace, and some supported those who advocated the renewal of the motherland. Gradually, the Caucasians assimilated. According to some sources, their descendants today make up about a third of the population of Turkey.

Introduction

In 1865, the governments of the Russian and Ottoman Empires reached an agreement regarding the resettlement of a number of Caucasian peoples to Turkey. This agreement made the desire of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus to move to a Muslim country following the Caucasian War (1817–1864) true. The migration went on for several years. Some Caucasians settled in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, in Kosovo field (Serbia) in particular; others settled in Syria and Transjordan (modern Jordan); and the rest of them made their home in different areas of Anatolia and Arab provinces.

As for the reasons for the resettlement of the peoples of the Caucasus and Crimea, it should be noted that by migrating to the Ottoman lands, the people sought to live among their fellow believers. A. Ganich, a Russian researcher, believes that there are several reasons that "prompted the mountain men of the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia to leave their homeland, for which they had been fighting for so many years, and move to the Ottoman Empire:

– firstly, the inability of small peoples to stand against the regular Russian army, numbering hundreds of thousands of soldiers;

– secondly, land-related uncertainties following the planned land reform in Russia;

– and finally, the desire of the mountain men to live in a Muslim country (*Dar al-Islam*) and not to submit to the *kafir* king." [1]

In turn, the Ottoman government encouraged the warlike Caucasian population to move to its territory, so they could resettle them in the lands where there was a necessity to secure the rule of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans. [2, p. 45]

The Caucasus was at the heart of rivalry between different civilizations for several centuries. The Turkish Empire started to reinforce its northern borders right after the conquest of Constantinople (1453). As a result, different areas of the Caucasus became part of the Ottoman Empire: Georgia between 1480 and 1878, Armenia between 1553 and 1604 & between 1724 and 1736, and Azerbaijan between 1578 and 1604 & between 1724 and 1736. Dagestan, the North-Western and Central Caucasus, Anapa, Azov, Circassia, Adygea were part of the Ottoman Empire for a lengthier period – for 354 years between 1475 and 1829. [3] Naturally, being part of the Ottoman Empire for such a long time resulted in conversion of the majority of the population to Islam.

In 1475, the Ottomans were at war with the Crimean Khan Meñli Giray and forced him to acknowledge himself a vassal of the Sultan. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire managed to conquer the southern regions of Crimea. The steppe and foothill areas of Crimea also joined the Ottoman Empire. The Crimean Khanate remained dependent on the Sublime Porte until 1774. [4]

At the beginning of the 16th century, the Safavid Empire emerged in the Caucasus, becoming a rival of the Ottomans. At the end of the war between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran (1555), the Ottomans obtained western Georgia, while the Persians gained Kartli and Kakheti. The Ottoman Empire made use of internal discord in Georgia and other regions in order to advance their policies. The Russian Empire, however, soon became Ottoman Turkey's main rival in the Caucasus and a source of concern for the Turkish sultans. Istanbul sent out a lot of missions, trying to maintain close ties with the Muslim

population in the region, while at the same time establishing an alliance with the Crimean khans.

The Russian Empire, in turn, annexed the Caucasian territories in several stages. The most active hostilities took place between 1817 and 1864, although Russians were present in the region long before then. Even during the reign of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1530–1584), a military settlement under the patronage Temryuk, the Grand Prince of Kabardia, was established on the Terek. Following the settlement of Greben Cossacks in the Caucasus,[1] the Terek Voivodeship of Russia was formed. [5] Also, Ivan the Terrible annexed Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556).

However, the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the region significantly weakened during the reign of Peter the Great. The alliance between Peter the Great and the princes of Kabardia (1709–1710) brought the region closer to Russia. [6] Later, the Ottoman Empire had to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca that ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1768–1774. Continued hostilities under Catherine the Great accelerated the annexation of Crimea (1783). Success in this area prompted Russia to step up its actions in the Caucasus and Crimea. However, religious differences in the annexed territories intensified during the reign of Catherine the Great, ensuing mass migration. In particular, over one million Crimean Tatars left the peninsula between 1783 and 1893, settling in Romania and Bulgaria, which were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. [7]

In 1785–1791, a revolt broke out in the Caucasus led by Sheikh Mansur Ushurma,[2] who was proclaimed the first Imam of the North Caucasus. As the French orientalist A. Bennigsen points out, Ushurma started to actively preach and agitate the Caucasians against Russia a year after being declared the Imam in 1784. After several failed attempts, the Russian troops managed to capture the sheikh; he was transported to St. Petersburg, imprisoned and died, aged 31, at the Shlisselburg fortress in 1794.

Forty years later, the Murid movement was headed by Imam of Dagestan and Chechnya Ghazi Muhammad (1795–1832), and then by Imam Gamzat-bek (1832–1834).[3] Imam Shamil (1797–1871) created the Caucasian Imamate by uniting the territories of Western Dagestan and Chechnya (1834–1859). [8]

The Ottoman state continuously backed Caucasian Muslims in their struggle against Russians. Istanbul's emissaries monitored all the developments in the region and reported to the Sultan. In 1779, during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid I, Ferah Ali Pasha, an Ottoman pasha of Georgian origin, was sent to Circassia. He was tasked to keep track of the situation and spread Islam in the region. In his reports to Istanbul, he noted that the Muslims in the region are still taking lead from their fellow believers in Turkey. [9]

The Caucasian War ended in favour of Russia following the capture of Imam Shamil (1859).[4] Nevertheless, Caucasians continued to resist the Russian authorities. And at that point, the plan to resettle Caucasian Muslims to the territory of the Ottoman Empire was conceived. [10] It was invented by Musa Kundukhov (1818–1889), a Russian major general of Ossetian origin. After moving to the Ottoman Empire, he adopted Turkish citizenship, was made a pasha and served as a divisional general.

Actually, the resettlement of mountain men to Turkey began long before the Caucasian War. It is well known that Caucasian women were famous for their beauty in Ottoman Turkey. Mountain men often brought their daughters to Istanbul in hopes of getting them into some rich Turk's harem, if not that of the Sultan. Caucasian men were also highly respected in Turkey as fierce and fearless warriors, who sat firmly in the saddle and were deft with weapons.

Naturally, resettlement of the population became inevitable after Russia began hostilities in the Caucasus. This migration came to be known as Muhajirism in the literature (from the Arabic *muhajir* – a migrant, an emigrant). However, some researchers believe that this word can only be applied to those

who moved to Turkey voluntarily, before the 1865 agreement, because Muhajirism means voluntary resettlement. Those who left the Caucasus after 1865 were forced to move.

Even before that, in 1857, the Ottoman officials noted that the number of Caucasians arriving in Turkey had increased dramatically. They drew up a special document – "The Settlers' Code" – that listed benefits for settlers; in addition, in 1860, a special Commission on Refugees was formed. Initially, the resettlers were even promised plots of land, as well as exemption from taxes and military service for six years.

Immigrants in the Ottoman Empire

The exact number of emigrants has never been determined due to conflicting figures in the surviving sources. According to Russian official data, 398,955 people emigrated between 1858 and 1864. [11] Based on the preserved documents in the Ottoman archives, 311,333 people arrived in groups between 1856 and 1864; they were reportedly resettled in some areas of the Danube valley, in Dobruja and Adana. In 1864, another 280,000 people arrived. Also, many immigrants, who travelled to Turkey by sea, drowned. [12] In addition, 87,000 more migrants arrived in 1865. Thus, 678,333 people immigrated to the Ottoman lands within the span of nine years. [13] Strong discrepancies between the data provided by the archives of the Russian and Ottoman Empires are obvious. According to other estimates, 900,000 people moved from Crimea and the Caucasus to the Ottoman lands during this period. The majority of the immigrants were Muslims, but there were also Jews among them. [14]

The transfer of the population of the Caucasus to the Ottoman lands did not stop after that. The 1877–1878 war triggered more migration. According to some estimates, 2 million people left the Caucasus between 1859 and 1879, although only 1.5 million managed to reach the Ottoman lands due to unfavourable circumstances. [15] After the war ended, the

migration rate slowed down; nevertheless, another 500,000 emigrated between 1881 and 1914. Thus, the number of resettlers in the period from 1783 to 1922 amounts to 1.8 million people. [2, p. 48]

The migration process continued during World War I; for instance, 270,000 people emigrated in the period between 1914 and 1921. At the same time, it is reported that about 470,000 people died. [16] Indeed, the figures in different sources vary, making it impossible to evaluate precisely the magnitude of emigration of Caucasians to the Ottoman Empire.

People from the Caucasus settled in almost all regions of the Ottoman Empire. [17] They were mainly sent to areas with a predominant Muslim population. [18] Economic situation in the Ottoman Empire was quite difficult at that time. In particular, there were all sorts of problems with financing of expenses on integrating immigrants. Although there were projects to provide accommodation and financial support to immigrants, in reality the funds were not enough.

Refugees from the Caucasus – 'mountain men' as Russians call them – were welcomed in the Ottoman lands. The state granted citizenship to immigrants without delay, significantly increasing the number of Muslims in the country. [19, p. 10] Social integration of the Caucasian peoples was quite quick, since the Ottoman society treated them as fellow believers. Naturally, immigrants had some issues stemmed from their ignorance of the Turkish language; however, clashes between Caucasians and a settled non-Muslim population were of greater concern. In particular, it was recorded in official Ottoman documents that Circassians, acting independently, tried to cultivate the land without official permission, which resulted in problems with their neighbours. [19, p. 29]

A large number of people from the Caucasus region were resettled in Anatolia along the railway under construction. This way the authorities wanted to boost economic activities of these areas. In 1878, twenty-five thousand Circassians settled in southern Syria, and another twenty thousand in the Aleppo

region. At the same time, many Caucasians were invited to work on the railway in Anatolia and the Balkan countries. They were given vacant land along the railway.

Besides maintaining the railway line in the Central Anatolia region, many immigrants were involved in the construction of the Hejaz Railway from Damascus to Medina, built between 1900 and 1908.[5] Moreover, immigrants were expected to guard the railways as well. (Editor's note: The railroad passed along the caravan routes traditionally controlled by the Bedouins. The rail link to the sacred Muslim cities took away their earnings, since servicing pilgrims brought income to the Bedouins and was one of their main sources of livelihood).

Russian diplomatic mission in Damascus reported on the construction of the railway, noting that 260 people from the Caucasus had arrived in Damascus. It was assumed that the railway would connect Damascus and Medina and go on to Mecca; immigrants were supposed to settle along the railway in order to protect it (Editor's note: The Medina–Mecca project was only partly implemented). The authorities believed that the prestige of Damascus would increase after the construction of the railroad was completed. [20] Thus, the Ottoman Empire tried to make rational use of the labour of immigrants.

At the same time, major steps were taken to address exploitation of agricultural lands that had previously been abandoned or not used in the first place. According to a report submitted to Ferik Muzaffer Pasha, 938,900 hectares of land were found suitable for the settlement of immigrants. These lands were distributed as follows:

– 178,000 acres in the Aziziye district in Hüdavendigâr (Bursa) Province;

– 100,000 acres in the Seyitgazi district in Eskişehir Province;

– 380,900 acres in the Sivrihisar Gorge and 280,000 acres in the Haymana district, both in Ankara Province.

In total, 938,900 acres of land were allocated in Hüdavendigâr and Ankara Provinces. [21]

Agricultural production, as well as production in general, significantly increased between 1885 and 1912. At the same time, however, prices remained stable, while production space and investments increased. It was during this period that a new class of entrepreneurs emerged in the Ottoman Empire. Founded in Istanbul in 1880, the Chamber of Commerce recorded that new entrepreneurs from among the indigenous Turkish population appeared in Istanbul and other parts of the country. Between 1880 and 1890 their numbers steadily increased and they were eventually joined by immigrant entrepreneurs.

