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CONTENT

MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

Yuri Zinin. The Situation in Ukraine during Russia SMO Period through the Prism of the Middle Eastern Media	5
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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

Kanybek Kudayarov. Scientific and Educational Policy of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan	23
Valeria Dyachenko. The Emergence and Development of the Radical Islamist Movement in Central Asia: Causes, Internal and External Factors of Feeding.....	32
Gozal Sharipova. Comparative Study of the Policy of Religious Tolerance in the State Systems of Malaysia and Uzbekistan.....	44

ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Vladimir Kirichenko. Iranian Azerbaijan: Past and Present	57
Olga Bibikova. "Non-Citizens" in the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula.....	71
Elena Dmitrieva, Valentina Schensnovich. Problems of Grain Supply to Developing Countries in the Conditions of SMO	89
Swetlana Pogorelskaya. Moslems in Germany: is Radicalization Possible?	96

**THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS**

Igor Dobaev. Islam and Islamism: General and Special Approaches to Understanding the Term "Islamism"	113
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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

YURI ZININ. THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE DURING RUSSIA
SMO PERIOD THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE MIDDLE
EASTERN MEDIA

*Keywords: Russia; SMO; Ukraine;
Kiev; Arabs; Near East; mass media;
communications; reaction.*

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*Abstract. The article is devoted to the analysis and assessment of
the events around Ukraine in the Middle East means of communication,
both governmental and conditionally independent after the start of the
SMO. The author analyzes the responses and reactions in the media and
the virtual space, which to a certain extent indicate the search for ways
to fix their attitude to the Ukrainian dossier without pressure from the*

West, primarily the United States. It is obvious that the leaders of the countries of the region are unwilling to be drawn into the political games under the slogans of democracy that are being waged by the West around Ukraine and to distance themselves from supporting it in this conflict. Such approaches are determined by the national interests of the states and elites of the Middle East, which are realized in the light of new realities in the region and at the global level. The materials of the local mass media indicate that, despite the ambiguity of the positions of countries regarding the Ukrainian dossier, there is a demand in the Arab world for Russia not to lose its role as an alternative partner in the spheres of politics, economics, and international affairs in general.

The events in Ukraine, especially after the start of the SMO of Russia on February 24, 2022, caused a wide resonance in the media and virtual space of the Middle East. Officially, most Arab states have taken a moderate, reserved stance on the crisis in Ukraine, objecting to military methods of solving problems, states the influential Arab website Elaf. Arabic officialdom is careful in its wording, calling on the parties to dialogue and more intensive use of diplomatic tools.¹

Monitoring of the media space shows that the United States and its allies want to force the authorities of the Middle Eastern countries to follow their policy in Ukraine and exert strong pressure through various channels, including political, informational and cyberspace. There is a difference of opinion between authors in the region who are influenced by the mainstream imposed by Western media and those who tend to distance themselves from the *PR* campaign against Russia.

We can talk about the attention of the Arab media to the key narrative of the Western media. They present the conflict in Ukraine as a “battle between the democracy of the West and the autocracy of Russia”: At the same time, they argue about the “universalism” of this democracy as opposed to authoritarian regimes and dictatorships in different regions of the world, including the Middle East.

This thesis is widely echoed in the region for a number of reasons. Firstly, the theme of the place of democracy, the role of the media in Arab societies is relevant and debatable. Secondly, Arab analysts find a number of parallels between the course of the West in Ukraine and in their region.

The authors identify democracy with the basic basis and tools of the foreign policy of the West. They note that it was under the guise of the moral imperatives of European civilization that wars and interventions were waged in the East. In Libya and Iraq – under the banner of the struggle against dictatorships. In Afghanistan – in the name of “protecting the world” from terrorism, human rights, etc.²

The imposition of democratic principles according to Western patterns in Arab countries in recent years led, as a rule, to the victory of Islamic or pro-Islamic forces in “free elections”, their subsequent seizure of power and various cataclysms, which was demonstrated by the events of the “Arab Spring”.

The imposition of democratic principles according to Western patterns in Arab countries in recent years, as a rule, led to the victory of Islamic or pro-Islamic forces in “free elections”, their subsequent seizure of power and various cataclysms, which was demonstrated by the events of the “Arab Spring”.

The reaction of the influential Saudi newspaper Okaz, which finds similarities between these events and the conflict in Ukraine, is indicative; the West, from the very beginning, according to it, acted on the basis of local ultranationalists. It nurtured and financed them in the same way as he did in the case of the Moslem Brotherhood in the Middle East with an eye to push it against the local legitimate authorities.³

Monitoring responses in the media says that experts point to clear miscalculations of Ukrainian leadership, which has lost its sovereignty due to subordination to the United States and the West. Otherwise, Ukraine would not have gone along with the foreign powers that supply her with weapons and push against her huge neighbor, the Algerian political scientist concludes.

Instead, Ukraine could profitably use Russia's vast natural resources for its development.⁴

Much attention is paid to the assessments of the policy and behavior of the head of the Kiev regime V. Zelensky, broadcast in the media. "The authorities put an actor who plays the role written for him. A person who is far from the great corridors of power, from world politics with all its subtleties, was simply deceived. He has clearly missed, not realizing that the Western powers traditionally do not give anything for free to their clients."⁵ "This Ukrainian president threw his people under the sight of Russian fire... He thought that he was playing the main role in this battle, not realizing that its directors and arbitrators are figures from America and the countries of the West, Europe. They watch as he leads his army and people to destruction. The result was the flight of millions of Ukrainians from the disasters of war to neighboring countries, the suffering of the civilian population from devastation, chaos and hostilities," states the largest Arab portal Elaf.⁶

A considerable number of Arab analysts are united by the understanding circumstances in which the Russian Federation operates, its sensitivity and attitude to protect its vital interests. They refer to the history of Moscow's relations with the West. The anti-Russian phobia the West is now inflating reminds Russia of the bitter experience of the past, the invasions against it: from Napoleon to Hitler from its western borders. The enmity of Western Europe towards Russia is not new, it is caused not by political, but mainly by historical, strategic factors, including the belief of Europeans in their civilizational and cultural superiority.

This forces the Kremlin to act in such a way as to protect itself from any surprises. "The West," as the Egyptian Mamoun Fandi, a professor at Georgetown University, noted, "paved the way for the crisis in Ukraine, relying militarily on NATO expansion, and ideologically on using democracy to cover up attempts at regime change. This prompted the Russian

Federation to conduct a military operation to protect its vitally important space.”⁷

According to the Libyan edition, “elementary sanity and a sense of self-preservation required action in opposition to Ukraine's accession to NATO. Despite threats of harsh sanctions and other risks, Moscow's long-term gains are far greater than what it could lose.”⁸

It is appropriate to note that the events in Ukraine, especially after the start of the SMO, opened the eyes of many local experts and politicians to the double standards of the West in such a matter as the freedom and pluralism of its media advertised by it. “The conflict in Ukraine has revealed the falsity of the statements of Western news agencies, claiming to become a model for the independent and free functioning of communications in the world,” sums up the Iraqi publicist. They covered themselves with shame, as they forced out or silenced voices opposed to the dominant mainstream, blocked content from Russia and those who spoke in the West in support of Moscow's positions and policies.”⁹

The media emphasize the fact that in order to get to the truth, unbiased analysts need to break through the dense veil of lies and fabrications spread about the situation in Ukraine. The West threw all the power of its information conglomerate against Russia into this.

In this regard, the materials of the Arab website Misbar, which since 2019 has been specializing in exposing fraud and falsification in networks, are indicative. It identified many such cases in relation to Russia's actions in Ukraine. Among them, in particular, posted pictures of houses “burnt by the Russian army in the city of Sumy.” According to Misbar, this is nothing but a media photo taken on February 2, 2020 after a fire in the city of Irshava in Transcarpathia.¹⁰ “Obviously,” reports the Al-Khalij newspaper (UAE), that a number of photos cited by Kiev as evidence of “war crimes” are a montage.”¹¹

"V. Zelensky, the Iraqi newspaper emphasizes, in his bravura reports about the "victories of the army" sings along with the West in order to beg for new supplies of weapons. His disinformation is designed for Western PR people who grab onto it to justify NATO's "unshakable" support for Kiev... Soledar fell, it was this city that became Russia's key to Bakhmut, and from there to the entire Donbass."¹² **Arab authors** believe that there was a shift in the special operation in Ukraine in favor of Moscow, which shook the political designs of the West.

The Emirates newspaper called the transfer of Bakhmut (Artemovsk) under the control of the Russian army "an achievement of Russia, which will then transfer the battles to larger regions such as Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. The surrender of the city was a big blow to the morale of the Ukrainian army and the political defeat of Ukraine, which insisted on continuing the fighting to the last drop of blood. Therefore, this Ukrainian defeat may lead to other losses of Kiev on the fronts, and its cities will consistently fall like dominoes."¹³

Moscow's recent successes on the battlefield have caused confusion in the decision-making centers of the West, and the delivery of modern weapons to Kiev has not changed the course of the fighting. The propaganda hype raised by the superiority of Leopard tanks, Challengers, other types of weapons and their ability to miraculously change the balance of power and the course of battles in favor of Kiev causes skepticism among military experts in the Middle East region. Experts realistically evaluate the combat qualities of Western weapons in comparison with their counterparts in the Russian military-industrial complex. The Egyptian edition speaks highly of the characteristics of the new Russian tank "Armata" and recalls that Russia has the largest tank fleet on the planet, which accounts for 18 per cent of their number in the world.¹⁴

The media in the region also criticize the attempts of the Western information services to inflate the subject of the suffering of Ukrainians, the drama of refugees. These same services, the

region notes, have for years and decades ignored the calamities that have befallen millions of Palestinians and other Arabs as a result of wars with the participation or connivance of the West. Today they have turned away from resolving these acute conflicts and switched to Ukraine, fanning a new fire in it.

The information space reminds that Ukraine was an accomplice of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. The former deputy chairman of the Union of Journalists of Iraq, D. Farkhan, referred to the fact that Ukrainian servicemen, participants in that war and occupation, were convicted of using torture against civilians, as well as prisoners in Iraqi prisons with the connivance of the US command.¹⁵

Sanctions against Russia: a view from the Middle East

Another notable media theme in the region is the consequences of sanctions against Russia, the shadow of which falls on the political landscape in it. We must not forget that a number of Arab countries have their own experience of living under Western sanctions. They have damaged their economies and caused suffering and death of civilians in Libya, Iraq and Syria. According to the Bahraini researcher Muhammad Sayad, "legal circles remind that in the case of the Arabs, as in the case of Russia, we are talking about unilateral restrictions that contradict the letter and spirit of the UN Charter."¹⁶

Anti-Russian sanctions have rebounded on their initiators in the US and the West. And those, according to Arab authors, are not averse to shifting their costs to the countries of the developing world, including the Arab ones.

The consequences of the conflict in Ukraine and anti-Russian sanctions for the oil and gas sector, fuel supplies and prices are especially significant. After the start of the SMO, the United States and its allies tried to persuade the Middle Eastern countries to increase hydrocarbon production so that the latter would reimburse Russian supplies, against which restrictions were

introduced. Until now, these efforts have not been successful and have not met with the support of the Arabs, who were guided primarily by their economic, social and geopolitical interests.

At the same time, the key suppliers of this raw material consider their energy reserves to be a “rare force”. According to a publicist from the UAE, “the Russian leader used this power perfectly in the interests of his country, and it would be useful for the Arabs to take advantage of this lesson.”¹⁷

The latter motivates Arab producers of raw materials to act together, in particular within the framework of OPEC and OPEC +, which creates the ground for joint actions with Russia. “We and the OPEC+ group have faced difficult challenges and have come out of them more united than before,” summed up Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman in the summer of 2022. “This means that stability in supply and balance in the markets will remain the strategy that the group will follow in the short and long term.”¹⁸

The prince's statement was not a PR move. Thus, on October 5, 2022, OPEC+ decided to reduce oil production by 2 million barrels, starting November 2022. The move drew an angry backlash from the US. They blamed OPEC for rising energy prices, accusing it of “playing along” with Russia’s SMO.

Saudi Arabia, the leader of the cartel, was attacked with a series of threats. Its organizers called Riyadh the initiator of the OPEC + decision, accused it of spurring “inflation in America in collusion with Russia.”

They started talking about the adoption of the “dormant” bill on NOPEC, presented to Congress two decades ago. If approved, Washington could bring charges against foreign governments that would be stripped of their sovereign immunity in US courts.

As it can be seen, this campaign of intimidation did not achieve its effect. In early April 2023, the OPEC+ group of countries agreed to voluntarily cut oil production by 1.66 million barrels per day by the end of 2023. Commenting on the developments, the Algerian press indicated that “today the alliance has become stronger than ever,

getting rid of external pressure and strengthening the spirit of solidarity among its members, especially the Arab states.”¹⁹

The media cut of the events in Ukraine shows that the Arab countries, especially the oil-producing countries, were apprehensive about the West's course of setting a price ceiling for Russian oil on world markets. A number of local media outlets have warned that a similar attempt to harm Russia could then spread to other regimes that the West labels as “autocratic.”

The Middle East is also extremely annoyed that Western mentors, who for centuries preached to others their rules of free market and trade, and now are violating the most sacred right to private property and competition.

How firmly the Arabs will defend their sovereign interests and adhere to the line taken depends on a number of factors. The authorities of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and other monarchies, apparently, are satisfied with the very comfortable prices for hydrocarbons that have developed now, after the start of the crisis in Ukraine.

Raised fees from oil are in the interests of the authorities, carrying out reforms in line with modernization programs. This is important for stability in the Gulf countries and strengthening the authority of the current ruling regimes and elites. But they will have to increase the cost of importing food products, primarily grain, as well as industrial products and equipment.

In the Arab world, with the imposition of sanctions against Moscow, there are arising fears associated with a violation of the supply chains of goods, especially food, caused by the consequences of sanctions against the Russian Federation.

Arab countries are major food importers. Through imports, they satisfy 63 per cent of the demand for grain, 65 per cent for sugar, and 55 per cent for vegetable oil. 42 per cent of their needs in grain were provided by purchases in Russia, 40 per cent – in Ukraine. Among the importers of Russian wheat in 2020, Turkey was in the group of leaders – 9 million tons, Egypt – 8.3 million tons, Saudi Arabia – 3.1 million tons.²⁰

Iraq's needs range from 4 to 5 million tons of grain, while local producers can provide no more than 3 million tons. Iraq imports part of the grain from Russia and Ukraine.²¹ Russia is also a flagship among fertilizer producers, especially nitrogen fertilizers. Already before the start of the conflict, their prices were at record highs, affecting overall food security.

According to observers, the rise in inflation, which is currently taking place in Europe, will inevitably spread to the Middle East region, pushing up consumer prices. This aggravates the consequences of the external debt of a number of countries, primarily Egypt and Tunisia.

In the regional media, there is concern about violations in the supply chains of goods, especially food. This concern could also affect the tourism sector, an important source of foreign exchange earnings in a number of Arab countries. All this is fraught with food shortages, famine, outbreaks of social discontent, and political destabilization.

Local analysts are also wary of the freezing of assets of Russian entrepreneurs abroad, since Arab finances are also in the United States and other parts of the West in the form of dollars as reserves, investments, etc. "Their owners," the Arab financial expert warns, "should understand that the risks of devaluation or seizure of such assets in their places of residence are high. It is clear here is an experiment by Washington and its allies, who are taking over other people's finances without having any legal or moral rights to do so."²²

The Arab media are alarmed by reports of the confiscation of funds of Russian businessmen who sponsor football clubs in the UK. According to the Egyptian publication, "nothing will prevent a similar operation with British clubs, in particular Manchester City and Newcastle United, which are financed by citizens of Saudi Arabia or the Emirates. In this case, the author claims, one can speak of the law of the jungle, and businessmen in the Middle East will think a hundred times before investing in Europe or the US in the future."²³ A number of political scientists

and economists in the Middle East region are calling on compatriots and the authorities to learn lessons in connection with the possible consequences for them from the financial and economic sanctions adopted by the Western world against Russia at various levels after the start of the SMO. "They," according to Iraqi scholar Dr. Abdullah Al-Badri, "are the product of the Western network economy system in the world. Outwardly, this system only seems to be some kind of example that promotes international cooperation and trade exchange, but in reality it is an instrument of Western control over the economy and finance ... Anyone who gets involved in it with their economy, in the event of a conflict with the West, will face a "powerful earthquake".²⁴ The Iraqi scholar also talks about the collapse of the concept of human rights, because Western governments have decided to seize the property and freeze the financial assets of people from the Russian Federation without carrying out the necessary judicial procedures.

An analysis of the events in Ukraine and their reflection in the virtual space shows that there is a further strengthening of the role of social networks, which involve a huge number of consumers in the region and which have become for them a window into the world of information and its exchange. According to Bubacravina, a blogger from Morocco, "the picture here is mosaic, it reflects the fusion of political and ideological preferences with the moods of the "Arab street", its emotions. A lot of arrows of criticism of the events in Ukraine fly towards the United States and its allies - much more than against Russia".²⁵ Today, undoubtedly, a Lebanese author believes, "President V. Putin wants to restore Russia's global role as the 'heir of the Soviet Union', and this in itself is what the Russian people want, and now we see that Putin's foreign policy enjoys the support of the majority of Russians."²⁶

An opinion is being expressed that the Arab masses, their cultural elites are disposed to Russia against Ukraine. This, in particular, is explained by the hostility of the Arabs towards the West because of its support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Hence the positive attitude towards Moscow in its conflict with Kiev. Merwan Al-Muashshar, former Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan, agrees with this, calling the position of the Arab society "retaliation against the United States and President Zelensky for his pro-Israeli statements and actions."²⁷ "We have been subjected to more than a century of oppression by the West, suffered from its interference with our affairs," emphasized the former Minister of Education of Bahrain A.M. Fakhru, – and today it is important that the fire fanned by this force does not burn us, the Arabs.²⁸ "Whatever the position of the governments of the countries of the Middle East, the peoples of the region for the most part understand Russians more than Ukraine for many factors, the most notable of which is that they see Russia as a close ally, as opposed to the West, especially the United States," admits the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al-Arab."²⁹

In social networks, the facts of open discrimination and double standards on the part of the Ukrainian police in relation to foreigners, primarily citizens of Arab and African countries, during the evacuation of refugees from Ukraine to the territory of neighboring states, were perceived extremely painfully. Bloggers and network activists position themselves as defenders of the rights of their compatriots who have been violated by the behavior of the Kiev authorities.

At the same time, one cannot ignore articles of anti-Russian content on the conflict in Ukraine that appear in various organs of a number of Arab countries. As a rule, they are written by the same composition of authors, most likely fulfilling an ideological order. The theses and arguments they use, are, as a rule, borrowed from the developments of Western propaganda kitchens. The materials do not shine with novelty and retell or repeat the rhetoric of Western publicists. Among them, the Russian-attributed initiative to attack Ukraine, accusations of the Russian military of "atrocities against the civilian population", a distorted interpretation of the goals of Russian actions in Ukraine, rehashing the claims of Kiev propaganda "about success in repelling Moscow's aggression and

the superiority of the combat training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over the Russians”, predictions of the “defeat” of Russian troops, allegations of growing international isolation of Russia, spreading speculation about sharp differences between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Wagner group, a hint and the repetition of the Russian Federation in Ukraine “Afghan syndrome”, etc.

