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MODERN RUSSIA: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, CULTURE AND RELIGION

IGOR KUZNETSOV, ELIZAVETA KULIKOVA, IULIIA PETROVA. MASS CULTURE AS AN ENVIRONMENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH*

Keywords: mass culture; youth; socialization of youth; cultural artifacts.

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Abstract. Currently, mass culture is becoming a significant tool for influencing the consciousness and behavior of the masses, especially young people. The commercialization of mass culture leads to a noticeable decrease in the quality of its content, as well as to the loss of the possibility of any regulatory control in this area, which requires a serious study of exactly which images and meanings of mass culture dominate in the consciousness of Russian young people, how the mechanism of formation of a worldview, the formation of a picture of the world and the formation of their own social identity works. Within the framework of this article, the main approaches to determining the role of mass culture in the process of political socialization of youth in Russia are highlighted: from studies emphasizing the purely targeted nature of the impact of cultural references on youth, to works declaring the comprehensive nature of mass culture. It is concluded that modern approaches to the study of mass culture are largely focused on conceptualization and the search for universal explanations of the principles of its functioning (commercialization, contextuality, general accessibility, the formation of conventions within the framework of communication, etc.). At the same time, the work documents the main intergenerational differences in leisure time and the choice of its specific forms, different for the generation of "fathers" and the generation of "children," which also significantly affects the information and cultural consumption of representatives of different - new generations. At the same time, for young people, the consumption of certain cultural

samples is determined primarily by the availability of relevant artifacts and social influence (fashion, environment, social contacts, etc.).

Issues of political socialization have long been firmly established among the most important in the social sciences. How exactly the formation of a young man, a citizen, an active participant in the political process occurs, is of interest not only to researchers, but is also extremely in demand by practitioners - decision makers. All the more significant and responsible, apparently, should be the means that are used in this process. Traditionally, the strong institutions of political socialization in society were the family, school, the circle of everyday communication of a young man, and the religious community. The last two decades are characterized by an increase in the capabilities of the sphere of mass culture (hereinafter - MC) in this process and, conversely, a noticeable decrease in the influence of traditional institutions. In this regard, it is necessary to take into account not only the formation of new communication channels and their impact on the mass audience, but also the decrease in the authority of direct interaction within the framework of traditional institutions and structures of social communication. Young people receive many primary information, skills, and guidelines in the field of culture faster and more fully even before the influence of family and school, personal circles, neighbors and friends manifests itself in this process.

Within the framework of this article, it is proposed to develop basic approaches to determining the role of mass culture in the process of political socialization of the empirical stage of research on this topic, including a mass survey (using an online survey using a relevant sample) and a series of expert interviews.

The role of mass culture in modern society: from the "elite - mass" antinomy to universal communication

The study of popular culture has been actively conducted in the social sciences since the beginning of the 20th century. Despite the fairly large volume of publications reflecting a wide

variety of theoretical and methodological approaches to the conceptualization of this concept, a strong convention has not yet emerged in a number of areas; the issues of possible boundaries of MC and the influence of individual social actors and institutions on its functioning, the interaction of MC and the so-called high culture, etc. remain debatable. We believe that these questions in general make it possible to propose our own version of the evolution of research approaches and outline the main strategic lines of work for studying the things of interest. Our question is the role of MC in the process of young people's exploration of the space of modern politics. If we turn to the main dimensions of the MC category in the social sciences, we can highlight the following.

Firstly, the definition of mass culture as the antipode of "elite", imperious culture. Theorists of the beginning of the last century spoke from this position, pointing out the obvious differences in the motives of social action of "heroes" and "crowd". The contrast between leaders and masses was intended to point out the different foundations of the political process in the conditions of massification of society, the formation of large social groups focused on participation in political life through the actualization of class, cultural, religious, ethnic and other needs. Thus, in the works of G. Lebon and G. Tarde, some patterns of mass social perception and behavior were formulated, which made it possible to re-evaluate the role of psychological, subjective factors in the formation of a worldview, building social-political strategies of the authorities [Lebon, 1995; Tarde, 2015].

Secondly, MC is often considered as a phenomenon accompanying the development of a modern industrial, mass society. Such a society is developing under the conditions of modernization of production, the emergence of a mass social community - the proletariat engaged in the sphere of material production - the spread of universal literacy and expanded opportunities for political participation (mass press, radio, universal primary or secondary education, cinema, poster art,

etc.). In the works of J. Ortega y Gasset, the problems of “mass society”, focused on equalization, the formation of standards in behavior and consumption, as the antithesis of an elite society, which led to the emergence of the concepts of “mass culture” and “elite culture” is actualized [Ortega y Gasset, 1991a; Ortega y Gasset, 1991b].

Thirdly, one of the most noticeable manifestations of such a culture was the commercialization of both the artifacts, cultural objects themselves, and the entire sphere of its “production.” In the works of representatives of the Frankfurt School and their followers, the development of the critical theory of mass culture occurs [Horkheimer, Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 2002; Baudrillard, 2020; Benjamin, 1996]. Much attention is paid to the so-called cultural industry, which produces standardized, unified artifacts that are considered novelties, is focused on making a profit and, as such, demonstrates a desire for maximum audience coverage, increasing opportunities to attract everyone's attention and interest. At the same time, such an industrial paradigm minimizes or completely eliminates the artist's personal initiative, limits the freedom of creativity, and dictates certain frameworks for its manifestation through establishing formats, defining trends, or conforming to some successful ideal. Further refraction of the theory of MC can be seen in attempts to establish correlations between the dominant type of culture in society and the trends in the evolution of the political regime [MacDonald, 1990, p. 243–275; Debord, 1999]. For example, in the work of G. Debord, play, staging, and performance are presented not so much as genres of theatrical art, but as a platform for the existence of modern society, where theatricalization is one of the main ways to express a social position and promote relevant interests.

In the second half of the 20th century, in studies of mass culture, more and more attention is paid not only to its passive consumption, but also to human participation in production, the process of creating objects and cultural phenomena. This partly removes the negative connotations characteristic of critical theory,

but at the same time points to important characteristics of the social context – the observed transition from an industrial society to a post-industrial society [Hall, 1980, p. 2–35; Bell, 2004]. The end of the last century and the beginning of the new 21st century are associated with the spread of new means of communication and the emergence of new opportunities for MC [McLuhan, 2004; McLuhan, 2019]. The means of communication themselves (computer, smartphone, etc.) become influential communication tools, exerting, among other things, a powerful influence on the content of the information being broadcast. Expanding the capabilities of storing and reproducing information creates almost unlimited prospects for using a large arsenal of world artistic culture. On the one hand, thanks to the Internet and powerful cloud storages of information, it becomes possible to introduce any person to the most important and significant objects of world culture. On the other hand, these same large-scale information resources significantly “downgrade” the elements of the once “elite” culture, and the achievements of world civilization are “averaged” and, in part, devalued. The owner of a modern gadget, a computer, is inclined to consume relatively simple artifacts, which include detective stories, melodramas, westerns, musicals, comics, etc., which indicates a simplification of art, reducing it to simple models that guarantee success with a mass audience [Castells, 2000; Hevesy, 2001].

Domestic Studies of Popular Culture

In the Russian scientific literature, there is also an intensive discussion of the problems and prospects for the development of mass culture, issues of its conceptualization, determination of the main boundaries and functions are debated. It is worth noting that the Russian experience in this case is of particular interest for two reasons.

Firstly, the study of mass culture in sociology, cultural studies, social psychology and art history is inextricably linked

with determining the characteristics of the evolution of Russian society. The last two decades of the 20th century and the first two current ones are a time of intense socio-political changes, the formation of a new economic model, characterized by a relatively rapid change in the way of life of many citizens, the transformation of the world familiar to them into a new one, causing wariness and anxiety. That is why researchers paid special attention to the possibilities of people's social adaptation to the new reality, strategies for searching for a new identity, and the formation of new communities and structures. A special place in this regard is occupied by studies of the political formation of youth and generational aspects of socialization in general.

Secondly, in recent decades, Russian society has had to go through a difficult path from Soviet ideological monopolism with a one-party system to the post-Soviet model of political competition with constitutional restrictions on state ideology. This path was associated with some high expectations from liberal democracy and the "free market" in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as disappointments in the results of reforms that led to radical social transformation with a sharp drop in the level and quality of life. Mass culture in these conditions was a natural environment for political socialization due to its accessibility, relative diversity and commercial attractiveness for investment by the emerging entrepreneurial layer (advertising, promotion and work with target groups were and remain widely popular areas of business development). In addition, it was in the sphere of mass culture that quasi-ideological phenomena began to appear and manifest themselves, contributing to the self-identification of certain socio-political movements (from pro-Soviet nostalgia in the spirit of "Old songs about the main thing" to projects building a new "white" or "red" empire/superpower or implementing a strategy of "entry/return" to the so-called civilized world, the West). Let us also note that in the space of mass culture, the process of forming the personal capital of leaders is the fastest: many of the post-Soviet politicians gained

fame and became recognizable thanks to their active participation in various entertainment projects.

The change in the dominant scientific approach to research of the phenomenon of mass culture has occurred in the domestic scientific literature in a very significant way: from labeling mass culture as a concrete manifestation of the class essence of a bourgeois, capitalist society [Kukarkin, 1985; Nechai, 1984; Culture..., 1990; Raynov, 1979] to its definition as an organic part of the modern post-industrial era, forming new models of social relations [Mass culture..., 2004; Ionin, 1998; Mass culture..., 2005]. In the works of many researchers, mass culture is inextricably linked with modern means of mass communication, which mediate the formation of ideological standards of society, including in the sphere of aesthetics. This view of MC allows us to call it "media culture," which allows us to more accurately correlate the functioning of various content with the creative, professional environment that selects, designs and represents it for the mass consumer.

To systematize approaches to defining MC and fixing its role in modern society, we will group the works of domestic researchers into three main blocks.

The first approach ("mass culture is all-encompassing") is based on the idea that mass culture is universal, which is expressed in its expansive nature and the desire to dominate the sociocultural space by imposing ideas about the morally worthy, aesthetically perfect, socially approved, etc. (or at least claiming such status).

Modern society is under constant pressure from MC due to the impossibility of completely "turning off" or significantly minimizing the influence of the media environment on its functioning. This is manifested in the aggressive promotion of those forms and objects of creativity that allow for increased public attention and thereby create conditions for investment. Thus, the space of mass culture is an aggressive environment of media culture, inextricably linked with communications, and,

therefore, existing within the framework of the accepted normative provisions of this sphere (for example, encouraging diversity and uniqueness, priority of emotional reactions of the public instead of conducting a rational dialogue, minimizing complex content as opposed to promoting light and entertaining, etc.) [Astashieva, 2013, p. 1-8; Ornatskaya, 2001, p. 129-133; Razlogov, 2010; Shapinskaya, 2017]. For example, A.V. Zakharov identifies the main features of modern mass culture: orientation towards the aggressive expansion of visual forms of culture, crowding out book culture; transformation of the information image from printed to visual; merging of the media with manifestations of mass consciousness [Zakharov, 2003, p. 3-16].

Researchers also note the inextricable connection of MC with the existing socio-economic model of society, which very strictly sets the main parameters of development: "mass culture has adopted the main characteristics of industrial society, it has commercial properties, is closely related to the mechanisms of advertising and public relations, so as long as the market economy exists, as long as mass consciousness dominates, mass culture will exist" [Lukov, 2018, p. 53-66]. Let us note that young people are traditionally the most active part of society with regard to the consumption of MC products.

The second approach ("the niche nature of MC, the triumph of marketization") is based on the assumption that the active use of new technologies of commercial advertising, promotion and PR in the field of mass culture forms it as a set of different niches, separate audiences with their own natural demands and resources of free time, attention, etc. This approach focuses on how exactly the MC industry functions based on modern technologies for targeting the target audiences and what market conditions can do with the content and the main forms of manifestation of culture. G.L. Tulchinsky writes: "From now on, values are not developed within society, but are introduced into it. Today tolerance may be revered, tomorrow - religious intolerance, and the day after tomorrow - individualistic

hedonism. And accordingly, various image figures and symbols will be promoted. Today – some, tomorrow – others, the day after tomorrow – others. Fame is created manipulatively, with the help of the media and for money. ... Mass culture is perhaps the first cultural formation in the history of mankind, devoid of a transcendental dimension, of any apophatic nature, but completely and exclusively cataphatic. If something supernatural appears in it, then, firstly, it is described specifically and literally like a description of the consumer qualities of a product, and secondly, this supernatural is subordinated to completely earthly goals and is used in solving the most whatever earthly needs are" [Tulchinsky, 2006, p. 54–66]. This vision of MC allows us to evaluate the success of specific practices in the field of culture, develop approaches to increasing their effectiveness based on the achievements of modern marketing, reputation management and advertising. The loss of the individual's opportunities for natural self-determination can be considered the flip side of this process: "Personal self-determination turns into a factor that provides the illusion of choice. Identity, self-awareness of the individual, her

"I" (myself) dissolves in the objectivity of the myth of mass culture. Mass culture and its artifacts are a holistic and well-integrated system, capable of permanent self-reproduction. This is a self-reproducing mass personology, or personological mass" [Tulchinsky, 2006, p. 54–66].

The third approach ("mass culture as a convention") seeks to see in MC a platform of communication that unites society: everyone discusses topics that concern them in the language that is commonly used. And this, as a rule, is the language of memes, symbols, speech patterns, which form a certain agreement between the participants in communication, allowing them to find understanding and indicate involvement in the problem under discussion. In this form, MC looks like it is extremely dependent on the current state of mass communications and the dominant ideas in them. The contextuality of these ideas, the emotional intensity of certain judgments and statements

encourages the involvement of interested participants and the formation of specific positions. At the same time, such communication has no restrictions for entry: everyone who is capable of the appropriate format of communication can participate and declare their own position (and the most talented can create their own communication platforms in the form of chats, blogs, video channels and podcasts). Some researchers do not exclude the hierarchical structure of mass culture, where different levels of communication with different communication styles can simultaneously coexist. So, according to A.N. Ilyin, "mass culture is not an attribute only of the masses, but acts as a cultural space for the entire society as a whole – the so-called modern mass society" [Ilyin, 2009, p. 67–75].

Of particular interest is the concept of the morphological structure of culture, in which the following structural units are distinguished: everyday culture, mastered by a person in the process of his general socialization in his/her living environment; specialized culture, the development of which requires special (professional) education; popular culture as occupying an intermediate position between these cultures with the function of a translator of cultural meanings [Orlova, 2004; Orlova, 2012].

So, modern approaches to the study of mass culture are largely focused on conceptualization and the search for universal explanations of the principles of its functioning (commercialization, contextuality, general accessibility, the formation of conventions within the framework of communication, etc.). For the purposes of our research, the emphasis on the complexity and comprehensiveness of this phenomenon is of particular importance, since MC can have a powerful impact on the processes of political socialization of young citizens and shape their worldview. In addition, the issues of functioning of specific images and symbols of MC in conditions of developed communication and the ability to control this process remain extremely important.

The Cultural Space of Modern Youth: between Entertainment and Education

The formation of the worldview and civic qualities of modern youth takes place under the powerful influence of the entire environment of mass communications on these processes. This is one of the features of the cultural situation today, since until quite recently not everyone could have mobile, broadband access to the Internet and the ability to watch videos, listen to audio files and read electronic texts. In addition, these processes are actively influenced by the very format of using computers and mobile devices. Their miniature size, mobile ergonomics and powerful capabilities largely ensure almost daily use in the "background practice" mode (when a person views, listens, flips through materials or searches for information while simultaneously carrying out some other activity – movement in transport, sports, household chores and even the educational process). Modern software has long been working in accordance with algorithms that are able to adapt to the interests and needs of the user, taking into account the characteristics of his network activity and even his life schedule.

The development of cultural space by young people occurs inextricably with the formation of the semantic foundations of self-regulation. In his work a Russian sociologist of the early 20th century P.A. Sorokin proposed the following version of the reconstruction of this process. Basic types of culture contain stable concepts with a set of fundamental values that are at the center of the thesaurus of most carriers of a given culture; they are not realized, but "emerge in the form of ideas about certain problems or objects, prompting people to commit actions, determining their direction and predetermining the perception of the world" [Sorokin, 2000, p. 11]. Thus, young people organically integrate into the sociocultural space, using the entire arsenal of specific concepts based on basic values.

Let us note that the factor of historical inertia poses a particular difficulty for the analysis of the topic of this research: the large-scale socio-political changes that took place in our country at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries could not but affect the processes of political socialization of youth. The “fathers” (generations of baby boomers and those close to them in age) had a difficult adaptation to the “market” and political pluralism, while the “children” (those who were born at the end of the USSR and in the new Russia) had to master the basics of the social system without the pioneers and the Komsomol, in a completely different environment of mass culture, where, along with domestic achievements, world ones are actively represented. We also emphasize that today’s diversity of sources and forms of broadcasting MC has helped to create a much wider range of choices in areas of interest.

Various phenomena and forms of culture, art and creativity that young people have to deal with in everyday life are reflected in their consciousness, leave a certain trace, thereby forming the cultural space of the individual, influencing the general level of development of intelligence, memory, imagination. Being in dialogue with the outside world, young citizens develop their own outline of interaction, communication, and assimilate existing samples and patterns of social behavior. Yu.A. Zubok writes: “Implementing his intentions, a young man is in certain conditions that are set by institutional discourse and at the same time regulated by cultural patterns and meanings, due to which self-regulatory processes in the youth environment have both general and individual traits” [Self-regulation..., 2022, p. 221]. In this regard, some researchers prefer to see in such work not only young people’s search for their identity, but also the formation of new directions for self-realization that claim to be independent, effective ways of creativity, choosing a profession, building a business or personal brand. For example, a team of researchers led by E.A. Omelchenko uses the concept of “youth cultural scenes,” which allows us to characterize the complex

process of choice and self-determination of a young person today [Molodezh..., 2020].

This process largely depends on the communication of young people with their peers and friends, since it is in communication with those who are close in age and social status that a number of basic ideas, meanings, and images are determined that capture picture of the world and empower its bearers with the ability to adequately perceive the social situation. At the same time, experts point out that young people can choose from several basic, typical strategies for such communication, among them: an innovative option (focus on activity, enterprise, novelty); physical development (healthy lifestyle, cult of health, cult of the body); spiritual (activation of spiritual life); hedonistic (the desire to get as much pleasure as possible); adaptive (the need to save in everything, adapt to changing conditions); moral anomie (denial of moral norms, "everyone has their own morals").

These typical strategies generally lead to the assimilation of the norms of some individual subcultures, but at the same time, identification also presupposes the assimilation of basic cultural patterns through education, the educational system, independent creative activity and communication. This allows you to form an identity with several generations at once – at least parents and peers.

The cultural space of modern youth is very diverse, distinguished by many options for choosing an individual life and creative trajectory of self-realization. At the same time, it imposes serious restrictions on this very act of choice. And the point here is not that there are different opportunities determined by different social status, place of residence, income or education. Rather, there is a relatively new social situation here for Russia: such a choice has to be made in conditions of increasing uncertainty, high risks and consideration of alternatives that are hardly acceptable for society as a whole (for example, quite popular, unfortunately, the strategy of young specialists leaving the country). In addition, there is another aspect that

distinguishes the current model of behavior of young people from their parents: young people have to choose from a very large menu, a variety of options and strategies that can be very attractive. Therefore, preferring some alternative, a young man after a short time begins to understand that he missed at least ten other options, which can be very tempting. It is often difficult to understand that they are no better than the choice that has already been made. In essence, we are talking about a frustrated consciousness, disappointment in one's own capabilities or in the world around us; there appear requests for "collecting impressions" through a constant search for novelty, what is relevant, and what is fashionable.

A big role here is played by the powerful pressure of the media environment on young people and their active network communication. The choice of young people is always mediated by a kaleidoscope of alternatives, their competition, the clash of versions of one or another option of life, creative and cultural preferences. In online communication, any significant goal can not only be challenged, but also subject to ridicule, devalued, which can lead to mental discord and depression [Kuznetsov, 2021, p. 237-252]. The possible range of reactions to such communicative situations with serious consequences is very wide: from escapism and refusal of activity altogether to procrastination and suicide.