During that period, the urban development largely depended on immigrants. It should be noted that until that time, the top of the Ottoman hierarchy mainly consisted of wealthy non-Muslims, while the lower levels were represented by less affluent Muslim Turks. [22] Everything changed at the end of the 19th century.

It is worth noting that the ideology formed towards the end of the Ottoman Empire was influenced by migration processes. In particular, the idea of Turkism originated from Muslim activists who moved to the Ottoman lands. Pan-Turkism as an ideology emerged among Crimean Tatars. In the late 19th century, it was Ismail Gasprinsky, a Crimean Tatar intellectual, who first put forward the idea of uniting all Turkic peoples. In the Ottoman Empire, the doctrine of Pan-Turkism was supported by Young Turks,[6] notably Enver Pasha,[7] Talaat Pasha[8] and Djemal Pasha.[9] Interestingly, while living in the Russian Empire, Gasprinsky developed ideology of cultural Pan-Turkism that was combined with the idea of harmonious coexistence between Turks and Slavs. In the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Turkism developed amidst confrontation with Russia and the processes that ultimately led to the collapse of the Ottoman state.

Many members of the Young Turk movement attempted to spread Pan-Turkism through the press and publications in Istanbul. After 1908, such people as Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali bey Huseynzade, Abdurreshid Ibrahim, Mahammad Amin Rasulzade,

Fatih Karimi, Ismail Gasprinsky and Mahmut Bey Huseynov are considered to be "pioneers of Turkism". [23, p. 189]

Some of the Crimean immigrants who moved to the Ottoman Empire had some money and were able to integrate into the Ottoman economy rather quickly. As they expanded their business activities, these immigrants gained prominence among merchants and entrepreneurs that were gradually becoming a significant segment of the Muslim middle class. They managed to establish commercial enterprises in many areas. At the same time, people from the plains settled in the steppes of Central Anatolia and engaged in growing grain and other agricultural crops. [24]

Moreover, immigration had an effect on the demographics of the Ottoman Empire. Today, taking into account the natural increase in population due to the descendants of those who moved to the Ottoman lands in the 19th and early 20th centuries, immigrants make up 30 percent of the current population of Turkey. [23, p. 187]

Political activities of immigrants

Emigrants from the Russian Empire were quite active in the military, economic, social and political spheres. Interestingly, Caucasian immigrants who tried to further themselves in Ottoman society settled in the area of *Bab-ı Ali* (Editor's note: The Sublime Porte – the Imperial Gate – leading to the Topkapı Palace). In addition, there were many immigrant women in the palace and even in the harem. Mothers of many sultans were Circassians. [25] Thanks to their influence, some immigrants were able to get jobs in the palace. [26]

It should be noted that due to the military skills of Caucasian men, the Ottoman authorities initially planned to involve them exclusively in military operations. With that in mind, they even came up with a project to create a military colony consisting purely of immigrants. [27, p. 847] Although the

project never came to be, many Caucasians were engaged in military activities within the Empire and outside it.

The Ottoman state was trying to efficiently use the military talents of immigrants. Çaçba Hasan, Gerandiqo Berzeg, Ghazi Muhammad (the son Imam Shamil) and Musa Kundukhov were natives of the Caucasus and prominent commanders, who subsequently fought against Russia in the Ottoman army. [28] Sultan Abdul-Hamid II appreciated Caucasian Muslims for their fighting skills, thanks to which many of them were held high in the Turkish armed forces. In particular, Caucasian settlers joined the troops of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

It must also be acknowledged that Caucasian immigrants and their descendants greatly contributed to the creation of the Republic of Turkey. There were Caucasian immigrants among the founders and members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which operated towards the end of the Ottoman Empire: Dr. Mehmet Reşit Bey (Hanuko), İsmail Canbolat, Hüseyin Tosun, Hüseyin Kadri, Zekeriya Zihni, Eşref Sencer Kuşcubaşı, Selim Sami, Hasan Vasfi, Ömer Naci, Aziz Mısri, İbrahim Süreyya, Mümtaz, Reşit, Ethem, Sarı Efe Edip, as well as Yenibahçeli Şükrü and his brother Nail. Naturally, Caucasians were also among those who tried to save the Ottoman Empire from collapse, but failed.

Later, the natives of the Caucasus took part in the formation of the Turkish Republic and held significant posts in the Government. Among them were: Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, Hüseyin Tosun, Hüseyin Kadri, Zakeriya Zihni, İsmail Canbolat, Şevket Dağ (a painter), Mustafa Nevzat, Esat Fuad, Dr. Mehmed Reşit, Miralay Bekir Sami Günsav, Yusuf İzzet Pasha (Met Çunatuka İzzet), İbrahim Süreyya Yiğit, Aziz (Orbay) Bey, Süleyman İzzet Tsey, Cemil Cahit Toydemir, İsmail Hakkı Berkok, Berzeg Kazım, Berzeg Ekrem, Zeşo Tahir, Şetoh Musa, Şemseddin Sular, Osman Onarak, Muzaffer Kılıç, Bekir Kubat, Ömer Mümtaz Tanbi, Hakkı Behiç, Emir Marşan Pasha, Hikmet Bey, Kamil Polat, Yusuf (Sangu) Bey, Yebcin İlyas Aydemir, Delhi

(Tugkua) Fuad Pasha (a marshal), Karzeg Salih Hulusi Pasha, Ahmed (Hamdi) Abuk Pasha, Mehmed Sabahaddin (a prince), Aslan (Toguzati) Bey, Rüştü Bozkurt, Sakallı Bedri (Başakıncı), Mahmud (Bad) (a captain), Şefik Ali (Özdemir), Deli Halit (Karşıalan), Aşir Bey, Mehmed Fuad Kerim, Hakkı Hami Ulukan, Mehmed Hulusi Akyol, Kaseiko Mahmud Hendek, Hunç Ali Said Pasha, Hakkı Mürsel (Bakü), Recep Peker, Hasan Atakan, Rüştü Kobaş, Rasim Kanbulat, Cevdet Kerim İnceday, Çakir Efe Sefer and Etem Bey. [29, p. 14]

All the above mentioned people were actively involved in many major projects such as the Hawza and Amasya Circulars; participated in the Congresses in Erzurum and Sivas; and were part of the Representative Committee. Many descendants of the natives of the Caucasus were among the deputies of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, founded in Ankara on April 23, 1920. It was at the second meeting of the Grand National Assembly that Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Editor's note: The future Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who is considered the founder of the Republic of Turkey) emphasized that the Circassian community was a significant part of the new Turkish society. [29, p. 15] He noted that immigrants were involved in political and administrative work at all levels of the state, effectively contributing to the building of the republic.

Some Caucasians could not fit into the host society and were a source of problems; those Caucasians who supported the republic did their best to explain ideological guidelines of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to their fellow countrymen.

It is indicative that when Mustafa Kemal Pasha convened the Sivas Congress in November 1919, the monarchy supporters managed to unite numerous regional human rights associations into Association for the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. It should be noted that at that time Istanbul, the capital of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, and several other cities were occupied by the allied powers planning to divide the country. A supporter of Young Turks, Emir Marşan (1860–1940)[10] did a

great job of persuading Caucasians to support Mustafa Kemal. [30] Later, he joined the first composition of the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey.

It was at this difficult time that former Caucasian immigrants split between the Istanbul and Ankara governments, which acted separately. For that reason, Caucasian immigrants who settled in some regions followed through with the demands of the Istanbul government, but rebelled against the Ankara government. Ahmet Anzavur Pasha (1885–1921), an Ottoman gendarme officer of Circassian origin, tried to resist the Kemalist movement. He rebelled against the Ankara government, defending the rule of caliph.

This revolt and the two uprisings that followed were all suppressed. Moreover, Anzavur was defeated by the Kemalist forces led by Çerkes Ethem, or Ethem the Circassian. [31] As a result, Caucasians who lived in the area of the uprisings (i.e. in the villages of Adapazarı and Düzce) were deported to other regions. [27, p. 877–883] It was later decided to punish the rebels by exiling them. Hundreds of Circassians from fourteen Circassian villages in Gönen and Manyas were deported to Afyon, Sivas, Tokat, Urfa, Muş, Bitlis, Konya and Malatya. [32]

Naturally, many Caucasians fell on hard times; their nationality was no longer mentioned and they were all called 'Turks'. Thus, Keriman Halis, who was of Circassian origin, was announced as a Turkish girl when she participated in the International Beauty Contest and was crowned Miss Universe 1932. Her true origins were never mentioned in the press. [33]

Before the declaration of the republic, due to numerous migrations, Ottoman society used to be multilingual, multicultural and multi-ethnic; the newly established republic, however, began to uphold the idea of a single nation. At the same time, many ethnic groups, especially Circassians, strived to preserve their language and culture, putting some issues on the agenda. Kemalism gave rise to communities that tried to preserve

their language and culture by creating all sorts of associations and organizations in a multinational society.

Between 1923 and 1946, guided by the functions of the nation-state, the one-party government did not allow different peoples living in Turkey to advocate for the preservation of their language and culture. The one-party administration worked to create a unified nation while ignoring great cultural strength of immigrant communities, which once joined the Ottoman Empire. [34] Naturally, this situation shaped today's society, but at the same time resulted in a significant loss of national memory.

Conclusion

To sum up, Russia's military campaign in the Caucasus resulted in the migration of the population to the Ottoman Empire, which went on until the mid-20th century. When the series of twelve Russo-Turkish wars (1568–1918) ended with a decisive victory for Russia, huge numbers of Caucasian Muslims immigrated to Anatolia. By accepting the natives of the Caucasus and Crimea, the Ottoman Empire largely increased Muslim population. In addition, Istanbul took it upon itself to resettle immigrants, accommodate them and give them jobs as a source of livelihood.

Let us highlight the role of Caucasians, who settled on abandoned and virgin lands; they shared their skills in growing a number of crops with Bedouins, which contributed to the latter leading a semi-settled way of life.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the division of Caucasian communities. In the end, some of them settled in Syria, Jordan and the Balkan countries. Nevertheless, the skills acquired by immigrants and their descendants in the Ottoman Empire helped them to integrate into the new societies.

People in Turkey still remember that the migration processes during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire played a significant role in the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

Immigrants who took an active part in the creation and activities of the Committee of Union and Progress contributed to the development of Turkism. This situation lasted from the reign of Abdul-Hamid II until the end of the Turkish War of Independence.

After a multi-party system was adopted in the Republic of Turkey, some ethnic communities were allowed to establish cultural associations. Today, a lot of immigrants are working to preserve their language and culture. In modern Turkish society, it is increasingly common to hear criticism of the methods that were used in dealing with their ancestors. In order to preserve their ethnic culture, the children and grandchildren of immigrants are now trying to rediscover the past and reconnect with compatriots who live in the Caucasus.

Notes

1. Greben Cossacks was a group of Cossacks who lived in the North-Eastern Caucasus (modern Northern Dagestan), and later along the middle reaches of the Terek.
2. Sheikh Mansur Ushurma (1765–1794) was a military commander and Islamic leader.
3. Gamzat-bek (1789/1801–1834) was Imam of Dagestan and Chechnya (1832–1834).
4. The Russo-Turkish wars were a series of armed conflicts that occurred during the span of almost three and a half centuries, between 1568 and 1918.
5. The Hejaz railway (Hicaz Demiryolu) was a narrow-gauge railway (1,050 mm) that ran for 1,320 km; it was built during the reign of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. The railroad was intended to facilitate the Hajj annual pilgrimage, as well as speed up the transfer of troops and military supplies to the southern (Arab) provinces of the Ottoman Empire, thus strengthening the control over them.
6. Young Turks (Jön Türkler, or Genç Türkler) was a political reform movement that from 1876 promoted the replacement of the Ottoman Empire's absolute monarchy with a constitutional government.
7. Enver Pasha (1881–1922) was an Ottoman military officer and politician.
8. Mehmed Talaat Pasha (1874–1921) was one of the leaders the Committee of Union and Progress, the Young Turk Party; he organized the mass deportation of Armenians.