The Conflict in Ukraine and the New Balance of Power in the World

When analyzing approaches in the Arab countries to the conflict in Ukraine and their media aspects, it should be taken into account that the sovereign interests of the states of the Middle East are influenced by new emerging realities in the region and at the global level, primarily in economic terms. At the same time, if the Gulf countries, especially the KSA, used to be heavily dependent on the United States due to their oil supplies in exchange for support in ensuring national security, today the situation has changed. America is no longer a significant importer of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Their flow has moved to the east of Asia, China has become the leading consumer of this raw material with more than 3 million barrels in a day.³⁰ Today, Beijing imports more than 50 per cent of its oil and gas needs from Arab countries.³¹ In 2020, the volume of trade between the Gulf countries and Beijing in 2019 was \$190 billion. In general, the Sino-Arab trade exchange in 2021 reached \$330 billion.³² In recent years, in the information Arabic discourse, the expression about the “turn to the East” has been heard more and more often. This term is given a very broad geographical and political-ideological interpretation. It includes the concept of the East as one of the poles of world politics in the era of the Cold War (it meant the USSR and the socialist camp as opposed to the imperialist West), and it means Eurasia, the countries located to the East of the Arab world, up to the Asia-Pacific region.

The events after the start of the SMO in Ukraine highlighted the relevance of the multi-vector relations of the Arabs on the eastern flank of their policy. Observers appeal to the idea that the Arabs should move in two directions: increase trade with Moscow, which in 2021 exceeded \$18 billion, and follow the path of India and China, gradually switching to the use of local currencies in settlements.

Indicative in this respect is the growing interest of the countries of the Arab region in the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At its summit in Samarkand, it was announced that Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait were granted the status of a Dialogue Partner with the SCO. In the light of increasing interaction between Moscow and Beijing in various fields, the convergence of their mutual interests, it is possible to expand the BRICS bloc³³ with the involvement of other countries of the South in this group.³⁴ "The Arab countries were the victims of a unipolar world after the end of the Cold War, when the era passed under the sign of the United States, which turned their region into a field of struggle and rivalry," the Jordanian political scientist believes. "Today, in light of the crisis in Ukraine and the brewing changes that accompany it, they have a chance to rectify the situation. The point is that local players, using their large financial, economic and natural resources, diversify their policies more actively, so that, shifting in political navigation towards Russia and China, they can say their own word."³⁵

Conclusions

The analysis of recent events in Ukraine testifies to the resonant role of the media component in comparison with other aspects: military, political, economic, etc. This is not surprising given the current age of communications technology, which has elevated web-based media to a global level of influence in foreign policy and international relations.

1. The materials and speeches of analysts and observers in the Middle East region reflect the unwillingness of the leaders of the respective countries to be drawn into the political games under the slogans of democracy being waged by the West around Ukraine. The overload of the countries of the Middle East with internal problems does not stimulate their interest in getting involved in other people's international agendas, including the Ukrainian one.

2. Although the positions of the Middle Eastern states in relation to the Ukrainian dossier are ambiguous, the reaction and responses broadcast in the regional media, to a certain extent, are indicative of the search for ways to fix their attitude to world events without dictate from other powers, primarily the United States. At the same time, they do not want either a breakdown in their relations with Western partners or deterioration in ties with Russia. The media are appealing to the idea that the Arab countries should keep open all channels for communication with the parties to the conflict in Ukraine, so that, if the opportunity arises, they can play their role as peacekeepers.³³

In general, there is a negative attitude towards anti-Russian sanctions, dissatisfaction with this "mixing of politics with the economy." A number of experts urge Arabs to learn from them. Media materials show that there is a demand in the Arab world for Russia not to lose its role as an alternative partner of this region in the areas of politics, defense, economics, scientific and technological progress, and international affairs in general.

The events in Ukraine after the start of the SMO have become an occasion for many analysts and experts in the region to look at the situation and the world order more broadly, moving away from the imposed stereotypes about the belief in the invincibility and advantage of the West under the leadership of the United States. Such clichés are increasingly subject to doubt and criticism. Statements on this subject, both in government and non-government media, show that there is a need for different approaches in light of the changes caused by the emergence and

growth of other poles of power and the development of “non-Western givenness”. Much in this regard is still in the process of crystallization.

The winds in Russia are not blowing the way those who shape the US and NATO policy would like. The course of the special military operation indicates that its results will be very negative for the Kiev regime and the entire NATO, whose authority has been hit. So says the Lebanese political scientist, founder of the Lebanese socio-economic forum Z. Hafiz.³⁶

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

KANYBEK KUDAYAROV. SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL
POLICY OF KAZAKHSTAN IN KYRGYZSTAN

*Keywords: Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan;
scientific and educational policy;
universities; analytical center.*

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Abstract. In this article, the author made an attempt to consider some aspects of the scientific and educational policy of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the existence of a legal framework in the field of cooperation in the educational and scientific fields, which has existed since 2006, significant progress in the issue under study began only in 2022. As a further deepening of bilateral cooperation, the author proposes the creation of analytical centers, the research of which could be a powerful tool for the implementation of the policy of “soft power” of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan and lobby Kazakhstan's interests in Kyrgyzstan and the region as a whole.

Until recently, the scientific and educational policy of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan was not considered by the expert community as an important and relevant topic requiring attention. And the reason for this is the absence of any noticeable dynamics in this direction until 2022. Only since last year, there has begun an intensification of Astana's policy in the development of scientific and educational ties, primarily related to higher education. The opening of branches of leading Kazakh universities in Kyrgyzstan has become a landmark event in the history of Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030 clearly outlines the main goals and objectives of Kazakhstan in relation to the states of Central Asia. To ensure the realization of its interests, Astana is pursuing a diversified policy aimed at strengthening the positive image of Kazakhstan in the region. [1] Much attention is paid to the “soft power” of the Republic of Kazakhstan, expressed primarily in humanitarian cooperation. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, much attention is beginning to be paid to the scientific and educational components of humanitarian cooperation. As you know, Kazakhstan has been very successful in the development of the scientific and educational sector, the achievements of which are regularly recorded in international and global rankings. For example, according to the QS World University Rankings 2023, [2] 15 universities of Kazakhstan were among the best higher educational institutions in the world, and according to the Moscow International Ranking “Three Missions of a University”, 11 universities of the republic were in the Top 1800 best in the world. [3] This is the best result among the countries of Central Asia, since in other countries of the Central Asian region a total of five universities are represented – four in Kyrgyzstan and one university in Uzbekistan.

The development of scientific and educational cooperation with Kyrgyzstan is based on the “Eternal Friendship Treaty” of April 8, 1997 [4] and the “Allied Relations Treaty” of December 25, 2003. [5]

The key document in the development of scientific and educational potential is the Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on cooperation in the field of education dated July 4, 2006. [6] The reciprocal state visits made by the presidents of the two republics in 2021 [7] and 2022 [8] played a big role in promoting bilateral cooperation in the field of education.

Within the framework of bilateral cooperation in these areas, branches of two leading universities in Kazakhstan have been opened in Kyrgyzstan – the Kazakh National University named after Al-Farabi (KazNU – May 26, 2022) and the Eurasian National University named after L.N. Gumilyov [9] (ENU – December 6, 2022), which is located in the building of Osh State University.

It cannot be said that before the said exchange of visits there was no scientific and educational cooperation as such between the states, but it was built not only on an interstate basis, but also in private. For example, in 2002, a private Kyrgyz-Kazakh Academy of Law and Public Administration was established, which lasted until 2015. (More than 200 students studied in it, 95 per cent of them were Kazakhs). [10] And since 2012, the private Kyrgyz-Kazakh University (KKU) has been operating, training specialists mainly in the humanities.

KazNU named after Al-Farabi training is exercised under 13 educational programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels in the state (Kyrgyz), Russian and English languages. The list includes such areas as: biology and biotechnology, mechanical and mathematical specialties, geography and environmental management, oriental studies, information technology, journalism, philology, economics and business, law, chemistry and chemical technology, philosophy and political science.

In 2022, about 30 students studied at the ENU branch. The first two years they receive education in Osh, the next two years – in Kazakhstan. As part of the curriculum, Kyrgyz youth learn the Kazakh language. In the 2022/2023 academic year, the subject

“History of Kazakhstan” was introduced. Training of specialists in the branch is carried out in two areas of higher professional education: “translation studies”, “Russian language and literature”. In the future, it is planned to increase the number of educational programs in the field of natural sciences, physics and IT.

KKU trains specialists in such areas as Jurisprudence, Linguistics, Pedagogy.

As of 2019, about 1,000 students from Kyrgyzstan studied at the universities of Kazakhstan, and 2,000 Kazakh students studied at the universities of Kyrgyzstan, most of them privately. However, due to the pandemic and the restrictions imposed, the number of students has slightly decreased. [11] In the 2021/2022 academic year, the number of students from Kazakhstan has decreased significantly, amounting to only 3.4 per cent. [12] In the 2022/2023 academic year, the number of Kazakh students was 4.4 per cent or 3179 people. [13]

At the same time, Kazakhstan annually allocates about 50 state-funded places in Kazakhstani universities for citizens of Kyrgyzstan and ethnic Kazakhs who have Kyrgyz citizenship. [14] In turn, Kyrgyzstan annually allocates ten places for training citizens of Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan.

In addition to supporting the higher education system, in 2015–2016, Kazakhstan built two general education schools in Kyrgyzstan at its own expense, [15] the construction agreements for which were signed in 2012.

An important aspect in the development of the scientific and educational policy of Kazakhstan itself is the modernization of the economy through the creation of scientific, educational, scientific, technical and research centers that train future specialists who are recruited to work in high-tech industries created by foreign investors, which are Russia, South Korea, Japan, Germany, the US and many other states.

A total of 334 joint ventures with the participation of Kazakh capital are registered in Kyrgyzstan. They are concentrated in the financial sector, mining, food production,

trade, transport and communications, construction and repair. Kazakh business, entering Kyrgyzstan, brings with it innovative solutions that it uses in doing business, but there is no information that any of their high-tech solutions are transferred to the scientific and educational sector of the Kyrgyz Republic, that is, these skills are not taught in local universities. Despite the fact that technologies come to Kazakhstan itself, for example, through scientific and technical centers created mainly by Western countries and Russia, including through the creation of new specialties at various universities, Kazakhstan does not use the gained experience in Kyrgyzstan through its transfer to citizens of the neighboring country.

For example, in Uzbekistan, there is the Uzbek-South Korean Inha University in Tashkent, established in 2014, which trains specialists involved in computer and software engineering and makes a great contribution to the digitalization of the country; Yeju Technological University and other joint scientific, educational and scientific and technological centers that successfully modernize the country's economy by introducing high-tech solutions into it through education.

Despite the growth of educational cooperation between the two countries, the transfer of technology to the Kyrgyz side from Kazakhstan has not yet been noticed, which may be explained by the latter's unwillingness to create additional competition for itself in the region. By large, technologies do not come to Kyrgyzstan from their neighbors in the region, with the exception of minor innovative solutions in mining, described in the pages of scientific journals, as well as projects related mainly to the digitalization of the economy.

As you know, the transfer of office work at enterprises to an electronic format is a necessity that facilitates production / operational control, but it does not provide economic growth by itself, this requires advanced technologies that can work on software, contributing to the automation and optimization of production processes. Kazakhstan primarily sees in Kyrgyzstan a

market for raw materials and sales of finished products, which is confirmed by the absence of joint technology parks and research centers.

The Kyrgyz-Kazakh Forum of Intelligentsia, which in January 2023 completed its seventh event, is held on an annual basis. The forum traditionally touches on the cultural and historical aspects of scientific and educational cooperation, and therefore it is difficult to consider it as a kind of “help” in the development of economy.

However, branches of Kazakh universities established in 2022 suggest that, in addition to humanitarian specialties, Kazakhstan intends to train experts in natural science specialties required in industrial agriculture and other areas. This gives reason to believe in a change in Kazakhstan’s policy in the area under study.

In addition to the traditionally conducted joint research in the field of culture and history, there are areas that need serious scientific research. These include, for example, everything related to water or water resources - groundwater and surface water, water-saving technologies for irrigation, water for energy storage instead of batteries, disaster prevention, the sharing of supercomputers and satellites [16] – which could be the subject of bilateral and multilateral research and seriously promote scientific and educational projects.

The main barriers to scientific collaboration are the low funding of science throughout the region and the established socio-cultural norms of academic communities in the countries of Central Asia. [16]

In the countries of Central Asia, funding for science is well below the global average. If in the whole world more than two per cent of GDP is spent on research and development (R&D), then the indicators of the countries of Central Asia vary within 0.1–0.22 per cent of GDP. The states of the region prefer to allocate funds for image projects rather than for science.

According to Kairat Moldashev, in order to strengthen scientific cooperation at the regional level, it is necessary, first of

all, to create a joint fund to finance projects. Accordingly, scientists from different countries of the region should be involved in order to strengthen the expert potential and give greater significance to the projects. It is very important to finance the research process itself, and not just conferences and other events where you need to present the results. Kazakhstan, in particular, in the State Center for Scientific and Technical Expertise, already has experience in successfully conducting project evaluations with the involvement of international experts, which can be used at the regional level. The next step requires regulation – decision-making based on expert opinions. An important step could be the creation of commissions of scientists from Central Asian countries with extensive research experience and ensuring transparency in decision-making.

In addition to the plan announced by Moldashev to design joint scientific projects, it is also very promising to use the base of branches of Kazakhstani universities in Kyrgyzstan to create analytical centers. As you know, Kazakhstan is the leader of the region in the analytical industry and has the largest number of “thought factories” that work in a variety of areas, from political and socio-economic issues to topics of the regional and global environmental agenda. Despite the fact that in Kazakhstan no attention is paid to the development of analytical centers at universities, their potential in this format is huge. On the one hand, this is explained by the fact that the development of “think tanks” at universities is somewhat behind the state and non-state “think tanks”, since when analyzing certain events and processes, experts must always look with caution at the reaction of the university management. In case of disagreement with the expert community of the university, the university management may stop funding them or suspend the activities of the analytical center for an indefinite period. On the other hand, universities in Kazakhstan see greater value in the development of foresight centers, which began to develop in the republic since the 2010s and are currently the only such research centers in the region. Forecasting,

derivation of the most possible scenarios for the development of certain processes in the subject under study make it possible to more accurately determine certain trends that will prevail in the medium and long term. This is a truly new type of analysis for Central Asia, which has been developed only in Kazakhstan.

“Thought factories” in universities are quite developed to date in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Their bulk was created on the basis of international universities, as well as, in fact, in Kazakhstan, where they exist on the basis of the International Kazakh-Turkish University named after. A. Yasawi and Kazakh-German University. Kazakhstan could take advantage of the already existing university infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan and create one or more think tanks that would promote the interests of Kazakhstan by lobbying specific Kazakh initiatives and defending the Kazakh point of view on certain issues. For example, the most important problem is the lack of water resources and their distribution among the states of the region; problems of religious extremism; drug trafficking, etc.

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VALERIA DYACHENKO. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA: CAUSES, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS OF FEEDING

Keywords: Islam; radical Islam; Central Asia; international security; terrorist threat extremism.

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Abstract. The article concentrates on the conditions and causes of the emergence of the radical Islamist movement in Central Asia. A historical digression with statistical data allows you to track the trajectory of the ideology of radical Islam development on the territory of the states of the region. The increasing activity of radical organizations, movements and groupings is proved on the basis of the information provided. The article also describes a number of external and internal factors fueling the radical Islamist movement in Central Asia; special attention is paid to its subjects and instruments of their influence. The impact of feeding factors on the religious and political situation in the countries of the region continues to be relevant to the present.

During the last third of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century the countries of Central Asia were faced with the destabilizing activities of radical Islamic organizations, movements, groups and regimes, which collectively form a radical Islamic movement.

One can find various interpretations of the concept of 'Islamic radicalism' in modern scientific literature devoted to the issues of terrorism and extremism. In this article, as a basic definition, the following interpretation will be used: Islamic radicalism is an ideological doctrine, as well as a political practice based on it; they are characterized by the normative-value consolidation of the ideological, political-ideological and even armed conflict of the world of 'true Islam' with the outside world of 'infidels' and the world of 'untrue faith' inside Islam; Islamic radicalism requires ultimate social control and mobilization (devotion to the idea) of its proponents. [1, p. 29]

At the same time, it should be noted that 'radical Islam' cannot be equated with Islam in general or the branches of Islam (Shia Islam or Sunni Islam). Islamic radicalism is only a part of a much broader trend of "re-Islamization" of the society and

politicization of the Muslim religious system; it is the most extreme and politicized segment in all the branches, currents and interpretations of Islam. Considering this, the study of "Islamic radicalism" and its extreme manifestations plays a significant role in understanding the situation in Muslim regions, the reasons for it, as well as fuelling factors.

The modern radical Islamic movement has its origins in Egypt during the first half of the 19th century. Initially, in 1929, Sheikh Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood as an opposition to the strong trends of secularization that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Later, it branched out in many other regions; also, other organizations of the same kind started to appear. [1, p. 37–60] In the second half of the 20th century, particularly in the 1970–90s, religious and political radical movements became simultaneously active in the Muslim countries. Today, the radical Islamist movement has become a reality in most Muslim countries to a certain extent.

When studying the current religious situation, it becomes apparent that radical Islam (religious and political extremism) originates in the Central Asian region in the early 1990s. Initially, it spread from the southern cities of Kyrgyzstan (Osh and Fergana region) under the influence of social and geographical factors, affecting the neighbouring republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. [2]

Since the mid-1990s, the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami) has been operating in the region. The party's objective was to change the constitutional order and the secular character of the states of Central Asia; it primarily worked to establish the Caliphate and Sharia ruling, which was supposed to take control over spiritual, economic, political and other spheres of society.

To this end, the party conducted active recruiting work among employees of the legislative and executive authorities (including law enforcement officers), representatives of the Islamic clergy, as well as public opinion makers (writers,

journalists, prominent public and political figures, leaders of political parties, etc.) [3]

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), founded in the 1990s and responsible for terrorist attacks in this republic, is still active throughout Kyrgyzstan. [4] Despite the fact that in 2001 the organization was practically liquidated during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, some researchers and experts believe that it has the potential to build up power again and pose a real threat to the region.

Hizb ut-Tahrir is the most popular Islamist organization in Kyrgyzstan. [4] Like the IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir's aim is to create an Islamic system of governance throughout the region. Despite the group's official statement of non-violence, many regional experts believe that Hizb ut-Tahrir uses violence in order to bring about political change. This is especially troubling for Kyrgyzstan, since ethnic Uzbeks are the core of Hizb cells. It is known that along with the poorest members of society, some Uzbek entrepreneurs, businessmen, professionals, university students and NGO activists are part of this organization. [5]

There is also so-called evolution of Islamic organizations, parties and associations. As the well-known Russian orientalist I. Zvyagelskaya notes, "in the early 1990s, they were only emerging and tried their hand; later they established themselves as part of the political landscape in the states of Central Asia – illegal part, with rare exceptions". [6] There are multiple such organizations in the region. Among the main are: the abovementioned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami; HT), the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and more recently the Islamic State (IS). There is also such an extensive structure as the Muslim Brotherhood, which is basically a network of independent cells that operates in the countries of Central Asia under various names (the Society for Social Reforms, the Islamic Appeal Committee, etc.) These organizations are mainly active in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and

Tajikistan. [7] Moreover, there are such groups as the Center for Islamic Development, Islom Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam), etc. [8]

According to current statistics, the rate of criminal offences of the religious extremist character is increasing each year in the countries of Central Asia. For instance, in the first half of 2013, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan registered 160 such crimes; a year earlier, during the same period, 140 crimes were committed, and approximately 130 people were detained. It should be noted that 99 per cent of those detained were young people. [9] In 2012, 150 people were prosecuted for religious extremism in Tajikistan. [10] Speaking at a press conference in 2021 in Dushanbe, Attorney General of Tajikistan Yusuf Rahmon reported the increase in extremist and terrorist crimes. In 2020, 1118 extremist and terrorist crimes were registered, while in 2019 this number was 1063. [11] According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan, between January and June 2022, the authorities managed to put an end to the activities of four groups associated with such organizations as the Islamic State and Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (Jihad & Tawhid Battalion). Over ten 'virtual gangs' were uncovered and about 250 alleged independent online recruiters were detained. Viktor Mikhailov, head of the Tashkent Center for the Study of Regional Threats, notes that 250 detainees since the beginning of 2022 is a rather big figure, considering that 400 radicals were identified during the whole of 2021.