Young Russians are actively interested in events and phenomena of mass culture, follow current trends in art and fashion, and try to "be in trend" by observing the creativity and network activity of famous people and leaders of public opinion. Researchers who turned to the analysis of cultural consumption of the "millennial" generation note an interesting trend - the young people's attraction to cultural products and general (non-applied) humanitarian knowledge. This is due not only to the desire to expand one's horizons and understand the current context, but mainly to the need for self-development outside the professional environment. V.V. Radaev believes that in this case

we can observe the desire of young people to combine pragmatism (orientation towards maximizing the acquisition of necessary skills and competencies in the profession) and “typical cultural consumption” as a sphere of additional opportunities for self-realization: “... a craving for Humanitarian knowledge (for example, history) does not, as a rule, concern professional pursuits (most people have no desire to become a professional historian), but is a means of individualization and one’s own self-development in a non-professional environment” [Radaev, 2020, p. 191–192].

The most intensive appeal to culture among young people is associated with leisure, practices of spending free time. Sociologists note that in this area young people strive to satisfy aesthetic, emotional, cognitive needs, and hedonistic aspirations. Among such practices, the following spectacular forms of cultural consumption stand out: watching TV shows and videos, listening to music; shopping; visiting cinemas, stadiums, sports shows, theaters, concerts, museums (see table 1). Being very diverse in content and form of inclusion, these practices shape the lifestyle and characteristics of self-identification of young people [Zubok, Chuprov, 2018, p. 170–191].

The same study notes that based on the data obtained, it is possible to clarify the hierarchy of cultural needs of young people. Communication with friends dominates here (more than 60 per cent); passive relaxation watching TV – almost half of respondents (47.9 per cent); every third person prefers to communicate on the Internet in social networks (32.3 per cent); every fourth person listens to music, watches videos (24.4 per cent); every fifth – activities with children (19.4 per cent); visiting a bar, club and cinema (18.4 per cent) and only 12.3 per cent choose reading, and 6.8 per cent go to the theater [Zubok, Chuprov, 2018, p. 170–191].

Table 1
Types of youth activities in their free time, per cent

Types of activity	Distribution of answers		
	Never / Rarely	Often	Regularly
Housekeeping, childcare	32,9	36,5	30,6
Walks	14,6	52,6	32,8
Fiction reading	55,4	34,5	10,1
Visiting and receiving guests	31,6	56,2	12,2
Artistic creativity and design	70,6	21,3	8,1
Watching TV, videos, listening to music	13,8	55,8	30,4
Amateur artistic activity, clubs, classes, sport groups	78,8	14,7	6,5
Attending theatres, concerts, museums	68,9	25,0	6,1
Attending cinemas	39,6	48,6	11,8
Attending discos, parties, dance parties	67,2	25,3	7,5
Communication with friends	7,0	48,8	44,2
Visiting stadiums, sport shows	67,9	23,9	8,2
Shopping	20,0	57,7	22,3
Sports, tourism	54,0	31,4	14,6
Spending time in Internet, networks	10,8	45,3	43,9
Receiving additional education	78,5	15,5	6,0
Attending a church, a mosque	81,2	15,5	3,2

Source: [Zubok, Chuprov, 2018, p. 170–191].

If we imagine the dynamics of cultural preferences of young people in a generational aspect, a very interesting and contrasting picture emerges. As noted by Yu.A. Zubok and V.I. Chuprov, in a 1967 study of Soviet youth, to the question "how do you spend your free time?" the following answers were received: "I am engaged in rationalization, invention" - 3 per cent; "I write stories, stories, poems" - 4 per cent; "I draw, cut bones, embroider" - 8 per cent; "I do photography, make amateur films" - 14 per cent; "I play musical instruments" - 12 per cent; "I take part in amateur performances" - 11 per cent; "I go in for sports, tourism" - 27 per cent; "I play chess" - 28 per cent; "spend with friends" - 28 per cent; "I visit cinemas and theaters" - 27 per cent; "I study at home or in the library" -

28 per cent; "I read fiction" – 68 per cent [Zubok, Chuprov, 2018, p. 170–191].

These data demonstrate a noticeable increase in the current share of passive leisure, when young people spend time at home watching TV or on the Internet. Most likely, this also means relatively less time spent in direct, personal communication with peers (which cannot but affect the formation of appropriate communication skills among young people). In addition, the structure of the needs of the generation of "fathers" clearly expresses the desire for activity, self-development, improvement in a profession or hobby. For "children" this is replaced by the need for entertainment. Apparently, in this regard, the nature of expectations from certain institutions and cultural institutes is changing: a noticeable demand for theater and classical music carries a largely hedonistic position (getting impressions, pleasure is more important, than to pose new questions for yourself or to find out something hitherto unknown).

Network communication and searching for information in the Internet are now very powerfully crowding out reading literature, going to the theater, museum, or concert. Finally, it is worth noting that the current sociocultural situation is very different from the late Soviet era, not only in the absence of state ideology and the corresponding system of political education, upbringing, etc. (see Table 2). Nowadays there is practically no authoritative regulation of the cultural needs of young people. Young people themselves choose certain forms of cultural consumption, often without relying on established socially prescribed and sanctioned patterns. Such a choice is greatly influenced by the communities in which young people communicate and those leaders of public opinion who are considered leaders in them.

Research by Russian sociologists from the Institute of Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences confirms noticeable generational changes in leisure preferences: "Youth, as the most dynamically responsive group to everything that is not

considered traditional, shows the greatest activity in the development of new opportunities. possibilities and forms of spending free time" [Gorshkov, Sheregi, 2020, p. 264].

Intergenerational differences in spending leisure time and choosing its specific forms are also recorded by V.V. Radaev. Defining millennials as the current, modern generation of youth, he compares them with older ones (the mobilization (military) generation, the "thaw" generation and the "stagnation" generation). For example, "the youngest adult generation listens to music, audio books, and watches videos much more often than all older generations – more than half of millennials of both sexes do this almost every day (53 per cent) (in the reform generation only every third of them (32 per cent), and among older generations – 18 per cent)" [Radaev, 2020, p. 87], "quite expectedly, millennials are much more likely to play on the computer and spend time on the Internet, two-thirds of them (65 per cent) do this daily, while in the reform generation this share drops to 42 per cent, and in older generations it drops abruptly to almost zero (on average for the three older generations – 17 per cent)" [Radaev, 2020, p. 87]. "Millennials differ little in the frequency of reading books – in all the generations we identified, regardless of age, slightly more than one in three read books almost every day. But gender differences among millennials are quite significant – significantly more women are involved in reading books. Let us add that, apparently, the form of reading is changing – we are increasingly talking about electronic books" [Radaev, 2020, p. 89]. It is worth mentioning separately the massive use of audiobooks by young Russians at present, which can also be attributed to a relatively new form of "background practices", and not just a leisure pastime. Thus, according to a Mediascope study, in 2022, about 33 per cent of Russian citizens aged 12 to 64 years listen to audiobooks on at least one device (smartphone or PC). At the same time, there are more women in the structure of listeners than in the population (55 per cent versus 51 per cent), but fewer

than in the structure of online readers; 15 per cent of those who listen to audiobooks bought a subscription to an online service, and 13 per cent prefer one-time purchases [Search for books on the Internet... 2022].

Table 2
**The main occupations of the population
 in their free time, per cent**

Occupation	USSR (1982)	Russia (2014)
Watching TV	85	72
Listening to music	66	38
Reading newspapers and magazines	83	34
Communication with friends, acquaintances	74	58
Reading books	78	39
Household chores	68	52
Just rest	32	49
Attending discos, clubs (in 1982 – attending dance evenings in a club)	38	8
Attending cinemas, concerts	79	22
Computer (including on the Internet)	-	47
Visiting cafes, bars	-	17
Sports (including fitness)	38	12
Additional educational classes	42	12
Hobbies, interests	30	21
Hobby groups	12	3

Source: [Gorshkov, Sheregi, 2020, p. 266].

The structure of leisure time for modern youth is such that young people spend most of this time passively (watching TV – 64 per cent, listening to music – 58 per cent, sitting at the computer – 45.9 per cent, “doing nothing” – 49.6 per cent). Among active forms, communication (meetings) with friends and walks in nature stand out (46 per cent). The proportion of young people who attend church in their free time has become relatively large – 8.1 per cent. Next in the preferences of young people are reading the press, magazines, books; visiting discos, sports clubs, cinema; housework, hobbies (handicrafts, modeling, caring for animals). Among the noticeable generational changes is the

gradual disappearance of such forms as participation in the work of interest groups, in the work of public and political organizations [Gorshkov, Sheregi, 2020, p. 270] (see table 3).

Table 3
The structure of leisure time
for young people aged 14–30 years, per cent

Meet and communicate with friends at home or away	65,1
Watch TV, listen to radio broadcasts	64,3
Listen to music, read books, watch videos	58,2
Just resting, relaxing	49,6
Spend time in nature, take walks	46,1
Are interested in computers, the Internet, play computer games	45,9
Take care of housework, children, dacha	29,1
Read newspapers, magazines	28,3
Attend cafes, bars, restaurants	28,1
Attend discos, nightclubs, and other entertainment events	26,5
Attend theaters, concerts, cinema	26,5
Attend sports clubs, sections, training sessions	20,3
Take additional classes for education and professional training	12,6
Hobby for home (handicrafts, photography, modeling)	11,5
Attend church and other religious meetings	8,1
Attend museums, exhibitions, opening days	6,8
Participate in various clubs and interest clubs (music, dancing)	3,7
Participate in the work of public organizations, meetings, associations	2,5
Attend political organizations, meetings, rallies	0,9

Source: [Gorshkov, Sheregi, 2020, p. 270].

A separate very important question is what exactly in mass culture young citizens prefer, what they are passionate about when accessing the Internet, TV, cinema, theater, books, etc. Such studies have also been carried out (see: [Gorshkov, Sheregi, 2020]), and highlighting individual trends in the formation of

cultural preferences in specific age groups of respondents. However, along with this, it is necessary, in our opinion, to seriously clarify which exactly images and the meanings of mass culture dominate in the consciousness of Russian youth, how the mechanism of worldview formation, the formation of a picture of the world and the formation of their own social identity works.

Let's summarize some results. Indeed, modern societies are turning into "leisure societies" – a particular type of consumer society. Centralized media create attractive lifestyle models, centered on the consumption of entertainment and goods" [Ilyin, 2010, p. 25–47]. Along with the media, mass culture is an equally powerful tool for influencing the consciousness and behavior of the masses, especially young people. The commercialization of mass culture leads to a noticeable decrease in the quality of its content (support and dissemination is mainly found in what is accessible, understandable and attractive to the majority), as well as to the loss of the possibility of any regulatory control in this area (with the exception of direct constitutional prohibitions on the propaganda of social, national, religious and other hostility and intolerance, and propaganda of violence, until recently there were almost no strict restrictions in this area in Russia). Nevertheless, the role of MC in the political socialization of young people is very large. And the preferences in information and cultural consumption of young people are largely determined by the availability of relevant artifacts and social influence (fashion, environment, social contacts...). In addition, the possibility of an adequate dialogue with young people about so-called difficult issues can be significantly enhanced by the choice of means of communication and adaptation of the content of relevant messages.

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PLACE AND ROLE OF ISLAM IN REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

IGOR DOBAEV. MIGRATION AND THE PROBLEM OF ENCLAVEMENT OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (BASED ON MATERIALS FROM THE MOSLEM REPUBLICS OF THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA)

Keywords: enclave; demography; Caucasus; clan; migration; tribe; clan; Central Asia' ethnostatism.

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Abstract. The article notes that in the post-Soviet period in the "Moslem" republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the clan-clientelist structure of local societies was partially revived. Against the

background of socio-economic deformations, colossal property-political stratification and, at the same time, demographic growth of the population of these republics, migration processes began to progress, mostly to the territory of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Their result was the emergence and strengthening of the so-called "migrant enclaves", and on their basis, an increase in criminal manifestations. Such processes produce the growth of a wide variety of dangers to Russia's national security. The situation requires the development and implementation of a comprehensive system to combat illegal migration and prevent the formation and functioning of alien enclaves on the territory of our country.

The systemic crisis of identity in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s updated ethnic identity, which was most clearly manifested in Central Asia and the Caucasus (North and South). As a consequence, the process of ethnic mobilization that took place within the framework of the national-territorial structure, took the form of state-legal institutionalization (ethno-statism), regenerating the traditional social structures of local societies.

It is known that the traditional social systems of many societies in countries with a predominantly Moslem population (Near and Middle East, etc.), including in the post-Soviet space (Central Asia, some Caucasian republics), are tribal in nature. For example, in Mecca there live representatives of the Quraysh tribe, one of the components of which is the family of the Prophet Mohammad - the Hashim. The state-forming people of Afghanistan - the Pashtuns - consist of three allied associations of tribes (Durrani, Ghilzai, Karani). In turn, each tribe (Kabilya) includes a number of clans (Kaum), each of which is based on the so-called "large families" (heil). Other Afghan peoples have a tribal system, although not so clearly expressed, but still existing¹.

In the sovereign states of Central Asia, there also exists a tribal division of societies. Thus, in Kazakhstan they still distinguish the so-called zhuzes (senior, middle and junior), their

constituent tribes and clans. However, it should be borne in mind that similar traditional social systems exist in other Central Asian countries².

Soviet modernization was never able to resolve the issue of breaking the archaic system of local communities. So, for example, during the investigation under the so-called. the “cotton affair” that shook Soviet Uzbekistan in the 1980s, it was established that in this republic those elements of the social system that were characteristic of the region even before it became part of the Russian Empire were actually preserved and working. Something similar is observed in some states of the South Caucasus, for example, in Azerbaijan, as well as in the national republics of the North Caucasus.

Despite all the differences between the North Caucasian republics, their socio-political system is based on the traditional nature of local societies. The most important element in the functioning of a regional traditional society is the collective solidarity of people, based on a system of social institutions of public regulation (family, clan, community, traditions, morality, customary law, public opinion) and social practices, including, among other things, blood revenge.

North Caucasian communities are phratrial associations (Dagestanians have jamaats, Chechens have tukhums and teips, Karachais and Balkars have “big families”, Adygs have “fraternities”), all of them go back to the adat culture, and still have a certain impact influence on regional political processes. In particular, the authoritative domestic ethno-conflictologist V.A. Avksentyev rightly notes that “structures such as councils of clans (teips, tukhums, etc.), elders, religious fraternities (tarikat) operate on the basis of the rules of law of the era of “military democracy,” that is, more than a thousand years ago. We can confidently say that human rights violations in the region committed by traditional social institutions are comparable in scale to the violations responsibility for which falls on the state.

Such a system of law is based on the inferiority of all “strangers,” that is, representatives of other peoples...”³

As is known, the administration system that emerged in its basic outlines in the mid-1990s in the post-Soviet national republics has a clearly expressed clan character, which could not but give rise to a lot of publications on this topic. Indeed, the problem of ethnostatism and ethnocracies inseparable from it in these regions has been growing since the turn of the 80s and 90s of the last century attracts close attention of scientists, although to a lesser extent than these socio-political phenomena deserve⁴. At the same time, ethno-statism, as an ideology for the construction of ethnic states and the ethnicization of power structures, in the late 1980s actually prevailed throughout the entire post-Soviet space. In conditions of a total and systemic crisis of the Soviet political, economic and sociocultural systems, the ideology of ethnostatism received a social base on the basis of the unfolding ethnic mobilization. After a wait-and-see pause, ethno-statism was adopted not only by opposition ethno-national movements, but also by the former party-nomenklatura elite of the now sovereign republics.

At the same time, as some experts believe, “the ethnocratic system cannot be broken at once... ethnocracies and ethnic clans can be transformed gradually by regulating the process both tactically and strategically... reproduction mechanisms of ethno-elites should be filled with modernization content... it is impossible to solve the problem without changes in social economic reality, development of ideological certainty and the formation of a new political culture”⁵.

As a result of the strengthening of ethno-statism, social elevators, do not work in the localities, the majority of the population, especially youth, does not have significant life prospects, which enables radically oriented activists to spread quite successfully in this environment the ideas alien to Russian statehood, involving, among other things, religious grounds.

Although historically there has been observed a gradual decomposition of traditional social institutions of the eastern type, but this process occurs unevenly in different regions and, of course, is not fully completed. As a consequence, the ethnic factor ranks High in the Moslem East. At turning history points it is often politicized, as has been recorded practically since the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the significant trends at the beginning of the new millennium is that there is a repoliticization of ethnicity. Another sharp escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, involvement of global and regional political players in it is a clear confirmation of this.

In almost all countries and regions noted above authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes have emerged, which are known to be quite unstable and unbalanced. The extant traditional social system of local societies, based on clans, tribes and tribal unions, is unable to predetermine the progressive modernization of these states. At the same time, on the basis of the traditional social system of Moslem societies administratively administrative apparatuses, influential political parties and public organizations are being formed. In the first post-Soviet years they, for rare exceptions, were represented by people from the Soviet-perestroika nomenclature of the CPSU and economic nomenclature of the second echelon. In subsequent years, some leaders retained their positions of power (for example, in Tajikistan), in others their children became successors (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan), in a number of the states representatives of other influential clans have taken leading positions (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan).

We emphasize that almost all power structures of these states were and are still being formed according to nepotistic (i.e., according to relationships of kinship and property) and tribalistic (i.e., ethnic and/or fellow countryman) characteristics and represent clan-cliental formations. The clan bears collective responsibility for the actions of its nominee, and the latter, in turn, ensures the interests of his clan. "An outside man" can only

be included in the sphere of such communities within the framework of the “client-patron” relationship, that is, without pretending to first roles in the community, but providing services to the clan in exchange for patronage.

At the same time, over the past thirty three post-Soviet years, not a single Central Asian republic (to a lesser extent Kazakhstan, to a larger – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) could not build high income societies. Despite the fact that the region is a treasury of natural resources: there are huge deposits of oil (Kazakhstan), gas (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), gold, copper, uranium, more than 100 types of mineral raw materials. However, due to a number of conflict-generating factors, including the clan nature of local societies, as well as historical past, we can talk about sustainable economic development only with a great deal of caution. A consequence of conflict-producing characteristics of this kind is the “fragility” of states of the region, instability of their development, high security risks.

A multi-vector foreign policy and foreign economic connections of these states became the dominant factor in the foreign policy. However, this kind of multi-vectorism, especially in relation to collective West, is extremely dangerous. Thousands of Western and pro-Western NGOs and NPOs specializing in preparation and implementation of “color revolutions” operate in the region⁶.

The position of the West in the economies of the countries of the region also turned out to be essential. Thus, in Kazakhstan up to 70 per cent of assets in the oil industry are controlled by Western “partners”. Consequently, representatives of the junior Kazakh zhuz living there found themselves in a poor socio-economic situation⁷.

The situation could be improved by economic and political integration of countries in the region. However, movement in this direction is being obstructed due to the absence of a key state in Central Asia and the presence of serious interstate contradictions. Predominantly resource-based nature of the countries' economies

of Central Asian region, stagnation of industrial production do not provide a decent standard of living of the population. Moreover, the entire economy is practically divided between a small number of influential clans. A similar thing may be said about Azerbaijan, where there are, practically, two states - wealthy Baku and poor other territories, especially rural areas, where there is a clear lack of jobs.

As for the republics of the North Caucasus, most of them are subsidized, and the interests of the administrative-management apparatuses are associated with the preservation of the existing situation where the apparatus itself, on the one hand, achieves significant independence and independence from the federal center, and on the other hand preserves financial, and sometimes even political support from the Kremlin. This situation is being corrected gradually, but slowly and not always progressively and purposefully⁸.

During the Soviet period, modernization processes in the Caucasus and Central Asia, especially in the field of industrialization, were not completed, which is explained by regional specifics (archaic economic structures, social institutions, structures etc.). Introduction to the region in the 1990s of market rules of the game, opening its economy for global markets of raw materials, products, manpower actually destroyed many of the achievements of the Soviet era.

The consequences of the events occurred were catastrophic. Suffice it to say, for example, that with an all-Russian industrial production reduction in the second half of the 1990s up to 48-49 per cent (from the 1990 level), this figure in the majority of post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia turned out to be only at around 17-24 per cent⁹. In this regard, experts spoke about a systemic deindustrialization of the majority of not only North Caucasian republics, but also some now sovereign states. It was also noted that the most significant impact over the scale of deindustrialization was made by the process of their complex ethnicization.

The “titular” generation of business executives that replaced the Soviet directorial corps, which consisted mainly of experienced business executives – mainly Russians, for the most part had neither specialized education, nor experience in managing industrial enterprises, nor the desire (ability) to return production taken under control to life in new economic conditions.

Including for this reason, the level of education, health care, culture, and other social spheres of the population’s life has fallen sharply. The socio-economic situation is aggravated not only by the clan system traditional for the regions under consideration, but also by large-scale corruption. It is clear that all this creates a breeding ground for crime and extremist groups.