9. Ahmed Djemal Pasha (1872–1922) was an Ottoman military leader and politician, who served as Governor of Syria (1915–1917); he was a prominent member of the Young Turk movement.

10. Emir Marşan (1860–1940) was a member of the Abkhazian princely family of Marşan, who settled in Turkey and Syria; a member of the Committee of Union and Progress.

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AIDA SIMONIA. THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MASS EXODUS OF THE ROHINGYA FROM MYANMAR

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Abstract. The article provides a retrospective analysis of the emergence of the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar. The historical part describes the history of the appearance of this people on the territory of

colonial Burma and their afterlife in a young independent state, where they were legally deprived of the right to citizenship. The author pays special attention to radicalization of a certain part of this people, which led to the mass exodus of the Rohingya from Myanmar in August 2017, and the initiation of genocide proceedings against Myanmar in the UN International Court of Justice. The author concludes that even five years later, the Rohingya crisis is a problem that no one can solve. The situation is also complicated due to the political crisis in Myanmar itself as a result of the military coup in February 2021, so the repatriation of refugees is postponed for an indeterminate future.

This anniversary is not worth celebrating, especially since mention of the distressful situation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh is missing from global headlines. Obviously, the problem of Rohingya, remaining today one of the largest humanitarian crises, has become less interesting for the world community and critics of the Myanmar government, and the fate of refugees will now depend on the actions of the UN specialized agencies, the international organizations Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross and, to some extent, from neighboring states – India and China. However, by August 25, – date, which is now noted as significant in the tragedy of this people, Western politicians made some statements and several articles appeared in the press. But these statements and publications are nothing new, and most importantly, there is no prospect of resolving the Rohingya crisis.

Who the Rohingya are. In Rakhine State (Arakan), located in southwestern Myanmar and bordering Bangladesh, until recently two major ethnic communities coexisted – Rakhine Buddhists or Arakans (Burmese sub-ethnos), and Rohingya Muslims (Bengali sub-ethnos), who made up 28,5% of that state's population. Rohingya are ethnic Bengalis from Chittagon District, Sunni Muslims by confession speaking the Chittagon dialect of the Bengali language[1].

The official position of the Myanmar government is that Rohingya Muslims are from Bengal, massively penetrated the territory of Buddhist Burma during the British rule and received economic support from the British colonialists, ruling in Arakan from 1825 to 1948. The mass migration of Bengalis to Burma for more than a hundred years is the result of colonial policy, including the import of cheap labor. After the collapse of the colonial system at the junction of the two states – Burma and East Pakistan (future Bangladesh), which were previously part of British India, a people formed who classify themselves as a special nationality of the Rohingya. According to publications by Burmese researchers, before the country gained independence, the word "Rohingya" was not in the lexicon of Arakan residents. It is not mentioned either by British officials who conducted a census on this territory and scrupulously specified all small national groups, or by scientists of that time, or by other written sources. It is believed that self-designation the Rohingya appeared in 1951 specifically for Bengali immigrants[2].

The Burmese authorities have always considered this people to be representatives of Bengalis living in their country. During the general census conducted in 1941 after Burma's secession from British India, future Rohingya and their descendants were named as "Bengalis".

The first fifteen years of Burma's independence under the U Nu government, when a difficult political situation occurred in the country – the separatist rebel movement of ethnic minorities forming part of the Burmese Union, armed opposition to the clandestine Communist Party of Burma and Kuomintang aggression, the situation in Arakan was relatively calm. Against the background of general chaos that predominated in the country, the Bengalis of Arakan received minority status and even representation in the Burmese parliament. At the same time, during the same period, Muslim migration from East Pakistan continued to the territory of Arakan, according to Burmese nationalists, migration was massive and illegal. This provoked a

difficult socio-economic situation in the region and a clear demographic fault. At the same time, separatist sentiments arose among some Rohingya: ideas were put forward for the annexing of this region to Pakistan, or the creation of a Muslim state independent of Burma – Arakandesh. In the early 1950s, the Bengalis of Arakan attempted an armed revolt, demanding the creation of an autonomous entity inside Burma, and mass repression began in return. Such sentiments among radical Rohingya are popular now – and this is the main problem. Only people who know the country and its history well understand this. "Claims of the Rohingya of ethnic identity recognition and the continuing military coup of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) should consider as a separatism problem what can't be understood in the West in any way", – the former ambassador of the USA in Myanmar (2012–2016) Derek Mitchell said in an interview to the newspaper Atlantic[3].

The reason for the prolonged tension between the two peoples, according to the Arakans (Rakhine), lies in the fact that "the Rohingya are constantly expanding their place of living and gradually displacing the Arakans from their ancestral lands[4]." Arakans also believe that they face Islamization due to the incredibly large growth of the Rohingya population, due to the high birth rate.

Status of Rohingya in Burma / Myanmar. Persecution of Rohingya at the state level began in 1962 after a military coup in Burma by General Ne Win. With the coming to power of the Revolutionary Council, the Rohingya lost their political and constitutional status. Being the head of state, Ne Win began to pursue a policy of Burmization of the country and the economy, forcing the remaining Indians (about 160 thousand), as well as Chinese and other foreigners, to leave the country in 1963–1966.

The Bengals' rejection of citizenship was then legally supported. According to the Special Immigration Act of 1974, aimed at reducing immigration from India, China and Bangladesh. Rohingya representatives were denied passports or

national registration certificates, at best they could obtain a foreigner's immigration card. The 1982 Citizenship Act of the Socialist Republic of Burma Union the Rohingya practically lost their status of an indigenous ethnic group. During the general census, completed in 1983, the Rohingya nation was no longer included in the lists of ethnic minorities, and thus, by removing 135 ethnic groups living in the country from the list, it was declared stateless.

It should be noted that in addition to the Rohingya, the so-called "Burmese Muslims" live in Myanmar. This confessional group in Burma formed during the colonial period, when Burma was part of India, from the marriages of Muslim Indians to Burmese women. Although the Muslim Indians, who married the Burmese, practically merged with the Burmese population, they brought their religion – their families began to practice Islam. During the 1941 census, they were listed as "Burmese Muslims"[5] for the first time in the history of the country, as opposed to the Rohingya, who were named "Bengalis", i.e. the non-indigenous population of Burma. Despite occasional conflicts between Buddhists and "Burmese Muslims", the latter are full citizens of the country. Burmese Muslims live in different parts of the country. Rakhine (Arakan) state also has "its own Muslims". Arakans (Rakhine) call "their" Muslims according to the ethnicity of the – Kamans and Myeidu.

Radicalization of Rohingya and aggravation of crisis. The so-called Rohingya problem escalated in June 2012 – shortly after the transfer of power to the military administration in Myanmar to the quasi-civilian government of President Thein Sein. As it often happens in world history, any domestic conflict, or purely criminal, between representatives of different faiths immediately takes on a religious connotation. The world press began to write about the sectarian strife in Myanmar and Buddhist chauvinism, genocide and fascism, that the Buddhist majority persecutes and destroys the Muslim minority. The Burmese side – both the

government and the opposition – preferred the term "communal violence".

The catastrophic situation with refugees in Bangladesh has developed as a result of a military provocation in the state of Rakhine in Myanmar. The armed attack by militants against police checkpoints on October 9, 2016 from the border with Bangladesh was the beginning of a series of armed clashes in the north of the state, which continued for a year. On August 25, 2017, militants from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ASRA)[6], consisting of representatives of this people, carried out another armed attack on strongholds of the Myanmar police and checkpoints in the border zone. Their goal was to net the village of Maundo. In response, Myanmar security forces launched a campaign of massive "clearances" from militants in eastern Rakhine state. Redeeming from the military, more than 700 thousand Rohingya living in this area fled to Bangladesh[7].

The exodus of Bengalis from Myanmar calling themselves Rohingya in the autumn of 2017 is recognized as the largest resettlement of peoples in Southeast Asia after the crisis in Indochina in the 1970s. The Rohingya have been seeking refuge in Bangladesh for the past five decades, creating the world's largest refugee settlement, Kutupalong, near the town of Cox's Bazar. Currently, about 1 million Rohingya are in camps in Bangladesh, while another 600,000 remain in the territory of Rakhine State in Myanmar[8].

For the most part, the Rohingya are non-combatants who want a quiet life. But most of them are illiterate – cannot read or write, that is why they are so easily manipulated. Those who speak on their behalf today are either emigrants who have their own bone to pick with the Burmese authorities or Bengalis who fled to Rakhine state territory during numerous bloody events in Bangladesh itself. They are more educated than the Rohingya living in Rakhine state, among them there are former political activists and religious figures, but they are legally unable to obtain Myanmar citizenship. Therefore, they are so intolerant of

those Rohingya who are ready to cooperate with the Myanmar authorities, to be called "Bengalis" and to obtain citizenship. The bulk of the Rohingya for radicals is just a way to blackmail Burmese authorities to achieve their own goals. The most extremist part of them created the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.

Repatriation problem. In November 2017, three months after the start of the exodus of the Bengali population from Myanmar, a decision was made to return the refugees. Both parties – Bangladesh and Myanmar have reached an agreement on a repatriation plan involving UN staff. According to the adopted document, only those refugees who left the country after armed clashes in Rakhine State in October 2016 and in August 2017 can return to Myanmar. Refugees must return to Myanmar of their own free will, must be residents of Myanmar, and both parents of a child born in Bangladesh must be residents of Myanmar. The start of the refugee return process was scheduled for December 2017. But the process of returning people then did not begin. The agreement aggravated the question: weather mass repatriation of refugees permissible if the main problem is not solved – the possibility of social and political integration of repatriates into Myanmar society.

The accumulation of more than 1 million refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh has become a huge burden for the poorest overpopulated country, its environmental safety. The Government of Bangladesh seeks to solve the refugee problem in various ways: by attempting repatriation, improving camps and ensuring acceptable conditions for large families to live there, and even arranging an uninhabited "floating" island in the Bay of Bengal for living[9]. For all these operations, the Bangladeshi government attracts international organizations and economic assistance from particular countries.

After the coup in Myanmar in February 2021, the situation in the country deteriorated. The military is unable to control the country, especially Rakhine State, which is currently ruled by the

Buddhist Arakan Army (not to be confused with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army!), which has long fought for the autonomy of this region. Repatriation of the Rohingya therefore depends on the goodwill of the Arakan Army to the same extent as the military junta. The Rohingya are calling on the international community to help them return to Myanmar and obtain citizenship rights. Celebrating World Refugee Day on June 20, 2022, they held a peaceful protest under the motto "Return Home."

Initiation of genocide proceedings in the International Court of Justice. At the suggestion of former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Raad al-Hussein, who in September 2017 called the events in Rakhine "a classic example of ethnic cleansing," Myanmar was accused of committing genocide against the Muslim population. At the end of 2019, the African state of Gambia, with a population of 2.1 million, filed a lawsuit against Myanmar at the UN International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing the country of genocide against the Rohingya. In December 2019, hearings on the genocide case began, the country was personally represented in the International Court of Justice by the State Adviser and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi.

The Rohingya genocide case in the International Court of Justice in The Hague was complicated by a military coup in Myanmar on February 1, 2021, Aung San Suu Kyi and her civilian government were ousted, sparking mass protests and bloody military repression. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate, who was criticized by human rights organizations for her participation in the Hague process, where she defended her country, is now under arrest and is being tried by the junta that carried out the military coup.