In Kyrgyzstan, between 2010 and 2017, the number of those convicted of terrorism and religious extremism increased by more than fivefold – from 79 to 422 people. As of 2018, in Kyrgyzstan, 558 people were serving sentences for crimes of the religious extremist nature. Out of these convicts, 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 96 were kept in pre-trial detention centers, 164 – in colonies of strict and special regime, 206 – in settlement colonies, and 92 were registered with the penitentiary inspection.

In January-July 2021, there were 139 offenses related to extremism and terrorism in Kazakhstan, which is 19.8 per cent more than a year earlier. For comparison, during the same period

of 2020, only 116 such offenses were registered in the country, which is less by 41.1 per cent than in 2019. [12] As law enforcement authorities note, the most frequently committed offenses are related to propaganda of terrorism or public calls to commit acts of terrorism, including “organizing or participating in the activity of a social or religious association or other organization after a court decision banning their activity or their liquidation in connection with extremism or terrorism they have carried out.”

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkmenistan does not disclose statistics on registered offenses. [13]

If we consider these statistics for the countries of Central Asia, it seems appropriate to carefully examine what causes and fuels Islamist radicalism, which directly affected the presented regional statistics.

The security of the Central Asian region is threatened by radical Islamism due to negative internal factors that put most of the countries in the region in the category of ‘fragile states’. ‘Fragility’ creates potential for collapse and moving into the category of ‘failed states’ that are unable to control their territory. It is these states that supply a suitable breeding ground for radical terrorist groups like the Islamic State to take root. Expert assessments of the situation in the countries of Central Asia in The Fragile States Index, 2015 are listed below. [14]

Table 1

Central Asian countries in The Fragile States Index, 2015 [15]

Country	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	Kyrgyzstan	Turkmenistan	Kazakhstan
Place in the world out of 178 countries (the lower the place, the bigger the threat)	51/178	57/178	62/178	78/178	110/178
Points (the higher the point, the larger the threat)	85.4	83.4	82.2	77.5	68.3
Category	High Warning	High Warning	High Warning	Warning	Low Warning

The presented figures show that, according to experts, there is truly a threat of destabilization in many countries of the Central Asian region. Also, these statistics indicate that there are some variations between the countries of the region – note the special position of Kazakhstan.

There are several primary factors contributing to the ‘fragility’ of the states in the region. Firstly, that is large-scale drug traffic along the northern route from Afghanistan to Russia. The latter is the world’s largest consumer of Afghan heroin. In addition, security experts are well aware that drug proceeds are often used to fund terrorism and religious and political extremism. [16] For example, this connection is known from the Batken conflict, since the IMU invasion of Kyrgyzstan was associated, among other things, with establishing the trade routes for heroin.

Secondly, the high rate of corruption in the Central Asian region is also an important factor contributing to the ‘fragility’ of these states and the growing threat of radical Islam. According to Transparency International, all countries in the region are at the very bottom of its Corruption Perceptions Index.

Table 2

Central Asian countries in The Corruption Perceptions Index [17]

Country	The Corruption Perceptions Index		
	2012	2013	2014
Kazakhstan	133/174	140/177	126/175
Kyrgyzstan	154/174	150/177	136/175
Tajikistan	157/174	154/177	152/175
Turkmenistan	170/174	168/177	169/175
Uzbekistan	170/174	168/177	166/175

Thirdly, poverty is another factor contributing to ‘fragility’ of the states in Central Asia. The countries in the region (especially parts of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan located in the Fergana Valley) are characterized by a significant degree of rural overpopulation exacerbated by the shortage of

water and fertile land. This inevitably leads to unemployment, creating masses of marginalized young people that are extremely susceptible to brainwashing by radicals. The issue is aggravated by the regression of the Soviet-era social welfare, education and healthcare systems. Labour migration to Russia was one of the important checks that prevented social explosions. However, devaluation of the rouble in 2014–2015, as well as decline in demand for labour in the Russian Federation, sharply depleted this source of income for the population. Naturally, the situation in the states of Central Asia dangerously deteriorated, especially in Tajikistan.

Poverty grows against the backdrop of a trend towards social and economic ‘de-modernization’. For instance, by 2010, due to the civil war and economic challenges, the share of urban residents in Tajikistan had decreased to 26 per cent of the total population, [18] which is comparable to the most backward countries in the world. Other manifestations of ‘de-modernization’ are: departure of highly qualified specialists and intellectuals (both Russian-speaking and ethnic); and the collapse of the Soviet-era technical and social infrastructure, even in relatively resource-rich countries like Turkmenistan.

Fourthly, the existence of so-called personalized sultanistic regimes is threatening the statehood of regional countries [19]; these regimes are integral part of the clan systems that determine intra-elite network configurations. [20]

To all of the above, fifthly, we can add the existence of major interstate conflicts over water resources between the upstream countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and the downstream countries (Uzbekistan and to a lesser extent – Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). These conflicts hamper the cooperation between the countries in Central Asia, particularly interfering with countering security threats.

At the same time, influential Great Powers (Russia, the US, China, the EU, Islamic countries) are involved in the “New Great Game” [21] for influence in the region. Clashes of interest

between them can cause a rise in security threats or undo their efforts to help the regional countries address all sorts of challenges.

The states of Central Asia are currently experiencing a certain crisis, which is indicated by the above-mentioned external threats from Afghanistan and the Middle East that are associated with radical Islam and severely aggravate the internal problems in a number of regional countries. The prospects of ending this crisis differ by the countries and are largely determined by the specifics of interaction between state structures and Islam.

The emergence and development of Islamic extremism in Central Asia was largely facilitated by a whole range of external factors, which still influence the religious and political situation in the regional countries. [22]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideological vacuum in the states of Central Asia began to be filled with the ideological influence of Iran, Turkey, the states of the Persian Gulf, as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim countries that sought to occupy political and economic positions in the new independent states. In those circumstances, foreign influence on the religion of the newly formed states matched economic and political interests of the local elites and sentiments of the Muslim population.

Foreign influence mainly came through funding the construction and equipping of places of Muslim worship, teaching religious doctrine, distributing religious literature and direct preaching of foreign emissaries.

The number of religious Islamic institutions, including the so-called 'private' mosques, madrasahs and other Islamic cultural and educational centers in the regional countries was growing uncontrollably. There faithful preached and taught in accordance with the religious and political preferences of foreign and local sponsors. The number of religious buildings exceeded the number of educated Islamic clerics rather quickly. In many cases, the services were held by people lacking deep knowledge of

Islam. They were often unable to understand the intricacies of Islamic theology.

The number of young people who studied Islam abroad – in religious institutions in Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, etc. – started to grow. In some of these educational centers educational programmes were based on the ideas of radical Islam. [23] During their studies, students adopted religious views and values that were different from Islam traditional for the countries of Central Asia. They were often falling under the influence of emissaries and missionaries from foreign radical Islamic organizations. In the last decade of the last century, the Islamist ideology (politicized Islam), mostly extremist, began to infiltrate the Central Asian countries from abroad. The activities of propagandists of international Islamic extremist organizations were facilitated by porous state borders and close geographic proximity to unstable countries and regions, where radical Islam is quite strong – in Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.

At that time, members of such international Islamic organizations as Taiba, the Committee of Muslims of Asia and others began actively operating in Central Asia. Most of them spread the ideas of radical Islam under the guise of missionary work. At this point, propagandists of international and regional Islamic extremist and terrorist organizations (Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, the IMU, etc.) stepped up their organizational and propaganda activities. Also, a large number of radical groups, including those of the Salafi (Wahhabi) orientation, became active in the region.

From 2000, the situation became urgent. Central Asian law enforcement agencies seized huge amounts of extremist literature: mainly the works of Sayyid Qutb, the leading ideologist of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; copies of the Arabic magazine Al-Wai; works of Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, which were translated into local languages; as well as brochures and leaflets of this party.

Around that time, extremists began to veer from propaganda to dedicated organizational work, mainly supported by international Islamic extremist organizations. Using miscalculations of the leaders of the Central Asian countries regarding the policy of Islamization to their advantage, extremists put direct moral and psychological pressure on the authorities, despite being banned in many countries.

During this period, certain Islamist organizations in Central Asia, primarily Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, enjoyed open political support from the EU countries and covert backing of the US. It should be noted that the US provided tacit support to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and some other Islamic opposition. [24]

To sum up, over the years of independence, the states of Central Asia have faced and are still confronting – to varying degrees – the activities of Islamic radicals, fuelled by corruption, poverty and drug trafficking from within, as well as foreign influence from outside. Statistics over the past decade call for a close study of the causes and factors fuelling the radical Islamist movement in order to more effectively combat extremists both within and outside the region.

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GOZAL SHARIPOVA. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLICY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN THE STATE SYSTEMS OF MALAYSIA AND UZBEKISTAN

*Keywords: Malaysia; Uzbekistan;
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tolerance; Islam; assimilation; culture.*

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Abstract. This article presents a comparative analysis of the policy of religious tolerance in the state systems of Malaysia and Uzbekistan, specifically examining history, law and culture of the

countries. The main question of the paper is whether there is common ground in the area of religious tolerance between two countries. The research is done using the principle of historicism; comparative and system analysis; and problem-chronological, integrated and interdisciplinary approaches.

At the end of the last century, M. Ansel (1902–1990), a prominent French lawyer, noted that foreign law allows jurists to get a better understanding of the law of their country, “since its specifics become especially apparent in comparison with other systems.” [1] Thus, the study and comprehensive analysis of the issue of religious tolerance in Malaysia and the Republic of Uzbekistan allows us to single out similarities and differences in this matter.

Some aspects of the subject have been studied in the works of modern scientists and researchers, such as E.U. Baidarov, K. Randall, N. Ismoilov, R.Kh. Murtazaeva and O.I. Satimov. However, it should be noted that each researcher considered the issue in the context of his own research, since the subject under consideration is relevant to the matters of politics, economics, culture and religion.

Historically, Malaysia – like Uzbekistan – is geographically located at the crossroads of major trade routes. Also, it was both economically and culturally tied to neighbouring and foreign countries, which influenced religious and cultural life of the local population to a great extent. Two states have much in common. For instance, during various development stages, they were characterized by high immigration mobility, assimilation, cross-cultural contacts, as well as convergence of culture and religion. It should also be noted that ethnic diversity in these countries largely shaped their citizens’ concept of respect for representatives of other faiths.

In Malaysia, it’s easy to single out the stages of formation of tolerance, which were associated with the immigration processes in Southeast Asia. The geographical location of the country helped

to turn this region into a place of pilgrimage for believers. Modern Malaysia is a country where old quarters, historical monuments and places of worship organically coexist with modern buildings. Despite the predominance of Muslim population, representatives of other religions live peacefully in the country. For example, in Malacca, there is the Cheng Hoon Teng Temple, a Buddhist temple also called the Temple of Green Cloud. This is the oldest functioning temple in the country practicing the Three Doctrinal Systems of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. It was built in 1645. There is also the Church of St. Paul, built in 1521; the Sri Poyatha Moorthi Temple, a Hindu temple; the Church of Christ; and the Stadthuys, a Dutch city hall. In the Chinese cemetery tombstones from the Ming Dynasty have been preserved. This is only a small part of the whole variety of religious buildings, and their location in the city center indicates religious tolerance.

Malaysia is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country, and it should be noted that the country has vast experience not only in the field of religious tolerance as a state policy, but also in the field of education. In particular, the ongoing state policy of the Rukun Negara is designed to achieve a deeper integration of all citizens of the multinational community. The main principles set forth in the declaration are aimed at maintaining a democratic way of life, a respectful approach to the rich and diverse cultural traditions of all the constituent peoples, as well as strengthening the nation.

Malaysia has come a long way from a colony to one of the most developed countries in Southeast Asia, where constitutional rights are guaranteed; there, constitutional rights are a fundamental pillar and instrument that ensures the existence of ethnic and religious minorities, and also a means of governing intergroup relations in a multi-religious society. Young people are the main driving force in society, which is why particular emphasis is placed on promoting tolerance among this category of citizens. The Malaysian education system has developed a

program aimed at conducting explanatory lessons during extracurricular activities theme weeks for students everywhere.

The territorial and historical proximity of Malaysia with neighbouring states contributed not only to cultural exchange, but also facilitated peaceful assimilation. Naturally, this led to mutual socio-cultural respect and ethno-confessional tolerance.

Lately, there has been an increased research interest in the role Malaysia plays in the Southeast Asia region. In today's world, a high level of religious tolerance is impossible to achieve without the involvement of scholars actively involved in solving pressing problems of the day. The integration of science and education has been officially recognized as one of the principles of world science policy. Today, international organizations such as the UN, UNESCO and the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) [2] are equally contributing to the development of an integrated system for the training of qualified scientific personnel, because integration of science and education promotes not only mutually beneficial relations between countries, but also efficient counteraction of ethno-religious discrimination.

The rich historical and cultural heritage of Malaysia and Uzbekistan share many similarities. In both countries, the overwhelming majority of Muslims honour and respect the prominent scientists and thinkers of the East, making it major point of contact between the two countries. One of the major indicators of this was the scientific and practical webinar "Islam and Modernity" that was held in the autumn of 2022 in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. It was organized with the assistance of the Embassy of the Republic of Uzbekistan in cooperation with the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan, Imam-Al-Bukhari International Research Center and the Center of Islamic Civilization. The online event was held under the slogan "Uzbekistan - a country of great thinkers" and was dedicated to the vast intellectual and spiritual heritage of

medieval scholars and thinkers who lived on the territory of modern Uzbekistan. [3]

The central territorial location of Uzbekistan had a profound influence on the formation of a tolerant worldview of the population. Long term cohabitation comes with an awareness of the imperative for peaceful coexistence of believers of different religions. A tolerant attitude towards other religious beliefs was formed gradually, which is clearly illustrated by the ancient religious texts that have become widespread throughout the region. For instance, one of the early collections of the sacred books of Zoroastrianism – the Avesta – discusses the issue of religious tolerance: “Listen with your ears; see the obvious with your soul – so that everyone chooses faith for himself.” [4] Indeed, a respectful attitude towards various religious beliefs has been spreading throughout Central Asia since ancient times. This is particularly evident in the ethnic diversity of the population; the society had the right to choose their own religion, which today would be called the recognition of human rights to freedom of religion. That is why there has been such a variety of religious beliefs and movements during the course of the history of Uzbekistan: Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, shamanism, Christianity and Islam. Peaceful coexistence of so many religions in a single territory contributed to cultural assimilation, creating a tolerant system of values in the minds of the population, which is only possible in conditions of peaceful cohabitation. In this connection, let us recall the statement of Albert Einstein, Nobel Prize winner in physics: “All religions, arts and sciences are branches of the same tree.” [5]

Today, there are over 130 ethnic groups and 16 confessions in independent Uzbekistan. Many religious organizations operate in the country simultaneously: Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, Full Gospel, Adventist and other Christian churches, as well as religious communities of Bukharan and European Jews, followers of the Bahá’í Faith, Krishnaites and Buddhists. [6] This fact allows us to make a conclusion that a sound national policy

promotes successful integration of Uzbekistan into the world community.

The people of Uzbekistan are also distinguished by their respect for the heritage of Eastern philosophers, who had a significant impact on understanding the value of a tolerant attitude towards people who have different religious views. Thus, Khoja Ahmad Yasawi (1103–1166), a prominent philosopher and Sufi, urged people to be tolerant towards the religion of other peoples: “If there is an Infidel in front of you, do not insult him. The Lord turns away from a cruel heart, from the soul of an offender. O Allah, the True King! Such a servant is destined for hell.” The saying of the famous philosopher al-Farabi (872–950) is just as important: “...a group or nation can perceive reflected images of things in a different way than another group or nation. That is why virtuous peoples are different, and virtuous cities may profess different religions and believe in the same kind of happiness. [4]

Given the ongoing globalization process, it has become obvious that no state can exist in the world apart from others, looking after exclusively its own interests. In the world where equality and cooperation constitute the foundation of relations between countries, Malaysia’s experience as a developed and leading country in the area of state policy of religious tolerance is highly useful. A number of major state visits and joint agreements attest to cooperation and friendly relations between Uzbekistan and Malaysia. The course of development of Uzbekistan since its independence can be an important indicator of consolidation of the spirit of democratic reforms and tolerance.

Diplomatic relations between Uzbekistan and Malaysia were established on February 21, 1992. [7] In a short period of time, the countries signed a number of bilateral agreements covering a wide range of issues, such as the Memorandum dated November 14, 1995 on culture and science, aimed at promoting mutual understanding in this area. In particular, paragraph (e) of Article 2 of this memorandum states the following: “Support for mutual assistance is discussed in many parts of this memorandum, such as

taking steps to allocate grants to the parties for continuing their studies in higher education institutions; development of ties between national libraries, museums and archives; and exchange of published and unpublished texts of historical, cultural and scientific significance in the sphere of culture". [8] This facilitates the formation of an idea of cultural diversity and value systems in the minds of the citizens of the two states, given that numerous researches link the increasing risk of conflict with the fact that the citizens neglect studying the history of their state.

Today, fundamental changes regarding religious freedoms are an integral part of political and legal reforms in Uzbekistan. These changes are envisaged by the objectives defined by the Development Strategy of Uzbekistan, which are aimed at ensuring interethnic accord and religious tolerance. On December 12, 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted a special resolution "Enlightenment and Religious Tolerance"; it was initiated by President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and is considered a historic event. [9]

In recent years, Uzbekistan has taken steps to ensure the implementation of international obligations of the Republic in the field of human rights. The Government has developed mechanisms to monitor respect for the rights and freedoms of citizens, and has taken consistent measures to expand cooperation with international and regional structures that protect human rights and religious freedom. The large-scale reforms in the country entail the need for further improvement of the mechanisms for ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as effective implementation of international norms and standards in the area of human rights protection. [10] The model of political system that Uzbekistan works to implement brings together state structures and political institutions developed according to internationally accepted standards that are based on the principles of democracy and feature a historically shaped system of values inherent in Eastern civilization. The current and future development path of the republic is based on creative

implementing the accumulated international experience, while taking full account of national characteristics and cultural traditions. [11]

To date, the Republic of Uzbekistan has signed more than 80 international human rights instruments, including six core treaties and four optional UN protocols. Uzbekistan annually submits national reports to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and UN Committees. Legislative measures are undertaken to ensure that national legislation conforms to international human rights standards and that of ethno-confessional relations. [12] In December 2020, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the National Center for Human Rights (NCHR) of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia. The signing of the Memorandum was timed to International Human Rights Day. [13] In March 2021, a Memorandum of Cooperation was signed between the Center of Islamic Civilization of Uzbekistan and the Institute of Islamic Civilization of Malaysia. During the talks, the Malaysian side highly appreciated the measures taken in Uzbekistan to promote Islamic theology, exemplified by the initiatives of President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev to establish and develop the Center of Islamic Civilization; international research centers named after Imam al-Bukhari and Imam at-Termezi; the International Islamic Academy; and schools for the study of hadith, Sharia, Sufism and other parts of Islamic tradition. Abdul Wahab, Vice-Rector of the National University of Malaysia (UKM; Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), expressed hope that the Memorandum between the Center of Islamic Civilization of Uzbekistan and the Institute of Islamic Civilization of Malaysia will foster greater cooperation in exploring the rich Islamic heritage. [14] This statement already set forward a certain integration mechanism. On July 16, 2021, a resolution of President Mirziyoyev on improving the activities of the Center of Islamic Civilization was adopted. [15] The Presidential Decree calls upon the Center of Islamic Civilization

of Uzbekistan to widely promote the idea of New Uzbekistan and Third Renaissance and scientifically study the achievements of the new revival. [16] This resolution is vital for the education of the younger generation, so it could navigate current political, socio-economic and cultural developments. Today, the role of religion in public policies for the protection of human rights increasingly assumes a larger significance. Uzbekistan is carrying out large-scale reforms in this sphere. The Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis conducted a parliamentary hearing on the issue of ensuring freedom of religion and belief. On May 4, 2018, a joint resolution by the Council (Kengash) approved an action plan. According to the figurative expression R. Collins, [17] an American sociologist, "in order to be tolerant of a different culture, you need to understand it" [18]; the quote reflects one of the approaches to understanding religious tolerance.