Against the backdrop of political disagreements and economic problems in the post-Soviet period in these regions, especially in Central Asia, there was recorded an accelerated demographic growth of titular ethnic groups and a simultaneous reduction in the share of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, a decline in the influence of Russian culture. As a result, according to some data, by 2050th, if current trends continue, local elites will no longer speak Russian, with all the ensuing consequences. The serious rejuvenation of the indigenous population is accompanied by the growth of ethnic, religious and political extremism. We are talking, first of all, about expanding the ideology and practice of pan-Turkism and radical Islamism¹⁰.

We emphasize that in the post-Soviet era, Russia entered a period of stable and prolonged depopulation, which was largely due to changes in the basic characteristics of population reproduction, a decrease in the birth rate, the spread of one- and two-child families, an increase in morbidity and mortality in working age, and a reduction in life expectancy, changes in the migration mobility of the population, the crisis of the modern family, etc.¹¹.

At the same time, we emphasize that depopulation was a significant feature of Russian reality in the 1990s, however, already in the new millennium, the measures taken by the country's leadership led to a positive result - an increase in the birth rate, a reduction in mortality, and a slight increase in average life expectancy. They spurred reproductive activity, first of all, among the population of the North Caucasian republics, which traditionally consider demographic dynamics as one of the central priorities of their development. Indeed, the North Caucasus, to a lesser extent than other regions of Russia, experienced the process of depopulation, although during this period the birth rate among local peoples also dropped significantly. According to experts, "by 2000, a natural population decline began in Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia-Alania. The demographic indicators of Kabardino-Balkaria have dropped to zero (simple reproduction). The increased rate of natural reproduction persisted only in the east of the region. But even there it was significantly inferior to the level of the 1970-1980s. Only the Chechen Republic (represented almost exclusively by the titular ethnic group) retained its position - vital statistics remained almost at the level of 1990¹².

However, the insufficient labor market in the North Caucasus region of Russia triggers migration processes: from mountainous regions to foothills and lowlands, and from there to other regions of Russia.

As experts emphasize, migration processes are facilitated by the agrarian-semi-subsistence type of economy as the dominant one, cemented by traditional family-tribal, clan-corporate, ethnic-oriented relations, which also reproduced its characteristic type of employment - agrarian overpopulation, characteristic of the era of early capitalism, the era of primitive capital accumulation, the first stage of industrialization with its attendant stagnant unemployment, migrant workers, low standard of living, closed farms, and underdeveloped

communications. "Without recognizing this," writes an authoritative southern Russian economist Yu.S. Kolesnikov, "it is impossible to explain the general labor surplus of the region's population, the fact, that due to agricultural overpopulation, the most educated and qualified part of the population is washed out of the republics (a negative migration balance is typical for Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria), depriving the region of the main resource of modernization - young innovators." Development of the recreational complex, tourism, ethno-economics and energy, reflected in the "Strategy of Socio-Economic development of the North Caucasus Federal District for the period until 2025th" is not capable of radically changing the employment problem in the North Caucasus republics. Moreover, it does not solve one of the most important problems of the region - the restoration of the full multi-ethnicity of the republics, in particular the re-emigration of the Russian population, without which the transition to innovative development is problematic¹³.

As is known, in the post-Soviet period, due to total demodernization, military and terrorist actions, and a wide variety of conflicts, including domestic ones, a mass exodus of a significant part of the Russian population from Central Asia and the Caucasus was recorded¹⁴. In general, according to expert estimates, the study of "the dynamics of the number of Russians in the North Caucasus in the last 40-50 years leads to the conclusion that the almost two-century process of ethnocultural integration of this region into Russia through the rooting of the Russian (and, more broadly, Russian-speaking) population in it, failed on the whole"¹⁵. The trend of reduction in the Russian population in the region in the late Soviet period was already quite stable, but after the collapse of the Soviet state it increased significantly.

Chechnya and Ingushetia have almost completely lost their Russians, having turned into almost mono-ethnic entities. However, in other republics the number of Russians has

decreased significantly. Experts believe that “the federal center is not able to undertake targeted and large-scale (i.e. effective) efforts to resolve the “Russian issue” and, more broadly, the systemic modernization of the North Caucasus. This means that the process of outflow of Russians from the regions will continue to proceed in a self-regulation mode”¹⁶.

Without a comprehensive, targeted program to resolve the “Russian question” in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the scenario of a continued complete exodus of Russians from the region by the middle of the 21st century seems almost inevitable.

So, it is socio-economic problems and demographic growth of the population in the regions under consideration that are steadily leading to powerful migration processes, primarily to Russia, which has become the reason for the emergence and strengthening of ethnic enclaves in the most developed regions of the Russian Federation. However, it should be noted that the average population density of, say, the Central Asian region is not that high. Here, on an area of about 4 million square km the population is just over 70 million people. For comparison: in Türkiye with an area of about 780 thousand square km the population exceeds 80 million people, the situation is about the same in Iran with an area of slightly more than 1 million 600 thousand square km. It means that the powerful migration flows of the titular population of the Central Asian states are not associated with an overabundance of population, but with their disastrous economic situation as a result of economic degradation, primarily industrial production, and the lack of a sufficient number of jobs.

According to available data, the total number of external migrants in Russia exceeds 10 million people. The largest number of them are citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Labor migrants also arrive from Kazakhstan, but there are relatively few of them. There is practically no labor migration from Turkmenistan, but this is explained by the preference for

Turkmens to travel to Türkiye due to the simplified visa regime, linguistic proximity and ethno-confessional kinship.

Migration processes of the titular population of the Caucasus and Central Asia to Russia lead to ethnic enclavization of a number of Russian regions. Moreover, by ethnic enclaves we mean any compact communities of an ethnic group within a territory historically inhabited by representatives of another people. Such territories have linguistic, cultural and economic systems that are different from the surrounding society. Migrant enclaves are a special case of ethnic ones. Their localization leads to a decrease in the motivation of foreign migrants to integrate into local communities, the implantation of their own ethnosculture into the society of the host country, the rejection of the values of the local community, and the emergence of conflicts on national and religious grounds.

However, the emergence of ethno-confessional enclaves may not be directly related to external migration. For example, by 1996, on the territory of Dagestan (as well as Chechnya), a kind of territorial bridgeheads with a formed infrastructure had been created that ensured its cultural, theological and even political expansion – the so-called “Wahhabi enclaves” (the most famous is the “Kadar zone”, which included the Dargin villages of Kadar, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi in the Buinak region of Dagestan). The specificity of these enclaves was that they were supported by “sponsor money” coming from abroad and were initially means of geopolitical expansion on the part of the Moslem world. The implementation of the doctrine worked out by the “Wahhabis” was supposed to be carried out in two stages: in the first, “enclave” formations were to be formed on the territory of all the republics of the North Caucasus, and in the second, it was planned to launch activities for the political unification of the “enclaves” into a single fundamentalist state “from sea to sea”¹⁷.

As a result of the events of August-September 1999, these plans were not destined to come true.

However, within the framework of this article, we mainly highlight external migration, as a result of which migrant enclaves have appeared and strengthened in some Russian megacities, as well as in oil and gas production regions. However, such "enclaves" have long been established in the United States (for example, "China towns")¹⁸, as well as in some European countries, say, in France, and therefore their experience may be useful for Russia¹⁹. Let us emphasize that neither the German "guest workers", nor the French assimilation project, nor the British concept of multiculturalism could become a panacea that prevented migrants, mainly Moslems, from creating their own enclaves and integrating them into their communities. European realities indicate that ethnically and religiously homogeneous migrant communities are actively and quite successfully forming an "enclave" habitat, which tends to be localized within the corresponding territorial boundaries, and the centers of their concentration, as a rule, are mosques or prayer rooms.

At the same time, one of the consequences of the emergence of such "enclaves" is the criminalization and religious and political radicalization of some of the migrants, which inevitably leads to the emergence of latent centers of socio-political conflict in a fairly long term, to their inevitable confrontation with the local population. In our opinion, in this case there is no need to talk about tolerant "Euro-Islam"; rather, we are talking about the Islamization of Europe, and in the most dangerous forms.

The events of the new millennium in Spain, Great Britain, France and other European countries clearly confirm this thesis. As a result, in recent years, European politicians have spoken in unison about the failure of existing adaptation practices for the integration of migrants in Europe, about the incompatibility of Islamism and Western liberal values. However, the migration flow to European countries, especially as a result of the Arab Spring, has only intensified, with all the ensuing consequences.

Similar “enclaves” appeared in Russian cities, and the results were not slow to appear. Huge flows of migrants caused a sharp deterioration in the crime situation and led to a sharp increase in criminal crime associated with thefts, assaults, drug trafficking, etc. At the same time, an increase in corruption is recorded in the Russian structures responsible for migration. It is quite obvious that ethnic enclaves complicate the adaptation of migrants to Russian society and cause a negative reaction from the Russian population. As a result, the federal authorities are taking some measures to block the negative consequences of poorly controlled migration processes, especially illegal migration. Individual regions are implementing their own programs in this direction. However, life urgently requires the development and strict adherence to a comprehensive all-Russian program aimed at streamlining migration processes and preventing the creation and strengthening of migrant enclaves on Russian territory.

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SERGEY MELNIK. INTERNATIONAL INTERRELIGIOUS SUMMITS IN MODERN RUSSIA

Keywords: interreligious dialogue; Russia; religious leaders; peacekeeping; religion; terrorism; moral values.

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Abstract. The article is concerned with three largest and most significant international interreligious events in the period of modern Russia: I Interreligious Peace Forum (2000), II Interreligious Peace Forum (2004), and World Summit of Religious Leaders (2006). The first part of the article describes different types of interreligious dialogue (polemical, peacekeeping, cognitive and partner). Then three mentioned interreligious activities, which are described as a peacekeeping dialogue at a “high level” are considered. Emphasis is placed on the analysis of summary documents that reflect the consolidated position of the participants. The conclusion of the article sums up the results, in particular, it is noted that the main topics of the summits were peacemaking, terrorism under religious slogans and moral values.

Introduction. Types of Interreligious Dialogue

Researchers consider the World Parliament of Religions (1893, Chicago) to be the starting point of the modern stage of

interreligious dialogue [Moyaert, 2013, p. 195]. The organizers declared as the main goal of the event the desire to build harmonious relations between believers of different religions against the model of interreligious polemics, accusatory theology, antagonism and confrontation that prevailed in relations between them for many centuries. Precisely such attitudes – strengthening peace, mutual understanding and cooperation for the common good – characterize the modernist period of the dialogue between religions. In the first half of the 20th century, such sectarian initiatives began to intensify, although they were relatively few [Melnik, 2022a, p. 20-32].

Interreligious dialogue has become widespread since the end of World War II, especially since the 1960s and 1970s. This was due to a number of factors, the main of which are globalization, the end of the colonial era (which caused inequality and inter-religious relations, the privileged position of Christianity), the Holocaust (which had a great influence on Catholicism and Protestantism), the popularity of ideas of mutually enriching dialogue of different religions and cultures, the interest of many people in them [Shokhin, 1997].

Since the 1970s, as K. Lehmann notes, interreligious dialogue has become a social movement of a global scale, in practice all religions around the world are involved in it [Talking Dialogue, 2021, p. 2-8]. As a rule, interreligious dialogue, in which high-ranking representatives of religious organizations participate, does not involve discussion of theological topics, but is concentrated around issues of peacemaking and cooperation to achieve social well-being [Melnik, 2021b, p. 95-118]. Today, in an interdependent and interconnected world characterized by an unprecedented high degree of social communication, the relevance of interreligious dialogue is beyond dispute. It is implemented at both local, country and international levels [Melnik, 2022a, p. 333-362].

In accordance with the approach developed by the author, it is proposed to distinguish between four types of interreligious

dialogue: “polemical, cognitive, peacekeeping and partner. The named types of dialogue can be conditionally compared with the questions that determine communication: “who is right?” “Who are you?” “How to live peacefully together?” “What positive contribution can believers make to society?”” [Melnik, 2020; Melnik, 2022a]. The interreligious activities considered in this article can be attributed to peacekeeping dialogue. At the same time, to understand the system of interreligious relations in modern Russia and the position which summits assume in it, it seems useful to give a brief overview of other types of dialogue.

The most famous example of polemical interreligious dialogue in Russia is the two disputes between the Orthodox priest Daniil Sysoev and the former Orthodox priest Ali Polosin, who converted to Islam. The meetings took place in Moscow in 2005 and concerned disputes regarding the inspiration of the Bible and the Quran, as well as conflicting views on God in two religions [Melnik, 2022a, p. 135]. Since polemical dialogue can lead to tension and enmity (it is significant that the priest D. Sysoev was killed in 2009), official representatives of religious communities do not support him, so such meetings were rare [Melnik, 2022a, p. 132–140].

Cognitive dialogue aims to explore different religions. In 2018, the publishing office of the Bible and Theological Institute published the book “Christian-Islamic Dialogue. Anthology” [Christian-Islamic, 2018] translated from German. In the chapters of the book, the Christian and Muslim authors set out the views of their religious tradition on the topic under discussion (for example, the conception of God, man, revelation, community of believers, family, eschatology, etc.). Unlike polemical dialogue, the task is not to convince the interlocutor, to demonstrate the advantage of his faith (who has the correct conception of God, and who is mistaken, etc.), but simply to get acquainted with his views, to understand his worldview and value system (for example, to find out what the conception of God is in a particular religion, about revelation).

Due to the predominance of atheistic ideology in the USSR in our country, the problems of comparative study of religions were investigated much less, than in the West, where this topic was dealt with, including specially created scientific centers, many leading theologians and researchers¹, meetings of believers were held who explored each other's spiritual experience in order to enrich themselves², as, for example, in the framework of the so-called "monastic interreligious dialogue" [Bethune, 2013]. It's possible to introduce isolated examples of cognitive interreligious dialogue in Russia, which was mainly expressed in intellectual acquaintance with other religions. These include the project "interreligious dialogue" on the basis of Tomsk State University [Karpitsky, 2014], the work of priest Nazariy Eyyazov [Eyyazov, 2021a; Eyyazov, 2021b], devoted to a comparative analysis of ideas about Jesus Christ and man in Islam and Christianity, the approach proposed by the author of the article is the so-called "personality model" of interreligious dialogue, based on a comparison of the spiritual practices of religions [Melnik, 2017].

Peacekeeping interreligious dialogue can be carried out at three "levels": "high" (religious leaders), "middle" (experts) and "lower" (grassroots; we mean ordinary believers, including young people) [Melnik, 2022a, p. 90-91]. Since religious communities in the USSR could not fully carry out their activities, interreligious dialogue at the "grassroots" level in our country, unlike the West, did not develop. Such initiatives began to become widespread only in the 2010s. One of the first of them was the annual International Interreligious Youth Forum in Dagestan³, held since 2013. Other examples include the Dialogue of Religions series of events in Moscow, during which chess tournaments, football and volleyball matches of believing youth of different religions were organized⁴.

For this reason, in our country, there were also almost no original concepts adopted by religious communities in which the principles of mutual respect and consent of representatives of

different religions, comparable to those that appeared during the last century in the West, would be philosophically, theologically, and religiously proved. In 1965, the Roman Catholic Church adopted at the Second Vatican Council the declaration "Nostra aetate" (Latin "Our Century"), which formulates a new attitude towards non-Christian religions [Christians and Muslims, 2000, p. 3-6]. Conceptual interreligious documents of a theological nature were subsequently published by representatives of Islam (an open letter from Muslim figures "A Common Word Between Us and You" (2007) [Common Word, 2018]) and Judaism (Dabru Emet (2000), "To Fulfill the Will of Our Heavenly Father: Towards Cooperation between Jews and Christians" (2015) [Jewish-Catholic, 2021]). Catholic theologian Hans Küng made an attempt to identify common moral grounds in different religions, which he designated as the Global Ethic Project Projekt Weltethos, (it was reflected in the outcome document of a major interreligious forum in Chicago in 1993 entitled "Towards a Global Ethic: An Initial Declaration")⁵.

One of the main approaches which is the basis of the listed documents (this is a peacekeeping dialogue at the expert level) is to identify the similarities of religions, which can lie at the core of respectful, constructive, good neighborly relations. For example, *Nostra aetate* says: "The Church also respects Muslims who worship the One God, the Living and the Eternal, the merciful and almighty, the Creator of heaven and earth, who spoke to people whose definitions... they wholeheartedly strive to obey" [Christians and Muslims, 2000, p. 4-5]. That is, it is emphasized here that both Christians and Muslims believe in the One God-Creator who created the world (which is not, for example, in Buddhism), similarly understand His properties ("living and existing, merciful and almighty"), believe that He opens his will through special people - prophets, and this will, expounded in the scriptures, must be obeyed. Without going into details of the content of the listed interreligious documents, it can be stated that there were no similar interreligious statements or

research approaches in our country in their theological elaboration and significance.

An example of cooperation between religious communities in the framework of collaborating interreligious dialogue is the activities of the Interreligious Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance to the Population of Syria, created in 2017 (operates within the framework of the Council for Interaction with Religious Associations under the President of the Russian Federation)⁶. Religious communities raised the finances for humanitarian aid and the restoration of a secondary school; in September 2019, a Russian delegation of religious leaders visited Syria⁷. In general, interreligious initiatives for the joint activities of believers of different religions in our country were rare. It seems that this is the niche, which can be filled as the expansion of interreligious contacts.

The sphere of interreligious relations, which is mostly developed in our country, is a peacekeeping dialogue at the "high" level of religious leaders, that is, the interaction of official representatives of religious organizations. Such a dialogue existed in the times of the USSR, both between the religious communities of the country and at the international level [Silantyev, 2010]. Two major interreligious summits were held in the Soviet Union: the World Conference "Religious Figures for Lasting Peace, Disarmament and Fair Relations between Peoples" (1977) and the Moscow World Conference "Religious Figures for Saving the Sacred Gift - Life from Nuclear Catastrophe" (1982). The last of them was attended by 590 delegates from 90 countries. The final document of the event states: "We do not seek to merge our worldviews. Our perspectives on reality remain distinct. We uncompromisingly adhere to our various religious beliefs. Despite these differences, we can jointly assert much that is precious to all of us" [World..., 1983, p. 7]. The participants declare that they distance themselves from the discussion of theological issues, everyone has the right to believe as it is thought to be necessary. Recognizing differences in religious

beliefs and not striving to level them, believers say that they are ready to cooperate in different spheres of public life and see this as the main task of interreligious dialogue. The same principles of interreligious relations at the bottom of the summits held already in the period of modern Russia with the participation of religious leaders.

It's possible to distinguish three largest and most significant interreligious summits in Russia which were held in Moscow: I Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (2000), II Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (2004), World Summit of Religious Leaders (2006). Ultimately, other interreligious events with international participation were held in Russia. Among them, it's acceptable to note, in particular, the Moscow International Forum "Religion and Peace," which has been held annually since 2013⁸. However, such events were less representative and of less importance. The I Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum was the first major interreligious summit in the history of modern Russia, and the World Summit of Spiritual Leaders was the largest in terms of the number of participants. In addition, it can be stated that on the subject, the main ideas of the speakers, the content of the final documents, interreligious conferences are close to each other. In this regard, the consideration of the three named summits will allow us to get a fairly full picture of the practice of implementing peacekeeping interreligious dialogue at the "high" level of religious leaders in our country.

Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (2000)

The I Interreligious peacekeeping forum took place from November 13 to November 14, 2000 in Moscow⁹. The event was held under the auspices of the Interreligious Council of Russia (ICR) and the Ministry of the Russian Federation on federation, national and migration policy affairs. ICR, and more specifically

Russian Orthodox Church being its part acted as “ideologist” and the main initiator of carrying out of this event.

The forum was attended by more than 300 people, among whom, in addition to representatives of religious communities and interreligious organizations, were employees of state authorities of Russia, diplomats of the CIS countries, experts. In addition to the religious leaders of the Russian Federation, among the foreign participants of the forum, one can note the Catholicos-Patriarch of all Georgia Ilia II, Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims (SAM) of Kazakhstan Mufti A. Derbisaliev, Secretary General of the International Council of Christians and Jews Pastor F. Pieper, Secretary General of “Religions for Peace” organization W. Wendley¹⁰. Basically, representatives of the CIS countries were invited to the event, which was reflected, among other things, in the final declaration and speeches of the participants, who paid special attention to the specifics of the development of interreligious dialogue in the post-Soviet space.

The event was opened by His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II, who delivered a short report. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church noted that there were no religious wars in the region of the CIS countries, and he called the main goals of interreligious dialogue the prevention of extremism and peacemaking, as well as overcoming the moral crisis and “moral revival of society.”¹¹ These topics are central to all summits under consideration.