The now ruling military administration of Myanmar tried to get withdrawal of charges, but at a regular meeting of the International Court of Justice in February 2022, the Gambia insisted on the legality of its accusations, submitted to the highest UN court, about the genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims[10].

The UN International Court of Justice in The Hague found out on July 22, 2022 that a landmark case accusing military-run Myanmar of Rohingya genocide could proceed. The International Court of Justice has dismissed all Myanmar's objections in the case filed by The Gambia in 2019.

The decision gives access to full-scale court hearings on allegations of repression of Rohingya in Myanmar in 2017. The president of the UN International Court of Justice, Joan Donoghue, said: the tribunal "believes it has jurisdiction... for proceedings in the application submitted by the Republic of the Gambia and the application is acceptable." All of Myanmar's arguments have been rejected, but full-scale hearings and final rendering of decision may require years[11].

A problem that no one can solve. In August 2022, the special envoy of the UN Secretary General Noelin Heiser was able to visit Myanmar, for the first time in eight months after taking office; in addition to the main issues related to the political crisis in Myanmar, she also touched on the topic of the refugee problem. She stated that Myanmar assumed responsibility for creating favorable environment for the voluntary, safe, dignified and secure coming of refugees, and ensuring that the rights and well-being of the Rohingya became an integral part of a future peaceful and prosperous Myanmar[12]. Earlier, speaking at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, N. Heiser noted that the multidimensional crises in Myanmar "have deepened and expanded significantly," paid special attention to the problem of refugees in Bangladesh, highlighting the terrifying dangerous conditions of existence in the camps, especially for women and children. The UN special envoy said that she supported the recommendations of the Rakhine State Advisory Commission, which aims to improve conditions in Rakhine State, their recommendations regarding changes both at the "vertical" level – involving actual authorities, champions of democracy and the separatist ethnic militia known both as the Arakan Army and on the "horizontal" level such as grassroots initiatives promoting

inclusivity, peaceful coexistence and equality of humans. Ultimately, she said, solving these fundamental problems is Myanmar's "responsibility."[13]

A week later, N. Heiser visited Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar. She took a look at UNHCR's ongoing activities, heard complaints and opinions from Rohingya women, youth representatives and religious figures. Ms Heiser also met senior government officials dealing with refugee issues, including Commissioner for Refugees and their repatriation Shah Rezwan Hayat. The visit was celebrated ahead of the fifth anniversary of the Rohingya exodus from Myanmar[14].

Relinquishing duties as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet visited Bangladesh for a four-day visit. Her trip, at the invitation of the Bangladesh government, was also timed to coincide with the sad anniversary. After visiting refugee camps in Cox's Bazar, the high commissioner said that even after five years there was still a lot of work to be done to create suitable conditions for the repatriation of refugees. She also expressed concerns about increased rhetoric against Rohingya in Bangladesh, stereotyping and making this people a "scapegoat" as a source of crime. She asked Bangladeshi authorities to draw members of the Rohingya community into social and economic employment to distract them from criminal activity[15].

But all the efforts of international organizations have not yet brought any solution to the Rohingya problem for one simple reason – no one needs them. The problem of Rohingya refugees – this is a huge human tragedy. Bangladesh and Myanmar do not recognize them as their citizens. In the slums of Karachi and other cities of Pakistan, there are about 500 thousand Rohingya who are also not citizens of that country. The Muslim community's condemnation of the actions of Myanmar's government security forces and filing a suit in the International Court of Justice in The Hague looks perversely. This is the instrumentalization of people's suffering for religious purposes. The Rakhine conflict was never a confrontation between Islam

and Buddhism. This is an economic and political confrontation that lasts in this region for many decades. Due to the Islamization of the Rakhine conflict with at the behest of religious activists, the already plight of the Rohingya was further aggravated. International humanitarian organizations have been helping this people in Myanmar for many years, and continue to do so now to refugees in camps in Bangladesh, on a permanent basis and on a much larger scale than loudly criticizing politicians from particular countries. Notably, none of the Islamic critics of Myanmar's government offer refugees their territory.

While legal charges are being brought against Myanmar's military at the International Court of Justice for the events of 2017, the political contribution of international actors to the Rohingya repatriation process remains disappointingly unsatisfactory. Resolving Myanmar's internal political crisis and the issue of Rohingya repatriation is likely to be durational and complex. Therefore, today the main task of the world community – is to create conditions in Bangladesh for a decent life for refugees awaiting their fate.

Notes

1. One of the first publications on the Rohingya problem, see: Simonia A.A. Who are the Rohingya? // Asia and Africa today, 2009. № 11. P. 27–31.
2. For details see: Simonia A.A. On the question of ethno-confessional relations in Burmese society. Religion and society in the East. No. II (2018). M., IOS RAS, 2018. P. 136–167.
3. *Krishnadev Calamur*. The Misunderstood Roots of Burma's Rohingya Crisis. The Atlantic, 25.09.2017. URL: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-burma/540513/ (accessed: 27.09.2017).
4. Mizzima News (Delhi), 11.09.2012.
5. *Thompson V., Adloff R.* Minority problems in Southeast Asia. Stanford, California, 1955. P. 70.
6. The "Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army" (ARSA), which was originally called "Haraka al-Yakin" ("Faith Movement"), was formed in the early 2000s to "fight for the liberation of the persecuted" Muslim minority. The group gained fame after periodically attacking police and military officers in

Rakhine State from October 2016 to August 2017, which provoked a tough response from Myanmar security forces and a wave of Rohingya refugees primarily in Bangladesh. These developments also spurred a sharp increase in the influx of young Rohingya Muslims into the ranks of the ASRA. Since the first attack, ASRA has strengthened its position in the northern part of Rakhine, receiving support (according to the testimony of the International Crisis Group – International Crisis Group) from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

7. See details: Simonia A.A. Myanmar: the origins of the Rakhine State crisis and the radicalization of the Rohingya problem // Asia and Africa today. 2018. № 1. P. 26–33; Simonia A.A. Mass exodus of Rohingya Bengalis from Myanmar: Who is to blame and what to do? // Southeast Asia: Current development issues. 2017. No. 36. P. 124–139.

8. These numbers are approximate.

9. See: Simonia A.A. Bangladesh is trying to solve the problem of Rohingya refugees by resettlement on the island//Southeast Asia: Current development problems. 2019, № 2 (43), P. 132–141. URL: https://sea.ivran.ru/articles?artid=13870

10. For details on the Hague Process, see: Simonia A.A. Hague Process: Aung San Suu Kyi denies genocide in Myanmar // Southeast Asia: Current Development Issues, 2020, No. 1 (46), P. 115–126. URL: https://sea.ivran.ru/articles?artid=16003. (accessed: 30.08.2022).

11. According to AFP, July 22, 2022. URL: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-rohingya-genocide-case-can-proceed-top-un-court-rules.html (accessed 29.08.2022).

12. Note to Correspondents: Statement by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Myanmar, Noeleen Heyzer. Nay Pyi Taw 17 August 2022. United Nations. General Secretary. URL: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2022-08-17/note-correspondents-statement-the-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-special-envoy-myanmar-noeleen-heyzer (accessed: 29.08.2022).

13. Myanmar's multidimensional crises have 'deepened and expanded dramatically'. URL: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120292. (accessed: 29.08.2022).

14. UN special envoy on Myanmar visits Cox's Bazar Rohingya camps. Dhaka Tribune. 23.08.2022. URL: https://www.dhakatribune.com/nation/2022/08/23/un-special-envoy-for-myanmar-visits-rohingya-camps-in-coxs-bazar (accessed: 29.08.2022).

15. Rohingya repatriation. Tribune Report. August 17, 2022. URL: https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2022/08/17/rohingyas-must-return-to-myanmar-pm-hasina-tells-un-rights-chief (accessed: 30.08.2022).

VLADIMIR KIRICHENKO. SYNTHESIS OF SHIISM AND SOCIALISM IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF IRAN BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1979 ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

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Abstract. In the late 1970s, dissatisfaction with the rule of the latter Shah of Iran Reza-Shah Pahlavi (1941–1979) led to the spread of oppositional ideas in Iranian society. The works of sociologist Ali Shariati (1933–1977) were particularly popular. His ideas were a kind of synthesis of Shiite Islam and socialist principles. Ayatollah Taleghani (1911–1979). He also tolerated left-wing political forces and spoke out for public ownership of land. However, after the Islamic Revolution (1979), the ideas of Shariati and Talegani were never implemented. And supporters of the synthesis of Islam and socialism after the overthrow of the Shah, began the struggle with the new Islamic authorities.

The reign of the last Shah of Iran, Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941–1979), was marked by a number of social and economic reforms. The reforms were aimed at the speedy development of agriculture and industry. According to the 1962 land reform, the government bought 1,600 villages (19,5% of Iran's agricultural land) from landowners and transferred them to the management of peasant families. Landowners were forbidden to own more

than one village. In addition, many new enterprises were built, and industrial employment increased dramatically.[1]

During the Shah's rule, Iran became one of the U.S. allies in the Middle East along with Saudi Arabia. Washington has provided Iran with military and economic assistance.[2] However, the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah was marked by internal unrest. In 1951, Mohammed Mossadegh (1982–1967)[3] became Prime Minister. He set as his goal the nationalization of the oil industry.

Mosaddegh's policy received the support of Iranians and the country's parliament, as the prime minister sought to restore Iranian sovereignty. Mossadegh managed to take control of almost all spheres of state power, including the military power.

While in power, he imposed martial law in the country, banned civil servants' strikes, suspended elections to the Senate and Majlis and restricted press freedom. He used the profits from the oil industry to improve the domestic economic situation and tried to put an end to foreign interference in Iran's affairs.

In 1953, Mohammad Reza Shah was forced to leave Iran under pressure from the Mosaddegh government[4]. However, Mosaddegh's policy of nationalizing the oil industry contradicted the interests of Great Britain and the United States. In this regard, the American intelligence services organized a military coup and in 1953 Mossadegh was overthrown, and Shah Reza Pahlavi returned to the country.

The reign of Mohammad Reza Shah cannot be evaluated unambiguously. On the one hand, thanks to the economic reforms carried out by the Shah, Iran has become a powerful industrial power. On the other hand, the policy of Westernization pursued by the Shah did not resonate with the majority of the Iranian population. By the end of the 1970s the economy stagnated, and inflation led to a decline in living standards. British researcher D. Hiro characterizes the economic conditions in Iran before the Islamic Revolution as follows: "In the mid-1970s, the exodus from rural areas increased. This, in particular,

was due to the government's attempt to curb inflation by establishing price controls on agricultural products. The population of large centers (over 100 thousand people) was almost 30% of the total population of Iran. At the same time, living conditions in the city were deteriorating everywhere: shortage of housing, electricity and water everywhere. In the five years preceding the revolution, rents increased by 300% and amounted to about half of the income of most urban families"[5].

All this led to the fact that many Iranians were dissatisfied with the regime. The Shah was criticized for corruption and incompetence of government officials. In addition, the Shah's regime used SAVAK, an American-trained secret police, to harass opponents of his government[6], which also did not add to the popularity of the Iranian leader.

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Dissatisfaction with the Shah's regime led to the spread of oppositional ideas in Iranian society. Among them were ideologies that combined traditional Islamic values and socialist principles. This kind of synthesis formed the basis of the ideas of the Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati, whose works were especially popular in the last decades of the Shah's regime (especially among students).