Tolerance promotes both bilateral relations and interethnic harmony. On January 27, 2021, during the regular meeting of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis, the deputies reviewed a draft law on the establishment of Friendship of Peoples' Day. [19] As Speaker of the Legislative Chamber Nuriddinjon Ismailov remarked, "Our people have always treasured friendship; friendship means our old good traditions and shared goals that ensure peace. A large-scale celebration of Friendship of Peoples' Day serves to further strengthen the notion of friendship and tolerance in the minds of citizens, regardless of their nationality." [20]

On April 27, 2021, the Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA), an agency accountable to the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan, organized a regional online conference on religious freedoms in the countries of Central Asia, entitled "Political and Legal Aspects of Ensuring Religious Tolerance, the Rights and Freedoms of Believers: A Review of National Practices". Religious experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan took part in the online conference. The expert and analytical community and the public of Uzbekistan were represented by experts from the Committee on Religious Affairs, the Ministry of

Justice, the Institute of Strategic and Regional Studies (ISRS), the National Center for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, the International Islamic Academy, deputies of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis, and representatives of various confessions. They discussed the experience of the Central Asian countries in ensuring political and legal guarantees of the rights and freedoms of believers; steps taken to further enhance interfaith harmony, peace and stability; and measures in place to fully protect the rights and freedoms of believers. They also emphasized the importance of developing practical recommendations on the issues under consideration and bringing the positive experience of the Central Asian countries to the attention of the international community. [21]

Normalization of interfaith and cultural dialogue requires the input of all parties. Such a dialogue is relevant while determining the role, place and position of religion in the world divided into traditional and technological states, especially in the context of migration and following adaptation to new living conditions.

On May 25, 2020, at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, representatives of social, political, scientific and academic circles of Malaysia expressed their opinion on the ongoing changes in Uzbekistan aimed to ensure religious tolerance and mutual understanding between nations and peoples. Thus, Azizan Binti Baharuddin, the Director General of the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), noted the positive dynamics of the ongoing policy seeking to promote friendship between different nations and peoples living in the country, protecting freedom of religion and ensuring religious tolerance. [22] Mohammed Yusuf Haji Osman, member of the National Council of Islamic Religious Affairs of Malaysia, said that the policies of President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev on ensuring tolerance is the quintessence of interreligious dialogue, harmony and cultural diversity. He noted that it helps to create necessary conditions and opportunities for religious needs of all members

of the peoples and nationalities in the country, which will facilitate further development and prosperity of Uzbekistan. [22] The practical aspect of this issue was developed and formalized in the Presidential Decree on measures for further improving interethnic relations and friendly ties with foreign countries. [23]

Uzbekistan has chosen the path of enlightenment against ignorance, since it minimizes the risk of conflicts and threats; a lack of understanding of the diversity and uniqueness of cultures and religious beliefs can lead to alienation of peoples. The importance of the speech of the head of Uzbekistan at the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly should also be noted. He suggested that a convention on the rights of youth should be developed, and also proposed the adoption of a special resolution on Enlightenment and Religious Tolerance. [24]

Today, the state system is being reformed in Uzbekistan, which is reflected in paying special attention to the concept of cultural diversity. The Imam-Al-Bukhari International Research Center was established in Samarkand, the ancient city of Uzbekistan that once was part of the Great Silk Road. Its activities are aimed at studying the rich heritage of the East. The Imam Termizi International Research Center studies the heritage of Abu Isa at-Termizi (824–892) and other thinkers of the region.

* * *

In conclusion, it should be noted that respect for an individual and for others, respect for elders and for people, regardless of their nationality or religion is a fundamental quality of the peoples of Uzbekistan. It provides the moral basis for spiritual and educational activities and constitutes the core of the religious tolerance of the people.

Summarizing, it is worth noting that the social and political stability in Uzbekistan is the result of a well-thought-out policy aimed at ensuring interethnic peace and civil harmony in the country, which in turn helps to enrich moral and ethical values,

and also promotes citizens' understanding of free will and respect for their fellow citizens.

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

VLADIMIR KIRICHENKO. IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN: PAST AND PRESENT

Keywords: Iran; Azerbaijan; Turks; Islamic revolution.

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Abstract. The article examines the history of Southern or Iranian Azerbaijan, pays attention to the place occupied by the Turks in the history of Iran. The policy of Reza Shah Pahlavi aimed at assimilation of the Azerbaijanis of Iran is also considered. In general, the Azerbaijanis were able to overcome difficulties and fit into the political system of modern Iran.

In the 1st millennium BC – the beginning of the 1st millennium AD on the territory of modern Azerbaijan and the northern regions of Iran, there were a number of powerful states, including Manna, Atropatena and Albania. [1] After the conquests of Alexander the Great (330 BC), a representative of the local nobility Atropates (some researchers believe that the word

“atropate” meant the title of ruler) was appointed ruler of Media. In 323, he was removed, but retained power over the northern part of the country, which received the name “Atropatena”. [2] It is believed that the current name “Azerbaijan” came from the name of Atropatene. [3] In the 3rd century AD Azerbaijan was conquered by the Persian Sassanid Empire. [4] In the 7th century The Arab conquest contributed to the spread of Islam in this territory. It is worth noting that the formation of the Azerbaijani ethnos was influenced by the Gutians, Lullubis, Turukians, Hurrians, Cimmerians, Saki-Scythians, Huns, Bulgars, Khazars, Barsils, Pechenegs, and other peoples. [5] From the 9th century from the territory of Central Asia the Oghuz Turks [6] started penetrating to the territory of modern Azerbaijan. It was the Oghuzes that had a decisive influence on the Azerbaijani ethnos. Since the 10th century the Turks began to play an important role in the history of Iran. It was then that the Ghaznavids [7] captured eastern Iran and became the first Turkic dynasty ruling the territory of this country. [8]

During the reign of the Turkic Safavid dynasty, [9] Shiism in Iran received the status of the state religion. Initially, the city of Tabriz, located on the territory of Azerbaijan, became the capital of the Safavid state, but later, due to Ottoman pressure, the authorities had to move the capital to the city of Qazvin, located further from the border with the Ottoman Empire. Later, Shah Abbas the Great [10] moved the capital to Isfahan. [11, p. 281–282]

Throughout the entire period of the Safavid rule (beginning of the 16th – 18th centuries), the Azerbaijani language was the official language of the royal court. Also this language was used in the army. [12] At the same time, the Persian language was used in diplomatic correspondence and was the language of fiction and history.

The Qajar dynasty (1779–1925) [13] was the last Azerbaijani dynasty of Turkic origin in Iran. The first ruler was Agha Muhammad Shah Qajar [14], who established Qajar hegemony in the Iranian plateau. During the reign of Mohammed Shah Qajar (1741-1797), Iran began to experience foreign influence. [11, p. 254]

At the same time, it was under the Qajars that the influence of the Islamic clergy became more pronounced in Iran. [11, p. 255]

Agha Mohammed Shah Qajar's nephew, Feth-Ali Shah, [15] suffered major defeats from Russia in two Russo-Persian wars. [16] According to the Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) treaties, Azerbaijan was divided between two empires. Russia received the northern part of Azerbaijan, and the southern part went to Persia. Thus, new political-geographical units appeared: "Northern Azerbaijan" (or "Russian Azerbaijan") and "South Azerbaijan" (or "Iranian Azerbaijan"). [17]

After Reza Khan, [18] the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty, [19] came to power, Iranization policy began in Iran. In this regard, teaching in the Azerbaijani language was prohibited in the schools of South Azerbaijan. [20] Most of the important positions in the territory of Iranian Azerbaijan were occupied by the Persians. [21] Also, toponyms of Azerbaijani origin were renamed in the province. The authorities pursued a policy of economic discrimination in the region. At the same time, the border with Soviet Azerbaijan was closed, and Iranian Azerbaijanis could not travel there for seasonal work. Therefore, Azerbaijanis, historically living in the north of the country, had to move to large cities, primarily to Tehran. [22]

The authorities considered Azerbaijanis to be "Turkicised Aryans", Persians by origin, and encouraged a sense of cultural and racial inferiority of the Turks as descendants of nomadic barbarians, in contrast to the ancient cultured Persians. In this regard, some Azerbaijanis since the 1960s and 1970s have distanced themselves from the Turkic identity, replacing it with the Persian one. [23]

There were also examples of how ethnic Azerbaijanis shared the ideology of Persian nationalism. For example, the scholar and diplomat Sayed Hasan Taghizade (1878–1970), [24] being an Azerbaijani, supported Persian nationalism. He headed the "Persian Committee" created on the initiative of the Germans in 1915, which was located in Berlin. The purpose of the organization was spreading nationalist propaganda and the possible creation of a nationalist government in Iran. [25] The scope and influence of the

Persian Committee is evidenced by a Persian-language journal called Kaveh. [26]

Another ethnic Azerbaijani who influenced the nationalist movement in Iran was the historian and linguist Seyyed Ahmad Kasravi. [27] In his work "Azeri, or the ancient language of Azerbaijan", he tried to show that the word "Azeri" is found in most ancient historical books, especially those relating to the first centuries of Islam. He believed that it was the name of the ancient language of Azerbaijan and had nothing to do with Turkic. In his opinion, this language was formed as a result of the merging of two ancient languages – the language of the Medes (after their invasion of Azerbaijan) and the language of the indigenous inhabitants of the country, and is close to the Persian languages, and not to the Turkic ones. [28]

Yu.N. Timkin, a Russian researcher, notes that, despite the spread of nationalist ideas under Reza Khan, the ruler himself: "was connected with the Azerbaijanis by many ties. So, his mother Nush Afarin Ayromlu belonged to the ethno-cultural group of Azerbaijanis, airomlu. Reza Khan's wife, Taj ol-Moluk, who bore him the heir to the throne, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, [29] was the daughter of Brigadier General Teimur Khan Ayromlu, who was very influential in Iran in the 1920s. A cousin, Taj ol-Molouk, became head of the Iranian Police Headquarters in the 1920s." [21]

From 1918 to 1920, there existed the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, independent of Russia. [1] Subsequently, it became part of the USSR. In 1945, with the support of the USSR, the Kurdish Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan were created on the territory of Iranian Western Azerbaijan with the dominance of the Communists in power. However, Iranian forces regained control of the region in 1946–1947 after the Soviet armed forces withdrew beyond their borders. [30]

* * *

Even before the events of the Islamic revolution (1979), one of the most important cities in the Azerbaijani provinces, Tabriz, became the center of protest activity. Starting from December 1977, students of the University of Tabriz held demonstrations. The students chose December 12, 1977 (21 Azar in the Iranian calendar) as the day of one of the most important protest demonstrations against the Shah's regime. This date is important for Azerbaijanis because it marks both the day of establishment and the day of the fall of the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Iran in 1945 and 1946, respectively. It is noteworthy that the government newspaper Ettelaat reported that the demonstration took place on December 19 and not December 12, so as not to link the demonstration with historical events.

In Tabriz, anti-Shah activity entered a new phase on February 18, 1978. This is due to the fact that in response to the killing of approximately 162 demonstrators in Qom on January 9, 1978, Ayatollah Mohammad-Kazem Shariatmadari [31] called on the people of Iran to strike on the fortieth day of mourning for the dead. [32] It should be noted that during the last years of the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah, Ayatollah Shariatmadari (an ethnic Azeri) was the senior cleric in the important religious center of Qom. While Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini [33] was in exile, Shariatmadari was a very popular and influential religious figure in Iran. Ayatollah headed that part of the Shiite clergy that remained loyal to the Shah and took part in the Islamic revolution only at its final stage. [34] When Khomeini returned, the popularity of Shariatmadari began to interfere with the new Islamic regime. Shariatmadari disagreed with Khomeini on such key issues as the place and role of the clergy in government. For example, the ayatollah did not like the idea of direct participation of the clergy in political life. Such views of the clergyman caused a confrontation with Khomeini. However, Shariatmadari did not completely abandon political activity. Together with a group of associates, the ayatollah participated in the

creation of the Moslem People's Republican Party (MPRP). This political force emphasized collective leadership, its members called for cooperation with secular parties and freedom of the media. [11, p. 305] Shariatadari was especially popular among Iranian Azerbaijanis. He also drew support from the Westernized business community and secular political parties.

Russian researcher V.I. Sazhin notes that "the Azerbaijani nationalists tried to take advantage of the differences between Khomeini and Shariatmadari, who tried to establish local autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan. The confrontation between Shariatmadari and Khomeini reached its peak in December 1979 and January 1980, when clashes broke out between the followers of both ayatollahs in Qom and Tabriz. Mass demonstrations in Tabriz in December 1979 demanded autonomy for Azerbaijanis and other ethnic minorities. Since Shariatmadari adhered to the religious principle of solving interethnic problems, he did not become the leader of the autonomists". [22]

In 1982, the ayatollah was accused of plotting against Khomeini and sentenced to prison, and his party was dissolved. The ayatollah ended his days under house arrest in 1986. [11, p. 305] One of Khomeini's supporters, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, [35] is also of Azerbaijani origin. Ayatollah Khamenei was elected the third president of the Islamic Republic in October 1981. After the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1989, Khamenei became Iran's supreme leader (rahbar) and remains so to this day. [11, p. 165]

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For most of the history of modern Iran, there was a single province, Azerbaijan, located along the Zagros mountain range in the plateau region of northwestern Iran. [11, p. 40] In 1937 the province was divided into West and East Azerbaijan. At the same time, some traditional territories of Azerbaijan became part of other Iranian provinces. In 1993, a new province of Ardabil was formed from part of the territories of the province of East Azerbaijan, to

which part of the northern territories of the Caspian province of Gilan was also transferred. [36] The provinces, traditionally inhabited by Azerbaijanis, have developed trade and industry, combined with a relatively prosperous agriculture. Agriculture is supported by sufficient year-round rainfall, as farmers do not have to rely solely on irrigation systems to support the cultivation of wheat, barley, tobacco and cotton. In this regard, Azerbaijan is often called the “breadbasket” of Iran. The industry of Azerbaijan is represented by carpet weaving, tanning, textile industry and copper mining. [11, p. 41] It is noteworthy that about 30 million Azerbaijanis lived in Iran, and 10 million in the Republic of Azerbaijan (2015). [37]

When the former Azerbaijan SSR became independent in 1991, the popularity of nationalist ideas increased among Iranian Azerbaijanis. This was facilitated by the fact that the Iranian authorities did not allow the teaching of the Azerbaijani language in schools. Since 1996, large demonstrations have taken place in Tabriz, Urmia and other predominantly Azerbaijani cities in northwestern Iran about once a year. The main requirement was the introduction of teaching in the Azerbaijani language and the recognition of the linguistic autonomy of the Azerbaijanis. [38] The National Liberation Movement of Azerbaijan, founded in 1994, was behind the actions. One of its prominent representatives was professor of linguistics Mahmudali Chekhregani. In 2002, he founded the South Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM). [39]

In 2006, mass protests erupted in the areas inhabited by Azerbaijanis in Iran. Their reason was the publication in one of the magazines of a drawing that was considered offensive to the Azerbaijani people and their language: in a sketch intended for children, a boy pronounces several words in Persian meaning “cockroach”, and a cockroach sitting at a table answers him with a question “What?” in Azerbaijani. The protest demonstrations sparked by this publication escalated into riots, and the Iranian security services cracked down. According to official sources, 330 protesters were arrested and four were killed. [40]

In 2005, protests erupted again in Tabriz, Urmia, Maragha, Ardebil and some other large settlements in northern Iran populated by Azerbaijanis. The reason was the show “Fitile” (“Wick”), which depicted an Azerbaijani boy brushing his teeth with a toilet brush and complaining of bad breath. Part of the program was in Farsi, but some of the dialogues were in Azerbaijani. [41]

In 2019, the teaching of the Azerbaijani language began in the schools of the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan. According to the new curriculum, schoolchildren were given the opportunity to study Azerbaijani for 2 hours a week (60 hours in total per academic year). [42] The change in the attitude of the Iranian authorities towards the teaching of the Azerbaijani language may have been influenced by external factors. Probably, the Iranian authorities are afraid that the US may use the Azerbaijani issue in the confrontation with Iran, and therefore changed the language policy. Apparently, this decision was also aimed at strengthening ties with the Republic of Azerbaijan. [42]

It should be noted that the majority of Azerbaijanis today identify themselves as Iranians, and not along ethnic lines. The fact that Azerbaijanis occupy important positions in the Islamic Republic of Iran is a deterrent to ethno-nationalist feelings. Former prime ministers Mehdi Bazargan and Mir Hussein Mousavi, as well as Ayatollahs Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardabili, Abu al-Qasim Khojeh and Sadegh Khalkhali are prime examples of how Azerbaijanis have integrated themselves into the political structure of Iran. [43]

* * *

Azerbaijan is trying to strengthen mutually beneficial economic, political and cultural relations with Iran. Since Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, relations between Baku and Tehran have not been without problems. Relations with Iran under President Heydar Aliyev (2003–2013) were close, based on ties established during Aliyev's rule in Nakhichevan (1991–1993).