After the speech of Patriarch Alexy II, greetings were read from state officials: President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, President of Georgia E.A. Shevardnadze, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation G.N. Seleznev, Moscow Mayor Yu.M. Luzhkov and others¹². Then Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad (future Patriarch) made a meaningful report on the topic “Through the harmonization of liberal-secular and religious-traditional approaches to solving interethnic and interreligious problems¹³.” The scope of the article does not allow even a brief review of the

main speeches of the summit participants, so we will focus on the analysis of the final documents. They largely repeat the key ideas of the speeches of religious leaders and, in addition, express their consolidated position, and therefore are of particular interest¹⁴.

Within the framework of the given forum, two documents were adopted. The first of them, the shorter one – “Statement of the participants of the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum.” Religious leaders express in it their concern about “manifestations of extremism and terrorism, which are often trying to justify religious rhetoric¹⁵.” The second document is the “Final Document of the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum,” the core theme of which was traditional moral values. The statement said: “We are convinced that peace is unattainable without genuine moral transformation and renewal of society. Harmony between people of different peoples and faith will become strong only when loyalty to the original, above given moral norms prevail among our compatriots on which any human activity should be based... Being conscious of the growing danger of conflict between secular worldview and adherence to a holistic religious lifestyle, we appeal to every possible effort to harmonize the existing legal systems and religious and moral traditions of various peoples¹⁶.” The document also calls to “follow the paths of peace,” and expresses concern about acts of “vandalism against sacred places, manifestations of xenophobia and blasphemy, propaganda of prejudice against religion, public actions related to insulting the feelings of believers.¹⁷” The experience of holding the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum was recognized as successful, in connection with which, four years later, a similar event was held in Moscow, which became more ambitious.

II Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (2004)

The II Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum was held from March 2 to 4, 2004 in Moscow. The event, which, like the previous

one, was held under the auspices of the Interreligious Council of Russia, was attended by 300 representatives of religious communities from the CIS countries. At the plenary session, there were made presentations by: "Patriarch Alexy II, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia I.S. Ivanov, Chairman of the Caucasus Muslim Authority Sheikh ul-Islam Allahshukur Pashazade, Chief Rabbi of Russia Berl Lazar, Head of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia Pandito Hambo Lama Dam Ayusheeva, Chairman of the MSD of Uzbekistan Mufti Abdurashid Bakhromov, Chief Rabbi of Russia Adolf Shaevich, Chairman of the Coordination Center for Muslims of the North Caucasus Ismail Berdiev, Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Mufti Ravil Gainutdin, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad" [II Interreligious..., 2004]. Greetings from the presidents of Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were read out.

Within the framework of the forum, round tables were held on the topics: "The current situation of state-religious relations in the CIS space," "Coordination of the efforts of traditional religions to respond to common challenges," "Social service of religious organizations," "Problems of religious education," "Experience of expanding interreligious cooperation to the regional level," "Religion and the media," "Peacekeeping efforts of religious organizations" [Ibid.]. As shown by the listed topics, the focus of the event was on the role of the religious factor in society.

At the forum, the participants announced the creation of the CIS Interreligious Council (IC) [Lyapin, 2022]. The organization included twenty-three religious leaders of the Commonwealth countries, and Patriarch Alexy II and Chairman of the MSD of the Caucasus Sheikh-ul-Islam A. Pashazade became honorary co-chairs [II Interreligious..., 2004]. The statement on the establishment of the CIS IC as a priority goal of the organization is "coordination of joint activities of traditional religious organizations of the CIS countries in strengthening interethnic and interreligious peace, achieving harmony and

stability in society, developing dialogue between spiritual leaders, joining forces in the fight against common challenges, affirming traditional spiritual values in society" [II Interreligious..., 2004]. Major forums took place with the participation of the CIS IC, the most significant of them were the World Summit of Religious Leaders (Baku, 2010)¹⁸ and the Presidium of the CIS Interreligious Council (Yerevan, 2011)¹⁹.

With the participation of the CIS IC, major forums took place, the World Summit of Religious Leaders (Baku, 2010) and the Presidium of the CIS Interreligious Council (Yerevan, 2011) are the most significant of them. However, this organization subsequently ceased its activities and currently the CIS Interreligious Council does not even have its own official website.

The final document of the 2004 forum raises a number of issues – peacemaking, the importance of moral values, the revival of religion in the CIS countries, the need to recognize the diversity of modern civilization in the context of renunciation of alignment [II Interreligious..., 2004]. One of the central topics of the statement was the problem of terrorism under religious slogans: "We testify that true believers will never embark on the course of terror. We are convinced that those who deliberately became terrorists have denied their faith. We bitterly state that their consciousness, blurred with crazy ideas, is closed to the reasons of conscience, and the only language they understand is the language of power. Traditional religious organizations are working hard to contain the proliferation of terror and the blasphemous use of religious symbols by terrorists. At the same time, we offer our governments assistance and support in the fight against this evil" [Ibid.]. After the previous forum, there were attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001; terrorist attacks in which criminals used religious rhetoric took place on the territory of the Russian Federation. The Interreligious Council of Russia adopted several statements on the problem of terrorism during this period: "Statement of the ICR in connection with the

hostage-taking in Moscow" (2002) (terrorist attack at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow at the musical "Nord-Ost"); "Statement due to a series of terrorist attacks" (2004), "Appeal in connection with the tragedy in Beslan" (2004) [Melnik, 2022b]. In this regard, the forum paid special attention to the topic of extremism and terrorism.

World Summit of Religious Leaders (2006).

On July 3–5, 2006, the World Summit of Religious Leaders was held in Moscow at the President Hotel. The event was organized by the Interreligious Council of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. The summit was attended by more than "one hundred and fifty religious leaders (more than 50 of them are leaders of the largest religious communities on the planet) from 49 countries of the world – representatives of the world's leading religions: Christianity (Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants), Judaism, Islam (Shiites and Sunnis), Buddhism, leaders of such influential international interreligious organizations as the World Conference of Religions for Peace, World Council of Churches, Conference of European Churches, International Jewish Committee, World Jewish Congress, Organization of the Islamic Conference.²⁰" The event came before the G8 summit in St. Petersburg. The opening ceremony was attended by President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin, who at the end of his speech announced that he would convey the final document of the forum to state leaders at the upcoming summit²¹.

Within the inter-religious summit, many issues were discussed: "the role of faith and religion in modern society; protection and affirmation of spiritual and moral values in the society and the responsibility of religions for this; ways to overcome terrorism and extremism; education and the need for moral education of young people; legality, freedom, human rights, moral responsibility; supporting the values of the family and human life, as well as gender equality; respect for religious

feelings and for what is considered sacred in religious traditions; morality in the economy, overcoming poverty; the role of the media; planet resources, environmental responsibility, challenges of epidemics of infectious diseases, drug addiction; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; dialogue and partnership of civilizations, the problem of globalization and the world order, the dialogue of religious figures with politicians, civil society structures and international organizations.²² All these topics were reflected in the final document of the event – “Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders,” the position of the participants was formulated in a separate paragraph for each of them²³.

The Speech, as in the two previous forums, reflected the themes of pseudo-religious terrorism and the importance of moral values. Much attention was paid to the issue of the value of human life, rights and freedoms: “human life is the gift of the Supreme Being. It is our sacred duty to preserve this gift, which should be the concern of both religious communities and political leaders ... Man is the supreme creation of the Almighty. Therefore, individual rights, their protection and observance at the national, regional and international levels are an important concern for us... we are convinced that the law and social order must be correspondent and combine the commitment to rights and freedoms with an understanding of the moral foundations underlying the human community. We declare the importance of religious freedom in the modern world²⁴. That is, the Speech notes that the idea of the value of human life, the concept of human rights and freedoms is supported by religions, at the same time, religious leaders emphasize that this concept takes into account the idea of morality and sin.

The Speech covered topics that were not involved in the final documents of previous forums – ecology and economics: “Human life is also connected with the economy. The international economic order, as well as other areas of global architecture, must be based on justice. All economic and business

activity should be socially responsible and based on moral norms... It is imperative that all governments and business communities are equally responsible protectors of our planet's resources. These resources, granted to all generations by the Creator, should be used for the benefit of every person... Responsible distribution of the Earth's wealth and active humanitarian work will help to overcome the poverty and hunger that influence billions of our brothers and sisters.²⁵" Thus, in the document we see an extensive range of issues in connection with which religious leaders jointly declare their desire for peace, solving social problems and conflicts, readiness to contribute "to creating a better future for the all-human family.²⁶"

The World Summit of Religious Leaders was the largest and most representative interreligious event in the history of modern Russia. In May 2022, it was planned to hold the World Conference on Interreligious and Interethnic Dialogue in St. Petersburg.²⁷ This event could have become larger, but it was canceled in six months due to the coronavirus pandemic.²⁸

Conclusion

In conclusion of the study, we summarize some of the main results regarding the experience of holding interreligious summits in modern Russia.

1. At interreligious meetings of religious leaders, as noted in the introduction, theological issues are not discussed, while the focus of the participants is on social topics. The main message of the summits is reflected in the final phrase of the final document of the II Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum: "We appeal to Christians, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, to all people to preserve peace and harmony among themselves, to work together for the benefit of our countries.²⁹" The statements actually reveal what specific contribution religions can make to peacemaking and social well-being.

2. One of the most important topics of the summits, which was reflected in all statements and speeches of the participants, was the phenomenon of terrorism. In particular, the 2006 Summit Speech says: "We condemn terrorism and extremism in any form, as well as attempts to justify them religiously.... The use of religion as a means of incitement to hatred or as an excuse for crimes against the individual, morality, humanity is one of the main challenges of our time. It can only be dealt with through education and moral upbringing.³⁰" The position of religious leaders is that it is wrong to associate the ideology of terrorists with religion, it distorts religious doctrine and contradicts spiritual values. In this regard, statements and speeches referred to "terrorism using religious rhetoric," "pseudo-religious terrorism³¹, and the main means of its prevention was called increasing the level of religious literacy.

3. Moral values have become another key topic of all forums. For example, the Speech says: "Through education and social action, we must ingrain stable moral values in the minds of people. We consider these values to be given by the Almighty and deeply rooted in human life. In practice, they are in many ways consistent for our religions. We feel responsible for the moral condition of our societies and wish to take on this responsibility, working together with states and civil associations in the name of a life in which moral values are the property and source of sustainable development.³²" In this context, traditional family values were often mentioned. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church, especially Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, developed this theme, contrasting the "liberal" ("secular-humanistic") and "religious-traditionalist" value systems. The first of them lacks the concept of "sin," a person is given maximum freedom to satisfy any of his needs (if this does not harm other people). The religious-traditionalist paradigm presupposes the presence of absolute and certain moral norms that a person is obliged to follow. The main significance of

religions in this context is thought of as opposition to the destruction of public morality [Melnik, 2022a, p. 322–325].

4. The participants of the meeting noted the need to respect and preserve the uniqueness, identity of different civilizations, the refusal to level cultural differences: "We need to build a world order that combines democracy – as a way to reconcile different interests and as the participation of people in decision-making at the national and global level – with respect for moral sense, lifestyle, various legal and political systems, national and religious traditions of people... The world should be multipolar and multi-layered, satisfying all people and all peoples, and not fit into lifeless and simplified ideological schemes.³³" A similar idea was expressed in the statement of the II Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum: "The relationship between leading cultural and spiritual traditions is complicated by attempts to unify them, impose the same way of life on peoples, one type of social structure, and a single civilizational model. All this provokes conflicts, creates a background for extremist sentiments" [II Interreligious, 2004].

5. Also it's possible to touch on the issue of the effectiveness of such international interreligious summits, which are regularly held around the world. For example, in the Eurasian space, the triennial Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in Astana³⁴ is the most famous of them. Often, interreligious forums are limited only to slogans and appeals of religious leaders, do not lead to practical activities outside the event, the final documents in their content are very close to each other, we can even say that they are partly formulaic. The limitations of this form of interreligious dialogue are recognized and acknowledged by experts [Orton, 2016]. For instance, Patriarch Kirill, who was an active participant in the considered summits, once noted: "The easiest way is to sign on to common words - no one takes any responsibility, and then no one reads these common statements. Interreligious groups talk about peace and friendship, and meanwhile bombs explode in the Middle

East, the North Caucasus, and Europe. On one level - a politically correct dialogue, on the other - a tough, sometimes terrible reality.³⁵ At the same time, according to the author, one should not expect from such a diplomatic dialogue to discuss theological topics or organize joint work. There are various forms of interreligious communication, including those related to joint activities (partner dialogue) and theological analysis and comparison of representations of religions (cognitive dialogue). These types of interreligious dialogue are not mutually exclusive, but can combine and complement each other. Interaction at the level of religious leaders also has its own niche, specifics and tasks. Here, the very fact of a friendly meeting, the demonstration of respectful relations (as an example for believers), the creation of a space of communication for religious leaders, evidence of adherence to high humanistic ideals, the expression of a consolidated peacekeeping position are important [More details, see: Melnik, 2021a]. The first and second interreligious peacekeeping forums, the World Summit of Religious Leaders, demonstrated that Russia is also the initiator of an intercivilization dialogue, in general, the experience of holding these events can be assessed positively.

Notes

1. For example, The Oxford International Interfaith Centre. - Access mode: <https://www.oxfordinternational.com/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
2. Svidler L. 10 commandments of interreligious dialogue. - Access mode: <http://www.moonsun-bel.blogspot.ru/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
3. Refer to: 10th International Interreligious Youth Forum opened in Dagestan <https://islamdag.ru/news/2023-05-27/v-dagestane-otkrylsya-yubileynyy-x-mezhdunarodnyy-mezhreligioznyy-molodyozhnyy-forum?ysclid=lisukr5ime732063069> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
4. Refer to: The First Interfaith Chess Tournament was held in Moscow. - Access mode: <https://www.mos.ru/news/item/54306073/> (date of access: 12.07.2023); The second interfaith chess tournament "Dialogue of Religions" was held in Moscow. - Access mode: https://www.mos.ru/news/item/89900073/?utm_source=fb&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=linkshare&u

tm_content=news&fbclid=IwAR1wAe41_7JFe7EHNn5OxS1hV0QIWW6jePZyT OpmQuS2n4T1PbGapHmhbzE (date of access: 12.07.2023); Interfaith football tournament "Dialogue of Religions" was held in Moscow. - Access mode: https://www.mos.ru/news/item/90430073/?utm_source=fb&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=linkshare&utm_content=news&fbclid=IwAR0eX88dDJv72Yir-Q8lvDghFwfmOll42hUgBn_YZidjVIWhyqZEuqaxq0Q (date of access: 12.07.2023).

5. Declaration of the World Ethnic Group / E.V. Seredkina - Access mode: <http://anthropology.ru/ru/text/dokumenty/deklaraciya-mirovogo-etosa> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
6. A meeting of the interreligious Working Group on the provision of humanitarian assistance to Syria took place. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/2017/04/12/news144542/> (date of access: 12.07.2023); The first batch of joint assistance from Russian religious organizations was sent to Syria. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/2017/06/23/news147833/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
7. Refer to: The delegation led by Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk transferred humanitarian aid to a children's boarding school in Syria. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/2018/11/18/news166781/> (date of access: 12.07.2023); Interreligious humanitarian action in Syria and Lebanon ended, which became unprecedented in terms of the volume of aid transferred. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/2018/02/09/news156494/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
8. The First Moscow International Forum "Religion and Peace" was held in the Russian capital - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3439230.html?ysclid=lixlukujja596617533> (date of access: 12.07.2023); Participants of the II International Forum "Religion and Peace" called on religious leaders to unite efforts against extremism under religious slogans - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3799264.html?ysclid=lixlvtgaz0352780063> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
9. Moscow will host the Interreligious Forum - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/85285/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
10. Interreligious peacekeeping forum in Moscow - Access mode: http://www-old.srcc.msu.ru/bib_roc/jmp/00/12-00/04.htm (date of access: 12.07.2023).
11. Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia at the opening of the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (Moscow, November 13-14, 2000) - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/85267/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
12. Greeting of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin to the participants of the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (Moscow, November 13-14, 2000). - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/85268/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).

- 13. "Through the harmonization of liberal-secular and religious-traditional approaches to solving interethnic and interreligious problems." Report of Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/85269/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 14. More details about the cited materials of the summits (speeches, final documents) can be found at the indicated links (the materials are publicly available).
- 15. Statement of the participants of the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum. - Access mode: http://www-old.srcc.msu.ru/bib_roc/jmp/00/12-00/07.htm (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 16. The final document of the Interreligious Peacekeeping Forum (Moscow, November 13-14, 2000). - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/85260/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 17. Ibid.
- 18. The final document of the World Summit of Religious Leaders (Baku, April 26-27, 2010). - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1147205.html?ysclid=ljbtyq8zx5495275384> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 19. Joint Declaration of the participants of the trilateral meeting of religious leaders of Russia and Transcaucasia. - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1787408.html> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 20. About the World Religious Leaders Summit. - Access mode: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/1587576/ (date of access: 12.07.2023). For details on the composition of the participants, see: Journals of the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of July 17, 2006. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/73260/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 21. "Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders" - Access mode: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23680> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 22. Journals of the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of July 17, 2006. - Access mode: <https://mospat.ru/ru/news/73260/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 23. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders. - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
- 24. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders. - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).

25. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
26. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
27. The UN Secretary General supported the idea of holding a conference on interreligious and interethnic dialogue. - Access mode: <https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/gensek-oon-podderzhal-provedenie-konferentsii-po-mezhethnicheskому-dialogu-v-rossii/> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
28. The World Conference on Interreligious Dialogue will be postponed from May to a later date. - Access mode: <https://tass.ru/politika/13023393?ysclid=lk5e8ivd1d67429761> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
29. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders. -Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
30. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders. - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
31. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders. - Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
32. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders.- Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
33. Message of the World Summit of Religious Leaders.- Access mode: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/123666.html?ysclid=ljemv7znu1593815597> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
34. Congress of world leaders and traditional religions in Astana. - Access mode: <https://religions-congress.org/ru/page/o-sezde> (date of access: 12.07.2023).
35. His Holiness Patriarch Kirill: Without support from below, interreligious dialogue loses its meaning. - URL: <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1546480.html> (date of access: 12.07.2023).

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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

KSEНИЯ АТАМАЛИ. МУСЛІМСІНДІРІ: ТАРЫСЫ және күнінде

Keywords: India; Pakistan; Islam; Hinduism; Arab conquests; Ghaznavids; Delhi Sultanate; Mughal Empire; British India; partition of India; intercultural conflict; interreligious conflict; Islamophobia; "Love jihad"; state terrorism; segregation; communalism.

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Abstract. The article discusses the history of Muslims in India from the advent of Islam to the subcontinent up to the present time. The work provides a brief historical background on the history of Islamic states on the territory of modern India and Pakistan, such as the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughal Empire and others. The contribution of Muslims to the Indian independence movement from British colonial rule, the partition of India along religious lines and the aftermath of such partition are also discussed. Much attention is paid to intercultural and interreligious conflict between Muslims and Hindus, the issue of

persecution of Muslims at the state level, acts of violence against the Muslim population and segregation.

Early History

Trade ties have existed between the Arabian Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent since ancient times, even in the pre-Islamic era. Arab traders visited the western Konkan-Gujarat coast and the south-western Malabar Coast on their route to the ports of Southeast Asia. There is ample historical evidence of close interaction between Arabs and Indians from the early days of Islam or even before the advent of Islam in the Arab regions. Thus, Arab traders brought the numeral system developed by the Indians to the Middle East and Europe, and in the 8th century many Sanskrit books were translated into Arabic. With the advent of Islam, the Arabs started to gain significant cultural influence in the world. Interaction between the peoples was not limited to commercial relations since Arab traders who used to visit the west coast annually often married Indian women and chose to settle in India. [1]

The arrival of Muhammad (569–632) transformed the Arabs into a nation united by faith, united in their mission of advancing Islam. Some historians believe that India's first contact with Islam was soon after its emergence in 610: the first ship carrying Muslim travellers was spotted on the Indian coast as early as 630. [2] In the second half of the 7th century, there were already first settlements of Muslims; [3] they became the ancestors of Mappila Muslims, the Muslim community of the Malayali people and the descendants of the Arabs. The Arab merchants, who were bringing dates to India every year, now also carried a young religion that was well received in South India. [4] According to popular tradition, Sheikh Ubaidullah, a relative of Abu Bakr, brought Islam to the Lakshadweep islands west of the Malabar Coast in 661. [5]

Muslims were allowed to build mosques, marry Indian women, and very soon an Indian-Arab community emerged. According to the Legend of Cheraman Perumals, the last ruler (Cheraman Perumal) of the Tamil Chera dynasty built the first Indian mosque in 624 at Kodungallur in modern Kerala; he converted to Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. [6] The oldest mosques were built in the modern states of Kerala and Karnataka during the era of Malik Dinar (d. 748), one of the first Muslim scholars and travelers to come to India carrying Islamic teachings. [7] There were extensive missionary activities along the coast, and many locals converted to Islam.