Ali Shariati[7] was born in 1933 in a village near Mashhad. His father, Mohammad Taqi Shariati, was a liberal cleric who ran his own lecture hall and taught Islam to children at a local high school. As a schoolboy, Ali Shariati attended discussion groups organized by his father, and in the late 1940s, father and son joined a small group called the "Movement of Worshiping Socialists". This group did not set political goals for itself, and its activities were of a religious and philosophical nature. At the same time, members of this association of intellectuals for the first time in Iran tried to find common ideas in socialism with Shiism.

In 1958, Shariati entered Mashhad University to obtain a master's degree in foreign languages, specializing in Arabic and

French. After receiving his master's degree in 1960, he entered the Sorbonne University for a degree in sociology and the history of Islam. In Paris, at the height of the Algerian and Cuban revolutions, he immersed himself in radical political philosophy, as well as in revolutionary student organizations. He joined the Iranian Student Confederation and the Iranian Freedom Movement[8], which were formed in 1961–1962, followers of Mosaddegh[9]. It was during his stay in France that Shariati began to formulate his political and philosophical identity.

Shariati saw Islam as a dynamic force that could inspire an uprising against the Shah[10]. Ali Shariati wrote: "Like the revolutionary party, Shiism had a well-thought-out, information-rich, deeply rooted and well-developed ideology, clear-cut and well-defined slogans, as well as a disciplined and well-trained organization. He led the unprivileged and oppressed masses in their quest for freedom and the search for justice.[11]" At the same time, despite the fact that Shariati actively used Marxist terminology to describe the political situation in Iran, he criticized Marxism. Shariati was not satisfied with the fact that Marxism does not recognize the role of the individual in history and reduces human life only to productive activity[12]. Atheism was also unacceptable for Shariati.

The Russian researcher A. Kuznetsov characterizes Shariati's attitude to Western ideas as follows: "Shariati sought to combine Islamic thinking with the achievements of Western thought, arguing that there is no need to follow any particular Western thinker, while all the best that progressive thought has achieved in the West has already been embodied in one person - Imam Ali. In the concept of Shariati, the class struggle is the embodiment of the historical confrontation between "monotheistic Islam" and "polytheistic Islam". He attributed the path of Imam Ali (Islam-e Alawi) to the first category, and groups of hypocrites fighting for their selfish interests under the slogans of Islam to the second category.[13]" The ideal for Shariati was a monotheistic classless society[14].

Ali Shariati died in 1977, the official cause of death was a heart attack, but there is a version about the involvement of the Iranian special services in the death of the scientist[15]. After the change of the political regime in Iran in 1979, the ideas of A. Shariati were not in demand by the new authorities. Perhaps one of the reasons for this attitude to the legacy of Shariati was the critical attitude of the scientist to the Shiite clergy.

The scientist accused the Ulama of becoming an integral part of the ruling class, "institutionalizing" revolutionary Shiism and thereby betraying its original goals. According to Shariati, the clergy treated the sacred texts as fossilized scholastic parchments, and not as a source of inspiration for a revolutionary worldview. Shariati has often stressed that the return to true Islam will take place not under the leadership of the clergy, but under the leadership of the progressive intelligentsia[16].

In addition, Shariati was often criticized by the clergy for some judgments concerning theological issues. An example of this is the idea of Shariati about the unity of God and man, apparently borrowed from Sufism[17].

* * *

One of the most popular religious figures of the period of the Islamic Revolution was Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani[18], who was very tolerant of socialist ideas.

Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani was born in 1911, he became one of the most influential clerics who stood at the origins of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Taleghani studied religion in Qom, where he was a fellow student of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini[19]. Later he became a teacher in Tehran. In 1938, during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza (1919–1980), Ayatollah Taleghani was sentenced to a one-year imprisonment for criticizing the methods of Shah Reza Pahlavi's rule[20].

After the abdication of Reza Shah from the throne in 1941, Taleghani created an Islamic Society, which began as a meeting

for the purpose of interpreting the Quran, but then expanded to include discussions of religious modernism. It was thanks to the Islamic Society that the close cooperation of Muhmud Taleghani and the long-time opponent of the Shah's regime, Mehdi Bazargan (1907–1995)[21], began.

Together they founded the democratic party "Movement for Freedom of Iran". Taleghani was also associated with the "National Resistance Movement" (NRM), which was organized in 1961. It was founded by various supporters of Mosaddegh in order to continue the policy of the prime minister after his overthrow in 1953[22]. Taleghani has established ties with the Iranian communists and the Islamic left-wingers[23] since the 1960s.

Subsequently, Taleghani and his family's tolerant attitude to leftist political views became one of the reasons for the conflict with Khomeini. The conflict escalated after Taleghani's two sons, who were members of various left-wing radical organizations, were arrested. After the arrest of his sons, Ayatollah Taleghani criticized the actions of the Islamic militia and revolutionary committees acting on behalf of Khomeini. The ayatollah warned that the nation could "fall back into the hands of dictatorship and despotism"[24].

One of his five sons, Syed-Mojtaba, was a member of the People's Mujahideen, the Islamic socialist guerrilla group Sazman Peikar[25]. Another son was a member of the Marxist organization Fedain-e-Khalq[26].

Russian researcher G.P. Avdeev believes that through Taleghani's relatives, the Palestinians tried to inform the leadership of Iran about the connections with the Americans of some Islamic figures who held higher positions[27].

The arrest of Ayatollah Taleghani's sons caused large-scale protests, as a result of which they were released[28]. The ayatollah did not escalate the conflict with the Iranian leadership and after the meeting with Khomeini said: "The leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini is recognized not only by me, but also by the world. He is a source of faith, sincerity, determination and honesty.

I have always approved of his struggle, his words and his projects"[29].

Taleghani advocated a special path of development based on the principles of "true Islam". According to the ayatollah, such a pure form of Islamic religion existed only for a short time under the Prophet Mohammed and Imam Ali[30]. Proceeding from the idea that according to Islam, the land belongs to God, Taleghani argued that the land and its subsoil cannot be privately owned, and personal use should not go against the collective interests of society[31].

In his teaching one can find acceptance of some socialist postulates. So, he proposed to Taleghani to create councils in Iran in which citizens would defend their interests. The primary link was the village council, and the final one was the supreme Council. Thus, the system would cover all levels of government[32]. Taleghani's initiative did not contradict Islamic principles, and initially Ayatollah Khomeini supported the creation of councils, but later Taleghani's initiative was rejected. Taleghani's ideas about the state structure based on the norms of Islam coincided in essence with leftist, socialist principles, but were not implemented.

* * *

The synthesis of Islamic and socialist ideas often became the basis of the ideology of Iranian terrorist groups. One of them was the "People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran" (PMOI). It was founded in the 1960s by a group of Iranian leftists, people with higher education, opposed to the pro-Western rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The founders of this group were Mohammad Hanifnejad and Said Mohseni Aliasgar Badizadegan. The ideology of the organization was a variant of radical political Islam and echoed the ideas of Ali Shariati. At the same time, the members of the group had a Marxist understanding of politics and history[33].

According to the US State Department, for a decade, OMIP organized terrorist attacks against the state, as a result of which several Americans working in Iran, including officers and civilian specialists, were killed[34]. In 1975, some of the members of the OMIP left the group, taking Marxist positions and forming the "Organization of the Struggle for the Freedom of the Working Class" (Paykar).

PMOI practically ceased to exist. It was recreated by the Islamic activist Masoud Rajavi, who joined PMOI as a student. In 1971, he was arrested by the Shah's special services and sentenced to death for terrorist activities. Subsequently, due to international interference, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Rajavi was released from prison during the events of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. After his release, he took over the leadership of the PMOI[35].

Although the group took part in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the ideology of the PMOI, which is a mixture of Marxism and Islamism, contradicted the views of the new Islamic authorities[36]. In 1981, the organization blew up the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party. As a result, 73 Iranian officials were killed, including one of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti[37]. Iranian President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar[38] were killed by members of the organization. After the prohibition of the activities of the PMOI in Iran, the headquarters of the organization was moved to France (1982), and then to Iraq (1986)[39].

The PMOI sided with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. In 1986, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein created the Ashraf military camp for members of the organization, located north of Baghdad. PMOI units were fighting against the Iranian army.

Also, the armed formations of the PMOI allegedly took part in suppressing the uprisings of Shiites and Kurds in Iraq in 1991–1992[40]. In April 1992, PMOI members attacked 10 Iranian embassies, including the Iranian UN mission in New York. These

actions were accompanied by hostage-taking, as well as arson of buildings and cars. Several Iranian ambassadors were injured[41]. Masoud Rajavi disappeared in Iraq in 2003 during the US invasion of the country. His whereabouts are unknown. After that, the PMOI was headed by his wife Maryam[42].

Currently, a significant number of members of this organization have emigrated and live in Europe and the USA. It is noteworthy that in 2012 the United States excluded the organization from the list of terrorist organizations. According to the press service of the US State Department, the reason was the rejection of violence, the absence of new terrorist attacks and the group's assistance in the peaceful closure of the Ashraf camp in Iraq[43].

Another terrorist organization whose ideology combined Shiism and socialism was the Forkan group. It owes its name to the Surah of the Quran "Al-Furqan" ("The distinction [between truth and falsehood]"). The organization was founded in 1976 by a former student Akbar Gudarzi, a native of Lourestan province[44]. Gudarzi believed that Shiism implied full equality of people, while he had a negative attitude towards the clergy and large merchants. He also had a negative attitude towards liberalism and Marxism[45].

Forkan began its terrorist acts in 1979. One of the first victims of the group was the first chief of staff of the Iranian army, appointed after the Islamic Revolution, General Mohammad Gharani. He was murdered on April 23, 1979 in his home[46]. The organization also claimed responsibility for the murders of the leading thinker of the Islamic movement and the head of the Council of the Islamic Revolution, Mortaza Motakhhari, TV presenter Said Behbehani, the head of the Qasr prison, Mehdi Araghi, Khomeini's representative in Tabriz, Ali Kazi Tabatabai. All these murders were committed in 1979. In total, about 20 terrorist actions of this group have achieved their goal[47].

On June 27, 1981, an attempt was made on Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. At that time, Ayatollah Khamenei was Imam Khomeini's representative in the Supreme Defense Council. During Khamenei's speech, an explosion occurred in the south of Tehran, but the ayatollah remained alive[48]. The assassination attempt on Khamenei was the last terrorist action carried out on behalf of Forkan. It is noteworthy that even before the terrorist attack, on January 18, 1980, Gudarzi and his supporters were arrested. And on June 3, 1980, the leader of Forkan and his associates were shot on charges of terrorism. Several dozen people received long prison terms. The investigation concluded that the perpetrator of the assassination attempt on Ayatollah Khamenei was Javad Gadiri, a member of the PMOI[49]. There is a version that there was a connection between the two terrorist organizations, and Forkan was the combat wing of the "People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran[50]."

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Summing up, it is worth noting that the synthesis of Islam and socialism by Ali Shariati or, in fact, the left-wing ideas on the structure of Iran's political life, which were expressed by Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, turned out to be unclaimed by the Iranian leadership after the Islamic Revolution. The negative attitude of the authorities towards leftist ideologies was also intensified due to the fact that Islamic groups with leftist views, after the overthrow of the Shah, began fighting against the Islamic republic.

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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

ELMIRA SADYKOVA, TEYMUR GALIMOV. THE PLACE AND ROLE OF INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE IN THE FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN CENTRALIZED STATE

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Abstract. This study, based on a wide range of historical sources, as well as a range of research literature on relevant topics, is designed to clarify the place and role of interreligious dialogue in the historical process of the formation of the Ancient Russian centralized state. The study raises the issue of the importance of the factor of interreligious dialogue in the development of statehood, both in foreign policy and domestic aspects. The authors set themselves the task of considering the most important, in our opinion range of historical subjects that took place in the 10–16 centuries in the context of the formation of the civilizational identity of the Ancient Russian centralized state.