But they became tense after the Americans excluded Iran from the Azerbaijan International Operating Company, which was set up to exploit three Azerbaijani oil fields in the Caspian. [43]

Iran's admission to an international consortium set up in 1996 to explore the Caspian Shah Deniz field have, probably, helped to improve relations. In the past, Heydar Aliyev accepted Iranian assistance in setting up large refugee camps in Azerbaijan. Iran feared a huge influx of Azeri refugees that could fill up the ethnic Azeri minority in northern Iran. In February 1992, Azerbaijan joined the Economic Cooperation Organization, which Iran considered as a forerunner of the Islamic Common Market. In October 1996, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to Nakhichevan. [44]

The first Armenian-Azerbaijani war that broke out around Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-1994) highlighted Tehran's position. Initially, Iran supported its Shia comrades-in-arms in Azerbaijan with loans, weapons and ammunition (apparently hoping for the successful export of its ideas). However, after Baku began to establish ties with Turkey, the United States and Israel, Tehran began to gravitate towards Armenia. [45]

Iran has always recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and considered as part of Azerbaijan seven regions that came under the control of Armenia during the Karabakh war (1992-1994), but were not part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region during the Soviet era. However, it also maintained good relations with Armenia. The status quo, which was in effect from 1994 to 2020, was beneficial to Iran. Iran serves as a link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Turkish goods also enter Asian markets through Iran. [46]

Relations between Baku and Tehran deteriorated after the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. Tehran has repeatedly stated that changing the borders in the Caucasus would be tantamount to a "red line". At a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held on July 19, 2020 in Tehran, Khamenei said: "If attempts are made to

close the border between Iran and Armenia, the Islamic Republic will oppose it, because this border has been a communication route for thousands of years.” [47] It should be noted that Azerbaijanis in northern Iran staged public celebrations after Azerbaijan's victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 and demanded the closure of the Iranian-Armenian border after the war. [48]

At the end of the summer of 2020, publications concerning South Azerbaijan appeared in the Azerbaijani media. “The time has come: South Azerbaijan must secede from Iran,” such a headline appeared on August 26, 2020 on the website Caliber.az, which is associated with the presidential administration of Azerbaijan. An unknown author wrote, referring to the Iranian Azerbaijanis: “The Azerbaijani state has sufficient mobilization power to protect the rights of its compatriots.” [47]

It should be noted that Türkiye also uses the Azerbaijani factor in its anti-Iranian policy. In December 2020, a political scandal erupted. The Turkish president uttered a few lines from a folk song about the reunification of the lands along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border during a military parade in Baku on December 10, 2020, drawing criticism from Tehran. After that, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Turkish Ambassador to the country, Deryu Orsa, to hand him a note of protest. [49] In response to Erdogan's actions, a demonstration was held outside the Turkish consulate in Iranian Tabriz. The participants spoke out for the territorial integrity of Iran and condemned the actions of the Turkish President. [50]

Conclusion

The Turks, including the natives of Azerbaijan, had a considerable influence on the history of Iran. Despite certain difficulties associated with discrimination suffered by Azerbaijanis in Iran after the fall of the Qajar dynasty (1925), after the Islamic revolution (1979), representatives of this people managed to take their place in the political structure of Iran. In addition, the majority

of Azerbaijanis feel like Iranians, and ethnic origin for them goes by the wayside.

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OLGA BIBIKOVA. "NON-CITIZENS" IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Keywords: bidoons; non-citizens; stateless persons; migrant workers; naturalization; deportation; Jus soli; Jus sanguinis.

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Abstract. The countries of the Arabian Peninsula are young states in which the measures forming state institutions (drawing borders, population census, legislative acts, etc.) have not yet been fully implemented. Huge revenues from the extraction and sale of oil and gas allow the rulers of these states to hire labor abroad, multiplying their wealth at their expense. These funds allow a part of the indigenous population with political rights to lead a rentier lifestyle without participating in economic life. At the same time, there is a separate

category of the indigenous population ("non-citizens") who, being local natives, do not have civil rights. Obtaining citizenship for them is complicated by conditions, difficult of accomplishment.

The word "non-citizens" entered the Russian everyday lexicon recently, after the law "The status of citizens of the former USSR who do not have either Latvian or other citizenship" was adopted in Latvia. At the same time, even those who were born in this country can fall into this category. In Latvia, almost a third of the population - about 700 thousand Russian speakers - received the status of "non-citizens". Russian-speaking residents of the country were deprived of voting rights, excluded from privatization programs, the Russian language and education in it were eradicated.¹ However, it turned out that in other countries there is also a similar category of the population.

In 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees presented a report according to which the problems of non-citizens affect 3 per cent of the world's population or 175 million people.²

According to the generally accepted definition, "citizenship is a legal relationship between a person and the state, expressed in the totality of their mutual rights, duties and responsibilities."³

In 1954, the UN adopted the Convention on the Status of non-citizens (otherwise stateless persons) - Conventions des Nations Unies sur l'apatridie, which established the minimum standards for relations between the state and this category of persons, but only 66 countries signed it. The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness - Convention sur la réduction des cas d'apatridie (1961) was signed by even fewer - 38 states. What is it connected with? With unwillingness to take responsibility and expenses for the care of these people. As of September 2018, only 75 states have ratified the convention.⁴

The category of non-citizens primarily includes refugees. Let us immediately note the closeness of the concepts of refugees and migrants. According to the UN documents (Convention 1951⁵), refugees (from the word *refuge*, (asylum)) are persons who

have left their country due to extraordinary circumstances. Saving their lives, they cross only one border. If a refugee continues on his way, then he is already a migrant – political or economic. That is, if a person moved to another country based on economic interests, and not as a result of some cataclysms that threaten his life, or political views, then he is an economic migrant. Otherwise, if he claims the status of a political refugee, he must provide evidence that he is persecuted in his country for political reasons. In any case, obtaining the citizenship of a new country takes time, and a person within a certain period receives the status of non-citizens (the category of “citizenship seekers”). This explains the behavior of those who started in Turkey in 2015 and, in an effort to obtain refugee status in Germany, Sweden or the UK, crossed several borders. Non-citizens can conditionally include refugees, migrants, guest workers. But of particular interest is the situation of people who do not have citizenship in the country where they were born. Anticipating our analysis, we note that non-citizenship (or statelessness) often arises as a result of the deliberate actions of governments seeking, for various reasons, to ignore a part of the inhabitants, not counting them in the population census, although they have the right to residence and legal protection in the country.

Statelessness can be inherited, despite the fact that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly provide that children have the right to acquire a nationality. Most often this happens in countries where citizenship is determined “by blood”.

There are two types of citizenship: “by soil” – *Jus soli* (for example, in the US, citizenship determines the place of birth) or “by blood” – *Jus sanguinis*, that is, by the citizenship of parents. Most often by the citizenship of the father (Syria and Lebanon). It is also allowed by the citizenship of both or one of the parents (Turkey, Russia). The list of countries that have not signed the convention, but where there is a problem of statelessness, includes the following Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,

UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. There are still hostilities in Syria and Iraq, so there are no reliable data on the number of non-citizens.

In Arab countries, such people are called BIDOON. “*Bidoon*” is short for جنسية بدون (bidūn jinsiyya), which means stateless in Arabic. Traditionally, only the first part of this expression is used – “*bidoon*”, consisting of two prepositions “*bi*” – with and “*dun*” – without. That is, those who do not have citizenship.

Arabian Monarchies

Kuwait

This country has the largest number of non-citizens in the Arabian Peninsula. Most of them belong to the northern tribes, mainly to the Al-Muntafiq tribal confederation. Even before gaining independence, in 1959, the emirate passed the “Citizenship Law”, which required the applicant for citizenship to confirm their permanent residence in the emirate as of 1920. These people received citizenship of the first degree. Those who could prove their continued residence in the country (from 1945 for Arabs or from 1930 for non-Arabs) were granted second-degree citizenship, without political rights.

Between 1959 and 1965 four citizenship committees were set up to decide on granting citizenship. At that time, oral evidence from respected people was allowed. However, they were subjective in nature, which is why the procedure was delayed. In addition, the Bedouins living in the desert were not aware of the possibility of citizenship in advance or did not realize its importance. Thus, for a part of the population of Kuwait, the issue of citizenship has not yet been resolved.

According to the law, “native Kuwaitis” (أصيل / pl. ناصيل) are the descendants of persons who have permanently resided in Kuwait since 1899. The Kuwaiti authorities take advantage of this

circumstance, arguing that the tribes arrived in Kuwait too late, and do not take into account the fact that during that period there was no special campaign to involve the non-settled population in the population census. Indeed, at that time there were not even clearly defined borders between states. The Kuwaiti-Saudi border was finally established in its current position only in 1965.⁶

At the same time, the *bidoons* were asked to join the armed forces, police and security services. The fact is that there were not enough native Kuwaitis to work at the lower levels of these structures. The military did not allow the recruitment of foreigners, so Kuwait preferred to recruit people whose citizenship applications were pending.

Until 1986, these people still hoped to obtain citizenship. However, on December 29, 1986, a secret document was signed, which later, in 2003, was published by the opposition Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Talia (Vanguard). It reclassified the *bidoons* as “illegal residents”, implying the loss of even the benefits they enjoyed while their status remained uncertain. Characteristically, the authorities have never refuted it.

The reasons for passing this law were related to the economy: low oil prices, the consequences of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) and the population displacement caused by it.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 exacerbated the situation of applicants for Kuwaiti citizenship, since it was from among the *bidoons* that the army was formed. As you know, the Kuwaiti army was defeated, and the country was saved from occupation by the Iraqi army by an international coalition.

After the war in Kuwait, a campaign was launched against the military and, in particular, against the *bidoons*, who were called “traitors”. Their loyalty to the ruling dynasty was questioned. Together with them, the Palestinians were also ostracized, and as a result were deported from the country. The latter is explained by the fact that, starting the invasion of Kuwait, S. Hussein said that he was fighting for justice, trying to return the lands that were once part of Iraq, and his second goal

was to liberate the Palestinian lands occupied by Israel with the help of Kuwaiti money. "Arab Street" was on the side of Baghdad. Therefore, after the end of hostilities, the Palestinians were massively deported from Kuwait.

Obtaining Kuwaiti citizenship is extremely difficult. After the war with Iraq, in order to make up for the loss of the population (primarily male), the government invited its people to return to the old tradition – polygamy. At the same time, special courses were created for widows who agreed to become a second or third wife ... In addition, the government invited young people from related tribes (even from Iraq) to the country, offering them a special program that precedes entry into Kuwaiti society.

According to Claire Beaugrand,⁷ the number of *bidoons* in Kuwait reaches 100 thousand, which, as of 2020, is almost per cent of the indigenous population of the country.⁸ The official policy of the government is to try to force the *bidoons* to confess their foreign / non-Kuwaiti ancestry. Such a solution to such a painful issue practically removes responsibility from the state for the fate of these people. However, the consequences of such a decision are not predictable.

Within Kuwaiti society there is no consensus on the current situation. There are those who believe that there is a historical injustice towards the *bidoons*, others categorically do not even want to discuss this problem.

Qatar

With a small territory (11 thousand km²), Qatar is one of the richest countries in the world. Qatar is home to about 2.9 million people, but only 10 per cent are indigenous citizens of the country. It is they who are subject to high salaries (USD 10 000), high pensions, free medical care and education (including abroad), no income tax, financial support for newlyweds, subsidies for housing and communal services, as well as numerous payments on the occasion of various holidays.

The source of this country's wealth is one of the world's largest natural gas deposits North Field. According to OPEC Statistical Bulletin for 2021 Qatar's proven natural gas reserves account for 12 per cent of the world's total reserves; it ranks third in the world after Russia and Iran.⁹ For the end of 2020 its proved reserves were estimated at 23,831 billion cubic meters.¹⁰

This circumstance allows Qataris to hire labor abroad, since indigenous Qataris can easily afford not to engage in heavy or unskilled work, preferring managerial positions or private businesses. As for foreign workers, they receive low wages and perform their work sometimes at temperatures exceeding 40 degrees Celsius. Many NGOs describe this situation as modern slavery.¹¹

Qatari citizenship is determined solely by the origin of the father, who holds a Qatari passport. It is possible to acquire citizenship by investment, but such cases are extremely rare. At the same time, citizens of countries that are members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC)¹² can stay in Qatar for indefinite time.

The country has its own *bidoons*. In 2004, the Emir's decision revoked the Qatari citizenship of the Al-Ghufran tribe. The fact is that the father of Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the current emir, organized a coup, overthrowing his father. The al-Ghufran tribe expressed dissatisfaction, for which it was punished – its members were deported to the border with Saudi Arabia. Protest demonstrations in the country and abroad did not bring results. The Emir of Qatar claimed that during the deportation, members of the tribe received citizenship of a neighboring state – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).¹⁴ Since then, representatives of the al-Ghufran tribe in their native homeland are undesirable. The reason for such negativism is, as noted by the Russian researcher A.R. Aganin "tribalism, which is still a very important aspect of relations between indigenous Qataris, and tribal ties that are invisible to an outsider sometimes play a major role in shaping Qatar's domestic and foreign policy."¹⁵

United Arab Emirates

The UAE economy is the second largest after Saudi Arabia among the Gulf countries. It has huge oil and gas reserves, as well as a large consumer market. This allows the indigenous population to live quite well, especially since the country has developed a social support system for indigenous people.¹⁶

The sponsorship system is *kafala* widely used here, which fact makes it possible to control the foreign labor market. The essence of the system is that a foreigner receives a work permit from a specific employer who is responsible for the foreign worker. Despite the fact that the right of a foreigner for residence and work permit is justified by Federal Law (No. 6 of 1973), a guest worker is not protected from the arbitrariness of the employer. Moreover, it is almost impossible for an employee to contact their guardian (*kafil*) in case of a conflict.

This system, which is often called a euphemism, as an essential element of economic life, provides income and security for citizens, real rent. The World Trade Organization (WTO) condemns this practice, as it contradicts the freedom of movement of people and capital and is a source of human exploitation.

The UAE ranks among the first in the world in terms of employing foreign workers. As of 2013, guest workers accounted for up to 80 per cent of the country's population.¹⁷ Most foreign migrant workers come from Asian countries such as India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan.¹⁸ Some of the technical specialists, as well as doctors, came from Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Highly qualified specialists from Europe and the US also work here.

The vast majority of expats working in the Persian Gulf countries, are people from Asia. Natives of India make up more than half of the population of the United Arab Emirates: 1.7 million of the approximately 3 million immigrants living in these small states. They are followed by Pakistanis, Iranians, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Nepalese and Filipinos.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic that broke out in 2020, many migrants in Dubai you lost your jobs. Some businessmen took advantage of the situation to break their contracts. Many workers lost their homes, huddled on the streets and with great difficulty returned to their homeland.

Foreign workers are the most vulnerable category of the population. They cannot obtain UAE citizenship, but they can lose their right to work at any time. However, the UAE government has introduced exemptions for foreigners who want to become a citizen of this country. However, to do this, they must own real estate or make investments in the country's economy. The minimum investment amount is 1 million dirhams (20 million 550 thousand rubles). People in high-demand professions – doctors, engineers, scientists, etc. – they can also apply for an Emirati passport, but for this they (having 10 years of work experience in the UAE) must prove their professional level, including the presence of international diplomas and awards.

It seems that this new naturalization procedure was introduced exclusively for human rights organizations, which have long criticized the Governments of Arab States for having a large number of non-citizens in their countries.

Obtaining UAE citizenship is very difficult. It should be borne in mind that the State of the United Arab Emirates was established on December 2, 1971, when the rulers of six emirates signed an agreement on the creation of a federation. Three months later, the 7th Emirate, Ras Al Khaimah, joined the agreement. The legislation of each emirate has its own conditions for those who wish to obtain citizenship. In fact, even a child born to a mother who is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates cannot expect to receive a UAE passport. The exception is for the children whose father holds a passport of one of the emirates.

The backbone of UAE citizens is made up of natives of local tribes, almost all of whom know their origin. In addition to them, citizenship was granted to those who managed to take root here

before the 1930s – for example, Hindus who are engaged in the pearl trade.

As for the Bedouins belonging to different tribes, there are still some *bidoons* among them. In the federal Law on Citizenship and Passports of the United Arab Emirates (1972), it is stated that any Arab has the right to receive the following documents: UAE citizenship, if his ancestor lived in this territory before 1925. It remains only to prove that his father or grandfather really lived in one of the emirates that later became part of the UAE. Naturally, in modern conditions, it is necessary to document the presence of ancestors who lived in the country before 1925 quite difficult.

The key role in solving this problem is played by *nasab* – a noble genealogy of the tribe and its members that you need to know by heart. Traditionally, the names of most indigenous people in the UAE include the name of the tribe: for example, “Ahbabi”, that is, originating from the genus “Ahabab”. Sometimes the name has a more complex construction: Al Bu-Shamis. In this case, “Bu” or “bani” can be translated as “son or descendant” of a distant ancestor, for example, Bani Yas, Bani Hamad, Bani Kaab.

Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has also established a hard-to-prove date of 1332 AD = 1914 for applicants for citizenship of the Kingdom. The total population of the Kingdom is 36 million. Non-citizens / *bidoons* in the country, numbers to about 25 per cent. Foreigners in the country account for approximately 55–60 per cent of the employed¹⁹, which is less than in neighboring countries. The Kingdom began to restore order in the field of attracting foreign labor earlier than its neighbors. However, researchers believe that the available statistics do not reflect the actual situation, because there are many illegal immigrants in the country, despite periodic deportations.

The Saudis do not publish data on the number of foreign workers and specialists. But the problem will soon arise, as the country's population is growing slowly. As a result of advances in health care, the population explosion is being replaced by a reduction in the birth rate. The country's fertility rate has fallen, from about seven children per woman in the 20th century to 2.4 in 2016.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who became Prime Minister on September 22, 2022, decided to reduce the number of foreigners working, including those in administrative positions. For this purpose, a plan was prepared for the "Saudiization" of personnel. However, the implementation of this plan is progressing extremely slowly. The fact is that with the existing quality of education, where the theological sciences are in the first place, former Bedouins cannot quickly replace qualified foreigners.²⁰ Probably, it was the understanding of the impossibility of quickly replacing foreigners with their own national cadres that influenced the fact that the procedure for obtaining a Saudi passport is more liberal than in other countries.

Thus, children born in a mixed marriage – to foreign women and a Saudi citizen – are eligible for citizenship of the Kingdom. A child born in Saudi Arabia to a non-Saudi father and a Saudi mother and who has reached the age of majority is also eligible for a Saudi passport if the following conditions are met: they must have permanent residence in the Kingdom, be fluent in Arabic, and prove that the mother's grandfather was a Saudi. But in this case, to obtain citizenship, you must obtain a special document *al-mu'afaka* (الموافقة – approval, Arabic) from the highest authorities of the country (i.e. from the king). If a Saudi woman marries a foreigner, she loses her right to Saudi citizenship. However, if she divorces her foreign husband, she can restore it, provided that she returns to her homeland after the divorce.

The kingdom's authorities understand that the country lacks qualified personnel, so they are interested in attracting foreign specialists. A foreigner can apply for citizenship if they

meet the following conditions: you must be an adult who has lived continuously in the Kingdom for 10 years, has legal means of earning a living, has no criminal record, and speaks Arabic.²¹

There are tribes in the kingdom that still roam, crossing borders with neighboring states. At the end of the 18th century, Arab Bedouins forced Istanbul to pay them, allegedly for protecting caravans going to Mecca. In fact, this payment provided for the refusal of Bedouins from attacking and robbing the caravan. At the end of the 19th century many Bedouins began to adopt a semi-nomadic lifestyle. At the same time, territories were gradually assigned to individual tribes. Nevertheless, even today there are many tribes that prefer to lead a nomadic lifestyle, and which can be classified as *bidoons*.

Oman

The population of Oman is close to 7 million people, of which more than half a million are foreigners. Their number has increased markedly since the early 1990s. The share of foreigners in the total population of Oman is, of course, lower than the share in the labor force. However, the foreign labor force accounts for up to 40 per cent of the employed.²² This is due to the fact that the sultanate started oil production later than other states in the Arabian region, its reserves are not very large, and the overall level of technological development here is lower than in other GCC countries.

In ancient times, the peninsula became a major producer of incenses and maintained extensive trade with various states in Asia and Africa. That is why the country is home to a significant number of foreigners, mainly from India. Pakistan and Iran people who settled there before the spread of Islam. As a result, a special social climate was formed, characterized by full recognition of religious freedom.