It is worth noting that during the reign of Ali ibn Abi Talib (c. 600-661) many Jats from Sindh (now Pakistan) converted to Islam. They sided with Ali [8] during the Battle of the Camel (December 8, 656) between supporters of the fourth caliph and a group of rebels led by the Prophet's widow Aisha and companions Talha ibn Ubayd Allah and az-Zubayr ibn al-Awwam.

Muslim Rule

In 712, the 17-year-old Arab general Muhammad ibn al-Qasim (695-715) conquered Sindh and Multan (now Punjab, Pakistan) for the Umayyad Caliphate, thus initiating the Islamic period in the history of India. [9] In the first half of the 8th century, the Indian kingdoms managed to repel the caliphate's advance, and the Umayyad campaigns in India were contained to Sindh. [10] The major Muslim conquest began much later, in 1206, and Muslim rule lasted 551 years, until 1757. In the early 11th century, the Ghaznavid Empire, under Mahmud of Ghazni (971-1030), captured and ravaged Punjab and Gujarat in north-western South Asia. [11] These invaders were much more violent, using swift-horse cavalry and time after time gathering large armies. The capture of Lahore (now Punjab,

Pakistan) by the Ghurid dynasty in 1186 put an end to the rule of the Ghaznavid dynasty. Ghurid Sultan Muhammad of Ghor (1149–1206) laid the foundation for Muslim rule in India by defeating the Rajput Confederacy during the Second Battle of Tarain (1192). In 1202, the Ghurid commander Bakhtiyar Khalji (d. 1206) led the successful invasion of Bengal, making it the easternmost point of Muslim rule at that time.

The Ghurids laid the foundation for the Delhi Sultanate in India. After Muhammad of Ghor was assassinated, his trusted slave-general Qutb ud-Din Aibak (1150–1210) declared himself the Sultan of Delhi and started the Mamluk dynasty. With the creation of the Delhi Sultanate, Islam spread across much of the Indian subcontinent. From the late 12th century, the subcontinent was dominated by Muslim empires, most notably the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire; from the mid-14th to the late 18th centuries various Muslim states ruled much of South Asia. Although the origins of the Muslim dynasties in India were diverse, they were invariably united by Persian culture and Islam.

The Delhi Sultanate lasted 320 years, and was successively ruled by five dynasties: the Mamluk dynasty (1206–1290), Khalji dynasty (1290–1320), Tughlaq dynasty (1320–1413), Sayyid dynasty (1414–1451) and Lodi dynasty (1451–1526). During the rule of the Delhi Sultanate, there was a synthesis of Indian and Islamic civilizations, as well as the integration of the Indian subcontinent into the developing world system and growing international networks, which had a considerable impact on Indian culture and society. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Delhi Sultanate also repelled potentially destructive invasions by the Mongol Empire. [12] In the 13th century, India began to adopt and widely use mechanical technologies from the Islamic world, such as papermaking technology. [13] During that time, Indo-Islamic architecture emerged. [14]

In the 14th century, the Khalji dynasty under Alauddin Khalji (c. 1266–1316) extended Muslim rule south to Gujarat, Rajasthan and the Deccan. The Tughlaq dynasty temporarily

expanded its territory to Tamil Nadu. However, the Delhi Sultanate slowly declined, undermined by internal strife. Thus, in 1347, rebel Shi'ite Muslims led by the Delhi military leader Hasan Zafar Khan founded the Bahmani Sultanate on the southern Deccan plateau. [15] Gradually, more territories broke away from the Delhi Sultanate, declaring independence: the Madurai Sultanate (1335), powerful Bengal Sultanate (1353), Khandesh Sultanate (1382), Malawi Sultanate (1392), Jaunpur Sultanate (1394) and Gujarat Sultanate (1407). Moreover, some sultanates were conquered by Hindu states such as the Vijayanagar Empire [16] and the Rajput dynasty. Also, the Delhi Sultanate suffered greatly during Timur's invasion in 1398.

In 1526, Babur (1483-1530) of the Timurid dynasty invaded India and defeated Ibrahim Shah, the last Sultan of Delhi from the Lodi dynasty. Large areas of northern India were controlled by the Sur Empire, which was founded by the Bihari general Sher Shah (d. 1545) after the Mughal emperor Humayun (1508-1556) was exiled in 1539. In 1555, Humayun triumphantly returned from Persia, and the Mughal Empire asserted complete dominance of the Indian subcontinent; the Mughal Empire was one of the three gunpowder empires. The Islamic rule in India reached its height during the reign of the Mughal empire Aurangzeb (ruled 1658-1707), who compiled the Sharia-based legal code *Fatawa 'Alamgiri*. It should be noted that the legal system of the Delhi Sultanate was Sharia-based, especially in the 14th century. However, the emperor Akbar the Great (reigned 1556-1605) adopted a secular legal system and ensured religious neutrality. [17] The Mughal Empire fell into decline after Aurangzeb's death, lacking competent rulers and waging bloody wars with the Rajputs and Marathas. It was the Maratha Empire that replaced the Mughals as the dominant power in the subcontinent between 1720 and 1818.

Muslim rule in India dramatically changed the cultural, linguistic and religious structure of the subcontinent. Persian and Arabic vocabulary entered local languages such as Punjabi, Bengali

and Gujarati, and even created new languages, such as Urdu and Deccani, which were the official languages of the Muslim dynasties. Religions such as Sikhism and Din-i-Illahi emerged out of the fusion of Hindu and Muslim religious traditions.

In 1857, the beginning of the British Raj ended Muslim rule in modern India, although some aspects of it remained in the states of Hyderabad, Junagadh, Jammu and Kashmir and other native princely states under the British protectorate in Hindustan until the mid-20th century.

The Indian Independence Movement and the Partition of India

Muslims greatly contributed to the Indian independence movement that ultimately ended the British Raj. There is a number of noteworthy Muslim revolutionaries, such as Titumir (1782–1831), who led the Bengali Muslim rebels; Hazrat Mahal (c. 1820–1879), who fought against the British East India Company during the Indian Rebellion of 1857; Mohamed Barakatullah (1854–1927), one of the founders of the left-wing Ghadar Party, which was behind the unsuccessful uprising in Punjab and Bengal in 1915; Hakim Ajmal Khan (1868–1927), one of the founders of the Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi; Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), one of the leaders of the Indian independence movement, who championed Hindu-Muslim unity; and Abdul Ghaffar Khan ('Bacha Khan'; 1890–1988), political and spiritual leader of the Pashtuns, associate and follower of Mahatma Gandhi, spent 45 years in prison.

Mahmud al-Hasan (1851–1920), co-founder of the Jamia Millia Islamia University, along with Deobandi leaders, organized the famous Silk Letter Movement, which plotted an armed coup and overthrow of British rule between 1913 and 1920. [18] The Sunni Islamic Deobandi movement was formed in one of the largest academic centres of the Islamic world, Darul Uloom Deoband, in 1867 as an anti-colonial movement and

spread mainly among Hanafi Muslims. [19] Today, Deobandism mainly protects Islam from *bid'ah* (innovation) and the influence of non-Muslim cultures in South Asian countries. There were many Muslims among Gandhi's followers who fought for independence of India and emancipation of Muslims.

Since Muslims needed political representation in British India, the All-India Muslim League was formed. [20] The idea of a party that would defend the interests of Muslims in Hindustan was put forward at the annual meeting of the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference in Dhaka in 1906. [21] Until the 1930s, Muslims of India generally supported the idea of an undivided India, the political position shared by their countrymen. Everything changed after the poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) delivered his famous speech at the 21st session of the All-India Muslim League, introducing the idea of creating a Muslim state within independent India. [22] The idea of uniting four provinces in north-western British India was a follow-up to the two-nation theory - a Muslim ideology in colonial India that promoted the notion that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations with their own customs, traditions, cultures and ways of life. The theory advocated the creation of separate countries for Muslims and Hindus within a decolonized British India. [23]

We should also mention Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), a Muslim politician, a famous fighter for independence and one of the initiators of the partition of British India. Jinnah was the leader of the All-India Muslim League from 1913 until its dissolution in 1947. When the Indian National Congress protested after the UK unilaterally involved India in WWII, the All-India Muslim League with the future founder of Pakistan at the helm supported the British war effort. In the 1940s, the party was the driving force behind the partition of India along religious and demographic lines and the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim state in 1947. [24] Gandhi opposed the division of the country on the basis of religion. [25] British India was divided into the

Dominion of Pakistan (in 1971 split into the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People's Republic of Bangladesh) and the Union of India (from 1950 the Republic of India). The All-India Muslim League was officially dissolved in India, but continued in Pakistan as the Muslim League led by Jinnah. In India, the Indian Union Muslim League was formed, which is still active today.

Some critics argue that the British haste in the partition process contributed to the violence that followed. [26] No one envisaged major population movements, and the partition plan included safeguards for religious minorities on both sides of the border. The new governments failed to keep the wave of violence in check, many people died in the riots. What followed was one of the largest population movements in recorded history. At the time of partition in 1947, two-thirds of Muslims lived in Pakistan but a third lived in India. [27] According to the 1951 Displaced Persons Census, 7,226,000 Muslims moved to Pakistan from India and 7,249,000 Hindus and Sikhs moved to India from Pakistan. [28] At the lowest estimates, half a million people died and approximately 12 million became homeless. [29] The violent nature of the partition created an atmosphere of mutual hostility and wariness between India and Pakistan, which still affects political relations between the two countries.

Violence against Muslims

Since the partition of India in 1947, there have been a number of acts of violence against Muslim population by Hindu nationalists (Hindutva). The roots of such animosity against Muslims go deep into history: the Islamic conquest of India during the Middle Ages, the policies of the British Raj and the partition of Hindustan on the religious basis. [30] Many scholars believe that there are political motives behind violence, and it is part of the strategy of leading parties associated with Hindu nationalists, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). [31] Some

researchers call such incidents pogroms and state terrorism in the form of “organized political massacres.” [32]

Most often, violence takes the form of Hindus mob attacking Muslims. The incidents are referred to as communal riots [33] and are described as sporadic sectarian violence between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority. The causes of the attacks are also linked to the rise of Islamophobia in the 20th century. Most of the incidents occurred in the northern and western states of India, where communalist sentiments are strong. There have also been cases of retaliatory attacks against Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Since 1950, more than 10 thousand people have died in clashes between Hindus and Muslims.

Major anti-Muslim protests, riots and acts of violence in post-independence Indian history as listed below:

– Hyderabad, 1948. Following the annexation of the princely state of Hyderabad by the Union of India ('Operation Polo'), more than 200 thousand people were killed. There were cases of violence against Muslims in particular. The killings are called the first genocide of Muslims in independent India. [34]

– Calcutta, 1964. More than 100 people died in the clashes, 70 thousand Muslims abandoned their homes. Segregation of Muslims significantly intensified after riots in the state. [35]

– Gujarat, 1969. According to official data, 430 Muslims perished. It is worth noting that Muslim chawls (low quality tenements) were attacked by Dalits (untouchables), who had lived in peace until that moment. [36]

– Bhiwandi, 1970. 192 Muslims were killed in clashes between the Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Islamic party Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (as well as several similar parties). [37]

– Moradabad, 1980. According to official data, 400 Muslims died in clashes between the police and Muslims; unofficial estimates run as high as 2500. The conflict was sparked by the

refusal of the police to remove the pig from Idgah (a special structure for performing Eid prayers). [37]

- Nellie (Assam), 1983. More than two thousand Muslims (official estimates) perished in the pogrom after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi granted voting rights to Bengali Muslims. [37]

- Gujarat, 1985. Riots that led to the death of more than 100 and displacement of 12 thousand Muslims began after the state announced a change in its policy that increased the benefits to people from lower classes. [38]

- Hashimpura, 1987. 50 Muslims were killed by the police during the Meerut Hindu-Muslim riots. In 2018, 16 police officers were sentenced to life imprisonment. [39]

- Bhagalpur, 1989. About a thousand people died and 50 thousand were displaced as a result of public tensions over a disputed piece of land plot in Ayodhya. The site of the Babri Masjid is often believed to be Rama's birthplace. It is the deadliest outbreak of anti-Muslim violence in India to date. [40]

- Bombay, 1992. The demolition of the Babri Masjid by Hindu nationalists resulted in the death of 575 Muslims. Many researchers believe that the riots were orchestrated and that Hindu rioters received information about the location of Muslim dwellings and businesses from closed sources. [41]

- Manipur, 1993. Approximately 100 Muslims died in riots between the Meitei Muslims and the Meitei Hindus. [42]

- Gujarat, 2002. The burning of a train carrying Hindu pilgrims in Godhra by a group of Muslims was followed by a three-day outbreak of violence. According to official figures, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus were killed in the riots. [43] The incident is often referred to as an act of state terrorism and ethnic cleansing. [44] In 2011, 31 Muslims were found guilty of setting fire to the train. [45] The drama film *Godhra* (2023) is based on the theory about an anti-Muslim conspiracy that was first put forward by the commission investigating the incident. A BBC documentary about Narendra Modi's role in the riots was banned in India. [46]

- Malegaon, 2006. In the explosions at a Muslim cemetery adjacent to a mosque 40 people were killed and more than 125 injured. The Hindu extremist group Abhinav Bharat was found responsible for the attack. [47]

- Muzaffarnagar (Uttar Pradesh), 2013. In the clashes between Hindu Jats and Muslim Jats at least 62 people were killed, 200 were injured and over 50 thousand were displaced. [48]

- Assam, 2014. In three days (May 1-3), an unknown perpetrator shot dead 32 Bengali Muslims using an AK-47. [49]

- Delhi 2020. Riots sparked by protests against an anti-Muslim citizenship law (part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Hindu nationalist policy) [50] left 36 Muslims dead and hundreds injured. [51]

When discussing Islamophobia in India, one should also mention so called "Love Jihad," a Hindutva conspiracy theory, according to which Muslims seduce (and sometimes even kidnap) non-Muslim Indian women in order to convert them to Islam. [52] The conspiracy theory was concocted by Hindu nationalists in 2009 in Kerala to instil mistrust of Muslims. An investigation found no evidence to support the allegations, but it did nothing to stop rumours from spreading to neighbouring states. [53] The right-wing BJP party and pro-government media continues exploiting the rumours as a justification for repressions against Muslims. [54] To promote the subject of "Love Jihad", Bollywood produced a drama film "The Kerala Story" (2023). [55]

Demography

As of 2021, there are 209 million Muslims in India. India is the country with the third largest Muslim population in the world (after Indonesia and Pakistan) and the country with the largest Muslim minority (14.6 per cent of the total country's population). [56] According to the 2011 census, Muslims form a majority in Lakshadweep (96.6 per cent) and Jammu and

Kashmir (68.3 per cent). Muslims make up a significant percentage of the state's total population in Assam (34.2 per cent), West Bengal (27 per cent) and Kerala (26.6 per cent). High concentrations of Muslims can also be found in the states of Uttar Pradesh (19.2 per cent), Bihar (16.9 per cent), Jharkhand (14.5 per cent), Uttarakhand (14 per cent), Karnataka (13 per cent), Delhi (12.9 per cent) and Maharashtra (12.9 per cent). The state with the largest Muslim population is Uttar Pradesh with nearly 38.5 million Muslims. [57]

As for the population growth rate, it should be noted that according to the latest estimates, Muslims in India have the highest birth rate in the country (2.36), [58] so the percentage of Muslims from the total population of the country is growing with every passing year. According to projections from statistical centers, by 2100 the Muslim population will rise to minimum a little over 280 million (17 per cent of the country's population) to maximum almost 350 million (21 per cent of the population).

In terms of denominations, the majority of Indian Muslims (over 85 per cent) are Sunni, while the largest minority (over 13 per cent) are Shia. Most Sunnis belong to the Hanafi madh'hab (school). According to some sources, India's Shia population is the second largest in the world after Iran. Sufism is also widespread among Muslims in India. There are also small communities of Ahmadiyya, Quranists and Bohra Shia across the country.

In conclusion, there is significant segregation of Muslims in the country, which started in the 1970s after the first communalist riots. In larger cities, Muslims were forcibly resettled to ghettos or segregated areas. [59] This can be seen in Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and many cities in Gujarat where there is a clear socio-cultural demarcation between Hindu and Muslim areas. Due to the lack of cross-cultural interaction, there has been an increase in stereotyping, and living in ghettos has drastically reduced economic and educational opportunities for Muslims.

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TAISIYA USTINOVA. RELATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION STATES WITH JAPAN

Keywords: Japan; the Middle East; "energy diplomacy"; foreign policy expansion in the region; peacekeeping missions.

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Abstract. The article examines the peculiarities of Japan's relations with the countries of the Mideast. A brief history of interstate relations is given, the reasons for Japan's activity in this region are considered. First of all, Japan is concerned about the flawless import of energy resources from these countries. In addition, Japan, in cooperation with the United States, pursues an active foreign policy in the countries of the region in contrast with China.

Japan is a highly industrial country that is poor in minerals and energy. Since modern industry is based on the consumption of large amounts of electricity, it is vital for Japan to import enough energy from the countries rich in them. As an energy-dependent state, Japan, for which its national and geopolitical interests are prioritized, cooperation with the countries of the Arab region and with Russia has always been beneficial. Natural resources more and more influence international relations, which affects the political processes taking place around the world. This has been especially acute in the past few years, when, on the one hand, there is a danger of depletion of earth interior (including

maldistribution of deposits, and due to the often irrational use of natural resources), on the other hand, dangerous tendencies of escalation of conflict situations constantly arise, which could affect oil production in the countries of the Mideast, considered traditional suppliers of Japan. As one of the most import-dependent countries, Japan cannot but consider these aspects. Japan's dependence on energy supplies was affected by the Fukushima accident and the subsequent shutdown of all nuclear power units throughout the country.

The Russian Far East, rich in minerals, has always drawn attention of the Japanese, primarily because Japan took into account the logistical benefits of delivering liquefied gas (LNG) and oil from its next-door neighbor, compared to their delivery from the Middle East, which is also carried out through the unsafe Strait of Malacca [Japan refuses...].

On the territory of the Far Eastern Federal District, large joint Russian-Japanese economic projects were implemented, for example, the development of oil and gas condensate fields in the Sakhalin Region, automotive industry in the Primorsky Territory, wood processing in the Khabarovsk and Primorsky Territories, processing of diamond raw materials and geological exploration in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the construction of an agrological terminal in the Amur Region, the construction of a large forest processing complex in the Irkutsk region and many other. The strategic area of cooperation between the two countries is the fuel and energy complex – large joint oil and gas projects, such as Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2. Accumulated investments from Japan amounted to about \$10 billion. Their largest inflow was in 2009, when a natural gas liquefaction plant was launched on the island, the products of which provide almost 9 per cent of Japanese LNG imports [Sattarova I...]. Therefore, Japan has always considered the Far Eastern-Siberian region as the most important base for the development and implementation of its security strategy due to the fact that the energy aspect in the modern world is one of the key ones.

In 2014, Japan, under pressure from the United States, joined the countries pursuing a sanctions policy against Russia. As a result of sanctions imposition investments in Russia, cooperation in the field of space exploration and an agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities were frozen. At the same time, Russian-Japanese consultations on facilitating the visa regime were suspended, and negotiations on a number of joint projects were postponed. On April 29, 2014, the Japanese Foreign Ministry published a statement on support for sanctions on its official website and announced its actions: "Japan is suspending the issue of visas to 23 Russian citizens involved in violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine." ("Japan has decided to stop issuing visas to enter Japan to a total of 23 individuals who are considered to have contributed to the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity for the time being") [Statement by the Minister... 29.04.2014]. Japan did not impose tough sanctions against Russia at that time, although it declared them by all means under pressure from its American partners under a military-political treaty. However, at this time, it began to expand economic cooperation even more actively with the countries of the Middle East, primarily the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and in recent years – also with Libya.

After the start of the SMO in 2022, Japan was forced to proceed to serious sanctions against Russia, which led to a significant cooling of relations and entailed both the suspension of many joint projects and a significant reduction in imports of minerals, oil, gas and other energy resources from Russia. By this time, Japan had already managed to conclude many economic and political agreements with the countries of the Middle East region, and to establish uninterrupted delivery of energy resources from there.