Introduction

New geopolitical challenges and threats to Russia's security actualize the study of conceptual approaches to the issues of a strong statehood capable of ensuring its sovereignty. When considering these issues, the civilizational paradigm of the genesis of Russian statehood becomes important. The role of interreligious interaction, given in the domestic and foreign policy of our state, attaches particular importance to scientific research in this direction. Russian President Vladimir Putin in his speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2022 noted: "In Russia, for a thousand years, we have developed a unique culture of interaction between all world religions. There is no need to cancel anything: neither Christian values, nor Islamic, nor Jewish values."[1]

The increasing role of Russia in world political processes is due to the past historical experience of uniting peoples representing different nationalities and faiths. In the process of historical development in the Eurasian space, there was a synthesis of customs, spiritual values, cultures that retain their significance in the modern life of Russian society. The objective of this study is to identify in numerous historical events in all their diversity the key factors that influenced the formation of the experience of a culture of dialogue and consent as an alternative

to confrontational crisis trends in the political system of the state. The dialectic of the formation of statehood in the context of creating prerequisites for the possession of political power in a certain territory is conditioned by the definition of its cultural and civilizational basis, the search for values and ideals. Historically, the cultural ties of the Russian lands, preserved in ethnic memory, created only certain favorable prerequisites for this, which still had to be realized. At the same time, the unification into a single centralized state was a difficult and contradictory process, which was associated with the inter-princely wars of the 12th–13th centuries and a change in the way of local life, a change in the identity of the population.[2]

Within the framework of a systematic approach, we have attempted to form a holistic view of the history of the formation of traditional value components, such as intercultural and interreligious dialogue, common interrelations and relationships that were formed during the formation and development of the ancient Russian state, which was also noted by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation.[3]

The question of the cultural and civilizational paradigm of the formation and development of Russian statehood involves considering the place and role of the medieval Russian state's interreligious dialogue, both external and internal contacts, in this process. The theme of Byzantinism occupies a special place in scientific research devoted to the foundations of the formation of the civilizational identity of the ancient Russian state. During the formation of the Slavic states, Byzantium was the most highly developed civilization in the world, which absorbed the heritage of Ancient Greece and Rome, the Middle East and Egypt. Byzantium created this universal civilizational phenomenon, to the formation of which the Slavs also contributed[4]. On the other hand, it is impossible not to note the role of the East, the Turkic world and Islam, one of the main monotheistic religions that contributed to the formation of the system of spiritual and value coordinates of a whole galaxy of peoples of Russia. Throughout

the millennial history of Russia, there have been processes of unification of various ethnic groups and cultures, which, regardless of internal and external factors, dissolving obstacles and overcoming them, preserved their identity and brought their own values and traditions to the common cultural denominator.

The active information propaganda of Western ideologists is aimed at spreading distorted facts about the past of the peoples that make up Russia and destroying the unity of the Russian people and deforming historical memory.

Religious aspects of the formation of a centralized Russian state

The Baptism of Ancient Rus took place at a time when Byzantium, which inherited the traditions of ancient culture, became not only the center of the Christian religion, but also reached the highest flourishing in the development of art, especially icon painting[5]. Byzantium was also a model of high culture, which attracted the attention of the Russian princes, who actively carried out contacts with Byzantium.

The Byzantine Empire remained a major center of Christian culture until the middle of the 10th century, and after the adoption of Orthodox Christianity by Ancient Rus, their ties strengthened through cooperation in political, cultural, and commercial spheres. At the same time, Russian proto-states were entering world politics and culture through Byzantium[6]. Historical circumstances created favorable conditions for the preservation of close Russian-Byzantine allied relations until 1453, when Constantinople was captured by the Ottoman Turks, while maintaining ties between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Church. Byzantium as a center for the development of world culture, including architecture, various genres of art: mosaics, icon painting, book miniatures and other forms, also had a wide influence on Russian culture.

It is worth noting that initially there were conflicts in the relations between Byzantium and the East Slavic, and later Russian principalities. Thus, in the well-known chronicle sources, military campaigns of Russian princes to Byzantium in the 9th–10th centuries are mentioned. The goals of the noted invasions were, first of all, military booty. However, along with the trophies, the development of cultural values also took place. Subsequent contacts were made for the sake of the diplomatic interests of Byzantium, which found in this the only right solution in the fight against the Slavic hordes. The issues of spreading their own culture, the planting of Christianity were not at all missionary for Byzantium and were of an expansionist nature. There is evidence of contemporaries of this period, confirming the hostile attitude towards the Slavs in general. Thanks to historical chronicles, information about the raids on Constantinople by Princes Oleg, Igor, Svyatoslav and Vladimir has been preserved. The Byzantine writer Mikhail Pselle writes about the Russians that "this barbaric tribe has always harbored a fierce and furious hatred against the Greek *hegemony*; at every opportunity, inventing this or that accusation, they created from it a pretext for war with us[7]." Military campaigns sometimes ended with the conclusion of peace treaties, but different religious beliefs led to the fact that the parties did not refrain from violating them. Despite all the above circumstances, trade contacts and relations between Byzantium and the Russian principalities developed.

The ideological and consolidating role of religion in the period of the emergence of Russian statehood is confirmed by the historical experience of the creation of the Orthodox state by Vladimir, the Baptist of Russia[8]. Academician G. Vernadsky wrote: "according to the chronicler, in 986 Vladimir was visited by religious missions from various faiths and churches: Moslems from the Volga Bulgarians, Roman Catholics from Germany, Khazars who preached Judaism, and, finally, a preacher of the Greek Orthodox faith[9]." In his opinion, "the adoption of one or

the other of these creeds inevitably had to become decisive for the future cultural and political development of Russia[10].” After meetings of Prince Vladimir with religious missions of Moslems, Catholics, Orthodox, Jews from the territories neighboring Kievan Rus, he, according to the Tale of Bygone Years, in 987 sent a group of trusted worthy men to check each of the beliefs and, as a result, received advice on the introduction of Orthodox Christianity as an official religion in Russia. According to the TBY, following the capture of Korsun (Crimea) in 988 a number of events occurred that influenced Vladimir's final choice in favor of Orthodoxy[11].

As already mentioned, the Byzantine Empire regarded Russia as a “barbaric” people and, following the conversion to Christianity, assumed the adoption in Russia of a church structure similar to and subordinate to the Byzantine patriarch, headed either by a supplied metropolitan or a Greek bishop[12]. It is worth mentioning the historical fact, which testifies, for example, that Anastas Korsunyanin, having become the confessor of the prince, is mentioned in the TBY as a teacher and a possessor of Vladimir's passions. However, at the time of baptism, Russia had already begun to form its own organization of princely power in a certain territory, which meant the obligation to share the powers of a bishop or metropolitan with local princes. The very principles of Christian Roman law of Byzantium demanded recognition of the prince's authority both in civil and, to some extent, in ecclesiastical terms. Under these circumstances, “the Empire sought to introduce the prince himself into the Byzantine official hierarchy, and to make the Russian land a province of Byzantium, under the administration of metropolitans sent from Byzantium[13].” According to D.S. Likhachev, such a statement of the question, of course, created a danger to the preservation of the political independence of Russia and essentially meant depriving it of the right to an independent church organization.

And indeed, with all the activity and pastoral ministry of the local priesthood, with the substantial help of the ministers of Bulgaria and the Balkans as a whole, in essence the metropolitan court performed an exclusively diplomatic function, and the missionary work of the high priests was limited to the Ancient Russian elite[14]. The bishops of some principalities actively acted as negotiators in the most complex intricacies of inter-princely feuds, repeatedly persecuted and humiliated, fulfilled their pastoral duty[15], unlike the metropolitans who rarely traveled outside of Kiev[16]. Such an attitude caused some discontent and set them up to bring their own natives and ministers to the metropolitan throne.

These circumstances during the reign of Yaroslav the Wise led to an acute struggle between the Ancient Russian state and Byzantium. Despite the fact that Yaroslav failed to achieve significant military successes in this confrontation, certain conditions were achieved for strengthening the political power of Russia in relations with the outside world and prerequisites for some independence of the Russian Church were created. Thus, Illarion Rusin became the first metropolitan of Slavic origin only with the substantial support and pressure of Yaroslav the Wise and served in this capacity until the death of his own donator in 1054. It was Yaroslav, who became, after more than half a century of Orthodoxy in Russia, the pioneer who issued the "Charter on Ecclesiastical Courts", bringing the metropolis to a new level, and securing a number of essential rights for the church[17]. However, according to researchers, even in these conditions, the church was not able to build its own full-fledged institution, it was largely dependent on representatives of the princely authorities, who were the founders of most cathedrals, curators and contributors to monasteries[18]. It is reasonable to believe that in this way the Ancient Russian princes defended their right to an equal position with Byzantium.

The common religion contributed to the processes of consolidation of the East Slavic society and the formation of a

single nationality. During this important historical period, as L. Gumilev noted, "the Russian state had few friends and many enemies[19]." The study of the relations of the nascent Russian state with neighboring countries is of interest not only in the historical context, but also to a certain extent for understanding the process of accumulation of spiritual potential, traditions and cultural experience of multifaceted human relations and assessing the importance of their preservation in modern Russian society.

The 11th century completes a special stage in the development of the Russian lands, when with the adoption of Christianity and the creation of their statehood there comes a sense of self-sufficiency, which had, in fact, become a new round of development of statehood, expressed during the period of feudal fragmentation. The Lubech Congress of 1097 led to the formation of a number of sovereign principalities that assumed the obligation to "keep their ancestral lands."

At the same time, in the 11th century, the foundations of the modern state of interethnic relations of peoples whose ancestors lived in the neighborhood hundreds, thousands of years ago also took place. For example, in 2022 an important historical event was celebrated – the 1100th anniversary of the adoption of Islam by Volgian Bulgaria. The study of the cultural ties between Rus and Volgian Bulgaria is of interest for understanding the unique unity of the peoples of Russia connected by a common historical destiny. In Russian historical science, the issues of the relationship between Ancient Rus and Volgian Bulgaria were considered by such pre-revolutionary scientists as V.N. Karamzin, V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.M. Solovyov, V.N. Tatishchev, etc.

In the period of its existence before the Mongol conquest, Volgian Bulgaria had economic, political and cultural partnerships with Ancient Rus, despite the fact that military clashes also took place. L.N. Gumilev in his work "From Rus to Russia" notes: "the difference between the two ethnoses was not anthropological, not racial, and not even economic, because the economic systems in Volgian Bulgaria and Northeastern Rus

were very similar. These differences were religious. But religious Moslem fanaticism has not yet triumphed in Volgian Bulgaria, and faith served only as an indicator of the differences between the Volgian Bulgars and the Slavs[20]."

Russian scientific research notes that "the oldest known peace treaty between Volgian Bulgaria and Kievan Rus dates back to 985, which was the result of the campaign of Grand Duke Vladimir I against Volgian Bulgaria. After the first contact with a detachment of Bulgarian scouts, the prince decided that peace with these neighbors would bring more benefits than war[21]." Then "made peace Volodimer with the Bulgarians, if there is no peace between us, the stone will begin to float, and the hops will sink[22]." After that, the Bulgars made an offer to the Kiev prince to convert to Islam. In addition to contractual relations, according to sources, there were also examples of humanitarian support. Timely assistance was provided during the famine in the Russian lands in 1024. Something similar happened in 1229, when "Bulgarians, making peace, carried spring rye along the Volga and the Oka to all Russian cities and sold, and thus did a great help[23]." The Bulgarian prince made a necessary gift in this lean year, sending Yuri Vsevolodovich 30 boats of grain. This truly "generous gift", as an expression of goodwill, was appreciated: "... the great prince accepted with gratitude, and sent him cloth, brocades with gold and silver, fish bones and other elegant things[24]." Scientists cite examples from chronicle sources about the existence of "numerous colonies of Russians in Volgian Bulgaria and Bulgars on Russian territory[25]." Similar processes of mutual settlement of the Russian peoples and Bulgars continued during the Mongol rule, which influenced the emergence of similarities in culture and everyday life.