After the pandemic COVID-19 the number of foreign workers (as of March 2021) has significantly decreased, which affects construction, real estate, services, and retail sales. In 2020,

due to the COVID-19 crisis and the oil shock, the government took measures to improve the economy. As a result, oil production in Oman increased by 10 per cent in 2022. As the country's oil reserves will soon be depleted, Oman is paying more attention to developing gas production. The new Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said, who was elected after the death of Sultan Qaboos in 2020, announced that his policies will focus on reducing the national debt and creating jobs, especially for young people. According to some sources, the unemployment rate among 18-30-year-olds in Oman exceeds 20 per cent. In May 2021, there were riots in the country. To keep the situation under control, the authorities promised to take certain measures to create jobs in the public and private sectors and provide additional social benefits.²³

The fact is that 2/3 of the territory of Oman is occupied by deserts and dunes, where there are few water sources and no vegetation. On the outskirts of the Rub al-Khali desert, which is not suitable for farming, you can only breed camels. Nevertheless, people have invented a kind of irrigation system *falaj*,²⁴ which turn small oases into gardens. Water from underground sources under the influence of gravity is sent to long distances, providing agriculture and household needs. The mountain Bedouin economy, based on a semi-sedentary existence, focuses on raising sheep that produce milk, meat, wool, and leather. The country also has Bedouin fishermen who live on the coast of Eastern Arabia, where the sea basin is very deep, but close to the coast. Millions of sardines pass through it at certain times of the year. The Government of Oman is trying to organize permanent settlements of local Bedouins in order to create a center for the production of canned fish, but meets with resistance. The reason is that from June to October the area is experiencing a storm and strong winds. And then the locals go to the oasis of Bilad Bani Bu Hasan inland to collect dates. This circumstance does not allow them to finally decide on their place of residence. Explaining this behavior, some experts believe that

this is the result of the distrust that Bedouins feel towards the authorities. It is well known that the local Bedouins prefer to distance themselves from the inhabitants of the cities, reflecting the ancient Bedouin skepticism towards the settled Arabs, who were contemptuously called "Felhi". We also recall that slavery in this country was abolished only in 1960. Naturally, at this level of development, the issue of citizenship is not a matter of principle.

The citizenship of Oman is recognized for everyone who was born here, regardless of the citizenship of their parents.²⁵ Such liberalism corresponds to the mentality of not only Arabs, but also foreigners who live in this country. We can say that corporate culture is present here, and it is unique in its kind, representing a mixture of Arab culture and the culture of newcomers (Western and Asian), since the country has always had a large number of foreign workers.

Bahrain

The situation in Bahrain is quite different from other countries in the region due to the fact that the state has practically stopped oil production, which has led to a reduction in the foreign labor force in the oil sector. In addition, the procedure for naturalization of foreigners has been simplified here, which allowed some immigrants to obtain Bahraini citizenship.

Bahrain is a small kingdom with a population of 1.3 million people, of which up to 70 per cent of the population professes Shiism. The ruling Al-Khalifa dynasty and its supporting tribes belong to the Maliki madhhab of Sunnism. Key posts, as well as the leadership of law enforcement agencies, are given exclusively to representatives of the Khalifa tribe, which professes Sunnism. According to the Ministry of Labor, only 156,000 Bahrainis were registered as working in 2015 compared to 538.5 thousand foreigners.²⁶

In 2011, anti-government protests called the "Arab Spring" that engulfed Arab States, demonstrations in the country sparked

demanding greater political freedom.²⁷ A month later, at the request of the government, Saudi troops were brought into the country. The protest was suppressed on March 15, 2011 as a result of the simultaneous intervention of the Bahraini security forces and Saudi troops under the cover of the GCC's Gulf Shield forces²⁸.

In the end, King Hamad promised the citizens of the country to pay 1000 dinars (approx. 80k rubles) rubles) for each family. Naturally, non-citizens were not entitled to this amount. However, the events of 2011 showed that the authorities, stigmatizing Shiites, radicalized the Sunni population and created prerequisites for new protests.

Among the Bedouin tribes living in the kingdom, there are Sunnis and Shiites. The latter are not considered trustworthy in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, as devout Shiites almost annually make pilgrimages to the holy places of Shiism located in Iran and Iraq. Amid the long-running rivalry between the Saudi Kingdom and Iran, Shiites are often harassed. In 2011, authorities took advantage of anti-Government protests to destroy 43 Shiite mosques and places of worship.²⁹ Later, the Minister of Justice of the kingdom said that only those buildings were demolished, which were built without permission.

It is known that the government is trying to patronize Sunnis, facilitating their naturalization process. The number of non-citizens in the country is not known, as the authorities do not publish demographic data.

Non-citizens in the country are mostly descendants of Iranians who have lived in the country since ancient times. In addition to Shia Moslems, there are also Christians. All non-citizens are deprived of many rights: they are denied the right to legal residence, are not allowed to travel abroad, buy homes, or hold public office. They are also not allowed to own land, start businesses, or take out bank loans. The Bahraini Government recently issued regulations prohibiting them from sending their children to public schools and receiving free medical care. Stateless persons can also be deported at any time. The Bahraini

government is known to have deported hundreds of Bidoons to Iran since the early 1980s.³⁰

The right to Bahraini citizenship is regulated by the Citizenship Act of 16.09.1963. Foreigners rarely obtain Bahraini citizenship. Only the King has discretion to grant and select Bahraini citizenship. In particular, since 2011, the Bahraini Government has revoked the citizenship of about 1,000 prominent opposition figures and activists. A child born to a Bahraini father becomes a citizen of the Kingdom, regardless of the nationality of the mother and the place of birth. The child of a Bahraini mother and a foreign father is not eligible for Bahraini citizenship.³¹

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Thus, the problem of non-citizens in the Arabian monarchies is a painful issue. In the context of the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the authorities prevent the naturalization of Shiites.

In a number of countries, there is a tendency to reduce foreign personnel and replace them with national ones. However, to implement this reform, it is necessary, first of all, to review the education system in order to instill labor skills in the indigenous population, and to create training centers for training personnel.

Another problem is finding out the ethnic and state affiliation of some Bedouin tribes. They still exist in almost all Arab countries. It is obvious that nomadic tribes cannot be eradicated, so it is necessary to create conditions for them under which young people can abandon the tradition and acquire a settled profession. Naturally, where tribal traditions, an important tool for mobilizing and controlling large human communities, are dominant, it is important to reduce the impact of tribalism, which is now seen as an obstacle for public projects, including solving the problem of non-citizenship in a particular country.

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ELENA DMITRIEVA, VALENTINA SCHENSNOVICH. PROBLEMS OF GRAIN SUPPLY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE CONDITIONS OF SMO

Keywords: SMO in Ukraine; Western sanctions; grain supplies; developing countries; Lebanon; Egypt; Libya; Tunisia; Africa, Middle East; Southeast Asia; Latin America.

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Abstract. In response to the SMO in Ukraine, the Western alliance led by the United States imposed economic sanctions against Russia, which led to the disruption of grain supplies, creating a threat to food security. Russia and Ukraine account for over a third of world grain exports and are key players in the global food system.

In February 2022, Russia launched a Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine. In response, the West imposed large-scale economic sanctions against Russia, which led to a violation of grain supplies and created a threat to food security. Ukraine and Russia are among the key participants in the global food system, as together they provide more than a third of the world's grain exports.

Under these conditions, Russian food exports faced refusals to insure and service ships in ports, and Rosselkhozbank, through which the payment of Russian agricultural products took place, was disconnected from the international system of interbank payments SWIFT. As a result, developing countries suffered from these actions. A food crisis broke out in the world, as a result of which Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt suffered the greatest damage.

Egypt, along with Lebanon, imports 75 per cent of wheat from Russia and Ukraine. In the first months of the conflict, not a single ship with grain arrived from Ukraine, which forced the governments of dependent countries to resort to emergency measures. By early March 2022, Egyptian authorities had to

encourage farmers to sell more wheat to the state. They raised purchase prices, set quotas and threatened farmers with jail in case they failed. Moreover, the economic crisis in Egypt led to the repeated devaluation of the Egyptian pound.

In Tunisia, in the spring of 2022, on the eve of the Ramadan holiday, all shelves were emptied in supermarkets: flour, cereals, sugar and eggs were almost impossible to find. In addition, since December 2019, due to the lack of financial stability, the Tunisian government has been forced to pay cash for imports. Given the lack of funds and frozen imports from Ukraine, goods were kept in offshore pending payment.

In May 2022, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres suggested easing restrictions on suppliers of Russian fertilizers in exchange for the passage of ships with grain from the ports of Ukraine. In turn, the Turkish authorities said they could provide security guarantees for the supply of Ukrainian grain by the Black Sea. On May 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a telephone conversation with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said that the Russian party was ready to export fertilizers and food, granting the lifting of sanctions from Moscow. On July 22, 2022, the signing of the so-called “grain deal” took place at the Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul. It should be noted that under the terms of the agreement, it is planned to automatically extend the grain transaction when its term comes to an end.

Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement on grain exports separately: each of the countries signed a document with Turkey and the UN. At the same time, a Memorandum of Understanding was concluded in Istanbul between the Russian Federation and the UN secretariat on assistance to promote Russian food and fertilizers to world markets, according to which the UN was supposed to join in the work to remove restrictions that impede the export of Russian products and fertilizers. The term of the agreements was 3 years.

In August 2022, ships with grain finally left Ukraine in accordance with the agreement on a safe passage between Moscow and Kyiv, which was signed in July with the mediation of Turkey

and the UN. Thus, the first ship with the Ukrainian grain Razoni under the flag of Sierra Leone headed for Lebanon. However, the Lebanese buyer refused the cargo, alleging grain quality problems due to a five-month delay in shipment. As a result, the cargo was sold to Turkey.

By mid-November 2022, over 10 million tons of grain were exported from Ukraine along the sea grain corridor. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, 51 per cent of supplies were for developed countries and only 3 per cent to those states that the UN calls "the poorest."

The Russian authorities have repeatedly stated that some points of the deal were not complied, according to which grain should flow to the poorest countries. Promises to lift sanctions on Russian shipping engaged in grain and fertilizer exports have not been fulfilled. After the aggravation of the situation in October 2022 (it was a terrorist attack on the Crimean bridge, an impact with the ships and structures of the Russian Navy, which were involved in ensuring the safety of the grain corridor), Russia announced the suspension of its participation in the grain deal. However, having received written guarantees from the Ukrainian party that it would not use the Black Sea corridor for military purposes, Russia resumed the grain deal on November 2, 2022. In turn, Erdogan said that an agreement was also reached with the Russian Federation on the supply of grain to the poor countries of Africa, in particular to Djibouti and Sudan.

It should be noted that the countries of North Africa are the world's largest importers of wheat. Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya grow less than half the amount of cereal consumed and import about half of their food needs. About a fourth of the population of these countries faces food shortages.

Thus, despite the obstacles created by the United States and the European Union, the supply of Russian grain was not interrupted to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, and recently is even growing.

One of the buyers of our grain and petroleum products is Lebanon. In the near future, Lebanon is waiting for the supply of 25 thousand tons of wheat and 10 thousand tons of fuel from Russia. In March 2023, Lebanese Ambassador to the Russian Federation Shauki Bu Nassar said that Moscow is working on logistics to transport grain and fuel to the port of Beirut. Lebanon has been struggling with a deep financial and economic crisis for more than three years, where up to 70 per cent of the population is below the poverty line. As for the countries of Africa, instead of the countries of Africa, Ukrainian wheat got, for example, to Spain to feed cattle. The bulk of the Ukrainian grain sent through Turkey did not go to poor countries of Asia or Africa, as originally planned, but to Spain, which offered a higher price for wheat. The fact is that Spain is one of the largest pork producers in the world, and 2.9 million tons of wheat and corn from Ukraine as a result were to feed cattle.

In due time, the slogan “Without wheat from the granary of Europe – Ukraine – the poorest countries in Asia and Africa face endemic hunger” was the EU’s main argument in negotiations with Russia when it came to exporting millions of tons of Ukrainian wheat through Turkey. Russian President V.V. Putin agreed to this project. When the first ships unmoored of the coast of Ukraine, this event was celebrated all over the world. But instead of the poorest countries, Spain became the main buyer of grain, although the Spaniards produce enough grain for their own needs. And in the countries of the third world (Ethiopia and Sudan) only about 15 per cent of Ukrainian export grain were received.

Russia has been the world leader in wheat exports for six years. More than 120 million tons of grain are harvested from the fields annually, two-thirds of which are wheat. At the end of 2022, about 150 million tons of grain were harvested in the Russian agricultural sector. Thus, the harvest of 2022 turned out to be the largest in the history of the Russian Federation. Internal needs for cereals have already been provided, and the crop that has exceeded all expectations allows us to increase supplies abroad.

Russia has been leading in wheat exports since 2016; 138 countries of the world buy Russian grain. Cereals account for 33 per cent of all Russian food exports. Wheat from Russia accounts for 20 per cent of global exports and 78 per cent of Russian grain exports. Next come Canada and the United States (17 per cent each) and Ukraine and France (12 per cent of the market each) close the list of the largest exporters. Wheat is imported mainly by countries in Africa and the Middle East, as well as Southeast Asia and Latin America with arid climatic conditions. In 2022, Russia exported about 30 million tons of grain to these regions.

According to the logistics company Logistic OS, in the first two months of 2023, Russian wheat exports almost doubled. The Bloomberg news agency admitted that importers of Russian grain have adapted to sanctions and are ready to increase purchases.

The grain deal was scheduled to end on March 18, 2023, but the Russian President extended the deal for two months until May 18 and then for another 60 days until mid-July. By July 17, 2023, no requirements of the Russian Federation within the framework of the grain transaction were fulfilled and the Russian Foreign Ministry said that the transaction was suspended from July 18, 2023 until these requirements were fulfilled. The Russian Foreign Ministry drew attention to the fact that Moscow will be ready to consider the restoration of the grain deal only if specific results are obtained, and not assurances.

The demand for Russian grain is now high. As a result, in January-February 2023, marine wheat exports increased by almost 90 per cent compared to the same period in 2022. Food did not fall under sanctions, but the restrictions imposed on Russian state-owned companies and banks significantly hampered grain trade. Hundreds of thousands of tons of Russian fertilizers have not yet been exported by sea from Europe, but Russian exporters supply huge quantities of wheat abroad.

As we have already noted, the main importers of Russian grain are the countries of the Middle East, primarily Turkey and

Egypt. At least a million tons were exported by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria, Libya, Sudan.

Exports of Ukrainian grain, unlike Russian, decreased over the year. In Kyiv, they blame the decline in exports on the slow work of Russian inspectors checking, according to the terms of the agreement, ships with grain. In total, the export of Ukrainian grain (including transportation by road and rail) was almost 25 per cent lower than expected during the specified period.

It should be noted that 50 countries of the world, including the least developed countries, are 30 per cent or more dependent on Russia and Ukraine for wheat supplies.

In the context of increasing rates of climate change and the number of extreme weather events (droughts, floods), crops are destroyed and become less productive, and livestock are reduced. Due to global warming from 2000 to 2019, the number of droughts increased by 29 per cent and continues to grow rapidly. Although droughts account for only 15 per cent of all natural disasters, they account for 45 per cent of deaths associated with natural disasters. In 2022, up to 323 million people suffered from acute food shortages. Currently, more than 2.3 billion people around the world are affected by an arid climate.

If the Ukrainian government continues to pursue destructive policies, the problem of grain supplies to developing countries will worsen. The negotiations that are being held on the grain deal are crucial for solving the problem of grain supplies, since the Russian party has repeatedly pointed out that the provisions of the deal that relate to the export of Russian food and fertilizers to world markets are not being implemented.

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SWETLANA POGORELSKAYA. MOSLEMS IN GERMANY: IS RADICALIZATION POSSIBLE?

*Keywords: internal policy of Germany;
Islamic community of Germany; Islamic
terrorism; Islamic Conference of Germany.*

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Abstract. The potential danger of radicalization of the Islamic diaspora of Germany is considered in connection with the ethnic composition, religious characteristics and in the context of measures taken by the state to integrate Islam and to prevent Islamic terrorism.

The involvement of the EU countries in the Russian – Ukrainian conflict on the side of Ukraine and the related debate about the intensity and limits of participation in it, displaced from the news feeds of the Western media the topic of Islamic radicalism in the EU as thoroughly as this topic for Europe no longer exists. However, has Europe ceased to exist for radical Islam, has it lost interest in it in the same way as Europe (at least on paper) – in it?

The proposed short article on the German example will attempt to show that the constellations that took place in previous years, seriously disturbing the German security services and reflected in the German media, aren't going anywhere. In theory, radicalization of the Muslim diaspora is still possible. However, by what parameters?

In the article, the likely radical potential of the Muslim community in Germany will be considered in connection with the ethnic and religious diversity of this community and in connection with the measures taken by state structures to prevent and combat Islamic terrorism.

Due to its internal political characteristics and the nature of its legal system, Germany has for too long rejected the very idea of obligatory integration of its Muslim diaspora into the life of the country, which originated with immigrant Islam, as well as the need to closely monitor the activities of its organizations. It was assumed that most of its members (migrant workers, refugees, members of their families) are in the country temporarily (from a

legal point of view, that is so), and Islam, especially during the period of opposition of the blocs, was generally considered an insignificant cultural feature of this social stratum, especially since the ideas of multiculturalism dominated domestic politics.

Thus, by the beginning of the new millennium, when the danger of Islamic terrorism acquired an obvious character for the Western countries and was widely thematized in politics and in the media space as a new threat, in Germany there was a very strong Muslim diaspora, diverse both ethnically and in the versions of Islam, functioning on parallel ways of the state's life and, in its nature, prone to radicalization. By this time, it was also clear that Muslims in Germany were for a long time, if not forever. They are part of the life of the country and, therefore, their own life, as well as the functioning of their organizations, must be integrated at least into the existing legal system.

The perception of the need to integrate Islam prompted German politics to dialogue with Muslim organizations and unions interested in it. At the same time, there was a political and legal marginalization of Islamic organizations that were not capable of internal political integration or were not interested in it. The government's course towards radical Islamic associations was significantly stiffened during the immigration crisis of 2014–2017, when the country received large contingents of Muslim refugees from the Middle East and when Islamic terrorism, which the Germans had previously heard only in the news from abroad, came to Germany, or rather returned Germany. As it was represented in it for a long time, it did not advertise its considerable potential in it, and even more so did not demonstrate it in terrorist actions within the country. It lived in Germany, and went to fight to other countries. During the confrontation of the blocs and in the first ten years after its end, Germany – out of ideological grounds and within the framework of its own, legislation on the provision of “political asylum” which has not changed significantly for many years, – generously endowed the status of political refugees with persons persecuted for beliefs in

their countries. On these ways, it, among other things, absorbed the powerful and diverse forces of Islamists, from venerable ideologists-preachers (later called “preachers of hate”) [1] to radical militants, and these forces came to the country not to fight the German order, but to live in it legally and constantly. They reunited with families, bringing wives and numerous kinship to themselves, forming entire clans, recruited supporters from among the local Muslim youth, mainly the notorious “fourth generation of migrant workers” (youth who rejected integration and returned to their religious and ethnic identity), as well as from students and young scientists from Arab space who came to Germany to study.

The perception that for radical Islamic forces Germany of the 1990s became the country where they lived, consolidated and developed, emerged into German politics only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States. At this phase, German politics first paid close attention to its internal Islam and officially recognized that from the “cultural peculiarity” of migrants (migrant workers, refugees), Islam has turned into a powerful force that determines the daily life of a huge diaspora, i.e. part of the country’s permanent population, not to mention even more formally “temporary” migrants. The branching and formalization of Muslim structures within the country, the politicization and radicalization of professed Islam, as well as the fact that all this, being formally within the state, develops, nevertheless, in fact, outside it, became obvious.

Terrorist Islamist acts overtook Germany only as Salafi groups strengthened and during the migration crisis of 2014–2016 when the country was filled first with “wild” Muslim “refugees” not integrated into local structures, those who came to fight as soon as possible, and secondly, very young, poorly educated and poor people, leaving families in their countries and, by virtue of this, vulnerable to IS pressure and blackmail. At this time, Germany has been implementing a new strategy for several years to tame its internal law-abiding Islam through the permanent

institution of cooperation between the state and diaspora organizations – the Islamic Conference under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, encouraging moderate organizations and marginalizing the radicals. The new, radicalized masses have significantly slowed down the process of Islam integration.