Historically, Japan imported oil from the countries of the Middle East back in the 20th century. For example, in 1973 Japan imported only 290 million tons of oil, 43 per cent of which were oil from the countries of the Middle East, 41 from Iran, and 16 per

cent from Indonesia [Harutyunyan E.V. Energy... p.53]. At the same time, Japan never openly intervened in Arab-Israeli relations and did not give official assessments of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This allowed it to maintain good partnerships with the United States and develop economic cooperation with the countries of the Mideast. Certain maneuvering between the United States and the Mideast countries allowed Japan to act in its own economic interests and overcome the oil crises of the 1970–1980s. During these crises, even the special term "Energy Diplomacy" appeared. All aspects were taken into account: from the US reaction to Japan's negotiations with Arab leaders, including those with whom the United States had a difficult relationship, to the need to negotiate at a quick rate, given the mentality of Middle Eastern partners.

In the second half of the 20th century, Japan considered the countries of the Mideast exclusively as donors of energy resources, and did not develop any special foreign policy course for these countries. However, frequent conflict situations in the region, armed clashes and the 1991 Gulf War forced Japan to intensify its foreign policy in these countries and consider them not only as economic, but also political partners. This was due to the safety issues of transporting oil and LNG from these countries to Japan. As a result, in the late 1990s, Japan developed a new active foreign policy course for the countries of this region.

Since the early 2000s, Japan has intensively developed relations with countries throughout the Arab region: from North Africa to Iran and Afghanistan. Since that time, the Blue Book of Japanese Foreign Policy (the main print edition of the Japanese Foreign Ministry) has published annual reports and prospects for the development of Japan's relations with these countries. But the focus remains on economic relations. Japan is primarily interested in obtaining energy resources from the countries of the region, and the Middle East region is also a profitable market for the sale of mass consumption goods for it.

The need for Japan to intensify and develop relations with all countries of the Middle and Middle East, regardless of their relations with each other, is emphasized. The 2023 Blue Book states: "The Middle East is the main source of energy supply for the international community, and Japan depends on the region for about 90 per cent in terms of crude oil imports. Therefore, peace and stability in the region, including the safety of shipping, are extremely important for energy security, as well as the stability and growth of the global economy, including Japan. On the other hand, the region has experienced various conflicts and disputes throughout its history. Tense and unstable situations, as well as difficult humanitarian conditions, continue to persist. Japan is an ally of the United States, and also traditionally maintains good relations with the countries of the Middle East. To maintain and strengthen a free and open international order based on the rule of law, including in the Middle East, Japan will actively participate in diplomatic efforts to help ease tensions and stabilize the situation in the Middle East, in close cooperation with the interest countries, taking into account the issues of concern and the needs of each country within the framework of various structures, such as the Japan-Arab Political Dialogue" [Diplomatic Bluebook 2023.., p. 011].

Japan managed to maintain good relations with both Israel and Palestine, it participated in international missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in general its policy in the region can be described as peacekeeping.

Japan's most active relations with the countries of the Middle East region developed during the period when Shinzo Abe was the prime minister of Japan. S. Abe often visited the countries of the Arab East on official visits, for example, in January 2014, he toured several countries in the region [Japanese Prime Minister sees...], conducting intensive negotiations with their leaders. During this tour, S. Abe proposed to allocate \$2.5 billion in material assistance to the countries of the Middle East, some of which will be provided to states affected by the

terrorist organization ISIS [Japan will help...]. In 2019, S. Abe took an active part in reducing the escalation of the conflict situation around Iran. In June 2019, he paid an official visit to Tehran, which was the first in the last 40 years (at the time of the visit). Abe held talks with then-US President D. Trump and insisted that the conflict situation should only be resolved peacefully through negotiations, without the use of force. As a result of diplomatic efforts by the Japanese party, the United States softened its position on Iran and did not impose tough sanctions against it. In fact, S. Abe became an intermediary between the United States and Iran, and this mission was successful [Tarasov S. Will it be possible...].

However, many political scientists, including Iranian ones, saw in S. Abe's visit not only a mediation mission, but also a specific economic interest. According to Mohsen Ruth Sefat, former deputy head of the Department of Political and International Studies of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the main goal of the visit is to protect Japan's interests in obtaining Middle East oil from the Persian Gulf. Any tension in the region harms Japan's economic interests. This entails the Iranian port of Chabahar, in the development of which Japan is ready to invest seriously [Vardanyan A.S. About the visit...].

Significant success was achieved by S. Abe and in an effort to provide Japan with the necessary resources as much as possible, securing the routes of their transportation. After 2 tankers transporting oil to Japan were subjected to a sabotage attack in June 2019, the United States blamed Iran for this. But S. Abe held a series of peacekeeping talks with both Iranian representatives and the United States. The negotiation process between Japan, Iran and the United States was successful. Speaking in September 2019 at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, the Japanese Prime Minister stressed that everything possible should be done to transport Middle Eastern resources safely, but exclusively through diplomatic methods,

excluding the escalation of the conflict and the application of any violent measures [Shinzo Abe: Japan...].

During the entire period of intensification of Japan's foreign policy in the Mideast, in addition to the economic and political aspects, interfaith dialogue between Japan and these countries takes place. In particular, in 2001, during the official visit of Japanese Foreign Minister I. Kono to Saudi Arabia, it was announced the beginning of an active dialogue between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds. Japanese students began to show interest in studying the traditions and foundations of Islam, between the universities of Japan and the Middle East states there is a scientific and personnel exchange which is being carried out. They began to study the Muslim world in Japan back in the 30s of the 20th century, when the Great Japanese Muslim League was created, which was the beginning of Islamic studies in Japan. In the same years, centers for the study of Islam were created: an institute of Islamic culture and a scientific society for the study of Islam. As a result of their activities, periodicals of the relevant topics began to be published: "Islamic Culture" and "Islamic World" [Bibik A. Features...]. Therefore, interest in Islam in Japan can be called historical.

Currently, Japan's policy towards the Middle East is not only changing, but also becoming more and more active. Japan also provides significant financial assistance to countries in the region. For example, it invested significantly in the reconstruction of Palestinian infrastructure, provided material support to Afghanistan to restore destruction, and provided assistance to the population. Japan's main partner is Egypt in helping Afghanistan. During the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi in August 2021, an agreement was reached on cooperation in this area [Paramonov O. Middle East...].

In 2018, Japan for the first time after the Second World War opened its military base in Djibouti [Almametov A., Sharafutdinov D. ...]. This is a serious military structure, occupying a significant area, technically well equipped, and

prepared for the deployment of a military contingent. As long as Japan joins the tripartite Alliance of the United States, Australia and Great Britain AUKUS in the near future, this base may be well used as an outpost. AUKUS was originally created as a tripartite alliance for joint security cooperation in September 2021, but the United States seeks to expand it primarily at the expense of Japan and South Korea. Obviously, the opening of such a base is directed against the policies of China, expanding its influence in this region, and providing significant financial support to the economies of African countries. The precedent of opening such a base means the beginning of Japan's revision of its military concept, previously based on the principles of demilitarization and the abandonment of any armed forces and means of warfare.

In the summer of 2023, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kisida visited a number of countries in the Middle East: Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These countries are the largest suppliers of LNG and other energy sources. Kisida continues to strengthen resource diplomacy in the region. With Japan's relationship with another major energy supplier, Russia, now stagnating, it is vital. Japan is ready to invest in technological cooperation with these countries in the field of decarbonization of their economy, and is also going to take part in the 28th session of the conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention, scheduled for November 2023, which will be held in the UAE [Japan is looking for...].

In July 2023, Japan and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) resumed free trade negotiations. The corresponding agreement was signed by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and GCC Secretary General Jasem al-Budaiwe [Japan and GCC resumed...]. The negotiations took place during F. Kisida's tour across the countries of the Middle East region.

It is very important for Japan that it is not perceived in the Middle East as a US vassal pursuing an exclusively pro-American policy. Japan is trying to seem like an independent actor in the Middle East region and cover as many countries as possible with

its influence. Nevertheless, it always has to strike a balance between relations with the countries of the Middle East on the one hand, and Israel and the United States on the other. To do this, it's necessary to be neutral during escalation of conflicts between Palestine and Israel, Iran and Iraq, Iran and the United States and others. Military-political partnership with the United States remains Japan's top foreign policy priority. Under pressure from the United States, Japan is forced to make sometimes unprofitable decisions for it in relations with other countries, and support all American foreign policy initiatives. This also affects relations with countries in the Middle East region, many of which see the United States as a political and often military adversary. So far, Japan has managed to maintain a balance in these multilateral foreign policy configurations, but given the ongoing changes in the system of international relations in general and in the region in particular, it is difficult to predict confidently the future development of events. It can only be said with confidence that Japan "has come" to the Middle East region for a long time, and intends to cooperate with the countries of the region in all areas, since this is vital for the country.

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VASILY OSTANIN-GOLOVNYA. “EUROISLAM” AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION OF THE MUSLIM DIASPORA IN THE EU

Keywords: Euro-Islam; multiculturalism; migration; European Union; Tibi; Tariq Ramadan; religious factor; ideological and value approach.

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Abstract. The article deals with the phenomenon of “Euro-Islam” in the context of the problem of adaptation of Moslem diasporas in the countries of the European Union. A comparative analysis of two author’s concepts of modern Islamic liberalism, Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan, who in their works offer alternative approaches to the development of the EU migration policy is proposed. Particular attention in this article is paid to the comparison of multiculturalism, cultural pluralism and the traditional Islamic division of the world within the framework of the ideological and value approach.

The situation of Islam in Europe in the 21st century, in historical terms, is an unprecedented. For the first time in fourteen centuries, large Muslim communities settled in countries outside the Dar al-Islam, where Sharia law has no force and many traditions find themselves banned. In such conditions, more than one generation has grown, and today there is an increase in their self-awareness. The European ummah has already strengthened enough to demand official recognition as a legitimate subject of the political arena.

Outside the framework of the Eurocentric approach, this situation is partially explained by the division of the world adopted in the Muslim tradition itself, which relies on the presence of the following categories:

Muslim territory	<p><i>Dar al-Islam</i> (Arab. دار الإسلام - peace/land of Islam) - countries where the rule of Islam is realized at the political and state level. It is also referred to as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Dar al-Salam</i> (Arab. دار السلام - peace/land of peace) • <i>Dar al-Amn</i> (Arab. دار الأمان - peace/land of Security) • <i>Dar al-Tawhid</i> (Arab. دار التوحيد - world/land of monotheism) <p><i>Dar ad-da'ua</i> (Arab. دار الدعوة - peace/land of appeal) - newcomer countries, where Islam has recently established itself, and they face to become part of the "world of Islam."</p> <p><i>Dar al-ahd</i> (Arab. دار العهد - peace/land of the treaty) or the <i>Dar al-sulh</i> (Arab. دار الصلح - peace/land of reconciliation) are non-Muslim countries whose political and state structure is based on the principles of secular society or other monotheistic religion, but where the legal system allows Muslims to send their cult freely.</p>
Neutral territory	<p><i>Dar al-Hudna</i> (Arab. دار الهدنة - peace/land of truce) - territories - "buffer zones," where a truce was established between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The prevailing religion and the existence of statehood are not mandatory parameters.</p>
Hostile territory	<p><i>Dar al-Kufr</i> (Arab. دار الكفر - peace/land of disbelief) - a country where political and state domination belongs to the Kafirs (Arab. كافر - unbeliever, wicked; gentile; godless), and the legal system denies or directly contradicts the norms of Islam.</p> <p><i>Dar al-Harb</i> (Arab. دار الحرب - peace/land of war) are non-Muslim countries where the preaching of Islam is impossible, and Muslims are persecuted or oppressed by the Kafirs.</p>

For Muslims, Europe has traditionally been neutral or hostile territory. Depending on the situation, it moved from the category of *Dar al-ahd* ("land of treaty") to the category of *Dar al-Kufr* ("land of disbelief"), in both cases the ummah had clear instructions on how to behave in relation to it. However, the "Islamic world," within the framework of the religious interpretation of this concept, does not reckon in the generally recognized demarcation of political borders. The borders of the "Islamic world" are mobile, and they depend primarily on the area of settlement of communities and the spread of faith.

On the basis of this logic, we can say that with the formation of stable diasporas, the "Islamic world" also got into Europe. These days, the Muslim community – ummah, in fact, is a network-centric structure in which five levels can be conditionally distinguished¹:

- 1) **global ummah** – the community of absolutely all Muslims of the world;
- 2) **regional ummah** – communities of Muslims of certain regions (Muslims of the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.);
- 3) **national ummah** - a community of Muslims within one specific state;
- 4) **local ummah** - a community of Muslims in a particular region, region or settlement (in particular, immigrant diasporas in Europe belong to this level);
- 5) **the ummah of an organization** – a community of Muslims within the framework of a specific cure, public organization or political movement.

Figuratively speaking, we can say that the *Dar al-Islam*, thanks to the network centrality of the ummah, acquired European enclaves. According to the traditional Muslim division of the world, states in which Muslim communities are present on a permanent basis automatically move to the category of *Dar ad-da'ua* ("lands of conscription"), i.e. newcomer countries, where Islam has recently strengthened itself and preaching should be carried out there.

Failure of Multiculturalism

As it's known, the policy of multiculturalism has two variations. "Salad bowl" is a European approach that involves the integration of immigrants: the culture of visitors is included in the general cultural space of the host country, while maintaining its authenticity. And the melting pot is an American approach aimed at assimilating immigrants: the culture of visitors is "melted down" in order to integrate into the existing matrix of values and identity of the host country. Often, the "salad bowl" and the "melting pot" are opposed to each other, which, from the point of view of the ideological-value approach with a certain degree of abstraction, can be questioned, since both approaches meet the same tasks of implementing the principles of tolerance and ethno-confessional pluralism.

Initially, Europe adhered to the first model, but with a sharp increase in the number of visiting Muslims in the 21st century, many doubted the adequacy of this approach. Criticism of the course towards the integration of immigrants has been expressed even at the official level of the European Union leadership. On October 16, 2010, Angela Merkel, speaking in Potsdam to the youth wing of the Christian Democratic Union, said that attempts to build a multicultural Germany "absolutely failed" [Moore, 2010]. The words heard from the mouth of the ex-Chancellor of Germany caused a wide resonance in society and the media. Some directly accused A. Merkel of trying to flirt with right-wing populism. Others tried to write off the voicing of the acute topic as a desire to boost the party's ratings. However, a little more than two months later, the leaders of France and Great Britain made similar statements.

David Cameron's speech on February 5, 2011 at the Munich Security Conference was even tougher: "In accordance with the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, separate from each other and separate from the mainstream. We have not been able to

represent the vision of the society they want to belong to in their view. We even tolerated the behavior of these isolated communities, which are completely contrary to our values... We have failed in trying to implement a similar type of society... We showed tolerance to the fact that all these divided communities develop in a way directly opposed to our goals.³"

It would seem that such speeches of the leaders of the leading European countries should have had a serious impact on the EU's migration policy, but in response, the Council of Europe published a report known as "Living Together. A combination of diversity and freedom in 21st century in Europe" on April 6, 2011. This document literally turned the situation upside down. The main problem of multiculturalism was not the initial failure of this concept, but eight "risks"⁴:

- 1) growing intolerance;
- 2) increased support for xenophobic and populist parties;
- 3) discrimination;
- 4) the presence of a largely rightless population;
- 5) parallel communities;
- 6) Islamic extremism;
- 7) loss of democratic freedoms;
- 8) probability of a clash between "religious freedom" and freedom of expression.

It is noteworthy that in such an interpretation, the blame for the failure of the policy of multiculturalism lies with the Europeans themselves and the leaders of their countries, while the conceptual foundations of this approach remain without proper critical analysis. Even the increase in the number of cases of Islamist extremism in the EU countries in this report is explained by the "alienation of Muslims in Europe" and the "anger of the Islamic world against the actions of the West".⁵

In the article of the outstanding Islamic historian Bernard Lewis, which caused a lot of controversy in the public and scientific spheres, "The Last Offensive of Islam?" (2007) there is a statement that in the Muslim environment there are no

complexes that have taken the West in, such as tolerance for different cultures or political correctness⁶. The failure of multiculturalism in the work of B. Lewis is explained by the fact that, despite all attempts at integration and assimilation, Muslims simply cannot integrate into the secular European matrix without losing their identity, because what “for some is a source of strength, for others is a source of weakness.”⁷

Given that faith and a sense of involvement in the global ummah are the foundation of the Muslim diasporas identity both in Europe and abroad, the emergence of a sharp contrast between their traditional way of life and the secular culture of host countries becomes a factor in strengthening religiosity among immigrants with each successive generation. In this regard, Samuel Huntington noted in his famous work “The Clash of Civilizations” (1996) that any variations of secular society with its inherent openness, tolerance and “cultural diversity” in the prism of the Islamic system of worldview will continue to be “materialistic, vicious, immoral and decadent.”⁸

Professor of the University of Utrecht Peter van der Veer shares a similar position. In his article “Political Religion in the 21st Century,” P. van der Veer expressed the opinion that the uncritical attitude of the collective West towards supporters of secularism in non-Western countries supported “the idea of a wicked alliance between secularists and the West, thereby destabilizing relations between the state and Muslim immigrants in Western societies, primarily in Europe.”⁹

Developing this idea further, it should be noted that the secular model of the state structure, asserting secular principles *de jure*, is unable to exclude religion from socio-political processes *de facto*. Ummah is inconceivable without Islam, nor Islam is capable of existing without ummah. Sharia reflects the principles of faith in the life of the community and regulates every aspect of it, from everyday life to state law. Any other law cannot contradict the Quran and Sunnah. In this context, the task

of finding alternative solutions for adapting Muslim diasporas in the EU is of particular relevance.

“Euroislam” and “Europeanized Muslims”

The fundamental impossibility of mass integration or assimilation of Muslim diasporas is due to both internal and external factors. The inclusion of the “enclaves” of the ummah with the preservation of the cultural code also requires the adoption of sharia, which will actually destroy the European matrix of socio-political structure, and the “melting pot” will inevitably lead to a tough pushback from Muslims to try to blur their identity. Nevertheless, there are exceptions in any pattern, and in isolated cases it is possible to achieve the absorption of immigrants.

As a rule, the image of a “Europeanized Muslim” has the following set of parameters:

- 1) typically a person of the first generation of immigrants of the 1970s and 1980s, or born into a well-to-do family of naturalized Muslims. Less often a child from a mixed marriage, where one of the parents professes Islam;
- 2) has demanded skills or higher education, holds a prestigious position or successfully conducts private business;
- 3) has citizenship, a residence permit or permanent visa, complies with local law and does not violate the conditional “European norms of behavior”;
- 4) considers himself to be Muslim and openly follows some of the prescriptions of the doctrine. Often adheres to a secular lifestyle or completely abandons religion, continuing to identify with the Islamic tradition by virtue of its origin.

A similar image is widely circulated in Western media. However, within the framework of the critical approach, the mass nature of such a phenomenon raises certain doubts.

First, it's referred to a common image based on isolated examples. There is no exact definition of what a “Europeanized

“Muslim” is, but, even according to the established stereotype, it can be definitely said that the representation of the diaspora in this case is not valid. At a minimum, the “Europeanized Muslim” is in isolation from the bulk of the community due to its social situation, and from the point of view of Islam, a Muslim who has put secular laws and norms above sharia.

Secondly, there are no, even approximate, statistics on “Europeanized Muslims.” Only with colossal assumptions, here it’s possible to resort to a Pew Research Center study on the demographic dynamics of Muslims in Europe¹⁰:

	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Natural increase	+ 2,92 mil	- 1,67 mil
Net migration	+ 3,48 mil	+ 1,29 mil
Change of affiliation	+ 160 thous.	- 160 thous.

Anyway, the insignificant (in relation to the millionth indicators of natural increase and migration) 160 thousand renounced Islam are fully compensated by 160 thousand who accepted it. Purely mathematically, the dynamics in this area are zero, which makes it possible to ignore “Europeanized Muslims” when studying the general processes and phenomena associated with Muslim diasporas in Europe.

Thirdly, as follows the table mentioned above, in addition to “Europeanized Muslims” there are “Islamized Europeans.” From the historical point of view, this is such a natural manifestation of the interaction of neighboring cultures as intermarriage or borrowing of culinary traditions. However, “Europeanized Muslims” in Europe are usually perceived with a plus sign, while “Islamized Europeans” in the Muslim environment are often perceived with a minus sign¹¹.

The phenomenon of Islamic liberalism also known as “Euroislam” is extremely interesting in this context. The very concept of “Euro Islam” was formulated by archetypal representatives of the category of “Europeanized Muslims.”