No less interesting are the Russian-Polovtsian relations. Beginning with a serious confrontation, they ended in union marriages between the Polovtsian khans and princes who used the power of the Polovtsian (Kipchak / steppe) troops in the conflagration of inter-princely feuds. As some proof, it is worth

noting that Mstislav Mstislavovich Udatny married the daughter of the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan Maria, who gave birth to Rostislava Mstislavovna, the future wife of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, the future mother of Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky.

In the history of the development of the territory of the ancient Russian lands, there was a difficult period associated with the reconnaissance invasion of Genghis Khan's hordes in 1223 and the subsequent large-scale invasion of Batu's hordes during his western campaign of 1237–1242. There is no single point of view among scientists on the nature and consequences of the relationship between Rus and the empire of Genghis Khan, and subsequently its part – the Golden Horde. However, recent research provides a completely different understanding[26] than the myth of exclusively negative influence planted by Soviet historiography[27]. It is worth noting that pre-revolutionary Russian scientists have repeatedly pointed out the benign contacts and processes that were launched as a result of the invasion itself and the further domination of the horde in Russia[28]. The subject of this study does not include a specific analysis of historical aspects and facts of mutual influence related to Russian-Horde relations – a traditional theme of Russian historiography. It is important for us to highlight the cultural and civilizational issues of intercultural and interreligious dialogue, its place and role in the development of Russia in the Golden Horde period.

The peoples who formed the basis of the empire of Genghis Khan, and later the Golden Horde, in the initial period represented a fairly wide ethno-religious spectrum, including Nestorians, pagans and Moslems. There were also conquered peoples which included followers of Judaism. The Catholic missions, which came of their own free will during their own intelligence mission and permanent representation in the Imperial capital, were small, but still took place. Even under Khan Berk, the Golden Horde elite was largely Moslemized. A little later, under the Uzbek Khan, the Golden Horde converted

to Islam. "The spread of Islam in the territory of the Golden Horde is associated with the names of sheikhs – adherents of the Sufi brotherhoods yasaviya and kubraviya. Their spiritual work within the framework of the traditional religiosity of the region has led to a positive attitude towards them by the state elite of the Golden Horde[29]."

The first contacts with the empire of Genghis Khan took place in the era of inter-princely feuds and, as a result, ended lamentably for many Ancient Russian princes. The main reason was the refusal to accept the terms of the peace treaty and the preference to provide military assistance to the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan against the hordes of Subede and Jebe, who invaded the Polovtsian lands by order of Genghis Khan and persecuted the Polovtsian Khan, as already noted above, to a related set of princely families. In one of the works of that time, "The Word about the destruction of the Russian land," although it does not have a full text, it is said about the contemporaries' understanding of the fullness of the existing threat and the results of the invasion of 1237–1240[30].

During the invasion of Genghis Khan's hordes on the territory of the Russian lands, Orthodoxy played an important unifying ideological and political role. During the siege and capture of Vladimir, Bishop Mitrofan assumed a special role of comforter and spiritual salvation. He perished together with those who took refuge in the Assumption Cathedral, the last refuge of the surviving citizens. Somewhat later, and finding it necessary to emphasize the lack of authority among the princely elites, Serapion of Vladimir in his Speech expressed general indignation at the disunity of the princes in the face of the threat of complete destruction[31]. The result of the invasion was, on the one hand, political dependence on the will of the khan's power of the golden Genghis Khan family, on the other hand, the introduction of a coherent system of inheritance of princely rights.

It is worth emphasizing that this period was quite difficult, from the point of view of the security of Russian lands. Thus,

historical facts are known about the ban on Catholic states to trade with Russian cities, announced by Popes Honorius III and Gregory IX. The Livonian Order, which aimed to advance to Russia, created a real threat almost at the borders of Novgorod. As a result, the Orthodox faith in Rus was really threatened by Western Catholicism. In this regard, the correspondence of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky with papal Rome, containing not so much the existing real desires to accept Catholicism, but rather political cunning and pragmatism in the event of violation of existing agreements on princely rights that had yet to be obtained in Karakorum, the capital of the Mongolian Empire[32]. The victory on Lake Peipsi did not stop Rome's plans, and in 1256 a "crusade" was declared against the Orthodox and Tatars, implying Orthodox Rus and the Horde. In this regard, it is necessary to note the role of Alexander Nevsky, who, unlike Daniel Galitsky, made a choice in favor of an alliance with the Mongols, in order to resist the Crusaders. And in this regard, the turn towards the search for military protection from the Horde was the salvation from the Western threat that Northeastern Russia took advantage of. One of the historical consequences of this turn to the East was the division of Rus as a result of the policy of Daniil Romanovich Galitsky, who finally adopted the Latin faith and, as a result, whose family was unable to resist the onslaught from the West, and thus marked the subsequent entry of Southern Russia into the Lithuanian state and so on.

The Mongol-Tatar invasion of the 13th century, as the researchers note, despite the military devastation, was not accompanied by religious oppression[33]. The Church made full use of the opportunities as a powerful political and ideological institution during the period of the Horde rule, which allowed it to significantly strengthen its spiritual authority[34]. The researchers cite documentary evidence of the toleration of the Golden Horde khans: "The Khans under death penalty forbade their subjects to rob, disturb monasteries[35]." It is clear that the

rhetoric of religious tolerance and real political practice did not always coincide, but the axiology of Russian statehood was formed in difficult conditions of the struggle for existence, and the Golden Horde period is part of Russian history, which does not exclude cultural mutual influence and Christian–Moslem dialogue.

Indeed, despite the results of the invasion, Orthodox monasteries and churches continued to be preserved in the cities of Vladimir and Kievan Rus. The fact is that according to the Yassa of Genghis Khan, the basic law of the Mongol Empire and the basis for subsequent legislative acts of the Golden Horde, religious tolerance was declared throughout the Empire with the condition of a positive attitude of religions to the khan's power. The first in the new era of the Horde rule in Rus, the Russian metropolitan, of Slavic origin, Kirill II (III), being a protege of Daniel Romanovich Galitsky, realizing the hopelessness of his staying in Kiev, directed his ministry to the court of the Vladimir princes, which gained him the opportunity to further strengthen his own authority. Most likely, he did not receive the proper blessing and installation in Nicaea (due to the impossibility in 1251 to make such a journey through the territory of Byzantium, conquered by the Latins), only the khan's edict confirmed the latter's right to the metropolitan cathedra.

Also of particular interest is the influence the church-Horde contacts had on Byzantium. "In 1263 [1261 – *author's note*] under Khan Berk (ruled in 1257–1266), the first Moslem khan, a new Orthodox bishopric was opened in Sarai, the capital of the Horde, called Sarskaya[36]." It was the Sarai Bishopric that became, on the one hand, the diplomatic representation of Byzantium, which was on the verge of death after the Latin strike, on the other hand, the representation of the Old Russian metropolitans in the khan's headquarters[37] and another confirmation of the tolerant policy of the Golden Horde. For Byzantium, the results of the opening and possible negotiations were confidence in the security of the eastern borders and the possibility of the return of

the previously abandoned territories by Byzantium by military means and restoration to the former borders, which was done in the same 1261[38].

The first of a number of surviving khan edicts given to Russian metropolitans dates back to 1267, although, apparently, edicts were issued to them earlier[39]. Unfortunately, only a few khan edicts have been preserved in the entire history of Russian-Horde relations, which granted the church special privileges and protection from encroachment by both the Horde and representatives of the princely family. Of course, this brought the Old Russian church to a new higher level, equal to the princely house. The subsequent growth of both the influence of the Orthodox Church and its economic power did not take long to wait. Even in the 14th century, one can note the active unprecedented monastic construction (about 200 monasteries were founded), while aiming deep into the territories, sometimes occupying the best princely lands, becoming trading and inns on important strategic roads, including at the entrance to the cities of Northeastern Rus[40].

The adoption of Islam by the Golden Horde did not affect the previous agreements and the khans continued to issue preferential and protective edicts for the first hierarchs of Rus. Rather, it is also a consequence of the presence in the Islamic canons of the principles of a benevolent attitude towards the people of Scripture, to which Christians also belonged. "The Holy Quran specifically identifies Christians as "people of Scripture" and even as "the closest in spirit to Moslems.[41]" Many Russian researchers note the strengthening of Orthodoxy in Rus during the period of the Golden Horde's power. The famous Russian scientist N.M. Karamzin, noting the negative factors of the Golden Horde period, at the same time sees the positive sides of the Yoke for Russia: "One of the memorable consequences of the Tatar domination over Rus was the rise of our Clergy, the growth of the number of Monks and church estates[42]," the historian notes. Eurasian scientists Vernadsky G.V., Savitsky P.N., Trubetskoy N.S.

adhered to the position of the significant influence of the Golden Horde on the formation and development of the Moscow state.

L.N. Gumilev in the book "Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe" formulated the following point of view: "No, of course, the Mongols were not good-natured! They could not do otherwise, because on all three fronts – the Chinese, the Near-Asian and the Cuman-Russian – they were opposed by forces that significantly exceeded them in numbers and armament. Another thing is important: the collision of different fields of attitude always generates a violent reaction – excessive passionaries, bearers of different traditions[43]."

In the subsequent 15th century, when Russian lands united around the Moscow Principality, the destinies of Moslem rulers intersected with service in the cavalry regiments of the Russian army, marriages, kinship and family relations. An important historical conclusion is that despite the long Golden Horde period in the history of Russia, the Russian Church has not only survived, but due to the Horde patronage has strengthened its position and authority among its own flock, and thanks to a kind of missionary activity designed mainly for the elite, it has also spread spiritual and cultural influence on certain groups of the weakening Golden Horde, namely, parts of the military-serving Tatars who joined the service of the Moscow sovereign. In the process of creating a Russian centralized state (the second half of the 14th century – the first half of the 16th century), not only the unification of lands took place, but also the state cultural and civilizational foundations were formed, which absorbed the best achievements of western and eastern cultures.

Despite the ongoing princely internecine strife during this period, nevertheless, the Russian Orthodox Church personified and supported the unity of the world. During this period there occurred a weakening and then the fall of Constantinople, which meant the end of Byzantine rule and the strengthening of the Roman Church. In 1439, the Florentine Union was signed – an agreement between representatives of the Catholic and Orthodox

Churches on the terms of recognition of the supremacy of the Pope over all Christians in exchange for promised assistance in repelling the Ottoman aggression against Byzantium. The Union did not come into force either in Byzantium or in Russia, although Metropolitan Isidore of Moscow put his signature under it[44]. In another literary monument – "The Tale of the Capture of Constantinople" there is already a hint about the future liberation of Constantinople by the Russian people and about the transition of the historical greatness of Byzantium to Rus[45]. The idea of helping Constantinople was developed by various Greek and other Orthodox theologians. This, in particular, was written by Maxim the Greek[46], who, like many Orthodox figures of the Balkans, found his permanent residence in Russia. Historical events have created prerequisites for the interpenetration of various cultural spaces. The Ferraro-Florentine union with the Catholic world was eventually rejected by Rus, which became the only independent state where Orthodoxy was recognized as the official religion.