A few words about what the diaspora is currently ethnically and religiously. Its most significant part is still Turkish, consisting of descendants of migrant workers who came to the country in the early 60s, as well as “refugees” accepted at different times due to their “persecution for beliefs” in Turkey. [2]

Guest workers, their offspring and their continuously replenishing kinship from Turkey are traditionally loyal to both Germany and the Turkish state, their mosques belong to the Turkish-run DITIB union and accept muftis appointed from Turkey. The second flow, which formed the Turkish diaspora for the most part in the 1980s and 1990s, consisted of persons admitted under the “Law on the Provision of Political Asylum” (until its first tightening in 1993). It consisted not only of Kurds, [3] but, often, of radical Muslims, and radical so much that they were persecuted by the Turkish authorities. It was such refugees who made a considerable contribution to the radicalization of Turkish Islam within Germany. Their mosques are mostly owned by the Milli Gyorush Union.

Germany’s next flow of Muslim diaspora formation is refugees from Arab space. The social structure of the Muslim population of Germany changed with their arrival, – the Turks from a social point of view represented a relatively prosperous group, while Arab refugees created a layer of socially needy and at the same time criminogenic Muslims (an example of the Abu Chaker clan in Berlin).

Before the immigration crisis in 2015–2017 about 63 per cent of Muslims living in Germany were of Turkish origin. In addition to them, Arabs, Bosnians, Pakistanis, Afghans, Chechens, Kosovo Albanians were represented. Due to the ethnic diversity of Muslims in Germany, almost all significant areas of Islam were

also represented: Turkish Sunnis dominated in number, they were followed by Shiites (Alevites, Iranian Imamites, Turkish Shiites, Ismailis), Sufi groups.

Having received during the migration crisis of 2014-2016, more than a million Muslims at once, Germany became the owner of the largest Islamic community in Europe (more than 5 million people).

The relatively stable Turkish diaspora and the rest, represented in Germany by Muslim organizations and unions, were opposed by a huge number of disorganized, restless Muslims from Arab countries after 2015. Germany formally accepted Syrian refugees in the first turn, but a considerable number of supposed Syrians were migrants from the Maghreb countries who bought Syrian passports in Istanbul. These were usually young men, sometimes even minors according to documents or without them at all.

Turkish Sunnis were concerned about the quantitative strengthening of Arab Islam. With the increase in the share of Arabs, organizations and groups belonging to the Central Council of Muslims of Germany, already known for their radical positions and competing with the Islamic Council of Germany intensified. [4] A stable conservative majority of the Turkish community does not support the radicalization of Islam in Germany.

* * *

In the last decade, Islam has been a matter of state concern and control in Germany. The country has a (mainly) well-coordinated, structured struggle against Islamism, involving both preventive and repressive measures and covering all levels of society - from state bodies to civil organizations. For this, the state has developed the appropriate tooling.

Since 2006, during the reign of the Grand Coalition (conservatives and social democrats), under the auspices of the

Ministry of Internal Affairs in Germany, the “Islamic Conference of Germany” began its work, which in our time has already justified itself not only as an institution of interaction between the state and a part of the Muslim community capable of integration, but also as a way to select Islam operating within the country in order to identify radical forces and prevent terrorist danger. Currently, special emphasis is placed on the “Germanization” of Islam so that within the framework of the subject “religion” it is taught to Muslim schoolchildren by teachers educated at German universities and that muftis educated in Germany, and not from Islamic countries, preach in mosques owned by organizations cooperating with the state. Thus, as the then Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer said in 2020, it is possible to “create alternatives to influence from abroad” [Deutsche Islamkonferenz...]. This new generation of imams has the hope of emancipation from Turkey, which controls the Ditib union and from Saudi Arabia, which maintained the “King Fahd Islamic Academy” [5] in Germany and offered Germany (indignantly rejected) assistance in the construction of new mosques.

Dialogue between the state and Islam is only one side of the state's activities aimed at preventing further separation and radicalization of Islam within the country. However, there is, of course, the other side – the direct struggle of the state with internal Islamism, the neutralization of its terrorist potential.

The anti-terrorist initiatives of the German authorities take place in the general legal field of the anti-terrorist struggle in the EU, since many European countries have strong Muslim diasporas. Suffice to say that in 2014–2015 more than 7,000 Islamists known to local intelligence agencies went to Syria and Iraq from the EU countries to fight for IS [BPB, Syrien...]. In Germany, Islamic terrorism is dealt with by several state security services. So, for example, the Federal Criminal Service, usually dealing with police issues, actively joined the fight. It began investigating Islamist-motivated crime back in 2000, but it ended up in the

crosshairs after information that terrorist Islamist attacks in the United States in 2001 were prepared by the Hamburg Cell.

In addition to it, the Federal Constitutional Defense Service, the Federal Intelligence Service, and the Military Intelligence Service deal with Islamism and Islamic terrorism, in the context of warning and combating it.

In 2004, the special services and the police created the Joint Center for the Prevention of Terrorism [BKA, Gemeinsames...] in Berlin, which, among other things, persecutes Islamic terrorism. This center was not allocated into a separate service, it was a coordination platform in which 8 federal and 32 land services combined their efforts, including internal, external and military intelligence, police, and the federal service for migrants and refugees.

In 2012, a similar "Joint Center for the Prevention of Extremism and Terrorism" was established in Cologne. The work of the services presented in it is coordinated in the following areas: daily monitoring, risk management, operational exchange of information, analysis of specific manifestations of Islamist terrorism, transnational aspects, personnel potential of Islamist terrorism, legal measures against Islamist terrorism, deradicalization.

During these years, according to the assurances of the special services, they managed to prevent several terrorist actions in Germany, which, according to them, were confirmation that Germany, like other European countries, "came in view" of terrorists. In fact, it, of course, has been in the field of view for a long time, but not as a place of assassination, but as a place of life. And the first successful Islamist terrorist attack in Germany was not directed against the Germans, and against American soldiers at Frankfurt Airport on Main in 2011. The situation transformed during the migration crisis, as noted above, the Muslim population of Germany in the course of receiving refugees has changed not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, in connection with the increase in the share of IS militants or young

people, who left families at home and therefore easily became victims of IS blackmail.

Since that time, there have been terrorist attacks against the local population. In 2016, several events occurred in Germany, overcrowded with “refugees,” defined by the police as terrorism on the portal of the Federal Criminal Service: a knife assault on a policeman in Hanover (February), a bomb explosion in a Sikh prayer hall in Essen (April), [6] an ax attack on passengers of a regional train in Würzburg (July), [7] an explosion in Bavarian Ansbach (July). [8] The largest terrorist attack of 2016 took place in December, at the Christmas market near a church in the Berlin district of Charlottenburg. [9] Again and again, the special services, according to their own data, prevented small terrorist acts (according to the Constitutional Defense Service, 15 Islamist assassination attempts were thwarted from 2016 to 2022) [BfV – Islamismus...], however, even in 2020, during a pandemic, a series of assassination attempts took place in Waldkreiburg (April), [10] shooting in Berlin on the Autobahn (August), [11] stabbing in Dresden (October). [12]

In addition to instant terrorists, the “Islamist scene” is monitored, i.e. the entire circle, to one degree or another associated with Islamism, as well as sympathetic to it. Here young people are radicalized, here new members are recruited into terrorist cells and they leave for training in boot camps of IS militants, [13] the so-called “German-speaking jihadism” is being formed. There is an increase in motivated young women, mainly family members who have taken over the “home office.” [14] Of the 1,150 Islamists known for 2022 to the German special services permanently residing in Germany who left for the Middle East in Iraq and Syria with the aim of training in Islamist camps or with the aim of supporting radical Islamist organizations - and are still there - 5 per cent are women. The vast majority of those leaving- are under the age of 30. [BfV – Islamismus...].

The returners, who are known to have been in IS training camps or fought for IS, are arrested at airports. The rest are

observed by the special services. The reasons for the returns are different, [15] someone (most often German convertibles) follows family pressure, others return to families living in Germany to relax and gather strength, although recently it has been noted that whole families travel to training camps, taking their children with them.

German special services also track the so-called "Dangerous persons" (Gefährder) who commit minor crimes and are seen in ties with Islamists known to the special services. For 2022, 630 such persons are under supervision, with 217 of them European convertibles, and 119 have German citizenship. Therefore, the issue of Islamic terrorism in Germany cannot be resolved by deportations alone.

As of July 2022 (these are the latest statistics so far) in Germany, according to the Constitutional Defense Service, 28,290 people identified as Islamists with terrorist potential lived. The largest group (over 11,000) are Salafis, followed by Milli Gyorush with 10,000, Muslim Brotherhood (1450) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (international pan-Islamist party) Hizb - 700 registered members. [16]

The growth of Islamism leads to structural reorganization of the security services. The Federal Criminal Service, for example, allocated in 2019 from the general department of "Police Defense of the State" the department of "Islamist Motivated Terrorism" [BKA - Islamistisch...]. Islamism is conducted in it under the heading "religious ideology" as part of all "politically motivated crime" (which includes right and left terrorism).

In the Federal Service for the Protection of the Constitution (internal intelligence service), Islamism, which used to be part of the "Department of Extremism of Foreigners," is also now allocated a special department "Islamism and Islamic Terrorism" (department 6) [BfV - Islamismus...]. The Federal Ministry of Defense and Military Intelligence deal with Islamism in the army. [17] However, according to military experts, only right-wing extremism is growing in the Bundeswehr, and Islamism is

decreasing – in 2019 they recorded only 78 suspicious cases [BMVg.], and the only study cited has not been updated since then. The foreign intelligence service is connected with the topic related to the external relations of German Islamists and their interaction with foreign Islamism and coordinates its work here within the framework of the Joint Center with other German special services.

Along with structural changes in the security services, improving the logistics of the anti-terrorist struggle, the legal situation is changing. Laws are being issued aimed at anticipating and preventing Islamist danger. Thus, the activities of the IS and its symbols in Germany were banned back in September 2014 [BMI – Presse...]. The activities of associations and unions related to Islamism [BfV – Islamismus] in Germany are prohibited. The law adopted after the UN resolution of 2014 [18] in June 2015 allows the seizure of passports from militant Islamists in order to prevent them from leaving the country to places of hostilities [BMI – Alle Meldungen]. The criminal code has also undergone changes: now those traveling to countries where Islamist training camps operate are punished if their stay there and their preparation are proved.

Moreover, the state started information work with citizens, not only through the Federal Center for Political Education, [BPB. Bundesweite...], but also through the portals of ministries and services. The Federal Ministry of the Interior offers the citizens detailed answers to all possible questions about what is Islamism in Germany, how to recognize an Islamist, why the number of Salafis is growing in Germany and why Salafism is dangerous, how to behave in case of danger and how to help the special services [BMI – Islamismus...]. The Constitutional Protection Service informs about the groups represented in Germany (Salafi, jihadist, radical, legalist).

The criteria allowing Islamic unions to work in Germany are also being tightened. This makes it possible to ban a number of previously represented organizations in Germany.

* * *

“The threat of Islamism is still high. And in Germany, we must take into account the chance of Islamist assassination attempts every day. Therefore, the German security services are vigilant,” its head Thomas Haldenwang [BfV – Islamismus] says on the portal of the Constitutional Protection Service. The change in the foreign policy and internal situation in connection with the SMO and with the involvement of Germany in the conflict changed the information background in the country, but not the state's attention to the Islamist segment of terrorist danger. Having identified the Islamist threat, the special services pursue it with purely German pedantry, problems can arise only in the nature of the distribution and redistribution of funds towards the fight against threats that in the current conditions may seem more relevant to the state.

In conclusion, we can say that the situation with German Islamism is an example of how the state itself has made grow a threat within itself for decades. Almost until the beginning of the 2000s (2004, the new law on foreigners), Germany refused to recognize that it is a “host country,” i.e. a state, on a regular basis, and not by exception, accepting migrants. This led to the uncontrolled growth of the Muslim diaspora with an unsettled status of the stay of its majority in the absence of any state measures to integrate them into the social and legal order. The absorption of Germany into the “main conflict of the era” during the confrontation between the blocs led to an underestimation of the role of Islam, which was considered a “cultural feature” of foreigners temporarily living in the country. The liberal law on the provision of political asylum brought radical Muslims into the country, persecuted as terrorists in their own countries. The policy of multiculturalism, which was considered almost the responsibility of Germany in the context of its “historical past,” led to the formation of parallel societies. The nature of the Islamic diaspora under such conditions

contributed to its radicalization. The seeds of Islamist emissaries fell on favorable soil.

The political course began to change only after September 2001, as part of the general tightening of the West's course towards Islamism. The Aliens Act (2004) settled up regular entry and for the first time strictly linked naturalization to integration. The dialogue proposed by the state to Islamic organizations withdrew non-integrated organizations from the sphere of legality (Salafis), in 2014 the activities of the Islamic State were banned. In other words, Germany in the past years has had to invest forces and funds to neutralize or eliminate the prerequisites for the radicalization of internal Islam, which itself has created by decades of past inaction. There will most likely be no further radicalization of the diaspora, taking into account the measures taken by the state against this.

Notes

1. Hassprädiger, a hate preacher, is an established concept for the radical Islamist clergy in Germany.
2. In 2020, 1.461.910 Turkish citizens and about 3 million citizens with Turkish roots lived in Germany. In the past two years, the number of Turkish citizens has been declining due to their active acceptance of German citizenship. 63 per cent of Turks living in Germany are Sunni. [Statista...]
3. Kurdish refugees also had terrorist potential, though not Islamist. The PKK, which has been waging an underground struggle for "independence of Kurdistan" for decades, recruits its supporters in Germany and is under surveillance by the Constitutional Defense Service.
4. Both Councils were created in the 1980s; both claim to be the main one. The Islamic Council of Germany, united 37 mainly Turkish-Sunni organizations, the other, already mentioned above, the Central Council of Muslims of Germany, united 21 organizations, mainly Arab and multi-ethnic..
5. A Saudi-Arab school that, according to intelligence agencies, maintained contacts with bin Laden's terrorist network. Most of the Bonn Islamists known to the special services sent their children to this school [DPA: Bonn...], and others even specially moved to Bonn for this, creating the city the glory of the "bastion of Islamism." Closed only in 2016 after a long conflict with the authorities.

6. Detained Salafist teenagers admit planning explosion as act of 'fighting infidels [Hohe Jugendstrafen...]
7. A teenager from Pakistan, who arrived in Germany through Hungary in 2015 without documents and registered as an "unaccompanied Afghan juvenile refugee," hacked a family of Hong Kong Chinese with an ax. According to police, he was already radicalized in Germany in contacts with IS emissaries. IS claimed responsibility for the attack. [Friedmann J...]
8. The terrorist, a 27-year-old Syrian refugee who arrived in Germany via Bulgaria, inadvertently blew himself and 15 people up in a wine bar, instead of a planned blast in the crowd during a local music festival. Links with IG have been proven. [Anschlag in Ansbach...]
9. A young criminal, Anis Amri from Tunisia, who called himself an "IS soldier," arrived as a refugee through Italy during the Arab Spring 2011, drove a truck into the pedestrian area of the Christmas Market near the church, killing 11 and injuring 55 people. [DPA: Polizisten...]
10. An IS supporter in April-May blew up Turkish enterprises and shops, the target was Turkish cultural organizations, mosques and imams. The reason is hatred of Turkey by virtue of its position in the Syrian conflict. [Auftakt im Terror...]
11. An Islamist on the Autobahn preyed on motorcyclists, seriously injuring three people. [Morling U.]
12. Stabbing with two victims, staged by a Syrian refugee, an active supporter of IS. The victims are two homosexual people from Cologne living in a registered partnership who came on vacation to see Dresden. [Messerangriff in Dresden...]
13. Until 2011, they traveled mainly to the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, since 2012 - to Libya and Egypt, since 2014 - to Syria and Iraq. [BKA. Islamistisch...]
14. "They motivate young people, work for Islamists on the Internet, recruit there, in general, provide Islamists with all the logistics and, moreover, travel with them back and forth" [Hoever...]
15. For the motives of the returnees, see the study of the Federal Criminal Service: [BKA - Forschungsergebnisse...]
16. Islamism statistics are constantly updated on the portal of the Constitution Protection Service Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz - Zahlen und Fakten. - https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten/zahlen-und-fakten_node.html;jsessionid=3C1D36B63A8A1CE20F041C42AFC16A1F.internet282
17. Coordination Department of Suspected Extremism Cases, Die Koordinierungsstelle für Extremismusverdachtsfälle (KfE). - Extremismus in der Bundeswehr: Bericht zeichnet differenziertes Bild (bmvg.de). -

<https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/extremismus-bundeswehr-bericht-zeichnet-differenziertes-bild-5035908>

18. The UN in the resolution requires the state to prevent the departure of “its” Islamists to the site of training camps of Islamic terrorists. [UN...]

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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

IGOR DOBAEV. ISLAM AND ISLAMISM: GENERAL AND
SPECIAL. APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING THE TERM
“ISLAMISM”

Keywords: Islam; Islamism;
confessions; modernism; political Islam;
Salafism; Sufism; traditionalism.

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Abstract. The article describes the process of emergence and
development of the world, monotheistic religion of Islam, the emergence
of directions in it (Sunnism, Shiism, Kharijism), schools of Moslem law
(in Sunni Islam: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali), ideological currents
(traditionalism, modernism, Salafism), numerous Sufi tarikats, as well
as the so-called “Political Islam”. In other words, modern Islam is

complex in its structure, one might say, kaleidoscopic. In the context of "political Islam", Islamism has developed, which today is considered by Islamic scholars in two versions: moderate and radical Islamism. Within the framework of the latter, religious and political extremism and terrorism are distinguished under the guise of Moslem dogma. In this regard, it is relevant to study the nature and evolution of Islamism.

Islam, as a major social institution and at the same time a process, is a complex and contradictory phenomenon, including a number of directions, interpretations, currents, as well as sects. However, despite the modern mosaic nature of Islam, there is a deep conviction among Moslems that they belong to a single community of people professing a common faith, united by common traditions, historical roots and unity of interests in the modern world – to the Islamic ummah of the world. Islam, in the eyes of its adherents, is not only a faith, but also a way of life, household rules and customs, a mentality determined by Sharia. Islam, to a greater extent than other world religions, is included in the system of social and political regulation. Almost all aspects of a Moslem's life are declared to be religiously significant, since the Koranic worldview does not know the opposition of the sacred and the profane, religion and politics, sexuality and piety. All the fullness of life is potentially holy. The goal is tawhid (affirmation of unity), the integration of all life in a single community, which gives a Moslem a sense of closeness to the highest unity – God. After all, as the Quran testifies, a properly organized society should flourish, because it exactly corresponds to the divine institutions. Thus, prerequisites are being created for the comprehensive politicization of Islam, as a result of which calls are made for the political consolidation of Moslems, for the transformation of the religious community of all Moslems into a political unity of one or another level of institutionalization.¹

The politicization and radicalization of Islam is historically conditioned. After the implementation in 622 of the hijra (migration) of the Moslem ummah, headed by the prophet

Muhammad, from pagan Mecca to the oasis of Yathrib (present-day Medina), an Islamic proto-state is gradually being created, life in which becomes impossible without the formation of appropriate social and legal norms. This is how the Charter of the Ummah appeared, now known as the "Medin Constitution", which, apparently, became the first document regulating socio-political, legal and religious relations among the inhabitants of Yathrib.