Bassam Tibi (born 1944) is a German political scientist and specialist in the field of international relations of Syrian descent¹². He was born into a wealthy family of hereditary nobility of Damascus. At the age of 18, he went to study in Germany, where he became a citizen in 1976. It is noteworthy that among his mentors there was one of the founding fathers of the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer, but B. Tibi differs from the classical adherents of the “critical theory” by a certain conservatism.

Tariq Ramadan (born 1962) is an Egyptian-born Swiss philosopher and Alim, born and raised in Geneva. He studied Western philosophy in Switzerland and Islamic law at the largest Islamic university al-Azhar. Maternally, T. Ramadan is the grandson of Muslim Brotherhood¹³ founder Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), and his father Said Ramadan immigrated to Europe in 1958 to open and head branches of the movement there.

Nevertheless, there is no need to talk about joint work or the general approach of these two authors. Their idea clearly developed in one direction, but the results coincided only on a number of fundamental principles.

Bassam Tibi relies on historical, philosophical and civilizational methods in his inventions. The key concept of his version of “Euro Islam” is “leading culture” (German: Leitkultur), the essence of which he revealed in one of his fundamental works with the self-explanatory name “Europe without identity? Leading culture or unwarranted values.¹⁴” B. Tibi pointed out the problem of “identity change” as the reason for the spread of civilizational conflict in Europe.

To successfully integrate or assimilate an immigrant, it is necessary to provide not only legal status, but the opportunity to feel part of the people of the host country. Most European countries cannot provide visitors with this opportunity, since their identity has a prominent ethnic component. In the United States, on the contrary, nationality is determined by citizenship and loyalty to the state, and an origin serves only as an additional parameter, due to which American society has great assimilation

potential. Thus, any identity, according to B. Tibi, is based on the system of values of the “leading culture” within a certain civilization to which the people belong. According to this logic, B. Tibi advocated abandoning the policy of multiculturalism in favor of cultural pluralism, where the “leading culture” of Europe will become decisive for the identity of each group, and immigrants will be able to maintain their identity, but only provided that their values and customs will comply with the current laws and rules of conduct of the host country.

Tariq Ramadan, in turn, is guided by Islamic theology and some areas of Western philosophy. He explained his version of “Euro Islam” through the traditional tool for the formation of Muslim law – Ijtihad, the essence of which is the interpretation of the Quran, Sunna and other religious and theological texts in order to revise Sharia norms. Borrowing from the Islamists of the 19–20 centuries the idea of “opening the gates of ijтиhad” with each new generation to adapt the ummah to the changing realities of the world, T. Ramadan brought a territorial aspect to it.

In his book “Being a European Muslim,” he wrote that over 14 centuries of Islamic culture development, several regional and ethnic clusters such as “Arab Islam,” “Türkiye Islam,” “Asian Islam,” “African Islam,” etc. have emerged within the Ummah, and now in the era of globalization and mass migration, the Muslim diaspora must create “Western Islam,” which will absorb the key principles and values of European society¹⁵.

As for the overlap points of the author's versions of “Euro Islam” of B. Tibi and T. Ramadan, it's possible to distinguish 5 elements:

1) rethinking the traditional model of dividing the world in Islam and obligatory abandonment of the category of hostile territories (Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Harb);

2) cease of promoting Sharia norms in Europe and positioning host countries as Dar ad-da'ua;

3) the adoption of democracy, secularization, civil rights and secular science through a new interpretation of Islamic teaching;

4) the separation of Muslim diasporas in Europe into an independent part of the ummah, which will be autonomous from the influence of the “Islamic world,” whether states, NGOs or Islamist organizations and movements;

5) the formation of a new identity (without opposing Islamic and Western cultures to each other), due to which Muslims will be able to classify themselves as a civilian community of host countries.

The sixth point here would highlight the need for immigration policy to shift from multiculturalism to cultural pluralism. However, with a detailed analysis, what seems to be the coincidence of the two versions of “Euro Islam” turns out to be a radical contradiction between them.

T. Ramadan, unlike B. Tibi, inserts completely different meanings in cultural pluralism. If, within the framework of the concept of “leading culture,” a specific model is proposed for overcoming acute contradictions between the autochthonous majority and the visiting minority by subordinating their identity to Western values, then T. Ramadan considers cultural pluralism as an instrument for introducing the Islamic component into the European ideological and value landscape.

“This is a great problem that the vast majority of European countries still associate Islam and immigrants,” he says in one of his speeches¹⁶. In his opinion, Islam is allegedly a European religion already, but not because of the constant increase in immigrant diasporas, but because of the presence of naturalized (“Europeanized”) Muslims. Further, through an appeal to the Western ideal of freedom of speech, conscience and religion, he justifies the “legality” of the status of European religion for Islam. Claiming as the true representatives of the “Islamic world” in the West Muslim citizens, T. Ramadan denies the religious background of the negative manifestations of mass migration.

T. Ramadan comes up with implementing the model of cultural pluralism by recognizing the values of Islam as a full part of the European ideological and value landscape, because "the greatest hotspots arose due to the divergence of the path to a common basis of two religious and intellectual traditions"¹⁷ [Ramadan, 2012, p. 172]. At this moment, it is difficult not to notice the obvious reference to the liberal idea of universal human values, but he goes further and, as if retelling the principles of Western tolerance, calls for "a deep and meaningful dialogue that will lead... to the transition from tolerant coexistence to mutual respect and enrichment"¹⁸.

Thus, the fundamental difference between the two approaches to cultural pluralism is revealed. The B. Tibi model plays more in favor of Europe, because the Islamic component is proposed to be subordinated to the "leading culture." The model of T. Ramadan, on the contrary, gains advantage for Muslim diasporas, because it's made a bid for the full approval of Muslim culture through its mimicry under the Western system of values. In other words, if the first model is aimed at integration of Islam in the ideological-value matrix of Europe, the second - at transforming the most ideological-value landscape of Europe under an extraneous element by Islam, the main carriers of which are numerous EU diasporas.

Notes

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5. Ibid.: P. 23–24.
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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS

SWETLANA POGORELSKAYA. SOME PROBLEMS OF TRAINING
IMAMS IN THE EU (USING THE EXAMPLE OF GERMANY)

Keywords: Islam in the EU; Islam in Germany; Islamic unions in the EU; imams; Islamic theology.

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Abstract. As Muslim diasporas grow in a number of significant EU states, associated with the radicalization of the Islamic world after the end of the era of blocs confrontation, the correlation of the religious life of Muslim diasporas with the requirements of the internal order of the legal democratic state became an increasingly pressing domestic political problem for these countries. One of the significant risk factors for stability and, most importantly, for the integration of diasporas into the life of civil society was the factor of unpredictability of imams, who

were often sent to mosques of Islamic unions from abroad and received funding from there. Therefore, the most important domestic political task of European states with significant Muslim communities is the training of Muslim clergy in these states. The article will consider the problems and difficulties associated with this on the example of Germany.

The quantitative growth and increment in activity of Muslim diasporas with the simultaneous religious and political radicalization of the Islamic world after the end of the era of blocs confrontation, assigns a serious and difficult task for the internal policy of a number of EU states (primarily in the countries of the so-called "old Europe¹"): how to correlate the religious life of "their" Muslim diasporas with the requirements of the internal order of the legal democratic state.

One of the significant risk factors for stability and, most importantly, for the integration of members of Muslim diasporas into the life of European civil society was the fact that Muslim preachers in mosques of most Islamic unions were sent to them from abroad, from various countries of the Muslim world and paid from there. The sermons of the sent (or invited) imams² often diverged fundamentally not only from the legal norms of liberal democracies, but also, due to ignorance of the realities of the host country, from the everyday life of members of diasporas within European societies, especially with regard to the education of children in public schools, the role of women, and clothing. In addition, individuals persecuted in their own countries for Islamic radicalism and living in the EU with the status of political refugees (as in Germany) became imams in mosques of some Islamic unions, and persons under the supervision of security services in relation to jihadism read Friday prayers. It is no coincidence that the concept of "preachers of hate" (Hassprädiger) became widespread in Germany in the 2000s. In its mosques, for example, in Cologne, where the "Cologne caliph" Mufti Kaplan preached in those years, there

were appeals to turn the Muslim children of Germany "into a point of a spear directed against the infidels."³

In this regard, the issue of systematic training of imams within the EU countries has become relevant for domestic policy, i.e. a kind of professionalism of this activity on the basis of certain unified state standards, the mastering of which is backed up by a single certificate of obtaining appropriate qualifications.

However, will such imams be accepted by the communities? Is it possible to oblige diasporas to accept only imams educated in the EU? Do these European standards correspond to those that the Muslim world itself applies to those carrying out this activity (ceremonies of large and small pilgrimages, for example). How can they provide training?

The present short article, after a brief review of the situation in the EU, proposes to consider these issues using the example of Germany, a country that never had an indigenous Muslim population and nevertheless has one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe today.

* * *

The most numerous Muslim diasporas of the EU live in France, Germany, the Netherlands. The peculiarity of France - the idea of primacy of citizenship over other forms of identity, allows to officially ignore ethnic and confessional self-identification, but Macron not so long ago expressed a desire to create structures for "French Islam." The foundations of the state approach to the education of imams were laid back in 2008, when the Catholic Institute in Paris began to conduct courses for imams, completing their education with knowledge of the functioning of the state order, the values of the republic and its history.

Moreover, Muslim unions (there are about 3,000 mosques in France) had their own structures for training imams. To realize Macron's intentions to create "French Islam," the legal framework must be reformed, providing for secularization and excluding any form of state support.

In Austria, where the diaspora has been represented by the Islamic Community of Faith in Austria (IGGÖ) since 1979, which involves about 300 communities, the education of imams is the business of the communities themselves, but they are paid for by their parent organization and are considered its employees. Imams are trained both at the theological faculty of the university and in the so-called "imam schools" ("Imam-Hatip-Schule") at the communities. The government, however, supports public education and is skeptical about private schools. A community wishing to invite an imam from abroad must pre-submit a request to the IGGÖ, in which the imam will pass the test and receive a certificate confirming his qualification. Only after that the community can apply to the state organization for a working visa for him.

In the Netherlands, with a community of about 500 mosques, there has been debate for more than thirty years about how imams should be trained. Since the necessary structures were not available for a long time, the communities invited imams from abroad, who, however, were supposed to finish language courses. Since 2004, the Ministry of Education has supported the education of imams at Dutch universities, in particular at the Faculty of Islamic Theology in Amsterdam, where a specialty of both an imam and a teacher of Islam in the framework of the subject "religion" is available. At the same time, the demand for this specialty is small.

In Belgium over 90 communities have the status of state-recognized religious communities out of 300. Therefore, their imams have the status of employees. The rest of the mosques belong to the Diyanet Foundation, so that the training of the imams and their payment is within its competence. At the same time, systematic state training of imams is planned. In the Flemish region, the authorities made attempts to ban the financing of mosques and the payment of imams from abroad, but the country's constitutional court in 2023 revoked this resolution.

Germany is especially interesting for researching the problem, of all EU countries, as a country that historically did not have its own Islam (even colonial), and, at the same time, in a relatively short time in the second half of the 20 century, due to the peculiarities of its economic and domestic political development, it acquired a powerful and diverse Islamic community (to date - more than five million Muslims and more than 2,500 mosques), moreover, until 11.9.2001 Germany practically did not pay attention at it, in terms of the formally "temporary" status of the stay of the majority of Muslims in the country. Disillusionment entailed a radical course changing and the desire to tame the diaspora, encouraging forces capable of integration and cutting off the radical movements as well after the realization that the participants in the terrorist attack on the United States, having studied in Germany, visited the mosque of the radical Islamic Union in Hamburg.

After the message of the federal president in 2010 that "Islam belongs to Germany and is part of it,"⁴ the first Islamic Theological Center was founded with financial support from the Ministry of Education (in 2012, at the University of Tübingen)⁵, followed by others, today there are six of them, but university graduates had almost no chance of finding a place in mosques where clergy close to specific communities and sent or invited from countries of the Islamic world worked. The story of the Islamic College of Germany founded in 2021 at the University of Osnabrück and working with state support even made the papers - a modern educational institution created specifically for training of Islamic clerics for all Islamic unions represented in Germany in 2023 faced the problem of employment of its first graduates, which led to a reduction in those wishing to study in it. Mosques called various grounds for that refusal. Somewhere they were afraid to lose their roots and tradition, somewhere they referred to the lack of funds and preferred to accept a "free" imam paid from abroad⁶.

For example, in mosques of the Türkiye-Sunni Union, DITIB⁷ exclusively imams who are Türkiye civil servants and sent to foreign mosques by the Türkiye Religious Affairs Department (Diyanet) could preach, usually for a period of five years in rotation. In a number of communities of other Islamic unions, imams from Saudi Arabia or the UAE preached, in Iranian mosques imams are paid from Tehran, in Bosnian ones - imams who learned in Bosnia, etc. Preachers from Arab countries who come by invitation to mosques of radical Islamic unions for a certain period with tourist visas deliver special care to the state.

Graduates of the theological faculties of German universities had a chance to get not so much a job as an imam in mosques of Islamic unions as teachers to teach Islam in the framework of the subject "Religion" in schools. By the way, this was the second important item in the Islamic-related domestic political security agenda - to transfer the acquaintance of Muslim children with their religion from the "Quran schools" at mosques to ordinary schools⁸.

The subject of practical discussions on training of "correct" imams in Germany was during the work of the Islamic Conference of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Ministry of Internal Affairs - a permanent institute of interaction (and in a number of issues and cooperation) of the state and various Islamic unions of Germany, operating since 2006. In 2022, with the change of government, the problem of employment of imams was named among the priority ones - after all, over the past years, it was not possible to reverse the trend and the vast majority of imams currently working in the country are still sent from abroad⁹. German politics requires that those who have been educated in Germany can be allowed to work in mosques on the territory of Germany and must be excluded any foreign funding. How does this desire relate to the legal situation?

On the one hand, Article 140 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany hands all issues of religious life to the religious communities themselves, so that the issues of education

and employment of clergy are within the responsibility of religious communities, on the other hand, the historical experience of interaction between the state and churches suggests favorable options for churches if they cooperate with the state. In the case of Islam, such cooperation already took place as a result of organizational problems – Islam represented in Germany due to its diversity, specifics, and sometimes rivalry between different directions could not create a single parent organization for the negotiation process with the state and, unlike Christianity and Judaism, it is still not a legally recognized religious community (Religionsgemeinschaft).¹⁰ At the same time, financing the religious life of its communities from the countries of the Muslim world opened up opportunities not only for interference in the internal affairs of Germany, as in the case of the Türkiye Sunnis, but also for the possibility of creating terrorist structures (Taib Mosque in Hamburg¹¹). The problem has not been resolved yet.

The Islamic unions themselves consider the complete refusal from communication with the Islamic world counterproductive on the issue of appointing imams, especially when it comes to the “countries of origin” of the community members, for example, Türkiye Sunnis, who still make up the majority of the Muslim diaspora of Germany. For example, the Islamic Council, which unites more than 450 communities, which also includes the radical Milli Gorush, believes that imams educated in Germany need advanced training and practice in Islamic countries (in this case, Türkiye). According to its head, the introducing of a course of Islamic theology in Germany, related to the desire of politics to cut off influence from the Islamic world, is dictated “by no politicians’ concern for the good of Muslims,” since not only the knowledge of theology is expected from the imam, from the leader of the community, but also “help in practical issues, in worship, and this is largely determined by the cultural traditions of the countries of origin.”¹²

The largest and most influential union of Türkiye Sunnis, DITIB, uniting more than 900 communities, also believes that the

formation of imams is primarily Muslims business. Back in 2006, it began its own imam training program for itself, at its own expense sending Türkiye students who grew up in Germany to study as imams in Türkiye in order to take a place in one of the union's mosques on their return. More than 90 per cent of graduates of this program now work in DITIB mosques. Following the wishes of German politics, in 2020 it opened its own college near Cologne, in Eifel, in which it invites graduates of the theological faculties of German universities to the course of "Islamic theology" to complete two-year practical training preparing for work with the community.¹³ As for the imams still sent from Türkiye, before arriving in Germany, they are now obliged to complete a five-month preparatory course, the program of which is agreed with the German Goethe Institute and involves learning not only the language, but also the country. The union would prefer to maintain this order further so as not to "lose its roots"¹⁴

The Central Council of Muslims in Germany (about 30 communities), rival to DITIB, uniting mainly Arab and multi-ethnic Muslims and some time ago it was under suspicion of associations with Islamic radicalism¹⁵, welcomes the training of imams in Germany because it will "break DITIB from Türkiye." At the same time, it objects to the ban on foreign funding, seeing this as an impairment of the rights of Muslims: after all, Christian and Judaist organizations receive such support. It itself mainly prepares imams within its own communities.

The Union of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ), which celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 2023 and unites more than 300 communities of conservative Türkiye Sunnis, believes that the imam is not a profession, but a mission. Therefore, it's been training imams in its educational center in Cologne for 40 years. A solid study continues for three years and includes not only theological, but also practical preparation for work in the community around the mosque, so that the head of the community meets not only the religious, but also the social and cultural needs

of its members. The abolition of foreign funding for training and maintenance of imams will not affect it in any way.

Thus, it's seen that traditional Islamic unions, representing the absolute majority of the diaspora, do not openly express skepticism towards the training of imams within the faculty of theology of German universities, at the same time prefer (as long as the decision to ban the invitation of imams from the outside is made) to prepare them in their educational centers within the framework of their own programs, and, as soon as a graduate of a German university has to be hired, offer him to enhance his theoretical education with a practice that includes knowledge of the social and cultural needs of this community. Liberal Islam offers significantly more chances for this, but its share, despite strong support from German politics, intellectuals, the public and the media, is small, and the possibilities of influencing the conservative, tending to tradition mass of the Muslim community are even smaller.

It can be concluded that the task of training imams within the EU states arose not so much as the quantitative growth of communities, as after the events of 11.9.2001, which attracted the attention of European politicians to the radicalization of Islam within their countries. Currently, EU states with strong Islamic diasporas are trying, if possible, to reduce the ties of these diasporas with the Islamic world, offering Muslims, as federal President Steinmeier did in 2023 at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, "to take a place in the middle of our society.¹⁶" The desire to turn the faith historically and culturally alien to these countries into "their" Islam will inevitably lead to a decrease in the influx of foreign Islamic preachers and an increase in the share of "their" imams. In this regard, the states and the Islamic unions represented in it will have to solve the problem of how to correlate the training of imams in Europe with the requirements for this profession adopted in the Islamic world.

Notes

1. It refers to the so-called immigrant Islam in states that did not previously have their own Muslim diasporas or, like France, whose Muslim population lived in the colonies, unlike, for example, such new EU members as Bosnia, where Islam adheres to the part of the indigenous population.
2. "Imam" in this case implies an Islamic cleric: the head of the community and the head of worship in the mosque.
3. Pogorelskaya S.V. Islamic terrorism. Case Germany. – Current problems of Europe, № 4 2021, P. 80.
4. "Islam gehört zu Deutschland": Wulff bekräftigt seine Aussage. – <https://www.rnd.de/politik/islam-gehört-zu-deutschland-wulff-bekräftigt-seine-aussage-4YAYIOB3NHEKKREGLL4B3M6HMA.html#:~:text=Als%20Bundespr%C3%A4sident%20hatte%20Wulff%20in%20seiner%20Rede%20zum,erhitzte%20Debatte%20um%20Integration%20und%20Identit%C3%A4t%20in%20Deutschland>.
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7. Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), a German branch founded in 1984 in Cologne, subordinate to official Türkiye structures (religious affairs departments, Diyanet İçleri Başkanlığı), the most powerful organization of Türkiye Sunnis in Germany to date, one of the four co-founders of the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany and the most important partner in cooperation with the state within the framework of the Islamic Conference at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
8. In German schools, as part of the subject "Religion," students can learn the basics of the religion to which they belong. The decision on these classes is within the competence of the federal states, and religious communities are responsible for them. The introduction of the subject "Islam" was difficult by the fact that, from a formal point of view, Islam in Germany is not a recognized religious community yet, like other confessions.
9. Islamkonferenz: Faeser will weniger Imame aus dem Ausland – <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/islamkonferenz-faeser-101.html>

10. Therefore, the negotiation process went with individual Islamic unions, at local (land) levels. Thus, the status of a "religious community" was received by the Ahmadites.
11. The mosque, visited by future participants in the terrorist attacks of 11.9.2001, including Mohamed Ata, when he was a student. The imam of the mosque was a recognized jihadist, nevertheless, it took the state ten years to close it. Refer to: Hamburger Taiba-Moschee geschlossen: Hassprediger ohne Heimat - <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/hamburger-taiba-moschee-geschlossen-hassprediger-ohne-heimat-a-710898.html>
12. Wie bilden islamische Religionsgemeinschaften ihre Imame aus? - <https://www.islamiq.de/2019/01/15/wie-bilden-islamische-religionsgemeinschaften-ihre-imame-aus/>
13. Ausbildung zur/zum islamischen Religionsbeauftragten | DITIB-Akademie. - <https://www.ditib-akademie.de/imamausbildung/>
14. Ibid.
15. To avoid further accusations, in 2022 it had to expel one of its strongest organizations - the German Community of Muslims (DMG), which was under suspicion of associations with the Muslim Brothers.
16. Steinmeier in Köln: "Der Islam hat Wurzeln geschlagen" | <https://www.express.de/koeln/steinmeier-in-koeln-der-islam-hat-wurzeln-geschlagen-647737>

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ALEKSANDR FILONIK, VERA BATURINA. EGYPT: THE FIRST STEPS OF FEMINISM

Keywords: Egypt; Union of Egyptian Feminists; women's issue; traditions; reforms; gender gap; protests; deficits.