Evidence of the strengthening of the power of the Moscow Grand Principality in the 16th century was that the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch appealed to the Russian tsar for support. "At the beginning of 1509, monks arrived in the Moscow Principality with a message from all the Athos monasteries, in which there were calls to defeat "foreign languages", namely, Moslems. Envoys from Serbia also came.[47]"

Historically, the Moscow Grand Prince has become the only pillar in the defense of Orthodoxy and Rome is moving to Russia as a country of true Orthodox Christianity. During this period, the idea of the Byzantine inheritance exerted an increasing influence on the ideological foundations of the political elites. The legend about the cultural and religious nature of the origin of the Rurik dynasty dates back to about this time. According to the researchers, this fictional fact "allowed to raise the status of the Rurik dynasty in the international arena, which Ivan the Terrible needed in the conditions of an acute struggle with the

separatists for the centralization and strengthening of Russia's international authority[48]." The symbolic act of confirming the origin of the Russian princes from the Byzantine emperors and their monarchical power, since the 15th century, was the "Monomakh cap" as the royal crown[49].

Strengthening of the political independence of the Moscow Principality influenced the fact that the Russian Church received the status of its own patriarchate independent from the Ecumenical See of Constantinople. "At the stage of origin (the end of the 15th century), the theory of "Moscow – the third Rome" had a religious content. Metropolitan Zosima in the "Presentation of the Paschal", speaking about the end of the world and calling on compatriots to become true Christians, called Moscow "the new Jerusalem[50]".

The religious circles of Moscow began to compare the Grand Prince of Moscow with the Byzantine Emperor Constantine. Subsequently, Moscow was compared with the "new Rome[51]", which was quite in line with the old myth about the origin of one of the founders of Russian statehood – Rurik from the Roman Augustus-Caesar[52]. In turn, the dynastic marriage of Ivan III with the Byzantine Princess Sophia Palaiologos and the offer of Rome to become the heir to the Byzantine throne, as well as the constant financial support of the Patriarchal Court of Constantinople gave every reason for the development of political ideas of an ecumenical and messianic nature. At the beginning of the 16th century Vasily III, the son of Sophia Palaiologos, by carrying out direct contacts with the Greeks, supported their hope of liberation from Ottoman rule with the help of Moscow[53].

It seems that this doctrine goes beyond only the religious aspect. The establishment of the patriarchate in Moscow had an important foreign policy significance (it also brought the Moscow state closer to the status of the Byzantine World Empire), as well as in general to strengthen the centralized power of the Moscow Principality. Since that historical moment Russian tsar's

legitimacy has been sanctified not by the ecumenical church hierarch, but by the Russian patriarch l. In addition, it violated Poland's plans to approve its own patriarch in Kiev. It should be borne in mind that during this period church and political relations were closely intertwined, influencing each other[54]." In the 14th–16th centuries, Russian Orthodoxy asserted itself in a dispute with the See of Constantinople, claiming to universal nature and to the highest hierarchy in the East. This has become a tradition that persists to this day.

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and in the Black Sea basin gave new cultural features to the Russian identity. The Russian Orthodox Church, which has already entered into direct competition with Rome, trying to keep up with it, tried to give its activities the character of a "holy struggle" against the infidel "Hagarites[55]" and Islam and in defense of all Eastern Christians. In particular, it was also a reaction to the mass and violent conversion of Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Georgians and others to Islam carried out by the Ottoman Empire. This testified that the Russian Church sought to take a leading place not only in the Moscow state, but also in the Orthodox world.

Establishment of the Patriarchate in Moscow at the end of the 16th century inspired religious philosophers and political publicists even more. They began to develop the idea of "moving" Byzantium and the "holy land" to the territory of Russia, at the same time pursuing the idea that Russia has now become the main concentration of ecumenical Orthodoxy. Finally, at the beginning of the 17th century the theological and ideological idea, cultivated for several centuries in the Russian national consciousness, gets into a government document[56], that is, it was the beginning of its transformation into an official foreign policy ideology. This happened during the reign of Boris Godunov and not without his participation. His uncle Dmitry Godunov sent to the monasteries church books, where it was said that they were made "in the God–forsaken and pre-venerated

and in the reigning city of Moscow - in the third Rome, blooming with piety[57]." The political and religious doctrine "Moscow – the Third Rome", which arose in Russia in the 16th century, is of growing interest among historians to the present time.

The material "transfer" of Byzantium to Russian soil also continued. The well–known religious and political figure Patriarch Nikon not only began the process of returning the Russian Orthodox Church to its "pure" origins – he rewrote religious texts, comparing them with the Greek originals. He literally began to build a New Jerusalem near Moscow, repeating in detail the famous Temple over the "Holy Sepulchre" in the Holy Land of Jerusalem[58]. It was then that Moscow abandoned the myth of the Caesar (that is, the Roman Caesars. – *A. Z.*) origin of Rurik. A new mythological version was developed about the lineage of the Russian princes directly from the biblical heroes. As a result, national identity involves more than just rivalry with the Empire. Now we are talking about claims to the very origins of human civilization in the Christian interpretation.

Conclusion

The religious foundations of the formation of the Russian centralized state are an important component of the national identification of Russian society. For the Russian state, the question of civilizational identity has a deep meaning in conditions when representatives of the "collective West" openly declare their goals to destroy Russia as a competitor. Despite the objective process of changes in socio-cultural dynamics, especially during periods of acute world upheavals leading to the violation of the historical foundations of the unity of peoples, the axiological basis of civilizational identity remains and is an important bond of the unity of society. In this regard, it is very important to develop an understanding of the role and place of dialogue in the historical process of forming a multinational Russian state.

Notes

1. *Putin V.V.* Speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club // http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69695

2. *Zadokhin A.G.* The national idea of Russia in the historical aspect // http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=238291&soch=1

3. Speech of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin at the XVIII meeting of the International Discussion Club "Valdai", 2022 // http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975

4. *Sadykova E.L.* Intercivilizational dialogue in modern international relations: theoretical and practical aspects: Thesis DS (Politology): 23.00.04 // http://dlib.rsl.ru

5. In the 10th–11th centuries, the gold-sparkling, porphyry-bearing Byzantium was the cultural metropolis of the world, in relation to which Western Europe, the product of the assimilation by the barbarians of the fragments of the Roman Empire, was the backyard. This circumstance has been repeatedly reflected in the works, see: Orthodox Palestinian Collection. 31st (94th) issue. Publication of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. Moscow, 1992. P. 64; *Le Goff Jacques.* The civilization of the medieval West. M., 1992. P. 27, 35, 140.

6. See: *Petrukhin V.Ya.* The beginning of the ethnocultural history of Russia. Smolensk, 1995. P. 49–50, 69.

7. Cit. by: *Likhachev D.S.* National self-consciousness of Ancient Rus. M., 1945. P. 19.

8. It is not surprising that these historical circumstances aroused particular interest in the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, who noted the high role of the baptism of Rus in the creation of a centralized state and the subsequent interreligious unity and harmony established at the 1000th anniversary. See: Speech of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the feast of the Baptism of Rus and the Day of memory on the occasion of the 1000th anniversary of the repose of Grand Prince Vladimir // https://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/73343

9. *Vernadsky G.V.* Russian History. Textbook. – "Agraf", 1997. P. 41.

10. The above mentioned work. P. 42.

11. Full Collection of Russian Chronicles. V.1. Col.109-116; *Tolochko P.P.* The place and time of the baptism and canonization of Vladimir Svyatoslavich // VV. M., 2011. 70(95). P. 92–93.

12. History of diplomacy. In 3 vols. / edited by V.P. Potemkin. M., 1941. Vol. 1. P. 120.

13. *Likhachev D.S.* National identity of Ancient Rus // https://statehistory.ru/books/Natsionalnoe-samosoznanie-Drevney-Rusi/3

14. *Gaidenko P.I.* The place of the Metropolitan of Kiev in the system of political relations of Kievan Rus (988-1037): dissertation Candidate of Historical

Sciences Kazan, 2005. P. 145–151; *Galimov T.R.* Kiev Metropolitans between Russia and the Horde (the second half of the 13th century) / *T.R. Galimov*; Institute of History named after Sh. Marjani of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan. – Kazan: Institute of History named after Sh. Marjani of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, 2019. P. 91–93.

15. *Teronovsky F.A.* Participation of Ancient Russian bishops in public affairs (during the apanage-veche). Kiev, 1870.

16. *Gaidenko P.I.* Episcopal trips in Pre-Mongol Russia: more on the mechanisms of church governance. ... P. 43–44.

17. *Shchapov Ya.N.* Princely charters and the Church in Ancient Rus 11th–14th centuries. M., 1972; *Shchapov Ya.N.* Old Russian princely charters 11th–15th centuries M., 1976.

18. *Peter (Gaidenko), hieromonk.* Were the episcopate and clergy of Kievan Rus feudal lords? // Orthodoxy in the fate of the Urals and Russia: History and modernity: materials of the All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference (Yekaterinburg, April 18–20, 2010) / ed. V.V. Alekseev. Yekaterinburg, 2010. P. 85–89.

19. *Gumilev L.N.* Ancient Rus and the Great Steppe. – Moscow: Iris-Press, 2011. P. 140.

20. *Gumilev L.* From Rus to Russia // https://knijky.ru/books/ot-rusi-k-rossii

21. *Mukhamadiev A.R.* Volgian Bulgaria and Russia: legal support of interests. (10th – beginning of 13th) // History of State and Law. 2012. No. 15. P. 40.

22. Ibid. P. 40.

23. Ibid. P. 41.

24. *Tatishchev V.N.* Russian History. Vol. 3. P. 225 // https://librebook.me/istoriia_rossiiskaia__chast_2/vol37/1

25. *Fakhrutdinov R.G.* Essays on the history of Volgian Bulgaria: Moscow: Nauka, 1984. P. 91.

26. *Trepavlov V.V.* "Russian ulus" of the Golden Horde / V.V. Trepavlov // Russian History. – 2021. – No. 1. – P. 3–15; *Trepavlov V.V.* Russia and nomadic steppes: the problem of Eastern borrowings in Russian Statehood // East. 1994. No. 2. P. 49–62 ; *Pochekaev R.Y.* The Kings of the Horde. Biographies of Khans and rulers of the Golden Horde. SPb., 2010; *Trepavlov V.V.* The Golden Horde in the 14th century. Moscow, 2010; *Enikeev G.R.* Shihab Kitapchy. Tartar Heritage. M., 2012; *Gorsky A.A.* "The Russian land is full of all kinds of things...": Personality and mentality of the Russian Middle Ages: Essays. M., 2001; *Danilevsky I.N.* Russian lands through the eyes of contemporaries and descendants (12th–14th centuries). M., 2001; *Danilevsky I.N.* Ancient Rus through the eyes of contemporaries and descendants (9th–12th centuries). M., 1998; *Podskalsky G.* Christianity and theological

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27. Such myth-making follows from the unconditional following of quoting the works of K. Marx. Alas, in his essay "Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century" Marx touched upon the issues of Russian-Horde relations and the legacy of the Horde, which eventually became the main leitmotif of all fundamental Soviet research on the subject. It is worth noting that the text of the essay itself is far from the norms of scientific research, it has rather a journalistic character, for example, "The cradle of Muscovy was the bloody swamp of Mongol slavery, and not the harsh glory of the Norman era. And modern Russia is nothing but a transformed Muscovy." (Marx K. Revelations of the diplomatic history of the 18th century // Questions of History. No. 4. 1989. P. 5; Marx Karl. Secret diplomatic history of 18th century. London, 1899. P. 77). Surprisingly, even in 1989, during the era of perestroika, this essay was published for the first time, but in the editorial office of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism with additional explanations, for example, "Marx meant...": Marx K. Revelations of the diplomatic history of the 18th century // Questions of history. No. 1–4 for 1989. 68 p. Wed.: Marx Karl. Secret diplomatic history of eigtheen century. London, 1899. 96 p.

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