In the Medina period, characterized by the need to manage the expanding community of Moslems, confront the Jewish tribes who did not want to convert to Islam, and wage war, primarily with the Meccan polytheists (pagans), the prophet receives the appropriate divine revelations regarding the constantly expanding aspects of the life of the Moslem ummah. Later, during the codification of the Quran during the reign of the third "righteous" caliph Osman (Uthman, reigned 644-656), they were reflected in the holy book of Moslems. It should be emphasized that there is a distinction between ahyas (verses, revelations) of the Quran received by the Prophet in the Mecca period (610-622) and the Medina period (622-632). If Islam was developing as a religion in Mecca, and the Quranic ahyas contained mainly ideological value guidelines for the then small cohort of Moslems, then in Medina the content of the Quranic text is already being filled with socio-legal and even political pragmatics. In the same period, there appear and develop, theoretically and practically, two fundamental constructs which currently form the basis of all the ideological doctrines of radical Islamists. We are talking about "takfir" (accusation of disbelief) and "jihad" (holy war for faith)².

The connection between Islam and politics is clearly traced after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (632). It was then that a clearly political question arose before the community of the faithful, namely: who and on what basis should replace the prophet, that is, become the caliph, the ruler of the faithful ("*amer al-muminin*")? On this occasion, the first split occurred in

the Moslem Ummah, initially two directions appeared in it, the adherents of which began to be called "Sunnis" and "Shiites". The first advocated the election of a caliph from among the most authoritative Moslems, representatives of the Arab tribe of the Quraysh; the latter insisted that only his blood relative, a descendant of the Hashim clan, which was part of the same tribe of the Quraysh, could be the successor of the prophet. The first approach was preferred, and as a result, the first split in the Moslem ummah, previously united during the lifetime of the prophet, into Sunnis (adherents of the principle of election) and Shiites (supporters of inheritance by blood) became inevitable. The split was aggravated by the confrontation between the leading Quraish clans, which led to the emergence of a third direction in Islam - Kharijism, and the death of the fourth and last elected (righteous) caliph Ali (r. 656-661) at the hands of the Kharijite as a result of which "usurpers" came to power in the Caliphate - representatives of the Umayyad clan (661-750). Subsequently, within each of the directions, various groups, sects and subjects emerged, some of which differed in very radical political views and actions. The most radical was the Kharijite movement, which for this reason faced social exclusion, and at present only in Oman and Yemen there is a small community of Ibadis, which can be classified with a high degree of conventionality as moderate Kharijites. In this regard, when speaking about trends in modern Islam, they most often mean Sunnism, which is followed by the majority (up to 90 per cent) of all Moslems, and Shiism, the number of supporters of which is close to 10 per cent of the Moslem Ummah of the world.

The period of religious activity of the Prophet Muhammad (610-632) and the first four "righteous" caliphs: Abu Bakr (632-634), Omar (634-644), Osman (644-656) and Ali (656-661), that is, the time period from 610 to 661, received a cliché in Islamic studies literature - "the golden age of Islam"³.

However, the fragmentation of the general Islamic field after the separation of independent trends in Islam is not

completed. Between the 7th and 9th centuries a split of all three Moslem directions into brands, or madhhabs (Moslem legal schools), the number of which varied at different times, is recorded. However, at present, in the prevailing direction – Sunni Islam – there are four madhhabs that are considered equivalent: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali. The first two schools of thought are considered "soft", adaptive to changing conditions and pre-Islamic customary law, the last two are "hard", especially the Hanbali madhhab, which, unlike other legal schools of Sunnism, was nurtured from a religious and political movement headed by a famous medieval Moslem scholar-jurist Ibn Hanbal (780–855).

A significant role in this evolutionary process of the development of Islam was played by private individuals – theologians (ulema) and especially jurists (faqih), specialists in the field of Islamic law, who, in response to the objective and subjective needs of the rulers, developed a system of Islamic law (fiqh), as well as Sharia, which accumulates religious, moral, aesthetic and some legal prescriptions, practically covering all spheres of life of believers. The basis of legal developments in Islamic madhhabs is the procedure of "reasonable inference", or the derivation (istinbat) of general norms, rules, regulations and judgments on certain issues, which is called "ijtihad". In other words, ijtihad is the activity of Moslem scholars (mujtahids) in resolving issues of religious and social life on the basis of the Quran and Sunnah. The main methods of ijtihad are the following: "consensus" (ijma), "analogy" (qiyas), "expert opinion of a single jurist" (rai), "common good" (istislah) and "relatively greater good" (istihsan). However, as far back as in the 11th century, after the aforementioned schools of Islamic law had developed in Sunni Islam, it began to be considered that new madhhabs could not be created. Moreover, it is impossible to add something new to the existing brands, the "gates" of independent judgment, "ijtihad", have closed. The biggest sin for the faithful is "*bida*" (unlawful innovations), which, according to Islamic orthodoxy,

can disintegrate the Moslem ummah, disrupt its peace and smooth flow of life. With the possibility of this kind of disintegration, Islam finds salvation in the struggle against innovations, which the Islamic state and the whole society (ummah) are obliged to wage. At the same time, it should be noted that in another powerful direction of Islam – Shiism – the practice of *ijtihad* is still available to the top of the Shiite clergy (ayatollahs, great ayatollahs with the title “*marja-ye taqlid*” – “model to follow”)⁴. When the Moslems founded their great empire, the Caliphate, the Islamic legislators offered a religious interpretation of the conquests that had been made, dividing the world into *dar al-Islam* (“the territory of Islam”) and *dar al-harb* (“the territory of war”), which can be considered the next step towards further politicization and radicalization of Islam. “*Dar al-Islam*” refers to countries under the rule of Moslems, “*dar al-harb*” – to “infidel” rulers. The “region of Islam” theoretically should always be in a state of eternal war with the “*dar-al-harb*”. In exceptional cases, Islam allows a temporary truce for up to ten years. In addition to these categories of countries, some faqihs distinguish another category of lands – the “region of the world” (“*dar al-sulh*”). These are lands that do not belong to Moslems and are not controlled by them, but their rulers consider themselves vassals of Moslem states and pay a certain tribute for this. In addition to numerous directions, currents and sects in the middle of the 8th – early 9th centuries in Islam (both in Sunnism and in Shiism), a mystical-ascetic direction – Sufism – arises and is being formed. Initially, the ascetic component dominates in it, later – the mystical one. The essence of the latter is as follows: a student (*murid*), under the mentorship of a teacher (*murshid*), goes through a mystical path (Ar.: *tariqa* – path, road), from the initial stage (*sharia*) through the next two (*tarik*, *maarif*) to the last – *haqiqat* (verity), until complete merging with the deity. Thus, we can assume that a believer who has chosen the path of a Sufi is a more “advanced” Moslem compared to an ordinary believer. Gradually, twelve main, uterine Sufi structures took

shape in the Sufi space, and were called "tarikats" (Sufi orders in Islam). Subsequently, other orders spun off from them, and at present there are several dozen Sufi tarikats in the world.

Characteristic for adherents of Sufism is their faith in the teachings of one or another tariqat, as well as unquestioning obedience to their teacher-sheikh. These moments sometimes played an important historical role in the development of religious and political movements, which the famous American scholar of Islam B. Lewis called "Islamic riots", especially during the colonization of Moslem states by the West.

So, in the 19th century almost simultaneously, the armed resistance of Moslems to an external force was recorded: in Libya (the Sinusite movement), in Sudan (the movement led by the Mahdi) and in the North-Eastern Caucasus (Caucasian Muridism led by the famous Avar imams, among whom the most famous was Shamil). Imam Shamil and his naibs, on the ideological and organizational basis of the Sufi Nakshbandiyya order, created the embryo of an "Islamic state" in the North Caucasus – the Imamate of Chechnya and Dagestan on part of the territories of modern Dagestan and Chechnya. This proto-Islamic state formation was the first symptom of the penetration of Middle Eastern Islamism into the Caucasus, which goes back to the political and legal doctrine of the well-known medieval Syrian Ulema Ahmed Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah, his supporters and followers.

Consideration of the process of "splitting of Islam" would be incomplete without mentioning the phenomenon that entered the history of this religion as "Islamic nationalism". It is well known that classical Islam does not recognize the division of "faithful" according to ethnic, racial and other similar differences. In principle, Islam is a supranational, world religion, in which representatives of all peoples and ethnic groups are equally valuable, in other words, it is an international (world) religion. However, in practice, the national (ethnic), as a rule, takes precedence over religious Islamic internationalism. In this context, the experience of Turkey is interesting from a scientific

point of view. Here in the late 19th – early 20th centuries lived and preached Said Nursi, the author of the well-known multi-volume work “Risala Nur” (“Source of Light”). After his death, the organization he created turned out to be divided into a number of structures, the most famous of which Nurcular (Bright Path) was headed by one of his students, the Turkish billionaire Fetullah Gülen, who in his numerous works prescribed the exceptional role of the Turks in Islam, calling them “the best of Moslems”. Such a separation of one people from the general Moslem environment has received the name “Islamic nationalism” in the scientific literature. The interaction of national and confessional in this case formed a kind of Turkic-Islamic synthesis. For us, this approach is interesting by the fact that not only Turkish pan-Turkists can be attributed to the varieties of “Islamic nationalism”, but also supporters of Afghan “Talibanism”, as well as “North Caucasian Wahhabism”, whose adherents and ideologists are such Caucasian nationalists as, for example, M. Tagaev, M. Udugov, Z. Yandarbiev and others.⁵

In addition to dividing the general Islamic field into directions and opinions (madhhabs), Sufi and Islamic-nationalist organizations and structures, in the 20th century, secular scientists, most likely for analytical purposes, identified three ideological currents in Islam: traditionalism, modernism and fundamentalism.⁶ Traditionalism is associated with the creation of a single Moslem Caliphate, the spread and strengthening of Islam on its territory, and then the disintegration of this state into a number of caliphates, and then completely homogeneous political units – nation states. However, in all these states, Islam continued to develop, but not always along the same trajectories. Gradually, different forms of existence of Islam were established in these territories. It is not surprising, therefore, that Islam in, say, Morocco differs from the Islam practiced in Indonesia. In this regard, gradually the term “traditional Islam” or “Islamic traditionalism” was filled with the following content: it is a form of existence of Islam, which is reproduced from generation to

generation without visible changes in one or another "Islamic" state, as well as in territories where traditionally Moslems live.

Modernism is conditioned by the development of society, the scientific and technological revolution, the deepening of globalist tendencies, the emergence of everything that is not reflected in the Quran and other sacred sources of Islam. Modernism is a reaction in Islam to the challenge of the times. As the authoritative Russian Islamic scholar Z.I. Levin, has precisely noted, the slogan of Islamic modernists is "Forward with the Quran". In other words, modernist thought and the practical activity of its bearers should be aimed at bringing Islam up to date with the realities of modernity, while not rejecting the fundamental dogmas and values of religion. One of the obvious features of Islamic modernism, which distinguishes it from Moslem traditionalism, is the upholding, first of all, of the thesis about the need to open the "gates of *ijtihad*", which is categorically rejected by conservatives. The third trend – fundamentalism – is associated with the rise and fall of Islamic civilization, the fragmentation of a single Caliphate, the colonization of most Islamic states by European powers, and the loss to the West in almost all areas of social development. In such a situation, there could not but appear people who consider the main reason for the humiliation of Islam the fact that this religion has been littered with "sinful innovations" for centuries, has departed far from the values of its "golden age". This process began with the division of the Ummah into many political "parties" that were at war with each other in the struggle for power. It is obvious that this struggle, which began immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (632), was the result of the deviation of the military-political elite from the primary Sunnah, the principles of communality and voluntariness, determined at one time by the provisions of the Medina Constitution. This was clearly manifested in the emergence of proto-state institutions of autocratic leaderism, first in Medina itself, and then in the main cities in the conquered territories,

which, in turn, already in the 7th–8th centuries, gave rise to a politically conditioned legislative power in the Caliphate, based on Sharia, transformed by means of *ijtihad* into public law, and on the “state Sharia” legitimized in this way, and the apparatus of coercion necessary to keep within the framework of the “Islamic empire” all the lands and peoples conquered in the west and east. Such a state could not stand the test of time, and the Arab-Moslem Caliphate disintegrated, and its fragments turned out to be colonies or semi-colonies of the “infidel” West. However, if state institutions fall short of the Quranic ideal, if political leaders are cruel or exploit the people or the community is humiliated by apparently godless enemies, the Moslem must feel that his faith in the higher purpose and value of life is in jeopardy. And all efforts must be directed towards returning Islamic history to the true path, otherwise the foundations of the religious edifice will be shaken and life will be deprived of meaning. Therefore, according to fundamentalists, Islam must be cleansed of everything superficial, introduced by time, returned to its origins – the foundation of religion, by the time of the life and work of the prophet and the “righteous” caliphs. According to the apt statement of Z.I. Levin, the slogan of the fundamentalists is “Back to the Quran!” At the same time, it should be emphasized that the term “fundamentalism” appeared in the 19th century in the US, in relation to one of the Protestant branches of Christianity, and is not recognized by Moslems themselves. However, there is an Islamic analogue of “fundamentalism” – “Salafism” (derived from the Arabic phrase “as-salaf as-salihun” – “righteous ancestors”), which is quite adequately perceived by the “Salafists”, the bearers of fundamentalist values in Islam.

Until recently, many Islamic scholars, and even more so publicists, put an identity sign between “fundamentalism” (“Salafism”) and “radical Islam” (“Islamism”) and even religious and political extremism and terrorism, which does not correspond to reality. In fact, Islamism (“radical Islam”, “Islamic radicalism”) is an independent phenomenon that should not be identified with

Islam itself or exclusively with any of its directions (Sunnism, Shiism, Kharijism), sects (madhhabs, or Moslem law schools – fiqh) or currents (traditionalism, modernism, fundamentalism).⁷

In our opinion, Islamism most closely correlates with Kharijism and fundamentalism, but in any case, in terms of its parameters, it does not coincide with these phenomena. Islamism is a phenomenon primarily political, but researchers note that almost all religious movements in Islam originate in political views. Kharijites, especially adherents of some of its sects and subsects, for example Azraqites, were extremists, they posed the question: can a member of the ummah and their leader, who made the slightest deviation from the Quranic requirements, remain a Moslem or not, giving an unequivocal negative answer to this. Moreover, they demanded the deprivation of life of “apostates”. Radical fundamentalists not only dream of a return to the “golden age”, but also demand from their supporters of political activity, the struggle for actualization of this ideal⁸.

The founding father of radical Salafism, not without reason, is considered the Baghdad Ulema Ibn Hanbal (780–855), who launched a religious and political movement in the center of the Caliphate to purify Islam from sinful innovations, which later transformed into one of the four schools of Sunni fiqh – the Hanbali madhhab. The ideological successors of the work of Ibn Hanbal were the Syrian ulem Taqi ad-Din ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), as well as his students, among whom Ibn al-Qayyim (1292–1350) was especially distinguished, who, in the conditions of the Islamic Middle Ages, developed the fundamental provisions of the Hanbalite doctrine. Ibn Hanbal and his associates qualified all the changes in Islam that occurred after the end of the “golden age” as “bida” (sinful innovations), and demanded that Islam be cleansed of them. Their works became the basis for the emergence and development of the radical doctrine of Wahhabism, as well as for the ideologists of the modern doctrinal provisions of radical Islamism.

A brief history of Wahhabism is as follows: by the 18th century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire became apparent, especially in peripheral areas. There, local “rectifiers of Islam” tried to restore order through religious reform. So, on the Arabian Peninsula, the teacher Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), having entered into an alliance with the emir from the Saud family from Nejd, managed to break with Istanbul and found a state in central Arabia and the Persian Gulf. He was a typical reformer in the spirit of Ibn Taymiyyah. He believed that the best counter to the current crisis was a fundamentalist return to the Quran and the Sunnah, and a militant rejection of all later additions, including medieval fiqh, mysticism and falsification, which most Moslems then considered the norm. Since the Ottoman sultans did not fit his vision of the caliphs of “true Islam”, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab declared that they were apostates and worthy of death. He attempted to create an enclave of pure faith based on his understanding of the original 7th century ummah. Wahhabism, the form of Islam now prevalent in Saudi Arabia, is a puritanical religion based on a strict, literal interpretation of Scripture and early Islamic tradition. Later, his aggressive methods were adopted by some radical fundamentalists. The most famous modern theorists of this wing are Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abd al-Salam Faraj, Abbud al-Zumr, Tariq al-Zumr, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others. These and other theorists of radical Islamism relied in their works on the works of authoritative ulemas of the Moslem past, among them - Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Kassir, Al-Kurtubi, an-Nawawi, M. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and others, who advocated the return of Islam to its “golden age” - the time of life and activity Prophet Mohammed and four righteous (elected) caliphs.

At the same time, the doctrine of radical Islamism is constantly filled with new stories, and this fact actualizes the problem of studying Islamic radicalism (Islamism) proper. Today, scientists have studied in detail the provisions that form the basis of Islamism. Most of them believe that radical Islamic

political movements are part of a broader trend of re-Islamization of society and the politicization of Islam. In other words, "Islamism" represents only the extreme part of all currents within the framework of "political Islam", that is, Islamist tendencies can be found in all three ideological currents in Islam. However, from this premise it is simultaneously seen that Islamism is not identical with fundamentalism, traditionalism or modernism, its radical part is present (or may be present) in all three currents to one degree or another.

The author of this article in the monograph "Islamic radicalism: genesis, evolution, practice", in which the phenomenon of Islamism is quite fully studied, presents the following definition of Islamic radicalism - "... this is an ideological doctrine and socio-political practice based on it, which are characterized by normative-value consolidation of the ideological, political-ideological and even armed confrontation of the world of "true Islam" in relation to the world of "infidels" outside and the world of "untrue faith" inside Islam and require absolute social control and mobilization (serving the idea) of their supporters."⁹

At the same time, speaking about Islamism, researchers single out at least two of its wings: moderately radical and ultraradical. The goals of their supporters are the same: building an Islamic state where Sharia norms would prevail. However, the methods and forms of realizing the cherished goal are different. Moderates prefer an evolutionary, bloodless path of development, promoting to the so-called "Islamic call" (daava) and, using democratic procedures, the promotion of their supporters in government and government at all levels. Upon reaching a certain "critical mass" of the number of their supporters, including those in power, the issue of the "Islamic state" and "Sharia rule", in their opinion, will be resolved by itself, automatically. Their like-minded extremists object: the "near enemy" (the state and its institutions, primarily power ones) and the "far-away enemy" (other states) will not allow the

Islamists to seize power peacefully. Therefore, the “Islamic revolutionaries” are not going to wait, and are ready to take power by force, including through the implementation of sabotage and terrorist attacks against the “enemies of Islam”: “infidels”, as well as those Moslems whom radical Islamists consider “apostates” (“murtaddun” – first of all, supporters of law enforcement agencies, opposing radicals) and “hypocrites” (“munafikun” – representatives of the official Moslem clergy).

In practice, when Islamists form their structures, in addition to moderates and extremists, they also distinguish the so-called “mixed organizations”, where the two functions of Islamism – educational and propagandistic (Islamic call) and combat – are tied to the same organization. Some of its members carry out the “Islamic call”, while the other, as a rule, hidden part of the group, carries out forceful attacks on the “enemies of Islam”. There are many such organizations, among them the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood, the Palestinian Al-Jihad, and others. The presented material allows us to conclude that the concept of “Islamism” is an independent phenomenon, it should not be identified with Islam itself, or exclusively with any of its directions (Sunnism, Shiism, Kharijism), currents (traditionalism, modernism, fundamentalism) or rumors. At the same time, it should be borne in mind, as the authoritative domestic Islamic scholar A.A. Ignatenko that “every Islamist is a Moslem, but not every Moslem is an Islamist.”¹⁰

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