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Abstract. The article analyzes issues related to changes in the situation of Egyptian women over the course of about two decades from the beginning of the July Revolution to the end of its stage associated with the Nasser regime. Egypt, embodying the avant-garde of the Arab world, became the first Arab State to abandon the traditional belittled interpretation of the role of women in society and constitutionally confirmed their equal rights with men. Women have actively shown themselves in the struggle for the country's independence from Britain and demonstrated their willingness to be full-fledged participants in national events on an equal basis with men. The emotional explosion of their social discontent culminated in the creation of the Union of Egyptian Feminists on their own initiative and the efforts of a small group of advanced Egyptian women who conducted educational work in the women's environment and outside it, spreading the ideas of gender equality, speaking out against insulting their human dignity and humiliation in everyday life. A separate topic was the overcoming of illiteracy and women's education, which was subsequently focused on by the regime that emerged in the wake of the July Revolution, which simultaneously initiated measures in the economy, creating the public sector and limiting private capital. Amid the aggravation of social contradictions, the ideas of feminism did not receive support from the state, and the Women's Union was transferred to the government, becoming one of the conductors of the policy of the ruling party.

Egypt is the largest country in the Arab East that has been considered the center of the Arab world since ancient times. It has a rich pharaonic and medieval culture, combining the Islamic heritage and certain secular principles that are quite similar to the European way of thinking and are based on the national priorities. These ideas are fully internalized by Egyptians and are

preserved in the people's memory, inspiring patriotism in the country.

In 1919, there was a powerful upsurge of the national movement in Egypt against British rule. The struggle unfolded both in cities and in rural areas, with all segments of the population taking part in it; women also turned out en masse. In 1922, through their joint efforts, they achieved recognition of Egypt's independence from Britain.

These two years inspired women, whose contribution to the protests was commensurate with the victory, raising their hopes for further changes in their destinies. Spontaneously bursting to the surface, women's enthusiasm indicated their disagreement with the rules that were inherent in Egyptian society and regulated everyday life. Activism united the women to some extent, preparing them for the next phase, namely the struggle for equality, dignity and recognition of their civil rights; it also demonstrated the need for formalization of their activities.

Moreover, Egyptian women of the educated class shared the desire to defend the rights of their country and their own. They were familiar with the slogans of European feminism, which emerged half a century before becoming known in Egypt; though women shared the ideas of feminism, they did not promote them. The proclamation of independence and noticeable enthusiasm among the masses prompted the most ardent supporters of women's rights to create the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923. The new movement seized the initiative from the Wafdist Women's Central Committee (WWCC), an organization that was founded in 1920 and had ties to the party. Having gained more influence, the EFU was speaking on behalf of Egyptian women. It was a significant landmark that emphasized the popularity of national sentiments and the readiness of the most active highborn women to resist opponents of women's liberation. This campaign was associated with Huda Sha'arawi, a public figure who founded and led the organization. In 1924, Egypt became the first Islamic country where women

stopped wearing the hijab, which was perceived as a step towards emancipation.

The starting point for the emergence of the “women’s agenda” in Egypt, which was not yet fully formed, was the issue of the education of school-age girls, which at first was not considered a prime necessity by the overwhelming majority of society. However, the idea was latently maturing, gradually gaining supporters, which was due to objective factors. The first endeavours of providing education for girls were made during the time of Khedive Ismail in the 1870s. The educational process was very selective and available to a small number of school-age girls from a non-elite segment of society; in classes, they received a minimum of everyday knowledge, which was considered sufficient. Over the half-century since the beginning of the educational process, schools of foreign missions, as well as Egyptian fee-paying schools had joined the practice; at first, even in the cities, there were few schools for boys that were also joined by schools for girls from non-elite class.

This undertaking was a significant innovation for ordinary people and was not accepted as a feasible way to benefit Egyptian society. Schools for girls were not immediately perceived as a common and natural thing, rather than some kind of tribute to Europeanism or a whim encouraged by foreigners. Nevertheless, the issue still remained and developed at an extremely slow pace, since the need for people educated to a higher standard was not deemed as urgent. Education was not mandatory, and common people were quite satisfied with some of their sons being able to read; as for daughters, they were even less likely to be educated. Much later, only by the beginning of the last century, schooling expanded, becoming more accessible for girls; however, only at the end of the first quarter of the 20th century, primary education became mandatory due to the growing need for more or less literate personnel.

Appealing to the youth became the order of the time under the influence of ideas that penetrated Egyptian society through

the contacts of Egyptian intellectuals with foreigners and through the British administration. One way or another, the British diversified their methods to exploit the country through cultural channels. They provided access to new phenomena that emerged in Europe and became also known in the colonies. In the same manner, European feminism paved its way to Egypt, where this movement was seen as a means of opposing social injustice towards women, while British policies were regarded as related to the conservation of this injustice.

As far as Egypt is concerned, these ideas stirred Egyptian society that was already restless and stressed-out because of the unfolding events. They were associated with the consolidation of the influence of foreign capital in Arab territories after the end of the First World War, with the spread of reform ideas and revolutionary sentiments, and finally, with the impact of gradual transition to capitalism. It should be noted that capitalism introduced the notion of feasibility and new workforce requirements into Egyptian practice, making place for women as living labor. Educated Egyptian women were also invaluable sources of exciting information. In the enlightened part of their social circle, they spread information about European activists who agitated the social atmosphere in their homeland by raising various issues, including equal education for men and women. In light of such developments, Egypt was now facing new prospects for the future.

At that time, the awakening of Egyptian women could be understood as a dawning awareness of their importance for society, and as a request for respect and dignity. However, it should probably be noted that such thoughts were not particularly widespread and circulated among those women who were more prepared to embrace them. Needing an outlet, these feelings and sentiments brought Egyptian women closer to the European feminist movement. Appearing in the middle of the 19th century, the feminist movement in Europe began to draw keen attention of the Western public to its activism near to the

beginning of the 20th century. News about the actual activities of the movement and its ideas reached Egypt with a delay. However, from that time on, the women's movement in Egypt began to imitate the first feminists, though it did not have a European scope or hype. It is very likely that the basis of the social base of Egyptian feminism were those women who were the first to remove their hijabs. Although there is no reliable evidence, such actions seem quite natural for the situation at the time, marked by the enthusiasm of the most active Egyptian women who found a platform to express their hopes.

The idea of full education for school-age children was one of the major objectives of the Egyptian Feminist Union. Moreover, the founders of the Union were from the elite social class; they believed that slogans of the liberation of women and the introduction of suffrage had no future unless it was coupled with the demand for full education and health care for women and children, as well as a revision of the personal status law and the ban on prostitution.

In fact, the Union being a public organization did not utilize feminism as a weapon. Voting rights for women were hardly a political issue, but rather a social justice issue that was not some kind of a trigger for class antagonism. In other words, the Union did not set itself purely feminist tasks, but instead called for the emancipation of women, without claiming to fulfil all the demands of feminism that sought to challenge men and achieve equality with the opposite sex. It is obvious that other local women's organizations could hardly cover a wider range of issues and focused on smaller tasks, contacting only with local village chiefs (*omda*).

The Women's Union, in the modern sense of the term, could hardly become an influential political entity. It was a formal association of women who sincerely sought to improve the quality of life of Egyptian society by unlocking the political potential of females. It seems that the Union succeeded in indirectly changing suffrage and prohibiting prostitution; it

joined the course of the Egyptian revolution, whose leadership came to the conclusion that it was necessary to support changes in the “women’s sphere”. Some major changes occurred only two years after the revolution, in 1956. However, there was no reform of family legislation and the law on personal status remained the same, as did the provisions on polygamy and the right of men to file for divorce without the consent of the wife. [6] But even this progress showed that by the middle of the last century the organization was well known and could achieve decent results because, among other things, their objectives were the call of the time. But overall its influence remained limited and initiatives did not quite resonate with women for several reasons. On the one hand, the Union’s activities were hampered by the idea of the place and role of women in Egyptian society in general; on the other hand, in Muslim society, activists personified secularism and promoted European values, which left the overwhelming majority of Egyptian women unsympathetic.

In 1948, a more radical and true feminist Doria Shafik established the Bint Al-Nil Union, which staged several spectacular protests. The intense of them was in 1951 when 1500 city women in semi-military uniforms managed to interrupt the parliament, demanding recognition of their rights yet receiving no answer. Six months before the 1952 revolution, she and her supporters also shut down a branch of Barclays Bank, which was a symbol of English rule in Egypt. [2]

After the revolution that happened in July of the same year, the country faced a slew of economic, political and social challenges. The country also had to address antiquated matters that were clearly becoming an anachronism in a new round of history, contradicting the new outlook on society and its institutions and understanding of the role of the state. The revolution played an outstanding role in the development of the country and society and, naturally, left an imprint on the minds of a considerable number of men and women.

Doria Shafik perceived the revolution as a sign of the immediate start of a renaissance for Egyptian women. When it never happened, she accused Nasser of dictatorship, for which she was punished by house arrest. She then carried out several hunger strikes and was persecuted, and the feminist organization seized to exist. [2]

At the beginning of his reign, Nasser responded to the demands of the EFU, granting women, in addition to the right to vote, some political and economic rights, equal opportunities for education and health care, and access to the labour market on an equal basis with men. But at the same time women did not receive full rights to participate in public life. "Women in the private sphere remained subservient to men, and family laws remained untouched." [5]

At the time of political instability, Nasser probably dared not destroy all the foundations of the traditional way of life, which facilitated the functioning of the system and at the time fit the development of the productive forces in general. He chose not to cause turbulence in society, a large segment of which was loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, there was no goal to entirely abandon traditional forms of economic management that were especially characteristic for outlying areas where the level of citizenship and consciousness was stagnant, with people guided mainly by their immediate needs and interests.

In such a situation, it was impossible to rally women enough in order to engage them in reformatory activities en masse in such a way that could promote the involvement of the fairer sex in a more diverse socially useful labour than housekeeping. There clearly was no plan to destroy the concept of domestic housekeeping due to the outflow of women, but after welcoming the victory of the national liberation revolution, the society felt that women needed to be "awakened" and get involved in a more productive work.

It is obvious that by that time the EFU had fulfilled its historical function of mobilizing women during the transition

period from royal to authoritarian power; the organization no longer fit into the new era in which its activities were unnecessary. The Union was transformed into a charitable organization and placed under government control, just like other women's groups were brought into direct contact with government agencies. In addition, women's rights became part of a broader government development strategy within the framework of state authoritarianism. As a result, state feminism under the Nasser regime made women economically independent, but left them dependent on the state in terms of employment opportunities, availability of important social services, i.e. education, health care and kindergartens; the same applied to political orientation. At the same time, state feminism created a system of social patriarchy that did not challenge women's personal and family lives.

As a result of a change in social and organizational "allegiance", women found themselves in a situation where male arbitrariness was replaced by an administrative guidance from the state that was benign on the outside, but rather harsh on the inside. Behind it was not so much concern for women's life situation as control over their ability to meet the job requirements and perform their duties in the workplace. However, there is reason to believe that since job opportunities were scarce, teaching women socially useful work and discipline was not the primary goal of liberating them from a patriarchy. It was more likely done to ensure their acceptable attitude towards power, given the high political and protest potential of women prior to and during the struggle against English rule.

In other words, unlike earlier, government supervision of the women's movement was predetermined by the policy of establishing state control not only over the economy, but also over significant entities, such as trade unions, youth organizations and, naturally, women's movement; the latter had access to virtually all segments of society and could influence the minds of people, spreading an ideology that may not be in line

with the state course regarding development and mobilization of human potential. In general, such a policy was justified, since it was necessary to maintain power in the country during a difficult political period in Egypt and the whole region.

Judging by the results of the early period of the women's movement, we can say that it had a very definite impact on the lives of Egyptian women, working to give them a new beginning to the best of its abilities. However, the area of its activities was quite limited and did not reach the bottom of society. That period in Egypt was a time of many initiatives, new parties, clubs and groups of various directions that offered their own opinions of the present and prospects for the political development of the country. Alas, they never gave much thought to the place of women in these processes and the problems of gender inequality.

The fact that the situation with women was a side issue, rather limited popularity of the ideas of women's emancipation and the lack of skills in managing large processes hindered the feminists' activities, thus undermining the development of an agenda that could have been as good as those of more influential structures, i.e. political parties. Articles in the press by individual supporters of women's liberation from patriarchal household rules and speeches by a few women's activists did not solve the problem, although they made quite an impression on the reading public. However, these demarches and women's enthusiasm alone were clearly not enough to gather political forces, much less to become strong enough to actually guide the women's movement or at least bring together a group of supporters capable of actual systematic work among the women's masses.

Nevertheless, the organization's leaders set the goal of the women's movement that was parallel to the official point of view. Having found its place in the Egyptian political agenda, the problem of women did not become a core issue at that time, but gained recognition and inspired many women with various speeches by female activists. In any case, the presence of female-led initiative that was claiming its own place in the political life of

Egyptian society reminded the politicians of another potential candidate for a place in the political establishment. In the future, this contender could have gained strength and influence, announcing its claims and interests with greater determination than one might have thought. However, this did not happen by force of circumstances.

As the new leader of Egypt, Nasser proposed a quite controversial political initiative at the time, suggesting that society take into account the fate of women, granting them legal protection at least partially. Egyptian women gained some guarantees against certain situations that arose as a result of total disrespect for gender equality and women's rights, the lack of response to which had practically become a custom in Egypt.

The 1956 Constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, and the 1962 Charter affirmed that women should be treated as equals to men and could throw off any remaining shackles that limited their opportunities to make a real contribution to improving the lives of people in the country. [4] The Charter also proclaimed that "the family unit is basic for society and must be fostered". [1] Some provisions of labor legislation were also adjusted in the interests of women.

The majority of the country's male population had a hard time accepting the ideas of equality. Egyptian women, on the contrary, received the news with great enthusiasm that was supported by feminist organizations in the West, who leapt at the chance to expand their influence to such a promising state as Egypt. It was due to the fact that Egypt had authority in the Arab world and was quite popular with many women in the Arab East after recognition of the rights of the weaker sex.

With these decisions, the Egyptian revolution undoubtedly taught the Arab Ummah a lesson of sorts, showing that it was not Islam that put women in disadvantage but institutions that began to dominate society and its female half after being nourished by the peculiarities of Arab Bedouin life for centuries.

Mobilization of the women's movement was not a quick process due to the pressure of traditions, time-honoured legal norms and many things that governed the life of women both in cities and in remote villages, where morals were even stricter. Under these conditions, it is not only state support that determines the level of activity of the female population. There is also a question of whether the community considers itself to be a free subject, and is able to encourage women to achieve goals within the framework of its "subjectivity" and to set the bar high enough by assessing their capabilities.

Indirectly, this may be evidenced by the example of Sudan, where a survey of men and women from the working quarters of Khartoum was conducted in the 1950s. Respondents were asked to choose up to two simple life priorities out of five given in the survey; the interviewers were especially interested in the gender-specific reactions to the question of haremlik. As a result, most men were thrilled with the option to build a wall in the house, providing a separate space for women to ensure their solitude; however, women themselves were much less enthusiastic about this, expressing their interest in a separate house altogether [3] but at the same time not outright rejecting the idea haremlik.

This fact is, in itself, rather interesting, but does not answer the question of what the respondents were thinking when delivering their "verdict". Women's opinion was intriguing: they either simply desired life's comforts, or they couldn't find it in themselves to abandon the old way of life and risk getting lost outside of it, or they were afraid of difficulties without male protection. Most likely, that was a combination of the three reasons, since the experience of "women from the lower classes" did not allow for other arguments given their consciousness, upbringing and feelings that were predetermined by the historical memory of the past generations of women.

That is not a unique case and, it seems, it can be extrapolated without any special reservations on other countries with a similar way of life, and even more so on Egypt. Sudan

obviously differs from the neighbouring state in a number of parameters. However, one should take into account their existence as part of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, emphasizing their African kinship, which is determined by similar psychological types and sociocultural features, as well as religion. Finally, the time of the survey is also important, since at that time there was not such a great discrepancy in economic development between the two countries. Also, respondents most likely were unfamiliar with feminist ideas, thus nullifying the possibility of an insincere answer.

Another attempt to gauge the attitude of women to freedom and the right to choose was made with the use of simple questionnaires that were supposed to evaluate the readiness of the respondents to change their living conditions. One of them was conducted among Arab students and touched on the subject of marriage. The result showed that young women were no more interested in marriage than young men, since at least 40 per cent of them expressed such an opinion. And another survey revealed that between 1952 and 1956 the number of women who preferred marriage to two other alternatives decreased from 57 to 41 per cent. [3]

In general, the given figures are informative, but can hardly be considered representative due to the narrowness of the social base and a small number of respondents. Nevertheless, they showed that old standards of women's behaviour were collapsing, and the trend might be associated with revolutionary events in Egypt, which gave impetus to the recognition of a woman's independence in Arab society. The reaction to the new possibilities may indicate that at least a part of women from different segments of society were internally ready or almost ready to change their living conditions, which was exactly what the survey was meant to determine.

It can also be assumed that the answers could have been inspired by feminist ideas, especially if you consider that students are usually more aware of the matters that do not

interest the general public (and even more so the public clinging to outdated concepts). Indeed, in the absence of mass means of communication, quality information about the female movement abroad could hardly reach the East in the amount necessary to win women over. In addition, it was not widely available due to widespread illiteracy, particularly among women. It is also obvious that the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt did not encourage any ideas of feminism and especially disapproved of Western feminism, considering it the destructive version, which did not correspond with the interests of the new Egyptian state.

The reasons for the awakening of female consciousness can be found within Egypt itself, in its post-war atmosphere and in the activation of national and patriotic sentiments (in connection, for example, with the Tripartite Aggression or the 1967 Arab-Israeli War), in the awakening of social thought and in society's growing interest in foreign policy processes and domestic political developments. It was a time when the country was freed from a foreign presence and began to search for its own ways and methods of development, based on the foundation that was in line with the requirements of time and realities of the New Egypt, as well as the ideas of its leadership for the country's near future.

It seemed that in the time of changes, tensions and Nasser's policy "curbing" the female issue in order to avoid turning it into a potent political trigger, feminism had little prospects in Egypt in the foreseeable future. But it did not mean that the female movement had exhausted its capabilities, which was later proved by turbulent events in Egypt's society, when women proved to be a rather spontaneous, but very powerful soft force. Such demonstrations indicate the hidden potential of the female masses that are capable of a great deal when facing direct threats caused by blatant social injustice or fraught with the return of oppressive patriarchy imposed on the female part of the population.

The Nasser regime took important but half-way measures in order to improve the situation of women, only partially

resolving their problems and setting aside other sensitive issues that still vex the female population. The suppression of feminism as a movement incompatible with the authoritarianism, even though it never could have become a weapon against the regime, left women to struggle with many difficulties generated by gender inequality.

There is neither radical feminism, nor harmony in Egypt's society. It is due to the fact that in terms of tensions in social relations, the contradictions between the male and female principles remain insurmountable.

The country faces two almost equal trends that affect the status of women, complicating things further. One of them is associated with the growth of education and cultural level of the population, including women, as a consequence of modernization processes in society altering the mind-set and reorienting it towards new values. The other is fuelled by the support of still influential conservative forces, including Islamist ones; looking back, they see bonding values that protect society from collapse and at the same time preserve the retrograde vision of a woman's place in life. It seems that both approaches are balanced out, but this outward calm is filled with profound contradictions that can result in an unpredictable and serious confrontation. It is especially possible if the balance is upset by fateful events, where women "play a hunch" and act not as feminists but as patriots, divided along party lines and forgetting about their differences with men for the sake of the victory of common sense.

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